The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner’s request for exemption from employment disqualification should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On June 21, 1991, Aaron Foreman (Petitioner) was convicted of one count of "possession of THC with intent to deliver" in the Circuit Court of Walworth County, State of Wisconsin, Case Number 90CR00080. At the time of the arrest, the Petitioner was a student at the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. He resided with several other students in the upstairs apartment portion of a residence. On or about February 1, 1990, local Whitewater law enforcement officials, apparently investigating one of the roommates for burglary, executed a search warrant and entered into the apartment where the Petitioner was living. During the search of the apartment, law enforcement officers discovered a quantity of marijuana in the apartment and bedrooms of the residents. The Petitioner had a refrigerator in his bedroom, within which law enforcement officers discovered a large plastic bag containing 26 smaller plastic bags, each containing a quantity of marijuana. The total weight of the plastic bags of marijuana within the Petitioner's refrigerator was identified in the charging document as approximately 126 grams. In Count One of the charge, the Petitioner and three other persons (apparently the roommates) were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, an element of marijuana. In Count Four of the charge, the Petitioner was individually charged with possession with intent to deliver 91 grams of THC. The record of the hearing does not establish the reason for the difference between the weight of the marijuana allegedly discovered and the THC quantities with which the defendants were charged. According to the Petitioner's testimony at hearing, the Petitioner participated in marijuana use, and bought and sold marijuana within a "small circle of friends" and his roommates. On June 21, 1991, the Petitioner entered a plea of "no contest" to Count Four as part of an agreement to resolve the drug possession charges, and as stated previously, was convicted of felony under Wisconsin law. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge was dismissed. As a result of the plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced to nine months in jail, two years of probation, and a fine of approximately $2,700. The Petitioner served the jail sentence in a work release program, continued to attend college and obtained an undergraduate degree in sociology from the University of Wisconsin. The Petitioner paid the fine imposed by the sentence and successfully completed the probationary period as of September 19, 1993. Subsequent to completion of the sentence, the Petitioner became employed as a licensed social worker in Wisconsin. From 1993 to 1999, the Petitioner was employed by "Southeastern Youth and Family Services," as a social worker. The Petitioner's employment evaluations range from "very good" to "outstanding." In July 1999, the Petitioner underwent a background screening prompted by his application for employment by Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., a program that, in part, provides services to young persons involved in the juvenile justice system and funded through contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). Based on the conviction, the Department notified Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., that the Petitioner was disqualified from employment. The Petitioner requested that the Department review the disqualification. The Department responded by letter dated June 19, 1999, advising that the desk review would be granted and identifying the information that the Petitioner was required to submit to facilitate the review. The Petitioner responded to the June 19 letter by supplying the requested information to the Department. The matter was apparently reviewed by a "Priscilla A. Zachary, BSU Supervisor" for the Department, who forwarded the file along with a cover memo to Perry Turner, the Department's Inspector General. As Inspector General, Mr. Turner is the person authorized by the Department to make decisions on disqualification exemption applications. Ms. Zachary's cover memo incorrectly identifies the crime for which the Petitioner was convicted and states that the Petitioner's June 21, 1991, conviction was for "Possession with Intent to Deliver" more than 500 grams of THC. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge, wherein the Petitioner and other persons were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, was dismissed. On August 5, 1999, Mr. Turner determined that the Petitioner's application for exemption should be denied. Mr. Turner based his decision on his belief that the Petitioner's felony conviction was for an amount of marijuana beyond that which Mr. Turner believes could be reasonably identified as being for "personal use" and which was intended for distribution. By letter dated August 5, 1999, the Petitioner was notified of the Department's decision by letter and advised of his right to challenge the denial in an administrative hearing. During the hearing, the Petitioner testified as to the events leading to his conviction and identified his efforts at rehabilitation. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that his initial experience with marijuana occurred in approximately 1988, when he entered the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater. The Petitioner testified that at the time of the 1990 arrest, he was an "immature" college student who recreationally used marijuana within his circle of friends and with whom he sold or exchanged marijuana. Other than the Petitioner's admission, there is no evidence that the Petitioner actually sold marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was arrested or charged with the sale of marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was a part of any continuing marijuana distribution organization. There is no evidence that, other than the arrest at issue in this proceeding, the Petitioner has ever been arrested for any other reason. Review of the charging documents suggests that the charge of "intent to deliver" was based on the quantity of the marijuana found in the apartment and the apparent candor with which the residents dealt with the law enforcement officials who executed the search warrant and investigated the situation. The Petitioner's arrest occurred approximately eleven years ago. The Petitioner's conviction was approximately ten years ago. The Petitioner completed the probationary portion of his sentence more than seven years ago. There is no evidence that there was any physical injury or harm done to any individual as a result of the Petitioner's conviction. There is no evidence that granting the Petitioner's request for exemption presents a danger to the Petitioner or to any other person. The Petitioner has continued with his education and in December 2000 received his master's degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. The Petitioner has also sought to obtain a pardon from the Governor of Wisconsin. By letter dated August 28, 2000, the Governor's Pardon Advisory Board notified the Petitioner that it was recommending to the Governor that a pardon be granted. Although the vote by the Board was not unanimous, the majority of the members believed that the pardon should be granted "based on positive adjustment, lack of subsequent criminal justice system contacts, non-violent nature of the crime, and valid job concerns." As of the date of the hearing, the Governor of Wisconsin had not acted on the Board's recommendation to grant the Petitioner's pardon request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice grant the request of Aaron Foreman for exemption from employment disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Aaron Foreman 10500 West Fountain Avenue Apartment No. 411 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53224 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to have disciplinary action taken against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent has violated subparagraphs (m), (q), and (t) of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, by allegedly failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of a patient, by allegedly prescribing legend drugs other than in the course of the physician's professional practice, and by allegedly failing to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized as acceptable by a reasonably prudent similar physician.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician, having been issued license number ME 0025256 by the State of Florida. The Respondent has been licensed for approximately forty years and is Board certified in Internal Medicine. He practices Rheumatology. Diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Roxicet is a generic form of Percocet, a legend drug containing oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Seconal is a legend drug containing Secobarbital, a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Patient T. P., a 40-year-old male, initially presented to the Respondent on or about May 14, 1991, with complaints of lower back pain and right side sciatica leg pain, which the Respondent treated with various legend drugs. The Respondent's records indicate that the Patient T. P. returned to the Respondent's office on a monthly basis from May of 1991 until April of 1993. On each visit, the Respondent prescribed multiple legend drugs to treat the Patient T. P.'s lower back pain and right side sciatica leg pain. Between December 19, 1991, and April 29, 1993, the Respondent prescribed to the Patient T. P. a total of eleven hundred ninety tablets of 10mg generic diazepam, eleven hundred ninety tablets of Percocet or Roxicet (oxycodone), and four hundred fifty capsules of Seconal. These quantities of drugs prescribed by the Respondent to the Patient T. P. during the course of his treatment were appropriate amounts. On or about April 30, 1993, the Patient T. P. was found dead in a Broward County hotel room of a drug overdose. Empty bottles of Valiums and Seconals prescribed by the Respondent to Patient T. P. were found at the scene of death. 2/ The Respondent did not refer the Patient T. P. to an orthopedic surgeon or to a neurosurgeon. The Respondent's medical records for the Patient T. P. do not contain any documentation of a referral of the patient to an orthopedic surgeon or neurosurgeon. The Patient T. P. had previously been treated by an orthopedic surgeon and the Respondent had in his possession the records related to that prior treatment. The Respondent did perform appropriate neurological and orthopedic evaluations of the Patient T. P. The evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that the Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the Patient T. P. 3/ To the contrary, the persuasive evidence is to the effect that the Respondent's records at issue here, although sparse and brief, were sufficient. 4/ The evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that the Respondent prescribed legend drugs other than in the course of his professional practice. To the contrary, the persuasive evidence is to the effect that the drugs prescribed to the Patient T. P. were reasonable under the circumstances. The evidence in this case is insufficient to establish that the Respondent failed to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized as acceptable by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar circumstances. To the contrary, the persuasive evidence is to the effect that the Respondent's care and treatment of the Patient T. P. was consistent with acceptable standards of care under the circumstances.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine issue a Final Order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12 th day of January, 1994 , at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate Respondent's employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a teacher since 1993. She is a 34- year-old divorced mother of a four-year-old son. Respondent has suffered from a chemical dependency since she was 18 years old. At that time, she completed a 28- day detoxification program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center in Miami. Six or seven years later, Respondent underwent additional inpatient treatment for her addiction to drugs. She submitted to a third detoxification, lasting five to seven days, in 1993 or 1994. Respondent underwent a fourth detoxification ten months later and, in 1996, a fifth detoxification. Respondent admits that she has undergone detoxification several more times since 1996. These detoxifications and Respondent's intermittent participation in Narcotics Anonymous were parts of treatment programs attempting to relieve Respondent from her addiction to cocaine and heroin. Respondent's addiction has spanned her college years through her entire teaching career. The effects of Respondent's illness have, at times, precluded her from reaching her full potential as a classroom teacher. After a brief period of employment by Petitioner as a permanent substitute teacher, Respondent began fulltime employment with Petitioner in August 1994 as a teacher at Oak Grove Elementary School. While at Oak Grove, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, although her attendance was less than satisfactory. Also, on at least six occasions, evidently starting in her second year, Respondent fell asleep while conducting a reading tutorial session in which the students spent 20 minutes in separate cubicles. Respondent's principal at Oak Grove documented by a memorandum dated December 4, 1995, eleven full-day absences and two half-day absences during the 1995-96 school year and two instances of sleeping while charged with the instruction of a student--both on the same day and both discovered by the principal. Due to these incidents and an earlier incident of sleeping while on duty, the principal administratively referred Respondent to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The December 4 memorandum documented the actions taken at a conference held the same date involving, among others, Respondent and the principal. Respondent then missed work on December 6 and 7--calling in at 10:06 a.m. on December 7 saying that she had overslept and asking if it was too late to report to work. Respondent missed a considerable amount of work during the 1996-97 school year. Some of the absences, especially from early December through early February, were due to Respondent's chemical dependency. However, some absences, especially during the latter part of the school year, may be attributed to the birth of Respondent's child on July 9, 1997, following a high- risk pregnancy. The record does not disclose much about the 1997-98 school year. However, Respondent missed ten days of work due to sick or personal leave and eleven days of work due to unpaid, but authorized, leave. The absence of additional administrative action against Respondent suggests that she may have improved her attendance and eliminated her sleeping while on duty. For the 1998-99 school year, Respondent transferred to a new school, Linda Lentin Elementary School. Again, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, except for absenteeism. However, during a nine-day absence from May 20 through June 2, 1999, the principal received a telephone call from someone claiming that Respondent had had a breakdown and was in a "drug rehabilitation hospital." Accordingly, the principal requested that Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) monitor Respondent's return to work. On June 8, 1999, Respondent, the principal, Petitioner's OPS Director, and others participated in a Conference for the Record (CFR). Respondent attributed her 21 absences in the 1997-98 school year, as well as 20.5 absences in the 1998-99 school year, to six miscarriages and depression. Petitioner's OPS Director explained the procedures for reasonable-suspicion drug testing. The CFR memorandum concludes by emphasizing that Respondent must report to work when scheduled and on time, obtain medical excuses for all absences, provide lesson plans for substitute teachers, and obtain approval for scheduled leave. At the same time, Petitioner's OPS Director referred Respondent to Petitioner's EAP. Subject to these actions, Petitioner approved Respondent's return to the classroom. However, Respondent's attendance did not improve the following school year, and her behavior became somewhat eccentric early in the school year. At noon on September 27, 1999, Respondent told the principal that she was ill and needed to go home for the remainder of the day and the following day. Respondent went home, but, despite requesting leave and a substitute for the following day, returned to work the following day without calling first. Near the end of the school day, while her students were in a special-area class, Respondent signed out of school and walked down the street, despite the fact that it was raining. The next day, Respondent left the school grounds without permission and, the following day, failed to attend a mandatory teachers' meeting. The situation deteriorated in mid-October 1999. From October 11-14, Respondent telephoned the school each day and reported that she was sick and in the hospital. The following Monday, October 18, Respondent reported to work. However, on October 19, Respondent failed to report to work or call, leaving her class sitting in the hallway. Respondent telephoned the school at mid-day and stated that she had been in a five-car accident. This accident did not take place. On October 20, while driving to school, Respondent was involved in a two-car accident, which resulted in her striking a fire hydrant not far from the school. The accident took place at about 8:45 a.m., which was about 15 minutes after Respondent assumed direct supervision of her students. Respondent arrived at school late, crying and disconcerted. An acquaintance transported Respondent home. The next morning, prior to the start of school, Respondent called the school and stated that she would not be at work. On the following morning, October 22, Respondent reported to work, and her principal ordered her to submit to a reasonable-suspicion drug test. Respondent complied, and the drug test revealed the presence of cocaine and morphine. The drug test accurately detected the presence of these substances because Respondent had used crack cocaine and heroin within the period for which the drug test is sensitive. By memorandum dated October 29, 1999, Respondent's principal asked Petitioner's OPS to monitor Respondent's return to work. By memorandum dated November 1, 1999, Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would require a clearance from OPS before returning to work. On November 8, 1999, Respondent requested a leave of absence without pay to extend from October 22, 1999, through June 16, 2000. Petitioner granted this request. Shortly after starting her leave from work, Respondent was first seen by Dr. John Eustace. Dr. Eustace is Board-certified in internal medicine and is also certified in the treatment of addictions. He is the medical director of the Addiction Treatment Program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. He is also an assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Miami medical school. In the last ten years, Dr. Eustace has performed 2000 evaluations of professionals to assess whether they can return to practice with the requisite skill and safety. During his career, Dr. Eustace has diagnosed and treated over 10,000 patients for addictions. Dr. Eustace admitted Respondent as an in-patient at Mt. Sinai for, among other things, a four- or five-day detoxification program. He found that Respondent was in the late middle stage of addiction to heroin and cocaine and that her illness was active. When releasing Respondent from the detoxification program, Dr. Eustace recommended that Respondent enter a twelve- step program to better prepare Respondent for the difficult recovery process, which requires, among other things, gaining insight into the consequences of the addiction. Following the detoxification process, Dr. Eustace opined that Respondent had an even chance of avoiding another relapse. However, this prognosis improves with time. After the first five years without relapse, the relapse rate is only ten percent. Also, after a second treatment, the recovery rate is over 90 percent. Of the 2000 professionals whom Dr. Eustace has treated, over 90 percent have recovered. Unfortunately, Respondent relapsed after her 1999 detoxification and treatment by Dr. Eustace. Despite her return to active use of illegal drugs, Respondent chose to restart the process by which she could return to the classroom. Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would need OPS clearance before returning to work. Reacting to Respondent's request for a clearance, OPS scheduled a CFR with Respondent and others to take place on July 28, 2000. At the July 28 CFR, Respondent signed an Employee Acknowledgement Form concerning Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy. The form states: "Before returning to duty, I must undergo a return-to-duty . . . controlled substances test with verified negative results." At the CFR, Respondent admitted that she had had a chemical dependency, but represented that she was now clean and sober. Apparently, Respondent did not anticipate that she would be required to take a drug test at the July 28 CFR. However, with the new school year imminent, it is difficult to understand exactly when Respondent thought she would be required to take the drug test. If she were going to teach the next school year, her principal needed more than a few days' notice. In any event, Respondent took the test on July 28, and the test revealed the presence of morphine, although not cocaine. By memorandum dated September 6, 2000, from Petitioner's OPS Director to Respondent, Petitioner advised Respondent that it was reviewing its options after receiving the results of the July 28 drug test. By letter dated October 6, 2000, to Respondent, Petitioner's Superintendent advised Respondent that Petitioner was suspending her and initiating dismissal proceedings due to just cause, including incompetency, misconduct in office, gross insubordination, excessive absences, and violation of Petitioner's Rules 6Gx13-4-105 (drug-free workplace) and 6Gx13-4A-1.21 (responsibilities and duties). By letter dated October 12, 2000, and revised October 17, 2000, Petitioner's board took the action recommended by the Superintendent. The contract between Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade (Contract) provides in Article XXI, Section 1.B.1.a, that "[a]ny member of the instructional staff may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year, provided that the charges against him/her are based upon Florida Statutes." Article XXI, Section 2.G, sets forth the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. Section 2.G.b provides the policy statement on illegal drugs, Section 2.G.c provides the policy statement on alcohol and prescription drugs, and Section 2.G.d provides the policy statement on employee drug screening. Under employee drug screening, Section 2.G.d.5 states: [Petitioner] recognizes that chemical dependency is an illness that can be successfully treated. It is the policy of [Petitioner], where possible, to seek rehabilitation of employees with a self- admitted or detected drug problem. Disciplinary action may be instituted against employees who the Board believes will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff. Employees who have previously been referred for assistance or employees unwilling or unable to rehabilitate may be subject to appropriate action, pursuant to Board Policy, applicable Florida Statutes, State Board Rules, and applicable provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Petitioner has invoked two of its rules in this case. Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which is a statement of "Responsibilities and Duties," requires, at Section 1, all employees "to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system." It is unnecessary to determine whether the Contract incorporates this rule, or whether Petitioner may otherwise rely on this rule to dismiss an instructional employee during the school year. Rule 6Gx13-4-1.05 (Rule), which is the "Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement," is a restatement of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement contained in the Contract. The prominent role of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement in the Contract, as well as its provision for the dismissal of employees, justifies Petitioner’s reliance upon a violation of the Rule as a basis for dismissing an instructional employee during the school year, notwithstanding the provision of the Contract otherwise requiring that all such dismissals be based on violations of Florida Statutes. In most respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement is the same in the Rule and the Contract. The Rule provides for "disciplinary sanctions" against employees who have violated the "standards of conduct" set forth within the Rule. Like the Contract, the Rule contains three "policy statements," which supply most of the operative provisions of the Rule. For illegal drugs, the policy statement, as set forth in the Rule, provides: "Employees are expected to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the following provisions: Employees on duty or on School Board property will not manufacture, distribute, dispense, possess or use illegal drugs, nor will they be under the influence of such drugs. Employees on or off duty will not influence students to use illegal or abuse legal drugs. An employee convicted, adjudicated guilty, or who has entered a plea of guilty for an criminal drug statute violation occurring in the workplace shall notify [Petitioner] within 48 hours after final judgment. Paragraphs A and C are limited to acts and conditions that take place while an employee is on Petitioner's property or on duty. Paragraph B is limited to acts of the employee directed toward students. The evidence does not suggest that Respondent violated any of these provisions of the Rule. Petitioner failed to serve that the incidents involving Respondent sleeping while in charge of students appear not to have been due to her cocaine or heroin intoxication; it is at least as likely that the sleeping resulted from fatigue following the use of one or both of these drugs the preceding night. The distinction between intoxicating levels of these drugs and nonintoxicating trace amounts is explicitly dismissed by the Rule's treatment of alcohol, as to which employees must be "free of measurable . . . concentrations." After the policy statements on illegal drugs and alcohol and prescription drugs, the Rule sets forth the policy statement on employee drug screening. Although this part of the Rule fails to provide explicitly that a positive drug screen is a violation of the Rule, the introductory paragraph of the Rule acknowledges that Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade are jointly committed "to create and maintain a drug-free work environment." Paragraph D within the drug-screening policy statement restates this purpose. Also, the disciplinary sanctions provided by the Rule clearly state that a refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Rule constitutes an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation; if a refusal to submit to a drug test is a violation, a failed drug test must also be a violation. These statements are therefore sufficient to provide that the presence in employees of even nonintoxicating amounts of illegal drugs, while on duty, constitute a violation of the Rule. In two respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Rule, is materially different from the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Contract. First, the Rule adds another objective: To communicate that persons who violate the standards of conduct cited in this rule and who refuse or cannot be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. Second, the Rule provides disciplinary sanctions for any violation--not just for violations of the drug-screening policy statement, as provided by the Contract--of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. The Rule also adds two presumptive conditions for determining when an employee is unable to be assisted by rehabilitation. The Rule states: Employees who violate the standards of conduct cited it this rule and who the Board determines will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. A refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Policy shall constitute an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation. . . . This case turns on whether Petitioner has proved that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation because Petitioner has produced little detailed evidence of any negative impact upon Respondent's students. The record lacks detail of Respondent's specific teaching duties, the specific impact of her sleeping incidents or absences, and the academic achievements of her students during the periods in which these shortcomings took place. Notwithstanding the marked shortcomings in Respondent's performance as a teacher, Petitioner did not dismiss her until first giving her a chance to rehabilitate herself. The most likely inference is that Petitioner's administrative employees found that the situation did not satisfy the first criterion for dismissal--negatively impacting students. The basic issue, then, is whether Petitioner could reasonably have determined, from July to October 2000, that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. Petitioner could choose to show rehabilitation would be futile by relying on one of the two presumptions contained in the Rule. However, Respondent never refused to submit to a drug test, and difficult questions of her employment status in July 2000 obscure the determination as to whether her failure of the July 2000 drug test constitutes a second violation of the Rule. In this case, though, Petitioner may satisfy its standard of proof without regard to either of the presumptions in the Rule. After a display of considerable patience and good faith by Petitioner, Respondent, in July 2000, misrepresented to Petitioner that she was clean and sober and prematurely requested permission to return to teaching duties despite her knowledge that she was still abusing drugs and not ready to return to the classroom. These facts support the finding that, as of July or October 2000, Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. This finding of the futility of rehabilitation, as of July or October 2000, is difficult due to the fact that subsequent events suggest that Respondent may finally be rehabilitating herself. After Petitioner dismissed her, Respondent underwent detoxification and then began treatment at St. Luke's Addiction Recovery Center, which is sponsored by Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. She was in intensive residential treatment from November 6, 2000, through January 24, 2001. She later underwent nine urinalyses, through June 1, 2001--a day after the end of the hearing in this case-- and all of them were negative. Respondent is successfully participating in the St. Luke's aftercare program, where she takes weekly drug tests. She is proud of the fact that she has turned her life over to God and has achieved the longest period of sobriety that she has experienced in many years. After regaining sobriety, Respondent substituted for awhile and then found a job teaching a third-grade class at a private school in the Miami area. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been so employed for six weeks, she had not been late or missed a day of school, and the school had invited her to teach again for the 2001-02 school year. Dr. Eustace opines that Respondent's prognosis is much improved from the prognosis of September 2000.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 N. E. Second Avenue Room 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Luis M. Garcia Attorney's Office School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Richard Baron Baron and Cliff 11077 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 307 Miami, Florida 33161 Honorable Charlie Crist Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Everett R. Rogers d/b/a Circus Bar (Respondent), has been licensed by Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), to sell alcoholic beverages under License No. 39- 602, Series 2-COP, for licensed premises located at 1118 West Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Florida, at all times pertinent to this case. Respondent's most recent license expired by its terms on September 30, 1985. Respondent voluntarily closed the business operated under his license on or about February 2, 1985. On or about February 2, 1985, Respondent initiated personal bankruptcy proceedings which encompassed the business which he was operating at the licensed premises. The licensed premises and Respondent's license have been turned over to Respondent's trustee in bankruptcy. On February 2, 1984, three marijuana cigarettes were possessed, sold and delivered at the licensed premises with the knowledge of Respondent's bartender, Bobby Warner.2 On February 3, 1984, the licensed premises were visited by a person named Melvin Stusse and undercover police officer Paul Miller for the purpose of the sale of cocaine, although no sale took place. On February 3, 1984, three grams of marijuana were possessed, sold and delivered at the licensed premises. On February 3, 1984, undercover police officer Thomas Kinsella possessed marijuana on the licensed premises with the knowledge of bartender Warner. Kinsella asked Warner for something in which to place a baggie of marijuana, and Warner took Kinsella to the stockroom to give him a paper clip box for that purpose. On February 6, 1984, bartender Warner and patrons of the licensed premises gambled on the pool table in the licensed premises. On February 8, 1984, the sale of eight marijuana cigarettes was negotiated at the bar in the licensed premises but the delivery took place outside the premises and there was no evidence that the marijuana was possessed in the licensed premises. On February 9, 1984, three marijuana cigarettes were sold, delivered and possessed at the licensed premises with the knowledge of Respondent's manager, Joan Sammons. On February 13, 1984, the sale of approximately two and one-half grams of marijuana was negotiated at the licensed premises with the knowledge of bartender Warner. The marijuana was delivered outside the licensed premises, and there was no evidence that marijuana was possessed on the licensed premises. On February 24, 1984, six marijuana cigarettes were sold, possessed and delivered on the licensed premises with the knowledge of manager Sammons. On February 28, 1984, approximately two and one-half grams of marijuana were sold, possessed and delivered on the licensed premises with the knowledge of bartender Warner. On March 5, 1984, bartender Warner possessed, sold and delivered five marijuana cigarettes on the licensed premises. On March 6, 1984, manager Sammons sold, possessed and delivered approximately two grams of marijuana on the licensed premises. On March 7, 1984, manager Sammons purchased $50.00 worth of USDA food stamp coupons for $25.00 on the licensed premises. On March 19, 1984, manager Sammons purchased $150.00 worth of USDA food stamp coupons for $75.00 on the licensed premises. Also on March 19, 1984, four marijuana cigarettes were possessed, sold and delivered on the licensed premises with the knowledge of manager Sammons. On March 21, 1984, approximately 1.2 grams of marijuana were possessed, sold and delivered on the licensed premises. It was not proved that any of Respondent's employees were aware of this transaction. On March 30, 1984, Respondent's bartender, Steve Keller, possessed, sold and delivered approximately three and one-half grams of marijuana on the licensed premises. Manager Sammons also knew about this transaction. Respondent had a policy against illegal drug activity and gambling on the licensed premises. He enforced the policy when he was on the licensed premises. Respondent posted signs prohibiting gambling and told employees that they should evict patrons suspected of illegal drug activities or gambling. But Respondent did little or nothing to ensure that his policies were followed evenings and weekends when he was not present at the licensed premises. Respondent performed no background checks on his employees and continued to employ Sammons as his manager although he knew she had been arrested. Respondent had no written employment application or written instructions for his employees. Respondent did not polygraph his employees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order revoking alcoholic beverage license number 39-602, Series 2-COP, held by Respondent, Everett R. Rogers d/b/a Circus Bar, 1118 W. Kennedy Blvd., Tampa, Florida. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. L LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1985.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of being convicted or found guilty of a crime directly relating to the ability to practice pharmacy or the practice of pharmacy and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent received his license to practice pharmacy in Pennsylvania in 1962. He has been continuously licensed in Florida since December 31, 1973, through March 28, 1995, when his Florida license was suspended by emergency order of the Board of Pharmacy for the reasons set forth below. His Florida license number was PS0013841. Respondent has not previously been disciplined. Respondent has been employed for many years with a large pharmacy chain. Over the years, he was promoted into positions of increasing managerial responsibility. At one point, he was in charge of the operations of over 25 stores. Sometime prior to the incidents described below, Respondent's responsibilities were reduced, evidently due to corporate restructuring. At the same time, his wife of 15 years had an affair. Respondent suffered other stresses, including a homicide involving someone in a close relationship. Respondent was ill-equipped to deal with these setbacks. He was a hard- working, intense person with no emotional outlets. Two prior marriages had failed in part due to Respondent's lack of emotional insight. Respondent has long defined his role in relationships almost entirely in terms of his income- earning ability. Unable to deal with the stress, Respondent one night picked up a streetwalker in Bradenton and paid her to have sex with him. Respondent identified himself to her. A sexual relationship ensued. The woman had a child, and they lived in squalor. Respondent' initial sexual impulse toward the woman yielded to an impulse by Respondent to rescue the mother and child and serve as their savior or hero. The woman made increasing demands of Respondent. Several times, Respondent tried to end the relationship, but the woman threatened to disclose the relationship to Respondent's wife and employer. Respondent informed her that he had no more money to give her, but she continued her demands. Eventually, Respondent began to steal from the pharmacy store at which he worked. At first, he stole boxes of cigarettes. Later, he stole prescription drugs, including various Schedule III and IV controlled substances. The drugs contained codeine, and Respondent knew that the woman was selling the drugs on the street. At least one of the drugs was popular among drug abusers. About a year after meeting the woman, Respondent was caught in the act of stealing drugs in the early-morning hours at the store. He immediately made a full confession and was prosecuted by federal authorities for the controlled substances and by state authorities for the cigarettes and other miscellaneous merchandise. In Count I of the federal indictment, Respondent was charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 by knowingly and intentionally combining, conspiring, confederating, and agreeing with the woman and other persons to possess with intent to distribute acetaminophen with codeine and hydrocodone bitartrate, which are Schedule III controlled substances, and diazepam and alprazolam, which are Schedule IV controlled substances. A Schedule III controlled substance has a potential for abuse less than substances contained in Schedules I and II and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule III controlled substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. A Schedule IV controlled substance has a potential for abuse less than substances contained in Schedules I, II, and III and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule IV controlled substance may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence. Respondent pleaded guilty to Count I, which carried a maximum sentence of five years, fine of $250,000, and probation of three years, as well as restitution. The United States noted Respondent's acceptance of responsibility as a factor in mitigation. In the plea agreement, Respondent acknowledged that he began diverting controlled substances, once or twice a week, in September 1993. He had been caught and arrested in April 1994. On February 24, 1995, The United States District Court entered a judgment adjudicating Respondent guilty of Count I, placing him on six months' house arrest, placing him on five years' probation, and ordering restitution to the pharmacy chain of $10,574.84 for the diverted controlled substances. The judge stated her desire that Respondent continue to work as a pharmacist in order to pay for what he had stolen. Respondent's conviction directly relates to his ability to practice pharmacy or to the practice of pharmacy. At the time of Respondent's arrest, the pharmacy chain had fired him. Following the arrest but before the conviction, Respondent worked as a pharmacist for a corporation that supplies licensed replacement pharmacists on a short-term or indefinite basis. Primarily assigned to one client working with terminally ill patients, Respondent was valued as a pharmacist by the clients and his employer for the six months that he was so employed. Respondent's employment as a licensed pharmacist ended when the Board of Pharmacy issued an emergency order suspending his license on March 28, 1995. Respondent has since attempted to find employment, but he has found none. His ability to make restitution has been impeded, although he has made some payments. Respondent has received private psychological counselling since October 1994. The psychologist's diagnosis was that Respondent was suffering from an adjustment reaction with depressed mood. Helping Respondent to analyze his past mistakes and equip himself to deal with stress, the psychologist opines that it is very unlikely that Respondent would repeat this behavior and would not represent a threat to the public safety, health, or welfare if he were to continue practicing pharmacy. Respondent has participated in the PRN since August 1994. The impaired practitioner program typically serves licensees who are unable to practice due to mental illness, substance abuse, or physical disability. The program has determined that Respondent suffers from no chemical dependency, sexual disorder, or psychiatric illness. Rather, at the time of the criminal behaviors, Respondent was under extreme stress. However, the director of the program testified that Respondent is progressing very well, free of all illness, and gaining insight into his difficulties so that he can now express his feelings and handle his stresses. The director also opines that Respondent would not pose a threat to public safety, health, or welfare if he were to continue practicing pharmacy. Respondent has entered into a five-year contract with the PRN. The program monitors Respondent for a lifetime. If at anytime the director were to determine that Respondent is not progressing, such as by failing to renew a contract when asked to do so by the program, the director would file a complaint with Petitioner. It has been almost two years since Respondent began diverting controlled substances to the prostitute and almost a year and one-half since he was caught. This relatively recent behavior was not isolated, but lasted six months. Respondent was caught and did not turn himself in. Respondent's behavior harmed himself, his family and friends, and his employer, which spends considerable resources to develop public trust and employee morale, both of which were damaged by Respondent's actions. Respondent's behavior also harmed the woman, whose squalid circumstances were worsened by Respondent's "generosity." And his criminal behavior threatened the safety, health, and welfare of numerous persons who purchased the controlled substances that Respondent had stolen and given to the woman. On the other hand, Respondent poses no risk to the public. This is the opinion of two mental-health professionals working closely with Respondent. Also, Respondent did not steal controlled substances while working for six months as a temporary pharmacist and while under considerable stress from the criminal prosecutions. Although Respondent did not turn himself in, he did confess immediately and completely. As a practical matter, his ability to make restitution is dependent on his ability to practice pharmacy. Respondent and Petitioner each present numerous final orders of the Board of Pharmacy evidencing past penalties. Petitioner's final orders include Newman, Case No. 94- 20465 (five years' suspension and $2000 fine for state conviction for sale, purchase, or delivery of Schedule IV controlled substance; and Dunayer, Case No. 07300 (revocation for shortage of over 500,000 dosage units of many of the same codeine- containing drugs). Respondent's final orders include Feldman, Case No. 92- 07313 (three years' suspension, retroactive 14 months to when licensee was ordered by court to surrender license, three years' probation, and $3000 fine for federal conviction for distributing and dispensing outside course of professional practice of pharmacy--although some of the same codeine-containing drugs were involved, it appears that considerably greater quantities may have been involved); Swoy, Case No. 93-11716 (two years' suspension, of which 22 months were stayed and several years' probation for state conviction of delivery of one of the same codeine-containing drugs--quantity unclear); and Levine, Case No. 92-04729 (two years' suspension that was stayed and four years' probation for state conviction of impaired practitioner for theft from pharmacy of relatively small quantities of Schedule II controlled substances).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pharmacy enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 465.016(1)(f), suspending his license for one year from the date of the emergency suspension, imposing a $3000 fine to be paid within 90 days after the end of the suspension, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of five years. ENTERED on August 8, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 8, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: John Taylor, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Nancy M. Snurkowski Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Salvatore A. Carpino 8001 North Dale Mabry Hwy. Suite 301-A Tampa, FL 33614
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violation of Section 464.018(1)(f), (g), and (h), Florida Statutes, on the basis of allegations regarding the improper use of drugs, narcotics, or chemicals.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times material hereto, the Respondent has been a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RN 83300-2. At all times material hereto, the Respondent was employed by A Visiting Redi-Nurse and Redi-Nurse of West Palm Beach, Florida (hereinafter "Redi-Nurse") Prior to the events that gave rise to the charges in this case, the Respondent suffered a broken hip in an automobile accident. The hip did not heal properly and it was ultimately necessary for the Respondent to undergo surgery a second time to correct problems with her fractured hip. During the time between the original hip surgery and the second hip surgery, the Respondent's physician prescribed, and the Respondent used, several drugs to relieve pain and stress. Those drugs included Percocet, Valium, Darvocet, and Tranxene. During June of 1987, after the Respondent had returned to work following her automobile accident, her employer became concerned because the Respondent seemed to be lethargic, tended to talk louder than usual, and tended to repeat herself. Because of these concerns, the Respondent was given two weeks leave with pay and a suggestion that she get some counseling. Following the two weeks of leave, the Respondent-returned to work and, apparently, nothing eventful occurred until early in September of 1987. During the week beginning September 7, 1987, the Director of Professional Services for Redi-Nurse, a Ms. Mary Lynn Dunne, was relieving the regular supervisor at the Redi-Nurse office in Palm Beach Gardens, where the Respondent was working at that time. During that week several other employees expressed concerns to Ms. Dunne regarding the ability of the Respondent to safely drive a car. These employees described behavior by the Respondent that included hand tremors, lethargy, taking loud, and being repetitive. As a result of these comments by other employees, the management at Redi-Nurse decided to ask the Respondent to provide a urine specimen. Ms. Dunne discussed this decision with the Respondent and the Respondent readily agreed to provide a urine specimen. The Respondent collected a urine specimen in the presence of Ms. Dunne and gave the specimen to Ms. Dunne. Ms. Dunne, in her own words, "sent the urine specimen out to be picked up by the laboratory." After obtaining the urine specimen from the Respondent, Ms. Dunne asked the Respondent to prepare a list of the medications she was taking. Later she asked the Respondent to write down how recently she had taken each of the medications. The Respondent complied with this request. The list of medications apparently explained the Respondent's behavior, because Ms. Dunne voiced the opinion that if she had known what medications the Respondent had been taking, she would probably not have requested the urine specimen. A couple of days later the management of Redi-Nurse received a report from National Health Laboratories that purported to be a report of the testing of the Respondent1s urine specimen. That report stated that the specimen was positive for cannabinoids (marijuana) and benzodiazepines. Upon receipt of that report, the management of Redi-Nurse called the Respondent into the main office at West Palm Beach, told her what the lab report stated, and told her she was fired. The Respondent told the Redi-Nurse management that she did not use marijuana and she offered to give another urine specimen. The Respondent has never used marijuana. Specifically, the Respondent did not use marijuana at any time material to the facts in this case.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a final order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29 day of May, 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of May, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0324 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 and 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance, with some clarification and additional findings. Paragraph 4: Accepted, with some additional findings for clarification. Paragraph 5: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. (For the reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, I have serious doubts as to the probative value of the lab report, Petitioner's Exhibit 7.) Paragraph 6: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (On this issue, I have found the Respondent's denials to be more persuasive than the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses.) Paragraph 7: Rejected as irrelevant in view of the absence of persuasive evidence that the Respondent used marijuana. Findings submitted b Respondent: (The Respondent did not submit any proposed findings of fact.) COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Mone', Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Sandra D. Bruce, R.N. 155 E. Hampton Way Jupiter, FL 33478 Julie Ritter, Executive Director Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Florida Board of Nursing General Counsel, Department 504 Daniel Building of Professional Regulation 111 East Coastline Drive 1940 North Monroe Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
