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LAUREN, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 92-003612 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 18, 1992 Number: 92-003612 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1993

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation that was at all times material to the instant case (but is no longer) in the coin-operated machine business. It owned various amusement and game machines that were placed at different locations pursuant to agreements with the location operators. Most of these agreements were not reduced to writing. In those instances where there was a written agreement, a "Location Lease Agreement" form was used, with insertions made where appropriate in the spaces provided. The form indicated, among other things, that Petitioner was "in the business of leasing, renting, servicing, maintaining and repairing of coin-operated machines" and that the agreement was "for the placement, servicing and maintaining of certain coin-operated machines" in the location specified in the agreement. In the coin-operated machine trade, the custom was for the parties to an oral or written agreement for the placement of an amusement or game machine on the property of another to treat such an agreement as involving the location operator's rental of the machine owner's tangible personal property rather than the machine owner's rental of the location operator's real property. Petitioner and the location operators with whom it contracted followed this custom of the trade in their dealings with one another. They construed their agreements as involving the rental of Petitioner's tangible personal property by the location operators and acted accordingly. Petitioner collected from the location operators the sales tax due on such rentals and remitted the monies collected to Respondent. 1/ It engaged in this practice for approximately a decade without challenge by Respondent. In late 1990 and early 1991, Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's records. The audit covered the period from January 1, 1988, to September 30, 1990 (referred to herein as the "audit period"). Among the records reviewed were those agreements between Petitioner and location operators that were reduced to writing. Based upon their reading of these agreements, the auditors were of the view that the agreements into which Petitioner had entered were actually for the rental of the location operators' real property, not the rental of Petitioner's machines. They therefore concluded that Petitioner, as opposed to the location operators, should have paid sales tax and that Petitioner's purchase of machines and parts should not have been treated as tax exempt. The assessment which is the subject of this proceeding thereafter issued.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the assessment that is the subject of the instant proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of November, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 1992.

Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.044
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FAMILY ARCADE ALLIANCE vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 91-005338RP (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 23, 1991 Number: 91-005338RP Latest Update: Mar. 17, 1992

The Issue The issues are whether proposed rules 12-18.008, 12A-15.001 and 12A-1.044, Florida Administrative Code, are valid exercises of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The Parties The Family Arcade Alliance (Alliance) is a group composed primarily of businesses that operate amusement game machines in the State of Florida which are activated either by token or coin. The parties agree that the Alliance is a substantially affected person as that term is defined in Section 120.54(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), and has standing to maintain these proceedings. The Department of Revenue (Department) is the entity of state government charged with the administration of the revenue laws. The Tax and the Implementing Rules Except for the period the services tax was in force, no sales tax had been imposed on charges made for the use of coin-operated amusement machines before the enactment of Chapter 91-112, Laws of Florida, which became effective on July 1, 1991. The Act imposed a 6 percent sales tax on each taxable transaction. Coin-operated amusement machines found in Florida are typical of those machines throughout the United States. The charges for consumer use of the machines are multiples of twenty-five-cent coins, i.e., 25 cents, 50 cents, 75 cents, and one dollar. The sales tax is most often added to the sale price of goods, but it is not practicable for the sellers of all products or services to separately state and collect sales tax from consumers. For example, there is no convenient way separately to collect and account for the sales tax on items purchased from vending machines such as snacks or beverages, or from newspaper racks. For these types of items, a seller reduces the price of the object or service sold, so that the tax is included in the receipts in the vending machine, newspaper rack or here, the coin-operated amusement machine. There are subtleties in the administration of the sales tax which are rarely noticed. The sales tax due on the purchase of goods or services is calculated at the rate of 6 percent only where the purchase price is a round dollar amount. For that portion of the sales price which is less than a dollar, the statute imposes not a 6 percent tax, but rather a tax computed according to a specific statutory schedule: Amount above or below Sales tax whole dollar amount statutorily imposed 1-9 0 10-16 1 17-33 2 34-50 3 51-66 4 67-83 5 84-100 6 Section 212.12(9)(a) through (h), Florida Statutes (1991). In most transactions the effect of the schedule is negligible and the consumer never realizes that the tax rate is greater than 6 percent for the portion of the sales price that is not a round dollar amount. Where a very large percentage of sales come from transactions of less than a dollar, the statutory schedule for the imposition of the sales tax takes on a greater significance. For those transactions between 9 cents up to a dollar the schedule's effective tax rate is never below the nominal tax rate of 6 percent, and may be as high as 11.76 percent. For example, the 1 cent sales tax on a 10 cent transaction yields an effective tax rate of 10 percent, not 6 percent. Where it is impracticable for businesses in an industry to separately state the tax for each sale, the statutes permit sellers (who are called "dealers" in the language of the statute) to file their tax returns on a gross receipts basis. Rather than add the amount of the tax to each transaction, taxes are presumed to be included in all the transactions and the dealer calculates the tax based on his gross receipts by using the effective tax rate promulgated by the Department in a rule. See Section 212.07(2), Florida Statutes (1991). Businesses also have the option to prove to the Department that in their specific situation the tax due is actually lower than a rule's effective tax rate for the industry, but those businesses must demonstrate the accuracy of their contentions that a lower tax is due. Applying the statutory tax schedule to sales prices which are typical in the amusement game machine industry (which are sometimes referred to as "price points") the following effective tax rates are generated at each price point: Total Sales Presumed Presumed Effective Price Selling Price Sales Tax Tax Rate 25 cents 23 cents 2 cents 8.7% 50 cents 47 cents 3 cents 6.38% 75 cents 70 cents 5 cents 7.14% $1.00 94 cents 6 cents 6.38% The determination of an effective tax rate for an industry as a whole also requires the identification of industry gross receipts from each of the price points. Once that effective tax rate is adopted as a rule, the Department treats dealers who pay tax using the effective tax rate as if they had remitted tax on each individual transaction. Proposed Rule 12A-1.044 establishes an industry-wide effective tax rate for monies inserted into coin-operated amusement machines or token dispensing machines of 7.81 percent. For counties with a one half or one percent surtax, the effective tax rates are 8.38 percent and 8.46 percent respectively. These rates include allowances for multiple plays, i.e., where the consumer deposits multiple coins to activate the machine. Proposed Rule 12A-1.044(1)(b) defines coin-operated amusement machines as: Any machine operated by coin, slug, token, coupon or similar device for the purpose of entertainment or amusement. Amusement machines include, but are not limited to, coin-operated radio and televisions, telescopes, pinball machines, music machines, juke boxes, mechanical games, video games, arcade games, billiard tables, moving picture viewers, shooting galleries, mechanical rides and all similar amusement devices. Proposed Rule 12-18.008 contained a definition of "coin-operated amusement machines" when the rule was first published which was essentially similar, but that rule's nonexclusive list of amusement machines did not include radios, televisions or telescopes. The Department has prepared a notice to be filed with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee conforming the definitions so they will be identical. The current differences found in the nonexclusive descriptive lists are so slight as to be inconsequential. The Petitioners have failed to prove any confusion or ambiguity resulting from the differences that would impede evenhanded enforcement of the rule. Proposed Rule 12A-15.011 did not contain a separate definition of coin-operated amusement machines. Owners of amusement machines do not always own locations on which to place them. Machine owners may go to landowners and lease the right to place their machines on the landowner's property. The transaction becomes a lease of real property or a license to use real property. Sometimes owners of locations suitable for the placement of amusement machines lease machines from machine owners. Those transactions become leases of tangible personal property. Both transactions are subject to sales tax after July 1, 1991. Proposed rules 12A- 1.044(9)(c), (d) and 10(a), (c) prescribe which party to the leases of real estate or personal property will be responsible to collect, report and remit the tax. Under subsection 9(d) of proposed rule 12A-1.044, sales tax will not be due on any payment made to an owner of an amusement machine by the owner of the location where that machine is placed if: a) the lease of tangible personalty is written, b) the lease was executed prior to July 1, 1991, and c) the machine involved was purchased by the lessor prior to July 1, 1991. The tax will be effective only upon the expiration or renewal of the written lease. Similarly, proposed 12A-1.044(10)(d) provides that sales tax will not be due on written agreements for the lease of locations to owners of amusement machines if: a) the agreement to rent the space to the machine owner is in writing, and b) was entered into before July 1, 1991. At the termination of the lease agreement, the transaction becomes taxable. Changes to the proposed rules The Department published changes to the proposed rule 12A-1.044(3)(e) on October 18, 1991, which prescribed additional bookkeeping requirements on any amusement machine operators who wished to avoid the effective tax rate established in the proposed rule, and demonstrate instead a lower effective tax rate for their machines. The significant portions of the amendments read: In order to substantiate a lower effective tax rate, an operator is required to maintain books and records which contain the following information: * * * b. For an amusement machine operator, a list identifying each machine by name and serial number, the cost per play on each machine, the total receipts from each machine and the date the receipts are removed from each machine. If an operator establishes a lower effective tax rate on a per vending or amusement machine basis, the operator must also establish an effective tax rate for any machine which produces a higher rate than that prescribed in this rule. Operators using an effective rate other than the applicable tax rate prescribed within this rule must recompute the rate on a monthly basis. (Exhibit 6, pg. 4-5) There was also a change noticed to subsection (e) of the proposed rule 12A-1.044, which reads: (e) For the purposes of this rule, possession of an amusement or vending machine means either actual or constructive possession and control. To determine if a person has constructive possession and control, the following indicia shall be considered: right of access to the machine; duty to repair; title to the machine; risk of loss from damages to the machine; and the party possessing the keys to the money box. If, based on the indicia set out above, the owner of the machine has constructive possession and control, but the location owner has physical possession of the machine, then the operator shall be determined by who has the key to the money box and is responsible for removing the receipts. If both the owner of the machine and the location owner have keys to the money box and are responsible for removing the receipts, then they shall designate in writing who shall be considered the operator. Absent such designation, the owner of the machine shall be deemed to be the operator. (Exhibit 6, pg. 1-2) The Amusement Game Machine Industry All operators must be aware of how much money an amusement machine produces in order to determine whether it should be replaced or rotated to another location when that is possible, for if games are not changed over time, patrons become bored and go elsewhere to play games on machines which are new to them. The sophistication with which operators track machine production varies. It is in the economic self interest of all operators to keep track of the revenues produced by each machine in some way. In general, amusement game machine businesses fall into one of three categories: free standing independent operators, route vendors, and mall operators. Free standing independent operators have game arcades located in detached buildings, and offer patrons the use of amusement machines much in the same way that bowling alleys are usually freestanding amusement businesses. Like bowling alleys, they are designed to be destinations to which patrons travel with the specific purpose of recreation or amusement. They are usually independent businesses, not franchises or chains. Route operators place machines individually or in small numbers at other businesses, such as bars or convenience stores. People who use the machines are usually at the location for some other purpose. Those games are maintained on a regular basis by an operator who travels a route from game location to game location. The route operator or the location owner may empty the machine's money box. Mall operators tend to be parts of large chains of amusement game operators who rent store space in regional shopping malls. The mall is the patron's destination, and the game parlor is just one of the stores in the mall. Amusement machines are operated by either coin or by token. About 75 percent of independent amusement game operators use coin-operated machines. About 75 percent of the large chain operators found in malls use tokens. The cost of converting a coin-activated amusement machine to a token-activated amusement machine is about thirty dollars per machine. The mechanism costs $10 to $12, the rest of the cost comes from labor. Token operators must buy an original supply of tokens and periodically replenish that supply. The use of tokens enhances security because it gives the operator better control over their cash and permits the operator to run "promotions," for example, offering 5 rather than 4 tokens for a dollar for a specific period in an attempt to increase traffic in the store. Depending on the number purchased, tokens cost operators between 5 and 10 cents each. Token-activated machines accept only tokens. Coin-operated machines only accept a single denomination of coin. Change machines generally accept quarters and one, five and ten dollar bills. A change machine may be used either to provide players with quarters, which can be used to activate coin- operated machines, or they can be filled with tokens rather than quarters, and become a token dispenser. In a token-operated amusement location, the only machines which contain money are the change machines used to dispense tokens. The game machines will contain only tokens. Token machines record the insertion of each coin and bill by an internal meter as a domination of coin or currency is inserted. Token dispensing machines record their receivables as follows: when one quarter is inserted, the machine records one transaction. When a fifty-cent piece is inserted, the machine records one transaction. When three quarters are inserted, the machine records three transactions. When a dollar bill is inserted, the machine records one transaction. When a five dollar bill is inserted, the machine records one transaction. When a ten dollar bill is inserted, the machine records one transaction. Token machine meters record separately for each domination the total number of times coins or currency of each domination are deposited in the machine. The internal meters of token dispensing machines do not distinguish between insertion of several coins or bills by one person and the insertion of singular coins or bills by several persons. Token dispensing machines cannot distinguish the insertion of four quarters by one person on a single occasion from the insertion of one quarter by each of four persons at four different times. Similarly, the internal meters of amusement machines activated by coin rather than by token do not distinguish between insertion of several coins or bills by one person and the insertion of single coins or bills by several persons. Machines which are coin-activated also do not distinguish between the insertion of four quarters by one person at one time or the insertion of one quarter by each of four persons at different times. Coin-operation has certain cost advantages. The operator avoids the cost of switching the machine from coin to token operation, for machines are manufactured to use coins, and avoids the cost of purchasing and replenishing a supply of tokens. The operator does not risk activation of his machine by tokens purchased at another arcade, which have no value to him, and can better take advantage of impulse spending. Coin-operated machines do not have a separate device for collecting tax and it is not possible for an operator to fit games with machinery to collect an additional two cents on a transaction initiated by depositing a quarter in a machine. There are alternative methods available to operators of amusement game machines to recapture the amount of the new sales tax they may otherwise absorb.1 One is to raise the price of games. This can be done either by setting the machines to produce a shorter play time, or to require more quarters or tokens to activate the machines. Raising the prices will not necessarily increase an operator's revenues, because customers of coin-operated amusement businesses usually have a set amount of money budgeted to spend and will stop playing when they have spent that money. In economic terms, consumer demand for amusement play is inelastic. Amusement businesses could also sell tokens over- the-counter, and collect sales tax as an additional charge, much as they would if they sold small foods items over the counter such as candy bars. Over-the- counter sales systems significantly increase labor costs. An amusement business open for 90 hours per week might well incur an additional $30,000-a-year in operating costs by switching to an over-the-counter token sales system. In a small coin-operated business, the operator often removes the receipts by emptying the contents of each machine into a larger cup or container, without counting the receipts from each machine separately because it is too time consuming to do so. But see Finding 17 above. With a token-operated business, the operator can determine the percentage of revenue derived from twenty-five cent transactions, as distinct from token sales initiated by the insertion of one, five or ten dollar bills into token dispensing machines. The proposed rule has the effect (although it is unintended) of placing the coin-operated amusement operators at a relative disadvantage in computing sales tax when compared to the token-operated businesses. Token operators can establish that they are responsible for paying a tax rate lower than the 7.81 percent effective rate set in the rule because many of their sales are for one dollar, five dollars or ten dollars. The smaller businesses using coin-operated machines do not have the technological capacity to demonstrate that customers are spending dollars rather than single quarters. Consequently, coin operators will have an incentive to shift to token sales rather than pay the proposed rule's higher effective tax rate if a large percentage of their patrons spend dollars rather than single quarters. For example, Mr. Scott Neslund is an owner of a small business which has 80 amusement machines at a freestanding token-operated location. He is atypical of small amusement game operators because 75 percent of them use coin-operated machines rather than token-operated machines. Mr. Neslund can demonstrate that 92 percent of his sales are for one dollar or more. By applying the tax rate of six percent to those transactions, he pays substantially less than the proposed rule's effective tax rate of 7.81 percent. This is very significant to Mr. Neslund because over the nine years from 1982 to 1990, his average profit margin was 7.77 percent. Although a flat 6 percent tax would have consumed 73 percent of that profit margin, if his businesses were on a coin-operated basis he would have been required to pay the proposed rule's 7.81 percent effective tax rate, which would have consumed 93 percent of his profit margin, leaving him with a very thin profit margin of 1/2 of 1 percent. The difference between a 1/2 of 1 percent profit margin and 2 percent profit margin, on a percentage basis, is a four hundred percent difference. Mr. Neslund's average profit annually had been $24,000. The effective tax rate of 7.81 percent would take $22,7000 of that amount, leaving an average annual profit of only $1,700. It is impossible to extrapolate from this single example and have confidence in the accuracy of the extrapolation, however. The Department's Effective Tax Rate Study There is no data for the amusement game industry specific to Florida concerning the number of transactions occurring at specified price points, but there is national data available which the Department considered. There is no reason to believe that the Florida amusement game industry is significantly different from the national industry. Nationally approximately 80 percent of all plays and 60 percent of all revenues come from single quarter (twenty-five- cent) plays. The Department's study used the typical sale prices charged in the industry and the categories of coin-operated amusement games reported in the national survey. Using them the Department derived an estimate of revenues by type of game for Florida. The effective tax rate the Department derived is the Department's best estimate of the price mix of transactions which occur through amusement machines. It is not itself an issue in this proceeding. Petitioners' counsel specifically agreed that they were not contesting the setting of the effective tax rate at 7.81 percent and presented no evidence that any other effective tax rate should have been set. The Department's Economic Impact Statement Dr. Brian McGavin of the Department prepared in July 1991 paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the economic impact statement for the proposed rules (Exhibits 14, 15 and 16), which concluded that proposed rules 12A-15.001, 12-18.008 and 12A- 1.044 would have no effect on small businesses. The economic impact statements for all three proposed rules contain identical information and involve the same issues concerning economic impact. Before drafting the economic impact statement published with these rules, Dr. McGavin had completed one other economic impact statement, had used a small manual which gave a general description of the process for developing economic impact statements and had discussed the process with another economist, Al Friesen, and his supervisor, Dr. James Francis, the Department's director of tax research. Dr. Francis prepares or reviews more than a dozen economic impact statements annually, and is well aware of the definition of small businesses found in Section 288.703(1), Florida Statutes. Dr. Francis reviewed Dr. McGavin's work and agreed with Dr. McGavin's conclusions. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the economic impact statements for these rules state: Estimated cost or economic benefits to persons directly affected by the proposed rule. The rule establishes effective tax rates for two categories of machines - 1) amusement machines, 2) vending machines. Amusement machines were not previously taxable (except during the Services tax period). * * * The costs of this rule are primarily compliance costs. The rules establishe several compliance provisions. quarterly sale and use tax reports. submission of supporting information for these reports on electronic media. affixation of registration certifi-cates to machines. presentation of certificates by operators to wholesale dealers. The filing requirement is obviously an integral and necessary part of the sales tax collection process . . . . The costs of complying will be borne by operators. If the operators have previously computerized their records, the marginal compliance costs will be negligible. For a small operator who has not computerized his operations, the costs of minimally configured PC systems - including software and training - would be roughly $2,000. This could be a major expense for a small operator . . . . We do not have data which will permit us to estimate the proportion of non-computerized operators in this industry. Effect of the proposed action on competition and on the open market for employment. * * * Given the low labor-intensity of this industry the overall effect should be very small. * * * 5. Impact of the proposed action on small business firms. Small business firms are not affected by the proposed action. (Exhibits 14, 15 and 16) The Petitioners demonstrated that before Dr. McGavin prepared the economic impact statement he did not read section 120.54 on rulemaking and he did not conduct any industry research or refer to any sources of information on the amusement game industry in Florida or nationally. He did not use any data to calculate or measure economic impact, consult text books, or refer to any outside sources or statistical information, nor did he talk with any industry experts or representatives. He did not obtain any information about the industry by distributing questionnaires to those in the industry, nor did he know whether there were differences in day-to-day operations between large and small amusement businesses or the different types of accounting and bookkeeping systems used by small businesses. He had not read Section 288.073, Florida Statutes, which defines a small business. He did not know the impact the 7.81 percent effective tax rate established by the rule would have on small business, and he did not analyze the cost difference businesses experienced between the sale of tokens by machine and the sale of tokens over-the-counter by an employee. To the extent it even entered into Dr. McGavin's thought process, Dr. McGavin made the general assumption that token sales would either be made over the counter, in which case the sales tax could be separately collected, or possibly by selling fewer tokens per unit of currency. When the Legislature enacted Chapter 91-112, Laws of Florida, and imposed the tax on the use of coin operated amusement machines, it did not provide for any phasing in of the tax, nor for any tiering of the tax based on the size of the taxpayers. Nothing in the language of the statute imposing the tax indicates that the Legislature believed that there was a distinction to be made in the taxation of larger and smaller businesses which provide the same service, viz, use of amusement machines. The Department does permit certain accommodations to businesses which have a small volume of sales. A business may report quarterly rather than monthly if its tax liability is less than $100 for the preceding quarter, and if the tax liability is less than $200 for the previous six months, a dealer may request semiannual reporting periods. Regardless of size, a business with more than one location in a county may file one return. Both of these provisions may lessen the burden of complying with the tax imposed on the use of coin-operated amusement machines. The Economic Impact Analysis Performed For The Challengers By Dr. Elton Scott Dr. Elton Scott is an economist and a professor at the Florida State University. The Petitioners engaged him to evaluate the economic impact statement the Department had prepared when these proposed rules were published. After conducting his own analysis, Dr. Scott wrote a report in which he determined that the Department's economic impact statement was deficient. According to Dr. Scott, one must understand an industry to determine whether an economic impact flows from a regulation and to determine the magnitude of any impact or the differential impact the regulation may have on large and small businesses. To prepare his own economic impact analysis, Dr. Scott first obtained information about the operational characteristics of the industry by speaking directly with a handful of industry members. He developed a questionnaire that tested the experience and background of operators so that he could evaluate the reliability or accuracy of information he received from them. He then asked additional questions about the operators' individual businesses and questions about differences between large and small operators within the industry. Dr. Scott's testimony outlines the factors which should be used to make an economic impact statement as useful as possible, but his testimony does not, and cannot, establish minimum standards for what an economic impact analysis should contain. Those factors are controlled by the Legislature, and no doubt the requirements imposed on agencies could be more onerous, and if faithfully followed could produce more useful economic impact statements. The economic impact small businesses will bear is caused by the statute, not by the implementing rule, with the possible exception of the electronic filing requirement, which has not been challenged in any of the three proceedings consolidated here. Large businesses have several advantages over smaller ones. Large businesses have sophisticated accounting systems, whether they use token or coin-operated machines, which allow tracking not only of gross receipts but kinds of plays, which enhance the operator's ability to establish that the tax due is lower than the effective tax rate, while the less sophisticated systems of metering receipts in coin-operated small businesses require reliance on the effective tax rates. (Exhibit 9 pg. 4) Large businesses may extend the useful life of a game machine by rotating the machine from one location to another, may deal directly with manufactures in purchasing a larger number of games or machines and therefore obtain more favorable discounts. Small businesses cannot rotate games if they have only one location, and purchase at higher prices from manufactures. In general, smaller businesses have lower profit margins than larger businesses. All of these advantages exist independently of any rule implementing the sales tax statute.

Florida Laws (10) 120.52120.54120.68212.02212.031212.05212.07212.12288.703689.01 Florida Administrative Code (5) 12-18.00812A-1.00412A-1.04412A-15.00112A-15.011
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. CHARLOTTE COUNTY LODGE NO. 2153 BPOE, T/A ELKS, 83-001931 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001931 Latest Update: Oct. 27, 1983

The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether Respondent's alcoholic beverage license should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for violations of Chapter 849, Florida Statutes, which prohibits gambling. At the formal hearing, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco called as witnesses Beverage Lieutenant Thomas Stout and Beverage Officer Stephen Tompkins. The Respondent called as witnesses Jack Bent, Wade Byington, Sam Fritz, Daniel Cronin, John Hengerle, Ward Hill, Earl Martel and Neal Mills. The Petitioner offered and had admitted seven exhibits and the Respondent offered and had admitted three exhibits. A drawing of the licensed premises as contained in the Division of Alcoholic Beverages official records was placed into evidence as Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the undersigned Hearing Officer. To the extent that these proposed findings and conclusions of law are inconsistent with the findings and conclusions herein they were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as being unsupported by the evidence or unnecessary to a resolution of this cause.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent held Beverage license No. 18-67, Series 11C issued to the licensed premises at 629 Tamiami Trail, N.W., Port Charlotte, Florida. Elks Lodge No. 2153 is a local chapter of the National Elks Lodge. It is a fraternal organization having 2,994 members in the local lodge. The licensed premises at 629 Tamiami Trail, N.W., is the club facility where the members hold meetings and also socialize together. The lodge building is a large building consisting of a lobby, lounge area with bar, kitchen, and large dining and meeting room. Additionally, there is a smaller room which is located behind the lounge area. This small room is called the "Stag Room" and is open to and used only by the local members of Elks Lodge No. 2153. No guests, wives, or nonmembers are allowed in the Stag Room. The Stag Room contains a pool table area, card table area with several tables, a shuffleboard court, a bar, and an area of tables for just lounging. The bar is tended by a bartender. The local lodge is governed by a Board of Governors which sets policy for the lodge and a Board of Trustees which is responsible for the financial matters and building and other physical assets of the lodge. The chief operating officer of the lodge is elected by the members and has the title of "Exalted Ruler." The manager of the club facility is hired by the Board of Governors. On January 27, 1983, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Beverage Officer Tompkins, of the Ft. Myers District, visited the licensed premises of the Respondent. His purpose was to investigate a complaint that the lodge had sold kegs of beer to another club. After speaking with the manager of the club facility, Officer Tompkins made a routine inspection of the licensed premises. As a part of his routine inspection, Officer Tompkins entered the Stag Room and first checked the bar area of that room. Behind the bar, he found a slip of paper (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) which reflected bets between unknown individuals on the Super Bowl game to be played within a few days between the Washington Redskins and the Miami Dolphins. The sheet was undated and unsigned and was laying in the open on a counter behind the bar. After checking the bar area, Officer Tompkins proceeded to inspect the contents of a cabinet located between the pool area and the card playing area. In that cabinet, Officer Tompkins found several items which he seized as evidence. In the top drawer of the cabinet, Officer Tompkins found three white pieces of paper, each appearing to be scoresheets for a game of some sort. On the first sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2-A) appears the first names of six individuals in columns with scores or running totals under each name. These totals consist of plus and minus numbers which after each round totaled zero. These numbers appear to represent amounts owed to and from each player and at the bottom of five of the columns is the entry "Pd." This sheet was used to keep track of winnings and losses in some type of game. No evidence was presented which identified the individuals named or the date the sheet was prepared. The second sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2b) contains several paired columns titled "We" and "They" at the top of each pair. These columns contained numbers which appear to be scores in some type of game. Some of these numbers contain decimal points, such as "14.67" which appear to represent dollar amounts. The third sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2c) is similar to Petitioner's Exhibit 2b, but does not contain decimal numbers or numbers that appear to represent dollar amounts. In that same drawer Officer Tompkins found three yellow envelopes with writing on the front of each envelope. The first envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3a) was empty and on the outside of the envelope was written "3 players." The second envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3b) also was empty and bears the notation "4 players." The third envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3c) bears the notation "tally sheets" and contained two sheets of paper that appear to be tally sheets for some type of game. In the same cabinet, but not in the drawer, Officer Tompkins found two paper bags bearing the business name "Quick Print." (Petitioner's Exhibits 4a and 4b). Each bag contained several hundred blank tally sheets. These sheets are similar to tally sheets used in card games such as bridge. These sheets were not purchased by the Respondent. Also in the same cabinet in Respondent's Stag Room, Officer Tompkins found a yellow folder, Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5, containing a typewritten rule book called "Eight Ball Tournament House Rules" dated August 23, 1982, with a notation that it was amended October 8, 1982. The rule book provides that "[e]xcept for the rules specified herein, the Official Book of Rules in the Stag Room will apply." The book further provides that the players' positions on the singles and doubles elimination sheets will be determined by lot. Also contained within the yellow folder, Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5, were original elimination sheets designed for tracking the players, drawn by lottery, through various levels of play in a pool tournament. These elimination sheets are titled "Elk's Lodge 2153 Pool Tourney." (See Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5). In that same cabinet in the Stag Room of Respondent's licensed premises Officer Tompkins found a manila envelope containing Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, a handwritten registration sheet titled Registration - 8 Ball Tournament 22 Jan 83 Doubles Fee: $3.00. This sheet contains four columns - two titled "Name" and two titled "Fee Paid." In the first column entitled Name are listed five names after which, in the Fee Paid column, is listed the amount of $3.00. This sheet further indicates that the listing was made as of 11 a.m. on 22 Jan 83 and that the money was refunded. Also found within that manila folder were "Guidelines for Coordinator on Day of Play." (See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7). Those guidelines provide that if less than 12 players sign up for the tournament, the tournament will be cancelled and the money refunded. Those guidelines further provide that, using the registration sheets, names will be drawn by use of numbered pills and given a position on the elimination sheet. The guidelines provide for prizes for first and second place winners in the doubles and for first, second and split third place winners in the singles. While play is underway, the coordinator is to calculate prize money by arriving at the "kitty" with $2.00 per player for the 12 to 15 players, then deduct $3.00 for the coordinator's services. The balance of the kitty would be divided with 45 percent going to the first place winner, 30 percent going to the second place winner, and 25 percent going to the third place winner to be split 50/50 between the two third place winners. A different method for calculating allocation of the kitty is provided for the doubles play. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7). Also contained within that folder found in the cabinet in the Stag Room of Respondent's licensed premises were copies of the original elimination sheets previously seen in Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5. The above described guidelines were prepared for a proposed pool tournament which did not take place. Sometime in the fall of 1982, the officers of the Respondent club became aware that a pool tournament was being planned. Upon learning of this, the Exalted Ruler, the chief presiding officer, cancelled the pool tournament and instructed those persons who were planning the tournament that such an event could not be held in the lodge. The Respondent has a policy against gambling on the lodge premises. Section 210 of the annotated statutes of the Grand Lodge of Elks prohibits gambling, in any and all forms, in any lodge room, club room or social parlor connected with a lodge. Failure to abide by a section of the annotated statutes can result in revocation of the local lodge's charter. The officers of Respondent were not aware of any gambling taking place on the lodge premises and after receiving notice from Officer Tompkins that he suspected gambling was occurring, the Lodge published an article in its monthly newsletter reminding its members of their duty to not gamble and to abide by the annotated statutes of the lodge. Petitioner presented no evidence that gambling had actually been observed by anyone on the licensed premises. No gambling had been observed by the officers or trustees of the lodge.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found not guilty of the charges alleged in the Notice to Show Cause and that such charges be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of October 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice G. Scott, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert M. Bader, Esquire 209 Conway Boulevard, N.E. Port Charlotte, Florida 33952 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (11) 561.29775.082775.083775.084849.01849.05849.07849.08849.09849.10849.25
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ROBBIE STADIUM CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 92-006935RP (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 19, 1992 Number: 92-006935RP Latest Update: Mar. 25, 1993

The Issue The issue for resolution in this case is whether Proposed Rules 8E- 4.003(3), (4), (9), (10) & (11) and Proposed Rule 8E-4.005 constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority as asserted by Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Findings based on written stipulations. On September 11, 1992, Petitioner submitted an application for certification as a "facility for a new professional sports franchise." Petitioner's application contains the information required by Section 288.1162(4)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes, but does not demonstrate that eligible costs for which funding is being sought pursuant to Section 212.20, Florida Statutes, are for costs incurred after the award of the new professional sports franchise or after the start of certification, as required in Proposed Rule 8E- 4.003(3). Due to the effect of the proposed rule on Petitioner, Petitioner is a "substantially affected person" as that term is used in Section 120.54(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Findings based on evidence at hearing. On October 30, 1992, the Department of Commerce published Proposed Rule 8E-4 in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Portions of that proposed rule are the subject of this rule challenge proceeding. The full text of the proposed rule (with the challenged portions underscored) is as follows: 8E-4.001 Purpose. This rule contains the procedure for applying for certification pursuant to s. 288.03, Florida Statutes. 8E-4.002 Application Procedures. An application for certification under s. 288.03, Florida Statutes, as a "Facility For A New Professional Sports Franchise" or a "New Spring Training Franchise Facility" shall be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and shall comply with and conform to the following requirements: An original and 5 copies shall be submitted. Applicants shall be a "unit of local government" as defined in s. 218.369, Florida Statutes, or a private sector group that has contracted to construct or operate a professional sports franchise facility on land owned by a unit of local government. The application must be signed by an official senior executive of the applicant. Items or forms requiring certification shall be notarized according to Florida Law providing for penalties for falsification. 8E-4.003 Application Contents. An application for certification as a Facility for New Professional Sports Franchises shall include the following: Documentation that the franchise team meets the following requirements: The franchise is not based in Florida prior to July 1, 1990. The applicant has a signed agreement with a new professional sports franchise for the use of the facility for at least 5 years or more. The new professional sports franchise agreement has been approved by one of the following leagues: National League (baseball) American League (baseball) National Basketball Association National Football League National Hockey League An independent analysis or study which demonstrates that the use and operation of the professional sports franchise facility will generate revenues on transactions at the facility of $2 million or more annually by taxes imposed under Part I of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Documentation of the actual cost or cost estimate for new construction, reconstruction, or renovation of the facility. Such documentation of cost shall be for construction, reconstruction, or renovation of the facility incurred or to be incurred after the award of the new professional sport franchise or after the start of certification. Eligible costs also include those incurred after July 1, 1990 and prior to the granting of a franchise where the costs were a necessary part of the competitive process for the awarded franchise. The applicant shall provide a commencement date upon which new construction, reconstruction, or renovation began or will begin. Projections demonstrating that the new franchise will attract a paid attendance of more than 300,000 annually. All data sources and methodologies of the projections must be included. Documentation that the municipality in which the facility is located, or the county if the facility is in an unincorporated area, has certified by resolution after a public hearing that the application serves a public purpose. Documentation that a unit of local government as defined in s. 218.369, Florida Statutes, is responsible for the construction, management, or operation of the professional sports franchise facility, or holds title to the property on which the professional sports franchise facility is located. Documentation that the applicant has demonstrated that it has provided, is capable of providing, or has a financial or other commitments to provide more than one-half of the costs incurred or related to the improvement and development of the facility. Statement certifying that applicant will comply with s. 288.1167, Florida Statutes, relating to requirements for minority participation. Documentation of the applicant's organization structure and principals. Applicants that are private sector groups shall file a public entity crime affidavit as required by s. 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes. 8E-4.004 Application Contents. An application for certification as a New Spring Training Franchise shall include the following: Documentation that the baseball team franchise meets the following requirements: The franchise is not based in Florida prior to July 1, 1990. The applicant has a signed agreement with a new professional sports franchise for the use of the facility for a term of at least 15 years. The agreement is approved by either the National League or the American League of professional baseball. Projections which demonstrate that the new professional baseball spring training facility will attract a paid attendance of at least 50,000 annually. Documentation of the actual cost or cost estimate for new construction, reconstruction, or renovation of the facility. Such documentation of cost shall be for construction, reconstruction, or renovation of the facility incurred or to be incurred after the grant of certification. Eligible costs also include those incurred after July 1, 1990 and prior to the granting of a franchise where the costs were a necessary part of the competitive process for the awarded franchise. The applicant shall provide a commencement date upon which new construction, reconstruction, or renovation began or will begin. Documentation that a unit of local government as defined in s. 218.369, Florida Statutes, is responsible for the construction, management, or operation of the professional sports franchise facility, or holds title to the property on which the professional sports franchise facility is located. Documentation that the applicant has demonstrated that it has provided, is capable of providing, or has financial or other commitments to provide more than one-half of the costs incurred or related to the improvement and development of the facility. Documentation that the New Spring Training Franchise Facility is located in a county that is levying a tourist development tax pursuant to s. 125.0104(3)(b),(c),(d) and (l), Florida Statutes, at the rate of 4 percent by March 1, 1992, and 87.5 percent of the proceeds from such tax are dedicated for the construction of a spring training complex. A site map and certification that the facility is located within 20 miles of an interstate or other limited access highway system. Statement certifying that applicant will comply with s. 288.1167, Florida Statutes, relating to requirement for minority participation. Documentation of the applicant's organization structure and principals. Applicants that are private sector groups shall file a public entity crime affidavit as required by s. 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes. 8E-4.005 Application Processing. The Department of Commerce shall certify applications only after these rules have been published in the Florida Administrative Weekly and all requested public hearings have been held. Subsequent to this, the Department shall have two weeks following receipt of an application to notify an applicant of any deficiencies in an application. The Department will allow 30 days from the date of notification for the applicant to correct any such deficiencies. Upon determining that an applicant is or is not certifiable, the Secretary of Commerce will notify the applicant by means of an official letter of his status. If certifiable, the Secretary will notify the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue of such certification by means of an official letter. If the Department of Commerce determines that the applicant satisfies all the conditions of Section 288.1162, F.S., and this rule, certification shall be issued by the Department of Commerce no sooner than, either the date of commencement as provided by the applicant in 8E-4.003(5) or 8E-4.004(5) or 120 days following receipt of application under this rule whichever is the longer. No certification shall be issued until the Department of Commerce has verified that actual construction, reconstruction, or renovation has commenced. The Department of Revenue will begin distributing funds 60 days following certification, but no such distribution may be made prior to July 1, 1992, pursuant to s. 288.03, Florida Statutes. If and when the above-quoted proposed rule becomes an effective rule, the Department of Commerce intends to apply the provisions of the subject proposed rule in the course of determining whether to grant or deny the Petitioner's application for certification as a "facility for a new professional sports franchise." The Department of Commerce intends for the language in Proposed Rule 8E-4.003(3) and (4) to limit funding under the applicable statute to new facility construction costs or to costs of renovation of an existing facility. The Department intends to disallow the use of grant funds for existing stadium construction costs, even if such costs were expended to facilitate the future recruitment of a "new professional sports franchise." The new requirements for certification contained in Proposed Rule 8E-4.003 are considered by the Department to be substantive in nature. The purpose of the funding program created pursuant to Sections 288.1162 and 212.20, Florida Statutes (1991), is to encourage the recruitment of professional sports franchises to Florida. During the 1992 session of the Florida Legislature, amendments were proposed to Section 288.1162, Florida Statutes (1991), which would have had the effect of limiting funding under the program to a reimbursement of costs of new construction. In Senate Bill 216-H, the Legislature proposed authorizing the Department to require that information be submitted regarding cost estimates verified by the Department for the new construction, reconstruction or renovation of the facility. This estimate shall include the costs of debt service on, or the costs to fund debt service reserve funds, costs for arbitrage rebate obligations, and other costs payable with respect to, bonds issued for the new construction, reconstruction or renovation of the facility. (e.s) The amendments proposed in Senate Bill 216-H would have eliminated as an approved use of the funds payment of costs of refinancing construction bonds and would have limited the use of funds only to newly incurred costs. In addition, the proposed bill provided that upon certification of an applicant, the Department shall also certify to the Department of Revenue the amount to be paid monthly to the applicant. In the case of a professional sports franchise facility, such amount shall be the lesser of $166,667 per month for a 30 year period, or the costs of the project verified by the Department pursuant to paragraph (4)(g) [which is the language cited directly above] and amortized over a 30 year period. The statutory limitation proposed by Senate Bill 216-H is consistent with, if not identical to, the limitation intended by the Department of Commerce through the promulgation of Proposed Rule 8E-4. Senate Bill 216-H failed to be enacted into law.

Florida Laws (12) 120.52120.54120.57120.60120.68125.0104212.20213.34218.369287.133288.1162288.1167
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES vs PORT MALABAR COUNTRY CLUB, INC., AND ROBERT L. MCDANIEL, 93-002230 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Apr. 21, 1993 Number: 93-002230 Latest Update: Feb. 04, 1994

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondents purchased and applied a restricted-use pesticide without a license and whether Respondents applied the pesticide in an improper manner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Port Malabar Country Club, is an unincorporated 18-hole golf course located in Palm Bay, Florida, owned and operated by Raysteff Corporation ("Raysteff"). Raysteff is a Florida Corporation, wholly owned by Mr. Robert Dolci. Respondent, Robert L. McDaniel, is the superintendent of golf course maintenance at Port Malabar Country Club and has held that position since 1985. On February 26, 1992, Respondent, McDaniel, purchased a 42 pound container of Kerb 50-W herbicide ("Kerb") from Harrell's Inc., located in Lakeland, Florida. Kerb contains chemicals that are classified as restricted- use pesticides by Petitioner. The labelling on the product's package contains the following warning: RESTRICTED USE PESTICIDE Because pronamide has produced tumors in laboratory animals, this product is for retail sale to and use only by Certified Applicators or persons under their direct supervision, and only for those uses covered by the Certified Applicator's certification. On February 26, 1992, neither Respondent, McDaniel, nor any other employee, officer, or agent of Raysteff held a valid applicator's license as required by Section 487.031(7), Florida Statutes. On March 4, 1992, Mr. Jason McDaniel was an employee of Raysteff and applied all Kerb to approximately three acres of the golf course. Respondent, McDaniel, supervised the application of the Kerb. Neither Respondent, McDaniel, nor any other employee, officer, or agent of Raysteff held a valid applicator's license at the time of the application. Respondent, McDaniel, had been licensed by Petitioner in 1975 and 1976 as a certified applicator. Mr. McDaniel's license expired on October 31, 1983. Mr. McDaniel took the examination required to obtain a new license after December 5, 1991. At the time he purchased and applied the Kerb, Mr. McDaniel had not been notified that he had passed the examination. Mr. McDaniel subsequently received his current license which expires sometime in 1996. The Kerb was applied properly around tees and greens on a sunny day with little wind. The treated area was not used by golfers until after the treated area was dry. The method of application did not expose either golfers or workers directly or by drift. The method of application complied with labeling precautions on the product. Neither package labeling, Petitioner's rules, nor Petitioner's policy establishes the amount of time needed for Kerb to dry. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to explicate its assertion that Respondents failed to determine that the Kerb was dry before allowing persons into the treated area. Evidence presented by Respondents was credible and persuasive. Respondents have no history of formal administrative disciplinary action for prior offenses. Respondent, McDaniel, properly applied the Kerb after taking the examination to obtain his license as a certified applicator and subsequently received that license. No harm was caused to any individual as a result of the application of the Kerb. There was no damage which would otherwise require expense to the state to rectify. Respondents did not benefit pecuniarily as a result of applying the Kerb prior to the time Mr. McDaniel received his license. However, Mr. McDaniel knew or should have known that he did not have his license when he purchased and applied the Kerb.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued denying Petitioner's claim of unlawful discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2230 Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. 1.-10. Accepted in substance 11.-12. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence Accepted in substance Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.-2. Accepted in substance Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Accepted in substance 5.-11. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial 12. Accepted in substance COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 John S. Koda, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Elting L. Storms, Esquire Post Office Box 1376 Melbourne, Florida 32902-1376 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (2) 120.57487.031
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AIRCRAFT TRADING CENTER, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 94-005085 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 14, 1994 Number: 94-005085 Latest Update: Jul. 30, 1996

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be assessed sales and use tax by Respondent, and if so, how much and what penalty, if any, should be assessed.

Findings Of Fact Aircraft Trading Center, Inc. (Petitioner), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, having its principal office at 17885 S.E. Federal Highway, Tequesta, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of purchasing aircraft for resale. During all times material hereto, Petitioner was registered as an aircraft dealer with the United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and registered as a retail dealer with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue (Respondent). The selling price of Petitioner's aircraft range from one million to twenty-five million dollars and helicopters from two hundred thousand to three million dollars. Normally, Petitioner purchases an aircraft, without having a confirmed buyer. Petitioner purchases an aircraft based upon in-house research which shows a likelihood that the aircraft can be resold at a profit. Petitioner's aircraft is demonstrated to potential buyers/customers. The customers require a demonstration to determine if the aircraft meets the particular needs of the customer. The demonstration could take one day or as long as two weeks. During the demonstration, the customer pays the expenses associated with flying the aircraft. Petitioner uses two methods to determine the costs of demonstration. In one method, the cost is determined from a reference source utilized in the industry to show the cost of operating a particular type of aircraft. In the other method, the customer pays Petitioner's actual out-of- pocket cost. No matter which method is used, the charges to the customers are listed as income on Petitioner's bookkeeping books and records, per the advice of Petitioner's certified public accounting (CPA) firm. Petitioner remains the owner of the aircraft during the demonstration and until the sale. Also, during demonstration, Petitioner maintains insurance coverage on the aircraft and is the loss payee. In an attempt to make sure "legitimate" customers are engaged in the demonstrations, Petitioner screens potential buyers to make sure that they have the resources to purchase one of Petitioner's aircraft. For sales to buyers/customers residing out-of-state, Petitioner utilizes a specific, but standard procedure. Such customers are provided a copy of the Florida Statute dealing with exempting the sale from Florida's sales tax if the aircraft is removed from the State of Florida within ten (10) days from the date of purchase. Florida sales tax is not collected from the buyer if the buyer executes an affidavit which states that the buyer has read the Florida Statute and that the buyer will remove the plane from Florida within ten (10) days after the sale or the completion of repairs and if the bill of sale shows an out-of-state address for the buyer. When an aircraft is sold, Petitioner's standard procedure is to prepare a purchase agreement and after receiving payment, Petitioner prepares a bill of sale. Petitioner sends the bill of sale to a title company in Oklahoma which handles all of Petitioner's title transfers. The title company records the bill of sale, registers the change of title with the FAA and sends Petitioner a copy of the title. For all sale transactions, Petitioner maintains a file which includes the affidavit, the bill of sale, and a copy of the title. Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period 2/1/87- 1/31/92 to determine if sales and use tax should be assessed against Petitioner. All records were provided by Petitioner. The audit resulted in an assessment of sales and use tax, penalty, and interest against Petitioner. Respondent assessed tax on the sale of a helicopter and on certain charges made by Petitioner to its customers as a result of demonstrations. Regarding the helicopter, Respondent assessed tax in the amount of $18,000.00 for the helicopter transaction. By invoice dated 7/10/89, Petitioner sold the helicopter to Outerscope, Inc., for $300,000.00. Outerscope was an out-of-state company. Petitioner used its standard procedure for the sale of aircraft and sales to nonresidents. Petitioner did not obtain proof that the helicopter was removed from the State of Florida, and Petitioner has no knowledge as to whether it was removed. As to the charges by Petitioner for demonstrations, Respondent assessed tax in the amount of $72,488.55. Respondent determined the tax by taking an amount equal to 1 percent of the listed value of the aircraft demonstrated and multiplying that number by 6 percent, the use tax rate. Respondent relied upon the records and representations provided by Petitioner's bookkeeper as to determining which aircraft were demonstrated, the value of the aircraft and the months in which the aircraft were demonstrated. Several transactions originally designated as demonstrations have been now determined by Petitioner's bookkeeper not to be demonstrations: The February 4, 1987 transaction with Ray Floyd. The July 10, 1988 transaction involving Trans Aircraft. The May 2 and 12, 1989 items for Stalupi/Bandit. The July 12, 1989 item involving Bond Corp. The July 18, 1989 item involving Seardel. The November 28, 1990 item involving J. P. Foods Service. Petitioner's CPA firm advises it regarding Florida's sales and use tax laws. At no time did the CPA firm advise Petitioner that its (Petitioner's) demonstrations were subject to sales and use tax and that it (Petitioner) was required to obtain proof that an aircraft had been removed from the State of Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing sales and use tax for the period 2/1/87 - 1/31/92 against Aircraft Trading Center, Inc., consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of July 1995. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July 1995. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Rejected as subordinate. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 14. Rejected as subordinate. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9. 12 and 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 14. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 16. Respondent Partially accepted in findings of fact 11 and 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Also, see Conclusion of Law 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 7 and 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10 and 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 13-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. NOTE: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the more credible evidence, argument, or conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert O. Rogers, Esquire Rogers, Bowers, Dempsey & Paladeno 505 South Flagler Drive, Suite 1330 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Lealand L. McCharen Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (9) 120.56120.57120.68212.02212.05212.12213.35253.69601.05 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.007
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OTHER SIDE SOD, LLC vs C. FULLERTON AND LANDSCAPING CO., INC., AND GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE GROUP, AS SURETY, 17-003275 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Jun. 07, 2017 Number: 17-003275 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2018

The Issue Whether C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., is indebted to Other Side Sod, LLC, for the purchase of sod and pallets; and, if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Arcadia, Florida, and at all times relevant hereto was a producer of agricultural products, as defined by section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is also a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). Respondent, during all times relevant hereto, was a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Great American served as surety for Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a customer of Other Side Sod. Respondent purchased sod from Petitioner and thereafter resold and installed the sod to Respondent’s customers. Petitioner sold sod to its customers on wooden pallets. An integral part of each transaction involved the pallets. There are 10 invoices in dispute which cover the period October 14, 2016, through February 10, 2017. For the underlying transactions that relate to the invoices in question, the following language is contained on each field/delivery ticket: Terms of Sale: Payment due upon receipt. All payment[s] applied to pallet balance first. Interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month will be charged on unpaid invoice amounts after 14 days. Invoices will be charged $0.02 per square foot additional after 30 days. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorney fees, in [the] event it is necessary to institute suit for collection. Venue will be in DeSoto County, Florida. All Sales F.O.B. Shipping Point. On or about October 14, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47293, which showed a balance due of $462 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 83,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,664). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $124.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,664 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 23, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47378, which showed a balance due of $224 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 70,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,408). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $105.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,408 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 24, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47420, which showed a balance due of $280 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 16,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($320). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $24 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($320 x 7.50 percent). On or about November 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47549, which showed a balance due of $1,526 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 103,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($2,064). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $154.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($2,064 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 6, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47755, which showed a balance due of $434 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 30,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($608). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $45.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($608 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 8, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48093, which showed a balance due of $1,256 for 12,800 units of Bahia sod, $224 for a pallet deposit, and $72 for sales tax. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 12,800 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($256). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $19.20 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($256 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48166, which showed a balance due of $343 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 163,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($3,264). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $244.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($3,264 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 29, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48285, which showed a balance due of $3,000 for 40,000 units of Bahia sod, $308 for a pallet deposit, and $225 for sales tax (total = $3,533). On February 3, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $3,210.50, which left an unpaid balance of $322.50. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 40,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($800). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($800 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 31, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48301, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $91 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $510.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $468.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92.1/ The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent). On or about February 10, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48409, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $21 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $440.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $398.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Other Side Sod, LLC, against C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., in the amount of $4,981.34. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569210.50604.15604.21604.347.50
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FLORIDA SUNSHINE PARKWAY CITRUS, INC., ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 83-000198 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000198 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 1983

The Issue Whether Petitioners' request to negotiate or competitively bid for a concession for amusement devices at service areas on the Florida Turnpike should be granted, pursuant to Section 340.091, Florida Statutes. This proceeding arose as a result of Respondent Department of Transportation's denial of the request of Petitioners Florida Sunshine Parkway Citrus, Inc. and Joe A. Chambliss to negotiate or competitively bid for a concession to install and operate video amusement machines at the various service plazas of the Florida Turnpike. Sunshine Parkway Restaurants, Inc. petitioned for leave to intervene in the proceedings and was granted status as an intervenor. Posthearing submissions by the parties in the form of proposed recommended orders have been fully considered, and those portions thereof not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, irrelevant, or unsupported in law or fact.

Findings Of Fact On June 1, 1982, Petitioner Florida Sunshine Parkway Citrus, Inc. entered into two agreements with Respondent Department of Transportation under which Petitioner was granted a five-year license to manage and operate the citrus products shops located at the Pompano and Fort Pierce service plazas on the Florida Turnpike, pursuant to Section 340.091, Florida Statutes. The agreements provided that the shops would be used for the sale of products "relating to Florida citrus and/or goods promoting the State of Florida, including but not limited to all Florida products and tropical juices." Petitioner was awarded the contracts as a result of a competitive bidding process. Petitioner Joe A. Chambliss is the president of Florida Sunshine Parkway Citrus, Inc. Chambliss also is a sub-lessee of two Texaco Service Stations at the Fort Pierce and Snapper Creek service plazas. (Testimony of Chambliss; Respondent's Exhibits 10-19, Joint Exhibit 1 (Stipulation)) On November 29, 1978, Respondent entered into an agreement with Intervenor Gladieux Food Services, Inc. and Canteen Corporation (Gladieux) whereby Respondent leased certain portions of buildings at eight service plazas on the Sunshine State Parkway (Florida Turnpike) for a period of ten years to operate and manage food and related facilities at the leased premises. Sunshine Parkway Restaurants, Inc. is a joint venture of Gladieux/Canteen. The lease provided that Gladieux would have the exclusive use of the areas designated as restaurants for the purposes of serving food, nonalcoholic beverages and "related merchandise." The agreement provided that Gladieux would have non- exclusive use, but maintenance responsibilities for parking areas, restrooms, and the lobby and vending areas. The agreement further provided that Respondent would have the exclusive right to approve the items to be sold, and required Gladieux to furnish all vending machines required for operating a vending center in designated vending areas. Gladieux was awarded the contract as a result of a competitive bidding process. (Testimony of Owen, Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Respondent's Exhibit 1, Joint Exhibit 1 (Stipulation)) In addition to the agreements with petitioner to operate citrus products shops, other contracts for such shops at the other service plazas are operated by licensees as a result of a competitive bid process. Similarly, all contracts for the sale of motor fuel at the various service plazas were awarded as the result of competitive bids. Respondent also has an existing license agreement with Florida Folder Distributing Company to operate an information leaflet rack at six of the seven service plazas where informational material promoting facilities and points of interest in the state are made available to the public. This agreement also was entered into after competitive bidding. The information racks are located in the lobby or corridor areas of the service plazas. (Testimony of Owen, Petitioner's Exhibits 5-8, Joint Exhibit 1(Stipulation)) Vending machines are operated by Gladieux at the various service plazas of the Turnpike. They include food and drink machines, machines that produce wax figures, and photograph machines. Most of the vending machines are located in the restaurant areas, but those at the Pompano and West Palm Beach plazas are placed in the "common areas" of the plazas. (Testimony of Chambliss, Owen, Petitioner's Exhibits 5-6, Respondent's Exhibits 2 g and h) In 1981, Section 340.091(1), Florida Statutes, was amended to permit the granting of concessions on the Turnpike for amusement machines which operate by the application of skill. Gladieux submitted a proposal to Respondent to install video game machines in appropriate areas under its lease. Respondent's General Counsel advised Mr. C. H. Owen, Deputy Director of Maintenance, in June, 1981, that Chapter 340, Florida Statutes, did not require competitive bidding for such a concession. Respondent's Turnpike engineer advised Owen, in November, 1981, that Gladieux's proposal to install and operate some 35 machines for a 12-month trial period at an acceptable rental fee should be accepted, and that the program should be evaluated at the expiration of the trial period. He further told Owen that if a satisfactory rental fee could not be negotiated at a satisfactory fee at the end of the one-year trial period, the operation should be offered for public bidding. Respondent and Gladieux thereafter on December 20, 1981, entered into an agreement whereby Respondent was granted the right to install and operate 35 amusement devices at individual locations to be designated by Respondent. The agreement was for one year and provided that Gladieux would pay Respondent 22.51 percent of the gross revenue from the operation of the devices, plus 4 percent tax. The agreement stated that the operation of the amusement devices was on an experimental basis and contained the statement that "Operator is currently lessee of the only space suitable for the installation of such devices and is prepared to cooperate with the department." Respondent's reason for negotiating with Gladieux was due to the fact that it "controlled" the vending machine and foyer areas under the lease, and that the video game machines were "vending" machines within the vending machine provisions of the lease. However, it was recognized that the lease provisions were originally intended only to apply to food and drink vending machines. Further, Respondent's General Counsel had opined prior to the 1981 amendment to Section 340.091(1) that a contract to install pinball machines or other electronic games on the Turnpike was specifically prohibited by that provision. Expert opinion testimony was received at the hearing that a video game machine is a "vending" machine because it is a coin-operated device that dispenses either goods or services. Although Respondent's officials were of the view that the provision of video machines was within the purview of the vending machine provisions of the lease, it entered into a separate agreement because it wanted a one-year trial period to determine the public's acceptance of the machines, and also to determine if they would be detrimental from the standpoint of congestion and noise level. Respondent preferred that the machines be located in the restaurant areas, where possible. This was a major reason for contracting with Gladieux because it controlled the restaurant areas under its lease. Another reason was that Gladieux operated the restaurants 24 hours each day and thus its personnel were always available to handle maintenance problems. (Testimony of Owen, Mizerski, Petitioner's Exhibits 11-12, Respondent's Exhibits 3-4, 8) Gladieux proceeded to place video machines pursuant to the agreement and with the approval of Respondent in the various service plazas along the Turnpike. Most were placed in the restaurant areas, but in several service plazas the machines were placed in the vending areas outside of the restaurants. (Testimony of Owen, Petitioner's Exhibits 5-6, Respondent's Exhibits 2 g and h, 9) Chambliss was aware in early 1981 that video games had been placed in several of the Turnpike service plazas, and later became aware that Respondent had a one-year experimental agreement with Gladieux. By letter of September 13, 1982, Chambliss requested that Respondent provide him the opportunity to contract for installing electronic game machines on the Turnpike. Respondent's Turnpike engineer informed him that a decision would be made in November, 1982, as to whether to eliminate or extend the current contract, but that he would be kept apprised as to the matter. Also, by letter of October 18, 1982, Gladieux requested that its agreement with Respondent be extended to the termination date of its existing restaurant lease in 1988, and pointed out that it had made a substantial investment of about $135,000 in providing the video machines and game rooms. Respondent thereafter determined that the experimental operation of video games had been successful, and advised Gladieux on November 19, 1982, that it would entertain a formal proposal to continue operation of the machines by an addendum agreement to its existing restaurant lease. (Testimony of Owen, Chambliss, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2, 10, 13-15) Chambliss submitted a proposal to Respondent on November 29, 1982, to either compete with Gladieux for a contract to operate amusement devices at all service plazas, or to allow him to operate machines at the Pompano and Fort Pierce plazas where he held citrus shop licenses. On December 17, 1982, Respondent denied the request as being improper because of the provisions in the one-year agreement with Gladieux to extend the period for operation of machines if the one-year trial period proved successful, and also because the restaurant contract with Gladieux included all the areas in the service plazas except for citrus product shops and service stations. The letter informed Chambliss of his right to file a notice of protest within 72 hours. Chambliss proceeded to do so on December 22 and thereafter filed its petition for hearing. On December 29, 1982, Respondent and Gladieux entered into an extension to its one-year agreement to January 20, 1983, pending resolution of Chambliss' protest. However, negotiations with Gladieux are still in progress concerning the percentage of revenues to be paid by Gladieux under any subsequent amendment to its lease with regard to the video game operations. (Testimony of Owen, Chambliss, Petitioner's Exhibits 3-4, 16-20)

Recommendation It is recommended that Respondent deny the amended petition of Petitioners Florida Sunshine Parkway Citrus, Inc. and Joe A. Chambliss. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Paul A. Pappas Secretary, Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire Jeffrey H. Abrams, Esquire 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mark Linsky, Esquire Legal Department Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Philip S. Blank, Esquire Suite 320 - Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 849.16
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