The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent should award a contract in accordance with an invitation to bid to the Petitioner, to some other bidder, or reject all bids and reissue an invitation. Petitioner contends that it was the low bidder in response to the invitation; that its bid was responsive; and to the extent that it was not responsive, any defects were of a minor sort which should be waived. Petitioner contends that the Respondent has previously waived irregularities such as existed in the Petitioner's bid and should therefore waive them in this case. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner's bid was not responsive, that the irregularities in Petitioner's bid are not minor, that any mistakes the Respondent has made in past acquisitions should not be repeated, and that the contract should be awarded to another company.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent issued an invitation to bid for a project known as the "Animal Science/Dairy Science Building" at the University of Florida. The project was given No. BR-108 by the Respondent. Petitioner was the lowest bidder in response to the invitation. The next lowest bidder, Charles R. Perry Construction Company, submitted a bid approximately $37,000 higher than Petitioner's bid. Perry has not filed any formal protest nor intervened in this proceeding. Petitioner is a responsible contractor and has in the past entered into construction contracts with the Respondent. Petitioner's bid was rejected by the Respondent. The Petitioner protested the rejection of its bid in a timely manner. Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications provides in pertinent part, as follows: In order that the Owner may be assured that only qualified and competent sub- contractors will be employed on the project, each Bidder shall submit with his Proposal a list of the subcontractors who would perform the work for each Divi- sion of the Specifications as indicated by the "List of Subcontractors" form contained in these Specifications... only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. * * * No change shall be made in the list of subcontractors, before or after the award of a contract, unless agreed to in writing by the Owner. Section "B" of the invitation for bid provided space for the bidder to list the name and address of subcontractors for the roofing, masonry, plumbing, mechanical, electrical, meat processing equipment, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. In Section "B" of its bid, Petitioner listed two subcontractors for the plumbing, mechanical, and controls and instrumentation phases of the project. Listing two subcontractors does not comport with the bid specification requiring that only one subcontractor be listed for each phase. Petitioner listed two subcontractors because one of the subcontractors submitted a proposal to Petitioner only fifteen minutes prior to the time when the bid had to be submitted, and Petitioner was unsure of whether the last-minute proposal included all of the work that the Petitioner anticipated would be required. In addition, Petitioner felt that one of the subcontractors may not have been acceptable to the Respondent. The requirement that bidders list only one subcontractor for each phase of a project helps to discourage "bid shopping." Bid shopping is a practice whereby a contractor who receives a bid from a subcontractor approaches another subcontractor with that bid and encourages the other subcontractor to reduce its price. If the other subcontractor responds, this reduced price can be taken back to the original subcontractor. The original subcontractor is then confronted with the choices of either lowering its bid or losing the project. Bid shopping that occurs after a bid has been accepted by the owner does not benefit the owner. It benefits only the bidder, who is able to reduce its costs and therefore increase its profit. Requiring that one subcontractor be listed for each phase cannot serve to completely eliminate bid shopping. A contractor could still bid shop by listing itself as the subcontractor, then after winning the contract shop between several subcontractors. A contractor could also bid shop by changing subcontractors after the bid award. In either case, however, the contractor would need to secure the approval of the owner. The practice is thus discouraged. If a bidder lists two subcontractors for a phase of the project, that bidder would have an advantage over those who listed only one subcontractor. Listing two subcontractors enables the bidder to make a choice as to the best subcontract bid at a time later than the choice is made by bidders who list only one subcontractor. In addition, listing two subcontractors makes it easier for the bidder to engage in bid shopping, which would be more difficult for bidders who listed only one subcontractor. Paragraph "B-24" of the bid specifications for this project provides in pertinent part: The Contract will be awarded . . . to the lowest qualified bidder pro- vided his bid is reasonable and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. * * * The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the Owner. The listing of two subcontractors for phases of the project is not a mere informality in the bid. It is directly contrary to Paragraph "B-15" of the bid specifications. It would not be in the interest of the owner to accept a bid in which two subcontractors are listed for phases of the project. The integrity of the acquisition process would be damaged by allowing such a deviation because a bidder who listed two subcontractors would have gained an advantage over bidders who complied with the bid specifications. It is not in the best interest of the Respondent to waive the defect in the Petitioner's bid. On at least two prior occasions, the Respondent awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor per phase of the work. One of these projects was for a gymnasium at Florida Atlantic University (Project No. BR-603). Another was for a window replacement project at Florida State University (Project No. BR-342). In at least three other projects, the Respondent awarded contracts where the bidder failed to list the name of any subcontractor for one or more phases of the work. These were for the cancer center at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-569), the student housing facility at the University of South Florida (Project No. BR-576), and an expansion project at Florida A & M University (Project No. BR-343). The bid specifications for all of these projects were not offered into evidence; however, the Respondent had utilized the same specifications as required in this project at all pertinent times. Failing to list any subcontractor for a phase of a project constitutes approximately the same defect in a bid response as listing two subcontractors. It provides even greater opportunities for bid shopping and an advantage to the bidder over those who list subcontractors as required by the specifications. In several other projects, it appears that the Respondent has awarded contracts to bidders whose bids contained defects of the same magnitude, but a different sort than the listing of two subcontractors. It does not appear that the Respondent has awarded contracts where bidders have listed more than one subcontractor, no subcontractor, or otherwise violated bid specifications because of any policy or because of any expressed waiver of the defect. Rather, it appears that the Respondent has not adequately policed bids to determine responsiveness to the bid specifications. This is especially true with respect to the listing of subcontractors. It appears that no one on the Respondent's staff took the responsibility to consider whether one subcontractor was listed for each phase of a project as required in the specifications. The only policy that the Respondent established was a policy of being too lax in examining bids. The Petitioner did not list two subcontractors for various phases of this project because of any reliance on past conduct of the Respondent. Petitioner's agent overlooked the bid requirements in Preparing its bid response. In prior bids submitted by the Petitioner in response to bid invitations issued by Respondent, Petitioner listed only one subcontractor, as required. Generally, unless it is otherwise required, Petitioner prefers to list two subcontractors because of the flexibility it provides to the owner and to Petitioner. Petitioner was not aware that Respondent had previously awarded contracts to bidders who listed more than one subcontractor for a phase of the work when it submitted its bid in this instance.
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in which the only disputed issues concern whether the Petitioner is a small business party and whether the Respondent was substantially justified in bringing the underlying proceeding.
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact which follow are based on “the pleadings and supporting documents, and the files and records of the Division of Administrative Hearings.” See Rule 60Q-2.035(7), Florida Administrative Code.1 In DOAH Case No. 96-4290, the Commissioner of Education filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Brown. By means of that Administrative Complaint, the Commissioner sought to take disciplinary action against Mr. Brown on the basis of allegations of misconduct by Mr. Brown in connection with his employment as a coach with the Dade County School System. An investigation was conducted prior to filing the Administrative Complaint and at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed, the agency had in its possession affidavits and other evidence which, if believed, were sufficient to establish the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Prior to filing the Administrative Complaint, the evidence collected during the investigation was reviewed by agency legal counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to file an Administrative Complaint. Upon review, the evidence appeared to be sufficient to warrant the issuance of an Administrative Complaint. Following discovery in the underlying case, the agency re-evaluated its position and, on the advice of counsel, decided to file a voluntary dismissal of the Administrative Complaint. The decision to dismiss the Administrative Complaint was based on the fact that, following discovery, the agency had serious doubts that it could prove its case by the required “clear and convincing” standard. At the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Brown was the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. His principal office was in this state. He was domiciled in this state. He had fewer than twenty-five employees and a new worth of less than two million dollars. At the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Brown was not an employee of the Dade County Public School System. Rather, he was performing part-time coaching services essentially as an independent contractor.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, the Respondent, ROBERT MENSCHING, was a certified residential building contractor in Florida, and held license number CR C020166. Mr. Mensching was the owner and qualifying agent for Robert Mensching Homes. On or about July 10, 1986, a written proposal was submitted by the Respondent to Mr. and Mrs. Mangiardi for the construction of a single family dwelling in Cape Coral, Florida. The construction price was $60,000.00, with an additional $500.00 for the purchase of the house plans. Mr. and Mrs. Mangiardi paid for the plans on the date of the proposal. Revisions to the proposal were submitted to the Mangiardis in September, 1986. The purchase price and the payment schedule remained the same. The proposal was accepted by the Mangiardis, and the down payment of $5,000.00 required by the contract to start construction, was given to the Respondent. Construction commenced in November 1986. By March 26, 1987, the Respondent had been paid $53,750.00 of the total construction contract price. This included the fourth draw on a five draw payment schedule. Only $6,250.00 remained to be paid by the purchasers for the last phase of construction. In April 1987, the Respondent informed Mr. Mangiardi that he would not complete the final phase of construction. The Respondent informed Mr. Mangiardi that he would pay him $5,000.00. An accounting was not given to the purchasers of the monies disbursed by the Respondent pursuant to the construction schedule. After the Respondent left the project, the Mangiardis were given notice of an outstanding lien in the amount of $963.80, which was owed to Kirkland Electric, Inc. Another Notice to Owner was filed by Wallcrafters, another subcontractor, for $5,272.50. The work completed by both subcontractors was performed during the Respondent's term as the prime contractor on the project. These two subcontractors were never paid by the Respondent out of the draws received by him for that purpose. The Respondent did not pay the $5,000.00 he told Mr. Mangiardi he would pay in April of 1987. The evidence is unclear as to whether this amount of money was a payment of liquidated damages for the breach, the balance of funds entrusted to the contractor which had not been disbursed in the preceding construction phases, or the amount of unpaid liens known to the contractor at the time of breach. The Respondent filed for bankruptcy after a judgment was entered against him in a civil action by the Mangiardis for breach of contract. A Notice of Aggravation was not submitted during the formal hearing regarding the actual damage to the licensee's customers as a circumstance to be considered in aggravation of the penalty to be assessed. A copy of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board's previous letter of reprimand was not presented at hearing so that the hearing officer and the Board could use the prior violation for aggravation purposes.
The Issue Whether Petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact On September 29, 2004, Respondent notified Petitioners that a complaint against them was received regarding an engineering project and that an investigation was to be undertaken. Between September 29, 2004, and March 16, 2006, Petitioners submitted numerous informal responses to Respondent either via e-mail or regular United States mail. On March 16, 2006, the probable cause panel of the Board of Professional Engineers found probable cause to charge Petitioners with violating Section 471.033(1)(g), Florida Statutes, by being negligent in the practice of engineering. At the time it found probable cause, the probable cause panel reviewed the materials that are attached to the Affidavit of Teresa Bake, Custodian of Records of FEMC (Respondent's Composite Exhibit numbered 1). These materials include the Investigative Report compiled by the investigator for FEMC; a copy of the plans for the relocation project, and letters dated October 22, 2005, and February 5, 2006, from Roland Holt, P.E., FEMC's engineering consultant. Mr. Holt's reports contained the opinion that Petitioners' plans for the relocation project were deficient. An Administrative Complaint reflecting the March 16, 2006, findings of the probable cause panel was issued April 20, 2006, and was subsequently served on Petitioners. The allegations in the Administrative Complaint are consistent with the purported deficiencies noted in Mr. Holt's letters. Petitioners requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing, which was held July 31, 2006. On August 29, 2006, a Recommended Order was filed recommending that all charges against Petitioners be dismissed. On December 12, 2006, the Board of Professional Engineers entered a Final Order that adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by the administrative law judge and dismissed the charges against Petitioners. The amount of attorneys' fees claimed is $26,298.00, which is reasonable and not unjust. The parties have stipulated to recoverable costs of $793.00, which represents that portion of the costs that conform to the Statewide Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions, effective January 1, 2006.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and/or costs, pursuant to section 120.595(4); and, if so, the amounts of attorney's fees and/or costs to which he is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 3, 2017, DOAH entered an Amended Final Order in Case No. 16-6127RU, determining that a portion of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Procedure Manual TL-10, dated April 30, 2014, and Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18, dated October 20, 2014 (hereafter, the "Unadopted Rules"), are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). "Stephen J. Williams, as a Trustee for the Sparkhill Trust," is Petitioner in this proceeding, and also was Petitioner in Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner appeared in Case No. 16-6127RU as a trustee of the Sparkhill Trust ("Trust"), which holds title to the motor vehicle for which a certificate of title was denied by Respondent and its agent, the Lee County Tax Collector, in 2014. As previously found in Case No. 16-6127RU, Petitioner also is the beneficiary of the Trust. Petitioner is not licensed to practice law in Florida, and has neither alleged nor shown that he was licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in Florida at any point during the pendency of Case No. 16-6127RU.2/ Petitioner received a law degree from the University of Connecticut School of Law and is licensed to practice law in Connecticut, New York, and the District of Columbia; however, he currently is suspended from practicing law in those jurisdictions. Petitioner also is a lawyer on the Roll of Solicitors in England and Wales, but is not currently authorized to practice in those jurisdictions because he does not hold a practicing certificate. Petitioner asserts in the Motion that he is an attorney acting in a representative capacity as a trustee on behalf of the Trust. Petitioner filed a document titled "Declaration of Stephen J. Williams in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs" ("Declaration") in support of the Motion. Although the Declaration represents that it is made "under penalty of perjury," it does not constitute a legally sufficient oath or affidavit because it does not comply with the requirements of section 92.50(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, it does not contain a jurat or certificate of proof or acknowledgement authenticated by the signature and official seal of a judge, clerk or deputy clerk of court of record in this state, or a United States commissioner or notary public in this state, as required by the statute.3/ Petitioner attached an itemized timesheet to the Declaration. The timesheet lists, for each item for which attorney's fees are sought, the date and description of the legal services alleged to have been rendered for the particular item, and the amount of time alleged to have been spent per item. The timesheet represents that a total of 54.8 hours were spent in prosecuting Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a $350.00 per hour attorney's fee, multiplied by a 1.5 loadstar multiplier, and a contingency multiplier of three, for a total of $86,310.00 in attorney's fees. Attached to the Declaration is email correspondence sent to Petitioner by Kiara Guzzo, Respondent's Public Records Coordinator, stating that Petitioner owed $119.73 for Respondent's response to Petitioner's public records request. In the Declaration, Petitioner states that "[t]he attached email of Guzzo email [sic] accurately indicates the out-of-pocket expenses which have been paid." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner is "exclusively engaged in the practice of law." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner undertook the prosecution of Case No. 16-6127RU on a contingency basis, with his attorney's fees being "limited to that approved by this tribunal."4/ Petitioner previously challenged the Unadopted Rules in two DOAH proceedings, Case Nos. 14-6005RU and 15-0484RU.5/ Thus, as far back as 2014, Respondent was on notice that its statements (i.e., the Unadopted Rules) may constitute unadopted rules.
The Issue Whether Respondent's License as a residential pool contractor should be suspended for alleged violation of Section 468.112(7), Florida Statutes. The Respondent did not appear at the hearing although proper notice thereof had been furnished under date of February 11, 1976 to him by the hearing officer. Accordingly, the hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been licensed as a registered pool contractor by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board since June 20, 1974. The license was not renewed for 1975/76 (Exhibit 4). Respondent filed a Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Bankruptcy No. TBK 75-25, on March 13, 1975 (Exhibit 5).
Recommendation That the registration of William R. MacKinnon as a residential pool contractor be suspended until such time as he meets the qualifications and other requirements for renewal of registration and applies therefor. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: David Linn, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. William R. Mackinnon Route 3, Box 584C Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statues, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Richard M. Golfman, was, at all times material hereto, licensed by the Department as a certified general contractor, having been issued license number CG C032860, and authorized to engage in the practice of general contracting as an individual.1 The Feinstein project (DOAH Case No. 00-0599) On or about October 30, 1998, Respondent entered into a written contract with Norman and Sheila Feinstein to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to enclose and remodel the screened patio, and to build a rock garden, at their home located at 5468 Northwest 20th Avenue, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $5,000. At the time, the Feinsteins paid Respondent $1,500 as the initial payment (deposit) under the terms of the contract. The contract Respondent presented and the Feinsteins executed on October 30, 1998, did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Following execution of the contract, Respondent made repeated promises to construct the rock garden; however, it was not until November 10, 1998, that Respondent appeared on-site and constructed the rock garden, albeit not to the Feinsteins' satisfaction. Subsequently, Respondent had some high-hat electrical fixture cans and a bundle of furring strips delivered to the home for the patio project but, thereafter, despite repeated requests, refused to perform any work on the project or refund any money to the Feinsteins. The value of the labor and materials Respondent invested in the rock garden, as well as the cost of the building materials (the high-hat fixtures and furring strips) delivered to the job-site, was $250, a sum considerably less than the $1,500 the Feinsteins had entrusted to Respondent under the terms of their agreement. The Burres/Berger project (DOAH Case No. 00-0600) On or about November 23, 1998, Respondent submitted a written proposal to Tanya Burres to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to replace the existing roof on her home located at 7270 Montrico Drive, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $22,125. The proposal was a one-page preprinted form. In the upper left there appeared, printed immediately following Respondent's handwritten name, the following: THE GOLFMAN GROUP, INC. P.O. Box 811926 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 The proposal did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. At the time the proposal was submitted, Tanya Burres was under contract to sell the home to Drs. Glenn Berger and Michelle Fiorillo, husband and wife (the Bergers), and Ms. Burres had agreed to split with the Bergers the cost of a new roof for the home. At the time, Ms. Burres had suggested the Respondent as a contractor to perform the work (because he had previously done satisfactory work for Ms. Burres); however, it was understood that the employment of any contractor was subject to the Bergers' approval. That the Bergers' agreement was required before any such employment would be accepted was clearly conveyed to Respondent. On November 23, 1998, Tanya Burres signed the proposal and gave Respondent a check payable to his order in the sum of $1,106.25, representing her half of the ten percent deposit called for by the proposal. The Bergers, however, declined to accept the proposal, and refused Respondent's request for the balance of the deposit. Rather, the Bergers, having received adverse information from the Department regarding Respondent's record, preferred to employ a different contractor, and Ms. Burres accorded the Bergers a monetary credit at closing (on the purchase of the home) for one-half the cost to re-roof the home. When the Bergers informed Ms. Burres (shortly after she signed the proposal on November 23, 1998) that they would not agree to use Respondent, Ms. Burres attempted to stop payment on her check; however, the check had already been cashed. Thereafter, Ms. Burres attempted on numerous occasions to contact Respondent by telephone and by his pager, but Respondent failed to return any of her calls or messages. To date, Respondent has failed to account for or return Ms. Burres' deposit of $1,106.25. The costs of investigation and prosecution As of February 25, 2000, the Department's costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, totaled $234.85 for DOAH Case No. 00-0599 (the Feinstein project) and $195.65 for DOAH Case No. 00-0600 (the Burres/Berger project.) Previous disciplinary action At hearing, the Department offered proof that, on two prior occasions, Respondent had been subjected to disciplinary action by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the Board). (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) The first occasion is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated August 4, 1987, which found Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (which were not revealed at hearing beyond what may be inferred from the terms of the Final Order), and resolved that Respondent suffer the following penalty: Respondent's licensure is hereby suspended for ten (10) years. Provided, Respondent may obtain termination of said suspension at anytime, without further action by the Board, upon providing the Board's Executive Director with a certified bank check in an amount sufficient to cover and pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500), and the bad check alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and all service charges in connection therewith, and all other fees accruing as of the date Respondent seeks said termination of supervision. The second occasion Respondent was subjected to disciplinary action is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated July 18, 1997, which approved a stipulated settlement of certain complaints then pending before the Board. That Final Order approved the dismissal of a number of counts contained in five Administrative Complaints then pending before the Board and, as to the remaining counts, agreed (without Respondent admitting or denying the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaints) to the following penalty: 3. FINE AND COSTS: Respondent shall pay a fine of Nine Hundred dollars ($900.00) and costs of Eight Hundred fifty One dollars ($851) to the Board within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Final Order. Said payment shall be in the form of a cashier's or certified check and shall be made payable to the "Construction Industry Licensing Board." To assure payment of the fine and costs, it is further ordered that all of Respondent's licensure to practice contracting shall be suspended with the imposition of the suspension being stayed for thirty (30) days. If the ordered fine and costs are paid in compliance with the terms set forth above, the suspension imposed shall not take effect. However, should payment not be timely made, the stay shall be lifted and Respondent's license shall be immediately suspended. Upon payment of the fine and costs in full, the suspension imposed shall be lifted. Respondent apparently satisfied the fines and costs imposed by the foregoing orders. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and which, as a penalty for the violations found, imposes an administrative fine in the total sum of $13,500.00, revokes Respondent's licensure, orders that Respondent pay restitution to Norman and Sheila Feinstein in the sum of $1,250.00 and to Tanya Burres in the sum of $1,106.25, and assesses costs of investigation and prosecution (through February 25, 2000) in the total sum of $430.50 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2000.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed the several violations of Sections 489.129(1)(h)2.,(h)3.,(j),(k), and (n), Florida Statutes (1997), for the reasons stated in the respective Administrative Complaints and, if so, what, if any, penalties should be imposed. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of contracting. Respondent is licensed as a certified general contractor pursuant to license number CG C059414. At all relevant times, Respondent was the qualifying agent for Fred T. Garrett Construction, Inc. ("FTG"). As the qualifying agent, Respondent was responsible for all of FTG's contracting activities in accordance with Section 489.1195, Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to obtain a certificate of authority for Fred T. Garrett Construction, Inc., as required by Section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes. The St. Cyr Case On or about August 21, 1998, Respondent entered into a contract with Louis L. St. Cyr to construct an addition to the residence located at 201 South Bel Air Drive, Plantation, Florida. The contract price was $50,000. Although Mr. St. Cyr paid $2,500 to Respondent, Respondent failed to commence work and canceled the project, thereby abandoning it without just cause and without proper notification to Mr. St. Cyr. The contract did not permit Respondent to keep the $2,500 paid by Mr. St. Cyr, and Respondent failed to refund the payment within 30 days after abandonment. Out of the $2,500 he received from Mr. St. Cyr, however, Respondent paid $1,600.00 to the architect before abandoning the project. Thus, the net amount that Respondent owes to Mr. St. Cyr is $900. Petitioner incurred a total of $1,092.28 in investigative costs relating to the St. Cyr case. The Forney Case On May 22, 1998, Respondent, who was doing business as FTG, entered into a contract with Mr. Warren Forney for the construction of a two-bedroom, one-bath addition to the residence located at 1698 Northeast 33rd Street, Oakland Park, Florida. The contract price was $32,500. The contract with Mr. Forney did not contain a written statement explaining the customer’s rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, as required by Section 489.1425(1), Florida Statutes. On July 7, 1998, Respondent obtained permit number 98-050297 from the Oakland Park Building Department. Construction commenced on or about July 7, 1998, and continued sporadically until October 29, 1998, when Mr. Forney dismissed Respondent for failure to timely complete the project. The Oakland Park Building Department issued notices of violation against the project on August 3, September 11, and October 14, 1998, for various building code violations. Mr. Forney was forced to obtain a homeowner’s permit and subsequently hired a subcontractor to complete the work. Mr. Forney paid Respondent approximately $29,250 before relieving Respondent of his duties. To complete the project, Mr. Forney paid a total of $48,746.52, which was $15,396.52 over and above the original contract price. Petitioner incurred a total of $2,190.78 in investigative costs relating to the Forney case. The Kong Case In or around January 1998, a contractor named Lakeview Concepts hired Respondent to perform demolition work for the Kong dry cleaning store project on the property located at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida. On or about June 17, 1998, permit 98-00002349 was issued to Respondent to perform alterations on commercial property located at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida. Respondent, however, did not yet have a contract with the owner for this work. The next month, on or about July 30, 1998, Respondent, who was doing business as FTG, entered into a contract with Shek Kong to complete the dry cleaning store project at 5171 South University Drive, Davie, Florida, for the contract price of $22,300. Shek Kong made payments to Respondent totaling $16,000. Respondent’s work was of poor quality, however, and on or about November 6, 1998, he ceased work, though the project had not been completed. On or about November 14, 1998, Douglas Frankow, license number CB C052960, gave Mr. Kong an estimate of $20,562 to complete the project. Thereafter, on or about June 30, 1999, Mr. Kong contracted with George Settergren, another licensed contractor, to complete the project for a contract price of $27,956. On December 9, 1999, in Case No. 98-020065 08, the Circuit Court, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, rendered a Final Judgment against Respondent and in favor of Mr. Kong. This judgment awarded Mr. Kong the total amount of $28,693.30, plus 10 percent interest per annum. Petitioner incurred a total of $2,502.78 in investigative costs relating to the Kong case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(h)2., (h)3., (j), (k), and (n), Florida Statutes, imposing administrative fines in the aggregate amount of $3,700, assessing investigative costs in the aggregate amount of $5,785.84, placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of four years from the date the Final Order is entered by the Board, and awarding payment of restitution to each customer as follows: (1) to Warren Forney, the amount of $15,396.52; (2) to Shek Kong, satisfaction of the unpaid civil judgment in the amount $28,693.30, plus 10 percent interest accrued thereon; and (3) to Louis L. St. Cyr, the amount of $900. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________________________________ JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was the prevailing party in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX on one of two challenged rule provisions. In that case, the challenge to Rule 61K1-1.0011(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code, which required all contracts between a manager and a boxer to be filed with Respondent within seven days of execution, was dismissed on its merits. Rule 61K1- 1.0011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, and Form BPR-0009451 incorporated therein, were found to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority to the following extent: (a) that Rule 61K1-1.0011(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code, deemed contacts between managers and boxers to contain all provisions set forth in Form BPR-0009451; and (b) that Form BRP- 0009451 deemed contracts between managers and boxers to be void if the managers were unlicensed on the date their contracts were executed or if the managers failed to file the contracts with Respondent within seven days of execution. Respondent presented no evidence, testimonial or documentary, in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX or the instant case, showing that it had a reasonable basis in fact to promulgate Rule 61K1-1.0011(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, and Form BPR-0009451 incorporated therein, in 1985 or thereafter to amend, enforce, or defend said rule and form. Respondent admits that it has not maintained the pertinent rulemaking record required by Section 120.54(8), Florida Statutes. There is no competent evidence that Respondent in fact conducted the mandatory rule reviews required by Section 9 of Chapter 96-159, Laws of Florida, or Section 3 of Chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida. Respondent did not file post-hearing depositions showing that it ever conducted these rule reviews. Respondent admitted during the hearing of the instant case that it had no written documentation confirming that the rule reviews took place. There is no factual evidence showing the existence of special conditions that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust in this case. There is no evidence showing how to allocate Petitioner's requested attorney's fees and costs between the two challenged rule provisions. The record in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX does not indicate that the Intervenor Danny Santiago created duplicitous and unnecessary work for Petitioner and Respondent. Two of the depositions taken on December 5, 2000, at the instance of Intervenor Danny Santiago and over Respondent's objections, were filed in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX, becoming part of the record in that case. Moreover, there is no evidence showing how to allocate a portion of Petitioner's requested attorney's fees and costs to work created exclusively by Intervenor Danny Santiago. Petitioner filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs on March 19, 2001. Petitioner seeks to recover $13,235 in fees and costs. Petitioner presented competent evidence that the requested attorney's fees were reasonable based on the number of hours expended (66.175) and the rate charged per hour ($200). Petitioner also presented competent evidence that an expert witness fee in the amount of $1,000 is reasonable in this case. Respondent objected to Petitioner's requested attorney's fees as they relate to the following specific charges: (a) charges pertaining to an unrelated case in which Respondent sought to discipline Petitioner for violating Respondent's rules; (b) charges relating to Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery after Petitioner improperly served the original discovery requests and was required to serve the discovery requests a second time; and (c) charges relating to the preparation of the instant motion for fees and costs. Petitioner agreed to reduce his claim for fees and costs by the amount of the disputed charges if Respondent could provide the total amount. After much discussion, the parties agreed to file a post-hearing stipulation as to the amount to be deducted from Petitioner's claim. The parties never filed that stipulation. The undersigned has compared the record in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX with the list of charges for fees and costs attached to Petitioner's Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs. The undersigned has also taken into consideration Respondent's objections to certain charges and Petitioner's acquiescence to those objections. The record reveals that Petitioner is not entitled to recover the following: (a) charges on April 13 and 27, 2000, in the amount of $100 that pertain to a request for and granting of oral argument that did not occur in the underlying case; (b) charges on July 6, 2000, and July 31, 2000, in the amount of $100, relating to review of an unidentified motion to compel and review of an order granting that motion, which did not occur in the underlying case; (c) charges on July 17 and 27, 2000, and August 14, 2000, in the total amount of $320, relating to Petitioner's improper motion to compel discovery after Petitioner incorrectly served the original discovery requests on the Attorney General and was required to serve the discovery requests a second time; (d) a charge on August 24, 2000, in the amount of $200 for attendance at court, which did not occur in the underlying case; (e) a charge on September 11, 2000, in the amount of $50 for review of an order dismissing with prejudice, which did not occur in the underlying case; (f) charges on February 23, 2001, in the amount of $80, relating to the preparation of the instant motion for fees and costs; and (g) charges on October 26, 2000, in the amount of $500 for travel to a deposition. The reduction amount for attorney's fee charges totals $1,350. There are no other identifiable disputes over amounts claimed by Petitioner as recoverable expenses or costs. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to recover $11,885 in attorney's fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX and an additional $1,000 for expert witness fees in the instant case, for a total recovery in the amount of $12,885. This amount is reasonable under the facts of this case. The record in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX clearly reflects that Respondent had sufficient and timely notice of Petitioner's intent to seek attorney's fees and costs prior to the entry of the Final Order. In Respondent's meeting on December 6, 2000, Respondent's counsel advised Respondent several times that it would be liable for attorney's fees and costs if the challenged rules or portions thereof were found to lack statutory authority. Counsel for Petitioner and Intervenor Danny Santiago made appearances on behalf of their respective clients at that meeting. Petitioner made his first formal demand for attorney's fees and costs in his Proposed Final Order, which was filed in DOAH Case No. 00-1600RX on January 22, 2001. Respondent filed its Statement of Defenses to Petition for Attorney Fees in the instant case on March 19, 2001. Respondent raised the issue that Petitioner's demand for attorney's fees and cost was untimely for the first time in Respondent's Proposed Final Order filed in the instant case on May 11, 2001.
