Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 8, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.001, 33-3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.004(3)(A), 33-22.0012 Code 3, s. 3-12, 33-29 and 33-4.001, 33-4.002" and Internal Operating Procedure Number AG-91.51 were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules and IOP concerns the possession of contraband and punishment therefor. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioners frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 2, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 2. That the (Respondents) Rules as 33-29 et. seq. 33- 3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.0012 Code 3, s 3-12 is [sic] invalid, arbitrary, capricious, vague, delegation to exceed, modify, contravenes, the specific provisions of laws [sic] implemented, citation required by 120.54(7), Florida Statutes and 944.09(1)(A). This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in punishing the Petitioner for having contraband in his possession. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules and the IOP. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules or the IOP are unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules and the IOP are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 4, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 23, 1991, an Amended Petition was filed by the Petitioner. The Amended Petition consolidated the Petitioner's challenges in this case and case number 90-7190R. The Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, the Petitioner includes the Department of Legal Affairs, and the State Attorney of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the Respondents in case number 91-7190R as Respondents and addresses his challenge to other rules, internal operating procedures and directives of the other named Respondents challenged in case number 91-7190R. The Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rules, the IOP or the other matters challenged in the Amended Petition are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its business located in Tampa, Florida. Respondent is a stated agency charged with responsibility for investigating and resolving unlawful employment practices. Its duties and powers are enumerated in Chapter 23, Florida Statutes, the Human Rights Act of 1977. 2. Respondent has adopted Rules 9D-8.06, 8.22(2), 9.03(4), and 9.03(7), Florida Administrative Code. These rules authorize Respondent to issue subpoenas, serve them by registered mail, and enforce them through judicial proceedings. The rules specifically authorize issuance, service, and enforcement of subpoenas in connection with investigations of unfair employment practices. They provide that inferences may be drawn from the failure of a person to provide requested information. . . Linda Parties filed a complaint against Petitioner with the Respondent, alleging sex discrimination by Petitioner. Based upon the complaint, Respondent initiated an investigation. It formally requested information from Petitioner on July 13, 1979. On April 7, 1981, Respondent issued a subpoena in connection with the investigation and served it by registered mail in accordance with its rules. Petitioner objected to the subpoena and has not provided the requested information. Respondent has sought to enforce the subpoena through a "Petition for Enforcement" filed in Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. Circuit Judge Donald O. Hartwell has entered an Order which provides: This cause came to be heard on the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena filed by the Human Development Center, Respondent. Both parties were represented by Counsel who presented argument to the court. The court being otherwise fully advised enters this its order; therefor it is, Ordered that the service of an investigatory subpoena served by certified mail pursuant to Rule 9D-8.22, Florida Administrative Code is valid service. Such service is not required to be served in accordance with Florida Statutes 48.031 or Rule 1.410(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further, Ordered that the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena is denied. It is further, Ordered that further proceedings to enforce the investigatory subpoena in this cause are stayed pending the ruling of Hearing Officer G. Steven Pfeiffer in Case No. 81-2101RX now set for hearing on October 21, 1981. Respondent has made no determination of reasonable cause to believe that Petitioner has engaged in any unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Review was filed on August 22, 1991. The Petition was signed by Donald Eugene Halpin and Jeffery Lynn Fowler. The Petition, which was purportedly also filed by Richard Edward Jackson, was not signed by Mr. Jackson. In the Petition Mr. Halpin and Mr. Fowler challenged Rule 33-3.04(9), Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rule provides, in pertinent part: . . . The return address of all outgoing mail must contain the inmate's committed name, identification number and institutional address. The institutional name in the return address must be spelled out completely with no abbreviations. It was alleged in the Petition that the Challenged Rule is "arbitrary or capricious in its application." The Petition also contained an allegation that the Challenged Rule provides "no legitimate or compelling purpose when weighed against its adverse effect on Petitioners and their family and friends." Throughout the Petition it was alleged that there are "less restrictive forms the Respondent could employ to accomplish [its] goal . . . ." In this regard, the Petition contains the following allegation: 11. Petitioners have no qualms with the Respondent informing those individuals they write that they are state correctional inmates. However, Petitioners do object to the manner in which Respondent implements this restrictive measure. There is a much less restrictive means to accomplish the same objective, i.e., letting individuals know they are receiving letters from state correctional inmates. As the rule stands now, it is arbitrary or capricious as applied to the Petitioners. No facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rule is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. Finally, the following relief was requested and the following statement was made in closing: WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully move the Division of Administrative Hearings to declare Chapter 33-3.04 to be arbitrary or capricious in its application. Furthermore, Petitioners reserve the right to proffer First and Fourteenth Amendment violations during any administrative hearings [sic] or motions for rehearing for appellate purposes. On November 1, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend was entered. On December 2, 1991, a pleading titled "Amended Petition for Administrative Review" was filed by Mr. Halpin and Blanche Moseley with the case number of this case identified as the case that the pleading was being filed in. Through the Amended Petition Mr. Halpin and Ms. Moseley attempted to initiate the following challenge: Petitioners, Donald E. Halpin and Blanche Moseley, file their Amended Petition for Administrative Review, pursuant to Chapter [sic] 120.52(8)(d)(e), 120.56 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, to challenge Rule 33-3.004, Florida Administrative Code . . . . . . . . 4. Petitioners file this action pursuant to Chapter [sic] 120.52(8)(d)(e), 120.56 (Halpin being a State Prisoner must utilize Section 120.56) and 120.57 (Ms. Moseley being a free citizen will utilize Section 120.57), Florida Statutes. Petitioners will allege Chapter [sic] 33-3.04, F.A.C., is vague, vest unbridled discretion in the agency, and is arbitrary or capricious in its application. Furthermore, Petitioner Moseley would allege Chapter [sic] 33-3.04, F.A.C., violates the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the United States Constitution. It is further alleged under the "Conclusion" section of the Amended Petition that Ms. Moseley's challenge is based upon Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, although no proposed rule or rule amendment has been challenged in the Petition or Amended Petition. In support of the allegation that the Challenged Rule is vague, it is alleged in the Amended Petition that the Challenged Rule "does not set forth why the public must be protected, e.g., the types of crimes committed by inmates, the number of inmates who violated U.S. Mail regulations, and how other crimes were committed by inmates through U.S. Mail." In support of the allegation that the Challenged Rule vests unbridled discretion in the Respondent, it has been alleged in the Amended Petition that the Challenged Rule is only intended as punishment--by informing those who come in conduct with an inmate's mail that the mail is from someone who is in prison. Several allegations are also included in the Amended Petition concerning how Ms. Moseley's constitutional rights are being violated by the Challenged Rule. The Amended Petition is devoid of any alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule is invalid under Sections 120.54 or 120.56, Florida Statutes. Mr. Jackson and Mr. Fowler did not file an amended petition.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners and Respondent have stipulated to the following facts: The three petitioners are inmates at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida, in the custody of the Department of Corrections. All three of the petitioners have had their PPRD's established by the respondent-commission as follows: In June of 1982, Mr. Piccirillo's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 30, 1986. In January of 1982, Mr. Adams' PPRD was established by the commission to be November 11, 1991. In December of 1982, petitioner Hemming's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 29, 1993. Subsequent to the commission having established their PPRD's, all three of the petitioners have been transferred from one Florida penal institution to another state institution as follows: Mr. Piccirillo was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1982. Mr. Adams was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1932. Mr. Hemming was transferred from Avon Park Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on February 16, 1983. The petitioners were not transferred to Union Correctional Institution because of any unsatisfactory institutional conduct at their former institutions. Petitioners are currently scheduled by the commission for biennial interviews to review their established PPRD's as follows: Mr. Piccirillo is scheduled for a biennial interview in March of 1984. Mr. Adams is scheduled for a biennial interview in October of 1983. Mr. Hemming is scheduled for a biennial interview in September of 1984. The following additional findings are made from evidence presented at the hearing: The respondent-commission has not made a finding that any of the petitioner's institutional conduct has been unsatisfactory under the challenged rule nor has respondent extended their PPRD's or refused to authorize their EPRD's. In applying the challenged rule, the fact that an inmate has been transferred to a higher custody or higher level institution is only considered to be unsatisfactory institutional conduct where the commission receives documentation evidencing institutional misconduct as the basis for the transfer. Petitioners transfers from other institutions to Union Correctional Institution would not be considered unsatisfactory institutional conduct under the challenged rule because there is no documentation of institutional misconduct which led to these institutional transfers.
The Issue Whether the Florida Department of Corrections' Emergency Rule 33ER83-3 constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the reasons contained in petitioner's Petition for Determination of Validity of Emergency Rule, dated November 21, 1983.
Findings Of Fact On November 18, 1983, the Department filed and adopted Emergency Rule 33ER83-3, which provides: Shaving. All male inmates in the custody of the Department shall be clean shaven. An exemption from this requirement may be granted on medical grounds if it is determined by qualified medical staff that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's health. In such cases the inmate may be required to keep his facial hair closely trimmed with scissors or clippers. In the December 2, 1983, Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 9., No. 48, the Department stated its reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare, justifying adoption of the emergency rule: The Department's rule requiring inmates to be clean shaven has recently been held invalid because of a failure to include provision for medical exemptions. If inmates were able to grow beards, mustaches and other facial hair it would seriously interfere with the identification of inmates by staff. To maintain institutional security and order it is essential that staff members be able to identify inmates easily. The emergency rule, by its terms, requires all male inmates in the Department's custody to be clean shaven, but authorizes a medical exemption. The rule applies to petitioner Adams because he is a male inmate in the Department's custody who grows facial hair. These facts are inferences which arise from the following: The hearing was held in guarded quarters at Baker Correctional Institution; Mr. Adams was obviously a male; and he wore a uniform identical to that worn by two inmates who testified. The clean-shaven rule is strictly enforced by the Department. One enforcement checkpoint is the inmate dining hall. Inmates with facial hair, and without no-shaving passes (proof of medical exemption) are required to shave their facial hair prior to eating. Food is not withheld, however, if they promise to shave immediately after eating. (Testimony of McGuire) There are sound reasons which justify the adoption of the rule on an emergency basis. If inmates were allowed to grow facial hair, such as beards and mustaches, the Department's ability to quickly and accurately identify them would be seriously impaired. Inmates with facial hair could easily and quickly alter their appearance by shaving. This would make it more difficult to identify inmates who commit crimes such as rape, robbery, and assault within the correctional institutions. For the same reasons, it would be more difficult to identify and apprehend inmates who successfully escape because the picture distributed to law enforcement agencies would depict inmates only in their clean-shaven condition. (Testimony of Townsend) The extent to which facial hair changes a person's appearance is illustrated by the recent experience of John Townsend, Assistant Superintendent of Baker Correctional Institution. During a two-week vacation in August 1983, he grew a mustache. On his return, he toured the correctional institution without being recognized by correctional officers. Two officers required him to show identification. (Testimony of Townsend) There is a bona fide infectious condition known as Pseudo Folliculitis Barbae ("PFB") which occasionally afflicts male inmates. In its acute form, it infects an inmate's face causing symptoms such as sores, puss, and bumps. Medical treatment consists of applying an antihistamine facial cream such as Caladryl, and authorizing the inmate to forgo close shaving for approximately two weeks. In lieu of shaving, whiskers are cut with scissors or clippers; this allows facial hair to grow to a length of 1-2 millimeters. PFB symptoms vary, and actual medical treatment must be decided on an individual basis. Some conditions may require only facial cream, others may require no-shaving passes for periods shorter or longer than two weeks. (Testimony of Di-Huyen Luu, M.D.)
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Paul R. Layton, is an inmate presently confined at the Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. Given a choice the Petitioner would not wear his hair any longer than his collar. His personal feeling, however, is that the rule is used as a harassment technique and is used to dehumanize and institutionalize the prisoners. The Respondent's rationale for the rule is that requiring prisoners to keep their hair short aids in identification of the individual prisoners within the institution and in the event of an escape. Prisoners have attempted escapes by altering their appearance. The Department of Corrections, pursuant to the challenged rule, has required prisoners to cut their hair such that it is above their collar and off of their ears. The Department houses approximately 27,000 inmates, all of whom are required to wear similar uniforms. When a prisoner escapes, the Department of Corrections must provide a current photograph of the escaped prisoner to law enforcement agencies. Requiring short standardized haircuts substantially reduces the cost and difficulty such current photographs. Petitioner contended that the rule is discriminatory in that female inmates are not subjected to the same haircut standards. The majority of female inmates wear their hair long and when they change the length of their hairs they are rephotographed. Shorter hair is more sanitary for those prisoners who are involved in food preparation. Long hair can also constitute a safety hazard for those inmates who operate machinery.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, adopted revised rules of practice and procedure which became effective on September 10, 1981. Among these is Rule 23-21.09, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes "matrix time ranges" that are used in determining presumptive parole release dates for persons who are serving prison terms. In determining presumptive parole release dates, the Respondent's rules require that a "salient factor score" be determined based upon such factors as the number of prior criminal convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, total time served in prisons, the inmate's age at the time of the offense which led to the first incarceration, the number of probation or parole revocations, the number of prior escape convictions, and whether burglary or breaking and entering is the present offense of conviction. The degree or severity of the present offense of conviction is then determined. The Respondent's Rule 23-21.09 sets guidelines for time ranges for presumptive parole release dates depending upon the severity of the present offense of conviction and the salient factor score. The more severe the present offense of conviction, the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. Similarly, given the severity of the offense, the higher the salient factor score the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. The rule replaced a rule which set different matrix time ranges. The new rule generally sets longer time ranges, but this is not uniformly true. The Petitioner, Seimore Keith, is an inmate presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution, Polk City, Florida. Polk Correctional Institution is a facility maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner Keith was convicted of grand theft in July, 1980, and was sentenced to serve five years in prison. The conviction was the result of a guilty plea which was entered in accordance with a plea bargain. During plea negotiations, Petitioner Keith was advised that his presumptive parole release date under Florida Parole and Probation Commission rules would require that he serve no more than 25 months in prison. At the time that Petitioner Keith's presumptive parole release date was set by the Respondent, the new Rule 23-21.09 had come into effect, and the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was set to require that he serve 32 months in prison. The Petitioner, Ronnie McKane, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted of the offense of armed robbery in February, 1981. Under rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Petitioner McKane's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by Respondent in setting McKane's presumptive parole release date. The Petitioner, Daniel P. Hull, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted in September, 1971, of the offense of robbery and sentenced to serve ten years in prison. He was paroled in 1974, but was reincarcerated as a result of a parole violation in 1976. In 1977 he escaped, and was recaptured in January, 1981. On June 1, 1961, Petitioner Hull was convicted of the offense of escape and sentenced to serve nine months. Under the rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Hull's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rules were applied by Respondent in setting Hull's presumptive parole release date, and it has been set subsequent to the expiration of his sentence. Hull will therefore be released when his sentence expires in March, 1982. The Petitioner, Douglas L. Adams, was convicted of the offenses of possession of marijuana and uttering a forged instrument, and sentenced in February, 1981, to two consecutive five-year sentences. Under the rules in effect when Adams was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23- 21.09, Adams' presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by the Respondent in setting Adams' presumptive parole release date. During 1980, the Respondent directed its staff to begin considering proposed changes to its rules of practice and procedure. Various proposals were considered, and by September, 1980, a proposed rule package had been developed. The Respondent directed its staff to submit the proposed rule package to the Governor and members of the Cabinet, various pertinent legislators, county and circuit judges, prosecutors and public defenders, superintendents of each prison in the State, and to members of the Supreme Court and the district courts. The Commission opted to conduct various workshops throughout the State, and to invite all interested persons to share their input. Notices of the workshops were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The workshops were conducted, and the Commission commenced formal rule-making proceedings. Notice of rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and hearings were scheduled. Notice of the formal rulemaking proceedings was also published in the St. Petersburg Times, the Pensacola Journal, the Tallahassee Democrat, the Orlando Sentinel-Star, and the Florida Times-Union. Persons who had requested specific notification were provided it. In response to this notice, the Respondent received considerable written input, and oral presentations were made at hearings that were conducted. The final hearing in the rule-making proceeding was conducted on June 19, 1981, and the rules, including Rule 23- 21.09, were thereafter adopted effective September 10, 1981. Notice of the proposed rule changes and of the formal rulemaking proceeding was not specifically disseminated to inmates at Florida's prisons. The proposed rules were for- warded to the superintendent of each facility. At some of the institutions the proposed rules were apparently posted. All persons who requested copies of the proposed rules from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission were provided them. Numerous prisoners and organizations that represent prisoners made input during the various states of the rulemaking proceeding. None of the Petitioners in this matter were specifically noticed of the rulemaking proceeding. One of the Petitioners had heard that rules were being proposed, and requested copies of them from members of the Legislature or from Department of Corrections personnel. None of the Petitioners requested copies of the proposed rules from the Respondent or anyone connected with the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. The Petitioner was convicted for sexual battery and robbery in proceedings before the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida. On April 23, 1976, he was sentenced to serve 20 years for robbery and five years for sexual battery. Petitioner is presently incarcerated in accordance with these commitment orders. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of recommending a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under the Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious II)." He set the salient factor score as one. The examiner recommended setting the PPRD at the top of the appropriate range given the offense characteristic and salient factor score, and further recommended aggravating this period because of the concurrent conviction for robbery. The examiner recommended a PPRD of September 7, 1982. The Parole and Probation Commission reviewed the recommendation and considered the robbery conviction as being a greater aggravating factor than applied by the examiner. The Commission set the PPRD for February 25, 1986. Petitioner sought further review of the PPRD by the Commission and was unsuccessful. Petitioner has also been unsuccessful in pursuing judicial relief in connection with the PPRD. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, as applied to the Petitioner, provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. In adopting its rules, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. An inmate's history is the most reliable predictive device. Statistically, an inmate who has been convicted for more than one offense is a greater parole risk than an inmate who has been convicted for only one offense. The Commission's rule is thus a reasonable device for predicting the likelihood of successful parole.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin, Richard Edward Jackson and Jeffery Lynn Fowler, are inmates under the supervision of the Respondent. Petitioners Halpin and Fowler are incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution. Petitioner Jackson is incarcerated at Martin Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-6.003, 33-6.0045 and 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rules govern transfers of inmates and custody classification of inmates. The Challenged Rules were amended by the Respondent after the Respondent enacted and applied several emergency rules governing inmate transfers and custody classification of inmates. These emergency rules were adopted during 1990 and 1991. The Petitioners have alleged that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious as applied to the Petitioners . . . ." The Petitioners have also alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because they were amended "through prohibited acts as defined in Chapter 120.54(9)(c), Fla. Stat., when the Respondent ran two emergency rules (33ER91-1 & 33ER91-2) back-to- back so that Amended Chapter 33-6, etc. (1991) could be implemented."
Findings Of Fact Exhibit A is the Orientation Handbook (Handbook) for Lake Correctional Institution published in June 1980 by the Department of Corrections. Its first page reflects that it will be updated annually or as deemed necessary by the administration of the institution. A copy of this book is issued to every inmate. Inmates are disciplined for violating the mandates set forth in the Handbook; however, the Handbook by its own terms is a compendium of the statutes, rules, and regulations. It is subject to amendment by official memorandum posted on dormitory bulletin boards. Some of the regulations and rules set forth in the Handbook have been amended or stricken by the Department of Corrections. The Handbook no longer lists all of the existing infractions and certain of the infractions listed are no longer applicable. The Handbook states that the rules and regulations change from time to time and that it is the inmates' responsibility to check to see what the existing rules are. Thomas Hayes, DC# 053503, was given a corrective consultation for failing to stockade his mattress on his bunk. Paragraph 9 on Page 3 of the Handbook requires that inmates stockade their bunks. A source is not stated on the Handbook for this requirement to stockade bunks. Superintendent Staggers stated the authority for the requirement was Rule 33-3.01, Florida Administrative Code, and opined that it was a reasonable requirement related to health and welfare of inmates. Evidence was received regarding disciplinary action against Kevin Knight, DC# 094150, who was placed on Disciplinary Report for having a $5.00 bill in his possession when returning from the visiting area. Knight had not reported, as required, that he had the money in his possession when he entered the visiting are, and a search of Knight when he entered the area did not reveal the money. Possession of money (or negotiables) is prohibited. See Paragraphs 3-8, page 8 of the Handbook. The source of this prohibition is Section 944.47, Florida Statutes. Evidence was received that the inmates could not get free postage to mail pleadings to the Division of Administrative Hearings relating to this case. No reference to the Handbook was referenced by petitioners. Petitioner's Exhibit D is the applicable memorandum regarding Legal Mail implementing Rule 3.05, Florida Administrative Code. It limits Legal Mail to mail to or from: municipality, city, state & federal courts state attorneys private attorneys public defenders Hearing Officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings are not state attorneys, private attorneys, public defenders and the Division of Administrative Hearings is not a court. Evidence was received that there was not a specific source to which inmates and staff could refer to determine exactly what rules were operative. See testimony of Thomas Hayes DC# 053503. Both parties submitted posthearing findings of fact, which were read and considered. Those findings not incorporated herein are found to be subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, unnecessary, or not supported by the evidence.
