The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees.
Findings Of Fact During all times relevant, Mr. Padgett served as a member of the Hampton Town Council, Hampton, Florida. Mr. Padgett resigned from the town council on a date subsequent to May 4, 2004. His last known address was 9885 South Temple Avenue, Hampton, Florida. The Commission was created by Section 112.320, Florida Statutes, and is vested with the power to implement the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Ethics Code). As a former member of the Hampton Town Council, Mr. Padgett is subject to the dictates of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, as that part pertains to acts and omissions occurring during his tenure as a town council member for Hampton, Florida. On September 9, 2002, Mr. Tillotson, filed a complaint against Mr. Padgett with the Commission. The Commission assigned this complaint case number 02-132. This case involved an effort by Mr. Padgett to convince Mr. Tillotson to withdraw two traffic tickets he issued to two citizens of Hampton in 2002. On August 27, 2003, the Commission issued a Report of Investigation (ROI) regarding case number 02-132, which was forwarded to Mr. Padgett. Based on the ROI, Commission Advocate Virlindia Doss (Advocate Doss) issued a recommendation that the Commission find probable cause to believe that Mr. Padgett's actions were a violation of Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. This information was provided to Mr. Padgett in a letter dated September 16, 2003. On September 19, 2003, Advocate Doss mailed to Mr. Padgett a Joint Stipulation of Fact, Law, and Recommended Order with regard to case number 02-132. This stipulation invited Mr. Padgett to admit to the two violations and to agree to forfeit one-third of his public salary as a member of the Hampton Town Council for a period of 12 months. On September 21, 2003, Mr. Padgett approached Mr. Tillotson and discussed the pending ethics complaint with him. Mr. Padgett stated that he would consider it a favor if Mr. Tillotson would withdraw the ethics complaint and stated that in return he would continue to support the Hampton Police Department. He further stated that if he had to pay the proposed fine that he would always remember, each time he paid a bill, that Mr. Tillotson caused him to lose a third of his salary from the Town of Hampton. The forgoing actions of Mr. Padgett were intended to use his position as town councilperson to intimidate Mr. Tillotson into withdrawing the ethics complaint. In a small town with a small police department, a councilperson is in a position to affect the economic well-being of officers employed by the police department. Mr. Tillotson refused to withdraw the complaint. On September 23, 2003, Mr. Padgett signed the stipulation proposed by Advocate Doss, thereby admitting to violations of the Ethics Code. He further agreed to forfeit one-third of his public salary as a member of the Hampton Town Council for a period of 12 months. Thereafter, Mr. Tillotson filed this complaint. It was assigned case number 04-097.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order and public report be entered finding that Respondent, Jason Padgett, violated Subsections 112.313(2) and (6), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $10,000; and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether respondent violated Section 112.3142(2)(b), Florida Statutes, with regard to her 1996 financial disclosure obligations, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Eileen McGuire, is now and at all times material to this proceeding has been a member of the Town Council of the Town of Welaka, Florida. As a public official, Respondent is subject to the applicable requirements of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. Respondent was first appointed to the Welaka Town Council (Town Council) on October 24, 1995. Subsequently, she was elected to the Town Council in March 1996, and was re-elected in 1998. As an elected public official, Respondent was required to file an annual CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests (Statement of Financial Interests), for the year 1996 with the Supervisor of Elections Office of Putnam County, Florida (Putnam County Supervisor of Elections or Supervisor of Elections). The 1996 Statement of Financial Interests was required to be filed by July 1, 1997. On June 23, 1997, Respondent submitted her 1996 Statement of Financial Interests with the Putnam County Supervisor of Elections. However, Respondent failed to sign and date the 1996 Statement of Financial Interests she submitted to the Supervisor of Elections. Respondent's failure to sign and date her 1996 Statement of Financial Interests was inadvertent and unintentional. All the official records of the Putnam County Supervisor of Elections reflect that Respondent's 1996 Statement of Financial Interests was submitted to that office on June 23, 1997. Moreover, on that same day, Respondent's 1996 Statement of Financial Interests was accepted, received, stamped, and deemed filed by the Supervisor of Elections. The Putnam County Supervisor of Elections, deemed Respondent's 1996 Statement of Financial Interests filed on June 23, 1997, notwithstanding the fact that the form was not signed or dated. Respondent was not given any written notice of any alleged defect in or failure to properly file her 1996 Statement of Financial Interests either by the Putnam County Supervisor of Elections or any other government officer or agency. In October 1997, Respondent received a telephone call from an employee of the Putnam County Supervisor of Elections who advised that she needed to sign some documents that she had previously filed. Soon after Respondent received the aforementioned telephone call from the Supervisor of Elections Office, she went to that office and signed the document which was presented to her for her signature. The form that Respondent mistakenly signed was the CE Form 10, Annual Disclosure of Gifts From Governmental Entities and Direct Support Organizations and Honorarium Event Related Expenses (CE Form 10), which was attached to the Form 1 when it was presented for signature. Notwithstanding the voluntary mutual effort of the parties to correct the oversight relative to Respondent's failure to sign her 1996 Statement of Financial Interests, the original form was thereafter filed away unnoticed until the advent of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics determine that the public interest would not be served by proceeding further against Respondent, and dismiss the complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Allen C.D. Scott, II, Esquire Scott & Scott 101 Orange Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Sheri L. Gerety, Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether Petitioners are entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees against Respondent and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, Marsha Strange, was the Mayor of McIntosh, Florida, having served in that position for approximately ten years. The Town of McIntosh (Town or Town of McIntosh) has a population of approximately 400 and has only three paid employees on its staff. The Town of McIntosh has a weak mayoral form of government. Under this system of government, the mayor does not have the power to appoint, promote, or dismiss Town employees or to appoint members to the Town's various committees or boards. Rather, these decisions are made by the elected five-member Town Council. The mayor is not a member of the Town Council and has no power to vote on issues coming before that governing body. Moreover, the mayor of the Town of McIntosh is not paid. On March 5, 1998, Respondent, Mary Lueders Burnett (Respondent), filed a verified ethics complaint against Mayor Marsha Strange, alleging Mayor Strange had violated Section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, regarding the appointment of relatives. In the complaint, Respondent stated that the mayor's brother-in-law, Thurman Kingsley, was appointed as the only person authorized to sign building permits. The complaint stated: I believe that this appointment to a position involving the approval of the Mayor by virtue of her management responsibilities mandated in the Town Charter, constitutes a violation of Section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, regarding the appointing of relatives. While our municipality is less than 35,000, our population is 413. I believe the function involves land planning or zoning as stated in the statute. Within a month of filing the initial complaint against Mayor Strange, Respondent separately filed three additional verified complaints against Mayor Strange. On March 20, 1998, Respondent filed a second complaint against Mayor Strange which alleged that the Town of McIntosh failed to comply with its Comprehensive Plan. Specifically, Respondent claimed that the official zoning map, Public Works Manual, and Land Development Regulations, documents required by the Town's Comprehensive Plan, did not exist. Respondent asserted that this alleged act "constitutes malfeasance and is a gross misuse of public position in violation of Florida Statutes." Notwithstanding Respondent's allegation that the Town had no land development regulations, in a letter dated March 13, 1998, signed by Respondent and attached to this ethics complaint, Respondent cites extensively from the Town's Land Development Code. On April 3, 1998, Respondent filed a third complaint against Mayor Strange alleging that the mayor had (1) improperly determined that the terms of members of the Town's Code Enforcement Board had expired; (2) failed to post notice of vacancies on that board; and (3) failed to adopt rules for the recruitment and appointment of board members. In this complaint, Respondent contended that the alleged acts were a breach of public trust in violation of Sections 112.311(6) and 286.011, Florida Statutes. On April 5, 1998, Respondent filed a fourth ethics complaint against Mayor Strange alleging that on certain property in the Town, land development by a former Town official was taking place without proper permits. In this ethics complaint, Respondent indicated that on March 4, 1998, she had filed a Notice of Complaint with the Town regarding this issue but that the Town's Code Enforcement Officer had determined that the complaint was unfounded. In the ethics complaint, Respondent stated that: It is my belief that the code enforcement officer as well as the mayor and the members of the McIntosh Town Council, under whose pleasure the code enforcement officer is appointed, have violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, for allowing this unpermitted land development by a former town official. Respondent's second, third, and fourth ethics complaints against Mayor Strange were found to be without merit and dismissed by the Ethics Commission without the necessity of an investigation. The Ethics Commission authorized an investigation of the allegations contained in Respondent's initial complaint, Complaint No. 98-37, alleging a nepotism violation against Mayor Strange. Larry Hill, a senior investigator, investigated the allegations in Respondent's Complaint No. 98-37 on behalf of the Ethics Commission. As a part of his investigation, Mr. Hill interviewed Respondent and Mayor Strange. Following the investigation, Mr. Hill incorporated his factual findings in a Report of Investigation dated June 19, 1998. After considering the Report of Investigation and the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission determined that there was no evidence that Mayor Strange advocated, recommended, or otherwise played any role in having Mr. Kingsley appointed to the municipal position. Thereafter, the Ethics Commission issued an Order finding that there was no probable cause to believe that Mayor Strange violated Section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, regarding her brother-in-law's appointment to a Town position as alleged in Respondent's complaint. According to the Report of Investigation, Thurman Kingsley was Mayor Strange’s brother-in-law. However, Respondent admitted she had no evidence that Mayor Strange had advocated or was in any way involved in Mr. Kingsley's appointment to his municipal position as a building official. Furthermore, according to the report, Respondent acknowledged that she knew that Mayor Strange did not have a vote on any official Town matters. During Mr. Hill's interview with her, Mayor Strange indicated that she had taken no action to appoint or promote Thurman Kingsley as the building official for the Town of McIntosh. Also, at hearing, Mayor Strange provided credible testimony that she did not take part in the Town's hiring of Thurman Kingsley and did not have the power to do so. Thurman Kingsley was appointed as building permit official for the Town of McIntosh approximately four years prior to Respondent's filing the complaint of a violation of the nepotism law by Mayor Strange. The minutes of the Town Council meeting at which Mr. Kingsley was approved as a building permit official reflect that Mayor Strange played no role in his appointment to the building committee. At the time Respondent filed the verified complaint against Mayor Strange, she was aware that the mayor had no power to appoint any town official. Moreover, Respondent had no first-hand knowledge of the alleged violations nor had the factual allegations been provided to her by reliable sources. Although Respondent had no knowledge or reliable information to support the allegations, she filed a verified complaint against Mayor Strange. In light of the foregoing, the statements and allegations contained in the Respondent's complaint against Mayor Strange were filed with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. On October 9, 1997, Petitioner, Maxine Holst, was appointed on a temporary basis as Town Clerk for the Town of McIntosh. Six months later, on April 9, 1998, Ms. Holst was appointed to the position as permanent Town Clerk. In both instances, Ms. Holst was appointed by the Town Council and served at the pleasure of and answered to that body. On March 3, 1998, Respondent filed a complaint with the Ethics Commission against Maxine Holst. The complaint alleged that "the issuing clerk" misused her public office by issuing a building permit to the relative of a Town Council member. The complaint further alleged that the permit was issued contrary to applicable issuance criteria and in spite of the fact that the permit had been denied by the former Town Clerk because the necessary requirements had not been met. In Respondent's complaint against Ms. Holst, Respondent, wrote: The issuing clerk was aware of the previous denial of permit. I believe this act represents a direct violation of the Florida Statutes, Section 112.313(6) as misuse of public position. The building permit referred to in Respondent's complaint was for construction of a carport on property owned by Wilshire Walkup, a family member of Howard Walkup. According to Respondent's complaint, when the subject permit was issued, Howard Walkup was a member of the Town Council. On March 9, 1998, Respondent filed a second ethics complaint against Ms. Holst, alleging that she (1) failed to file applicable financial disclosure after being appointed to her public position; and (2) refused to return the former Town Clerk's notary seal left through oversight at the clerk's office. In regard to the first allegation, Respondent stated: A Town Clerk was appointed in October 1997. This was on a temporary basis but later became a permanent appointment. As of this date, according to the [O]ffice of the Marion County Supervisor of Elections, the town clerk has not filed Form 1, Limited Financial Disclosure. This is a violation of the Sunshine Amendment. In regard to the allegation concerning the notary seal, Respondent stated in her complaint: A Town Clerk was appointed in October of 1997. The former Town Clerk, by oversight, left her notary seal at the office. The newly appointed town clerk, M. Maxine Holst, refused, upon the former clerk's three requests to give the notary seal to it's [sic] owner." The letter acknowledged that the notary seal was returned to the former Town Clerk but noted that the act of refusing to return the notary stamp constituted a misdemeanor according to Section 117.05(9), Florida Statutes. Finally, Respondent's letter stated that the alleged act "constituted misuse of public position in violation of Section 112.313(6) of Florida Statutes." On April 3, 1998, Respondent filed a third ethics complaint against Ms. Holst. The allegations in this complaint were identical to those made in the ethics complaint filed by Respondent against Mayor Strange on the same date and described above in paragraph 7. In fact, a copy of the same letter was attached to the complaints filed on April 3, 1999, against Mayor Strange and Ms. Holst. In the third complaint filed against Ms. Holst, Respondent alleged that the terms of members of the Code Enforcement Board had been determined without documentation and concluded that the new members appointed to the Board were chosen without public notice and search. In this complaint, Respondent alleged that: The Town Clerk, Maxine Holst, Mayor Marsha Strange, and Council Members Stott, Smith, McCollum and Walkup determined without documentation that the [Code Enforcement Board] Chairman's and another member's terms had expired. Although the Chairman and the other members wished to be considered for reappointment, the Town Council recruited, without posting a notice that interested residents might apply for the position, and appointed their replacements. I believe that the bogus expirations and the reappointments of hand-picked replacements without notice to board members or the public posting of the vacancies represents a breach of public trust in violation of Florida Statute 112.313(6). The Ethics Commission authorized a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by Respondent against Maxine Holst. The investigation was conducted by Larry D. Hill, a senior investigator with the Ethics Commission. The results of Mr. Hill’s findings were recorded in a Report of Investigation dated June 19, 1998. Based on the Report of Investigation and the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission issued an Order finding that there was no probable cause to believe that Maxine Holst was guilty of the violations alleged in the three complaints filed by Respondent. The initial ethics complaint filed by Respondent against Ms. Holst alleged that Ms. Holst (1) improperly issued a building permit although the application had been previously denied; (2) was aware, when she issued the permit, that the permit had been denied; and (3) issued the permit only because the applicant was related to a member of the Town Council. These allegations were not true. Moreover, at the time the complaint was filed, there was no basis in fact for the allegations made by Respondent. When Margaret Walkup, wife of Wilshire Walkup, first submitted the permit application, it was accepted by the Town Clerk, Barbara Bessent. At the direction of June Glass, the chairperson of the Town's Historic Preservation Board, Ms. Bessent told Mrs. Walkup that the application must also include a site plan. Mrs. Walkup drew a diagram of a carport that was to be constructed and re-submitted the application. Ms. Bessent accepted the application. When a permit application involved a request for construction in the Town’s historic district, the Town's Historic Preservation Board would typically be required to review and approve the application. In this case, Ms. Glass believed that Mrs. Walkup’s application was incomplete in that the diagram drawn on the application did not, in Ms. Glass' opinion, constitute a site plan. In light of her belief, Ms. Glass told Ms. Bessent to send a letter to Mrs. Walkup notifying her that the application was incomplete and/or that it was denied. The letter was never written and no official action was taken on the application. Ms. Holst’s immediate predecessor, Ms. Bessent, never approved or denied the permit application nor did she create a file or in any way document the status of the application. Rather, she put the application in the correspondence file. This failure to document would make it impossible for anyone to know or determine what action, if any, had been taken on the application. On or about October 13, 1999, Margaret Walkup went to the Town Clerk's office and inquired about the status of the previously-filed building permit application. When the inquiry was made, Ms. Holst had been in the position of Town Clerk less than a week, was unfamiliar with the permitting process, and had no knowledge of the permit application in question. Therefore, prior to responding to Mrs. Walkup’s inquiry, Ms. Holst sought the advice of Town Council member Eunice Smith, who was in the office training Ms. Holst. Ms. Smith was an appropriate person to train Ms. Holst for her new position because, several years ago and prior to being elected to the Town Council, Ms. Smith had worked as the Town Clerk. After Ms. Holst and/or Town Councilwoman Smith located the application, Councilwoman Smith advised Ms. Holst that the Town's Land Development Regulations required issuance of the permit because the permit had been pending for more than 45 days. Based on Town Councilwoman Smith's advice and directive, Ms. Holst issued the permit, which allowed the construction of an aluminum carport on the property owned by Wilshire Walkup. Respondent's statements in the March 3, 1999, complaint against Ms. Holst, that the subject permit application was initially denied and that Ms. Holst was "aware" of the denial, were false and had no basis in fact. Finally, Respondent alleged that Ms. Holst issued the permit to Wilshire Walkup because he was related to Howard Walkup, a member of the McIntosh Town Council. This allegation was false and was easily discernable as such. Although Howard Walkup was a member of the McIntosh Town Council when Respondent filed her complaint against Ms. Holst, he was not a member of the Town Council in October 1997 when the permit was issued by Ms. Holst as alleged by Respondent. Respondent offered no explanation of the basis of her belief that at the time she filed the complaint, these statements were true. Thus, the allegations contained in Respondent's first complaint against Ms. Holst were filed with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. As noted in paragraphs 21 and 22, Respondent's second complaint alleged that Ms. Holst failed to file a financial disclosure and also refused to return the notary seal to its owner and the former Town Clerk, Barbara Bessent. The allegation concerning Ms. Holst's failing to file a financial disclosure form is true. As of March 9, 1998, Ms. Holst had not filed the required financial disclosure form. In fact, it was only after Respondent filed this complaint that Ms. Holst first learned that the filing was required. However, upon learning of the requirement, Ms. Holst immediately filed the required financial disclosure form. Respondent stated that the former Town Clerk, Ms. Bessent, left her notary seal in the Town Clerk's Office through "oversight" and, thereafter, requested on three occasions that Ms. Holst give her the seal. There is no indication that Respondent had first-hand knowledge of the facts surrounding the return of Ms. Bessent's notary seal nor was there any evidence that Respondent's allegations were based on information obtained from reliable sources. Moreover, these statements made by Respondent in the March 9, 1998, complaint against Ms. Holst are contradicted by the credible testimony of Ms. Bessent, the person most knowledgeable about the situation involving her notary seal. Respondent's statement that Ms. Bessent left her notary seal in the Town Clerk's office through an oversight is not true. On Ms. Bessent's last day as Town Clerk, she voluntarily and intentionally left her notary seal in the Town Clerk's office after being asked to do so by Town Council member McCullum. Councilman McCullum explained to Ms. Bessent that he wanted to "clear" her and indicated that it would "be safer" for her to leave the notary seal at the office. Ms. Bessent complied with Councilman McCullum's request and never expressed an unwillingness to temporarily leave the notary seal in the Town Clerk's office. The second allegation included in the second ethics complaint, that Ms. Holst refused to return a notary stamp to the former Town Clerk, is false. The former Town Clerk, Barbara Bessent, provided credible testimony that Ms. Holst never refused to return the notary seal on the one occasion that Ms. Bessent asked Ms. Holst for the notary seal. When Ms. Bessent made this request, Ms. Holst, who had been Town Clerk only a few days, told her that if the Town paid for the seal that it belonged to the Town and that she would have to check with the Town Council. Ms. Bessent was familiar with how the Town Council worked and knew and understood that Council members wanted to be consulted on most matters. Ms. Bessent did not believe that Ms. Holst was refusing to give her the seal and did not believe Ms. Holst intended to use the seal. In fact, Ms. Bessent had reason to believe that Ms. Holst was a notary. Several weeks after Ms. Bessent requested that Ms. Holst give her the notary seal, a Town Council member authorized Ms. Holst to give Ms. Bessent her notary seal. Upon receiving this authorization, Ms. Holst gave Ms. Bessent the notary seal. Prior to Ms. Holst's returning the notary seal to Ms. Bessent, and soon after Ms. Bessent resigned as Town Clerk, the Town maintenance man came to the Town Clerk's Office to retrieve Ms. Bessent's personal items that she had left in the office. A few weeks later, Ms. Glass wanted to have Ms. Bessent notarize something for her. After Ms. Bessent told Ms. Glass that her notary seal was in the Clerk's Office, Ms. Glass volunteered to go to the Clerk's Office and retrieve the seal. Ms. Glass went to the office and asked for Ms. Bessent's notary seal. Ms. Holst did not give Ms. Bessent's notary seal to either the maintenance man or to Ms. Glass because she believed that it was improper to give Ms. Bessent's notary seal to a third party. At the time Respondent made the statements regarding the notary seal in the March 9, 1998, complaint against Ms. Holst, she either knew they were false or made them with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. The allegation in Respondent's third ethics complaint against Ms. Holst was that she, the mayor, and Town Council members had improperly determined that the terms of the Town's Code Enforcement Board had expired. This allegation is false and has no basis in fact. When Respondent made the statements and allegations in the complaint, filed on April 3, 1998, she either knew they were false or made them with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. On January 8, 1998, Petitioner Richard McGath, a retired Sarasota building inspection official and resident of the Town of McIntosh, was appointed as the Town's code enforcement officer. This is a voluntary position, and one for which Mr. McGath receives no compensation. Mr. McGath spends about two hours a week performing duties associated with his position as the Town's code enforcement officer. On March 3, 1998, less than two months after Mr. McGath agreed to accept the Town's position of code enforcement officer, Respondent filed a verified ethics complaint against him. In the complaint, Respondent alleged that Mr. McGath failed to act on a matter and that such failure was a misuse of his position. The alleged act giving rise to Respondent's complaint against Mr. McGath was that the Town Clerk had improperly issued a building permit to Town resident Wilshire Walkup for construction of a carport, although it failed to meet the requirements of the Town's Historic Preservation Board. Respondent felt that the permit was issued only because Wilshire Walkup was related to Town Council member Howard Walkup. On or about December 10, 1997, two months after the subject permit was issued, Respondent filed a Notice of Complaint with the Town Clerk, alleging that Mr. McGath refused to take action when he determined that Wilshire Walkup had constructed an aluminum carport. The position of code enforcement officer was vacant at or near the time Respondent's December 1997 Notice of Complaint was filed. Therefore, no immediate action was taken on the Respondent's complaint. However, soon after Mr. McGath's appointment as code enforcement officer, he investigated Respondent's complaint regarding the permit issued to Wilshire Walkup. During the course of his investigation, Mr. McGath determined that the building permit had been issued to Wilshire Walkup on October 13, 1997. Mr. McGath then went to Wilshire Walkup's property and observed that an aluminum carport had been constructed. Mr. McGath believed that the structure was in violation of Town ordinances. However, Mr. McGath issued a one-time waiver for the structure because the Town Clerk had issued the building permit on October 13, 1997, and by the time he assumed the position of code enforcement officer, the structure already had been constructed. Based on Respondent's December 1997 Notice of Complaint, the structure had likely been constructed as early as December 10, 1997. Mr. McGath explained to Mr. Walkup that any further modifications on the structure would have to comply fully with all applicable code requirements. These comments were noted on the response portion of Respondent's Notice of Complaint. Mr. McGath took the action he did with respect to Wilshire Walkup's carport because, prior to his investigation, the building permit had been issued and the carport had already been constructed. Both of these events occurred before Mr. McGath was appointed as the Town's code enforcement officer. Based on his experience and given the facts related to the Wilshire Walkup project, Mr. McGath believed that the course of action he chose was a prudent one. Respondent also alleged that Mr. McGath took no action against Wilshire Walkup because he was related to Howard Walkup, a member of the Town council. First, as stated in paragraph 33, Howard Walkup was not a member of the Town Council at the time the permit was issued. Second, after Howard Walkup was elected to the Town Council in November 1997, he never attempted to influence or even discuss the matter with Mr. McGath during his investigation of the matter. Finally, prior to his investigating Respondent's December 1997 Notice of Complaint, Mr. McGath had never met Wilshire Walkup and did not know that he was related to Town Councilman Howard Walkup. The action taken by Mr. McGath relative to Respondent's complaint regarding Wilshire Walkup's aluminum carport was not a misuse of his position as alleged by Respondent. Respondent had no evidence to base her claim that Richard McGath misused his public office for private gain. Yet, she filed a verified complaint with the Commission alleging that he had done so. Respondent offered no reasonable explanation or basis for her believing that when the statements in her ethics complaint were made, that they were true. In light of the foregoing, the statements and allegations contained in Respondent's complaint, filed on March 3, 1998, against Mr. McGath were filed with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. On April 14, 1998, Respondent filed a second ethics complaint against Mr. McGath. In that complaint, Respondent alleged that Mr. McGath had violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by allowing unpermitted land development by a former Town official. In the complaint, Respondent noted that she had previously filed a Notice of Complaint with the Town regarding the alleged unpermitted land development and that the code enforcement officer, Mr. McGath, had determined that the complaint was unfounded. Respondent's Notice of Complaint regarding the alleged unpermitted land development was filed with the Town on March 4, 1998. Mr. McGath investigated the matter and determined that on the property in question, a culvert was being put in to replace another culvert that had been crushed. Based on his investigation, Mr. McGath did not find that there was unpermitted land development and thus concluded that Respondent's complaint was unfounded. This finding was made on March 12, 1998. Respondent learned of Mr. McGath's finding on April 1, 1998, but never questioned him regarding the reason for his finding. On April 14, 1998, without making any inquiry into the basis of Mr. McGath's finding, Respondent filed an ethics complaint alleging that Mr. McGath misused his public position by allowing alleged unpermitted land development. Respondent had no factual basis upon which to base the statements and allegations contained in the ethics complaint against Mr. McGath. In light of the foregoing, the statements and allegations contained in Respondent's complaint filed on April 14, 1998, against Mr. McGath were filed with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. The Ethics Commission authorized a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by Respondent against Mr. McGath. The investigation was conducted by Larry Hill, a senior investigator with the Ethics Commission. Thereafter, the Ethics Commission issued an Order finding no probable cause to believe that Mr. McGath was guilty of the violations alleged in the two complaints filed by Respondent. Respondent frequently attends the Town Council meetings and is knowledgeable of the workings of the Town of McIntosh. Moreover, Respondent knows how to obtain public documents through public records requests and has made such requests on a regular basis. The record reveals that for many years Respondent attended many Town Council meetings, made numerous public record requests to the Town of McIntosh, and wrote numerous letters to the Town Council, various governmental agencies, and officials. In many of those letters, Respondent complained of alleged violations by Town officials, cited statutes, codes, and ordinances, and quoted liberally from Town ordinances, Town council minutes, and other documents. Many of the letters prepared by Respondent reflect that she had extensively researched selective issues contained therein. In fact, Respondent indicated in one letter that based on her research, she had determined that certain conduct constituted a misdemeanor offense. However, in the instant case, Respondent not only failed to research the facts alleged in the complaints, but apparently never made even a cursory review of the Town records prior to leveling her complaints against Petitioners. Where allegations are made under oath, as in this case, it is appropriate for a complainant to at least make a cursory review of the facts before filing a complaint alleging officials have violated Florida Statutes. In the instant case, between March 3, 1998, and April 5, 1998, Respondent filed a total of nine verified ethics complaints against Petitioners. Three of the complaints were dismissed by the Ethics Commission without an investigation. In the remaining six complaints which are the subject of this proceeding, Respondent made numerous unsubstantiated allegations and statements of fact to which she had no personal knowledge. Respondent also failed to check the accuracy and veracity of statements before she filed these complaints. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Respondent filed the ethics complaints against Petitioners with a malicious intent to injure the reputations of Petitioners because they were filed with the knowledge that the complaints contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard for whether the complaints contained false allegations of fact material to a violation of the Code of Ethics. In defending themselves against the allegations in the subject complaints and in this proceeding, Petitioners have been represented by S. Scott Walker, Esquire, and Gary Printy, Esquire. The normal hourly rate for S. Scott Walker and Gary Printy, counsel for Petitioners, is $175.00 per hour. This is a reasonable hourly rate. However, in this case, the hourly rate assessed to Petitioners was $75.00. The hourly rate of $75.00 is also reasonable. S. Scott Walker expended 47.70 hours on this matter, including time spent in this proceeding. Mr. Printy expended four hours on this matter. The total attorney time expended on this matter, 51.70 hours, is reasonable. The attorney's fee of $4,109.47 incurred by Petitioners as a result of Mr. Walker's representation is reasonable. Also, the attorney's fee of $400.00 incurred by Petitioners as a result of Mr. Printy's representation is reasonable. Reasonable costs of $231.98 were incurred in connection with defense of the ethics complaints against Petitioners and in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Mary Lueders Burnett, is liable for attorney's fees of $4,509.47 and costs of $231.98. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Scott Walker, Esquire Post Office Box 1070 Gainesville, Florida 32602-1070 Mary Lueders Burnett Post Office Box 381 McIntosh, Florida 32664-0381 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to its authority to regulate water and sewer rates, charges and rate structures embodied in Chapters 367, Florida Statutes, and 25-30, Florida Administrative Code, the Public Service Commission entered Orders numbered 16971 and 17058, which adopted specific guidelines and conditions for utilities to implement certain income tax impact charges for contributions-in-aid- of-construction ("CIAC gross-up charges"). (See Orders numbered 20409, p.3; 16971, p.2-4; and 17058). One of these conditions requires that utilities submit appropriate tariff sheets (rates and charges sheets) for the Commission's approval prior to implementation of the CIAC gross-up charge. CIAC is the payment or contribution of cash or property to a utility from a customer or entity seeking service from that utility in order to secure the provision of such services or to reserve it for a future time. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 changed the treatment of CIAC from being non-taxable to being taxable as income. A CIAC gross-up charge is a method by which a utility can recover that tax expense, represented by the income tax assessed against collected CIAC, through approved rates and charges to customers. The amount of CIAC tax impact funds collected by a utility is not itself treated as CIAC for rate-making purposes. The Respondent, St. Johns North Utility Corp., collected gross-up charges which were not authorized by its filed and approved tariff schedules (rate schedules), and without securing the requisite approval from the Commission. (See Orders numbered 20409 and 20762). The Commission was made aware of the charging of unauthorized CIAC gross-up charges by the Utility Respondent when a developer, Fruit Cove Limited, communicated with the Commission concerning its doubts about utility service being available for one of its subdivisions, when required, from the Respondent. Fruit Cove Limited had paid CIAC gross-up charges to St. Johns. On June 3, 1988, the Commission, through its staff, contacted Mr. Joseph E. Warren, the General Manager for the Respondent, and explained the Commission's requirements regarding the requisite pre-approval of the charging of CIAC gross-up charges. Mr. Warren agreed to file a written request for authorization to implement such charges. No request was filed, despite repeated admonitions and solicitations by the Commission and its staff and a lengthy opportunity to comply. Finally, Order No. 20409 was issued by the Commission on December 5, 1988, requiring the Utility to file a written request for authorization to implement CIAC gross-up charges within thirty (30) days of that Order. A written request was not timely filed, however. The Utility finally filed its written request for approval of these charges on September 5, 1989. The accompanying tariff sheets representing such charges were ultimately filed in response to Orders numbered 16971 and 20409, and Show Cause Order No. 20762. They became effective on September 15, 1989. The Commission, through its staff, also made repeated inquiries to the Utility regarding certain service availability charges and practices, initially by letter of July 29, 1988. The Utility was allowed until August 19, 1988 to make the requested responses. The letter was addressed to Mr. Joseph Warren at the Utility's mailing address of record. The Utility, however, did not provide written responses to the comments and questions by the Commission, despite repeated assurances that it would do so. Order No. 20409, issued on December 5, 1988, required the Utility to provide the full written responses to the July 29, 1988 letter within thirty (30) days of the date of that Order. The responses were not timely made. Order No. 20762 was issued on February 17, 1989, requiring the Utility to show cause in writing on or before March 13, 1989 why it should not be fined up to $5,000.00 per day, in accordance with the Commission's penalty authority, for failure to comply with the provisions of Order No. 20409, regarding the necessity for written responses to the Commission's specified questions and the submission of a written request to implement the CIAC gross-up charges referenced above. The first item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to seek approval, including submission of proposed rate tariff sheets for authorization to implement the CIAC tax impact charge referenced above. That item was responded to on September 5, 1989, more than eight months after the deadline set by Order No. 20409. The second item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide the names and addresses of financial institutions in which gross-up charge funds were being retained. That item was responded to as requested. The third item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide a listing of all gross-up monies received from each contributor. No response was ever provided by the Respondent. The significance of the information requested by the Commission is that it would provide identity of the individuals who were entitled to a refund of the unauthorized CIAC gross-up charges collected by the Utility, as provided in Order No. 20762. The fourth item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to provide a copy of all current developer agreements. That item was responded to within the deadline set by Order No. 20409. The fifth item in the Commission's July 29, 1988 letter to the Utility had requested the Utility to file revised tariff sheets indicating the actual legal description of the Utility's certificated service territory. No response was ever provided. Order No. 20762 was ultimately issued on February 17, 1989 imposing a $5,000.00 fine on the Utility for serving outside of its authorized service area. Order No. 20409 requested the Utility to indicate to the Commission whether, with regard to the developer agreement between the Respondent and Fruit Cove Limited, the charges listed in the various paragraphs of that agreement would, upon completion of the real estate development involved, be adjusted to reflect actual utility service costs incurred. No response to that request was ever provided by the Utility. Additionally, in that Order, the Commission requested information concerning a so- called "step tank", which was referenced in paragraphs 12C and 13D of the developer agreement with Fruit Cove Limited. That request, in Order No. 20409, was never responded to. A certain fee was charged for installation of the step tank by the Utility to Fruit Cove Limited, and no response was given to the Commission's inquiry as to why that fee was omitted from the Utility's approved tariff on file with the Commission. The significance of the requested information was that the omission of the step tank installation fee from the Utility's tariff of rates and charges could cause the developer agreement to constitute a "special service availability agreement", which can only be approved in advance by the Commission. It is not a matter, approval of which has been delegated by the Commission to its staff members. The Order referenced last above also requested an explanation for why a meter installation fee, referred to in that same developer agreement, does not include a "curb stop" or a meter box. This information is significant because it is necessary in order for the Commission to determine whether the charge involved is reasonable. A cost breakdown for the meter installation, including the various hardware components and other charges, was necessary and was not provided by the Utility. Additional information concerning the area of service availability, required to be provided to the commission by Order No. 20409, included the requirement that approval be obtained from the Commission for the CIAC gross-up charge in the developer agreement with Fruit Cove Limited. As stated above, that approval was not requested in writing, as required by the Order, for more than eight months after the deadline set by that Order. By Order No. 20762, St. Johns was fined $5,000.00 for three separate violations of the statutes and rules, and the Orders enumerating them, for a total of $15,000.00. The Utility was fined for serving outside of its authorized service territory, for collecting unauthorized CIAC gross- up charges, and for failing to file its developer agreements with the Commission as required by law. The developer agreements were only submitted after repeated efforts by the Commission's staff which culminated in Order No. 20409 and which were either unresponded to or not properly responded to by the Utility. Additionally, by Order No. 21559, issued on July 17, 1989, St. Johns was fined $5,000.00 for failure to file an application for an extension of its territory as required by Order No. 20409. In the meantime, by Order No. 22342, issued on December 26, 1989, the Commission approved a transfer of the Utility's assets from St. Johns to Jacksonville Suburban Utilities Corporation ("Jacksonville Suburban"). That Order did not authorize transfer of the liabilities of the Respondent to Jacksonville Suburban. The Order specifies that St. Johns, and not Jacksonville Suburban, will remain liable for the previously imposed refund obligations and fines. Only in the event that there remained sales proceeds in excess of the certain debt of St. Johns owed to its institutional lender would funds from the Jacksonville Suburban sale be applied toward payment of the refund and fines found to be due and owing by the above-cited Orders, by way of escrow or otherwise. Any excess proceeds, absent Order No. 22342, were to be paid to St. Johns. Order No. 22342 does not make Jacksonville Suburban liable for the refund and fines at issue. It is speculative whether there will be any sales proceeds available from the sale, after payment of the debt, to be applied toward the refund and fines. The sales price was made dependent upon establishment of the Utility's "rate base" amount, to be established in that transfer proceeding at a point in time after entry of Order No. 22342. That Order, however, specifically preserves the liability of St. Johns for the refund and fines and does not provide for the extinguishment of such liability in the event that the sales proceeds prove to be insufficient to pay them.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that St. Johns be assessed a penalty of $5,000.00 for knowingly and willfully failing to comply with Order No. 20409. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings 1990. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 14th day of June, APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-24. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Respondent filed no proposed Findings of Fact) Copies furnished to: David Schwartz, Esq. Florida Public Service Commission Legal Division 101 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Joseph E. Warren, Esq. 1930 San Marco Boulevard Suite 200 Jacksonville, FL 32207 Mr. Steve Tribble Director of Records and Recording Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Mr. David Swafford Executive Director Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street, Room 116 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Susan Clark, Esq. General Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street, Room 212 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Florida A & M University Board of Trustees (“Board of Trustees”), improperly reassigned Petitioner, Dale Cassidy, to an alternative position at Florida A & M University (“FAMU” or the “University”); and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to damages or other relief.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former employee of the University. He was hired in 2014 as vice president of Finance and Administration/Chief Financial Officer (“vice president of Finance/CFO”). He assumed the position at a starting annual salary of $195,000. In August 2015, he assumed additional duties and his salary was increased to $220,000 in recognition of the additional responsibilities. Petitioner served as vice president of Finance/CFO until March 14, 2017. Respondent is the Board of Trustees for FAMU, a university within the State University System. FAMU is a nationally known, historically black college located in Tallahassee, Florida. On Friday, March 11, 2016, Petitioner was visited in his office at FAMU by two individuals: Jimmy Miller and Santoras Gamble. The two came into his office as emissaries of the then-President of FAMU, Elmira Mangum. Miller was President Mangum’s chief of staff; Gamble was a “special assistant” to the President. The purpose of Miller and Gamble’s visit was to hand-deliver to Petitioner a letter signed by the President notifying Petitioner of a “change-in-assignment.” Specifically, Petitioner was being removed from his position as vice president of Finance/CFO and reassigned to the newly created position of Chief External Compliance and Ethics Officer (referred to herein as the “Ethics Officer”). His annual salary in that position would be reduced to $176,000 and he would receive normal (as opposed to enhanced) fringe benefits.1/ He would no longer be eligible to participate in the Executive Service pay plan which existed for certain high-level administrative and professional (“A&P”) staff. Petitioner’s change in assignment was to take effect the following Monday, March 14, 2016. Petitioner read the letter from President Mangum and dropped it on his desk. The two emissaries asked if he had any questions about the letter. He either told them he did not have any questions or he told them, “[no questions] that you can answer.” Either way, that was the end of the discussion between Petitioner and the two representatives of President Mangum. Miller, Gamble, and Petitioner then left Petitioner’s office and toured Lee Hall, purportedly looking for a new office for Petitioner once he assumed his new role. President Mangum’s office is also located in Lee Hall. Petitioner was ultimately moved to an office in the Foote-Hilyer building. On the day after the reassignment took effect, Jimmy Miller, as President Mangum’s chief of staff, issued a memorandum to the Board of Trustees. The memorandum outlined the changes in senior leadership assignments, including Petitioner’s reassignment to the position of Ethics Officer.2/ Over the next couple of weeks, Petitioner made his displeasure with the reassignment made known to a number of people. He was, however, especially unhappy that news of his reassignment (and presumptive demotion) was reported in the Tallahassee Democrat, the local newspaper. Petitioner moved into his new office on the fourth floor of the Foote-Hilyer building, in a suite of offices occupied by the vice president of Research, within two weeks of receiving the job change notice. On the day before he moved into his new office, Petitioner drafted a memorandum to his personnel file concerning his reassignment. The memo included the statement, “I accept this new role and pledge to perform the related duties . . . to the best of my ability.” On the day he assumed the new position, Petitioner wrote another memo that he asked to be placed in his personnel file. In the memo, Petitioner essentially complained that he had not been given any specific reason for the reassignment from the position of vice president of Finance/CFO. The memo did not mention that President Mangum’s emissaries had asked him if he had questions about the letter or that he had no questions for them. Petitioner did not point to any requirement in University regulations (or otherwise) that the President was required to give him a specific reason for the transfer. In fact, all A&P employees serve at the pleasure of the President and could have their employment terminated at any time, with or without cause. Petitioner received a request from President Mangum for him to meet with her concerning the change in assignment. The meeting was held (albeit on a day other than proposed by the President, pursuant to Petitioner’s request). At the meeting, ultimately held on March 21, 2016, Petitioner was presented with his new employment contract for the Ethics Officer position. He refused to sign the contract, citing his reasons, to wit: 1) He had not been told specific reasons why he could no longer serve as vice president of Finance/CFO; and 2) the President had not shared with him her vision of how she expected him to perform his duties in the new role. By not signing the employment contract, he knew that President Mangum would be within her rights to terminate his employment altogether. Petitioner seems to acknowledged that President Mangum “consulted” him about the new job classification at the meeting. He maintains, however, that it was too late to hold the consultation at that time. He provided no support or rationale for his stance. Petitioner then attempted to negotiate a different job description for the position to which he had been assigned. He asked for more salary, that the position be “interim” in nature, and that he retain his Executive Service benefits. President Mangum informed him that the University’s human relations department had “market priced” the salary and that it would not be changed. There is no evidence the other issues he raised were discussed at that time (or later, for that matter). As noted, Petitioner moved into his new office space on March 14, 2016, and by all appearances, assumed his duties as the Ethics Officer. He nevertheless maintains he did not believe he had ever formally served in that capacity. This testimony contravenes a memo he wrote on the day of his meeting with President Mangum. The memo, written to his personnel file, said, “I currently plan to accept the role [of Ethics Officer].” On June 21, 2016, Petitioner attended a seminar in Orlando relating to ethics and compliance officer regulations. In his travel request form, Petitioner identifies himself as “Officer, Compliance” and affirmed that the seminar constituted official business. His travel was approved and he attended the seminar. At final hearing, Petitioner said he attended the seminar as “an employee of the university” but not as the Ethics Officer. There is no evidentiary support for that contention and it seems unlikely in light of his travel documents. From March 14, 2016, until his resignation from employment, effective December 29, 2016, Petitioner was considered by the University to be its Ethics Officer. He performed duties associated with that position, operated out of the office assigned to that position, and accepted compensation for serving in that position. The University human resources officer (who was called as a witness by Petitioner at final hearing) opined that Petitioner’s actions clearly confirmed that he had accepted the position. A further example: On August 19, 2016, Petitioner issued a report on matters relating to his position as Ethics Officer. He signed the report, noting his position as “Acting Chief Compliance & Ethics Officer.” Petitioner said he signed the report that way because FAMU did not have “acting” administrative employees; they were either permanent or interim. However, Regulation 10.106(1)(b) states, “A&P employees who are appointed to established positions with an appointment status modifier or type, other than Regular (for example, Acting, Temporary or Visiting) are not entitled to a notice of non- reappointment.” Granted that section is referring to non- reappointment and addresses established positions, neither of which is relevant to the instant matter, but it does show that “Acting” is a nomenclature used by FAMU for A&P employees. Petitioner is seeking the difference in pay and benefits he received as Ethics Officer versus what he had been making as vice president of Finance/CFO, for the time period March 14 through December 29, 2016. He asserts that since he never signed the contract to be Ethics Officer, he never officially served in that position. The Personnel Action Request (“PAR”) in Petitioner’s personnel file was signed by President Mangum, the appropriate vice president (Ronica Mathis), and the HR Officer; and it clearly reassigns Petitioner to the position of Ethics Officer, effective March 14, 2017. The PAR, which sets out the employee’s current position, proposed new position, salary and other information, need not be signed by the employee. He or she would only be provided a copy of the PAR if they requested to review their personnel file. When asked what services he performed during his tenure as Ethics Officer, Petitioner responded, “Whatever the President, as my supervisor, asked me to do, which was largely nothing.” Petitioner did not provide further elucidation as to how doing “largely nothing” warranted additional payment from the University. Petitioner maintains he was not properly advised of his proposed reassignment pursuant to relevant University regulations. He cites to Regulation 10.209, Change-In- Assignment of Faculty and Administrative and Professional Employees, which states in pertinent part: The President or President’s designee may for the best interest of the University, at any time, assign a Faculty or Administrative and Professional (A&P) employee to other institutional assignments only after consultation with the employee and the departments or other units affected. Regardless of the change-in-assignment, however, the University is committed to compensate the employee. Despite being asked by the President’s designees (Miller and Gamble) on March 11, 2016, whether he had any questions about the reassignment, Petitioner maintains he had no “consultation” as required by the regulation. Rather, he posits, all he received was “notice” of the reassignment. Petitioner points out that the dictionary definitions of consultation and notice are different and they do not share the same synonyms. From Petitioner’s perspective, consultation would involve some degree of give and take between the President and the employee. Or, as he stated in his PRO filed in this case, the synonym for consultation is “asked to discuss or exchange views” of a matter. Petitioner says that Miller and Gamble asking him if he had any questions was not sufficient “consultation” on the matter. Petitioner provided no other support for his position. Further, Petitioner points out that Richard Givens, vice president of Audit and Compliance, was not notified about Petitioner’s reassignment. Petitioner maintains that Givens’ office was affected by the reassignment and thus should have been consulted as well. Givens stated at final hearing that his office “could have been affected” by the reassignment, but ultimately it had not been affected. Timothy Moore, vice president of Research, maintains that consultation means nothing more than a letter, email, phone call or other means of transmitting the fact to an employee. Clearly, Petitioner was provided notice of the reassignment and had opportunity to consult with the President’s representatives, but he refused to do so. Givens received notice of the reassignment when he read about it in the local newspaper. He does not remember being advised by anyone at FAMU concerning the change before it occurred, but received written notice on the day Petitioner started his new position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Florida A & M University Board of Trustees, upholding the employment action as to Petitioner, Dale Cassidy, and denying Petitioner’s claim for damages or other relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner is eligible for an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust pursuant to the terms of Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Since December 1997, Petitioner has been employed as a mental health technician at The Harbors, a mental health and behavioral facility in Pinellas County. Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust as a result of an adjudication regarding battery and improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon. In 1996, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to one count of battery on her spouse, a first degree misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and to one count of improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon or firearm, a first degree misdemeanor under Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld, and Petitioner received 12 months' probation on the battery charge, commencing August 21, 1996. George H. Seibert, a background screening specialist for the Department of Children and Family Services, testified that Petitioner’s disqualification was premised on her having committed an act of “domestic violence.” See Section 435.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, authorizing disqualification for having "committed an act that constitutes domestic violence," without reference to having been formally charged with or convicted of "domestic violence." Petitioner testified that her disqualification has not to date affected her job status, but has resulted in her inability to care for children and for elderly or disabled patients. Unlike other mental health technicians, she is not allowed to care for certain patients, even on days when staff is short-handed and her help is needed. Petitioner is thus concerned that at some point her employer may decide to replace her with an employee who can be more flexibly assigned. Petitioner applied to Respondent for an exemption. A hearing was held by the Exemption Review Committee on December 16, 1997. The Exemption Review Committee recommended to the District Administrator that Petitioner be granted the requested exemption. After reviewing the record and the Exemption Review Committee’s recommendation, the District Administrator denied Petitioner’s request by letter dated February 18, 1998. In his letter, the District Administrator stated that the denial was due to the fact that Petitioner has not had sufficient opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, given the serious nature of the charges and her recent release from probation, and due to the fact that she falsified her Affidavit of Good Moral Character. Mr. Seibert testified that other factors considered by the District Administrator in denying the exemption were that Petitioner’s children were present during the incident, and the fact that Petitioner attempted serious bodily harm to her husband. Petitioner’s undisputed testimony was that the incident leading to her arrest was the only time in her life she had run afoul of the law. Petitioner forthrightly described the circumstances. One of her two children was in the hospital. She had just learned she was pregnant with her third child. Then, she found out that her husband had been having an affair with her sister. She chased him with a wooden club, which he managed to wrest away from her. She punched him, then went after him armed with a brick. When she couldn’t get to him, she threw bricks at his truck. According to the arrest report, no one was injured during the incident. Petitioner testified that she and her husband have reconciled and currently live together, with their three children. They have received marriage counseling. Petitioner completed her 12-month probation period without incident. Without excusing the actions of Petitioner or minimizing the seriousness of the charges against her, it is found that the District Administrator took insufficient notice of the circumstances surrounding the criminal incident, particularly that this was the only such incident in which Petitioner has ever been involved, that the victim was not a minor, that Petitioner's children were too young to suffer any lasting effects from their presence during the incident, and that no one was injured in the incident. Mr. Seibert testified that the District Administrator applies a policy that one year should pass after completion of probation before an applicant can be said to have had a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation. Respondent made no demonstration that there is a basis for this policy in statute or rule, or that Petitioner received notice of this policy prior to petitioning for exemption. However, even assuming the policy is valid, Petitioner’s probation had been completed for eleven months at the time of hearing in this matter, substantially complying with the District Administrator’s nonrule policy. The Affidavit of Good Moral Character, which Petitioner is alleged to have falsified, contains the following language: By signing this form, I am swearing that I have not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), regardless of the adjudication, to any of the following charges under the provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction. I also attest that I do not have a delinquency record that is similar to any of these offenses. I understand I must acknowledge the existence of any criminal records relating to the following list regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged. I understand that I am also obligated to notify my employer of any possible disqualifying offenses that may occur while employed in a position subject to background screening under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. The affidavit goes on to list the offenses found in Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes. Respondent contends that Petitioner failed to disclose her adjudication for battery, a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. However, both Section 435.04(2)(h), Florida Statutes, and the Affidavit of Good Character itself limit the consideration of battery to situations in which the victim of the offense was a minor. The victim of Respondent’s battery was her husband. The court records entered into evidence by Respondent do not indicate the age of Petitioner’s husband. However, the arrest report does indicate that Petitioner was 22 years old at the time of her arrest, and had been married to her husband for two years at the time of the incident. The couple had two small children at the time of Petitioner’s arrest. It is presumed that the victim of Petitioner’s offense was an adult. Respondent presented no evidence that would lead to a finding that the victim was a minor. Petitioner was under no obligation to acknowledge criminal records regarding violations of Section 741.28, Florida Statutes, relating to domestic violence, because Petitioner was never charged with or convicted of a violation of that statute. Petitioner testified that she thought she was not required to acknowledge her battery adjudication because of her mistaken belief that “adjudication withheld” was tantamount to expungement of her record. Petitioner was mistaken as to the legal effect of her adjudication, but is credited with having no intent to falsify her Affidavit of Good Character. In any event, Petitioner’s motive is irrelevant because the plain language of the statute and the affidavit relieved Petitioner of any duty to report the battery. It is found that Petitioner did not falsify her Affidavit of Good Character.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order granting Petitioner an exemption to work in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Johanna Burkes, pro se 9702 Eldridge Road Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Frank H. Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
