The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's site located at 13292 N.W. 118th Avenue in Miami, Florida is eligible for reimbursement of the costs of petroleum contamination cleanup pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rinker Material Corporation ("Rinker") owns and operates a site known as the Rinker FEC Quarry located at 13292 N.W. 118th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33127 (the "site"). At the Site, Rinker operated three (3) one thousand (1,000) gallon tanks which stored waste oil, virgin oil and hydraulic fluid. The DER Facility ID Number for the Site is 138628827. On December 2, 1988, Petitioner, as part of a tank replacement program that it was attempting to conduct in compliance with the applicable state and county regulations, began excavating the three underground storage tanks at the Site. During the excavation, a visible sheen was discovered. At the time of the excavation on December 2, 1988, Alan Gillespie of the Dade County Environmental Resource Management (DERM) was present to conduct a closure inspection of the Site. The December 2, 1988 closure inspection was conducted for Dade County DERM in its own capacity and not as an agent for DER. The purpose of the December 2, 1988 visit by Alan Gillespie was to inspect the removal and closure of the three 1,000 gallon tanks containing, respectively, waste oil, new oil and hydraulic fluid. Mr. Gillespie's inspection indicated that, while there appeared to be no holes in the tanks, free product was visible. Mr. Gillespie noted in his inspection report, dated December 2, 1988, that the contamination was not caused by a tank leak, but, instead, by overspills caused by the pouring of waste oil into the tank, spilling locally around the riser and then contaminating the soil around the tank. Rinker took samples at the Site and submitted them to a laboratory for analysis. It is not clear when the laboratory report was returned, but it generally takes two (2) weeks to obtain the laboratory analysis. Upon receipt of the laboratory report, Rinker initiated its efforts to apply for participation in the Inland Protection Trust Fund for reimbursement or site rehabilitation. In order to participate in the Inland Protection Trust Fund, an applicant was required to submit an Early Detection Incentive Program Notice (the "EDI Form") to DER prior to midnight on December 31,. 1988. The back of the EDI Form states that the form must be filed with and received by DER during the 15 month grace period beginning July 1, 1986 and ending October 1, 1987. The EDI program was; originally scheduled to end on September 30, 1987. However, the deadline for filing was extended by the legislature to December 31, 1988. The EDI Notification Form was not amended to change the dates to reflect subsequent amendments to the reporting date made by the legislature. While the back of the EDI Application Form indicates that the notification form must be filed with and received by DER on or prior to the initial deadline, DER considered as timely all applications with a postmark on or before the extended deadline of December 31, 1988. Petitioner's EDI Form for the Site was prepared by William Voshell, environmental manager for Rinker. Mr. Voshell was out of the state during the last few days of December, 1988. Petitioner's EDI Form was reviewed and signed by William Payne as Vice President of Real Estate for Rinker, on Friday, December 30, 1988. William Payne was informed by Mr. Voshell that the EDI Forms needed to be sent out before the end of the year. A cover letter accompanying the EDI Form for the Site was signed for Mr. Voshell by his secretary, Linda Vasquez on December 30, 1988. After signing the EDI Form, William Payne returned the application to Linda Vasquez to "process to mail". He reminded her that it had to be mailed that day. Ms. Vasquez placed the EDI Form and the cover letter in the Petitioner's mail system on December 30, 1988. The Certified Mail Number P 533059801 appears on the envelope containing Petitioner's EDI Form. January 3, 1989 was the first business day of 1989. The envelope containing the EDI Form was postmarked January 3, 1989. A certified mail return receipt attached to the envelope containing the EDI Form and cover letter shows that the return was stamped by the post office on January 3, 1989. The postal receipt for the EDI Form and cover letter was returned to Rinker from the post office on January 3, 1989. DER received Petitioner's EDI Form for the Site on January 9, 1989. Petitioner's normal procedure is to internally meter regular mail and affix a postmark date. However, certified or registered mail is metered and taken to the post office for processing. Registered mail received in the Petitioner's mailroom on December 30, 1988 should have been metered and taken to the post office for processing the same day or at the latest the next business day (December 31st, a Saturday). After the EDI Form was filed but prior to the eligibility determination, Petitioner was required to submit Site characterization information and documentation of the Site conditions before the initiation of cleanup. The evidence did not establish the expense or costs incurred by Rinker in gathering this information. Prior to ruling on Petitioner's EDI application, DER, through DERM, conducted an eligibility inspection at the Site. Alan Gillespie of DERM conducted the EDI eligibility inspection on April 20, 1989. During an EDI inspection, the inspector examines and reports on the existing conditions of a facility including: recordkeeping, the age of the tanks and the conditions of the monitoring wells and whether there is any negligence involved with the contamination that has occurred. During the April 20, 1989 inspection, Alan Gillespie reported that the three 1,000 gallon underground tanks had been removed and replaced with a new aboveground petroleum storage system. On the EDI inspection report, Mr. Gillespie reported evidence of soil contamination and/or recent product loss and noted that such contamination was discovered at the time of tank removal. After completion of the April 20, 1989 inspection report, Mr. Gillespie's supervisor at DERM sent the report to DER in Tallahassee. In 1989, final Early Detection Incentive Program or Reimbursement Program eligibility determinations were made in Tallahassee by DER. At the time of the EDI eligibility inspection of the Site on April 20, 1989, the role of Dade County DERM was only to conduct an EDI inspection at the site and to forward the information to Tallahassee. Prior to making an eligibility determination on the Site, Patricia Dugan, Environmental Administrator of the DER Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement Section, reviewed the EDI application, the inspections from DERM, documentation of the site conditions prior to initiation of cleanup and the envelope that the application came in. On November 23, 1989, DER issued an order finding the Site to be ineligible for participation in the Reimbursement Program. Initially, Petitioner's reimbursement application was deemed ineligible because of mixed contamination (i.e., the Site contained used oil) and because the application was deemed untimely. Subsequent to the date of the denial, certain legal decisions made it clear that, contrary to DER's position, sites containing used oil were eligible for participation in the Reimbursement Program. Thus, the only remaining predicate for DER's denial of Rinker's application is that the application was not timely filed. Because Petitioner's EDI application was postmarked on January 3, 1989, after the December 31, 1988 statutory deadline, the Petitioner's application was deemed untimely by DER. DER's policy of relying on the postmark date for purposes of determining timeliness was informally arrived at in 1987. DER has never promulgated a rule on this matter nor conveyed its interpretation to affected parties. Petitioner could have and would have internally placed a postmark date of December 30, 1988 on the envelope containing the EDI Form had it been aware of DER's policy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order approving Petitioner's application for eligibility under the state's reimbursement program. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of July, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 9 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17 and 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22, 36, 37 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as argument rather than a finding of fact. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37, 38 and 39. 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 28. 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 29. 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 30. 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. 28. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 32. 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 34. 31. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 35. 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. 34. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 36. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36, 37 and 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Pettigrew, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33181 Janet E. Bowman Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale W. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 5, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was hired by Respondent as a temporary employee on January 17, 2005. She continued to be employed by Respondent until she resigned her position on November 7, 2007. Respondent, PPS World Medical (PPS), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. PPS is a distributor of medical supplies from manufacturers to physicians’ offices. Crystal Marx interviewed Petitioner and hired her as a temporary employee in January 2005. Petitioner worked for several months as a temporary employee, and her performance was very good. Ms. Marx recommended to Renee Placette that Petitioner be hired as a regular, full-time employee. Ms. Placette had an opportunity to observe Petitioner’s performance as a temporary employee. Ms. Placette made the final decision to hire Petitioner in a full-time position in May 2006 as a supply chain expediter. Ms. Marx and Ms. Placette are Caucasian females. After three months of employment, Ms. Marx decided to conduct a 90-day performance review of Petitioner. It was not standard procedure in the department where Petitioner worked to receive a 90-day review. However, Ms. Marx made the decision to conduct the review to let Petitioner know about some concerns so Petitioner would have an opportunity to make improvements before her annual review. In a meeting to discuss the 90-day review, Ms. Marx addressed the following issues with Petitioner: work that was not being completed correctly which resulted in Ms. Marx's receiving e-mails concerning mistakes Petitioner was making; issues Petitioner was having with her coworkers; and Petitioner’s practice of skipping lunch and leaving an hour early without prior approval. The score received by Petitioner on her 90-day review did not affect Petitioner’s compensation in any way. When initially hired, Ms. Marx was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. At some point in time, Patricia Barnard was brought in as another layer of supervision. Ms. Barnard worked for Ms. Marx. For a period of time, Petitioner e-mailed Ms. Barnard when she went to, and returned from, her 15-minute break. This issue initially arose when several people asked Ms. Barnard where Petitioner was when she was away on her break. Ms. Barnard discussed this with Petitioner. Petitioner then suggested that she e-mail Ms. Barnard when she left on her break and upon her return. Ms. Barnard did not require Petitioner to do this. When Petitioner stopped sending these e-mails, Ms. Barnard did not instruct Petitioner to resume sending the e-mails or take any action regarding the e-mails. During a period of time when Petitioner was on medical leave, two accounts were reassigned to other employees while she was away. One of the accounts was assigned to another employee, Tracy Hundley, who is African-American. After that, Ms. Barnard and Ms. Marx took over the account for a while, later assigning it to Tara Nelson, another African-American employee. In any event, Petitioner did not receive any extra pay when she handled those accounts, and did not receive any cut in pay when these accounts were reassigned to others. On November 17, 2006, Petitioner received a Documented Verbal Warning for failure to properly notify management of her absence. On August 15, 2007, Petitioner received a Final Written Warning for unprofessional and inappropriate behavior towards an employee relations representative. On May 8, 2007, Ms. Barnard completed a job performance annual review of Petitioner. On her annual review, Petitioner received a score of 80, which is an average score. Ms. Marx approved the review as prepared by Ms. Barnard. Allegations of failure to promote Petitioner applied for the position of “WM Supply Chain Procurement Specialist” in November 2006. Petitioner again applied for the Procurement Specialist position in May 2007. Petitioner received an e-mail from Ms. Placette advising her that three people were hired with “a lot of buying experience.” In July 2007, Petitioner applied for the position of IT Governance Process Analyst. She received a letter from the IT Governance Process Manager of PSS which informed her that she was not selected for the position. There is nothing in the record establishing the qualifications required for these positions, whether Petitioner met these qualifications, or even whether these positions could be considered as promotions. Further, no competent evidence was presented as to the identity, qualifications, or race of the persons who were hired into these positions. Other allegations Petitioner also alleged that she was paid less then what had been promised, $11.54 an hour, in her letter offering employment. Petitioner contends that she was instead paid one cent an hour less, i.e., $11.53 per hour. The official pay stub reflects her rate of pay to have been $11.54 per hour. Further, Petitioner alleged that she was, at some point, given a new wireless headset which was replaced by a used one that she described as “yucky.” Employees who work in “confirmation” received wireless headsets because those employees needed to be able to go to the fax machine and the printer while on the telephone with a vendor. Petitioner was an “expediter” not a “confirmation” person, and did not need to be able to go to the fax machine or the printer as often while on the telephone. Petitioner resigned her position on November 2, 2007. At the time she resigned, she informed her co-workers that she owned her own t-shirt business and resigned to run her own company full time. At hearing, Petitioner asserted that she resigned because there was a “different atmosphere,” that she was stressed, and could not work there anymore. There was no competent evidence presented that establishes or even suggests that any employment action taken by Respondent toward Petitioner was based on race.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This controversy arose as the result of an application being filed by respondent/applicant, G. T. Williams (Williams or applicant), seeking a permit to construct a biological waste incinerator at 1530 North Beal Street Extension, Fort Walton Beach, Florida. The original application reflected that applicant intended to incinerate type 4 cardboard, paper and plastics furnished by area hospitals, laboratories and doctors' offices at a rate of 440 pounds per hour. Also, the proposed unit included a secondary chamber with a 3,000,000 BTU burner and controls for one second retention at 1800 degrees. However, on August 20, 1990, applicant amended its application to reflect that, instead of a one second retention chamber, it would employ a two second retention chamber to ensure total combustion in the secondary unit. After receiving the application and conducting a review and on-site inspection, respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER), gave notice of its intent to grant the permit on August 23, 1990. The agency action also required applicant to publish notice of such intended action in a local newspaper of general circulation and to provide the agency with proof of publication. Because applicant had obtained a draft of the notice prior to its formal issuance by DER, it published notice of the intended action on August 1, 1990, or more than three weeks prior to the date of the formal proposed agency action. Considering such publication to be ineffective, DER gave notice on October 15, 1990, that it was reversing its earlier action and denying the permit. On October 20, 1990, applicant published notice of the agency action. After DER issued a final order denying the permit, applicant filed an appeal but later dismissed it after DER agreed to issue the permit subject to a petition for hearing filed by a third party prior to the issuance of the final order. On November 1, 1990, petitioner, Okaloosa County (County), the county in which the facility will be located, filed its petition for administrative hearing. As later amended on December 12, 1990, the petition contested the proposed issuance of a permit generally on the grounds that its employees working in nearby areas would be exposed to harmful emissions from the facility and the applicant had not given reasonable assurances that the facility would comply with all DER pollution standards. The Application Type of permit being sought In order for the facility to become operational, Williams is required to obtain both a construction and operating permit. This application concerns only a construction permit and, if approved, Williams will be allowed to construct the facility, have an initial start-up period, and perform compliance testing within the start-up period to demonstrate that the facility can meet the requirements and limitations set forth in the permit. Before obtaining an operating permit, Williams must first perform compliance testing under the auspices of a certified testing consultant employed by DER and submit those results to the agency. If the testing results do not meet all DER standards, an operating permit will not be issued until and if all deficiencies are corrected. The unit Applicant proposes to utilize an incinerator manufactured by Cleaver- Brooks, model CBU-500, with a design capacity to burn 500 pounds of Class 4 biological waste per hour. 1/ As a unit designed to burn no more than 500 pounds of waste per hour, the unit falls in the smallest of the three categories of incinerators regulated by DER. The unit was described by a DER witness as being a "relatively small" one and the size typically found "behind your medium sized hospital". It costs in excess of one hundred thousand dollars. The unit is a modular, factory built, packaged and tested system that burns combustible waste of varying heat content. The basic system consists of the main (pyrolysis) chamber, secondary chamber, which is the primary pollution control device, burners, stack and controls. The incinerator employs a two-stage waste combustion process. In more technical terms, the first stage is a pyrolysis process whereby combustible gases are generated under controlled air and temperature conditions. The main chamber receives waste through a manual batch door or from an optional hydraulically powered feeder, and with the aid of a temperature controlled burner and sub-stoichiometric underfire air supply, combustible gases with minimum particle entrainment are produced. Complete destruction of the fixed carbon and less volatile material takes place continually in the firebed. The second stage is an excess air combustion process whereby the combustible gases generated in the main chamber are ignited in the secondary chamber producing a high temperature carbon dioxide and water vapor flue gas. The secondary chamber supplies all the air for this combustion through temperature controlled forced air jets and employs temperature controlled burners to ensure complete ignition of the gases. The flue gas is then ducted to the stack and exhausted to the atmosphere. Although the applicant originally proposed to use a thirty foot stack on the unit, he has agreed to install a stack having a height that will be a minimum of two and one-half times the height of any building within one hundred fifty feet. Location The proposed site for the incinerator is on a flat, three-acre lot within an industrial park located approximately 1,150 feet east of North Beal Street Extension, a paved collector road that serves an industrial area north of the City of Fort Walton Beach. This location was selected by Williams because it was "run down", was basically "heavy industrial", and was "already polluted" with junk cars and plastic. Indeed, adjacent to or in the general vicinity of the site are undeveloped Eglin Air Force Base property, a plastic recycling plant, a landfill operated by the County, a City of Fort Walton Beach sewer plant and an auto salvage yard. According to the County engineer, the surrounding area "looks pretty bad" but is "probably an average industrial site." There is also an older residential area known as Pine Subdivision which, at its closest point, lies approximately 200 feet southeast of the edge of applicant's property. Applicant owns a 3,000 square foot metal frame building of an undisclosed height on the southeast end of his property and intends to lift up one of the garage bay doors in the front, slide the lower unit in place, peel back three or four sections of metal roof, set the horizontal unit on top, and replace the roof. A stack will then be added to the unit. The property is fenced and access may be had only by a dirt road leading into the area. Treatment process Applicant intends to provide service to various hospitals, physicians, and laboratories in the area. At the present time, approximately one-half of the medical waste in the Panhandle portion of the state is being transported to incinerators in central and south Florida for disposal because there are inadequate facilities in the Panhandle area. Williams will use a panel truck registered with the Department of Transportation to transport all materials to the site. He will also give all customers special sealed containers in which to place their waste materials. These containers, which are known as sharps containers, are designed to hold syringes, scalpels, and other objects capable of penetrating the skin, as well as cotton swabs saturated to the point of dripping. After arriving at the site the truck will be unloaded and the material and containers placed in the incinerator and burned. Because Williams contemplates burning waste as often as needed, waste materials will not be stored on premises except for very short periods of time. In addition, the unit will be operated by a state certified gas operator who has received special training from the manufacturer. The unit into which the waste is fed is approximately eight feet in diameter, nine feet high and cylindrically shaped. Through the use of natural gas, the burn chamber reaches a temperature of sixteen hundred degrees, a temperature at which no organisms can survive. The gases from the first burn chamber then circulate into the secondary burn chamber for two seconds, which is greater than the one second retention time required by DER rules. The only visible emission seen from the stack will be heat waves. All emissions will be well within the air quality standards utilized by DER. Any glass slag or ashes remaining in the unit can be handled as regular waste and disposed of in a class 2 landfill. Finally, the prevailing winds throughout most of the year are from the south and southeast and thus all emissions will blow primarily to the northwest across the sewage treatment plant area. d. DER's review of the application In connection with the processing of the application, DER reviewed it for completeness and accuracy and was satisfied that the application was complete and accurate in all respects, including the submission by applicant of a topographic map. In addition, DER staff conducted an on-site inspection of applicant's property. Also, during the course of the review, DER technical staff had a number of discussions with Williams to clarify the information submitted with the application. Finally, based upon its review of the data originally filed together with information provided by Williams during the review process, DER staff reached the preliminary conclusion that Williams had satisfied all applicable rules and statutes. Petitioner's Concerns In its amended petition, the County raised two principal concerns regarding the construction of the facility. First, it contended that its employees who worked in areas adjacent to the facility would be subject to harmful emissions from the unit. Second, it argued that the applicant had failed to give reasonable assurance that the unit would comply with all DER standards. During the course of the hearing, the County focused principally on the issues of (a) "hot spots", which are high concentrations of pollutants which may occur at a distance of ten feet up to as far as five hundred feet downwind from the point of emission if the stack height on the unit is not at an adequate height, (b) applicant's lack of a storage facility for waste to prevent the potential leaching into the ground of medical waste waiting to be incinerated, and (c) the agency's failure to require Williams to post proof of financial responsibility through a bond. These concerns will be addressed below. The agency does not have a have a specific stack height rule applicable to the incineration process but rather requires that the unit be constructed in accordance with good engineering practices and that it meet all emission requirements. At hearing petitioner's expert agreed that any potential "hot spots" problem would be resolved by applicant agreeing to utilize a stack having a height of at least two and one-half times the height of any building within one hundred fifty feet of the unit. Moreover, DER has required that Williams place a monitoring device on the stack so that all emissions can be measured 24 hours per day. Since the applicant has agreed to both of these conditions, this issue has been resolved. County employees occasionally work on several roads within Pine Subdivision, one of which is only 250 feet from the proposed facility. They also are engaged in the periodic maintenance of ditches which run along the sides of North Beal Street Extension, and eight to ten employees regularly work at the County landfill approximately 1,350 feet away. To this extent, then, it may be reasonably inferred that any potential injury suffered by County employees would differ in degree and kind from that suffered by members of the general public. Even so, with the resolution of the "hot spots" problem, the County's expert agreed that the proposed incinerator would meet all applicable requirements contained in Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and that all pertinent agency rules would be satisfied. Thus, the employees would not be exposed to emissions that contravene DER's air pollution requirements. There is no evidence of record to support a finding that applicant should file a bond as a prerequisite to being issued a permit. Indeed, the only evidence on this issue suggests that DER requires a bond from an applicant when it believes the applicant has not proceeded in good faith or has a history of violating DER regulations. Neither situation is applicable here. As to the storage issue, the evidence shows that applicant will incinerate materials as often as needed, and waste materials will be kept on the premises only for brief periods of time when the unit is already filled and then only until those materials are burned and the unit is ready to receive new waste. Thus, as a practical matter, the facility will not be used to "store" waste materials within the meaning of that term. In addition, the area where waste materials will be kept until being fed into the unit will be an integral part of the treatment facility, and DER represents it has no authority to require Williams to submit information regarding storage areas associated with the incinerator. Put another way, in the construction permit review process, DER is concerned only with the air pollution source and the adequacy of the proposed control equipment. This was not contradicted. Finally, there was no evidence to suggest that the materials will leak into the ground. Indeed, petitioner's expert suggested only that the facility should be "secure" and that the material should be covered in the event of rain. The Required Reasonable Assurance Effective on an undisclosed date in 1991, new and more stringent DER rules became applicable to all new medical waste incinerators, including that proposed by Williams. Thus, his application was reviewed to determine its consistency with those new standards. An agency rule [rule 17-2.600(1)] provides that facilities with a capacity equal to or less than 500 pounds per hour, such as the Cleaver-Brooks 500 model, shall not have particulate matter emissions exceeding 0.100 grains per dry standard cubic foot of flue gas, corrected to 7% 0 or hydrochloric acid (HCL) emissions that exceed 4 pounds per hour. When operated as proposed by Williams, and as guaranteed by the manufacturer, emissions of small amounts of particulate matter and hydrocloric acid will not exceed those amounts allowed by rule. In addition, any emissions of water vapors and carbon dioxide will be in very small amounts and will not result in unlawful emissions. This finding is based upon the testimony of witnesses Middleswart and Dzurik which has been accepted as being persuasive on this issue. Thus, Williams has given reasonable assurance that the proposed facility will not cause air pollution in contravention of DER standards. The applicant has given reasonable assurance that the proposed facility will comply will all other applicable DER standards and rules. This was not controverted. Therefore, Williams has demonstrated his entitlement to the permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that G. T. Williams' application for a permit to construct a biological waste incinerator adjacent to North Beal Street Extension, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, should be GRANTED subject to the following condition: That the applicant utilize a stack height of two and one-half times the height of any building within 150 feet of his unit. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Department of Corrections? action to withdraw its Intent to Award and to reject all replies to ITN 12-DC-8396 is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and if so, whether its Intent to Award is contrary to governing statutes, rules, policies, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact The DOC is an agency of the State of Florida that is responsible for the supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of Florida?s inmate population. In carrying out this statutory responsibility, the Department provides access to inmate telephone services. On April 15, 2013, the DOC issued the ITN, entitled “Statewide Inmate Telephone Services, ITN 12-DC-8396,” seeking vendors to provide managed-access inmate telephone service to the DOC. Responses to the ITN were due to be opened on May 21, 2013. The DOC issued Addendum #1 to the ITN on April 23, 2013, revising one page of the ITN. The DOC issued Addendum #2 to the ITN on May 14, 2013, revising a number of pages of the ITN, and including answers to a number of vendor questions. EPSI, GTL, and Securus are providers of inmate telephone systems and services. Securus is the incumbent contractor, and has been providing the Department with services substantially similar to those solicited for over five years. No party filed a notice of protest to the terms, conditions, or specifications contained in the ITN or the Addenda within 72 hours of their posting or a formal written protest within 10 days thereafter. Replies to the ITN were received from EPSI, GTL, Securus, and Telmate, LLC. Telmate?s reply was determined to be not responsive to the ITN. Two-Part ITN As amended by Addendum #2, section 2.4 of the ITN, entitled “ITN Process,” provided that the Invitation to Negotiate process to select qualified vendors would consist of two distinct parts. In Part 1, an interested vendor was to submit a response that described certain Mandatory Responsiveness Requirement elements, as well as a Statement of Qualifications, Technical Response, and Financial Documentation. These responses would then be scored using established evaluation criteria and the scores would be combined with cost points assigned from submitted Cost Proposals. In Part 2, the Department was to select one or more qualified vendors for negotiations. After negotiations, the Department would request a Best and Final Offer from each vendor for final consideration prior to final award decision. The ITN provided that the Department could reject any and all responses at any time. High Commissions and Low Rates Section 2.5 of the ITN, entitled “Initial Cost Response,” provided in part: It is the Department?s intention, through the ITN process, to generate the highest percentage of revenue for the State, while ensuring a quality telephone service with reasonable and justifiable telephone call rate charges for inmate?s family and friends similar to those available to the public-at- large. Section 2.6 of the ITN, entitled “Revenue to be Paid to the Department,” provided in part that the Department intended to enter into a contract to provide inmate telephone service at no cost to the Department. It provided that, “[t]he successful Contractor shall pay to the Department a commission calculated as a percentage of gross revenues.”1/ The commission paid by a vendor is the single largest expense in the industry and is an important aspect of any bid. Contract Term Section 2.8 of the ITN was entitled “Contract Term” and provided: It is anticipated that the initial term of any Contract resulting from this ITN shall be for a five (5) year period. At its sole discretion, the Department may renew the Contract in accordance with Form PUR 1000 #26. The renewal shall be contingent, at a minimum, on satisfactory performance of the Contract by the Contractor as determined by the Department, and subject to the availability of funds. If the Department desires to renew the Contracts resulting from this ITN, it will provide written notice to the Contractor no later than thirty days prior to the Contract expiration date. Own Technology System Section 3.4 of the ITN provided in part: The successful Contractor is required to implement its own technology system to facilitate inmate telephone service. Due to the size and complexity of the anticipated system, the successful Contractor will be allowed a period of transition beginning on the date the contract is executed in which to install and implement the utilization of its own technology system. Transition, implementation and installation are limited to eighty (80) days. The Department realizes that some "down time" will occur during this transition, and Respondents shall propose an implementation plan that reduces this "down time" and allows for a smooth progression to the proposed ITS. GTL emphasizes the language stating that the successful contractor must implement “its own” technology system, and asserts that the technology system which EPSI offers to install is not owned by it, but by Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC (ICS), its subcontractor. However, EPSI demonstrated that while the inmate telephone platform, dubbed the “Enforcer System,” is owned by ICS now, that EPSI has a Master User Agreement with ICS and that an agreement has already been reached that before the contract would be entered into, a Statement of Work would be executed to create actual ownership in EPSI for purposes of the Florida contract. GTL alleges that in EPSI?s reply, EPSI relied upon the experience, qualifications, and resources of its affiliated entities in other areas as well. For example, GTL asserts that EPSI?s claim that it would be providing 83 percent of the manpower is false, since EPSI has acknowledged that EPSI is only a contracting subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and that EPSI has no employees of its own. While it is clear that EPSI?s reply to the ITN relies upon the resources of its parent to carry out the terms of the contract with respect to experience, presence in the state, and personnel, EPSI demonstrated that this arrangement was common, and well understood by the Department. EPSI demonstrated that all required capabilities would be available to it through the resources of its parent and subcontractors at the time the contract was entered into, and that its reply was in conformance with the provisions of the ITN in all material respects. EPSI has the integrity and reliability to assure good faith performance of the contract. Call Recording Section 3.6 of the ITN, entitled “Inmate Telephone System Functionality (General),” provided in part: The system shall provide the capability to flag any individual telephone number in the inmate?s „Approved Number List? as „Do Not Record.? The default setting for each telephone number will be to record until flagged by Department personnel to the contrary. Securus alleges that section 3.6 of the ITN implements Department regulations2/ and that EPSI?s reply was non-responsive because it stated that recording of calls to specific telephone numbers would be deactivated regardless of who called that number. Securus alleges that this creates a security risk because other inmates calling the same number should still have their calls recorded. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with section 3.6. While EPSI went on to say that this capability was not connected to an inmate?s PIN, the language of section 3.6 does not mention an inmate?s PIN either. Read literally, this section requires only the ability to “flag” any individual telephone number that appears in an inmate?s number list as “do not record” and requires that, by default, calls to a telephone number will be recorded until it is flagged. EPSI?s reply indicated it could meet this requirement. This provision says nothing about continuing to record calls to that same number from other inmates. Whether or not this creates a security risk or is what the Department actually desired are issues which might well be discussed as part of the negotiations, but this does not affect the responsiveness of EPSI?s reply to section 3.6. Furthermore, Mr. Cooper testified at hearing that EPSI does have the capability to mark a number as “do not record” only with respect to an individual inmate, at the option of the Department. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-recording provisions of section 3.6 of the ITN in all material respects. Call Forwarding Section 3.6.8 of the ITN, entitled “System Restriction, Fraud Control and Notification Requirements,” provided that the provided inmate telephone services have the following security capability: Ability to immediately terminate a call if it detects that a called party?s telephone number is call forwarded to another telephone number. The system shall make a “notation” in the database on the inmate?s call. The system shall make this information available, in a report format, to designated department personnel. In response to an inquiry noting that, as worded, the ITN did not technically require a vendor to have the capability to detect call-forwarded calls in the first place, the Department responded that this functionality was required. Securus alleges that EPSI is unable to comply with this requirement, citing as evidence EPSI?s admission, made some months before in connection with an RFP being conducted by the Kansas Department of Corrections, that it did not yet have this capability. EPSI indicated in its reply to the ITN that it read, agreed, and would comply with this requirement. As for the Kansas solicitation, EPSI showed that it now possesses this capability, and has in fact installed it before. EPSI?s reply conformed to the call-forwarding provisions of section 3.6.8 of the ITN in all material respects. Keefe Commissary Network Section 5.2.1 of the ITN, entitled “Respondents? Business/Corporate Experience,” at paragraph e. directed each vendor to: [P]rovide and identify all entities of or related to the Respondent (including parent company and subsidiaries of the parent company; divisions or subdivisions of parent company or of Respondent), that have ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings whether related to the services contemplated by this ITN or not, or entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice, including services contemplated by this ITN, in response to a civil or criminal action, or have been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The Respondent shall identify the amount of any payments made as part of any settlement agreement, consent order or conviction. Attachment 6 to the ITN, setting forth Evaluation Criteria, similarly provided guidance regarding the assessment of points for Business/Corporate Experience. Paragraph 1.(f) provided: “If any entities of, or related to, the Respondent were convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings, what were the circumstances that led to the conviction and how was it resolved by the Respondent?” Addendum #2. to the ITN, which included questions and answers, also contained the following: Question 57: In Attachment 6, Article 1.f. regarding respondents “convicted of fraud, deceit, or unlawful business dealing . . .” does this include associated subcontractors proposed in this ITN? Answer 57: Yes, any subcontractors you intend to utilize on this project, would be considered an entity of and related to your firm. As a proposed subcontractor, ICS is an entity of, or related to, EPSI. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has ever been convicted of fraud or of deceit or unlawful business dealings. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to a civil or criminal action. There is no evidence to indicate that ICS has been the subject of any complaint, action, investigation, or suit involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. The only evidence at hearing as to convictions involved “two individuals from the Florida DOC” and “two individuals from a company called AIS, I think that?s American Institutional Services.” No evidence was presented that AIS was “an entity of or related to” EPSI. Conversely, there was no evidence that Keefe Commissary Network (KCN) or anyone employed by it was ever convicted of any crime. There was similarly no evidence that KCN entered into any type of settlement agreement concerning a business practice in response to civil or criminal action. It was shown that KCN “cooperated with the federal government in an investigation” that resulted in criminal convictions, and it is concluded that KCN was therefore itself a subject of an investigation involving any other type of dealings contrary to federal, state, or other regulatory agency regulations. However, KCN is not an entity of, or related to, EPSI. KCN is not a parent company of EPSI, it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI, and it is not a division, subdivision, or subsidiary of EPSI?s parent company, CenturyLink, Inc. EPSI?s reply conformed to the disclosure requirements of section 5.2.1, Attachment 6, and Addendum #2 of the ITN in all material respects. Phases of the ITN Section 6 describes nine phases of the ITN: Phase 1 – Public Opening and Review of Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements Phase 2 – Review of References and Other Bid Requirements Phase 3 – Evaluations of Statement of Qualifications, Technical Responses, and Managed Access Solutions3/ Phase 4 – CPA Review of Financial Documentation Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheets Phase 6 – Determination of Final Scores Phase 7 – Negotiations Phase 8 – Best and Final Offers from Respondents Phase 9 – Notice of Intended Decision Evaluation Criteria in the ITN As amended by Addendum #2, the ITN established scoring criteria to evaluate replies in three main categories: Statement of Qualifications (500 points); Technical Response (400 points); and Initial Cost Sheets (100 points). It also provided specific guidance for consideration of the commissions and rates shown on the Initial Cost Sheet that made up the pricing category. Section 6.1.5 of the ITN, entitled “Phase 5 – Review of Initial Cost Sheet,” provided in part: The Initial Cost Proposal with the highest commission (percentage of gross revenue) to be paid to the Department will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other commission percentages will receive points according to the following formula: (X/N) x 50 = Z Where: X = Respondents proposed Commission Percentage to be Paid. N = highest Commission Percentage to be Paid of all responses submitted. Z = points awarded. * * * The Initial Cost Proposal with the lowest telephone rate charge will be awarded 50 points. The price submitted in Table 1 for the Original Contract Term, and the subsequent renewal price pages for Table 1 will be averaged to determine the highest commission submitted. All other cost responses will receive points according to the following formula: (N/X) x 50 = Z Where: N = lowest verified telephone rate charge of all responses submitted. X = Respondent?s proposed lowest telephone rate charge. Z = points awarded. The ITN as amended by Addendum #2 provided instructions that initial costs should be submitted with the most favorable terms the Respondent could offer and that final percentages and rates would be determined through the negotiation process. It included the following chart:4/ COST PROPOSAL INITIAL Contract Term 5 years ONE Year Renewal TWO Year Renewal THREE Year Renewal FOUR Year Renewal FIVE Year Renewal Initial Department Commission % Rate Proposed Initial Blended Telephone Rate for All Calls* (inclusive of surcharges) The ITN, including its Addenda, did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the state would be based. Allegation that EPSI Reply was Misleading On the Certification/Attestation Page, each vendor was required to certify that the information contained in its reply was true and sufficiently complete so as not to be misleading. While portions of its reply might have provided more detail, EPSI did not mislead the Department regarding its legal structure, affiliations, and subcontractors, or misrepresent what entity would be providing technology or services if EPSI was awarded the contract. EPSI?s reply explained that EPSI was a wholly owned corporate subsidiary of CenturyLink, Inc., and described many aspects of the contract that would be performed using resources of its parent, as well as aspects that would be performed through ICS as its subcontractor. Department Evaluation of Initial Replies The information on the Cost Proposal table was reviewed and scored by Ms. Hussey, who had been appointed as the procurement manager for the ITN. Attempting to follow the instructions provided in section 6.1.5, she added together the six numbers found in the boxes indicating commission percentages on the Cost Proposal sheets. One of these boxes contained the commission percentage for the original five-year contract term and each of the other five boxes contained the commission percentage for one of the five renewal years. She then divided this sum by six, the number of boxes in the computation chart (“divide by six”). In other words, she calculated the arithmetic mean of the six numbers provided in each proposal. The Department had not intended for the commission percentages to be averaged in this manner. Instead, they had intended that a weighted mean would be calculated. That is, they intended that five times the commission percentage shown for the initial contract term would be added to the commission percentages for the five renewal years, with that sum then being divided by ten, the total number of years (“divide by ten”). The Department did not clearly express this intent in section 6.1.5. Mr. Viefhaus testified that based upon the language, Securus believed that in Phase 5 the Department would compute the average commission rate the way that Ms. Hussey actually did it, taking the arithmetic mean of the six commission percentages provided by each vendor, and that therefore Securus prepared its submission with that calculation in mind.5/ Mr. Montanaro testified that based upon the language, GTL believed that in Phase 5 the Department would “divide by ten,” that is, compute the weighted mean covering the ten-year period of the contract, and that GTL filled out its Cost Proposal table based upon that understanding. The DOC posted a notice of its intent to negotiate with GTL, Securus, and EPSI on June 3, 2013. Telmate, LLC, was not chosen for negotiations.6/ Following the Notice of Intent to Negotiate was this statement in bold print: Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. On June 14, 2013, the DOC issued a Request for Best and Final Offers (RBAFO), directing that Best and Final Offers (BAFO) be provided to the DOC by June 18, 2013. Location-Based Services The RBAFO included location-based services of called cell phones as an additional negotiated service, requesting a narrative description of the service that could be provided. The capability to provide location-based services had not been part of the original ITN, but discussions took place as part of the negotiations. Securus contends that EPSI was not a responsible vendor because it misrepresented its ability to provide such location-based services through 3Cinteractive, Inc. (3Ci). EPSI demonstrated that it had indicated to the Department during negotiations that it did not have the capability at that time, but that the capability could easily be added. EPSI showed that due to an earlier call it received from 3Ci, it believed that 3Ci would be able to provide location- based services to it. EPSI was also talking at this time to another company, CTI, which could also provide it that capability. In its BAFO, EPSI indicated it could provide these services, explained that they would require payments to a third- party provider, and showed a corresponding financial change to their offer. No competent evidence showed whether or not 3Ci was actually able to provide that service on behalf of EPSI, either at the time the BAFO was submitted, or earlier. EPSI showed that it believed 3Ci was available to provide that service, however, and there is no basis to conclude that EPSI in any way misrepresented its ability to provide location-based services during negotiations or in its BAFO. Language of the RBAFO The RBAFO provided in part: This RBAFO contains Pricing, Additional Negotiated Services, and Value Added Services as discussed during negotiation and outlined below. The other specifications of the original ITN, unless modified in the RBAFO, remain in effect. Respondents are cautioned to clearly read the entire RBAFO for all revisions and changes to the original ITN and any addenda to specifications, which are incorporated herein and made a part of this RBAFO document. Unless otherwise modified in this Request for Best and Final Offer, the initial requirements as set forth in the Department?s Invitation to Negotiate document and any addenda issued thereto have not been revised and remain as previously indicated. Additionally, to the extent that portions of the ITN have not been revised or changed, the previous reply/initial reply provided to the Department will remain in effect. These two introductory paragraphs of the RBAFO were confusing. It was not clear on the face of the RBAFO whether “other specifications” excluded only the pricing information to be supplied or also the specifications indicating how that pricing information would be calculated or evaluated. It was not clear whether “other specifications” were the same thing as “initial requirements” which had not been revised. It was not clear whether scoring procedures constituted “specifications.” While it was clear that, to the extent not revised or changed by the RBAFO, initial replies that had been submitted -- including Statements of Qualifications, Technical Response, Financial Documentation, and Cost Proposals -- would “remain in effect,” it was not clear how, if at all, these would be considered in determining the best value to the State. In the RBAFO under the heading “PRICING,” vendors were instructed to provide their BAFO for rates on a provided Cost Proposal table which was virtually identical to the table that had been provided earlier in the ITN for the evaluation stage, including a single square within which to indicate a commission rate for the initial five-year contract term, and five squares within which to indicate commission rates for each of five renewal years. The RBAFO stated that the Department was seeking pricing that would provide the “best value to the state.” It included a list of 11 additional services that had been addressed in negotiations and stated that, “in order to provide the best value to the state,” the Department reserved the right to accept or reject any or all of these additional services. It provided that after BAFOs were received, the Negotiation Team would prepare a summary of the negotiations and make a recommendation as to which vendor would provide the “best value to the state.” The RBAFO did not specify selection criteria upon which the determination of best value to the State would be based. In considering commission percentages as part of their determination as to which vendor would receive the contract, the Negotiation Team decided not to consider commissions that had been listed by vendors for the renewal years, concluding that the original five-year contract term was all that was assured, since renewals might or might not occur. On June 25, 2013, the DOC posted its Notice of Agency Decision stating its intent to award a contract to EPSI. Protests and the Decision to Reject All Replies Subsequent to timely filing notices of intent to protest the intended award, Securus and GTL filed Formal Written Protests with the DOC on July 5 and 8, 2013, respectively. The Department considered and compared the protests. It determined that language in the ITN directing that in Phase 5 the highest commission would be determined by averaging the price for the original contract term with the prices for the renewal years was ambiguous and flawed. It determined that use of a table with six squares as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to say that the Department would use the same methodology to evaluate the pricing in the negotiation stage as had been used to evaluate the Initial Cost sheets in Phase 5, or could be read another way to mean that BAFO pricing would not be evaluated that way. It determined that the inclusion in the RBAFO of a table virtually identical to the one used as the initial cost sheet was a mistake. The Department determined that the language and the structure of the RBAFO could be read one way to require further consideration of such factors as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in determining best value to the State, or could be read another way to require no further consideration of these factors. The Department prepared some spreadsheets demonstrating the varying results that would be obtained using “divide by six” and “divide by ten” and also considered a spreadsheet that had been prepared by Securus. The Department considered that its own Contract Manager had interpreted the Phase 5 instructions to mean “divide by six,” while the Department had actually intended the instructions to mean “divide by ten.” The Department had intended that the Negotiation Team give some weight to the renewal-year pricing, and had included the pricing table in the RBAFO for that reason, not simply to comply with statutory requirements regarding renewal pricing. The Department determined that the way the RBAFO was written and the inclusion of the chart required at least some consideration of ten-year pricing, and that vendors had therefore been misled when the Negotiation Team gave no consideration to the commission percentages for the renewal years. Specifically, based upon the Securus protest, the Department determined that the RBAFO language had been interpreted by Securus to require that the Phase 5 calculation of average commission percentage be carried over to evaluation of the pricing in the BAFOs, which Securus had concluded meant “divide by six.” The Department further determined that based upon the GTL protest, the RBAFO language had been interpreted by GTL to require the Department to consider the renewal years in pricing, as well as such things as the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response in the BAFO stage. The Department determined that had “divide by six” been used in evaluating the BAFOs, Securus would have a computed percentage of 70 percent, higher than any other vendor. The Department concluded that the wording and structure of the ITN and RBAFO did not create a level playing field to evaluate replies because they were confusing and ambiguous and were not understood by everyone in the same way. Vendors naturally had structured their replies to maximize their chances of being awarded the contract based upon their understanding of how the replies would be evaluated. The Department concluded that vendor pricing might have been different but for the misleading language and structure of the ITN and RBAFO. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the initial cost sheets set forth in section 6.1.5 to the cost elements of the BAFOs. The Department did not compute what the final award would have been had it applied the scoring procedures for the Statement of Qualifications and Technical Response set forth in section 6.1.3 to the BAFOs. Ms. Bailey testified that while she had originally approved the ITN, she was unaware of any problems, and that it was only later, after the protests to the Notice of Intended Award had been filed and she had reviewed the specifications again, that she had come to the conclusion that the ITN and RBAFO were flawed. Following the protests of the intended award by GTL and Securus, on July 23, 2013, the DOC posted to the Vendor Bid System a Notice of Revised Agency Decision stating the DOC?s intent to reject all replies and reissue the ITN. On August 5, 2013, EPSI, GTL, and Securus filed formal written protests challenging DOC?s intended decision to reject all replies. Securus subsequently withdrew its protest to DOC?s rejection of all replies. As the vendor initially notified that it would receive the contract, EPSI?s substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. GTL alleged the contract had wrongly been awarded to EPSI and that it should have received the award, and its substantial interests were affected by the Department's subsequent decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act arbitrarily in its decision to reject all replies. The Department did not act illegally, dishonestly, or fraudulently in its decision to reject all replies. EPSI would likely be harmed in any re-solicitation of bids relative to its position in the first ITN, because potential competitors would have detailed information about EPSI?s earlier reply that was unavailable to them during the first ITN. An ITN requires a great deal of work by the Department and creates a big demand on Department resources. The decision to reject all replies was not undertaken lightly. The State of Florida would likely benefit in any new competitive solicitation7/ because all vendors would be aware of the replies that had been submitted earlier in response to the ITN, and bidders would likely try to improve upon those proposals to improve their chances of being awarded the contract.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Corrections issue a final order finding that the rejection of all replies submitted in response to ITN 12-DC-8396 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing all four protests. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, L.B. King, Jr., violated certain rules relating to petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria promulgated by Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), whether he should be required to pay an administrative fine and investigative costs and expenses incurred by the Department, and whether he should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on June 15, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record presented by the parties, and those allegations in the Notice of Violation which are undisputed, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is the owner and operator of non-residential property (doing business as King Oil and Tire) located at 16776 Southeast U.S. Highway 19 (at Main Street and Ward Street) in Cross City, Florida. He has owned the property since June 30, 1982. Since July 1978, eight regulated petroleum storage tanks were situated on the property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62- 761.200(20), (45), (53), and (65). The Department has assigned facility identification number 15/8839661 to the site. During the intervening time period since Respondent assumed ownership, six of the tanks and their associated piping have been closed or removed, including tank 4 in August 1997 and tanks 5 and 6 in March 2004. Tank 4 was a 1,000 gallon diesel underground storage tank system (UST) originally installed in July 1982, tank 5 was a kerosene UST installed in July 1978, while tank 6 was a waste oil UST installed in July 1978. Only tanks 7 and 8 still remain in service. After tank 4 and the associated piping were closed in August 1997, Respondent conducted a closure assessment in the area of tank 4 and performed soil and groundwater analytical sampling in the area of its former piping run. He then filed a Tank Closure Assessment Report (TCAR) with the Department on August 19, 2003. The TCAR revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's Cleanup Target Levels (CTLs) for Methylnapthalene in two respects and for Naphthalene. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-777.170(1)(a), Table I. Because of the presence of contamination on the site, on September 3, 2003, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he submit a Discharge Report Form (DRF) and initiate a site assessment, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600, and that he file a completed site assessment report by July 10, 2004.3 Subsection (1) of that rule requires that "[w]ithin 30 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall initiate a site assessment." On September 29, 2003, the Department received the requested DRF. During a tank closure inspection of tanks 5 and 6 performed on March 4, 2004, the Levy County Health Department, acting on behalf of the Department, discovered stained soils in the fill area of tank 6. On May 18, 2004, the Department received a TCAR dated May 7, 2004, for the closure of tanks 5 and 6. The TCAR documented the results of laboratory analytical tests on groundwater samples, which revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's CTLs for Methylnapthalene in two respects. On May 24, 2004, the Department received from Respondent a copy of a DRF (dated March 9, 2004, as amended on April 9, 2004) for the contamination related to tanks 5 and 6. The DRF was the last report filed by Respondent concerning tanks 5 and 6. On the same date, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he initiate site assessment activities for the discharge related to tanks 5 and 6, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(1). On July 14, 2004, the Department sent Respondent another letter requesting (a) completion of a site assessment and (b) the submission of a Site Assessment Report (SAR) for the discharge from tank 4 (SAR-97), which complied with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(8). (The SAR-97 was originally due on July 10, 2004, but had not yet been filed.) In order to be deemed complete, a SAR must contain all of the information detailed in subsection (8). Also, the letter requested that a SAR for the 2004 discharge (SAR-04) be completed no later than August 1, 2004, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7). That subsection requires in relevant part that "[w]ithin 270 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SAR] " On July 15, 2004, or the day after the above letter was mailed, the Department received a copy of the SAR-97 from Respondent. The report was then referred to the Department's Petroleum Cleanup Section for its review. By letter dated August 27, 2004, the Department advised Respondent that SAR-97 was under review. The letter also changed the due date for the SAR-04 from August 1, 2004, to November 9, 2004. On September 15, 2004, the Department received correspondence from Respondent requesting an extension of time in which to submit his SAR-04. On December 10, 2004, the Department approved the request and authorized Respondent to file a SAR-04 no later than March 1, 2005. On April 12, 2005, Respondent filed with the Department a Site Assessment Report Addendum (SARA) for the 1997 discharge (SARA-97). The report was dated March 1, 2005. On May 25, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he file two copies of a supplement to the SARA-97 no later than July 5, 2005, to address certain deficiencies noted in that report, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770-600(11). That subsection provides that "[i]f the [SAR] is incomplete in any respect, or is insufficient to satisfy the objectives of subsection 62- 770.600(3), F.A.C., the Department or the FDEP local program shall inform the responsible party pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.600(9)(b), F.A.C., and the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SARA] that addresses the deficiencies within 60 days after receipt of the notice." The same letter also requested that a disposal manifest be provided for the tank and piping closures. On July 11, 2005, the Department received a second SARA-97 from Respondent's consultant. On July 14, 2005, it also received the disposal manifest documentation for the closure of tank 4 and its piping. These were the last reports filed by Respondent. On October 4, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he provide two copies of a third SARA for the 1997 discharge to address deficiencies noted by the Department in the second SARA. The letter indicated that the third SARA was to be filed no later than November 23, 2005. The Department also requested that he provide a completed financial affidavit to justify Respondent's claim that he was financially unable to complete the remaining required cleanup corrective actions at his property. On November 29, 2005, Respondent requested an extension of time to complete the third SARA-97. (The reason for the requested extension was that Respondent's insurance carrier would not give authorization for the work.) On January 12, 2006, the Department advised Respondent by letter that his request had been denied and that he must submit either the third SARA or a financial affidavit, as previously requested, no later than February 15, 2006. In its response, the Department indicated that it did not "consider generic delays by contractors or insurance carriers as good cause for an extension." To date, neither filing has been made. By failing to file the requested third SARA for the 1997 discharge, Respondent has contravened the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rules 62-770.600(11) and 62- 770.800(3), which require that within 60 days after notice, a responsible party submit a SARA to address deficiencies noted in a SAR. Respondent's conduct also implicates Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(5), which makes it a violation of two Florida Statutes for a responsible party to not submit requested information within the time frame specified. Since March 1, 2005, which was the due date on which a report was to be filed, Respondent has failed to submit an approved SAR for the 2004 discharge, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7), which in turn contravenes Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(3) and (5). To date, Respondent has failed to complete site assessment activities for both the 1997 and 2004 discharges, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(10). That provision states that "[s]ite assessment activities shall not be deemed complete until such time as a [SAR] is approved." To date, Respondent has failed to timely and completely assess and remediate the contamination at his property, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-770. That chapter contains the criteria which apply to the cleanup of a site contaminated with petroleum products. During the course of its investigation of this matter, the Department has incurred expenses "in the amount of not less than $500.00." As mitigating evidence, Respondent offered into evidence Respondent's Exhibits 2-15, the majority of which pertain to his insurance policy and the pending litigation with his carrier, Mid-Continent Casualty Company (MCC), or the priority score funding process, which is the process by which contaminated properties are scored or rated for purposes of determining eligibility to receive state cleanup funds when the responsible party is financially unable to do so. Although evidence regarding the insurance policy and pending litigation was deemed to be immaterial to the issues of establishing Respondent's liability for the violations and responsibility for undertaking the corrective actions necessary to satisfy the violations, the undersigned ruled that it could be used by Respondent as mitigating evidence, if relevant, for the purpose of seeking to reduce the administrative penalty. Respondent's Exhibits 8, 9, and 11 indicate that after he reported the 2003 discharge to MCC, in 2003 the carrier denied coverage for that discharge (on the ground "any 'confirmed release' must commence after the retroactive date of the policy (4/3/98)"). However, MCC initially accepted coverage for the 2004 discharge and authorized Respondent's environmental consultants to conduct a site assessment. The documents further show that in December 2005, or before the 2004 site assessment had been completed and a SAR prepared, MCC reversed its position and denied coverage for the 2004 discharge on the ground there was no "Confirmed Release," as defined by the policy. Respondent then filed his lawsuit seeking a determination that the carrier was responsible for cleanup costs. Respondent asserts that he has expended more than $50,000.00 in pursuing the lawsuit, which is much more than the administrative penalty being assessed by the Department. Respondent points out that prior to the time MCC reversed its position as to coverage for the 2004 discharge in December 2005, he had filed a DFR, TCAR, disposal manifest, SAR- 97, and two SARAs for the 1997 discharge, and a TCAR and DFR for the 2004 discharge, all of which indicate a good faith effort on his part to comply with the assessment requirements. As noted above, the final reports prepared by Respondent's consultant were a second SARA-97 and a disposal manifest for the 1997 discharge, which were filed with the Department in July 2005, and a TCAR and DRF for the 2004 discharge filed in May 2004. Respondent's Exhibit 10A recites language in Coverage B of the insurance policy, which provides in part that MCC "will pay Clean-up Costs by an Insured for environmental damage that an Insured is legally obligated to pay . . . ." Respondent argues that if he acknowledges by affidavit or other proof that he does not have the ability to pay for cleanup costs, he fears that under the above language, MCC would not be "legally obligated to pay." This is because Section 376.3071(7)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that when a responsible party does not have the ability to pay for all of the cleanup costs, the Department "may" enter into an agreement with the responsible party to undertake all or part of the site rehabilitation after "taking into consideration the party's net worth and the economic impact on the party." Respondent contends that if he files an affidavit under this statute, MCC would then be relieved of any responsibility under the policy, and his rights in the lawsuit would be jeopardized. Respondent further points out that several other provisions in the insurance policy prohibit him from completing the assessment until the litigation is concluded. For example, one provision (Section II.B) provides that "No Clean-up Costs, charges, and expenses shall be incurred without the Company's consent," while another (Section II.C) provides that "An Insured shall not admit or assume any liabilities or settle any Claim(s) without the Company's consent." Respondent asserts that these provisions prevent his consultant from conducting any further work on the site without MCC's consent, and if he does so, he will lose the right to reimbursement under the policy. Finally, Exhibits 3 through 6 show that Respondent's property has been assigned a site ranking score of ten points, and that the Department is currently funding sites that are eligible for state restoration funding only if they have scores of 37 points and higher. Thus, Respondent argues that a delay in remediation of the site is not unreasonable. Except for the two discharges at issue in this case, there is no evidence that Respondent has a history of non- compliance or that he gained any direct economic benefit by virtue of the discharges. Although no reports have been filed since July 2005, through counsel, Respondent has kept the Department abreast of his efforts to establish liability on the part of MCC so that the site assessments can resume.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, an African-American male, on May 6, 1996, as a Code Enforcement Officer. Almost ten years later, on March 28, 2006, Respondent suspended Petitioner for five days for violating City of Gainesville Personnel Policy 19, Rule 19, by providing a false sworn affidavit attesting that a particular property was in compliance with an Order of the Code Enforcement Board when the property was not in compliance. Additionally, the Petitioner received a written warning and counseling regarding a violation of City of Gainesville Personnel Policy 19, Rule 13, which consisted of neglecting to perform a required re-inspection of a property for a period of several months. Petitioner’s work as a Code Enforcement Officer involved “responsible inspection work enforcing compliance with the City Codes and Ordinances pertaining to zoning, housing, landscaping, street graphics, lot clearance, junk vehicles, and related codes and ordinances.” On December 30, 2004, Petitioner received a complaint regarding violations of the housing code at 220 South East 1st Street, Gainesville, Florida. After inspecting the property further on January 5, 2005, Petitioner issued the owner a notice of violation allowing the owner until February 5, 2005 to remove non-operational vehicles and junk, trash and debris from the property. Petitioner re-inspected for compliance on May 16, 2005, when he found the property to be in non-compliance with the notice. Respondent states that Petitioner referred the case to the City of Gainesville Code Enforcement Board, and it was docketed as case number CEB2005-106. The City of Gainesville Code Enforcement Board is a quasi-judicial board created by the City of Gainesville pursuant to Florida Statutes Chapter 162 and City Code of Ordinances Chapter 2. The Code Enforcement Board is charged with hearing cases of alleged violations of the City’s Code. The Code Enforcement Board heard the case on June 9, 2005, found the owner guilty of the violation, and allowed the owner until July 13, 2005 to bring the property into compliance. On August 11, 2005, Petitioner made notes in the file to the effect that the matter had gone to the Code Enforcement Board and that he would “inspect for compliance with [the] order when time is up.” No other case-related activity was noted by the Petitioner in the time period between the Enforcement Board hearing on June 9, 2005, and Petitioner’s alleged January 4, 2006 inspection which led to the Affidavit of Compliance issued by Petitioner on January 6, 2006. On January 4, 2006 Petitioner noted in the file that the property was in compliance and later executed the Affidavit of Compliance before a licensed Notary Public after being duly sworn. Petitioner swore under oath in that Affidavit that the corrective action ordered by the Board had been taken. In February 2006, a new complaint regarding the above- referenced property was made to the Code Enforcement Division. The new complaint was reported by multiple sources. Code Enforcement Supervisor David Watkins investigated the February 2006 complaint. Watkins found the property not in compliance and deduced that Petitioner filed the affidavit a month earlier with the knowledge that the compliance sworn to in the Affidavit had not been achieved. Watkins’ determination is corroborated by photographic evidence presented at the final hearing and establishes that the property was not in compliance at the time of Petitioner’s affidavit. Watkins summarized his investigation and findings in a detailed Supervisory Report. He also learned from an interview with the owner of the 220 South East 1st Street property that the owner did not believe he had come into compliance with the order. Petitioner’s false affidavit misrepresenting the facts of case number CEB2005-106 permitted the violator to evade the penalty prescribed by the Code Enforcement Board of $250 a day for a period of 175 days or an accumulated fine of $43,750. Petitioner was issued an Employee Notice on March 28, 2006 for violation of City of Gainesville Personnel Policies and Procedures, Policy 19, Rules 19 and 13, resulting in a five-day suspension without pay. Policy 19, Rule 19, prohibits “immoral, unlawful, or improper conduct or indecency, whether on or off the job which would tend to affect the employee’s relationship to his/her job, fellow workers’ reputations or goodwill in the community.” The minimum disciplinary action provided for a first violation of Rule 19 is instruction and five day suspension or dismissal.” Policy 19, Rule 13 prohibits “productivity or workmanship not up to required standard of performance.” The minimum disciplinary action provided for a first violation of Rule 13 is “written instruction & cautioning.” Pursuant to the established procedure, Petitioner challenged the suspension through the three-step grievance process and was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and argument to the division manager, department head, and the City Manager’s Office. The disciplinary action was sustained at each level. Petitioner compared his case to a case handled by a white code enforcement officer where that officer was not disciplined. In response to Petitioner’s allegations, Watkins reviewed the case referenced by Petitioner to determine possible existence of violations similar those committed by the Petitioner. No evidence was discovered by Watkins to support Petitioner’s allegations. The allegations raised by Petitioner against his fellow code enforcement officer were not supported at the final hearing through proof of execution of a false affidavit by a similarly situated white employee. The City has had no cases of similar offenses within the memory of current management and no record of past cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel M. Nee, Esquire City of Gainesville 200 East University Avenue, Suite 425 Gainesville, Florida 32601-5456 Walter Booth 2810 Northeast 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32609 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Nemi, Inc., should pay a $500.00 administrative fine for maintaining an unpermitted stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution (Count I); whether it should pay an administrative fine of $9,500.00 for failing to submit a completed Site Assessment Report (SAR) within 270 days of discovery of the discharge of chemical solvents (Count II); whether it should pay investigative costs and expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 incurred by Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department) (Count III); and whether it should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on January 23, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is a for-profit corporation registered to do business in the State. Respondent's president and registered agent is Neil Schuberg, who represented the corporation at hearing. Respondent is the owner of a 1.1-acre parcel of real property located at 6801 Northwest 17th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property is situated in what is known as the Gateway Industrial Center just south of the City of Pompano Beach and midway between the Florida Turnpike and Interstate 95. The parcel is rectangular shaped and is approximately 90 feet wide by 180 feet long. The property is further identified by the Broward County Property Appraiser as Parcel Identification Number 494209050040. A one-story warehouse and parking lot are located on the property, which is currently leased by Respondent to a testing laboratory. The evidence shows that for at least since 1981 David R. Ligh owned the property until his death. After he died, his widow, Elsie M. Ligh, sold the property in 1994 to Clayton John Pierce subject to a mortgage in the amount of $167,640.00. Mr. Pierce began operating a business on the premises known as Combined Roof Services, Inc. In 1995, Mr. Pierce decided to sell the property. A potential buyer, S & S Propeller Company, retained the services of Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., an environmental consulting firm, to prepare an environmental site assessment for the purpose of "determining the suitability of property for ownership by [S & S Propeller Company]." When it first inspected the site in July 1995, Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., discovered three thirty-five gallon drums and a twenty-gallon black plastic tub, all labeled "hazardous waste" and reflecting that they had contained tetrachloroethene (also known as perchloroethylene) waste. This is a chemical solvent that is typically used by dry cleaning establishments. The labels carried the name and "EPA ID number" of Family Dry Cleaners located at 6804 Stirling Road, Davie, Florida, an address which appears to be around ten to twelve miles south of the subject property. The three drums were lying on their sides on the northern end of an asphalt parking area beneath overgrown Brazilian pepper trees and were empty; the empty twenty-gallon tub was located inside the building on the property. Soil borings on the property performed by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., revealed concentrations of tetrachloroethene at 10,613 parts per billion, which exceed allowable standards. Tetrachloroethene and its breakdown products are a solid waste, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-701.200(113). A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (Phase I ESA) dated August 13, 1995, was prepared by the consulting firm and sets forth in detail the results of its inspection. See Department Exhibit 2. The sale was never consummated. Later that year, Mr. Pierce engaged the same consulting firm to perform a Phase II Environmental Site Assessment of the property. That assessment revealed concentrations in groundwater ranging from 8,840 parts per billion to 173,000 parts per billion of tetrachloroethene, which exceed the State Clean Soil Criteria and State Maximum Contaminant Levels. The report, issued on October 13, 1995, was received in evidence as Department Exhibit 3. On October 30, 1995, a Mr. Pivnick, an attorney with the firm of Dombroff & Gilmore, P.A., which represented Mr. Pierce, notified the Department by letter that the empty drums and tub had been discovered on the property. The letter also attached a copy of the Phase I ESA. Mr. Pivnick was instructed by the Department to contact the local police department to report the incident as well as the state warning system for reporting discharges to the environment. Also, the Department contacted other local agencies and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In October 1995, Mr. Pierce vacated the premises and ceased operating Combined Roof Services, Inc. In January 1996, he began leasing the property to Sun Valley Industries, also a roofing repair business, until that firm vacated the premises in December 1997. With the use of grant monies, the Department engaged the services of International Technology Corporation to prepare a Preliminary Investigation Report (PIR) for the property. That report was issued on February 13, 1997. See Department Exhibit The PIR recommended that additional monitoring of the site (through shallow monitoring wells, soil samples, groundwater samples, and groundwater flow direction) be made to quantify the presence of chlorinated solvents. Again with the use of grant monies, in 1997 the Department engaged the services of Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., to prepare a Site Inspection Report (Report) for the subject property. The Report was issued in March 1998. See Department Exhibit 5. Excessive tetrachloroethene, Cis-1, 2- dichloroethene, and trichloroethylene were detected in ground water samples, while tetrachloroethene was detected in all seven soil samples. On April 2, 1998, Ms. Ligh assigned the mortgage on the property to Nemi, Inc., for around $100,000.00. Mr. Schuberg explained that he was able to purchase it at a discount because Mr. Pierce had ceased making payments on the mortgage and had warned Ms. Ligh that if she foreclosed on the mortgage, she would be responsible for cleanup costs on the property exceeding a million dollars. While Mr. Schuberg acknowledged that he was aware of a contamination problem on the property, he says the mortgage was purchased as an investment, and he never thought he would actually acquire the property because he believed Mr. Pierce would continue to make the mortgage payments. After failing to make payments on the mortgage, on September 21, 1999, Mr. Pierce executed a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor of Nemi, Inc. Based on conversations with Mr. Pierce at that time, Mr. Schuberg says he was under the impression that the spill was much smaller than it actually was, and that it would be cleaned up by the Department. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg characterized Mr. Pierce as "a hustler and a liar." After Mr. Pivnick's report of contamination was received, the Department, along with the Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection, initiated an investigation (probably in late 1995 or early 1996) in an attempt to verify the source of the contamination. Because Family Dry Cleaners "was on the top of [its] list," the Department first sought to determine whether that firm had actually deposited the drums and tub on the subject property. It learned that in 1994, or a year before the contamination was reported to the Department, Family Dry Cleaners had been evicted by its landlord, Lincoln Park. According to the Department, this "led to a dead- end" as far as Family Dry Cleaners was concerned. However, that business had been replaced by another tenant, Liberty Dry Cleaners. The Department then attempted to ascertain whether Lincoln Park or the new tenant might have been responsible for transporting the drums and tub to the subject property and dumping the waste. However, the Department was unable to confirm that either of the two had done so. Photographs of the drums and tub were made by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., when it conducted an assessment in July 1995. Because the empty drums and tub were later removed from the site by unknown persons, the Department was only able to review the photographs when it conducted its investigation. Photographs of the drums indicated that they were larger than the twenty-gallon drums normally used by a dry cleaning establishment, and the labels on the drums were not perforated or dot matrix, which are more typical of those used by dry cleaners. For this reason, and because the empty tub was found inside the building on the property, the Department attempted to determine if Mr. Pierce had purchased the contaminants for use in his operations; it was not able to confirm this fact. The Department also contacted local law enforcement officials to see whether a criminal investigation could be launched. As noted above, however, the drums and tub had been removed by unknown persons while Mr. Pierce still had possession of the property and there was no forensic evidence for law enforcement officials to examine. The result of the investigation was that the Department was unable to determine who deposited the drums on the site or the exact location where the contents were first dumped. Although Respondent contended that the Department could have easily determined who removed the empty drums and tub from the subject property by examining the manifests of the carriers who engage in that type of business, the Department investigator did not attempt to do this since the yellow pages in the telephone directory reflected at least six pages of transporters in this type of business. Further, there is no evidence that a commercial transporter was even involved. For all of these reasons, the Department looked to the current owner of the property, Respondent, as the entity responsible for site rehabilitation since there were, and still are, contaminants leaching into the groundwater and aquifer system. Specifically, as of 2007, or twelve years after the discharge occurred, the groundwater on Respondent's property was still contaminated with tetrachloroethene, trichloroethylene, and cis-1, 2-dichloroethene exceeding the Department's groundwater standards. Also, the same contaminants exceeded the Department's soil cleanup target levels based on ground water criteria. Because rainfall and surface water continue to come into contact with the contaminated soil, and there is no liner or impervious cap in place, the installation is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution. On September 12, 2001, the Department sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent advising that contamination was present on the property, that there were "possible violations of law for which you may be responsible," and that a Preliminary Contamination Assessment (PCA) must be filed within sixty days from the date of the letter. See Department Exhibit 6. Although a meeting of the parties was held on October 4, 2001, a PCA was never filed. 16. On April 27, 2006, March 12, 2007, and July 3, 2007, the Department issued Warning Letters to Respondent advising that an enforcement action would be initiated unless Respondent provided a SAR within a time certain. See Department Exhibits 7, 8, and 9. (The record is silent as to why no formal activity occurred between October 2001 and April 2006.) Exhibit 8 reflects that on November 21, 2006, "analysis results of sampling of one monitoring well were received by the Department." A meeting was later conducted by the parties on January 16, 2007, at which time Respondent agreed to "draft a suitable letter of [its] intentions with regard to conducting the required assessment and send it to the Department on or before January 31, 2007." There is no record of such a letter being sent. In August 2007, Respondent contracted with Florida Environmental Engineering, Inc., to perform a "limited site assessment report." In March 2008, that firm submitted to the Department a Preliminary Site Assessment Report (PSAR) See Department Exhibit 10. For this service, Respondent paid around $16,000.00. On March 21, 2008, the Department advised Respondent by letter that the PSAR was incomplete and that further information should be provided by April 30, 2008. See Department Exhibit 11. An Addendum to the PSAR was provided on May 5, 2008. See Department Exhibit 12. This report cost Respondent an additional $3,000.00. The PSAR indicated that contaminants (dichloroethene and trichloroethylene) in the water and soil on the property exceeded Department groundwater and soil cleanup target standards and levels. The report concluded, however, that "the discharge to the site is from an offsite source" (west of the property) and that "the property owner is no longer a responsible party." On August 27 and then again on October 22, 2008, the Department issued letters to Respondent advising that "there is not enough data to support the assumption that the discharge is offsite and the contamination is from an offsite source located west of the property." The Department reached this conclusion because, among other reasons, "[t]he contamination does not seem to be delineated towards the northern and southern portions of the site," "[t]here are no horizontal delineation wells to [the] north," the "iso contour maps provided appear to show the vertical delineation of the contamination but not horizontal delineation [of the plume]," "additional monitoring points need to be [added]," and "the onsite monitoring well, MW-2, shows a very high concentration of Perchloroethylene (PCE) at 81,000 ug/L [microgram per liter] and other contaminants, while the MW-1 does not exhibit groundwater contamination to that extent." See Department Exhibits 14 and 15. In plainer language, Respondent's report was deficient in that all contamination sources were not identified; it failed to delineate the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and groundwater contamination; and it failed to recommend a remedial action to clean up the contamination. The two letters advised that the site assessment was incomplete and that additional information described in the letters must be submitted by November 14, 2008. To date, Respondent has failed to submit the required information. According to Mr. Schuberg, to perform a study that would supply the additional information requested by the Department would cost him around $100,000.00, an amount he is unwilling to pay. More than 270 days has expired since a discharge was discovered on Respondent's property, and it has failed to submit a complete SAR, as described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-780.600(8). See also Table A, Fla. Admin. Code R. Ch. 62-780, which prescribes the specific time frame (within 270 days after the discharge is discovered) for submitting this report. The Department has incurred expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 while investigating this matter. See Department Exhibit 17. This amount is not disputed. As corrective action, the Department requests that within ninety days of the effective date of this Final Order, Respondent submit a complete SAR which addresses the deficiencies specified in the Department's August 27, 2008, letter. See Department Exhibit 14. To complete the SAR, additional soil and groundwater samples need to be collected to determine the vertical and horizontal extent of contamination, all source areas must be identified, and a remedial action must be developed to abate the contamination. Finally, the contaminated soil must be removed from the property so that it will no longer discharge into the groundwater. The Notice of Violation requests that upon approval of the SAR, Respondent "shall commence and complete in a timely fashion all further tasks" required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-780. These corrective actions are reasonable and are hereby approved. In calculating the penalty, Respondent has assessed a $500.00 administrative penalty for Respondent maintaining a stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution without a permit. This is based upon a violation of Section 403.121(5), Florida Statutes, which makes it unlawful to not comply with a regulatory statute's requirement. Under Section 403.121(6), Florida Statutes, the Department has also assessed a $500.00 per day penalty against Respondent for failing to file a SAR for nineteen days, for a total of $9,500.00. When added to the $500.00 previously assessed, the total administrative penalty is $10,000.00, which is the maximum allowed in this type of proceeding. See § 403.121(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Throughout this process, Mr. Schuberg has contended that the responsibility for cleanup lies with the person or entity actually responsible for placing the drums and tub on the property in 1995. He says that the evidence clearly shows that Family Dry Cleaners is the responsible party. However, the Department and local authorities were never able to confirm who actually dumped the waste on the subject property. Although Mr. Schuberg says it will take "[i]n the hundreds of thousands of dollars" to clean up the site, the evidence shows that when he purchased the mortgage in 1998 and assumed ownership in 1999, he knew the property was contaminated. Mr. Schuberg further stated that because his consultant could never get "answers" from the Department, the consultant was instructed to stop work. However, Mr. Schuberg never contacted the Department to get clarification about what was required. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg also offered a lay opinion that his consultant's report filed in March 2008 proves that in 1995 the contents of the drums and tub were dumped on an offsite asphalt road adjacent to the property, surface water runoff then carried the chemical solvents onto his property, and the empty drums and tub were left in the parking lot. The Department's expert did not agree with this supposition, and there is no expert testimony to confirm the accuracy of this theory. Respondent has also contended that the property should be cleaned up with state funds. As pointed out by a Department witness, however, one problem is that the property does not meet the definition of a dry cleaner and thus cannot qualify for funds under that program. Then, too, a state-funded cleanup is a last resort which is used only after the Department has exhausted all enforcement remedies. Also, in this era of tight budgets, the Department has a finite amount of funds to use for this purpose, and is limited to cleaning up only a few sites per year. Finally, the responsible party must first acknowledge by affidavit that it lacks the necessary resources to clean up the property before the Department "may" seek cleanup funds. Respondent has not yet filed such an affidavit or admitted liability. In terms of mitigating evidence, Mr. Schuberg conceded that he has not done "a whole lot" to address the contamination problem since acquiring the property in 1999. In 2008, he did expend around $20,000.00 in having a PSAR and Addendum prepared for the Department. In all other respects, he steadfastly refuses to spend any more money on assessments or take responsibility for the cleanup since he believes that Family Dry Cleaners is the entity responsible for site rehabilitation.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Respondent based on race and/or subjected to a hostile work environment based on race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alphonso Williams, Jr., is an African- American male (Petitioner). Respondent, L. Pugh & Associates (Respondent), is a closely held company in the business of designing, constructing and maintaining fire safety equipment and systems. The company is owned by Larry Pugh and his wife Sharon Pugh. Andy Pugh, the brother of Larry Pugh, is employed by the company as a construction supervisor and spends most the day in the field away from the company’s shop and warehouse. Soni Sully is the company’s office manager and bookkeeper. In 1997, Petitioner was hired by Larry Pugh to run errands for him and to maintain the shop. Petitioner had learned of the job opening from Johnny James, an African-American employee of Respondent’s. Prior to being hired, the employee warned Petitioner about Andy Pugh. The employee intended to communicate that Andy Pugh was a hard, irascible person to work for who did not tolerate mistakes, did not cut anyone any slack, and did not speak in socially polite terms. At hearing, Andy Pugh was described as an ex-marine sergeant. The employee did not intend to communicate that Andy Pugh was a racist. However, Petitioner interpreted the employee’s remarks as such. Throughout this process, Petitioner’s allegations regarding Andy Pugh’s racial slurs towards him have grown initially from three incidents of Mr. Pugh calling Petitioner a "nigger" to, by the time of the hearing, daily racial disparagement. Other than Petitioner’s testimony, there was no evidence of such name calling or such racial disparagement being reported by Petitioner. Contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, there was no evidence from either Petitioner or Respondent that Soni Sully ever issued any racial slurs against Petitioner. Given the lack of corroborative evidence regarding racial slurs and their increasing frequency, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was subjected to such racial slurs while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner also charged that Andy Pugh would deliberately take the company vehicle assigned to him and assign it to someone on one of the construction crews Mr. Pugh supervised. However, the evidence demonstrated that none of the company’s fleet of vehicles were assigned to any one employee. The company’s vehicles were for use as needed by the company and could be assigned by Andy Pugh as he needed. This policy was explained to Petitioner many times. However, he never seemed to understand the explanation or accept it. Indeed, Petitioner continued to complain to Ms. Sully and Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. Petitioner’s constant complaints on the subject irritated Andy Pugh who did not always respond politely to Petitioner’s complaints. Petitioner received an hourly wage and mileage for the number of miles he drove. Initially, his hourly wage was $7.00. Over time, his hourly wage was increased to $8.50. By his choice, he received mileage even though he usually drove a company vehicle because it benefited him financially to claim mileage. No employee, including Petitioner, received both mileage and a vehicle allowance. At some point, Respondent instituted a company-wide policy limiting the amount of overtime an employee could work. Larry Pugh felt overtime billing was out-of-control and therefore created the policy. All employees, including Petitioner, were affected by the limitation. When Petitioner complained of the reduction the limitation of overtime caused in his pay, Petitioner was treated more beneficially than other employees and was permitted to work five hours of overtime per week. There was no evidence that Petitioner did not receive the mileage or the hourly pay he was entitled to receive. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was the only employee required to sign in and out. On June 7, 2001, Petitioner again complained to Andy Pugh about "his" vehicle being taken. At some point, words were exchanged between Andy Pugh and Petitioner. Petitioner alleged that Andy Pugh grabbed him by throat, called him a "nigger" and threatened to kill him. However, the details of this exchange are unclear due to the changing story of Petitioner about those details, the irreconcilable testimony and statements of Petitioner and Mr. Pugh, witnesses to the altercation and the surveillance tape of the premises during the altercation. Other than words being exchanged, there was insufficient evidence to show that this altercation was based on Petitioner’s race or occurred in the physical manner alleged by Petitioner. After talking with Sharon Pugh, Petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the Sheriff’s Department. The details of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Pugh are unclear. After an investigation, including interviewing witnesses and reviewing the surveillance tape, no arrest or criminal charges were filed against Andy Pugh. Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave until Larry Pugh, who was away, could investigate the incident. Upon his return, Larry Pugh looked into the matter and decided to terminate Petitioner mostly for filing criminal charges against his brother, but also, in part, for other more minor personality conflicts Petitioner had had in dealing with others while on company business. The evidence did not show that Larry Pugh’s reasons for terminating Petitioner were pretextual, retaliatory for Petitioner engaging in a protected activity or based on race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick J. Gant, Esquire Allbritton & Gant 322 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Michael J. Stebbins, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, P.L. 504 North Baylen Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Alphonso Williams, Jr. 2415 North "E" Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
