Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent held Class "D" Security Officer License Number D00-26960 and Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License Number DI89-00304. Both licenses were duly issued by Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent has held his Class "D" license since 1976 and has held his Class "DI" license since 1989. Respondent has no previous record of a felony or misdemeanor offense and was, at the time of the formal hearing, working at an adult community condominium complex as a security guard. Officer Charles Wharton is a detective with the Fort Pierce Police Department who was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, assigned to the juvenile division. T.G. is a female who was eleven years of age as of July 1993. F.S. 1/ is a female who was fourteen years of age as of July 1993. Both F.S. and T.G. were described by Officer Wharton as appearing their stated ages. Both of these girls were from what Officer Wharton referred to as "Fort Pierce's ghetto" and both were described by Officer Wharton as being "street wise". On or about July 1, 1993, Respondent paid T.G. and F.S. to have sexual relations with him at his house in Fort Pierce. The sex with F.S. included the penetration of her vagina with his penis. The sex with T.G. included her having oral contact with his penis. Officer Wharton questioned Respondent and read to him his Miranda rights. Respondent waived his Miranda rights and admitted to Officer Wharton that he had paid these two girls to have sex with him as described above. Officer Wharton referred this matter to the State Attorney's Office, which subsequently dismissed all charges against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000, suspends Respondent's licensure for a period of three months, and thereafter places Respondent's licensure on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1994.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-5.006(8) and 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Larry Hendrix, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing visiting hours and privileges and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Petitioner's marital status was single. Section 944.23, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be authorized to visit at their pleasure all state correctional institutions: The Governor, all Cabinet members, members of the Legislature, judges of state courts, state attorneys, public defenders, and authorized representatives of the commission. No other person shall be permitted to enter a state correctional institution except under such regulations as the department may prescribe. . . . [Emphasis added]. Pursuant to the authority of Sections 944.09 and 944.23, Florida Statutes, the Respondent has adopted Chapter 33-5, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Visitors." Visitation with approved family members or friends is encouraged by the Rule 33-5.006(7), Florida Administrative Code, to maintain home and community ties. Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (8) Inmates not married may be allowed to have one single non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval. A married inmate may be allowed to have one single, non-family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval, if a pending divorce or separation of long duration can be verified, and the spouse is removed from the list. The Petitioner presented no evidence during the formal hearing concerning Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code. During part of 1990, Terry Moore was incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, the same Institution the Petitioner in incarcerated in. Vianna Austin is the sister of Terry Moore. Ms. Austin is not incarcerated by the Respondent. Ms. Austin and the Petitioner are not related. In early 1990, Ms. Austin submitted a visitor information form to the Respondent in an effort to be placed on the Petitioner's approved visiting list. By letter dated January 30, 1990, the Respondent informed Ms. Austin that she could not be added to Petitioner's visiting list because she was already on the visiting list of her brother, Terry Moore. Ms. Austin made more than one request to be placed on the Petitioner's visiting list and her requests were denied by the Respondent for the reason stated in the January 30, 1990, letter. In late 1990, Terry Moore was moved from Union Correctional Institution to another prison. During the formal hearing, Terry Moore was incarcerated in Avon Park Correctional Institution. Subsequent to Terry Moore's transfer out of Union Correctional Institution, Ms. Austin again requested approval to visit with the Petitioner. Ms. Austin's requests to be placed on the Petitioner's visiting list was denied by the Respondent before and after Terry Moore's transfer because she was an approved visitor of Terry Moore. The Petitioner also requested that the Respondent approve Ms. Austin as his visitor. These requests, which were made before and after Terry Moore's transfer from Union Correctional Institution, were denied by the Respondent because she was on Terry Moore's approved visiting list. The Respondent's denial of Ms. Austin's requests to visit the Petitioner and the Respondent's denial of the Petitioner's requests for visitation by Ms. Austin were based upon Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (16) Regular and special visitors cannot be on more than one inmate's approved visiting list, except for immediate family. A visitor may not visit an inmate and then decide to visit further with friends of that inmate. The Respondent interprets Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code, to prohibit a person from visiting more than inmate unless each inmate the person visits is part of the inmate's immediate family. The Respondent's interpretation applies regardless of the location of the inmates the visitor wishes to visit. Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated by the Respondent to prevent triangle relations. Triangle relationships tend to cause security problems, such as fights between inmates and/or altercations between visitors and inmates and to deter romantic relationships with inmates. The Respondent makes approximately 100,000 inmate transfers each year. Therefore, although inmates may not be in the same institution at a given time, it is not reasonably possible for the Respondent to insure that inmates that have the same visitor on their visiting list are not at some later time transferred to the same institution. Some inmates have been able to get visitors on their visiting lists even though the visitor was on another inmates visiting list in violation of Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent allows such visitation if the Respondent is aware of the fact that the visitor is already on one approved visiting list. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Rule 33-5.008(16), Florida Administrative Code, does not establish adequate standards for decisions by the Respondent, or vests unbridled discretion in the Respondent or that it is arbitrary and capricious.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Donald Alvin Jones, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1980. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until February 4, 1901, so that Petitioner might secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called as witness Michael Denny, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital. The Respondent called Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital as its witness. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, (1977). Petitioner presently resides in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, theRespondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. Indeed, the Petitioner participated in the program at the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center, a sex offender program. This treatment commenced in October, 1977, and lasted for a period of approximately six months, after which time he was returned to the committing court and later placed in the Florida State Hospital forensic unit. The primary program for mentally disordered sex offenders in the Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in group therapy sessions and beginning in January, 1980, was assigned to intensive assertion training. In this connection, his group therapy sessions now involve a group which is more confrontation oriented. In the course of the group therapy sessions he has only personally discussed himself one time in his most recent group and that participation discussion occurred on February 3, 1981. The discussion related to the Petitioner's interest in a talent show at the hospital. The Petitioner has learned about his childhood experience while in the program but he will not relate his sexual history or discuss his daily activities. The patient carries a diagnosis of inadequate personality and sexual deviation, namely pedophilia and has subnormal intelligence. His behavior is guarded and evasive and on balance his cooperation and participation is superficial. In the last six or eight months of his treatment, the Petitioner has not made satisfactory progress. The progress that has been achieved in the program relates to the patient's willingness to deal with others more readily, thereby getting along with others and creating a better feeling about himself. The patient has not broken the rules of the Forensic Unit lately but when pushed by others will become angry. The Petitioner has been involved in wood and musictherapy, is a member of the Jaycees and attends dances and dance classes. In January, 1980, the Petitioner was presented to a staff disposition conference consisting of members of the treatment team in the program for mentally disordered sex offenders and it was determined that the patient should be retained for a period of time. Again, in September, 1980, the patient was presented to the conference and it was determined that the hospital had exhausted the treatment possibilities for the Petitioner. Through a staff conference of the heads of the various sex offender programs in the Department's overall system held in October, 1980, it was the unanimous opinion of those members that treatment possibilities for the patient had been exhausted. Although the Petitioner continues to express some motivation about participation in the sex offender program and feels that he needs more assistance, needs a structured environment, further participation in a sex offender program offered by the Respondent would not be sufficiently beneficial to cause the Petitioner to remain in the program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Donald Alvin Jones and that said Donald Alvin Jones be returned to the committing court for further proceedings. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude Arrington, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Second Judicial Circuit 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent corruptly used his official positions to sexually harass female subordinates in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and, two, whether Respondent solicited or accepted sexual favors from female subordinates based upon any understanding that his vote, official action, or judgment would be influenced thereby, in violation of Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rudy Maloy (“Maloy”) worked at the Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from 1980 until October 21, 2001. The last seven years of his career in state government were spent in DOT’s Turnpike District Planning Office, where Maloy served as the “Public Involvement Manager.” In that capacity, Maloy conducted workshops and public hearings around the state concerning Turnpike projects. In 1992, Maloy was elected to the Leon County Commission as a Commissioner-at-Large. He was reelected twice, in 1996 and 2000. At the time of the final hearing, Maloy was a sitting Commissioner. Laurie Bradley When Maloy began working in the Turnpike District Planning Office on October 7, 1994, Laurie Bradley (“Bradley”) was already employed there in a career service position, namely, administrative assistant to the director of planning. Though she reported to the director, who was her immediate supervisor, Bradley performed secretarial functions for others in the office, including Maloy after his arrival. Maloy did not have the authority to promote Bradley, increase her salary, or let her go, but he was one of Bradley’s “bosses” in the sense that he could assign her tasks. Maloy and Bradley enjoyed a cordial relationship at work, at least by outward appearances. For example, Maloy frequently gave Bradley (and other co-workers) the complimentary tickets to events such as hockey games and concerts that he, as a County Commissioner, routinely received but could not always use himself. Bradley genuinely appreciated this token of Maloy’s generosity. She thought Maloy was a very friendly person, and she was friendly toward him. The two, in Bradley’s words, “got along fine.” At the final hearing, however, Bradley testified about other acts and practices of Maloy’s that she considered decidedly unfriendly. According to Bradley, Maloy touched her inappropriately on a number of occasions, as follows: Hugs. Bradley alleged that Maloy hugged her——from the side, around the waist——many times, and that after awhile this began to bother her. Shoulder rubs. Bradley alleged that “fairly often” Maloy stood behind her and rubbed her shoulders without ever being invited or encouraged to do so. Kisses. Bradley alleged that in or around February 1996, Maloy kissed her on the cheek. Bradley also claimed that a few weeks later, Maloy kissed her on the mouth, while the two were alone together in an elevator going down at the end of a workday. Caresses. Bradley asserted that on one occasion in May 1996, within hours, ironically, after they had received sexual harassment training, Maloy taunted her by stroking her arm and asking if such behavior constituted sexual harassment. Bradley further averred that Maloy expressed his opinion that if one person is bothered by another’s conduct in the workplace, then the two should resolve the problem privately, rather than reporting it to management. Finally, Bradley alleged that, as part of this episode of teasing, as she perceived it, Maloy stated that he might be able to get her a job with the county having a higher salary than her present position.1 Maloy testified that he never touched Bradley inappropriately, and he specifically denied her allegations to the contrary. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Maloy sexually harassed Bradley. It is significant, therefore, that not a single witness who testified at the final hearing had actually seen Maloy touch Bradley improperly or in an unwelcome manner. In contrast, one disinterested witness testified credibly that she observed Bradley hug Maloy once or twice as a friendly gesture of thanks for receiving tickets to a hockey game; this testimony is accepted as true. Several witnesses who lacked personal knowledge of any misconduct on Maloy’s part were called to establish that Bradley told others in confidence——at or near the time of the events in question——that Maloy was allegedly harassing her. There is no doubt that Bradley did share such information with others. In fact, her contemporaneous accusations were soon reported to persons in DOT’s management, who understandably insisted that an investigation be conducted. Consequently, Bradley submitted a formal written complaint about Maloy to her employer, and DOT investigated the matter.2 That Bradley complained to others about Maloy in 1996 is circumstantial evidence from which one might infer that the alleged sexual harassment occurred.3 It is relatively weak circumstantial evidence, however, because it ultimately rests largely, if not entirely, on the credibility of the very same person——Bradley——whose testimony it was offered to corroborate. Indeed, drawing the inference largely would beg the question of Bradley’s veracity, for doing so would require that her veracity (which Maloy disputes) be assumed.4 Having carefully weighed and evaluated all of the relevant, persuasive evidence, the undersigned is unable to find, without hesitancy, that Maloy engaged in the conduct of which Bradley has accused him. This determination, it should be stressed, reflects the fact-finder’s judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is purposefully not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur between Bradley and Maloy.5 The undersigned affirmatively finds that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Bradley.6 Likewise, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Bradley that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Bradley——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ophelia Morris In December 1996, Ophelia Morris (“Morris”) replaced Bradley as the director’s administrative assistant in the Turnpike District Planning Office. As had Bradley, Morris served as a secretary to a number of managerial employees, including Maloy. She was a career service employee. Maloy could assign work to Morris, but he lacked the power to promote or fire her. Maloy and Morris became friends, and their friendship deepened over time. By 1999, the two were sufficiently close that Morris routinely confided in Maloy, sharing private information with him concerning the personal problems she was having with her then-fiancé, whom she planned to (and did) marry in May of that year. In June 1999, soon after Morris got married, Morris and Maloy began a mutually consensual sexual affair. While there are some conflicts in the evidence regarding certain immaterial details of their relationship,7 the fact-finder is convinced that neither party entered into this adulterous affair as the result of coercion, bribery, intimidation, harassment, or any type of untoward pressure, either express or implied; rather, each wanted to have an extramarital sexual relationship with the other. Some time in the autumn of 1999, Maloy offered Morris a job as his aide at the County Commission.8 The undersigned is not convinced that Morris had attempted, in any serious way, to break away from the ongoing affair with Maloy before he made this offer of employment. To the contrary, it is found that, more likely than not, Morris remained satisfied with——and had no present intention to end——the affair at the time Maloy proposed to hire her as his aide.9 Morris testified that, after initially demurring, she finally agreed to accept the at-will position as Maloy’s aide, wherein she would serve at his pleasure, but only on the condition that she and Maloy must cease having sex once she was on the county’s payroll. Morris claimed that Maloy reluctantly assented to this condition. Morris started working for Leon County as Maloy’s aide on Monday, December 20, 1999. At a Christmas luncheon that week, Morris met Denise Williams, a one-time aide to County Commissioner Cliff Thaell who was then employed in the county’s Public Works office. The two women quickly became friends and—— within a matter of days——lovers, commencing their own affair shortly after the start of the new year. In January 2000, some secrets were revealed. Denise Williams divulged to Morris that she, Denise, had slept with Maloy and asked whether Morris had done the same. Morris lied to Denise Williams and denied that she had slept with Maloy. Shortly thereafter Morris confronted Maloy with Denise Williams’s disclosure, and he admitted that the two had indeed had sex with one another. That same month, Denise Williams separately told Maloy about the affair she and Morris were having. Maloy was upset, angry, and hurt that Morris had been seeing Denise Williams. He urged her to end the affair with Denise Williams, but Morris did not immediately follow Maloy’s counsel. By February 2000, Maloy’s ongoing interest in Morris’s sexual relationship with Denise Williams was starting to cause Morris to become concerned that she would be fired because of that affair. Consequently, Morris stopped talking to Denise Williams, effectively suspending their relationship, and informed Maloy about the apparent breakup. In the meantime, Morris and Maloy continued their liaison, contrary to the supposed understanding that the sex would stop. At hearing, Morris claimed that she continued to participate in the affair with Maloy only because she feared he would fire her if she refused. However, while Maloy clearly had the power summarily to dismiss Morris, there is no convincing evidence that he ever expressly or impliedly threatened——or even intended——to take such action if she declined to have sex with him. In June 2000, unbeknownst to Maloy, Morris resumed her relationship with Denise Williams. Then, in July or August 2000, Denise Williams left a sexually explicit message for Morris on the county’s voice mail system, in a voice mailbox that Maloy checked on a routine basis. Maloy happened to hear this message before Morris did, and he was not pleased. The voice message incident was the beginning of the end of Morris’s employment as Maloy’s aide. Before long——and for a variety of reasons that are not relevant to this case—— Morris resigned, effective September 8, 2000. Two findings about Morris’s separation are made based on a preponderance of the evidence. First, Maloy did not fire Morris or force her to resign. Second, Morris did not leave because of her sexual relationship with Maloy.10 The purported understanding, mentioned above, that the affair between Maloy and Morris would terminate upon Morris’s becoming Maloy’s aide is the factual linchpin of the Commission’s case as it relates to Morris. The reason for this is that Morris clearly and candidly testified (and the undersigned has found) that her relationship with Maloy was mutually consensual and not the product of sexual harassment during the entire period she was employed with DOT. Thus, to establish that Maloy either intentionally misused his public positions to sexually harass Morris or, by sleeping with her, improperly accepted sexual favors as consideration for some official action, the Commission needed convincingly to distinguish and separate the mutually consensual “DOT phase” of the affair (which did not violate the ethics laws11) from the allegedly coercive “County Commission phase.” The undersigned is not convinced, however, that the subject affair comprised two such distinct phases. The evidence is too much in conflict regarding whether Maloy and Morris had an understanding about——or even discussed——ending their affair effective the date Morris started working as Maloy’s aide for the undersigned to find without hesitancy that such occurred.12 As a result, and in any event, it is not clear to the undersigned fact-finder that the affair between Maloy and Morris was coercive during the time she worked as his aide. The evidence in this regard, as the undersigned has evaluated and weighed it, is much too ambiguous to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that, beginning in January 2000, Maloy was explicitly or implicitly forcing Morris to have sex with him——especially given the undisputed fact that Morris freely and voluntarily had been sleeping with Maloy for the previous six months because she wanted to.13 Additionally, the undersigned affirmatively finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Morris. Finally, it is found, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Morris that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Morris. Denise Williams Denise Williams, introduced above, was an aide to Commissioner Thaell from October 1997 through November 1999. At hearing, Denise Williams testified that, in June 1998, Maloy——whom she had known since the mid-1980’s——began to “prey” on her after learning that she was separated from her husband. She alleged that Maloy frequently came into her office, uninvited, to look at her legs, rub her shoulders, or give her a hug. She asserted that this attention was unwanted but admitted that she never told Maloy to stop. To discourage Maloy, she claimed, she tried to dress in a less feminine way. At the same time, she acknowledged, she sometimes hugged Maloy back.14 The picture of Maloy that Denise Williams’s testimony ultimately paints——for which, it must be said, there is no independent, eyewitness corroboration——is that of a man pursuing her with dogged persistence, ignoring her constant attempts to turn him off.15 Maloy, in contrast, suggested that Denise Williams had taken the initiative, signaling her availability by often making mildly suggestive comments to him such as, “You could have been my husband.” It is not surprising, then, that while there is no dispute that the two had casual sex at Denise Williams’s apartment in February 1999, the evidence regarding how this came about is very much in conflict. Denise Williams testified that, despite having no desire whatsoever for Maloy, she finally gave in to his repeated requests for sex in order to “let him satisfy his curiosity” in the hope that he then would quit “bugging” her.16 For his part, Maloy depicted Denise Williams as the initiator who, one Tuesday or Wednesday, unexpectedly told him that her kids would be gone the next weekend and asked him to come over for a “visit” on Saturday, which invitation he accepted. It is undisputed that Maloy and Denise Williams had casual sex a second time, in July 1999, again at her place.17 Given the conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence, the fact-finder is not convinced, without hesitancy, that the events unfolded precisely as Denise Williams has described them. Yet, he is not able to find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Maloy’s testimony is entirely accurate, either. Thus, there can be no affirmative findings, one way or the other, on the broad question whether Maloy sexually harassed Denise Williams. Concerning the particular charges, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment or “pursuit” of Denise Williams. Nor is he convinced that there was an understanding between Maloy and Denise Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her. These determinations, it should be clear, reflect the fact-finder’s assessment of the quality and weight of the evidence; although properly made by the undersigned in his role as the trier of fact, they are not affirmative findings concerning what occurred or did not occur during the relevant timeframe.18 Tina Williams Tina Williams (no relation to Denise) was Maloy’s aide at the County Commission for about six months, from July 15, 1999, through the end of that year. Before coming to work for Maloy, she had worked as an accountant at the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), the state agency where persons who believe they have been discriminated against can file charges as a first step towards redress. Tina Williams had been introduced to Maloy in late 1998 by a mutual acquaintance, Edward Dixon, who at the time was not only a Gadsden County Commissioner but also was associated with the FCHR in some way. A few months later, Tina Williams had bumped into Maloy again at a local function, and he had asked her to apply for the position as his aide, which she later did. After having received favorable recommendations from Commissioner Dixon and from Ron McElrath, a fraternity brother of Maloy’s who was then the Executive Director of the FCHR, Maloy had hired Tina Williams. Tina Williams claims that Maloy sexually harassed her on numerous occasions, in various ways, starting before she was hired and continuing into September 1999. She testified, for example, that he frequently put his hand on her lap or attempted to do so, hugged and attempted to kiss her, talked dirty on the telephone, and made suggestive comments, including, once when they were on an out-of-town business trip together, “this is so soft” in reference to the bed in her hotel room. Tina Williams testified that the harassment stopped in September 1999, at which point, she asserted, Maloy became increasingly critical of her work and avoided her. Their relationship, she testified, seemed to improve in November 1999, but then in December Maloy asked for her resignation, which she tendered.19 Maloy testified that he hired Tina Williams to be his aide with high expectations concerning her abilities but soon became disappointed in her failure, as he saw it, to measure up. At hearing, Maloy asserted that Tina Williams had simply not worked out in the position for a number of reasons that need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that Maloy testified he asked Tina Williams to leave in December 1999 because he was generally dissatisfied with her performance on the job. Maloy flatly denies that he ever said or did anything to Tina Williams that could be considered improper or untoward, including touching, kissing, hugging, shoulder-rubbing, suggestive comments, or like conduct. The conflicts in the evidence concerning Tina Williams’s allegations of harassment clearly cannot be attributed to individuals’ unique perspectives or differences of opinion. This is not a situation where two people have described the same historical event in different but reconcilable terms; instead, the testimony has produced two mutually exclusive versions of history. Determining which of the protagonists is telling the purest truth is a difficult task made tougher by several factors. First, there is no independent corroboration of either his testimony or her testimony by a witness having personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts. This is a greater problem for the Commission, of course, because Maloy did not have the burden to prove his innocence. Absent independent corroboration, the conflicting testimony presents a classic “he said-she said” dilemma whose resolution, if one must choose between the competing narratives,20 depends on whether “he” or “she” is deemed to be the more credible witness. In this particular case, because the Commission bears the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence, Tina Williams must be judged not just credible, but considerably more credible than Maloy to sustain a finding of guilt.21 Herein, then, lies the second factor (or interrelated pair of factors) that complicates the fact-finding function: Neither participant’s testimony is inherently incredible;22 and conversely, neither one’s testimony is inherently more credible than the other’s. Tina Williams’s saga of sexual harassment cannot be rejected out of hand as a fabrication; it is obviously not fantastic. Upon hearing her story, one does not think, “That could not possibly have happened.” To the contrary, Tina Williams’s testimony is very believable. And yet, Maloy’s testimony, too, is eminently believable. He has not presented some half-baked alibi that tests credulity but rather has said exactly what one would expect an innocent man, falsely accused of sexual harassment, to say: “I did not do it.” What more, indeed, could he say, if in fact he were innocent? There was, really, no way for Maloy affirmatively to disprove the particular allegations that Tina Williams made. Third, having closely observed both Tina Williams and Maloy on the witness stand, the undersigned is unable to state with assurance, based on their respective demeanors, which of the two was probably telling the truth——or who was not. Both appeared to be sincere in recounting what had happened (or not happened) as they recalled the events in question. Neither appeared to the fact-finder to be lying. After carefully weighing all of the evidence with the foregoing factors in mind, the undersigned is not so convinced by either side’s proof as to conclude with confidence that any particular version of history advanced at hearing is highly verisimilar relative to the competing alternative. To the point, the evidence at bottom does not produce in the mind of this fact-finder a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of Tina Williams’s allegations.23 Thus, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Tina Williams. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, however, the undersigned finds that there was no understanding between Maloy and Tina Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ultimate Factual Determinations24 The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that the Commission has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Maloy violated either Section 112.313(2) or Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as charged, in relation to his respective associations with Laurie Bradley, Ophelia Morris, Denise Williams, and Tina Williams. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Maloy is not guilty of the ethics violations with which he has been charged.
Recommendation The fact-finder having determined that the evidence fails clearly and convincingly to establish a factual basis for culpability on any ground charged, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order declaring Maloy not guilty of violating Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
Findings Of Fact On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rule 33-22.012, 3-12, Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rule. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, contains rules governing "inmate discipline." Those rules provide the general policy of the Respondent concerning inmate discipline (Rule 33-22.001), terminology and definitions (Rule 33-22.002), the procedures for taking disciplinary action against inmates (Rules 33-22.003-33-22.010), and the "Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions (the Challenged Rule). Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: 33-22.012 Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions. The following table shows established maximum penalties for the indicated offenses. As used in the table, "DC" means the maximum number of days of disciplinary confinement that may be imposed and "GT" means the maximum number of days of gain time that may be taken. Any portion of either penalty may be applied. "All GT" includes both earned and unearned gain time. In addition to the penalties listed below, inmates may be required to pay for damaged, destroyed or misappropriated property under the provisions of rule 33-22.008(2)(b)13. . . . . Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, includes a table listing of various offenses for which disciplinary action may be taken and the maximum penalty for such offenses. The Challenged Rule provides that "Possession of any other contraband" is an offense for which discipline may be imposed on inmates. The Challenged Rule also provides that the maximum penalty for this offense is 15 days of disciplinary confinement and loss of 30 days gain time. The Challenged Rule does not include a definition of "contraband." Rule 33-22.012, 3-1 to 3-11, Florida Administrative Code, designates the possession of certain specific items of contraband to be a ground for discipline and provides the maximum penalty therefore. The Petitioner has alleged, in part, that the Challenged Rule is invalid because it: . . . constitutes an invalid rule where the rule has exceeded its grant of authority as contain in 944.47, Florida Statutes (1991), in that the rule seeks to define contraband to be "any other contraband" not defined as such by enabling legislation contrary to Section 120.52(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). As matter of fact, the rule . . . goes beyond the statutory definition of contraband with the inclusive phrase "any other contraband" without more. . . . The Petitioner also alleged that the Challenged Rule is invalid pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes, for essentially the same reason. The Petitioner further alleged that the Challenged Rule is vague and vest unbridled discretion in the Respondent because of the failure to define "any other contraband" in the Challenged Rule. Finally, the Petitioner alleged that the Challenged Rule is arbitrary and capricious because there is "no logical basis in fact to condemn legally lawful material as contraband with the phrase 'any other'. Rule 33-3.006, Florida Administrative Code, provides a definition of the term "contraband." There is, therefore, no reason to further define the term "contraband" used in the Challenged Rule. The reference to "any other" is merely an indication that the penalty provided for in the Challenged Rule is for the possession of any contraband (as defined elsewhere) other than contraband specifically listed in Rule 33-22.012, 3-1 through 3-11.
The Issue Is the Respondent unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or as a result of any mental or physical condition? If yes, what is the appropriate disciplinary response to that impediment?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, in accordance with Chapters 20, 455, and 458, Florida Statutes, regulates the practice of physician's assistants in Florida. The Respondent practices as a physician's assistant in Florida. His license number is PA002355. PRESENT EMPLOYMENT At present, the Respondent works as a physician's assistant for Michael Dulaney, M.D. Dr. Dulaney is a board- certified family practitioner. The Respondent has worked for Dr. Dulaney for approximately one year. Dr. Dulaney has been satisfied with the Respondent's work. Dr. Dulaney has had no reports of problems with the Respondent's conduct reported by patients or other office staff. In particular, Dr. Dulaney does not have any specific knowledge concerning complaints made about Respondent related to sexual misconduct from the period February, 1992 forward. At present, the Respondent's practice in Dr. Dulaney's office is limited to treatment of adults; however, Dr. Dulaney would not be opposed to having the Respondent treat minors and adults. Dr. Dulaney is aware of the reasons for the present restrictions on the Respondent's practice, limited to care of adults. These limits are as had been imposed by the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) based upon the Respondent's mental health status. The controls that are in place by Dr. Dulaney to limit the Respondent's present practice to adults include an inquiry by office staff when an appointment is made by a patient as to the age of the patient and another check when the patient arrives for the appointment as to the patient's age. The Respondent is also required to check the patient's age before rendering care. The protocol followed by Dr. Dulaney in his practice is to the effect that no female patient is examined by a doctor or a physician's assistant without a second staff member being in attendance. The second staff member would be a female. Should the Respondent not be allowed to provide care to minors in the future, Dr. Dulaney would allow the Respondent to remain as a physician's assistant and treat adults only. HISTORY On or about June 18, 1992, following allegations regarding custodial sexual battery of his 14-year-old stepdaughter, K.B., the Respondent entered into a monitoring contract with the PRN. The Respondent had also sexually abused his six or seven-year-old daughter from his first marriage. The Respondent was sexually abused by male and female siblings as a child. Raymond Pomm, M.D. specializes in general psychiatry, as well as addiction psychiatry. Among other duties, Dr. Pomm is a staff psychiatrist for the PRN. While under the terms of the monitoring contract in connection with the State of Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation's Impaired Practitioner's Program, Dr. Pomm consulted the Respondent's physician employers on occasion to determine the Respondent's conduct as a physician's assistant. Dr. Pomm never received a report from the employers that the Respondent was acting inappropriately. On these occasions, the employers would indicate that they were satisfied with the Respondent' s work. When the Respondent signed the monitoring contract with the PRN, he agreed not to see patients under 18 years of age; to have a supervising physician report to the PRN on a quarterly basis regarding his behavior. The Respondent's supervising physician was responsible to make sure that patient information forms were handed out to patients to allow the patients to give immediate feedback concerning their perception of the Respondent's behavior. The supervising physician was to review 10 percent of the Respondent's charts on a quarterly basis. The Respondent was to receive ongoing therapy from John Vallely, Ph.D., a psychologist. On December 28, 1993, Dr. Goetz, the Director of the PRN, wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation to advise the Secretary that Dr. Goetz was convinced that the Respondent's impairment seriously effected the public health, safety and welfare. This was followed by action by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, to bring the Administrative Complaint, under Case No. 93-07340, charging the Respondent with being unable to practice his profession as a physician's assistant with reasonable skill and safety to patients based upon his illness and mental status. The Administrative Complaint makes reference to the opinion of Dr. Vallely. The opinion of Dr. Vallely which promoted the complaint was that the Respondent carried an Axis II Diagnosis of Mixed Personality Disorder with Obsessive- Compulsive, Anti-Social and Paranoid Features, and that the Respondent would need long-term therapy. The Administrative Complaint makes reference to a recommendation by Dr. Vallely that the Respondent's practice be limited to patients 18 years of age and older. Dr. Vallely did not testify in this proceeding to render his opinion concerning the Respondent's fitness to practice. Testimony on this subject was presented by Barbara A. Stein, M.D., testifying for the Petitioner. She is board-certified in general psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. In opposition to that testimony, the Respondent presented the testimony of Keith R. D'Amato, Ph.D., who is a clinical and forensic psychologist, who treated the Respondent. The Respondent also presented the testimony of Gini Fort, M.A., in counseling psychology, who worked with Dr. D'Amato in treating the Respondent. The Administrative Complaint makes reference to findings by George Bernard, M.D., who examined the Respondent and diagnosed the Respondent as suffering from pedophilia, opposite sex, non-exclusive type. Dr. Bernard did not testify in this proceeding. The Administrative Complaint makes reference to a determination on July 8, 1993, when the Respondent was evaluated by Gene Abel, M.D., of the Behavioral Medicine Institute in Atlanta, Georgia, in which Dr. Abel recommended that the Respondent not be in a medical setting, where the Respondent had proximity to girls under 18 years of age, nor in proximity to his former victim, taken to mean the Respondent's stepdaughter, until the Respondent had further treatment. Dr. Abel did not testify in this proceeding. Finally, the Administrative Complaint makes reference to the reference by Dr. Vallely, on December 16, 1993, in which Dr. Vallely described the Respondent as "a highly dangerous sex offender with pedophilic desires and attractions". The Respondent was also seen by Michael J. Herkov, Ph.D. at the time the Respondent was seen by Dr. Bernard. Dr. Herkov is a psychologist. Dr. Herkov did not testify in this proceeding. The treatment and evaluations performed by Drs. Vallely, Bernard, Herkov and Abel were all in association with the monitoring performed by the PRN. Although the health care providers associated with the Respondent that have been mentioned in the prior paragraph did not testify in this proceeding, their insights assisted Drs. Stein and D'Amato and Ms. Fort in arriving at their opinions concerning the Respondent's condition. Consequently, it is to some advantage to describe the history of treatment and evaluation by those health care providers, notwithstanding the inability to rely upon their independent judgment in determining the Respondent's present ability to render care with reasonable skill and safety. The Respondent began seeing Dr. Vallely in June, 1992 and received treatment off and on until December, 1993. For the benefit of the PRN, Dr. Vallely indicated that the Respondent carried a diagnosis of pedophilia and mixed personality disorder with obsessive- compulsive, antisocial and paranoid features. Dr. Vallely tried to address these conditions. Other attempts were made by the PRN to assist the Respondent. On December 9, 1992, the Respondent saw Drs. Bernard and Herkov. They diagnosed the Respondent as having pedophilia, opposite sex, non-exclusive type. At that time, according to a report by these health care providers, there was no information indicating that the Respondent was being presently sexually inappropriate with patients or any indication that he would engage in that behavior in the future. The recommendation by Drs. Bernard and Herkov was that the Respondent continue to be restricted in seeing children under the age of 18, be they male or female, until such time as the Respondent's treating therapist felt that the restriction was no longer necessary. The Respondent was initially treated by Dr. Vallely through June 18, 1993, at which time, Dr. Vallely suspended the Respondent's care. At that juncture, Dr. Vallely expressed the view to the PRN that the Respondent was manipulating therapy in attempting to gain closer contact with his stepdaughter. At that time, the Respondent expressed the view to the PRN that he did not believe that he was being heard by Dr. Vallely and that Dr. Vallely was overreacting. The Respondent requested another therapist to resolve this conflict. The PRN recommended that another evaluation be performed by a professional. This led to an evaluation by Dr. Abel in Atlanta, Georgia. The evaluation by Dr. Abel took place on July 8, 1993. Dr. Abel is recognized as an expert in the treatment of child sexual abusers. Although Dr. Abel did not arrive at a formal diagnosis, he summarized his belief of the continuing existence of pedophilia on the Respondent's part and a concern about the Respondent's manifest symptoms of arousal in relation to minor females. That concern was addressed through a penile plethysmophgraphy performed on the Respondent, in which the Respondent evidenced arousal to young girls. In his conclusions, Dr. Abel recommended that the Respondent should not be allowed to treat girls under 18 years of age. The Respondent then returned to receive therapy from Dr. Vallely. The Respondent and Dr. Vallely continued to have conflict concerning the Respondent's relationship with his stepdaughter and the Respondent's intention to remarry his ex-wife. Eventually, the Respondent was expelled from the program administered by Dr. Vallely. This expulsion took place on December 16, 1993 and was followed by the correspondence of December 28, 1993 by Dr. Goetz recommending that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation find that the Respondent's condition seriously effected the public's health, safety and welfare. The Respondent was referred to Dr. D'Amato from the State Attorney's Office. This was in association with the case of State of Florida v. Stephen Allan Newbern, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 92-3347CF CR-C, as agreed to by the Respondent's counsel. The day Dr. D'Amato first saw the Respondent was February 10, 1994. The case described was the case in which the Respondent was accused of custodial sexual battery directed to his stepdaughter, K.B. Following the Respondent's decision to remarry his ex-wife, the Respondent was arrested in association with the aforementioned Circuit Court case, in which he had previously been allowed probation to participate in the program conducted by Dr. Vallely. The reason for the Respondent's arrest was premised upon a report by Dr. Vallely concerning the Respondent's decision to remarry his ex-wife. The Circuit Court case was then disposed of on June 24, 1994, in which an order was entered by the court following the Respondent's plea of guilty to a lesser included offense in Count I, lewd and lascivious act. For that plea, the Respondent had his guilt withheld; the Respondent was placed on community control for a period of two years, followed by eight years probation; and the Respondent was ordered not to have contact with his stepdaughter, directly or indirectly, without consent from his counselor or the Community Control Officer. The Respondent was ordered to pay for his stepdaughter's counseling or treatment through a treatment facility or counselor to which the stepdaughter had been referred, as directed by the Community Control Officer. The Respondent was ordered to continue his psychosexual counseling through Dr. D'Amato, who had substituted for Dr. Vallely. In this connection, the Respondent, in February of 1992, had voluntarily hospitalized himself based upon panic attacks and depression. Subsequently, an investigation was conducted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the INS of the Navy; and the Respondent was arrested and incarcerated for 21 days for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. As a consequence, he was referred to the KIDS Sexual Offender Program, in Jacksonville, Florida, and directed to receive treatment from Dr. Vallely. In March or April of 1992, the Respondent was advised by his Naval Preceptor, Dr. Carrierre, to refer himself to the PRN. The Respondent accepted that advice and took the referral in May, 1992 and signed a contract in June, 1992 to monitor his mental health status. The Navy found him guilty of the sex offense and allowed him to remain in the service on active duty until his retirement on October 31, 1992. During this time, he served as a physician's assistant but was limited in his practice to adults only. When the Respondent attempted to reunite with his ex-wife in February, 1993, Dr. Vallely suspended him from the KIDS Program. In June, 1994, the Respondent was accused of violating his probation associated with the case in which he was a participant in the KIDS Program. The allegation of violation of probation was in relation to the Respondent's decision to stay with his ex-wife and stepdaughter in January, 1994. The Respondent was not prosecuted for this violation because he agreed to enter Dr. D'Amato's sexual offender program. In turn, he entered a nolo contendere plea to lewd and lascivious act and had the order entered on June 24, 1994 setting the terms of continued probation. The Respondent received treatment from Dr. D'Amato and Ms. Fort for approximately two years. In his practice, Dr. D'Amato specializes in the treatment of sexual offenders and has treated 500-700 persons with those conditions. Of those persons, two to three percent have been referred for a jail sentence and another two to three percent have been terminated from the treatment program. To deal with the Respondent's pedophilia, Dr. D'Amato conducted an initial clinical interview. Dr. D'Amato performed a number of tests to gain an impression of the Respondent's condition, to include the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Beck Depression Inventory, the Columbia Sexual Screening Questionnaire, the Jackson Incest Blame Questionnaire, the Wilson Sex Fantasy Questionnaire, the Sexual History Questionnaire, and the Sexual Interest Card Sort. Following the initial assessment, Dr. D'Amato entered the Respondent into a treatment program, which had four levels. Level I was designed to insure safety of the community by restricting movement and by insuring that the Respondent owned up to and took responsibility for the sexual offense that had been committed against his stepdaughter. Levels II and III were devoted to psycho-educational activities, where the Respondent was expected to learn to identify antecedents to the sexual misconduct that had been committed. Level IV was a relapse-prevention process to allow the Respondent to develop a comprehensive plan that could "offshoot" any problems, stresses or arousals that would lead the Respondent to re-offend in the future. During the first phase of the treatment received by the Respondent, an abuse letter was written, a meeting was held with the victim to confront the abuse, history of the abuse was taken, and an apology letter was written. During the second and third phases, the Respondent learned to identify stresses that may lead to problems and to develop empathy for the victim. The emphasis of Dr. D'Amato's program that he administered to the Respondent was cognitive in nature. The program was anticipated to last between two and five years, depending on the person receiving the therapy. Patients in the program are seen in group treatment and, in some instances, receive marital or family therapy individually. The Respondent had polygraphs administered to him to attempt to determine if there was ongoing sexual abuse and to determine if the types of fantasies that the Respondent was entertaining when he entered the treatment program were still in evidence. In treating the Respondent, Dr. D'Amato did not use behavioral therapy to any large extent. This choice was made because having the Respondent undergo polygraphs and looking at the Respondent's psychological assessments which were done over the years, led Dr. D'Amato to believe that the primary problem that the Respondent had was in distorting information. It was observed, through the polygraph examinations, that the Respondent was not showing deviant sexual arousal. Therefore, it was not deemed necessary to offer treatment to deal with that form of problem. It was deemed more important to deal with cognitive restructuring of the Respondent and his view of life and people and interpersonal relationships. The Respondent did receive some behavioral training in his treatment by Dr. D'Amato, referred to as covert desensitization and role playing. Dr. D'Amato believes that cognitive therapy is the best approach to treating pedophilia, non-exclusive type, which the Respondent evidenced. Non-exclusive pedophiles, as defined in DSM-IV, have age-appropriate relationships, whereas fixated pedophiles focus exclusively on children. The Respondent was last seen by Dr. D'Amato in March, 1996. At that time, Dr. D'Amato diagnosed the Respondent as having a mixed personality disorder, NOS., with slight depression, not of a clinical nature, that the Respondent still suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and pedophilia, non-exclusive type in remission. Dr. D'Amato does not believe that the Respondent needs to undergo further treatment to address the Respondent's condition, in that the Respondent is not showing any active symptoms, has acted in a responsible manner in his work and life, and has integrated back into his family. To require therapy when it is not needed would cause the Respondent to be more resistant, and the Respondent would not grow from the experience, according to Dr. D'Amato. Dr. D'Amato believes that the Respondent has good relapse prevention skills and has shown that he is implementing those skills in his life. Dr. D'Amato relied upon the polygraph examinations to determine whether the cognitive therapy received by the Respondent was successful. In doing so, Dr. D'Amato recognizes that the polygraph measures physiological responses following the subject's answer to a question. Dr. D'Amato did not refer to the prior penile plethysmophgraphy testing to confirm the Respondent's status and did not administer that test. He sees the latter test as being a measurement of sexual response to pictures, which is less important to Dr. D'Amato than the question of whether the Respondent is having sexual fantasies or acting out in a sexually-inappropriate way, which Dr. D'Amato believes the polygraph examination would uncover. Dr. D'Amato has experienced 95 percent success in the treatment of sexual offenders. Nonetheless, he recognizes that this success does not establish that persons who are pedophiles, who have not been known to re-offend, are cured. Dr. D'Amato is not aware of any reports concerning misconduct by the Respondent in treating patients. Dr. D'Amato does not believe that the Respondent should have his practice restricted to adults only. Dr. D'Amato was impressed with the Respondent's ability to deal with stress in relation to a death within the Respondent's family, various legal problems associated with the Respondent's sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, his work load, and the re-unification of the Respondent's family, without committing further sexual abuse based upon the stress. Dr. D'Amato saw the experience which the Respondent had in re-unifying his family as being helpful to his treatment by giving the Respondent the opportunity to deal with the realities of those relationships and to reconstruct those relationships in a positive manner. Dr. D'Amato observed that the Respondent's religious convictions assisted the Respondent in his rehabilitation by sharing the experience with his family and providing a code of conduct to follow. Dr. D'Amato recognized that the Respondent's character structure would not change over time but believed that the Respondent would change his behavior based upon new strategies and coping lessons that he had learned in the treatment. Dr. D'Amato expressed the opinion that if the Petitioner automatically revoked or suspended the Respondent's license to practice as a physician's assistant, the Respondent would not come forward and seek treatment in the future if he experienced a problem, and the result would be more sexual abuse. Ms. Fort expressed the opinion that the Respondent was a low or no- risk candidate for recidivism. Further, she indicated that the Respondent had successfully handled stress related to his older son coming home and financial difficulties. Ms. Fort expressed the belief that given the Respondent's successful completion of therapy, the Respondent could be in close contact with children in private. In performing her evaluation of the Respondent, Dr. Stein spoke to Dr. D'Amato and Ms. Fort concerning the care they rendered to the Respondent. Dr. Stein saw the Respondent on referral from the Physicians Resource Network, formerly known as the Physicians Recovery Network. Dr. Stein examined the Respondent in February, 1996. Dr. Stein's evaluation included an interview with the Respondent and preparation of a history. Dr. Stein also had access to collateral information from other treatment professionals who had seen the Respondent. Dr. Stein contacted individuals who were familiar with the Respondent's professional and private life. Dr. Stein arranged for Flora Zaken- Greenberg, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to perform a clinical interview, record review, and psychological testing by use of a WAIS-R, Beck anxiety inventory, Beck depression inventory, MMPI-2, MCMI-III, and Roschach. Dr. Stein took all of these matters into account in preparing a report of her forensic psychiatric examination. That report was rendered on March 9, 1996. Dr. Stein, in her report, and at hearing, expressed the opinion that the Respondent suffers from pedophilia, non-exclusive type, DSM-IV 302.2, and personality disorder, not otherwise specified, which includes narcissistic, antisocial and dependent personality traits. Dr. Stein pointed out that pedophilia is a type of sexual deviant disorder, which lasts for at least six months, in which setting, the individual has strong urges, behaviors or fantasies of having sex with a prepubescent child, and this impairs the life of the pedophile. In a non-exclusive type of pedophilia, the individual may also have relationships with adults. Dr. Stein described the Respondent's personality disorder as being a circumstance in which the Respondent has difficulty viewing and interacting with the world. The Respondent sees the world through a distorted view, thinking in a distorted way, interacting in a distorted way, being impulsive and having a tendency to have mood problems from time to time. Those traits endure and impair him. That disorder does not necessarily mean that the Respondent could not work. In Dr. Stein's opinion, pedophilia cannot be cured and is a disease that has a very high relapse rate, notwithstanding that there are periods in which the pedophile does not have urges or behaviors or fantasies directed to prepubescent children. Dr. Stein holds the opinion that the Respondent will, given his condition of pedophilia, be at greater risk of sexually acting out inappropriately regardless of whether it is in the workplace or elsewhere. Dr. Stein expresses this opinion with the knowledge that the Respondent has learned a great deal from his sexual offender treatment and that the experience that he has had in participating in the treatment has lowered the risk for him to re- offend. Nonetheless, according to Dr. Stein, his psychological testing shows an underlying character structure that creates a potential for sexual deviance, impulsivity, antisocial acts, and impaired interpersonal relations, particularly so when under stress; and that set of circumstances has not changed overtime. Dr. Stein believes that the Respondent should have his practice as a physician's assistant restricted to adults only and the practice monitored. Dr. Stein believes that the monitoring should include biannual polygraph examinations, in which the following questions are asked: (1) have you had sexual feelings towards children under the age of 18 accompanied by your adult patients?; (2) have you concealed any relevant sexual history from your therapist?; (3) have you attempted to access those or other children under the age of 18?. Finally, Dr. Stein believes that the Respondent should participate in a relapse prevention group for the next 12 months and at least at quarterly intervals beyond that point for an indefinite period. She believes that this would assist the Respondent in relapse prevention, to build a repertoire to decrease his risk for re-offending and to protect society from a professional in his position of trust who has a disorder which cannot be cured. Dr. Stein believes that the additional 12-month therapy, followed by quarterly therapy for an indefinite period, is necessary to preserve a degree of continuity and to reinforce the skills achieved by the Respondent in addressing his condition and promotes the further recognition by the Respondent that he knows that he has to answer to people, and that there are external controls in a setting in which his internal controls are not as good as they need to be. The use of a polygraph on a biannual basis would be a means to aid in the process of exerting controls over the Respondent's conduct. Dr. Stein does not believe that it is necessary to revoke or suspend the Respondent's license completely to address his condition and protect the public. From the views held by Drs. Stein and D'Amato and Ms. Fort, it is clear and convincing that the Respondent has a mental condition which effects his practice as a physician's assistant and the ability to render care with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. According to the evidence, the Respondent has performed his practice in an acceptable manner when limited to treating adults only. Dr. D'Amato and Ms. Fort believe that the Respondent could practice as a physician's assistant in contact with children. Dr. Stein disagrees with that opinion. The experts also disagree concerning recidivism rates for pedophiles. Dr. D'Amato and Ms. Fort believe that the rate is low for their program. Dr. Stein does not generally hold that opinion. Given the seriousness of the Respondent's illness and the risk it presents to children, the lack of ability to cure his condition, and the possibility of relapse, however slight, there is a real concern about patient safety should the Respondent be allowed to practice as a physician's assistant treating children. To that end, Dr. Stein's opinion is more compelling when she urges restrictions on the Respondent's practice. Although Dr. D'Amato does not believe that a relapse prevention program is needed for the Respondent, if determined to be needed, he is persuaded that a program should only extend for six months. Having considered the views held by Drs. Stein and D'Amato, a further relapse prevention program of six months provided by Dr. D'Amato, together with quarterly therapy for an indefinite period beyond that point, with biannual polygraph tests of the sort recommended by Dr. Stein, is appropriate to insure that children, who are treated in the office where the Respondent practices, remain safe. No evidence was produced which would suggest that the Respondent should be completely denied the privilege to practice as a physician's assistant based upon concern that he would not proceed with reasonable skill and safety by reason of his mental illness. The restrictions that are discussed above adequately protect the public without depriving the Respondent of his livelihood.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Thaw, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, restricting his practice as a physician s assistant to adults only, requiring the Respondent to undergo an additional six months of relapse prevention therapy, followed by quarterly therapy sessions for an indefinite period and biannual polygraph examinations. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Terry D. Bork, Esquire 200 West Forsyth Street, Suite 1100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202-4308 Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street1 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Rural Metro of North Florida, Inc., violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on October 11, 1999, as an Emergency Medical Technician Basic, until July 2001 when he was reclassified with Respondent as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic, until his termination from employment with Respondent on April 16, 2003. In July 2001, Petitioner told his then manager, Dominic Persichini, that he no longer wanted to work with his partner, Marlene Sanders, and he requested a transfer. Petitioner gave as his reason for the transfer that Ms. Sanders was interested in him in an inappropriate way which disrupted his family life. He never actually heard Ms. Sanders make any inappropriate sexual remarks directed at him. Ms. Sanders accused Petitioner of allowing his wife to interfere with their working relationship and to involving herself in Ms. Sanders' personal life, which made her uncomfortable working with Petitioner. On March 27, 2002, Stephen Glatstein, Respondent's new General Manager, wrote a letter to Petitioner in which he acknowledged that problems had occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Sanders, that the two of them would be separated and reassigned to new shifts, and that Petitioner was being reassigned to the B-shift rotation (1800-0600 hours), which conflicted with his family duties. Petitioner received a good evaluation and a pay raise dated February 15, 2003, in which his supervisor, Ryan Jenkins, stated that "Michael's abilities meet or exceed industry standards. Michael keeps current by completing CEU's and taking refresher classes. There is one new Corrective Action Notice in his file since last year involving a post move. The incident was on 08-07-02 and to my knowledge there have not been any further problems since." Further, the evaluation reads that "Michael shows a great attitude and appears to really enjoy his job. This makes him very easy to work with. Michael's good personality and working knowledge of E.M.S. is a benefit to the customers that he serves. It is clear that we should be proud to have Michael as part of our team." Petitioner received letters of commendation from his supervisors and letters of thanks from patients and their families he had served. In April 2003, Natashia Duke, a new employee with Respondent, went to the General Manager, Mr. Chalmers, and accused Petitioner of having made statements of a sexual nature to her and of touching her inappropriately. Ms. Duke provided a written statement to Mr. Chalmers who forwarded the information to the Division General Manager, Chris Rucker. Mr. Rucker advised Mr. Chalmers to place Petitioner on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning Ms. Duke's complaint. Mr. Chalmers followed this instruction and placed Petitioner on leave. Mr. Rucker traveled to Pensacola to meet with Mr. Chalmers and Ms. Duke. At this meeting, Ms. Duke reaffirmed what she had written in the complaint against Petitioner and told Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers about another employee she believed had been sexually harassed by Petitioner, Kristy Bradberry. The next day, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers interviewed Ms. Bradberry who informed them that she had been sexually harassed by Petitioner. She provided a written statement which described the alleged harassment in detail. Ms. Bradberry told the interviewers of another person she believed had suffered sexual harassment by Petitioner, Tina Dunsford (Tina Richardson at the time of her complaint). Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers next interviewed Ms. Dunsford who confirmed that Petitioner had sexually harassed her as well by making sexual comments and propositions to her, and by touching her inappropriately. After Ms. Dunsford's interview, Ryan Jenkins, another of Respondent's employees, reported that Ms. Dunsford had complained to him of sexual harassment by Petitioner a few months earlier. Mr. Jenkins had failed to take any action on the previous complaint. After interviewing the three complainants, Ms. Duke, Ms. Bradberry, and Ms. Dunsford, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers met with Petitioner. At that meeting, Petitioner denied all of the allegations made by the three female co-workers and gave no explanation for what they alleged had happened. Mr. Rucker believed the statements given by the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner were credible. Mr. Rucker made the decision with Mr. Chalmers to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent had no prior history of problems with any of the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner. Petitioner believes the sexual harassment charges were trumped up against him so that Respondent could fire him, since he was beyond the company probationary period and therefore could be terminated only for a business purpose pursuant to the company employee handbook. No evidence was produced at hearing to support a violation of company policy by Respondent in Petitioner's termination. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was employed with the Escambia County E.M.S.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Welch 2060 Burjonik Lane Navarre, Florida 32566-2118 John B. Trawick, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge 226 Palafox Place Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32591-1831 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's law enforcement certification should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Base upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Lloyd H. Sisk, held law enforcement certificate number 2252 issued by petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission). Respondent has held his license since April 3, 1971. When the events herein occurred, Sisk was employed as a detective with the Charlotte County Sheriff's Department. The charges against respondent are based upon an allegation of sexual abuse lodged against him by his niece, S. C., who is now seventeen years of age. The abuse allegedly occurred between December 1986 and February 1988. To place this controversy in proper perspective, a brief discussion of the living arrangements in the Sisk household is appropriate. In 1983 respondent, his wife, Brenda, and Brenda's mother (grandmother) decided to jointly purchase a home in Port Charlotte, Florida. Also residing with the Sisks were their teen-age son, Jeffrey, and the alleged victim. The grandmother had been given legal custody over the alleged victim, who was the daughter of Janis, Brenda's sister. Janis lived in Pinellas County, but because of various legal and personal problems, she had relinquished custody of her daughter to the grandmother shortly after S. C.'s birth. In late 1986, and over the objections of the grandmother and alleged victim, the Sisks decided to sell the home. This in turn engendered antagonism and animosity between the members of the family component and eventually culminated in the sexual abuse charges being made. The home was finally sold in February 1988, or more than a year later. Before the sale occurred, the Sisks advised the grandmother and alleged victim that, because of constant friction, the grandmother and S. C. would not live with the Sisks and their son when they relocated to a new home. At almost the same time the sale took place, S. C. began making sexual abuse allegations against respondent. In this regard, the testimony is sharply conflicting. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence. The allegations first surfaced on an undisclosed date in February 1988 when S. C. told her sixteen year old boyfriend, James, that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her back massages and had put a condom on his penis while in her presence. On February 17, 1988, S. C. telephoned her mother in Pinellas County and said respondent had been coming home in the afternoon and asking to give her backrubs. The alleged victim further complained that, during those backrubs, respondent was "rubbing her butt and in between her legs". That same day, S. C. told her grandmother that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her backrubs. Three days later, S. C.'s mother, while in an intoxicated state, telephoned the Largo Police Department and relate the abuse allegations to a detective. That led to an investigation by the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office and the eventual filing of criminal charges by the state attorney and sexual abuse charges by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). 1/ At final hearing, the former boyfriend, grandmother and natural mother related the allegations described in the previous finding of fact. In addition, statements made by S. C. to an HRS counselor were offered into evidence. Finally, the alleged victim gave her version of what transpired. This included a rather graphic account of respondent, while in the presence of S. C., placing a condom on his penis and masturbating, and after attaining an erection a few minutes later, positioning his body next to S. C. and demonstrating various coital positions to his niece. The testimony of the alleged victim is not accepted as being credible for a number of reasons. To begin with, S. C. was extremely upset with respondent because the family home was being sold and she had been told that she could not remain with the Sisks. Her animosity towards respondent is also evidenced by the fact that, just prior to final hearing, she encouraged her mother (Janis) to "slam him (respondent)" with her testimony. It is also noted that the alleged victim's testimony at hearing differed in several material respects with the complaints she made to the Commission, HRS and in prior court testimony. Finally, the testimony of Lloyd, Brenda and Jeffrey Sisk, which is accepted as being credible, demonstrated numerous inconsistencies in S. C.'s testimony. Accordingly, it is found that respondent did not commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of his niece by exposing his penis and masturbating, and he did not handle her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area as alleged in the administrative complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Heading Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1990.
