The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's employment with Petitioner as a school bus driver should be terminated because he violated his rehabilitation contract and Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines by testing positive for cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida public school district. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about ten years and three months prior to his suspension without pay in the summer of 1996. The position of school bus driver is a safety-sensitive position. In June of 1989, Petitioner adopted a drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner directed its superintendent to develop guidelines to implement the policy. In December of 1991, Petitioner adopted Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines, GBCBA-G, which state as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. Employees in job classification which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. * * * Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four hour notification . . . . Random testing of employees shall not be conducted. Respondent signed a notice to all applicants and employees on April 15, 1992, advising him in advance that the drug-free workplace policy would become effective on June 15, 1992. This notice stated as follows: All pre-employment applicants will be drug-tested prior to being hired. All employees who require fitness-of-duty examination will be drug-tested at least once annually. An employee will be drug-tested when reasonable suspicion of substance abuse exists. An employee will be drug-tested following any work-related accident or mishap involving actual or potential injury or property damage. An employee will be drug-tested during any probationary period following a drug- related suspension or approved drug treatment program. Petitioner acknowledged that he received a copy of the drug-free workplace policy and understood the consequences of violating the drug-free workplace guidelines by signing the notice. The notice clearly states that failure to comply with the guidelines could result in termination of employment and forfeiture of eligibility for workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. The guidelines for the drug-free workplace policy are a part of Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the instructional and non-instructional bargaining units of the Alachua County Education Association (ACEA). The ACEA ratified the policy and guidelines in January of 1993. The Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines have been continuously in effect since that time. Article XI, Section 1(B) of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the ACEA requires Petitioner to provide school bus drivers with an annual physical as required by the rules of the State Board of Education. Appendix F of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the drug-free workplace guidelines. It states as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. * * * Employees in job classifications which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. * * * As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance programs, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The laboratory shall be chosen jointly by ACEA and SBAC if the employee is a member of the bargaining unit. The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. Employees who seek voluntary assistance for substance abuse may not be disciplined for seeking assistance. Employees shall be subject to all employer rules, regulations, and job performance standards with the understanding that an employee enrolled in a rehabilitation program is receiving treatment for an illness. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. Random testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law . . . . On December 13, 1994, Respondent signed the following statement: I have received, read, and understand the training materials on drug and alcohol testing under the U. S. Department of Transportation regulations. In January of 1995, Petitioner began complying with an additional drug testing program pursuant to a federal statute entitled Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA). Petitioner did not formally adopt a written policy or develop written guidelines to implement the new drug-testing program. Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the ACEA does not refer to OTETA or the federal regulations implementing it. Mandatory procedures governing drug testing in transportation workplaces under U. S. Department of Transportation regulations require that drug tests be performed using split samples. A "split specimen collection" consists of one urination followed by the splitting of that specimen into two bottles. If the primary specimen tests positive, the employee may request that the split specimen be sent to a different laboratory for testing. The majority of drug testing performed in this country is single specimen collection. Drug testing pursuant to state law and rules and the regulations of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services does not require employers to utilize split samples in the collection process. A split specimen generally is used only for purposes of testing pursuant to the regulations of the U. S. Department of Transportation. The U. S. Department of Transportation requires Petitioner to provide the following testing in transportation workplaces: (a) pre-employment testing; (b) post-accident testing; (c) random testing; (d) reasonable suspicion testing; return-to-duty testing; and (f) follow-up testing. OTETA does not require a routine fitness-for-duty drug test as part of an annual medical examination. State law does require such a test. OTETA requires random testing and post-accident testing. State law does not require these tests. Petitioner's guidelines as adopted in 1991 specifically prohibit random drug testing of employees. However, Petitioner's guidelines, as incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement, state that "[r]andom testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law." In June of 1995, Respondent received a routine fitness- for-duty drug test as part of his annual physical examination. The test yielded a positive result for cannabinoids and cocaine metabolites. Respondent did not contest the results of the test. On June 22, 1995, Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations had a conference with Respondent. During the conference, Respondent signed a medical records release and a rehabilitation contract. The rehabilitation contract stated as follows: . . . positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County, Florida. Respondent subsequently took leave to attend to his rehabilitation. By letter dated August 21, 1995, Petitioner's rehabilitation counselor at the Corner Drug Store reported that Respondent's drug tests from July 5th through August 16th were negative for illegal drugs. The counselor also informed Petitioner that Respondent had attended weekly intervention group meetings as required under the rehabilitation contract. The counselor did not recommend further treatment. A substance abuse professional, other than one who provided treatment, had to assess Respondent in order for him to return to work. In August of 1995, a clinical psychologist from The Education Center evaluated Respondent. The psychologist recommended that Respondent return to work subject to five years participation in the "random drug screening program that is in addition to the standard screening program." Respondent returned to his duties on or about August 26, 1995. His follow-up drug tests performed on October 25, 1995, January 17, 1996, and March 4, 1996, were reported as negative. On the morning of June 10, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that he was scheduled that day to take his regular annual physical examination, including a drug test. Respondent went to a medical facility in the northwest part of Gainesville for the physical exam during that morning. He went to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in the southwest part of Gainesville after work for his drug test. The following are routine procedures when a person goes to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville for a urine drug test: The front desk checks the donor's photographic identification, such as a driver's license. The collector takes the photo ID and the donor into a separate room to sign in. The collector asks the donor to remove any hat, if he or she is wearing one, and to empty his or her pockets onto the counter. The collector watches the donor wash and dry his or her hands. The donor selects a testing kit, which is individually packaged in a plastic bag, from a box. The kit contains a urinalysis bottle. The collector opens the bag, breaks the seal on the specimen bottle, and gives it to the donor. The collector shows the donor how much urine is required on the bottle. The collector takes the donor to the bathroom. The donor is informed that the toilet water contains bluing. The donor is instructed not to flush the toilet. After the collector leaves the bathroom, he or she cuts off the water to the sink using a lever outside the door. The donor stays in the restroom no longer than two and a half or three minutes. The donor comes out of the bathroom and hands the specimen bottle to the collector who is waiting outside. The collector checks the amount of urine in the bottle to be sure the quantity is at least 40 ML. The collector measures the temperature by means of a gauge on the outside of the bottle to be sure that the temperature is between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The collector notes this information on the chain-of-custody form. The bottle's cap is screwed on tightly. The collector also checks the appearance of the urine for any unusual color. The collector asks the donor to place his or her initials in the following three places: on the bag; on the chain-of-custody form peel-off label; and on the security seal. The security seal is placed over the top of the bottle. The collector dates and also initials the peel-off label. The collector then removes the label from the form and applies it to the bottle. The collector completes and signs part II of the multi-part chain-of-custody form. The collector separates copies one through three from copies four through seven. The collector hands the donor copies four through seven so that he or she can fill out part III with the donor's name, address and two telephone numbers. The donor signs the form certifying that he or she provided the specimen to the collector, that the bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in the donor's presence, and that the information on the form and on the bottle label is correct. The collector completes part IV of the multi- part forms, copies one through three, initiating the chain-of-custody documentation. The specimen bottle is then placed inside the plastic bag, which is sealed. Copies one through three of the multi-part form, which do not contain the name of the donor, are placed in a pouch on the side of the bag. Copies four through seven of the multi-part form are not sent with the specimen. Instead, one copy is retained at the collection site. Another copy is sent to the employer. The third copy is given to the donor. The bagged specimen bottle is kept in a box in a locked refrigerator with other packaged specimens prior to shipment by courier to the testing laboratory. The collector gives the donor a written checklist showing the steps to be taken in the urine collection process. The donor is asked to read the list and check to make sure that the procedures were followed. The donor signs this form indicating that the collector followed all appropriate steps in the collection process. Once a collector begins the collection process, he or she completes the process alone. No other collector at the site may perform any of the required steps or safeguards. In this case, Respondent signed the following statement in part III of the multi-part chain-of-custody form: I certify that I provided my specimen(s) to the collector, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in my presence, and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to the specimen bottle is correct. The collector gave Respondent a copy of the donor's checklist to read and verify that the collection procedures were followed. Respondent signed the donor's checklist. Elizabeth Verbeke was the person at Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville, Florida, who collected Respondent's urine specimen on June 10, 1996. She usually collected 50 to 60 urine specimens per week for drug testing. She has no independent recollection of collecting Respondent's specimen. However, there is no reason to believe that she failed to follow the laboratory's routine procedures in this case. Ms. Verbeke entered the word "none" at question five of part II on the chain-of-custody form, indicating the collection of Respondent's specimen was entirely routine. She noted no irregularities of any kind. The chain-of-custody identification number for Respondent's urine specimen was 026A13381. In part II of the chain-of-custody form, Ms. Verbeke indicated that she checked Respondent's picture identification, collected the urine specimen, and read the specimen's temperature within four minutes of collection. The specimen's temperature of 94 degrees Fahrenheit was within the proper range. The volume of the specimen was at least 40 milliliters. Later in the day on June 10, 1996, a courier picked up Respondent's urine specimen and transported it to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia. The laboratory performs forensic drug testing, as well as other kinds of tests. It processes about 8,000 specimens a month. The accessioner at the laboratory receives the specimens from the courier. Next, the accessioner examines the packaging and the sample bottles for any possible compromise of the security seals. Then, the accessioner compares each specimen bottle with the custody documents to ensure that they are accompanied by the correct paperwork. The accessioner places the urine specimens in batches with approximately 40 in each group. The accessioner pours a small portion of each specimen (an "aliquot"), one at a time, into a collection cup for analysis. The original specimen bottle with the remaining portion of the specimen is placed into temporary refrigerated storage until the initial test is deemed negative or positive. If the test is positive, the accessioner retrieves the original specimen bottle from temporary storage and pours a second aliquot for confirmation testing. The original specimen bottle, with the remaining portion of the specimen, is then placed in long-term frozen storage. Once testing is completed, the aliquots are discarded. Urine drug testing consists first of a rapid and relatively inexpensive procedure which is known as an immunoassay test. A positive result is confirmed by a more sophisticated and expensive technique called gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The second test, if properly performed, is one hundred percent accurate. The function of the initial test (immunoassay), is strictly to weed out the negatives. Perhaps 90 percent of all the samples that the laboratory processes are negatives. The initial test also identifies which drug group or groups should be the focus of the extraction procedure because there is no universal extraction procedure for all drugs. The second test (GC/MS), makes an unequivocal identification of a molecule based on its molecular structure. If the confirmation test is positive, the laboratory reports the results to the medical review officer (MRO) as positive for the particular drug group. On June 10, 1996, the laboratory's accessioner received Respondent's specimen from a courier. The specimen's chain-of- custody identification number was 026A13381. The accessioner assigned the specimen a unique lab accession number, number 01298048. Subsequently, Respondent's specimen was tested in the laboratory in the usual manner. The initial test on Respondent's specimen used the total cocaine metabolite screening method. When this method is used, any compound similar to cocaine in the specimen will give a positive result. The initial test on Respondent's specimen was reported as "8H," which means that it was a presumptive positive. For the immunoassay test, any compound similar to cocaine in an amount equal to or in excess of 300 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) is positive. In the confirmation test, Respondent's specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. After a person consumes cocaine, benzoylecgonine is present in that person's urine specimen. Respondent's specimen contained 303 ng/ml of benzoylecgonine. For the GC/MS test, any amount of benzoylecgonine equal to or in excess of 150 ng/ml is positive. Respondent's urine sample had an abnormally low level of creatinine. Creatinine is a waste product produced by every human being. Respondent's sample had a creatinine level of 17 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dl). Any creatinine level below 20 mg/dl may indicate dilution. When the creatinine level is low, it is possible that the donor consumed a large amount of fluid at least two to three hours before donating the sample in an attempt to dilute the specimen. It is also possible that water was added to the sample. The laboratory checked the specific gravity of Respondent's sample to determine whether the sample was adulterated. Respondent's specimen passed the specific gravity test. It had a specific gravity of 1.004. Anything over 1.003 is within normal range for specific gravity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's sample was not diluted outside of his body because the specific gravity of the specimen was normal and because the specimen's temperature was 94 degrees within four minutes of collection. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., inserted blind quality controls in the initial testing runs to determine whether the test analysis was valid. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., receives proficiency test inspections by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, was certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the State of Florida, and the College of American Pathologists to perform the kind of test at issue here. A scientist employed at Doctor's Laboratory, Inc., certified that the final result of the testing performed on Respondent's specimen was accurate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the tests of Respondent's urine specimen were performed in conformity with all applicable testing guidelines. On June 11, 1996, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, reported Respondent's test results to the MRO in Brunswick, Georgia, as being positive for benzoylecgonine. Dr. Robert H. Miller was the MRO who received the Respondent's drug test report. Dr. Miller is certified as an MRO through the American Association of Medical Review Officers. He works for MRO Services, Inc. The function of the MRO is to ascertain whether there is any medical reason for a given test result. If the individual has a legitimate prescription for a medication that showed up on a drug screen and there is no safety concern over the individual having a significant blood level of that particular substance at work, then the report to the employer is negative. In this case, the MRO reviewed the chain-of-custody form. He did not find any irregularity in the chain-of-custody for the Respondent's specimen. The MRO's office telephoned Petitioner on June 12, 1996, and requested that Petitioner have Respondent contact the MRO. Respondent returned the MRO's call that same day. During their conversation, the MRO informed Respondent about his drug test report. The MRO asked Respondent whether there might be any medical reason for the positive test result. Respondent informed the MRO that he had taken a prescription for a toothache. Respondent did not furnish the MRO with the name of a specific drug to account for the positive test result. Benzoylecgonine is the metabolite measured to identify cocaine. Cocaine is rarely used in ear, nose, and throat medical procedures, such as bronchoscopy. It is not available by prescription. The MRO properly determined that there was no medical reason for Respondent's positive drug test result. The MRO explained to Respondent that a re-test of his specimen was available. The MRO gave Respondent a toll-free telephone number to call if he wanted a re-test performed. By letter dated June 12, 1996, the MRO informed Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine. By correspondence dated June 13, 1996, the MRO provided Respondent with directions for obtaining a re-test of his specimen. Respondent did not request a re-test. MRO Services, Inc. receives about 1000 reports of drug tests from Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., each month. In the past three years, MRO Services, Inc., has not documented any cases where a re-test of a specimen created a discrepancy with initial test results produced by Doctors' Laboratory, Inc. Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations conducted a pre-termination conference with Respondent on June 18, 1996. The purpose of this meeting was to give Respondent an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In the conference, Respondent indicated his belief that a co-worker, Debra Martin, put cocaine in his drinking water without his knowledge. The Director of Employee Relations talked to individuals that Respondent thought might have witnessed his activities and the activities of Debra Martin on June 10, 1996. During the time in question, Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing and waxing buses. Respondent and Ms. Martin often would get drinking water for each other. Ice was available in coolers located in a building near the gas pumps and washrack. Water was available from a spigot next to the place where Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing the buses. Ms. Martin specifically denied that she ever put cocaine or any other illegal drug in Respondent's drinking water. Ms. Martin also tested positive for a controlled substance on June 10, 1996. She subsequently signed a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner. After completing her rehabilitation treatment, Ms. Martin returned to work as a school bus driver for Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Martin did not put cocaine in Respondent's drinking water without his knowledge at any time prior to his June 10, 1996, drug test. By letter dated June 19, 1996, Respondent was informed that the Superintendent intended to recommend that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order, terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Florida Education Association/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's certification as a correctional officer should be revoked under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in proceeding, I make the following findings of fact: The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer on November 26, 1981 and issued Certificate Number 19-81-500-03. The Respondent was a correctional officer with the Metro-Dade Department of Corrections ("MDDC") during the first four months of 1988. During the year 1988, all correctional officers with MDDC were required to take an annual physical exam which included a urine test. In February of 1988, the Respondent took his physical exam. As part of that exam, Respondent gave a urine sample at Mount Sinai Medical Clinic. The procedures followed in handling and testing the urine sample are set forth in paragraphs 13-26 of these Findings of Fact. The result of the toxicology report from that exam indicated the Respondent had tested positive for cocaine. The Respondent was informed of the test results by the Director of Operations for MDDC, Jerry Meese, who explained to Respondent the steps and conditions that would be necessary in order for Respondent to continue employment with the MDDC as a correctional officer. Respondent voluntarily signed an agreement whereby he acknowledged that he had tested positive for cocaine on or about February 12, 1988. Pursuant to that agreement, Respondent, also agreed to a leave of absence during which time he was to enter a rehabilitation program which he was to continue until he no longer needed assistance. Upon returning to his job, Respondent agreed to submit to random periodic drug screening for a period of twenty four months and agreed that any positive test results during that time period would result in termination. The Respondent did not contest the conditions for continued employment set forth above. After a ten day suspension, Respondent returned to work at MDDC. Respondent was referred by MDDC to New Horizons, a drug counseling program where he received treatment free of charge. On April 14, 1988, Mr. Meese instructed the Respondent to promptly present himself at the testing office to give a urine sample for drug testing. The Respondent stated that he had a family emergency and could not report for testing at that time. Mr. Meese gave Respondent a time period during that day during which he could report. However, Respondent subsequently called and stated he could not come for testing that day because of his family problems. Respondent never reported for testing on April 14 as ordered. On April 15, 1988, the Respondent was again ordered to submit to a urine test as per the drug testing agreement. Later that same day, the Respondent reported to the Mount Sinai Medical Center, which was responsible for the collection of urine samples for the MDDC. On both occasions when the Respondent gave urine samples, (February 12 and April 15) he reported to the Mount Sinai Medical Clinic where the sample was provided by Respondent in a sterile plastic sample bottle with a metal cap. Upon production of a quantity of Respondent's urine into the bottle, the bottle was promptly sealed with its cap and then with evidence tape. On both occasions when Respondent gave a urine sample, a label was placed on the sample bottle containing a unique bar code number. That bar code number was also placed on the chain of custody form which accompanied the bottle. That form included the social security number and signature of the person giving the sample who in each instance in question here was Respondent. On each occasion, the Respondent's bottled urine sample was placed in a locked box and transmitted by courier to Toxicology Testing Service, Miami, Florida, for testing. Until immediately prior to testing, the Respondent's sample was kept in a locked box. The Respondent's first urine sample arrived at Toxicology Testing Services ("TTS") in Miami on February 12, 1988. The second sample arrived on April 15, 1988. On both occasions, the seals placed on the bottles at Mount Sinai were intact upon arrival at Toxicology Testing Services. Both of the sample bottles were opened by Israel Sanchez, a forensic toxicologist technologist. The first sample was opened on February 12, 1988 and the second on April 16, 1988. On each occasion, TTS followed a procedure designed to control the urine sample in the laboratory. Mr. Sanchez dispensed a small amount of each of the samples and introduced it into the laboratory's Hitachi Analyzer for purposes of screening the sample for the possible presence of controlled substances. On each occasion, the samples screened positive for cocaine during this initial screening test. A second screening test was performed on each of the samples and again the screening tests results were positive for cocaine. After the initial screening test results were positive for cocaine, a confirmatory analysis of each of the samples was performed utilizing the gas chromatography mass spectrometry method ("GSMS"). The first GSMS test was performed by Dr. Terry Hall, an expert in the field of forensic toxicology. The first sample was tested in this manner on February 14, 1988 and the second was performed on April 21, 1988 by John de Canel, an expert in the field of forensic toxicology and chemistry. GSMS is an extremely accurate testing procedure (more than 99% accurate) and is the accepted method among forensic toxicologists for identifying drugs and their metabolites. Dr. Hall confirmed that the Respondent's first urine sample contained a metabolite of cocaine, methyl ethylene, in a concentration of 100 nanograms per milliliter. The second urine sample also tested positive for cocaine metabolite. The GSMS test on the second sample revealed a concentration well in excess of 100 nanograms per milliliter and perhaps as much as 1000 nanograms. The concentration levels of 100 nanograms per milliliter on each of the GSMS test results are the result of Respondent's voluntary use of cocaine. Furthermore, the higher level found in the second test is the result of the use of cocaine subsequent to the first test on February 15, 1988. Respondent was dismissed from the MDDC following receipt of the test results from the April 15, 1988 urine test.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and seriousness of the offense as it relates to the public trust placed in a correctional officer who guards those incarcerated by society, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a Final Order revoking Respondent Harry T. Williams' correctional officer certification. Respectfully submitted and entered this 3rd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Harry T. Williams 3545 Florida Avenue Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's corrections officer license is subject to suspension, revocation or other discipline.
Findings Of Fact On August 29, 1996, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent's corrections officer license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, which was indicative of the illegal ingestion of a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On September 5, 1996, Respondent filed an Election of Rights in which he disputed the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requested an administrative hearing. Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on June 23, 1999. The Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Volusia Correctional Institution (VCI) in early 1991. A corrections officer is a special risk employee in a safety sensitive position. At the time of licensure Respondent passed his drug screen. In 1996, the month of February had 29 days. In February 1996, Warden Bruce Scherer received allegations of possible drug abuse by Respondent from Connie Beach, Respondent's (then) wife. Respondent's wife was also a corrections officer. Ms. Beach had been in the Warden's office asking for a day off to retrieve her belongings from the marital home due to personal problems with Respondent. Upon inquiry of the Warden, the Warden learned that Ms. Beach's brother Carroll Bradshaw had smoked marijuana with Respondent. The Warden called the brother by telephone. The brother confirmed he had smoked marijuana with Respondent several occasions. In response, the Warden asked Respondent to submit to a drug test. Respondent was cooperative and agreed to submit to the drug test. Volusia Correctional Institution does not conduct random drug testing. At no time did Respondent question why he was being asked to submit to a drug test. Bolton accompanied Respondent to the Halifax Hospital facility to submit a urine specimen for drug testing. In testing specimens for marijuana, two tests are conducted; the first of these is an immunoassay screen, and the second is a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) test. The GCMS test is the more definitive test which specifically identifies THC, the major metabolite of marijuana. THC is also the part of marijuana which gives it its psycho-active properties. Cut-off levels are used in the testing process in order to exclude positive test results for persons who may have had accidental (or second-hand) exposure to marijuana. Respondent submitted his first urine sample for drug testing on February 28, 1996. On March 4, 1996, the results on the immunoassay screen came back positive for cannabinoid (marijuana). The sample first tested positive. It then tested about 300 nanograms of THC in the GCMS test. On March 19, 1996, a second test was conducted on Respondent's original urine sample. On March 20, 1996, the results of that test were received and reviewed by Dr. Hung Doan. The GCMS test showed 259 nanograms of THC. The result was confirmatory of the first as positive for marijuana. Dr. Hung Doan is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO). He is certified as to his knowledge of drugs, their medical usage and ingestion. Dr. Doan is an expert in the field. Dr. Doan was the MRO who reviewed and certified the results of Respondent's two positive drug tests in 1996. The high levels of marijuana detected in the two positive tests of Respondent's urine sample conclusively establish that the results could not have been caused by accidental or passive inhalation of marijuana. The results did not rule out ingestion of marijuana since the evidence showed that about two cigarette sized amounts of marijuana would produce results similar to those found on Respondent's tests. However, the evidence did not show that Respondent had eaten any marijuana. Only multiple "accidental" exposures to, in conjunction with "accidental" ingestion of marijuana could possibly have resulted in the nanogram levels detected in Respondent's urine without his knowledge. Respondent did not produce any evidence beyond speculation to suggest that this might have occurred in his case. Mr. Beach was notified of the first positive test on March 4, 1996, by Mary Yochum, Dr. Doan's assistant. Respondent's response to being told that he tested positive for marijuana was "okay." He was concerned with the result but could not go into detail over the phone because other officers were present. On March 6, 1996, Respondent submitted a separate urine sample for the purposes of having an independent drug test. The results of that test were negative for marijuana. However, this second test occurred seven days after the first urine sample was given. The test only shows Respondent's level of cannabinoid on the latter date had decreased or diluted sufficiently to fall below the cut-off point for such tests. Marijuana can clear the human body's system within days. However, a chronic user of marijuana may take up to 75 days before the drug clears the persons system. It depends on the persons individual metabolism. Carroll Bradshaw is the ex-brother-in-law of Respondent. Mr. Bradshaw is a known drug user and convicted felon. He was last released from incarceration in 1998 after serving time for a cocaine charge. He continues to use drugs to date. Mr. Bradshaw regularly socialized, and smoked marijuana with Respondent. However, he had not smoked marijuana for quite a while before receiving the telephone call from the Warden. Respondent admittedly was familiar with the smell and appearance of marijuana. Respondent would typically supply and prepare the marijuana which he and his brother-in-law smoked while socializing. Respondent kept his stash of marijuana on a "paraphernalia" tray underneath his couch in his home. Respondent's former mother-in-law, who was also familiar with the look and smell of marijuana because of her son's problems, witnessed Respondent smoking marijuana with her son and others. She confirmed the testimony of her son and her daughter as to Respondent's use of marijuana. Given these facts Petitioner has shown clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Chapter 943, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 John Stanton, Esquire 121 1/2 North Woodland Boulevard Suite 3 Deland, Florida 32720 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue The issue to be decided is whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Respondent's license as a medical doctor for the alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (1983), as set forth in the Administrative Complaints?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed as a medical doctor with the State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners. The license, Number 28366, was first issued on February 11, 1976. The Respondent was licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. October 5, 1983 Complaint. On or about July 7, 1982, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed a ten (10) count Information against the Respondent. In the information it was alleged that the Respondent knowingly and unlawfully filed, attempted to file or aided and abetted in the filing of claims for services to recipients of state or federally funded assistance program benefits (the Florida Medicaid Program) in violation of Section 409.325, Florida Statutes. The services, according to the Information, were never rendered. On April 18, 1983, the State of Florida nolle prossed Counts 3 and 4 of the Information. On June 30, 1983, the State nolle prossed Counts 1, 2, 5, 7 and 9. The same day, the Respondent withdrew his original plea and plead guilt to the remaining counts: 6, 8 and 10 of the Information. As a result of the Respondent's guilty plea, he was found guilty on counts 6, 8 and 10 and adjudication was withheld. The Respondent was placed on probation for one (1) year and was required to repay $3,500.00 to the Florida Medicaid Program. The Respondent completed his probation, which was terminated early by the court, and made restitution to the Florida Medicaid Program. The Respondent stipulated that he plead guilty to Counts 6, 8 and 10 of the Information, that adjudication ways withheld and that the case was disposed of in the manner described above. According to the Respondent, he plead guilty on the advice of this counsel and as a matter of convenience (to himself and not "to all parties" as suggested by the Respondent in his proposed findings of fact). He did so despite his belief that he was not guilty. The Respondent's proposed finding of fact that his attorney never advised him that he could be in violation of Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes, irrelevant. July 27, 1983 Complaint. On March 24, 1981, the Respondent saw Ana Gonzalez as a patient in his office. Ms. Gonzalez was thirteen years old at the time of her first visit (Ms. Gonzalez's date of birth was incorrectly listed as "8-7-82" in the Respondent's records). Ms. Gonzalez, according to the Respondent's record of Ms. Gonzalez's visits (hereinafter referred to as the "Patient Records") complained of "pain of mild intensity on lower left quadrand [sic], inradiating [sic] to right lower quadrant and left lumbar fossa." The Patient Records, which were all in the same handwriting, 1/ also indicate that Ms. Gonzalez had low back pain, dark urine which looked like blood and a fever of 100.4 degrees. A physical examination of Ms. Gonzalez found nothing abnormal except pain in both lower quadrants of the abdomen and the left lumbar fossa of the back. The Respondent made a probable diagnosis of pyelonephritis and ordered a SMAC 26, a Complete Blood Count ("C.B.C."), an urinalysis, an E.K.G. and a chest x-ray. The Petitioner has proposed a finding of fact that the chest x-ray and the E.K.G. were not referred to in the Patient Records. This proposed finding is incorrect. The Respondent did, however, order a kidney, urethra and bladder x-ray ("K.U.B.") which was not recorded in the Patient Records. The Respondent also prescribed an antibiotic. The results of the E.K.G. and the chest x-ray are not noted in the Patient Records; nor does the E.K.G. print-out include any findings. The SMAC 26 showed nothing abnormal. The C.B.C. also showed nothing abnormal and the K.U.B. was negative. Finally, the urinalysis showed that the patient's urine was yellow, clear and contained no blood. The charges for the first visit were $30.00 for the examination, $182.00 for the SMAC 26 (charged at $7.00 per 26 procedures), $6.00 for the urinalysis, $10.00 for the C.B.C., $40.00 for the chest x-ray and $40.00 for the E.K.G. No charge was made for the K.U.B. The patient was next seen by the Respondent on March 31, 1981 (erroneously reported as March 31, 1982 in the Patient Records). The Petitioner's proposed finding of fact that the Patient Records were kept in the same pen is therefore incorrect. The Patient Records indicate the following: "The patient is feeling a little better of pain. No fever. Persist urine dark." The Patient Records do not indicate that Ms. Gonzalez was examined on this visit. The Respondent continued the antibiotic and ordered the following tests: a C.B.C., a K.U.B. and an intravenous pyelogram ("I.V.P."). The I.V.P. was reported as negative in the Patient Records. The C.B.C. again found no abnormalities. The K.U.B., as testified to by the Respondent, was also negative. The Respondent testified that he ordered another K.U.B. on this visit because he again found blood in the patient's urine and because he believed that you can never tell when a test will result in a positive finding. The Petitioner has proposed the following finding of fact with regard to the March 31, 1981 visit: Again, the tests results obtained from the laboratory show that the urine is not discolored and that the urine does not contain blood, in contradiction with the handwritten medical record of the Respondent. Although this proposed finding is correct with regard to tests performed on the March 24, 1981 visit, no urine test was performed on the March 31, 1981 visit. The charges for the March 31, 1981, visit included $30.00 for the examination, $10.00 for the C.B.C., $40.00 for the K.U.B. and $80.00 for the I.V.P. The third visit by Ms. Gonzalez was on April 7, 1981. On this visit, Ms. Gonzalez was feeling much better (the "pain was very mild"), but the Respondent determined there was still blood in her urine. The Patient Records again do not indicate the results of any physical examination. The Respondent ordered an urinalysis which found that her urine was yellow. Although the Respondent testified in his deposition that the Patient Records for the April 7, 1981 visit were complete, billing records show that a charge for an I.V.P. was made for April 7, 1981 which was not recorded in the Patient Records. The Respondent admitted in his deposition that no I.V.P. was performed and stated that the charge for $80.00 was a mistake. The Respondent stated that he did perform a K.U.B. or I.V.P. on this visit because it was too soon after the last K.U.B. and I.V.P. tests. Instead of an I.V.P., the Respondent testified in his deposition that Ms. Gonzalez received physiotherapy for which she should have been charged only $20.00. The physiotherapy was ordered because of the patient's complaints of lower back pain and consisted of heat treatment/ultrasound. Petitioner, in its proposed findings of fact, indicates that the Respondent took Ms. Gonzalez, off the antibiotic he had prescribed earlier at the April 7, 1981 visit, citing "(Depo., page 20)." This proposed finding is not supported by the record. Other charges for the April 7, 1981, visit included $30.00 for the examination and $6.00 for the urinalysis. The next visit by Ms. Gonzalez was on April 14, 1981. The Patient Records do not indicate Ms. Gonzalez's condition or that an examination was performed. The Patient Records only indicate that the Respondent suggested hospitalization of Ms. Gonzalez so that more tests could be made and that her father refused. The Respondent ordered a K.U.B. (which was negative) and a SMAC 26 (which found no abnormalities). The antibiotic was also changed. The charges for this visit included $30.00 for the visit, $40.00 for the K.U.B. and $182.00 ($7.00 per 26 procedures) for the SMAC 26. Again the bill included a charge of $80.00 for an I.V.P. which, according to the Respondent, was a mistake in billing. The Respondent actually performed physiotherapy which should have resulted in a $20.00 charge. The final visit occurred on April 20, 1981. The Patient Records for this visit indicated the following: I insisted some UROLOGY must consultate this patient and she refused to see another Doctor and culture and sensitivity. She says she does not want to go to the rest room. She decides pick up the urine. I decide another I.V.P. because persist a mild hematuria [blood]. Mr. Gonzalez again refused to admit his daughter to a hospital as suggested by Respondent. The Respondent recommended hospitalization because his tests were not finding anything and he therefore wanted to run a kidney scan. There is no indication in the Patient Records as to whether an examination was performed. The Respondent ordered a K.U.B., an I.V.P. and a C.B.C. The results of these tests are not recorded in the Patient Records but the Respondent has testified that they were negative. On this visit the Respondent indicated his diagnosis was pyelonephritis, which he described as "kidney infection." Charges for this visit were $30.00 for the examination, $40.00 for the K.U.B., $80.00 for the I.V.P. and $10.00 for the C.B.C. Pyelonephritis is an inflammatory reaction of the kidney involving the kidney tissue and the pelvis of the kidney. It is usually accompanied by severe toxicity, a temperature for a child the age of Ms. Gonzalez of 104 to 105 degrees and extreme chills. It is a serious infection. The diagnosis of pyelonephritis on March 24, 1981 and April 20, 1981, by the Respondent was not medically justified. Ms. Gonzalez did not have any of the symptoms normally associated with pyelonephritis. The results of all of the tests performed by the laboratory 2/ and the Respondent were negative. Laboratory test results conclusively showed that Ms. Gonzalez's urine was yellow, and contained no blood. Additionally, the Respondent should have performed a urine culture, a blood culture and a sensitivity test before concluding that the patient was suffering from pyelonephritis. The cultures would have determined if there was an organism present and, if so, what type. The sensitivity test would have shown what the organism was sensitive to. None of these tests were performed. Most of the tests ordered by the Respondent were also not medically justified. The only tests which were clearly medically justified were the SMAC 26, C.B.C. and the urinalysis ordered on March 24, 1981. Most of the remaining tests were not medically justified as hereinafter discussed. The E.K.G. performed by the Respondent on March 24, 1981, was not medically justified. The Respondent indicated that he ordered an E.K.G. because he was looking for valvular problems with Ms. Gonzalez's heart. An E.K.G., however, only, shows the electrical activity of the heart. The Respondent also testified that the E.K.G. was performed because he suspected a kidney problem. According to the Respondent, if there was a problem with Ms. Gonzalez's kidneys, it could have affected her E.K.G., especially in light of her age. No problem was found according to the Respondent. The chest x-ray performed on the March 24, 1981 visit was not medically justified. This test resulted in exposure of Ms. Gonzalez to x-rays which could be harmful to her. The Respondent, based upon his deposition testimony, believes that a chest x-ray should be taken of anyone who comes to his office as a patient and has insurance. With regard to Ms. Gonzalez, he indicated that her parents requested the chest x-ray but admitted there was no medical cause for her to receive a chest x-ray. The K.U.B. tests performed on March 24, 1981, March 31, 1981, April 14, 1981 and April 20, 1981 and the I.V.P. tests performed on March 31, 1981 and April 20, 1981 were not medically justified. These tests also resulted in exposure of Ms. Gonzalez to x-rays which could be harmful to her; especially the I.V.P. test which has six to seven times the radiation level of a K.U.B. The I.V.P. was also a dangerous procedure because it is an invasion procedure (the introduction of a foreign substance to the body). Even the Respondent must have realized the possible problem with the I.V.P. since he indicated that this test was not performed on April 7, 1981, because it was too soon after the test performed on March 31, 1981. The second SMAC 26 test, performed on April 14, 1981 was not medically justified. The test, according to the Respondent, was performed because the blood in Ms. Gonzalez's urine persisted. The evidence clearly shows that there was no blood in her urine, however. A SMAC 26 is a single laboratory procedure whereby one blood sample is divided into 26 parts (or some other number of parts) which are diagnosed or read by a machine at the same time. It is not 26 separate tests; it is a single automated test. The method by which the Respondent billed for the SMAC 26 tests performed on March 24, 1981 and April 14, 1981, (charging $7.00 for each of 26 tests) was not justified. The Respondent billed for the S4AC 26, which gas performed by Central Medical Laboratory, because he believed that the insurance company would pay what he hoped to receive for the test: $60.00-$80.00. If he had only billed $60.00 for the test he stated that he would only have received $6.00 to $10.00 from the insurance company. The Petitioner has proposed a finding that the SMAC 26 billing was "outrageously high." The evidence supports a finding that the charge was excessive. Finally, the C.B.C. tests of March 31 1981 and April `20, 1981 and the physiotherapy performed on April 7, 1981 and April 14, 1981 were not medically justified. Dr. Handwerker's testimony was consistent with the findings in this Recommended Order with regard to the lack of medical justification for most of the tests. The Respondent stated that he agreed in part and disagreed in part with Dr. Handwerker's testimony. When asked to identify those areas of Dr. Handwerker's testimony he disagreed with, the Respondent unsuccessfully attempted to rebut Dr. Handwerker's testimony with regard to the E.K.G. and chest x-ray and with the fact that the tests were repeated to often. 3/ The Respondent did not attempt to rebut any other part of Dr. Handwerker's testimony, which was based upon his examination of the Patient Records and the Respondent's deposition (she did not examine Ms. Gonzalez). Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the Respondent failed to practice medicine in conformance with the generally accepted and prevailing standards of medicine in the medical community. The Respondent also failed to, practice medicine with the level of care, skill and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar circumstances and conditions. The father of Ms. Gonzalez testified on behalf of the Respondent. Mr. Gonzalez stated that he was satisfied with the Respondent's medical care of the Gonzalez family and that he would continue to retain the Respondent. Letters submitted by the Respondent also indicated that friends, associates and his pastor believe the Respondent is honest, experienced, qualified and of high moral and ethical standards. Although the Respondent testified that he had done the best he could do for Ms. Gonzalez, the unrebutted testimony supports a conclusion that his best was not good enough. Finally, the Respondent's testimony to the effect that he had not intended to exercise influence over Ms. Gonzalez or to deceive her in his medical treatment of her is not believable in light of the facts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), by being found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondents be found guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(l), Florida Statutes (1983), by employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine when such scheme or trick fails to conform to the generally prevailing standards of treatment in the medical community. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(o), Florida Statutes (1983), by exercising influence on a patient or client in such a manner as to exploit the patient or client for financial gain of himself, as a licensee. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1983), by failing to practice medicine with the level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's medical license be suspended for a period of one (1) year and that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of three (3) years, upon reinstatement of his license, subject to such conditions and terms of monitoring and continuing medical education as may then be prescribed by the Board of Medical Examiners. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1985.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated paragraph 2(G) of the December 14, 2010, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission ("EPC"), and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Commissioner of Education, is the head of the Florida Department of Education, the state agency charged with the ultimate responsibility to investigate and take disciplinary actions against persons who hold a Florida Educator's Certificate and are alleged to have violated specified statutes. The EPC is charged with imposing discipline for violations of sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate Number 519374 issued by the Department. Respondent's Employment History and Disciplinary History Respondent has been employed in the State of Florida public education system for thirty-one years, twenty-seven of which she has served as a full-time teacher. During the four years in which she was not a teacher, she served as an occupational specialist and career counselor, involved in helping at-risk students find employment and providing guidance regarding academic training for specific careers. She also served as a counselor for Project Hope, a drug rehabilitation program, and as a substitute teacher. She currently is employed as a classroom teacher by Broward County Public Schools. She has received positive job performance evaluations throughout her career. On or about May 14, 2010, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging violations of specified Florida Statutes and agency rules, and seeking to impose disciplinary sanctions against Respondent's Certificate. Following an informal hearing on the Administrative Complaint conducted pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(2), the EPC entered a Final Order dated December 14, 2010, placing Respondent on two employment years of probation, subject to specified conditions. The Final Order provides in pertinent part: "2. Upon employment in any public or private position requiring a Florida educator's certificate, Respondent shall be placed on 2 employment years of probation with the conditions that during that period, she shall: . . . G. [n]ot consume, inject or ingest any controlled substance unless prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes." To ensure compliance with paragraph 2(G)1 of the Final Order, Respondent is required to submit to random substance abuse testing, as directed by the Recovery Network Program for Educators ("RNP") or her employer.2 Pursuant to the Final Order, Respondent submitted to random substance abuse testing on January 28, 2011. Respondent was notified by letter from the RNP dated February 7, 2011, that she was in violation of the Final Order. The letter stated in pertinent part: "you failed to comply with Paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, to wit: You consumed, ingested, or injected a controlled substance that was not prescribed by a doctor as evidenced by your drug test on January 28, 2011, that was positive for Cocaine Metabolite." On February 17, 2011, the EPC issued a Notice to Show Cause, requiring Respondent to show cause why a penalty for violating the Final Order should not be imposed. A hearing on the Notice to Show Cause was convened before the EPC on April 8, 2011. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that she had not consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes. Respondent's Random Drug Test of January 28, 2011 On January 28, 2011, Respondent reported to Occupational Medicine Centers of America ("OMC"), in Miramar, Florida, to submit to a random drug test as required under the Final Order, paragraph 2(H). Because she had to work that day, Respondent reported to OMC in late afternoon, before 5:00 p.m. Respondent brought a chain of custody form, formally known as a Forensic Drug Testing Chain of Custody Form ("Form"), with her to OMC.3 The Form for Respondent's testing was provided by the RNP or Respondent's employer.4 The Form is multi-layered, with the pages (or "layers") designated for specific recipients ——i.e., the collection laboratory, the testing laboratory, the employer, the medical review officer ("MRO"),5 and the donor. The Form lists "8543245" as the "Specimen ID No." for Respondent's random drug test conducted on January 28, 2011. Because Respondent's employer or the RNP provided the Form for her drug testing, OMC could not, and did not, generate a chain of custody form that could be used in collecting Respondent's specimen. The Form is to be filled out by the person collecting the specimen in accordance with the specific steps set forth on the Form. Step 1 lists the employer's name, address, and identification number, and the MRO's name, address, phone number, and facsimile number. Step 1 requires the specimen collector to fill in the donor's name and social security number or employee identification number; verify the donor's identity; identify the reason for the drug test; identify the type of test to be performed; and provide the collection site name, address, phone number, facsimile number, and collection side code. Step 2 is completed by the collector once the donor has provided the specimen. The collector identifies the type of specimen provided (i.e., split, single, or none provided) on the Form, reads the temperature of the specimen within four minutes of collection, and verifies on the Form whether the temperature is between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit. Step 3 requires the collector to pour the specimen into a bottle, seal the bottle with a tamper-evident label or seal, have the donor initial the seal, and place the specimen bottle in a laboratory bag along with the testing laboratory's copy of the Form. Step 4 requires the collector to certify that "the specimen given to me by the donor identified in the certification section on Copy 2 of this form was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the Delivery System noted in accordance with applicable requirements." To complete Step 4, the collector must sign and date the form, fill in the time that the specimen was collected, and identify the courier service to which the specimen bottle is released. After the collector completes Steps 1 through 4 of the Form, the donor completes Step 5. Step 5 requires the donor to certify that he or she provided the specimen to the collector and did not adulterate the specimen, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper- evident seal in his or her presence, and that the information and numbers provided on the Form and label affixed to the bottle were correct. Upon arriving at OMC, Respondent was called into the portion of the facility where drug testing is conducted. She provided the Form to OMC's medical assistant, Jackie Scialabba, who was on duty at that time. Scialabba completed Step 1 of the Form, and instructed Respondent to place her belongings in a locker, wash her hands, and provide a urine specimen in the collection cup. While Respondent was in the restroom providing the specimen, Scialabba completed Step 4 of the Form. Specifically, she signed and dated the form, filled in the portion of the Form stating the "Time of Collection" as 4:25 p.m., and checked the box identifying the delivery service courier. Respondent emerged from the restroom and handed Scialabba the specimen to pour into a specimen bottle for sealing and delivery to the testing laboratory. At that time, Scialabba discovered that Respondent had not provided a specimen of sufficient quantity to be tested. Scialabba provided water to Respondent so that she would be able to produce a specimen of sufficient quantity for testing. Respondent waited in the lobby of the facility until she was able to provide another specimen. Scialabba's shift ended at 5:00 p.m. and she left for the day. By the time Respondent was able to provide another specimen, Scialabba was gone. Before she left, Scialabba informed Christin Visbal, also a medical assistant at OMC,6 that Respondent's drug test was incomplete and that Visbal needed to complete the test. Scialabba left the partially completed Form with Visbal. Scialabba testified that Respondent did not complete Step 5 of the Form in her presence. Once Respondent indicated she was able to provide another specimen, Visbal called Respondent back into the testing facility. Both Visbal and Respondent stated that they were the only people present in the testing facility at that time.7 Visbal had Respondent her wash her hands, gave her the specimen collection cup, and instructed her regarding providing the specimen. At that time, Respondent provided a urine specimen of sufficient quantity to meet the testing requirements. Visbal checked the temperature of the specimen as required on Step 2 of the Form, and completed the portion of Step 2 requiring verification that the specimen temperature was between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit.8 Visbal poured the urine into a specimen bottle, sealed the bottle with a tamper-evident seal, and had Respondent initial the seal. Respondent then completed Step 5 of the Form, which constituted her certification that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in her presence.9 Visbal placed the sealed urine specimen and the testing laboratory's copy of the Form in a bag, and sealed the bag. Visbal provided Respondent with the donor copy of the Form. Respondent collected her belongings from the locker and left the facility. Because Scialabba had prematurely completed Step 4 of the Form while attempting to collect Respondent's specimen before she left work for the day, Visbal was unable to complete Step 4. However, Visbal provided a sworn statement and testified at hearing regarding the substance of the certification in Step 4——specifically, that the urine specimen given to her by Respondent was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the delivery service10 in accordance with applicable requirements. The evidence establishes, and the undersigned determines, that Visbal correctly followed the established protocol in collecting, labeling, sealing, and releasing the specimen to the courier in accordance with the applicable chain of custody requirements. Accordingly, the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. Scialabba's paperwork error did not compromise the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen. On February 7, 2011, FirstLab provided a document titled "Participant Call Test Edit" to the RNP, showing a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. The document bears "Specimen ID No. 8543245"——the same specimen identification number as was listed on the Form that Respondent brought to OMC on January 28, 2011, for use in her drug test that day. Respondent does not dispute that the tested specimen yielded a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. She maintains that she did not produce the tested specimen. Respondent's Subsequent Random Drug Test Results Since January 28, 2011, Respondent has been randomly tested for drug use each month. Respondent's drug test results have been negative every time that she has been tested since the January 28, 2011 test——nine times as of the hearing date. Respondent served a subpoena duces tecum on FirstLab in August 2011, seeking to obtain all documents related to Respondent's random drug test results, including the negative test results. The subpoena provided the correct spelling of Respondent's full name but did not list her social security number, employee identification number, date of birth, address, or school system by which she is employed. Instead of producing Respondent's test results, FirstLab produced test results for another teacher having a similar name who is employed by Miami- Dade County Public Schools.11 Ultimate Facts Regarding Alleged Violation and Penalty For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned determines that the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. The evidence does not support an inference that Respondent's specimen was tampered with, tainted, or otherwise compromised in the collection, sealing, labeling, or delivery process. Therefore, either Respondent had cocaine metabolite in her system when she donated the urine specimen on January 28, 2011, or the testing laboratory or MRO made a mistake in testing or reporting the test results of her urine specimen. Respondent maintains it is the latter, but did not present any persuasive evidence to support her position. To that point, FirstLab's error in producing the wrong person's records in response to Respondent's subpoena does not provide a sufficient basis to infer that in this case, FirstLab reported another person's drug test result instead of Respondent's. It shows only that FirstLab makes mistakes when not provided sufficiently specific information about the person whose records are being subpoenaed. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent, in violation of paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for a legitimate medical purpose, as revealed by the random drug test to which Respondent submitted on January 28, 2011. However, there is no evidence in the record showing that Respondent's violation of the Final Order presented any danger, or caused physical or mental harm to any students or to the public. Nor is there any evidence that the violation caused any actual damage, physical or otherwise, or that Respondent benefited from the violation. To the contrary, the sole evidence shows that Respondent is a good teacher who has performed well as a public school employee for thirty-one years. There is no evidence that the violation has in any way impaired her performance of her duties as a classroom teacher. Moreover, the sole evidence regarding Respondent's subsequent random drug test results shows that Respondent is now complying with the Final Order, and apparently has complied ever since her January 28, 2011, test. This evidences Respondent's contrition and her recognition of the seriousness of this matter. At hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from Respondent regarding her criminal history, and an excerpt of the transcript of the EPC hearing, during which her criminal history was discussed, was admitted into evidence.12 However, her criminal history and alleged failure to report that history were the basis for the EPC's Final Order imposing penalties against Respondent, including the probation that she now is charged with violating. Respondent already has been penalized by the EPC on these bases, and they are not relevant to this proceeding. As justification for the penalty it seeks, Petitioner asserts that Respondent "never accepts responsibility for her own behavior, but blames others for her miscreant deeds." However, the evidence does not support this position. With respect to the hearing before the EPC that resulted in issuance of the Final Order, Respondent offered a plausible explanation for not having previously reported her criminal history on her Florida Educator's Certificate applications——specifically, that when she filled out the previous certification application forms, she did not realize that the form required the reporting of all prior criminal history, including offenses for which adjudication had been withheld. Indeed, when she filled out an updated version of the application form that apparently was clearer regarding criminal history disclosure requirements, she reported all prior offenses.13 Respondent acknowledged responsibility for her actions more than once during the EPC hearing. Moreover, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's testimony that she understood she was to be drug tested on a monthly basis as a condition of her probation.14 To the extent Respondent may have been incorrect regarding this detail, that mistake is more likely attributable to confusion (which is understandable under the circumstances) rather than lack of truthfulness on her part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order determining that Respondent violated the December 14, 2011, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission, and suspending Respondent's Florida Educator's Certificate for a period of six consecutive calendar months, followed by two years of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a nolo contendere plea by Petitioner, Daniel Banks, to possession of a controlled substance (phenobarbital) in the State of Kansas in 2004 is a disqualifying offense under section 435.04, Florida Statutes. (Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes shall be to the 2015 version.)
Findings Of Fact Banks is a 30-year old resident of Northglenn, Colorado. He is currently employed as the coordinator of integrated pest management for MJardin Management Company. Banks is also designated as the research and development director of San Felasco Nurseries, Inc. (“San Felasco”), an applicant to become designated as a low-THC cannabis dispensing organization by the State of Florida. See §§ 381.986, et seq, Fla. Stat. San Felasco filed an application identifying Banks and other owners or managers, all of whom were required to undergo a Level 2 background screening pursuant to section 435.04, Florida Statutes. After Banks’ background information was submitted to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as part of San Felasco’s application, a Level 2 background screening was undertaken by that agency. By letter dated August 7, 2015, OCU notified Banks that they needed more information concerning his arrest on June 3, 2004, and subsequent plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of phenobarbital. In response, Banks had the Clerk of Court for Geary County, Kansas provide a document entitled “Journal Entry” in Case No. 04 CR 294. The Journal Entry is equivalent to a Final Judgment in a Florida criminal court. OCU then notified Banks, via letter dated November 23, 2015, that he had failed to pass his Level 2 background screening. San Felasco was also notified of Banks’ failure to pass, inasmuch as that failure would impact San Felasco’s pending application to be designated as a dispensing organization. Banks’ failure to pass the screening was due to the fact that his nolo contendere plea in Kansas was to a crime OCU deemed similar to a crime enumerated in section 435.04 as a disqualifying offense. The construction of the Kansas and Florida statutes are, indeed, similar. Kansas Statutes Annotated (K.S.A.) 65-4162(a)(1) states in pertinent part: Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to possess or have under such person’s control: Any depressant designated in subsection (e) of K.S.A. 6504105, subsection (e) of K.S.A. 65-4109 or subsection (b) of K.S.A. 65-4111, and amendments thereto. 65-4111(b)(44) lists phenobarbital as one of the depressants designated as a controlled substance. By comparison, Section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes, states in relevant part: A person may not be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance unless such person’s controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription. . . . The two statutes are different, however, in the penalties which will inure from violation of the statutes. Section 893.13(6)(a) states that: person who violates this provision commits a felony of the third degree . . . . K.S.A. 65-4162(b) contains the following penalty language: Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a class A nonperson misdemeanor. If any person has a prior conviction under this section, a conviction of a substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction . . . then such person shall be guilty of a drug severity level 4 felony. Thus, the crime in Florida is a felony; in Kansas it is a misdemeanor. Banks came to be in possession of phenobarbital while working at an animal hospital. He was a senior in high school at the time, just two months after reaching the age of 18 years. He stole the phenobarbital from the animal hospital and took it home for his own use. His father found the drugs, confronted Banks with them, and made Banks self-report his theft to the police department. The police notified the doctor at the animal hospital, but she refused to press charges against Banks. Nonetheless, on June 3, 2004, Banks was eventually charged with the crimes of theft of and possession of a controlled substance, to wit: phenobarbital. Both crimes in Kansas at that time were misdemeanors. Pursuant to advice from his attorney, Banks pled nolo contendere to the possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the charge for theft. He was given a suspended sentence, placed on 12 months’ probation and ordered to pay $115.00 in court costs. The theft charge would not have been a disqualifying offense in Florida. A fact taken into consideration by Banks before agreeing to the plea bargain was that the crime was only a misdemeanor. When he was arrested, and when he pled to the charge, Banks did not advise the police that he had previously been arrested and charged with possession of cannabis, a crime enumerated under the same statute (K.S.A. 65-4162) to which he was charged for possessing the phenobarbital. His prior arrest occurred in Riley County, Kansas, on May 7, 2004. He was charged with possession of a small amount of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and the purchase and consumption of alcohol by a minor. He received a suspended sentence, 12 months’ unsupervised probation, and paid a $250.00 fine in the Riley County matter. The crime was later expunged from Banks’ record. Under K.S.A. 65-4162, the existence of the prior charge just weeks before the Geary County possession of phenobarbital charge could have resulted in the Geary County crime being upgraded to a felony. However, for whatever reason, Banks’ Geary County violation was handled as a first offense and Banks was only found guilty of a misdemeanor.2/ The illegal possession of a controlled substance, in this case phenobarbital, is the similarity tying the Kansas and Florida statutes. In that respect, they are similar. However, the degree of penalty differs greatly between the two states’ laws, at least for a first offense. Following his arrest and nolo contendere plea in Geary County, Banks attempted to rehabilitate his life.3/ He entered college, attending the University of Northern Colorado in 2004 and 2005. He attended Kansas State University in 2005 and 2006. He then took time off from his formal studies to work in various jobs for a few years. He returned to college in 2009, attending and ultimately graduating magna cum laude from Colorado State University in 2012. He has since worked for various organizations in the fields of horticulture and agriculture. That experience led to his current position with San Felasco. There is no doubt Banks’ life following his arrest in 2004 has been successful and devoid of any further criminal activity. He has engaged in activities indicative of a stellar member of society. However, this proceeding is not an “exemption from disqualification” case. If it was, there is little doubt Banks would receive such an exemption based upon his obvious and documented rehabilitation from the 2004 crime. The issue in this case, however, is simply whether the arrest and conviction in Kansas was for a crime similar to a disqualifying offense in Florida and, if so, whether the crime constitutes a disqualifying offense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Health, Office of Compassionate Use, finding that Petitioner, Daniel Banks, does not have a disqualifying event in his Level 2 background screening.4/ DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue for final determination is whether William Barber's employment with the Monroe County School Board should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact The federal Omnibus Transportation Employees Testing Act (Act), enacted in 1991, mandates, among other things, that employers with fifty (50) or more employees begin drug testing programs on January 1, 1995. The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to prescribe regulations requiring motor carriers to conduct drug and alcohol tests on drivers, including random urine drug tests. Testing procedures are mandated to be conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the federal DOT. The procedures are set forth at 49 C.F.R. Part 40, "Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs" (DOT's Regulations). DOT's Regulations are explicit and very detailed, including providing for security measures for the test site, procedures for the taking of urine samples, chain of custody for urine samples, and guarantees of privacy for tested employees. Monroe County School Board (School Board) began the federally-mandated drug testing in January 1995. The School Board's drug testing program (Testing Program) is administered to all employees who are required to have a commercial drivers license and who are in safety-sensitive positions, which includes all bus drivers and mechanics. The parties agree that DOT's Regulations require the School Board's Testing Program to use the split sample method, found at 49 C.F.R. Section 40.25(f)(10)(i)(B). The School Board's practice is to notify employees in safety-sensitive positions about the Testing Program, including the Testing Program's policies and procedures, through an informational packet of materials. Included in the informational packet are the citation to the DOT's Regulations, a brief synopsis of specific areas of the DOT's Regulations required to be included, and the policies and procedures of the School Board's Testing Program. The employees sign the first page of the packet to acknowledge that they have received the informational packet. The signed acknowledgment is retained in each employee's personnel file. The School Board's bus drivers are not expected to have in their possession, during working hours, the informational packet. William Barber was employed by the School Board as a bus driver. On January 6, 1995, Mr. Barber signed an acknowledgment that he had received the informational packet. A little more than two years later, on the morning of May 22, 1997, Mr. Barber was ordered by his supervisor to report for a random drug test at Truman Medical Center. Mr. Barber complied with the directive. Since 1995, Truman Medical Center maintained written procedures for collecting urine for drug tests. Its procedures were consistent with DOT's Regulations. On May 22, 1997, Truman Medical Center's lab technician collected Mr. Barber's urine. It is undisputed that the lab technician collected only a single specimen, not a split sample as required by DOT's Regulations and the School Board's Testing Program. The lab technician had been employed at Truman Medical Center in that capacity for five years, and one of her responsibilities was collecting urine specimens for drug testing. During the five-year period, Truman Medical Center's nurse, who was also the lab manager, had provided the lab technician with some "hands-on" training in the collection procedures followed by Truman Medical Center. During her employment, the lab technician had performed from 1,200 to 1,800 collections for DOT-mandated tests. In May 1997, neither the lab manager nor the lab technician was aware that a split sample, rather than a single sample, collection method was required by DOT's Regulations and by the School Board. After Mr. Barber's urine sample was collected, he signed step 4 of the custody and control form, which states as follows: I certify that I provided my urine specimen to the collector; that I have not adulterated it in any manner; that each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in my presence and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to each bottle is correct. The lab technician followed the proper procedures for the collection of the single urine sample.1 Mr. Barber's urine sample was sealed in a specimen container and forwarded to the laboratory, Quest Diagnostics in Teterboro, New Jersey, for testing. The specimen container was forwarded in a sealed, tamper-proof box, together with the custody and control form. The urine specimen received by Quest Diagnostics was not tampered with during transport. Also, at the laboratory, the specimen was not tampered with or mistaken for another specimen. There is no evidence to indicate, and an inference is made, that the laboratory did not make a notation that a split sample was not received. Further, an inference is made that the laboratory proceeded on the basis that the urine sample was a single, not a split, urine sample. Quest Diagnostics performed a screening test and a confirmation test (a second testing method) on the urine specimen. The testing of the urine specimen was performed in accordance with DOT's Regulations. There were no irregularities as to chain of custody, calibration of laboratory equipment, and quality control. A laboratory report was issued. The screening test on Mr. Barber's urine specimen was positive for the presence of marijuana. The confirmation test was also positive. A positive result indicates that anywhere from a couple of days to two and one-half weeks, Mr. Barber had taken marijuana into his body. The laboratory results were certified. In accordance with DOT's Regulations, the positive results were forwarded to the Medical Review Officer (MRO) assigned to Mr. Barber's case. The MRO was employed by National Medical Review Offices, Inc., in Los Angeles, California. On May 28, 1997, six days after Mr. Barber's urine sample was collected, the MRO called Mr. Barber to discuss the positive results of the tests. The telephone call was made pursuant to DOT's Regulations. During the telephone discussion, Mr. Barber denied that he had used or had ever used marijuana, but provided no information to the MRO which tended to provide a medically alternative explanation as to the cause of a positive test. The MRO informed Mr. Barber that he had 72 hours to request a re-test or a re-analysis. An inference is drawn that Mr. Barber expressed an interest in a re-analysis or a re-test as a result of Mr. Barber accessing a recorded message which provided information regarding the re-test or re-analysis. Mr. Barber accessed the recorded message. The message stated, among other things, that Mr. Barber, as the donor and a DOT regulated employee, had 72 hours after the discussion with the MRO to request a re-analysis; that the urine sample would be forwarded to another certified laboratory for testing; that the cost for the re-analysis was $125.00; and that payment must be made within five (5) working days. Mr. Barber did not request a re-analysis of the urine sample because he was unable to pay the cost of the re-analysis. Mr. Barber was aware that, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and the bargaining unit of which he was a member, he was responsible for paying the cost for the re-analysis. However, Mr. Barber was unaware that he was not required to pay the cost for the re-analysis prior to the re- analysis being performed. The evidence is not persuasive that the recorded message notified Mr. Barber that his employer may require him to re-pay the cost for the re-analysis. However, the evidence is persuasive that, had Mr. Barber known that he was not required to pay the cost for the re-analysis up front, he would have requested the re-analysis. At no time was Mr. Barber or the MRO aware that a split sample had not been collected. According to DOT's Regulations, had Mr. Barber requested a re-analysis, the MRO would have been notified at that point that no split sample was available for a re-analysis, and the MRO would have cancelled the test and reported the testing as being negative, not positive. As a result of Mr. Barber not requesting a re-analysis, the MRO reported the test results as positive to First Lab, the School Board's third party administrator for the Testing Program. In turn, First Lab reported the positive results to the School Board's Personnel Director and drug manager, who reported the positive results to the School Board's Executive Director of Support Services. School Board Policy GBEC, "Drug-Free Workplace," provides in pertinent part: No School Board employee shall unlawfully . . . possess, or use on or in the workplace . . . marijuana. . . . Workplaces in the District shall be considered as work performance sites; School Board property; school-owned vehicles or school-approved vehicles for transporting students to and from school or school activities; and off-school property during any school-sponsored or school-approved activity, event, or function in which students are under District jurisdiction. As an employment condition, individuals shall: abide by the provisions of this School Board Rule. * * * The School Board based on the Superintendent's recommendation shall take one (1) or both of the following actions within thirty (30) days of receiving notification as described in Subsections (1)(b) and (2) herein: Initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the employee which may be nonrenewal, suspension, or dismissal of employment as provided in Sections 230.23(5) and 231.36, Florida Statutes. Allow the employee to participate in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program approved by the School Board. Failure of an employee to satisfactorily complete such program may result in nonrenewal, suspension, or termination of employment. The School Board shall offer assistance and information on drug abuse to maintain a drug-free workplace by providing School Board employees with * * * (c) An Employee Assistance Program or access to such a program to provide counseling, treatment, or rehabilitation. School Board Policy GDQD, "Discipline, Suspension, and Dismissal of Support Staff," provides in pertinent part: Noninstructional staff members may be suspended from duty by the Superintendent or the School Board. . . . Prior to making a recommendation for dismissal, an administrative investigation shall be completed and an informal hearing shall be conducted at which time the employee shall have an opportunity to refute the charges or provide additional information or evidence. When a recommendation for dismissal is made by the Superintendent, good and sufficient reasons shall be stated. A noninstructional staff member may only be dismissed by the School Board's action. The School Board shall take final action on the Superintendent's recommendation. Any suspension or dismissal shall be pursuant to Florida Statutes. * * * Cause for dismissal shall include, but not be limited to: * * * (c) Reporting to work under the influence of intoxicants or possessing alcohol or illegal drugs while on the job [refer to the School Board Rule entitled "Drug-Free Workplace" (File: GBEC);. . . . Even though the above School Board policies do not provide for mandatory termination from employment for employees who test positive in the School Board's Testing Program, the established practice of the School Board is to terminate such employees. The rationale for the School Board's established practice is that, because the results of a positive DOT drug test does not indicate precisely when the employee used drugs, the School Board has decided to "err . . . on the side of children" and terminate the employee. Prior to Mr. Barber, four employees had tested positive. Of the four, two employees resigned, one employee never returned to work, and one employee was terminated. Regarding discipline, the collective bargaining agreement, Section 12: "Drug and Alcohol Testing," provides in pertinent part: The purpose of drug and alcohol testing is to deter the use of drugs and alcohol in the workplace by establishing standard procedures for drug and alcohol testing for all employees required to hold a commercial driver's license. . . . The School Board shall be responsible for the cost of drug and alcohol testing of employees with the exception of administrative and legal challenges to test results, which shall be paid by the employee. * * * Return to Duty Testing All employees who previously tested positive on a drug or alcohol test must submit to a Return to Duty Test and test negative prior to returning to duty. Follow-up Testing Unannounced follow-up alcohol and/or controlled substance testing as directed by a substance abuse professional in accordance with the FHWA Regulations shall occur when it is determined that a covered employee is in need of assistance in resolving problems associated with alcohol misuse and/or use of drugs. The number and frequency of follow-up testing shall be determined by the substance abuse professional. If an employee elects to request additional testing of the split urine sample, the employee shall be required to pay for the test. Positive Tests 1. Employees who have a confirmed positive drug or positive alcohol test may be disciplined, up to and including discharge. The Board may, if the circumstances so warrant, offer rehabilitation. If the rehabilitation is offered and accepted by the employee, the employee will be responsible for all costs associated with participation in the rehabilitation program. The informational packet of materials provided to employees, regarding the School Board's Testing Program, provides in pertinent part: Under what circumstances will a driver be subject to testing? * * * Return -to-duty testing: . . . Each employer shall also ensure that before a driver returns to duty in the performance of a safety-sensitive function, after engaging in prohibited conduct regarding controlled substance use, the driver shall undergo a return-to-duty controlled substances test with a verified negative result for controlled substance use. In the event a return-to-duty test is required, the driver must also be evaluated by a substance abuse professional (SAP) and participate in any assistance program prescribed. Follow-up testing: Following a determination that a driver is in need of assistance in resolving problems associated with alcohol misuse and/or use of controlled substances, each employer shall ensure that the driver is subject to unannounced follow-up alcohol and/or controlled substances testing as directed by the substance abuse professional. The driver shall be subject to a minimum of six follow-up controlled substances and/or alcohol tests in the first 12 months. * * * What procedures will be used to test for the presence of controlled substances or alcohol? Controlled Substances All testing for controlled substances shall be performed on urine specimens and be accomplished by means of an initial screen (Enzyme Immunoassay or EIA), followed by a confirmation of any positive findings by Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry or GC/MS. All controlled substances testing will be carried out at a laboratory certified by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). * * * What are the consequences for drivers found to have violated the prohibitions of this rule? Drivers who are known to have engaged in prohibited behavior, with regard to alcohol misuse or use of controlled substances, are subject to the following consequences: -- Drivers shall not be permitted to perform safety-sensitive functions. -- Drivers shall be advised by the employer of the resources available to them in evaluating and resolving problems associated with the misuse of alcohol or use of controlled substances. -- Drivers shall be evaluated by substance abuse professional (SAP) who shall determine what assistance, if any, the employee needs in resolving problems associated with alcohol misuse and controlled substance use. -- Before a driver returns to duty requiring performance of a safety-sensitive function, he/she shall undergo a return-to-duty test with a result indicating a breath alcohol level of less than 0.02 if the conduct involved alcohol, or a controlled substances return-to-duty test with a verified negative result if the conduct involved controlled substance use. -- In addition, each driver identified as needing assistance in resolving problems associated with alcohol or controlled substances shall be evaluated by a SAP to determine that the driver has followed the rehabilitation program prescribed. -- The driver shall also be subject to unannounced follow-up alcohol and controlled substances testing. The number and frequency of such follow-up testing shall be as directed by the SAP, and consist of at least six tests in the first 12 months. The School Board's Director of Transportation admits that rehabilitation is a potential alternative to dismissal. However, the Director of Transportation is of the opinion that parents of children would have no confidence in a school bus driver who has gone through drug rehabilitation; and she, therefore, agrees that school bus drivers who test positive for drugs should be terminated. The Director of Transportation did not present any basis for her opinion. By letter dated May 30, 1997, the Superintendent of Monroe County Schools notified Mr. Barber, among other things, that he was suspended, with pay, until the next School Board meeting, and that a conference for the record would be held prior to the School Board meeting. On June 6, 1997, a conference for the record was held. Among those in attendance were Mr. Barber and the School Board's Executive Director of Support Services. The conference for the record was, among other things, a fact-finding meeting regarding Mr. Barber testing positive for marijuana. Mr. Barber denied that he had used or had ever used marijuana. Additionally, at the conference for the record, Mr. Barber expressed his concerns regarding the collection procedure used by Truman Medical Center for the collection of his urine sample. The Executive Director of Support Services investigated Mr. Barber's concerns regarding the collection procedure, including talking with the employees at Truman Medical Center and the testing laboratory. The Executive Director concluded that the procedures followed by Truman Medical Center were proper and that the positive result was valid. As a consequence, the Executive Director recommended to the Superintendent that Mr. Barber be terminated. By letter dated August 4, 1997, the Superintendent notified Mr. Barber that, among other things, he was terminated from employment with the School Board. Mr. Barber requested a formal hearing regarding the termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Monroe County School Board enter a final order declaring the drug test results of William Barber to be invalid and reinstating William Barber to his position. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified corrections officer, certificate number 68527. On March 24, 1994, Sergeant Farless made a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by Respondent. It was approximately 3:00 a.m. and Sgt. Farless had observed Respondent's vehicle fail to remain in a single lane. Sgt. Farless asked Respondent to produce a driver's license, proof of insurance, and registration. When Respondent advised Sgt. Farless he had a firearm in the glove compartment, he was requested to exit his vehicle. When Respondent exited the vehicle, Sgt. Farless noticed that the Respondent's eyes were bloodshot, his balance unsteady, his speech slurred, and that he had a strong odor commonly associated with alcoholic beverages. Sgt. Farless directed Respondent to remain at the rear of the vehicle while he went to the glove compartment to secure the firearm. Sgt. Farless observed what appeared to be a piece of crack cocaine in the middle of the driver's seat. Deputy Hyde arrived at the scene in backup to Sgt. Farless. Sgt. Farless requested a narcotics identification test kit from Deputy Hyde for the suspected substance. Deputy Hyde field tested the substance taken from Respondent's vehicle and it received a positive reaction for the presence of cocaine. The positive test was observed by Sgt. Farless and Respondent. Sgt. Farless placed Respondent under arrest for possession of cocaine and secured him in the back of the sheriff's vehicle. Deputy Hyde and Sgt. Farless then searched the Respondent's vehicle and found a second piece of a substance suspected to be rock cocaine. Deputy Hyde performed a narcotics field test on the second substance seized from Respondent's vehicle which also reacted positively for the presence of cocaine. The criminal charges against Respondent were resolved through a pretrial intervention program. Because of such resolution, the two substances taken from Respondent's vehicle were never sent to a crime laboratory for further testing and verification. Sgt. Farless and Deputy Hyde have been trained in the use of the field test to determine drug identification. Each has numerous arrests resulting from the field testing of a suspected substance. The area Respondent was traveling through is known as a high drug area with a high crime rate. Although he was alone at the time of the traffic stop, Respondent theorized that someone had put the crack cocaine in his vehicle.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Willie B. Ward, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. He was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 193831 on October 20, 2000. Respondent was employed by the Highlands County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period March 6, 2000, through March 13, 2002. On or about April 22, 2002, Respondent was referred for a random drug test. Respondent signed the certification indicating that he provided his urine specimen to the collector; that he had not adulterated it in any manner; that each specimen bottle used was sealed in a tamper-resistant seal in his presence; and that the information provided on the Custody Control Form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle was correct. The sample was then sent to LabCorp for analysis. It was received with the seal intact. The sample was initially screened at a screening cutoff of 15 nanograms per milliliter. The sample showed positive for cannabis. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) confirmation testing for a specific marijuana metabolite. The results by LabCorp reflected a positive drug test on the initial screening and the confirmation test. On or about April 25, 2002, the electronic positive result was then sent to the National Medical Review Corporation, along with a faxed copy of the Custody Control Form. Dr. John Eustace, M.D., medical review officer (MRO) for National Medical Review Corporation, provides MRO services to the Highlands County Sheriff's Office pursuant to a contract for a drug-free workplace. Dr. Eustace received the Custody Control Form from LabCorp showing a positive drug test on Respondent for a test taken on April 22, 2002. Dr. Eustace processed the final certification of the Custody Control Form, Copy 4, certifying the drug test as positive. Dr. Eustace requested LabCorp to quantify the amount of the chemical present and document it on a Forensic Drug Analysis Report. LabCorp reported 28 nanograms of cannabinoid. It did not change the positive result; it merely quantified it. The MRO and his assistant then attempted to contact Respondent. They finally made contact with him on May 1, 2002. Respondent indicated he had tested positive a year and a half prior to this test of April 22, 2002. He also stated that he took over-the-counter pain killers, Advil or Aleve. Dr. Eustace stated these medications would not cause a false positive for marijuana. The GC/MS test rules out the possibility of a false positive. The MRO contacted the Human Resources Department of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office to report the positive drug test result after speaking with Respondent. Human Resources then contacted Respondent's supervisor, Captain Hinman, who sent a memo to Sheriff Godwin requesting an investigation. An investigation was opened; Respondent was called in and gave a statement. He had no explanation or mitigation for his positive drug test result. He admitted that he had followed all of the chain of custody procedures and that he had seen the lab technician place the seal on the container. Respondent had a prior positive drug test in April 1999 that was not prosecuted because the confirmation levels were not codified by sheriff's office policy. As a result of the investigation, Respondent was terminated from the Highlands County Sheriff's Office. The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent tested positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, during a random drug test administered on April 22, 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001). Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willie B. Ward 1043 Booker Street Sebring, Florida 33870 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
