Findings Of Fact Sundial is a limited partnership authorized to do business in the State of Florida and is a developer and builder of a condominium complex known as Sundial of Sanabel. In order to provide the purchasers of the condominium units with a means of renting their units when the units were not occupied by the owners, a second limited partnership was formed, Sundial Rental Partners Ltd., in which Sundial is the general partner and each of the condominium owners are limited partners. On August 1, 1973, a management agreement was entered into between Sundial Rental Partners Ltd. (hereafter Rental Partners) and Sundial whereby Sundial agreed to provide management services in connection with the operation of the condominium units as rental accommodations. The terms of this agreement provided that Sundial would be compensated for its management services in the amount of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenue of the rental partners. On April 7, 1973, an Additional Facilities Lease Agreement was entered into between Sundial and Rental Partners. By this agreement, Sundial leased to Rental Partners additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial and used by the condominium unit owners, the persons who rent the condominium units from the Rental Partners and their guests. Compensation to Sundial is set forth in paragraph 3 of the agreement: Sundial Associates shall be paid an annual rental fee for the additional facilities equal to fifteen percent of the gross revenues of the Rental Partnership. Sun- dial Associates shall operate the additional facilities for its own account. All incom- ing profits shall inure to its benefit and the rental partnership shall have no interest in such incoming profits. The limited partnership agreement between Sundial and Rental Partners was amended on August 6, 1974. Paragraph 5.1 of the Amended Agreement provides that a total of five percent (5 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial for its management services and that fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership shall be paid to Sundial as rental payments for those additional facilities to be constructed by Sundial Paragraph 6.1 provides for a management deed to be paid to Sundial in the amount of four percent (4 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership and paragraph 6.4 provides that the partnership shall lease from Sundial the additional facilities at the rate of fifteen percent (15 percent) of the gross revenues of the partnership. Paragraph 6.4 of the limited partnership agreement calls for the construction of additional facilities, the cost of which is to be some two million one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($2,150,000.00). During the tax period in question, the only facilities actually constructed were a lobby and registration area, the value of which is significantly less than the total value of the expected construction. Nonetheless, during the tax period in question, the Rental Partners have paid Sundial the full five percent (5 percent) management fee and the full fifteen percent (15 percent) rental payment. Sundial recorded receipt of these amounts in separate accounts in their financial records. Sundial received as income during the tax period in question, certain tennis court admission fees which DOR did not intend to include in its computation of the sales tax due from rental proceeds. Yet, the record reflects that the total of fifteen percent (15 percent) of gross sales was three hundred seventeen thousand three hundred ninety-three dollars and ninety-four cents ($317,393.94) while the total from tennis court admission fees was eighteen thousand four hundred ninety-seven dollars and sixty-seven cents ($18,497.67). The sum of these two figures is three hundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and sixty-one cents ($335,891.61) which, when multiplied by four percent (4 percent) equals thirteen thousand four hundred thirty-five dollars and sixty-six cents ($13,435.66). This is the exact amount of the tax assessed by DOR exclusive of interest and penalties. The assessment is in error to the extent that tennis court admission fees were included in the figure purporting to reflect gross receipts of rental fees.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced in this proceeding, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Sailfish Club of Florida, Inc. is a nonprofit Florida corporation which operates a 550-member private club in Palm Beach County, Florida. Its facilities include a swimming pool, large dining room, cocktail lounge, private dining rooms, card rooms and a marina with three docks and 62 slips. Petitioner's annual membership dues are $925 per member. The marina docks are constructed over 94,815 square feet of submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The wet slip space comprises 2,531 linear feet. Marina slips are available to members only and are rented at $39.69 per linear foot per year. Prior to March 10, 1970, it was the policy of the Board of Trustees to permit the use of sovereignty submerged lands without charging annual fees. At present, all docks, piers and other structures on sovereignty lands in existence prior to March 10, 1970, are "grandfathered" and are not subject to the current lease requirements until January 1, 1998. On March 10, 1970, the Board of Trustees adopted a new policy providing for the licensing of private interests desiring to occupy sovereignty lands in conjunction with the operation of marines, charter boat docks and other commercial mooring facilities. The licenses were to be issued upon payment of no less than two cents per square foot annually for sovereignty land severed from public use, and each license was to be renewable annually after receipt of the appropriate fee. On August 25, 1970, petitioner and the Board of Trustees entered into a license agreement whereby petitioner was permitted to construct, install and operate a marina and commercial dock facility upon sovereignty lands. Petitioner agreed to pay the Board two cents per square foot of the sovereignty lands occupied. Section 5 of the license agreement provided as follows: "This License shall be renewable annually if the Licensee has complied with all the terms and conditions of this License, including payment of the annual license fee. The license fee for renewal shall be no less than the original fee. The Board shall not increase the license fee by more than 10 percent in any one renewal term." Section 6 allows the licensee a 90-day grace period after expiration to renew the license. Most, if not all, license agreements entered into between 1970 and 1975 contain this language. In reliance upon that license agreement, petitioner expended some $205,000.00 for construction of docks and other facilities solely related to the marina function of the Club. Each year thereafter, beginning in August of 1971, petitioner renewed its license for a period of one year by tendering the license fee of two cents per square foot for the 94,815 square feet of submerged land occupied by the marina. From 1970 until 1980, petitioner paid annual license fees of $1,896.00. Beginning in 1980, the Department started increasing its annual marina license fee by ten percent, as permitted under the license agreement, and petitioner paid the increased annual fee. Around 1975, the Board of Trustees and DNR discontinued issuing licenses and shifted to leases for the use of sovereignty submerged lands. The form sovereignty submerged land lease agreement provided that "renewal of this lease is at the sole option of the Board of Trustees or its legally designated agent." Nevertheless, the Department continued to renew existing licenses upon the tender of the annual fees. By letter dated June 30, 1982, the DNR informed petitioner that its marina license fee would increase each year at the rate of ten percent, and suggested that petitioner may wish to convert its license into a five-year lease. Petitioner declined the suggestion and remitted its annual renewal fee for its license. In August of 1983, the petitioner paid to the DNR fees in the amount of $2,776.37 for its 1983-94 annual marina license. On August 1, 1983, the DNR adopted amendments to Chapter 16Q-21, Florida Administrative Code, which governs sovereignty submerged lands management. The amendment included in the list of activities for which a lease would be required "Existing licenses upon the date of expiration or renewal." Rule 16Q-21.05(1)(b)4, Florida Administrative Code. Marina leases were to be handled under the standard lease provisions, which include a term of up to 25 years "renewable at the option of the Board." Rule 16Q-21.08. The annual standard lease fee, as amended in August 1983, was to be computed at a statewide base rate of $0.065 per square foot, with an additional 20 percent of the lease fee to be charged for the first annual fee, and the per square foot base rate to be revised each year. Marinas open to the public on a first come, first serve basis were permitted a 30 percent discount per square foot per year. Rule 16Q-21.11(1), Florida Administrative Code (1983 Annual Supplement). By letter dated November 14, 1983 petitioner was informed by the DNR that due to the new rule amendments, specifically section 16Q-21.05(1)(b)4 which requires a lease for existing licenses upon the date of expiration or renewal, petitioner would need to obtain a sovereignty submerged land lease in order to continue to legally operate its facility. Petitioner was further informed that its license fee was current until August 25, 1984, and that it would be billed for the difference between the license fee and the new rate required under the lease. The DNR warned petitioner that if it did not receive petitioner's lease application within 90 days, it would assume petitioner no longer desired to maintain the legal use of the facility and would proceed under the removal of structures provisions of petitioner's license. Petitioner did not submit a lease application to the DNR. Had petitioner converted to a lease, the annual lease fee would have been $6,162.98, plus the 20 percent surcharge of $1,232.59 for the first year of the lease. A $200.00 processing fee would also have been required. In the February 24, 1984 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (Vol. 10, No.8), the DNR gave notice of its intent to amend Rule 16Q-21.11 relating to standard annual lease fees. The purpose of the amendment is "to establish a framework for more equitable compensation to the Board of Trustees. . for exclusionary uses of state-owned submerged lands." While the prior rule provided for an annual lease fee computed at a statewide base rate of $0.065 per square foot, the amendment establishes a new formula of seven percent of the "total potential annual revenues from the wet slip rental area or the base fee, whichever is greater." The total potential revenues are to be calculated "by multiplying the total number of linear feet for rent in the wet slip rental area times the weighted average monthly per linear foot rental times 12. The weighted average per linear foot rental will be derived from the monthly rates (seasonal rates included). Any ancillary charges, such as membership fees, dues, or miscellaneous fees which are required to rent a wet slip, shall also be proportionately factored into the average monthly rate." Rule 16Q-21.11(1)(a)1. The proposed rule provides that the monthly rental rates used to determine the weighted average will be derived for posted price sheets or other information from the previous year certified as true and correct by the lessee. The calculated rate is to be reviewed and adjusted annually on the anniversary date of the lease. A full copy of the challenged proposed rule is attached to this Order. In early 1982, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, appointed a "Blue Ribbon Marina Committee" to review Florida's marina policies and to develop a policy to establish a new formula for submerged land lease fees. The 14-member Committee included representatives of county government, a regional planning agency, environmental interests, marine industries, marina owners, general citizenry, boating interests and developmental interests. The Director of the Florida Sea Grant College Program, Dr. James Cato, served as the Committee's Chairman, and designated DNR personnel served as its staff. After meeting monthly from May through October and holding seven public workshops, the Blue Ribbon Marina Committee issued its final report in January of 1983. It was the final recommendation of the Committee that while there should be some differential charges (i.e., for activities in aquatic preserves, between revenue generating, income related uses and non-revenue generating, non-income related uses), the differential should not be geographic and the method for determining lease fees should be a simple statewide base rate. The committee recommended a base rate of 5 cents per square foot per year, with capped increases tied to the Consumer Price Index. The Blue Ribbon Marina Committee's recommendations were not accepted by the Board of Trustees. Instead, an interagency task force comprised of the Executive Directors of the DNR, the Department of Revenue and the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting, plus staff, was formed to report back to the Board of Trustees with recommendations on fee structures. Without holding any public meetings or listening to witnesses, this task force originated the lease fee formula found in the proposed rule. The task force elected to utilize the "total potential annual revenues from the wet slip rental area" as the basis for its 7 percent formula, in lieu of a percentage of pure gross revenue approach, primarily to avoid auditing problems. It was believed that it would be too difficult to separate out revenues received from grandfathered structures or other facilities not related strictly to wet slip rentals. In effect, total potential annual revenues were assumed to be identical to actual gross revenues. The Economic Impact Statement (EIS) prepared for the proposed amendments to Rule 16Q-21.11 estimates in detail the cost to the DNR to implement the new lease fee formula. In estimating the costs to those persons directly affected by the proposed rule, the EIS generally notes that there will be an increase in fees for certain existing and new lessees, makes a broad generalized estimate of an average increase of $378.00 per lease and recognizes that the exact individual lease fee increase will vary greatly among lessees. The EIS notes that increased costs to the boating public utilizing marina facilities could be anticipated. Finding that lease fees based on five to twelve percent of gross revenues are economically viable, the EIS concludes that the proposed rates are economically feasible. The EIS contains no estimate of the effect of the proposed rule upon competition within the marina industry. It is noted in the EIS that submerged land leasing practices utilized in other states were reviewed and a comparison of those practices is attached to the EIS. Of the eleven states reviewed, none utilized a percentage of potential revenue approach. Other practices included lease fee structures based upon appraised market value of the adjacent upland, percentages of actual gross revenues, uniform base rates per square foot and flat permit charges. In Florida, there are considerable variations among commercial marines as to rental fees charged for wet slips, the level of services provided, utilization or occupancy rates, services and amenities located on the upland property and costs of operation, taxes, insurance and utilities. Wet slip rental rates are generally based not only upon the value of the submerged land in terms of its location, convenience and access to recreational waterbodies. Rental rates also take into consideration the value of the upland property in terms of its geographic advantages, the value of the improvements to the upland property and amenities available thereon, and the value of the improvements to the submerged land in terms of the structures and services offered, as well as the costs of operation of the docking facility. The slip rental fees are also dependent upon whether the particular marina is financially supported entirely by wet slip rentals or whether other services, such as repair and maintenance fees, fuel charges, charges for dry storage, or even upland facilities and activities comprise the bulk of its revenues. It is thus possible for two adjacent marinas or docking facilities which occupy the exact same amount of sovereignty submerged land to have a wide variance in the fees charged for wet slip rentals. Under the proposed total potential revenue formula lease fees per linear foot may vary from marina to marina in the same geographic location, depending upon the weighted average per linear foot of slip rental charged by each marina in the preceding year.
Findings Of Fact In late December, 1991, the Department decided to seek space for a move of its regional toll operations office currently located in Lake Worth, Florida. This office provides administrative support for toll personnel and the distribution of supplies and maintenance equipment for the nine toll plazas between Ft. Pierce and Lantana. This move was sought because the Department had outgrown its current office and concurrently therewith, a decision was made to seek a more centralized location to better service the existing and two additional toll plazas sought. Under the existing procedures before letting any lease the Department must seek and receive approval of the Department of General Services, (DGS), leasing office for the proposal. Consistent therewith, a letter of agency staffing was prepared to justify the amount of space the office would need. DGS approved the Department's request for the lease on December 27, 1991, and assigned lease No. 550:0234 to the procurement action. By that approval, the Department was authorized to begin soliciting quotes for the lease of 2,985 square feet of office space. Since the proposed lease was for less than 3,000 square feet, under existing DGS rules the procurement did not have to be competitively bid. The Department's request to DGS sought office space in either Jupiter or Palm Beach Gardens and described the requirement for the property as being centrally located on Florida's Turnpike between the Ft. Pierce and Lantana plazas. Six prospective landlords submitted quotes for this space. They were Worth Realty and Management Co. Inc.; Cascio Real Estate, Inc.; Elizabethan Interiors; Petitioner, Kohno Corporation, USA; Deitz Realty Company; and Paramount Real Estate Services, Inc. Several of the quotes submitted by other than Petitioner, Deitz Realty and Paramount Realty, were rejected right away for various reasons. The Worth Realty quote was rejected because the proposed location, (Lake Worth), the current location, did not meet the basic geographic criteria specified by the Department, and in addition, the future status of the building was uncertain because the owners had recently declared bankruptcy. Cascio Real Estate's bid required a $2,000.00 non-refundable deposit just to hold the space until a lease was signed, which the Department was not authorized to post, and Elizabethan's space was eliminated because it had been leased prior to the Department evaluation. This left three quotes for consideration - those of Petitioner, Deitz and Paramount. These three quotes were evaluated on the basis of the criteria, equally applied to all, which was specified by the Department's regional office in conjunction with its lease coordinator. Review revealed that Petitioner offered 2,925 square feet of space on the second floor of its building. The Department was seeking 2,985 square feet of space and any space for future growth over Petitioner's initial offering of 2,925 square feet would have been on a different floor, losing the contiguity of the office. The Department also preferred ground floor space for ease of access for the numerous deliveries and pick ups of supplies which takes place at the regional office as well as for the convenience of the many visitors to the office. Petitioner claims the distance from its parking area to its proposed office was minimal and serviced by elevator, but the Department's preference is still valid. In addition, the space offered by Petitioner included a private balcony and a private bathroom in that area which would be designated as the regional manager's office. This type of accommodation is considered inappropriate for state offices. In addition, Petitioner's space was not already built out and would have required some remodeling to be usable by the Department. The Director of the toll facilities office, who had the ultimate authority to select the best quote, rejected Petitioner's submittal as non- responsive because it contained 60 feet less than the 2,985 square feet called for. This 60 square feet, however, is well within the 3% leeway which Ms. Goodman indicated was the standard for determining the responsiveness of an offer. Notwithstanding the fact that the square footage was within acceptable parameters, this does not necessarily mean the evaluator had to consider it as functionally acceptable, and he did not. In addition, he considered the second story location and the unacceptable private bath and balcony as adverse factors. Petitioner's space was offered at $15.85 per square foot for the first year of a six year lease with an increase of 5% per year over the term of the lease. Deitz Realty's property was quoted at $22.65 per square foot for the first year of the least with a 4% increase per year over the term of the lease. Paramount's property in the Sun Bank Building was also offered at $22.65 per square foot with the same increase as Deitz. Petitioner's offer would have saved in excess of $100,000.00 over the term of the lease. Price, however, was not the primary consideration when the various quotes were evaluated. More important was the operational need of the regional office, and therefore, the Department did not attempt to negotiate a lower price with any of the offerors even though it was entitled to do so under DGS's interpretation of the controlling leasing procedures. Instead, the Department considered of higher priority the ground floor location; the location closer to a Turnpike entrance; the potential for growth and where that growth would be located; and whether the space offered was ready for occupancy or would require modification. Based on all those considerations, the Department determined that the space proposed in Fairway Center, at $22.65 per square foot was more desirable and better suited to its needs than that offered by Petitioner at a lower price. However, because of correspondence received from the Petitioner, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation ordered an internal audit of the lease process utilized here. As a part of that audit, the auditor interviewed the personnel who had participated in the lease process both at the Department and at DGS; reviewed the statutes and both Department's rules and procedures relevant to this procurement; and reviewed the lease proposals. The report of this audit, accomplished according to normal Departmental procedure, indicated that only two of the six quotes received were responsive - those of Petitioner and Elizabethan Interiors, whose property had already been leased prior to evaluation. The other four offers were determined to be non-responsive either because the price exceeded the maximum rate allowed or for being outside the defined geographic area even though the Governor and Cabinet could approve an exception. This included Fairway Center. The audit report also concluded that in conducting this procurement, the Department had complied with normal leasing procedures and guidelines for this type of procurement. The report thereafter recommended that because of the above, it was in the best interests of the state to begin to re-solicit offers for this procurement, and also recommended that all offers already received be rejected. It further recommended that in any future procurement the requisite criteria to be used be documented in advance even though the procedure for leases of under 3,000 square feet of property did not require such documentation. Department of Transportation procurement procedures require that at least three responsive quotes be forwarded to the Department of General Services for evaluation. In the instant case, the audit conducted at the behest of the Secretary established that only two responsive bids had been received. This situation req uired a re-bidding or a new solicitation and based on that determination, all bids, including Petitioner's, were rejected. Petitioner's protest was filed as a result of that rejection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Kohno Corporation, U.S.A., in regard to the Department's rejection of all offers in the procurement of lease No. 550:0234 for the Regional Toll Office of the Florida Turnpike Authority in Palm Beach County, Florida. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted but location was not the only basis for not choosing Petitioner's property. Accepted. Size alone was not the disqualifying factor. Rejected as an exercise in semantics. The Department made it very clear that it desired its office to be on a floor which provided direct access to the public and for deliveries without the necessity for the use of an elevator. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. - 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Randy Cropp Corporate Representative Kohno Corporation, U.S.A. 1615 Clare Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Respondent's correctional officer's certification should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Linda S. Linton was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 27, 1988, and was issued Certificate Number 11-87- 502-04. Respondent began her employment with the Department of Corrections as a Correctional Officer I at Calhoun Correctional Institution on May 27, 1988. She has continued in that position to the present. During her years with the Department, Ms. Linton received overall achieves performance standards ratings and has been rated as exceeding her standards in several specific categories. Her performance appraisals indicate that she excelled in the following areas: supervision of inmates in her area of responsibility; adherence to Department rules, regulations, policies and procedures; completion of all written reports and assignments in an accurate, concise and neat manner within specified time limits; maintenance of control of the inmate population through counseling and appropriate disciplinary actions; and completion of other related duties as assigned within specified time frames and according to supervisors' instructions. The comments of her supervisors indicate that Ms. Linton is considered to be a conscientious, dedicated, reliable and dependable employee. However, in 1990, she was suspended 120 days for the misdemeanor conviction which is the subject of this case. Other than the discipline imposed by the Department of Corrections, the misdemeanor conviction has not affected or impaired Respondent's ability to perform her duties as a correctional officer. The misdemeanor conviction in this case occurred after her licensure. However, the facts giving rise to the conviction occurred prior to her licensure as a correctional officer. Prior to her employment with the Department of Corrections, Ms. Linton worked as a clerk in the Post Office. The Post Office was located in the Fiesta Food Store at Mexico Beach, Florida. Beginning in early 1987, Ms. Linton's duties included assisting Janis Brownell, the senior clerk at the post office, in the postal unit, putting up mail, waiting on the postal window, operating the cash register, selling postage stamps and money orders to the public and accepting items for mailing. Isaac "Ike" Duren and his brother operated the Mexico Beach Branch Post Office for a monthly fee pursuant to a contract with the United States Postal Service. Mr. Duren also was and is a real estate broker. His brokerage office was located within a block of the Post Office. Ms. Linton had known the Duren family for approximately twenty years. She worked for Ike Duren's father at the convenience store for seven years prior to being hired by Ike Duren at the Post Office. Her pay was $2.35 per hour at the Post Office. While working full-time at the Post Office, Ms. Linton attended night school at Gulf Coast Community College for four hours a night, five nights a week. Ms. Linton attended school in order to obtain the necessary educational credentials to become certified as a correctional officer. On weekends, she practiced at the firing range to achieve the level of firearm proficiency required for certification. The Post Office generally maintained an inventory valued at around $5,000.00. The safe for the Post Office was located at the back of the area Mr. Duren provided for the Post Office. Those persons having access to the safe included Linton, Judy Hendricks, Janis Brownell, Ike Duren and his wife, as well as one or two employees of Duren's real estate office, Gulfaire Realty. On more than one occasion when she reported to work, Linton found that the safe had been left open overnight. The cash/stamp drawer containing stamps and money was located at the front of the Post Office. At night, the cash/stamp drawer was removed from the front of the Post Office and placed in the safe. The key to the drawer remained in the drawer during working hours. The drawer was never locked during either the day or night. The Post Office inventory was not audited when Linton began her employment. However, the inventory was apparently short at that time by about $50.00. It was common practice for Gulfaire Real Estate employees to take sheets or rolls of stamps from the Post Office and leave slips of paper in the drawer denoting the amount taken. On several occasions Ms. Linton saw two or three slips in the drawer. She had been advised to remove the slips if a postal inspector came to the Post Office. Janis Brownell handled the slips from the real estate office, ordered stamps and other supplies, and completed the daily worksheets. The daily worksheets showed the "running totals" of cash received and expended as well as inventory items received and sold to the public. These daily worksheets were sent to the Panama City Post Office. Either Judy Hendricks or Ms. Linton ordered inventory and completed the daily worksheets when Ms. Brownell could not. When Ms. Brownell could not be at the Post Office during regular working hours because of illness or death in her family, she would sometimes come in after hours to handle the ordering and accounting matters that Ms. Linton did not know how to do. Ms. Linton and Ms. Brownell discussed the shortage in the inventory/cash several times prior to late 1987 when Ms. Brownell performed an audit. The audit verified a shortage of approximately fifty dollars. Around Christmas time of 1987 Ms. Linton and Ms. Brownell discussed the possible need to notify the postal inspectors so that they could audit the post office. Ms. Linton does not know whether Ms. Brownell discussed the shortage with Mr. Duren. Ms. Linton did not tell Mr. Duren of the shortage at that time since it was Ms. Brownell's duty to inform Mr. Duren. Eventually, however, Mr. Duren became aware of the shortage in the Post Office. In February, 1988, at Duren's request, two postal inspectors audited the Mexico Beach Post Office. The audit revealed a shortage of $2,545.69 in the $5,000 inventory for which the contract unit was accountable. Upon questioning by the postal inspectors, Ms. Linton admitted that she had occasionally taken small amounts of money from postal funds in the cash/stamp drawer to purchase cokes or cookies at the convenience store. She believed such actions to be common practice and did not intend to steal any money since she intended to pay the money back when she left employment with Mr. Duren. She did not know the total amount she had taken. The postal inspectors prepared a statement for Linton to sign which estimated $600 as the amount of money she had taken. The postal inspectors told Ms. Linton that she could avoid prosecution if she made restitution for the total shortage and signed the statement they had prepared. She voluntarily signed a statement acknowledging that she had taken approximately $600.00 from the contract Post Office for her own use, without returning same. She told the inspectors as well as Mr. Duren that she had not taken the amount they estimated or the much larger total shortage of $2,545.69. However, she agreed to pay the entire amount of the shortage to Mr. Duren in order to put the matter behind her and move on to finishing her certification requirements. Ms. Linton agreed to the settlement as stated by the postal inspectors and signed papers which she thought satisfied all matters with the Postal Service. Both Respondent and Mr. Duren understood that if Respondent repaid the amount of the shortage ($2,545.69), the Postal Service would take no further legal action against her. As the postal contractor ultimately responsible for the postal contract, Mr. Duren immediately paid the Postal Service the entire amount of the shortage. Mr. Duren withheld Ms. Linton's last paycheck and applied it to the total she owed him of $2,545.69. Additionally, on March 21, 1988, Ms. Linton paid Mr. Duren $900.00 towards repayment of the shortage. Mr. Duren had kept in contact with the Postal Service "every so often" to inform them whether Ms. Linton had made full restitution. On May 19, 1988, a postal inspector came to Ms. Linton's house, showed her his badge identifying himself as a "Postal Inspector," and told her she had to pay full restitution that day or be taken to jail. She unsuccessfully attempted to borrow the amount of the shortage remaining unpaid. 1/ Ms. Linton could borrow only $1,000.00 from her brother-in-law Johnny D. Linton. Johnny D. Linton had borrowed the $1,000.00 on his signature at Northwest Finance in Port Saint Joe. Ms. Linton told the postal inspector that she had tried to obtain the entire amount she owed but could not get all of it. She gave the inspector the $1,000 and received a receipt for the payment. The postal inspector, who had apparently been in contact with Mr. Duren, told Linton she had to "work out something" with Mr. Duren for the remainder of the shortage. Following her conversation with the postal inspector, Ms. Linton drove to the real estate office to talk with Mr. Duren about the balance she owed after the $1,000.00 payment. The postal inspector, who drove in his own car, arrived at the real estate office after Ms. Linton and gave Mr. Duren the $1,000.00 payment. Mr. Duren told Ms. Linton that the postal inspector was waiting for his acknowledgment that the matter of restitution had been settled. To settle the matter, Ms. Linton signed a promissory note in the amount of $1,161.50 that Mr. Duren had prepared. The amount of the promissory note was calculated by Mr. Duren and was purported to be the balance Linton owed on the $2,545.59 shortage, after she had paid her last paycheck and $1,900. Added to the shortage were Mr. Duren's attorney's fees. Again, the figures used by Mr. Duren, did not add up to the shortage amount plus a reasonable attorney's fee. In addition to the promissory note, Duren's attorney, Tom Gibson, had prepared a mortgage for Linton's signature. The mortgage referred to an "Exhibit A" where the property description would ordinarily have been. Exhibit A was either not attached to the mortgage or Respondent did not look at it when she signed the mortgage. Ms. Linton understood that the mortgage referred to the property on which her home was built, Lots 8, 9 and 12 in Bay View Heights. She also understood that the mortgage would not "have to come into effect" since she signed the promissory note. Unknown to Respondent, Exhibit A mortgaged Lots 8, 9 and 12; and Lots 7, 10 and 16, Block F, in Bay View Heights. All of Respondent's property was also owned by her husband as tenants by the entirety. Her husband did not sign the mortgage and the mortgage was invalid as a lien against the property and particularly invalid against the homestead property. 2/ Ms. Linton owned no property apart from the property she and her husband owned jointly. Mr. Duren knew Ms. Linton was married, knew her husband, knew where their home was built, and knew the approximate value of lots in Bay View Heights. Mr. Duren was a real estate broker but did not obtain the husband's signature or verify in any way that the husband's signature was not needed on the mortgage he obtained from Respondent. 3/ Ms. Linton and her husband had purchased Lot 16, Block F from Quality Services, Inc., in Marianna under an agreement for deed and were making monthly payments on the Lot. Lot 7, Block F had two $35,000 mortgages on it, one to AVCO Financial Services and the other to Citizens Federal. Lot 10, Block F had no mortgage on it. The Lintons built a house in 1986 on Lots 8, 9 and 12 to replace their house that had burned in 1985. On November 24, 1987, the new house was appraised at $100,000. They attempted to mortgage the house and property to AVCO Financial Services for $35,000. However, the mortgage was mistakenly placed on Lot 7. Subsequently, Citizens Federal repeated the AVCO mistake and placed a second mortgage for $35,000 on Lot 7 instead of on Lots 8, 9 and 12, as intended. The mistakes on lot identification were not discovered by the Lintons, AVCO or Citizens Federal until AVCO started to foreclose its mortgage. In an effort to clear title and place AVCO in the position it should have been in if the property description in AVCO's mortgage had been correct, the Lintons executed a quit claim deed on their home and lots 8, 9 and 12 on September 1, 1988, in lieu of foreclosure and corrected the prior mortgage error on Lot 7. On September 28, 1988, the Lintons deeded Lot 16 back to Quality Service in lieu of foreclosure. In connection with returning Lot 16 to the original owner, Respondent signed an Affidavit under oath, attesting that no mortgage or lien existed against Lot 16. At the time she signed the affidavit she believed there was no mortgage or lien existing on the property. Moreover, apart from her belief, Mr. Duren's mortgage was invalid as either a mortgage or a lien. Both legally and factually there was no mortgage or lien in existence on Lot 16 and Respondent is not guilty of any false statement or perjury. Therefore, the portions of the Administrative Complaint and amended Administrative Complaint relating to this affidavit should be dismissed. Ms. Linton had a number of financial difficulties and was unable to pay the $1,161.50 balance to Mr. Duren promptly. Mr. Duren wrote the postal inspector to encourage the Postal Service to criminally prosecute Ms. Linton and filed civil suit on the note against Ms. Linton. The civil suit resulted in a default judgment. Mr. Duren then wrote the superintendent at Calhoun Correctional Institution to tell him "what kind of employee he had" and to see if the superintendent would get Ms. Linton to make monthly payments on the default judgment he had obtained. On December 20, 1988, the Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Ms. Linton with knowingly converting to her own use public funds entrusted to the United States Postal System of a value in excess of $100.00 in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 641. Pursuant to this indictment, the federal court issued a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Linton was unaware of either the indictment or the warrant for her arrest until the United States Marshall's Office telephoned her and notified her that it had a felony warrant for her arrest. In response to this notice, Ms. Linton drove to Panama City to be arrested and was released. The following day Ms. Linton consulted her supervisor, Lieutenant Durham, and reported her arrest in a letter to the superintendent at Calhoun Correctional Institution. On June 29, 1989, the United States Attorney executed and filed an information that amended the charge against Ms. Linton to encompass a lesser period of time and a value of less than $100.00, thus, reducing the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. Linton pled guilty to the charge as amended without going to trial. The United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, convicted her of violating the misdemeanor provision of Title 18, Unite States Code, Section 641, suspended her sentence and placed her on probation for a period of three years. Linton has voluntarily continued to pay restitution even though that was not a term of her sentence. Linton notified the Department of the proceedings in her case as they occurred. The evidence was neither clear nor convincing that Respondent committed any felony offense against either the U.S. Postal Service or Mr. Duren. The evidence did demonstrate that Petitioner committed the misdemeanor offense of petty theft. However, even with this conviction, given the underlying facts of this case, the evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent lacked good moral character or is dishonest or unfair. In fact, the unrebutted evidence from her peers is that she possesses good moral character and should be allowed to continue as a correctional officer. The portions of the Administrative Complaint and amended Administrative Complaint relating to this misdemeanor conviction should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the amended Administrative Complaint filed against Linda S. Linton be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1991.
