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SHARON FORD vs LINCARE, INC., 18-005072 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 21, 2018 Number: 18-005072 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 2019

The Issue Whether Respondent, Lincare, Inc., is liable to Petitioner, Sharon Ford, for subjecting her to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.

Findings Of Fact The Parties and Complaint Allegations Lincare is a Tampa-based company that focuses on home- healthcare services. It has an annual revenue of over $3 billion and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company based in Germany. Ms. Ford, a married woman with children, is an accountant and an attorney. Lincare first hired her as its acquisition counsel in 2001 and promoted her to director of acquisitions in 2002. She held that position for almost 15 years before she left the company on January 27, 2017. Mr. Tripp, a married man with children, served as an Arabic linguist in the Army before obtaining his law degree. Lincare hired Mr. Tripp to replace Ms. Ford as its acquisition counsel in 2002 and promoted him to general counsel in 2013. He still holds that position. On January 19, 2018, almost a year after leaving Lincare, Ms. Ford filed a Complaint with the Commission alleging a hostile work environment. She alleged that Mr. Tripp, over a 15-month period from December 2015 through March 2017, subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment. On July 13, 2018, the Commission issued its notice of determination of no reasonable cause and mailed it to Ms. Ford. The notice advised her that she “may request an administrative hearing . . . by filing a Petition for Relief within 35 days of the date the determination was signed by the Executive Director.” Ms. Ford received the notice in the mail on July 16, 2018. On August 16, 2018, 34 days after the Commission issued its notice, Ms. Ford requested an administrative hearing by mailing her Petition to the Commission via U.S. mail. The Commission received the Petition on August 20, 2018. On the same day, the Commission generated its transmittal letter. But, instead of transmitting the Petition to DOAH, the Commission advised Ms. Ford that the Petition appeared to be untimely because it was received three days beyond the 35-day deadline under section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. After Ms. Ford responded that she timely requested a hearing by post-marking her Petition before the 35-day deadline, the Commission transmitted the case to DOAH on September 21, 2018. The transmittal letter, dated August 20, 2018, did not dismiss the Petition as untimely but rather requested assignment of a judge to “conduct all necessary proceedings required under the law.” Lincare’s Structure and Policies Between 2015 and 2017 Lincare had three officers: chief executive officer (“CEO”), chief financial officer (“CFO”), and chief operating officer (“COO”). The corporate chart had the CEO at the top and the CFO and COO, who reported to the CEO, immediately thereunder. The second tier of the chart listed six department heads, none of whom were corporate officers: corporate compliance officer, head of business innovation, head of human resources, head of public relations & communications, general counsel, and director of acquisitions. These managers were equal on the hierarchy chart and all reported directly to the CEO. As director of acquisitions, Ms. Ford brought in the deals, negotiated the business side, and quarterbacked them to closing. She helped move the deals along by ensuring that Lincare personnel communicated and accomplished their required tasks. She provided business advice to the legal department and worked closely with the acquisition attorney (on smaller deals) and the general counsel (on larger deals). Ms. Ford received a salary and an objective bonus tied to the deals that closed.2/ As the general counsel, Mr. Tripp oversaw legal affairs and supervised five lawyers in the legal department, but had no control over any other department. As to the deals, Mr. Tripp handled the legal aspects, such as contracts, due diligence, and compliance, provided legal advice, and assessed risks. The CEO, COO, and CFO had sole authority to decide whether a deal closed. Mr. Tripp received a salary and a discretionary bonus tied to the company’s financial success in a given year. Although Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp gave each other advice, they were equals on the corporate chart. Mr. Tripp had no authority over Ms. Ford and lacked the power to hire, discipline, promote, transfer, fire, or control her compensation. They were coworkers who both answered directly to the CEO. The head of human resources (“head of HR”) ran the HR department and its roughly 15 to 18 employees. Directly under the Head of HR was the employee relations director, Ms. Adams. Among other things, the HR department oversaw the employee handbook and investigated reports of discrimination and harassment. The handbook included a detailed anti-harassment policy forbidding sexual harassment by any employee at work or at work-related events outside the office. Harassment was defined to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for conduct of a sexual nature, and other unwelcome behavior that was personally offensive and interfered with work effectiveness done in person or through electronic means. The policy prohibited any employee from making employment decisions based on the submission to or rejection of sexual advances, and noted in bold that any violation would subject an employee to discipline up to an immediate discharge. The handbook contained a detailed reporting procedure for employees who believed, had concerns, or suspected they or anyone else may have been harassed. The policy required them “to immediately notify” a named individual based on their location, which included the employee relations director or the HR Manager for employees in the corporate office. The handbook required employees to follow the procedure and noted that the failure to do so could adversely affect their rights to pursue a claim. Lincare took harassment allegations seriously. Once an allegation was reported, the employee relations director or HR managers investigated; the legal department was not involved unless a particular legal question arose. They obtained as much information as possible from the victim, spoke to potential witnesses, reviewed available documents, and interviewed the accused. If the investigation uncovered no corroborating evidence and the accused denied any wrongdoing, a report would be added to the accused’s personnel file; upon a second allegation, the accused would be terminated. If a supervisor retaliated against an employee for reporting harassment, that supervisor would be terminated. Lincare disseminated the handbook and updated versions to employees and required them to sign a form acknowledging that they received the handbook and would abide by its policies. Ms. Ford signed such forms each time she received a revised handbook, including in 2015——the version in effect until she left Lincare in January 2017. She knew about the harassment policy, the reporting requirement, and the fact that her failure to so report could adversely affect her rights. Friends and Coworkers for Over 15 Years Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp worked closely together at Lincare for 15 years and they became good friends in the process. When Lincare hired Mr. Tripp as acquisition counsel in 2002, he worked closely with Ms. Ford on hundreds of deals. They were in constant, daily contact to strategize, handle diligence and compliance issues, advise each other on the tasks they both had to complete, and ensure the deals closed. They also had a close friendship. They regularly went to lunch alone and with others, as often as three days per week, attended social events with mutual friends, and spoke on the phone and texted about business and personal matters. They had much in common as married parents with kids around the same age and they enjoyed each other’s company. When Mr. Tripp became general counsel in 2013, Ms. Ford initially worked closely with the new acquisition counsel. In late 2014, however, she and Mr. Tripp resumed working closely together when Lincare began negotiating larger transactions. Project Maverick was the largest acquisition of Ms. Ford’s career and it closed in March 2016. Project Falcon was the largest divestiture of her career and it closed in August 2016. These two deals, and others, required Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp to work even more closely together from 2015 until she left the company in January 2017. They often met multiple times per day. Ms. Ford sought Mr. Tripp’s assistance on the legal side and he sought her assistance on the business side. As before, she remained the quarterback shepherding the deal forward. Their friendship continued during this period. They invited each other to lunch regularly, alone and with coworkers. They attended social events with friends, including holiday dinners in 2015 and 2016. On out-of-town work trips, they rented cars together and sometimes spent time alone, such as for meals. They continued to text and speak on the phone about business and personal matters. They talked about their families, children, and other personal matters much like longtime friends do. They checked in on each other when personal crises occurred. And, when Ms. Ford began tense negotiations with the CEO about her compensation, which ultimately led her to leave Lincare, she relied on Mr. Tripp as a sounding board and for moral support. Even after Ms. Ford left the company in January 2017, she maintained contact with him. They had lunch alone at least once. For months, they continued to text each other, even about personal matters such as when she texted him after he had been in a car accident. However, their communication largely ceased once Ms. Ford filed a lawsuit against Lincare over her compensation. Ms. Ford’s Testimony Accusing Mr. Tripp of Sexual Harassment The first incident occurred on December 11, 2015. In that 10 to 20 minute conversation in her office, Mr. Tripp professed strong feelings for her and that he desired a confidential, sexual relationship with her. She rejected him and said they were just friends. She immediately called her husband and spoke to him all the way home. She felt humiliated, embarrassed, and angry. She did not attend a football game that weekend with other coworkers to avoid Mr. Tripp and kept her communications with him to e-mail for the next week. The second incident occurred in her office later in December 2015. While discussing another affair that may be happening at work, Mr. Tripp said he could not report the other employee because he wanted to do the same thing with Ms. Ford, notwithstanding the professional and personal risks. She again rejected him. For the next few weeks, Ms. Ford tried to avoid him as much as possible, but she had to face him because the deals began to lag. She said he continued to make comments here and there, but she offered no specific details. The third incident occurred in January 2016, after a conference call in Mr. Tripp’s office. He said he knew Ms. Ford was avoiding him, but he could not function. He told her he was willing to leave his wife, but she again rejected him. Over the next few months, the comments and innuendo pretty much ceased so Ms. Ford decided to go back to being friends to ensure that the Maverick and Falcon deals closed. However, a fourth incident occurred in the parking lot after a late conference call in June 2016. Mr. Tripp professed that his feelings were stronger now and that he was waiting for Ms. Ford to change her mind. She said her feelings had not changed and he said he understood. For the remainder of 2016, Ms. Ford testified generally that Mr. Tripp continued to make comments about his inability to function and that he got more obsessive as the year progressed. But she offered little detail about the comments or where and when they occurred, except that she had to be around Mr. Tripp’s wife several times and she and Mr. Tripp agreed it was uncomfortable. The fifth incident occurred in October 2016 when Mr. Tripp told her he was learning Hebrew to “connect” with her in her native language. He tried to communicate with her in Hebrew in person and via text, despite her telling him to stop because it made her very uncomfortable. As a result, she again started to avoid him at the office, though he texted her to see if she was alright and admitted to acting like a high school student. In January 2017, Mr. Tripp continued with innuendo, spoke in Hebrew, and told Ms. Ford that he might move closer to her. She believed he was obsessed, which made her nervous about his stability and her safety. But she offered no specific dates on which these events occurred. Mr. Tripp came to Ms. Ford’s office twice that month after she had heated meetings with the CEO, including on her last day at the company, January 27, 2017. He cried because he could not imagine how he would go on if she left, as she was the only reason he came to work every day. That evening, he told her on the phone that he now knows what a divorce feels like. Mr. Tripp continued to harass her following her departure, including taking his family to the same ski resort in March 2017. She testified that she stayed in her room to avoid him and never initiated contact with him while there, though text messages admitted into evidence confirm she texted him several times, about a security breach and generally about his vacation. In January 2018, a year after she left the company during a mediation of her lawsuit against Lincare, Ms. Ford for the first time accused Mr. Tripp of sexual harassment. She had not reported the allegations pursuant to Lincare’s policy, though she knew it required her to do so. She never informed other coworkers either. In fact, the only person she said she told was her husband, though he did not testify at the hearing. Ms. Ford testified that she did not report the allegations because she had a contentious relationship with the CEO during this period and she believed the CEO would terminate her. She also was concerned that Mr. Tripp was unstable and could decide to kill the deals to ensure she missed out on her bonuses. Lastly, she thought reporting would be futile due to Lincare’s culture of harassment, including by one of the two individuals to whom she was directed to report, the head of HR. Mr. Tripp’s Testimony Denying the Alleged Sexual Harassment Mr. Tripp said that he never harassed Ms. Ford. Indeed, no one has ever accused him of harassment. He said he never expressed romantic feelings for her, suggested having a sexual relationship with her, or did anything to scare her. Ms. Ford’s allegations against him came as a shock. He believed they had been good friends for over 15 years and she never indicated otherwise. They enjoyed each other’s company, had children around the same age, and spoke often about business and personal things, like friends often do. Even during the period of alleged harassment, he noticed no changes in her behavior. They continued to invite each other to lunch regularly, often eating together alone, and continued to discuss deeply personal matters about their families. They texted each other often and attended holiday dinners with friends. She chose to sit next to him at a work event at a hotel in the fall of 2016. The same could be said for business trips during this period. On a March 2016 trip to New York, Ms. Ford left a group dinner early with him because he was sick, they worked out the next day, and had breakfast. On an August 2016 trip to Nashville to celebrate the closing of the Maverick deal, they rented a car together and went to dinner alone after Ms. Ford invited him. On a trip to New York in August/September 2016, Ms. Ford stayed with Mr. Tripp to retrieve his briefcase from the office and went to the airport together after the rest of the team left. Mr. Tripp admitted to learning some Hebrew, but because he liked languages (he was an Arabic linguist in the Army), not to become romantically connected to Ms. Ford. He practiced with her because she was the only person he knew who spoke Hebrew, just as he did with other coworkers who spoke another language. She never said it made her uncomfortable. Mr. Tripp also admitted that his wife suggested moving closer to Plant High School because it had a beneficial program for their son. The idea had nothing to do with Ms. Ford, who did not live nearby, and they decided not to move in any event. Even on her final days at Lincare, they had usual interactions. Mr. Tripp admitted calling Ms. Ford the evening of her last day (but said he had not come down to her office earlier) to express concern for his friend and sadness that they would no longer be working together. He did not recall commenting about a divorce, but if he had, it only related to her being a friend. For a few months after she left Lincare, Mr. Tripp believed their relationship had not changed. They continued to text each other and had lunch alone at least once. Though he took a ski trip to the same resort in March 2017, his wife chose the resort and Ms. Ford reached out to him several times during that trip to see how he was doing. Ms. Ford also texted him after he had a car accident in March/April 2017. It was not until several months after Ms. Ford left Lincare and filed her lawsuit against the company that he noticed a change in her attitude. At one point, he invited her to lunch with a mutual friend, but she did not respond and he later learned they had lunch without him. Ms. Ford also told him on the phone that he was going to hate her someday, though he had no idea then what that meant. After a hurricane in August/September 2017, he reached out to make sure she was safe; she thanked him and wished his family well too. That was their last communication before the sexual harassment allegations were made. Credibility Findings as to the Conflicting Testimony After hearing the conflicting testimony from Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp and observing their demeanor, the undersigned found it exceedingly difficult initially to determine who is telling the truth and who is quite an effective storyteller. Ms. Ford’s conviction in her accusations against Mr. Tripp was equal to his conviction in his denials. But, when considering all of the record evidence and testimony, the scales of credibility tip in Mr. Tripp’s favor for several reasons. For one, Ms. Ford cultivated a professional and personal relationship with Mr. Tripp throughout the alleged harassment period and continued to do so even after she left Lincare. Although she said she maintained contact because they had to work together and she wanted him as an ally, she also accused him of stalker-like, obsessive, humiliating, and unstable behavior. Her efforts to maintain a friendship with him, even after leaving Lincare, are at odds with someone who feels humiliated and fears for their safety. Ms. Ford’s testimony also veered from the affidavit she filed with the Commission. She testified that he generally made comments between November 2016 and January 2017, yet her affidavit offered more specifics as to the comments allegedly made. Her testimony about him moving to her neighborhood was entirely omitted from her affidavit. Her testimony about his efforts to sometimes communicate with her in Hebrew was at odds with the affidavit’s claim that he did so “continuously.” And, her testimony about the comments he made on her last day at Lincare differed as to substance and degree from her affidavit. Further, Ms. Ford’s testimony was directly refuted by other evidence. She testified that she did not affirmatively communicate with him about anything personal in March 2017, but text messages confirm that she checked in with him several times during the trip about his vacation and engaged in more friendly conversation than initially admitted. Ms. Ford’s reasons for waiting until a year after she left Lincare to report the accusations also call her credibility into doubt. Though she testified that she feared Mr. Tripp would kill two large deals and her bonuses therefrom, those deals closed in March and August 2016, and yet she never reported the allegedly ongoing harassment before she left Lincare at the end of January 2017. It also cannot be ignored that she waited until January 2018 to report the accusations and did so during the mediation of her compensation lawsuit against the company. Lastly, though not fatal to her claim, Ms. Ford’s failure to present any corroborating evidence cannot be ignored. She testified that she lost weight, suffered hair loss, and could not sleep, and said that it was the worst year of her life. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence that any other friends or coworkers noticed such changes, that she missed work or social events, or that she suffered at work in any way. She said he sent her inappropriate text messages, but provided no proof of them. She apparently kept a journal about work issues, but did not document the harassing incidents. And, though she said she immediately told her husband in December 2015, she chose not to present his testimony even though he was the only person who could corroborate her accusations.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Sharon Ford, failed to timely file her Complaint and, regardless, that Ms. Ford failed to establish that Respondent, Lincare, Inc., committed an unlawful employment practice against her, both of which warrant dismissal of her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2019.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.06760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (6) 28-106.10428-106.10628-106.11160Y-3.00360Y-4.01660Y-5.008 DOAH Case (10) 01-5401-5504-145104-15905-1152006-281516-291918-507299-357699-4035
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs KAYODE EZEKIAL SOTONWA, M. D., 11-005780PL (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Nov. 10, 2011 Number: 11-005780PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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MICHAEL J. WELCH vs RURAL METRO OF NORTH FLORIDA, INC., 04-003184 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 08, 2004 Number: 04-003184 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Rural Metro of North Florida, Inc., violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on October 11, 1999, as an Emergency Medical Technician Basic, until July 2001 when he was reclassified with Respondent as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic, until his termination from employment with Respondent on April 16, 2003. In July 2001, Petitioner told his then manager, Dominic Persichini, that he no longer wanted to work with his partner, Marlene Sanders, and he requested a transfer. Petitioner gave as his reason for the transfer that Ms. Sanders was interested in him in an inappropriate way which disrupted his family life. He never actually heard Ms. Sanders make any inappropriate sexual remarks directed at him. Ms. Sanders accused Petitioner of allowing his wife to interfere with their working relationship and to involving herself in Ms. Sanders' personal life, which made her uncomfortable working with Petitioner. On March 27, 2002, Stephen Glatstein, Respondent's new General Manager, wrote a letter to Petitioner in which he acknowledged that problems had occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Sanders, that the two of them would be separated and reassigned to new shifts, and that Petitioner was being reassigned to the B-shift rotation (1800-0600 hours), which conflicted with his family duties. Petitioner received a good evaluation and a pay raise dated February 15, 2003, in which his supervisor, Ryan Jenkins, stated that "Michael's abilities meet or exceed industry standards. Michael keeps current by completing CEU's and taking refresher classes. There is one new Corrective Action Notice in his file since last year involving a post move. The incident was on 08-07-02 and to my knowledge there have not been any further problems since." Further, the evaluation reads that "Michael shows a great attitude and appears to really enjoy his job. This makes him very easy to work with. Michael's good personality and working knowledge of E.M.S. is a benefit to the customers that he serves. It is clear that we should be proud to have Michael as part of our team." Petitioner received letters of commendation from his supervisors and letters of thanks from patients and their families he had served. In April 2003, Natashia Duke, a new employee with Respondent, went to the General Manager, Mr. Chalmers, and accused Petitioner of having made statements of a sexual nature to her and of touching her inappropriately. Ms. Duke provided a written statement to Mr. Chalmers who forwarded the information to the Division General Manager, Chris Rucker. Mr. Rucker advised Mr. Chalmers to place Petitioner on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning Ms. Duke's complaint. Mr. Chalmers followed this instruction and placed Petitioner on leave. Mr. Rucker traveled to Pensacola to meet with Mr. Chalmers and Ms. Duke. At this meeting, Ms. Duke reaffirmed what she had written in the complaint against Petitioner and told Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers about another employee she believed had been sexually harassed by Petitioner, Kristy Bradberry. The next day, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers interviewed Ms. Bradberry who informed them that she had been sexually harassed by Petitioner. She provided a written statement which described the alleged harassment in detail. Ms. Bradberry told the interviewers of another person she believed had suffered sexual harassment by Petitioner, Tina Dunsford (Tina Richardson at the time of her complaint). Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers next interviewed Ms. Dunsford who confirmed that Petitioner had sexually harassed her as well by making sexual comments and propositions to her, and by touching her inappropriately. After Ms. Dunsford's interview, Ryan Jenkins, another of Respondent's employees, reported that Ms. Dunsford had complained to him of sexual harassment by Petitioner a few months earlier. Mr. Jenkins had failed to take any action on the previous complaint. After interviewing the three complainants, Ms. Duke, Ms. Bradberry, and Ms. Dunsford, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers met with Petitioner. At that meeting, Petitioner denied all of the allegations made by the three female co-workers and gave no explanation for what they alleged had happened. Mr. Rucker believed the statements given by the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner were credible. Mr. Rucker made the decision with Mr. Chalmers to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent had no prior history of problems with any of the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner. Petitioner believes the sexual harassment charges were trumped up against him so that Respondent could fire him, since he was beyond the company probationary period and therefore could be terminated only for a business purpose pursuant to the company employee handbook. No evidence was produced at hearing to support a violation of company policy by Respondent in Petitioner's termination. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was employed with the Escambia County E.M.S.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Welch 2060 Burjonik Lane Navarre, Florida 32566-2118 John B. Trawick, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge 226 Palafox Place Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32591-1831 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (5) 120.569509.092760.01760.10760.11
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FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs TAYLOR L. LANDRY, 18-002905PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City Beach, Florida Jun. 07, 2018 Number: 18-002905PL Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2015), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(a); and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida. Petitioner issued Corrections Certification No. 320518 to Respondent on December 15, 2014. The Florida Department of Corrections employed Respondent between July 1 and September 30, 2015. Between July 1 and September 30, 2015, the minor child, who was related to Respondent by marriage, resided with Respondent at his residence. Between July 1 and September 30, 2015, the minor child was 12 years of age or older, but younger than 18 years of age. The minor child’s parents each executed documents evidencing their intent that Respondent’s wife, Jessica Emanuel, act as guardian of the minor child. These documents indicated that Ms. Emanuel could enroll the minor child in school, make health care decisions, and make other decisions concerning the minor child’s general welfare. In October 2015, Monica Lange, a case coordinator for the Child Protection Team in the Children’s Advocacy Center, received a referral from the Department of Children and Families in Charlotte County, Florida, concerning the minor child. Ms. Lange testified that she conducted a video interview of the minor child on October 19, 2015, in Fort Myers, Florida (the CPT interview). Ms. Lange credibly testified that when she interviewed the minor victim, the minor victim (who was 17 years old at the time of the interview) did not appear to be impaired, appeared to have the skill set to answer the questions asked, and understood everything that Ms. Lange asked. Ms. Lange also credibly testified that the minor victim understood the concept of being truthful, and was responsive to the questions Ms. Lange asked. The CPT interview revealed the following recollections of the minor victim: Shortly after the minor victim (who was then 16 years old) began living with Respondent and Jessica Emanuel, Respondent and the minor child began consuming alcohol together and engaging in conversations of a sexual nature; Respondent and the minor child thereafter engaged in sexual activity over 30 times in Respondent’s house and truck; The minor child described many of these incidents of sexual activity with detail as to time and location; The minor child stated that Respondent and the minor child engaged in sexual activity with and without a condom; and The minor child stated that the minor child was exposed to a sexually transmitted disease during this time period. After the CPT interview, Ms. Lange contacted Jason Cook, an investigator with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Cook testified that he reviewed the CPT interview, and then called and scheduled appointments with Jessica Emanuel and the minor child’s mother. Based on those interviews, Mr. Cook contacted Respondent, and, on November 2, 2015, interviewed Respondent at Mr. Cook’s office for approximately two hours and 15 minutes. Mr. Cook testified that he provided Respondent with a Miranda warning, informed Respondent that he was not being charged with a crime at that time, and that Respondent was free to leave the interview at any point. The undersigned’s review of the interview confirms Mr. Cook’s testimony. Mr. Cook testified that for the first 40 to 50 minutes of the interview, Respondent’s demeanor was nervous, guarded, and defensive. However, according to Mr. Cook, Respondent later seemed to open up and spoke more freely.2/ Throughout the interview, Respondent stated that he and his wife provided the basic necessities to the minor child, including room and board. Additionally, Respondent stated that the minor child attended school. During the first 40 to 50 minutes of the interview, Mr. Cook testified that when he asked Respondent whether he engaged in sexual activity with the minor child, Respondent stated many times that he was not sure or could not remember. The undersigned reviewed Mr. Cook’s interview of Respondent. During the first approximately 40 minutes of the interview, when Mr. Cook asked Respondent whether he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child, Respondent provided various non-denials of such activity, stating, at various points: he had psychological issues, so he could not give Mr. Cook an honest answer; (b) he did not feel that he had sexual activities with the minor child; (c) he did not know if he had sexual activities with the minor child; (d) he could not believe engaging in sexual activities with the minor child was something he would do; and (e) he did not know if he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child, but it was a possibility. After approximately 40 minutes of the interview, Mr. Cook and Respondent discussed various disciplinary measures Respondent took with the minor child. After this discussion, Respondent stated that he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child. Respondent stated that these allegations were true, and that he was “tired” of trying to remember or think about this subject. Respondent further stated that he did not engage in sexual activities with the minor child more than 30 times, as the minor child reported. Instead, he stated that he engaged in sexual activities with the minor child between 10 and 20 times. Respondent also stated that the local health department prescribed him medication for either an infection or a sexually transmitted disease, but he could not recall which. At multiple times during the interview, Respondent vaguely referred to mental health issues he felt he suffered, including “bipolar schizophrenia.” When pressed by Mr. Cook, Respondent stated that he had not sought treatment for any mental health issues and had essentially self-diagnosed these issues. Respondent has not otherwise presented any evidence of such mental health issues in this proceeding and recanted this self- diagnosis at the final hearing. At the final hearing, Respondent testified that he did not engage in any sexual activity with the minor child. Respondent further stated that if he had engaged in sexual activity with the minor child, he would have been tried and convicted. Respondent testified that the state attorney dropped the charges against him in the criminal case. At the final hearing, Respondent stated that Mr. Cook did not force him to make any statements or admissions during the November 2, 2015, interview. Respondent provided various documents concerning the criminal case demonstrating that the State dismissed criminal charges concerning the same conduct alleged in this proceeding. The undersigned notes that the “Order Dismissing Charges” in the criminal case found that “the State will be unable to prove the charges against the Defendant without the testimony of the alleged victim, and the alleged victim’s testimony has been excluded by the Court because the alleged victim has repeatedly failed to appear for her deposition . . . .” The undersigned also notes that a Subpoena for Telephonic Deposition to be served on the minor victim indicates that the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office was unable to serve the subpoena, stating, “THIS SUBJECT MOVED OUT IN MARCH, SHE IS HOMELESS LIVING IN THE WOODS SOMEWHERE, NO CONTACT INFORMATION AVAILABLE, WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.” The undersigned has considered evidence of the disposition of Respondent’s criminal case in this proceeding. Despite the disposition of the criminal case against Respondent, the undersigned finds that Mr. Cook’s testimony, and the November 2, 2015, interview of Respondent in which Respondent ultimately admits to engaging in sexual activity with the minor child, corroborates the minor victim’s statements in the interview with Ms. Lange that the minor victim engaged in sexual activity with Respondent while Respondent was in a position of familial or custodial authority. The undersigned finds the testimony of Mr. Cook and Ms. Lange to be credible. The undersigned further finds the minor victim’s statements in the CPT interview to be clear, precise, and distinctly remembered. The undersigned further finds that Respondent ultimately admitted to engaging in sexual conduct with the minor victim, as alleged, and that Mr. Cook did not force or coerce Respondent to provide this admission.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent Taylor L. Landry has failed to maintain the qualifications for good moral character for a correctional officer, established under section 943.13(7), and defined in rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a). It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner revoke Respondent Taylor L. Landry’s Corrections Certification No. 320518. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2018

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57775.082775.083775.084794.01190.80190.803943.13943.1395
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MICHELE PRICE vs FLAGLER COUNTY SCHOOLS, 07-005677 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bunnell, Florida Dec. 14, 2007 Number: 07-005677 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 2009

The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006), and if so, what remedy should be ordered?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female formerly employed by the School District. From February 2006 to April 18, 2007, she was employed as a paraprofessional in the special education unit at Flagler Palm Coast High School. Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(6) and (10), Florida Statutes, in that Petitioner is female and filed a complaint of gender discrimination and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. From the inception of her employment and until March 13, 2007, Ms. Price was assigned as a paraprofessional (parapro) in Mr. Robert Rinker's classroom. Ms. Price had not been in the work force for several years before taking the job at Flagler Palm Coast High School and was taking classes at night to obtain her teaching degree. Mr. Rinker teaches in what was described as a self- contained classroom for students who are classified as emotionally handicapped in the exceptional education program. At Flagler Palm Coast High School, at least some of the students in the program would attend classes in the 300 building of the campus, and would have fewer classes and teachers compared to a traditional schedule. However, students would not necessarily be limited to one classroom all day. They could, for example, have classes with other special education teachers in the 300 building. Parapros are evaluated by the assistant principal. While teachers with whom the parapro worked might be asked to provide input for evaluations, the teachers are not considered to be their supervisors. Ms. Price was in the classroom with Mr. Rinker during first and second periods, between classes, and during lunch. During third and fourth period, Mr. Rinker supervised students in the gym while Ms. Price remained in the classroom with students who did not go to the gym. Stan Hall also teaches special education in the 300 building of Flagler Palm Coast High School. During Ms. Price’s employment, he was assisted by a parapro named Kathy Picano. Ms. Picano sometimes visited Ms. Price in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She is significantly younger than both Ms. Price and Mr. Rinker. Mr. Rinker is a jovial man and a veteran teacher. He coaches soccer and has coached basketball. He is well liked by his peers and by the students he teaches. Mr. Rinker often tells jokes and stories, and sometimes his jokes are “off color” or of a sexual nature. The jokes and stories are told to both male and female colleagues and not in the presence of students. No other staff member had ever told Mr. Rinker that his jokes were offensive and no one had ever complained to supervisory personnel that they were offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior. Mr. Rinker sometimes used the phrase, “a good lovin’ is the universal cure.” He testified that he had heard this phrase since his childhood from his older relatives, and simply meant that when someone is having a bad day, a hug or other encouragement helps make things better. The remark could be addressed to students and staff alike. He did not mean anything sexual by the phrase, and others hearing the phrase did not interpret it as a sexual remark. Mr. Rinker’s testimony is credited. Ms. Price, however, was offended by Mr. Rinker’s jokes. She testified that nearly every conversation with Mr. Rinker became focused on sex. According to Ms. Price, the first week she worked with Mr. Rinker, they were discussing mailboxes in the classroom, and he stated, “let’s talk about the box you are sitting on.” She understood that he was referring to her vagina. Ms. Price stated that she was shocked by this statement, but did not say so because it was her first week on the job. Mr. Rinker does not remember ever making such a statement. Whether or not this incident actually happened, it occurred over a year prior to Ms. Price's complaint to either the School District or the Commission. Also that first week, Ms. Price mentioned in the classroom that she had a headache, and in response Mr. Rinker rubbed her shoulders or neck. Ms. Price was offended but did not tell Mr. Rinker his touch was unwelcome. Ms. Price claims that while things were not too bad the first semester she worked with Mr. Rinker, eventually it got to the point where she was unable to have a conversation with Mr. Rinker without it focusing on sex. She claimed that he sometimes purposefully rubbed up against her in the classroom.1/ In order to avoid talking to him or being physically close to him, she moved her desk to another part of the room. While she claimed the situation was intolerable, she did not report Mr. Rinker’s behavior to any supervisor and did not tell him she was offended by his conduct. Kathy Picano and Ms. Price sometimes spent time together in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. Mr. Rinker sometimes told jokes in Ms. Picano's presence and sometimes “invaded her personal space.” He acknowledged that he might have patted her on the back in passing as part of a greeting, but Ms. Picano described the touch as no different from what she might have received from her grandmother. Although Ms. Picano did not particularly care for Mr. Rinker’s jokes, she attributed them to being “just his personality.” She was not offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior and, before being questioned with respect to Ms. Price's complaint in this case, never complained about it to him or anyone else in authority at the school. She acknowledged hearing Mr. Rinker make the “good lovin” comment, but found it endearing, as opposed to harassing. Ms. Price, however, was deeply offended by what she viewed as Mr. Rinker’s behavior toward Ms. Picano. The things with which she took offense did not stop with Mr. Rinker’s jokes or the attention she perceived that he gave to Ms. Picano. She did not think that Mr. Rinker or Mr. Hall did an adequate job of teaching, and was upset that Mr. Hall’s students were allowed, on occasion, to come to Mr. Rinker’s classroom to finish assignments because they were disruptive. She did not appreciate the way Mr. Peacock, the assistant principal, performed his job and believed there was an unwritten code where coaches and athletes did not have to follow the same rules as others on campus. Perhaps most of all, she was offended because students in Mr. Rinker’s classroom talked about sex too much and she did not believe that he did enough to stop it. In her view, this was exacerbated when Mr. Hall’s students were allowed to come over and finish work. Further, she believed that the students were using the computers in the classroom to access inappropriate videos and music that were offensive. Computers were in the classroom for students to complete assignments and to do research for school projects. When they were finished with their work, students sometimes played games on the computers and checked sports sites. Sites such as “myspace,” however, were blocked in accordance with school policy. While Ms. Price claimed the students were using the computers for inappropriate purposes, she admitted that she could not see what was on the computer screens from where she sat in the classroom. The testimony of the students did not corroborate her claim. All stated computers were used for school work and when school work was finished, to play games as stated above. Only one student indicated that he watched music videos. All the others denied doing so. There is no question that the students in Mr. Rinker’s class sometimes talked about sex and used profanity in the classroom.2/ One of the classes was a health class. The students were teenagers, many of whom had significant emotional problems with little or no support at home. Some of their individual education plans addressed the problem of too much use of profanity, with a goal of reducing its use in the classroom setting. Staff who testified all stated that trying to eliminate the use of profanity entirely was probably not a realistic goal, but modifying behavior to reduce it was. Their testimony is credited. Ms. Price was not the only one who complained about students talking about sex in the classroom. Barbara Ryan was another parapro who sometimes worked in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She agreed that the students sometimes talked about sex and remembered a particular incident where she thought the discussion was particularly explicit and she said something to Mr. Rinker. He told the students involved to “knock it off.” In December 2006, an anonymous call came in to Ms. Myra Middleton at the District office complaining about inappropriate language used by students in the 300 building. Ms. Middleton referred the person to Mr. Peacock in accordance with School District policy. She spoke to Mr. Peacock, who said he would take care of it. After the phone call, Mr. Peacock went to each of the classrooms in the 300 building and spoke to the students about the inappropriateness of using profanity and talking about sex in the classroom. There was no evidence, however, that the anonymous call was placed because of conduct occurring in Mr. Rinker's classroom. The talk by students did not necessarily stop after Mr. Peacock spoke to the students. However, the more credible evidence is that these conversations did not involve the entire class, but rather small groups of students. Several students testified they never heard talk about sex in the classroom. The conversations that did occur took place while other conversations were also taking place. When Mr. Rinker heard the conversations, he told students to stop. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Rinker heard each conversation that Ms. Price heard or that he deliberately chose not to address the students’ behavior. Nor is there any evidence that the students’ discussions regarding sex were in any way directed toward her. Mr. Rinker was not particularly computer literate. As a consequence, Ms. Price entered all of the students' grades in the computer. She had access to Mr. Rinker’s password and would print out his e-mail. In early March, 2007, Mr. Rinker received an e-mail from Mr. Peacock’s secretary directing that he see Mr. Peacock regarding his evaluation. Ms. Price did not believe that Mr. Peacock intended to complete the required observation for Mr. Rinker's evaluation, and this offended her. Ms. Price answered the e-mail as if she were Mr. Rinker, noting that no observation had yet taken place. This conduct violated the written standards applicable to parapros. Mr. Peacock discovered that Ms. Price, and not Mr. Rinker, had responded to his secretary's e-mail. On March 9, 2007, Mr. Peacock called Ms. Price into his office and told her that it was improper for her to send e-mails under Mr. Rinker’s name. During the meeting, Ms. Price explained that she was inputting grades, attendance and all other computer data. Mr. Peacock advised that additional training would be made available for Mr. Rinker, but that she was not to perform his duties. Ms. Price was under the impression that she was receiving a reprimand. She also felt that Mr. Rinker, who was also counseled by Mr. Peacock, did not defend her as vigorously as he should, and that he was the one who should be in trouble. In fact, Mr. Rinker told Mr. Peacock that Ms. Price had his permission to use his password for the computer and that she was very helpful. Ms. Price’s reaction to this incident was well out of proportion to the incident itself. Moreover, she did not appear to recognize that what she did in signing Mr. Rinker’s name to the e-mail was wrong. She was crying, both after the meeting and into the next week. The meeting with Mr. Peacock took place on a Friday. On Monday, Ms. Price was on a previously-scheduled day off. On Tuesday, she was still upset to the point of tears, and went to see Sue Marier, the ESE Department head. Although she was told repeatedly, both by Ms. Marier and by Mr. Peacock, that she was not being formally reprimanded for the incident, she continued to believe she was being treated unfairly. She told Mr. Rinker, Ms. Marier and Mr. Peacock that if she was going down, then so was Mr. Rinker. The following day, March 14, 2007, Ms. Price went to the principal, Nancy Willis, and complained that Mr. Rinker had been sexually harassing her since the beginning of her employment. Ms. Willis advised Ms. Price to put her complaint in writing, which she did. The complaint was forwarded immediately to the district office for investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Rinker was suspended with pay. Mrs. Willis also asked Ms. Price if she wanted to be moved to a different classroom, and Ms. Price indicated she did not want to be around Mr. Rinker. Mrs. Willis went to Sue Marier, the ESE Department Head, and asked where there was a need for a parapro so that Ms. Price could be transferred. At the time of the request, Ms. Marier did not know that Ms. Price had filed the complaint regarding sexual harassment and thought Ms. Price was still upset over the computer e-mail incident. She told Mrs. Willis that the greatest need was in the class for autistic children, and Ms. Price was transferred to that class. A decision had been made to add more staff, including another teacher, for that area, but positions had not yet been advertised. Parapros do not generally have the right to choose their assignments. They are placed in the classroom with the greatest need. At the time of Ms. Price's transfer, the autistic classroom was the classroom with the greatest need. This transfer did not result in a change in pay or status. There were significantly fewer students in the autistic class than in Mr. Rinker's class, and at least one of the students had a one-on-one aide in the classroom. While there was a slight change in schedule, it was not significant, and she remained a parapro at the same rate of pay. Both Sue Marier and Nancy Willis went by at different times to check on Ms. Price in her new placement. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Price did not complain about being in this classroom. The School District has two policies that deal with sexual harassment: Policy number 662, entitled Prohibition of Sexual Harassment - Employees, and Policy number 217, entitled Prohibiting Discrimination, Including Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment. It is unclear why the School District has both at the same time. The definitions regarding sexual harassment in both policies are similar, with Policy number 217 being slightly more detailed. The complaint procedure outlined in Policy number 217 is clearly more detailed, and it cannot be said that it was followed to the letter in this case. However, Policy number 217 was amended after the investigation took place in this case. No testimony was presented to show whether the more detailed procedures presently listed in Policy number 217 were in place at the time of the investigation. Further, the documents related to the investigation reference Policy number 662, as opposed to Policy number 217. It is found that the investigation was conducted in accordance with Policy number 662, and that to do so was appropriate. Ms. Price’s complaint of sexual harassment was investigated by April Dixon and Harriet Holiday. Over the course of the next several days, both Mr. Rinker and Ms. Price were interviewed (separately) as well as several other staff members. Those staff members included Sue Marier, Kathy Picano, Donna Dopp, Stan Hall, Pat Barile (Sue Marier's assistant), Mr. Tietema (another teacher), and Barbara Ryan. The investigation conducted was reasonable, given the allegations by Ms. Price. Ms. Price's written complaint stated that Mr. Rinker made inappropriate sexual comments; that he rubbed up against her on numerous occasions; that Mr. Rinker allowed the students to talk in the classroom using sexually explicit language and had made no effort to stop it; and that he had made inappropriate sexual comments to Ms. Picano. Policy number 662 provides in pertinent part: Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of employment (or of an individual's education). submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for an employment or employment decisions affecting that individual; or such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment, as defined above, may include but is not limited to the following: verbal harassment or abuse; pressure for sexual activity; repeated remarks to a person with sexual or demeaning implications; unwelcome or inappropriate touching; suggesting or demanding sexual involvement accompanied by implied or explicit threats concerning one's employment. * * * Procedures. -- Any employee who alleges sexual harassment by any staff member must report the incident directly to the building principal or the employee's immediate supervisor. Alternatively, the employee may make the report to the Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Accountability. Filing a complaint or otherwise reporting sexual harassment will not affect the individual's status, future employment or work assignments. The right of confidentiality, both of the complaint and of the accused will be respected, consistent with the Board's legal obligations, and with the necessity to investigate allegations of misconduct and take corrective action when this conduct has occurred. In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the totality of circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged conduct occurred will be investigated. The Superintendent or designee has the responsibility of investigating and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. A substantiated charge against a Board employee shall subject such employee to disciplinary action, including but not limited to warning, suspension or termination, subject to applicable procedural requirements. After investigation of Ms. Price's complaints, April Dixon discussed her findings with Mr. Delbrugge, the School District Superintendent. She also turned over to him all of the transcripts of taped interviews and her conclusions regarding the investigation. She concluded, and he agreed, that the investigation showed Mr. Rinker told inappropriate jokes in the workplace but that in all other respects Ms. Price's complaints were not substantiated. The investigation also revealed that Ms. Price also used profanity and occasionally told sexually- related jokes in the workplace. The Superintendent decided that the appropriate penalty (in addition to the suspension with pay already imposed) was to reprimand Mr. Rinker with a letter in his file; to require him to receive additional training on sexual harassment; to warn him that further complaints would result in termination; and to place him on probation for the remainder of the school year. This discipline was consistent with the School District's collective bargaining agreement concerning discipline of instructional staff. Mr. Rinker was informed of this result March 19, 2007, and completed the sexual harassment training as required. Ms. Price was notified informally of the results of the investigation that same day. She received official notification by letter dated May 3, 2007. Ms. Price was very dissatisfied with the results of the investigation and the action taken by the School District. She felt that Mr. Rinker should be fired. It is clear, after hearing, that nothing less then Mr. Rinker's termination would appease her. Ms. Price was also unhappy with her new placement. She did not like being in the classroom with the autistic students and felt they were dangerous. She felt that she should have been allowed to remain in her original classroom and Mr. Rinker should have been removed. After less than three weeks, she tendered her resignation. This three-week period included one week off for Spring Break and some personal leave days taken due to Ms. Price's husband having a stroke. Her resignation is dated April 18, 2007, but her last day working in the classroom was approximately April 6, 2007. Ms. Price's resignation was voluntary. While there was some belief that she left because of her husband's stroke, Ms. Price disputes that assertion and insists that it was because of the conditions in the new classroom to which she was assigned. Her resignation letter, however, references neither reason. It states: Dear Ms. Willis: It is with sincere regret that I am writing this letter of resignation as an ESE Para Professional for Flagler Palm Coast High School. Please accept this as such. I do apologize for the short notice. I would also like to take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation of your handling of my complaint. You are the only one who has validated me as a person and as a worthy employee. I only had a brief encounter with you but it was enough for me to know that working directly under you would have been a pleasure as well as a great learning experience as I respect your leadership abilities. I recognize that this is a trying situation for all involved and that you have done your very best to rectify the matter under the circumstances. It is important for me to let you know that whatever happens in the future in regards to my claim, this is no way a reflection on you. I truly hope that you can appreciate my position and the importance of making positive changes for the future. Based upon the evidence presented, it is found that Ms. Price resigned for a variety of reasons, including her husband's stroke and her unhappiness with the new placement. However, her dissatisfaction with the handling of the complaint regarding Mr. Rinker and his continued employment was at least a part of her decision. Ms. Price was not subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of her complaint. To the contrary, school officials transferred her to another classroom at her request. The conditions in the new classroom setting were not onerous.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing Petitioner’s complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2008.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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TAMMIE COLLINS | T. C. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-002972 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Jul. 08, 1998 Number: 98-002972 Latest Update: Aug. 18, 1999

The Issue The issue at the hearing was whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from disqualification of employment as a person who has direct contact with aged or disabled adults.

Findings Of Fact In 1993, Petitioner was 25 years old. Petitioner was employed by Sunland to care for its disabled clients. Petitioner's duties included direct contact with the clients of Sunland. The background screen revealed that on November 9, 1993, Petitioner plead guilty to two counts of battery (domestic violence). The conviction was the result of a physical altercation between Petitioner and Petitioner's live-in boyfriend, during which Petitioner threw an iron at her boyfriend missing him and striking her 3 year-old child. As a consequence of the conviction, Petitioner was fined the minimum amount and sentenced to two years' probation. She was adjudicated guilty. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, the evidence showed that Petitioner has had at least two other encounters with the criminal justice system. The greater weight of the evidence showed that Petitioner has a problem with controlling her anger and in controlling her violent response thereto. Based on the record in this case, Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that she will not be and is not a danger to disabled or elderly persons with which she might come into contact and that she has not learned to control her anger and use of physical aggression. The Petitioner is therefore not entitled to an exemption from disqualification from employment.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner, Tammie Collins, an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Wallace, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Tammie Collins Post Office Box 208 Greenwood, Florida 32444 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (25) 120.57415.102415.103435.03435.04435.07741.30782.04782.07782.071782.09784.011784.021784.03784.045787.01787.02794.011798.02806.01817.563826.04827.03827.04827.071
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs DAVID A. BRESSETTE, L.D.O., 20-003419PL (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jul. 30, 2020 Number: 20-003419PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to the crime of Aggravated Assault relates to the practice of or ability to practice opticianry, and, therefore, constitutes a violation of section 484.014(1)(q), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, David Allen Bressette, L.D.O., was a licensed optician within the State of Florida, having first been issued license number DO 3755 on or about May 1, 1992. Respondent's address of record is 4545 Sweet Bay Avenue, Melbourne, Florida 32935. On or about November 29, 2017, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office arrested Respondent for 10 counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct, in violation of section 827.07(5), Florida Statutes (2017). On or about March 2, 2018, Respondent was charged with four counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct, in violation of section 827.07(5), Florida Statutes (2017), in Case No. 05-2017-CF-052816- AXXX-XX. On or about March 20, 2019, Respondent pled nolo contendere to one count of Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony, in Case No. 05-2017-CF- 052816-AXXX-XX. The ability to practice or the practice of opticianry requires interacting with children built on trust and maintaining social boundaries. A special condition of Respondent's order of probation for his plea to the crime of Aggravated Assault requires that Respondent have “no unsupervised contact with a child under the age of eighteen (18) unless supervised by the child's parent or legal guardian or by a court order.” Evidentiary Findings of Fact Respondent owned a practice with Dr. Ronald Ryan, an ophthalmologist. Dr. Ryan sold his interest in the practice in 2016 to Dr. David Hendrix. Respondent sold his interest in April 2018. He has not practiced opticianry since that time. Respondent intends to resume practicing opticianry when this case is resolved. During the investigation of the complaint that led to Respondent’s arrest and his ultimately being charged with four counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct in Case No. 05-2017-CF-052816-AXXX-XX, Respondent submitted to a recorded interview. In the interview, Respondent alluded to the possibility of his having used his devices to view images of girls in their mid-teens -- 14 or 15 years of age -- though his description of what may have been on his devices was insufficient, in itself, to support a finding that they were unclothed or engaged in sexual conduct. Nonetheless, Respondent admitted to masturbating to, and deriving sexual gratification from those images. At the conclusion of the interview, Agent Kersey seized Respondent’s iPad and iPhone. A warrant was subsequently executed at Respondent’s home where other devices were seized. Agent Kersey testified that he personally observed images of what he described as child pornography, depicting sexual acts or genitalia of what he believed to include pre-teen juveniles, retrieved from Respondent’s electronic devices. Agent Kersey’s employment since 2014 as an agent for the Special Victims Unit, charged with investigating, inter alia, child abuse, child sex crimes, and possession of child pornography, provides weight to his testimony that the images were of juveniles, and his testimony is accepted. Agent Kersey prepared a Case Supplement Report dated January 2, 2019, in which he provided a more detailed description of the images he observed. His descriptions are substantiated by his testimony, and are sufficient to support a finding that the images retrieved from Respondent’s electronic devices were of under-aged girls engaged in sexual acts or exposing their genitalia. Respondent argues that, as a matter of law, the crime to which he pled nolo contendere, Aggravated Assault, is not a “lesser included offense” to the crime of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child. He further argues that he did not commit the crime of Aggravated Assault: i.e., there was no intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent, involving a deadly weapon without intent to kill. See §§ 784.011 and 784.021, Fla. Stat. The Court Minutes that accompanied Respondent’s plea of nolo contendere to one count of Aggravated Assault in Case No. 05-2017-CF- 052816-AXXX-XX, including the Judgment/Order of Probation and the Plea Offer accepted by Respondent, establish the parameters under which Respondent understood and accepted his plea agreement. The Court Minutes establish that the charge of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child was “Reduced” to Aggravated Assault. The Court Minutes further provide that “[t]he Defendant withdrew the previously entered plea of not guilty,” and that “[t]he Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser included offense of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.” There are countless reasons why a person would chose to accept a plea to a crime, not all of which constitute a direct expression of culpability. Nonetheless, regardless of whether Aggravated Assault is a “lesser included offense” to the crime of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child, his plea, made in open court and with representation of counsel, was made with the intent that it be accepted as a lesser included offense. The plea was accepted by the circuit court on those terms. The Court Minutes demonstrate the link between the offense to which he pled, and the offense for which he was charged. The terms of Respondent’s probation included a number of Special Sex Offense conditions in addition to that identified in the Stipulated Facts. For example, the terms of probation included a psycho-sexual re-evaluation and, if recommended by the re-evaluation, “participation in and successful completion of a sex offender treatment program with qualified practitioners specifically trained to treat sex offenders”; annual polygraph examinations by a polygrapher trained in the use of the polygraph “for the monitoring of sex offenders” and for the purpose of obtaining “information necessary for risk management and treatment”; a restriction on accessing materials “that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern”; and restrictions against distributing candy to children at Halloween, dressing as Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny “or other costume to appeal to children,” entertaining at children’s parties, or visiting schools, child care facilities, parks, and playgrounds. Section 120.569(2)(g) allows for the consideration of “evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs” in a proceeding under chapter 120. The terms of the plea and of the terms of probation, and Respondent’s agreement with those terms, are admissible and persuasive evidence that the crime to which Respondent pled nolo contendere is one that supports a finding that Respondent poses a sexual threat to children. Dr. Aeh testified that opticians operate from a position of trust, and that there is an expectation of professionalism and good judgment on the part of persons holding a license to practice opticianry. As stipulated by the parties, opticianry requires interacting with children built on trust and maintaining social boundaries. Upon her review of the police reports and court documents related to Respondent’s crime, Dr. Aeh opined that the acts described therein evince an erosion of the interests of trust and safety between the healthcare provider and the patient. Although she did not state that Aggravated Assault, per se, affects the ability to practice opticianry, when coupled with the evidence that the crime was a direct offshoot of child pornography, she had no hesitation in opining that Respondent’s crime did affect the ability to practice opticianry. Under the specific facts of this case, including the circuit court’s minutes demonstrating that the judgment of Aggravated Assault and the conditions of probation related to the charge of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Respondent’s plea of nolo contendere to Aggravated Assault relates to his ability to practice opticianry.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Opticianry, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated section 484.014(1)(q); suspending Respondent’s license for a period of 60 months, to run from the March 20, 2019, date of his Order of Probation in Case No. 05-2017- CF052816-A in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida; placing Respondent’s license on probation for a period of 60 months, to commence upon the expiration of the suspension, subject to such conditions as the Board may specify, including requiring Respondent to submit to treatment or to work under the supervision of another optician as authorized by rule 64B12-8.020(7)(d); and imposing an administrative fine of $750.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Rose L. Garrison, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Douglas D. Marks, Esquire Douglas D. Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 33790 Indialantic, Florida 32903 (eServed) Alexander Ciupalo, J.D. Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Janet Hartman, Interim Executive Director Board of Opticianry Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 (eServed) Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.5720.43456.072456.073484.014784.011784.02190.40390.803 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.20628-106.21364B12-8.020 DOAH Case (1) 20-3419PL
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PAUL RANCOURT vs STATE OF FLORIDA, 11-000167VWI (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Jan. 10, 2011 Number: 11-000167VWI Latest Update: May 09, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Paul Rancourt (Mr. Rancourt), established through clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2011).1/

Findings Of Fact Before discussing the findings from the administrative hearing, it is appropriate to set out the procedural history of the criminal proceedings. On December 18, 1996, the State charged Mr. Rancourt and Daniel McLean (Mr. McLean) with the kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery of A.S., which occurred on October 31, 1996. On July 27 through July 30, 1998, the State tried Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean together. The jury convicted both men, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On April 5, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion overturning Mr. McLean's conviction based on trial errors. McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The appellate court reversed Mr. McLean's conviction for kidnapping because it found that the State "failed to prove [McLean] intended the kidnapping to occur, or that he performed any action that assisted in the kidnapping." Id. at 180. Further, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in two key evidentiary rulings. First, the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from the medical provider who examined A.S. following the assault. The disputed question was: "[d]id she act in any way inconsistent with the way a rape victim would act?" Id. at 181. The appellate court found that the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony under the Rape Shield Statute.3/ Id. Specifically, the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. McLean's attorney to cross-examine the medical provider about whether or not the A.S.'s soreness in her vulva area was due to the fact that she had not had sexual intercourse in the past year, as opposed to a sexual battery. Id. The appellate court found that this question went to a key issue of whether the sexual contact was consensual. The appellate court found the exclusion of this testimony was not harmless error; and thus, reversed Mr. McLean's convictions and sentences, and ordered a retrial. On January 5, 2001, Mr. McLean, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1996). Based on the plea agreement, Mr. McLean was sentenced to 64 and one-half months’ incarceration, which reflected his time served, and two years’ probation. On June 14, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Rancourt's convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, and his life sentences. Rancourt v. State, 766 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In affirming Mr. Rancourt's conviction, the appellate court found that trial counsel had failed to preserve the issues concerning the medical expert's opinion vouching for the victim's credibility and the exclusion of the medical testimony under the Rape Shield Statute. On September 13, 2000, the appellate court issued its mandate. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Rancourt filed a post- conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction motion alleged, in part, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the evidentiary issues that had formed the basis of Mr. McLean's reversal. On November 3, 2003, the circuit court entered an order vacating Mr. Rancourt's convictions and sentences "after considering the Motion and applicable law, and upon agreement of both parties[.]" The order directed that a new trial be held. On September 27, 2005, the State re-tried Mr. Rancourt for sexual battery and kidnapping. The jury convicted Mr. Rancourt of the lesser-included offense of battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1996), a first-degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt to one year in the Polk County jail with credit for time served. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Rancourt filed the Amended Petition for Determination of Wrongfully Incarcerated Person, which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Rancourt has not been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. At the time of these events, Mr. Rancourt was a 32-year- old man, and A.S. was a 19-year-old freshman at Florida Southern College. Mr. Rancourt, in offering proof of actual innocence, testified on his own behalf that the sexual encounter that occurred between him and A.S. was consensual. Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, was consistent with the testimony that he had provided in his two criminal trials. Transcripts of Mr. Rancourt's prior testimony at the criminal proceedings were admitted into evidence. Mr. Rancourt's testimony at the hearing concerning his meeting A.S. and the subsequent sexual encounter was not believable. Specifically, the undersigned did not find Mr. Rancourt's description of how a young woman, whom he had never spoken too, would at the closing of the bar grab him at the door as patrons attempted to leave the bar, and give him a "deep french kiss." Further, it was incredulous that after asking him for a ride back to her dorm room that A.S., while in the back seat of the car, would engage in a series of intimate gestures towards himself and his best friend, Mr. McLean. Finally, it was not credible that A.S. and Mr. Rancourt engaged in a consensual sexual encounter as described by Mr. Rancourt on the lawn of a home off a dark street. The conclusion that Mr. Rancourt's description of the events is not credible is further bolstered by the testimony showing A.S.'s actions immediately after the sexual encounter, and Mr. Rancourt's untruthful responses to the police investigation following the events. Mr. Rancourt also offered Mr. McLean, who testified that he witnessed A.S. acting as a "willing participant" in the sexual encounter with Mr. Rancourt. Further, Mr. McLean offered testimony that he did not engage in any sexual relations with A.S., and that he only pled to the sexual battery charge in order to avoid the risk of receiving another lengthy sentence. Next, Mr. Rancourt brought forward the testimony of Brandon Perron (Mr. Perron), a private investigator, and introduced into evidence copies of Mr. Perron's investigative reports. The record shows that Mr. Perron prepared these reports as part of Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction efforts. The reports and Mr. Perron's testimony show that he identified many factual issues regarding Mr. Rancourt's convictions. Specifically, Mr. Perron raised issues concerning discrepancies in A.S.'s statements, testimony, and her motivations to lie concerning the events of October 31, 1996; discrepancies in witnesses' statements to the police investigator and testimony; poor and prejudicial police investigative techniques that overlooked potentially exonerating evidence showing that the sexual encounter was consensual; and defense counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential witnesses. Although Mr. Perron was a persuasive witness for showing potential problems with the State's criminal case against Mr. Rancourt, Mr. Perron's testimony did not establish Mr. Rancourt's actual innocence. Mr. Rancourt's final witness was his aunt, Barbara Hoffman (Ms. Hoffman). In October 1996, Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean were living with Ms. Hoffman while they sought employment. Ms. Hoffman's testimony concerned Mr. Rancourt's character and her opinion that he was not capable of committing a crime. Further, she testified about the day that law enforcement officers went to her home to ask Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to come in for questioning. She testified that the detective investigating the events had prejudged Mr. Rancourt to be guilty of rape. The purpose of this testimony appeared to show that statements given by Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to the police may not have been voluntary. It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Rancourt nor Mr. McLean was arrested; thus, the questioning was non-custodial. Moreover, Ms. Hoffman's testimony was marginally relevant in that it did not bring forward any fact showing that Mr. Rancourt was actually innocent of the sexual battery and kidnapping charges. The State introduced evidence showing that the sexual encounter was not consensual. A.S.'s trial testimony shows that she consistently testified that the sexual encounter was not consensual. In addition to A.S.'s trial testimony, the State introduced trial testimony of Angie Wren (Ms. Wren) and Issac McKeithan (Mr. McKeithan). The criminal trial transcript shows that Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove upon A.S. shortly after the event and saw a car quickly drive away from the area where A.S. was standing. Ms. Wren testified that A.S. was hysterical and crying, and "she just didn't look like she had been through anything good, that's for sure." A.S. reported to Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan that she had been raped. Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove A.S. to the Lakeland Police Department immediately, and the attack was reported. This testimony shows that A.S. contended that she had been raped moments after the sexual encounter. Further, a review of the criminal proceedings shows that the State brought forward medical testimony showing bruises on A.S.'s arms. A.S. had testified that, before the attack, she did not have the bruises. Finally, the criminal trial transcripts and testimony given at the December 8 through 9, 2011, hearing showed that Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean had provided false statements, and changed the story given to the officer conducting the investigation. Specifically, the trial transcripts, and Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, showed that he told the investigator at first that he did not engage in sexual relations with A.S., then changed his story to claim that he and A.S. had sex in the vehicle, and then changed his story, yet again, to state that he and A.S. had consensual sex on the front yard of a home off a dark street. During his testimony on December 8, 2011, Mr. Rancourt acknowledged that the statements he gave about not having sex with A.S. and then having sex in the vehicle were false. Similarly, Mr. McLean, when asked if he and Mr. Rancourt had sex, informed the officer "no." Mr. McLean testified that he answered that way because he contended that he had not had sex with A.S. This parsing of words was not credible. The undersigned found these acknowledged false statements, made at the time of the investigation, persuasive evidence that Mr. Rancourt's explanation of the night was not credible.

Recommendation Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Mr. Rancourt has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Mr. Rancourt's claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2012.

Florida Laws (4) 784.03961.02961.03961.04
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JASEN BAKER vs CARRABBA`S ITALIAN GRILL, 05-000623 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 23, 2005 Number: 05-000623 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2006

The Issue Whether Respondent, Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., subjected Petitioners, Jasen Baker and Bernard Southwell, to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).

Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of casual Italian restaurants. Respondent has adopted a policy against discrimination and harassment. In addition to prohibiting harassment, the policy instructs employees whom to contact if they experience harassment. The policy is contained in an employee handbook that is distributed to all employees during the initial orientation process. During orientation, Respondent's manager reviews the employee handbook with the new employee, including the policy on sexual harassment. During the orientation process, Respondent also requires employees to view a video that explains that Respondent will not tolerate harassment. The video familiarizes the employees with the company's expectations regarding the reporting of harassment in the workplace. During the orientation process, the employees are required to sign an acknowledgment on the exterior of their employee folders indicating that they have received and read the policy against harassment. The critical sections of the policy are reprinted on the folders immediately above the signature lines. All of Respondent's restaurants are required to display a poster known as the "Carrabbamico Info" poster in the kitchen area. This poster reprints the harassment policy and provides employees with a list of names to call if they feel that they have been harassed. Respondent has implemented reasonable precautions to prevent harassment from occurring in its restaurants. In the Central Florida market, Respondent's restaurants are overseen by a joint venture partner named Dick Meyer. Meyer is responsible for hiring and firing the managers of the restaurants that he oversees. In March 2000, Lawton DePriest became the managing partner at Respondent's Palm Bay location. DePriest reported to Meyer. DePriest remained in that capacity until September 2003, when he became the managing partner of Respondent's restaurant located in Formosa Gardens. It was DePriest's management style to frequently yell at employees in order to motivate them. It is also possible that he had favorites on the staff of the Palm Bay restaurant. Baker was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in January 2002. At the time that Baker began working for Respondent, he attended an orientation session conducted by DePriest. It was DePriest's practice during orientation to discuss harassment issues and instruct employees to come to him directly if they experience any problems with sexual harassment. If for some reason an employee is not comfortable with him, DePriest would encourage the employee to contact any other person listed on the poster. Baker was given a copy of Respondent's handbook, which contains the company's policy against harassment. On that same date, January 19, 2002, Baker signed his employee folder on the blank line under the harassment policy indicating that he had read and received the policy. Whether he reviewed the employee handbook further after that date is irrelevant. Baker "vividly remembers" that during his orientation, he watched the videotape that included instructions on what he should do if he felt harassed. However, during the hearing, Baker denied ever seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster. However, Baker admitted on cross-examination that during his deposition, he had acknowledged seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster posted in the store. During the deposition, Baker specifically remembered that there were business cards with contact information for Meyer and Cheri Ashe attached to the bottom of the poster. Despite Baker's attempt to deny seeing the poster, his earlier answers in deposition were more credible in view of his specific recollection of the attached business cards and the lack of any persuasive explanation for the discrepancy. After completing his orientation, Baker initially worked as a dishwasher. Later, he was shown how to do food preparation work. Before coming to work for Respondent, Baker had previously worked for a restaurant by the name of Golden Corral. During the time that he worked with Golden Corral, he became acquainted with a co-worker named Bernard Southwell. In the summer of 2002, Petitioners discussed the possibility of Southwell coming to work for Respondent. Baker spoke favorably of the restaurant and recommended that Southwell submit an application. At the time, Baker had worked for Respondent for six or seven months. Baker did not express to Southwell that he had observed or experienced any problems with unwelcome harassment. Southwell submitted an application and was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in August 2002 as a dishwasher. At the time he began employment with Respondent, Southwell was living with a friend of his named Joe Corbett. At the time, Baker was living in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend. Several weeks later, Baker's girlfriend decided to move out. According to Petitioners, she suggested to Southwell that he move into Baker's apartment to replace her. Around October 2002, Southwell moved out of the Corbett residence and moved in with Baker. A third employee named Chris Germana also moved into the residence around the same time. Because the apartment only had one bedroom, Germana slept on the couch. Petitioners slept in the bedroom. When employees at the restaurant learned of these arrangements, speculation began about whether the two men were homosexual. According to Petitioners, sometime after Southwell started to room with Baker, co-workers at the restaurant started referring to Petitioners by nicknames. The co-workers referred to Baker as "powder," "crack pipe," and "crack head." Baker knew that "powder" was a reference to a character from the movie "Powder" and that the name had nothing to do with his sexuality. The co-workers also referred to Petitioners as "butt buddies." Southwell testified that a male co-worker, Christopher Bouley, told him, "I know you guys are lovers." Bouley, Arnold Samuel and DePriest all used these nicknames on occasion to refer to both Petitioners, according to Baker. After several months, Southwell eventually went to DePriest and complained about the "powder," "crack pipe," and "butt buddies" nicknames. Southwell told DePriest that the nicknames were funny at first, but that they started getting old. DePriest then told Samuel and Bouley to stop using the nicknames. Thereafter, the use of the nicknames stopped. Southwell claimed that Bouley would gyrate his hips behind other employees as they were bending down. However, Petitioners both admitted that Bouley would do these hip motions to both male and female employees. During the hearing, Petitioners claimed that Bouley subjected them to unwelcome touching. Baker claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks once. However, Baker acknowledged that when his deposition was taken prior to the final hearing, he did not mention that Bouley touched his buttocks. In fact, when asked during his deposition whether he had been sexually harassed, Baker testified that he had not and that he had only been verbally harassed. Furthermore, Baker made no mention of any physical touching in the Affidavit that he submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination. Southwell never saw Bouley touch or grab Baker's buttocks. And despite their close relationship, Baker never told Southwell that Bouley had grabbed his buttocks. Accordingly, Baker's allegation that he was touched inappropriately by Bouley or any other of Respondent's employees is not credible. Southwell claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks on two or three occasions and touched his nipples twice. Southwell also claimed that Bouley had touched his penis on one occasion. According to Southwell, he was bending down to pick up sauté pans when Bouley, who was supposedly standing behind him, reached between Southwell's legs from behind and clutched Southwell's genital area through his trousers. This incident supposedly occurred during the restaurant's hours of operation while customers were in the restaurant. The alleged grabbing supposedly took place in front of a stove that sat in full view of customers seated at the restaurant's bar. Bouley flatly denied ever touching Southwell's genitals or private area. In the Affidavit that Southwell submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination, Southwell made no mention of Bouley touching Southwell's penis. At the time that he submitted this Affidavit, Southwell was represented by counsel. Southwell did not offer any convincing reason for the omission of any description of his genitals being grabbed. Accordingly, Southwell's allegation that Bouley touched Southwell's genitals is not credible. Although Petitioners testified that they spoke to DePriest on several occasions, they admit that they never spoke to any of the other individuals listed on the harassment poster to complain about sexual harassment. DePriest testified that the only complaint he ever received had to do with the nicknames and that he took prompt action to resolve this problem. Annually, Respondent submits an employee experience survey to its employees that is completed anonymously and forwarded to an outside company for analysis. After the survey is completed, employees participate in a small group feedback session to discuss the results of the survey. On March 11, 2003, DePriest held the feedback session for his store, which was attended by Petitioners. During the session, Southwell commented about the situation with the nicknames. He indicated that the situation was resolved when it was brought to DePriest's attention. This was the sole extent to which either employee complained of unwelcome behavior. Respondent was not on notice of any problems with regard to touching or more serious inappropriate behavior. On March 12, 2003, Petitioners' last day of work, Southwell approached DePriest to complain about scheduling for a special event at the convention center. Southwell stated that he and Baker had signed up to participate in this event. Southwell was scheduled for the event, but Baker was not. DePriest explained that he needed Baker to float, because there were not enough people scheduled to work at the restaurant that night. DePriest later talked to Baker, who indicated that he was not disappointed that he was not participating in the event. That conversation, however, was the last time that DePriest saw Baker. DePriest learned that Petitioners had left before the end of their shift, when the plates in the restaurant were getting low and the sauté pans were getting stacked up. DePriest asked about the whereabouts of Petitioners and learned that they were seen riding their bicycles away from the restaurant. DePriest could not contact them because they did not have a telephone. DePriest eventually terminated their employment for voluntarily walking off the job.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that: Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Jasen Baker, in DOAH Case No. 05-0623, FCHR No. 23-03891; and Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Bernard Southwell, DOAH Case No. 05-0632, FCHR No. 23-03892. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason M. Gordon, Esquire Gordon & Cornell 103 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Kevin D. Johnson, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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KENNETH DAVIS vs PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF`S OFFICE, 03-000950 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Mar. 19, 2003 Number: 03-000950 Latest Update: Dec. 01, 2003

The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.

Florida Laws (5) 112.317120.569120.57120.6890.801
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