Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), is a "manufacturer" of motor vehicles as that term is defined by Section 681.102(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), 1/ and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, the "Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act." Consequently, Chrysler is substantially affected by the rules promulgated by respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) to implement Chapter 681, and the parties have stipulated that it has standing to maintain this rule challenge proceeding. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law") imposes upon manufacturers, as defined by Section 681.102(10), a duty to repair nonconformities which are first reported by consumers during the "Lemon Law rights period," and liability for the refund of the purchase price or replacement of those motor vehicles if their nonconformities are not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts. A consumer's right to exercise the remedies provided by the Lemon Law accrue from the date the consumer takes delivery of the motor vehicle. The "Lemon Law rights period" is defined by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as follows: "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. On October 9, 1992, the Department published notice, inter alia, of proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e), in volume 18, number 41, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Such rule would define "24,000 miles of operation," for purposes of calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period established by Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, as "miles of operation by the consumer." By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 30, 1992, Chrysler timely challenged the validity of such proposed rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The predicate for Chrysler's challenge was its contention that the proposed rule enlarges, modifies or contravenes Section 618.102(9), Florida Statutes, the provision of law sought to be implemented. 2/ The proposed rule Proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) provides: When calculating the running of the Lemon Law rights period as defined by s. 681.102(9), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by the consumer. If the consumer is a subsequent transferee as defined in s. 681.102(4), FS., "24,000 miles of operation" means miles of operation by both the original consumer and the subsequent transferee. The gravamen of the dispute between the parties concerning the propriety of the proposed rule is a disagreement regarding the interpretation to be accorded Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, which defines the "Lemon Law rights period" as: . . . the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Chrysler contends that the "Lemon Law rights period," as defined by Section 681.102(9), is clear and unambiguous, and that the "first 24,000 miles of operation" refers to the actual mileage shown on the odometer of the motor vehicle, without regard to when or by whom the mileage was accrued. So read, proposed rule 2-30.001(3)(e) conflicts with the law sought to be implemented. The position advanced by Chrysler is of import to it since Chrysler impresses new motor vehicles into use as company cars and permits its dealers to purchase and use new vehicles for demonstration purposes for customers or personal use, prior to their retail sale. During this period, the motor vehicle accumulates mileage on its odometer as a result of such "demonstrator" use. Excluding the mileage so accrued from the running of the "Lemon Law rights period," as contemplated by the proposed rule, could extend Chrysler's liability under the Lemon Law beyond the first 24,000 miles of operation registered on the vehicle, if it issued a warranty as a condition of sale to the consumer. See Section 681.102(14), definition of "motor vehicle," discussed infra. Contrasted with Chrysler's position, the Department interprets the "first 24,000 miles of operation" provision of Section 681.102(9), to relate to operation by a consumer, and would exclude any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." So interpreted, the proposed rule is consistent with the law sought to be implemented. The Department's interpretation is premised on its reading of Section 681.102(9) in pari materia with Section 681.102(14) which defines a "motor vehicle" as: . . . a new vehicle, . . . and includes a vehicle used as a demonstrator or leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale, or the lessee is responsible for repairs. . . . So read, a demonstrator is considered a new vehicle, and no distinction is made in applying the Lemon Law rights period between consumers who purchase a motor vehicle with no or minimal mileage on its odometer at delivery and those who purchase a demonstrator. The proposed rule's predecessor Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 88-95, Laws of Florida, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, was amended effective January 1, 1989, to establish what has been referred to as the Lemon Law. At that time, the "Lemon Law rights period" was defined as: . . . the period ending 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(7), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). To implement the provisions of the Lemon Law, the Department adopted Rule 2-30.001, Florida Administrative Code, in or about January 1989. At that time, the rule included the following definition of the "Lemon Law rights period": The "Lemon Law Rights period" is the period ending one year after the date of the original delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, or the first 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. This period may be extended if a substantial defect or condition is reported to the manufacturer or its authorized dealer during the Lemon Law Rights period, but has not been cured by the expiration of the period. If you put 12,000 miles on your vehicle (miles driven minus miles on the vehicle on the date of delivery) before the end of the first year of operation, you should note that date in your personal records. If a warranty problem is examined or repaired during the Lemon Law Rights period, be sure you get and keep a copy of the work order which contains the date, odometer reading, and a description of that problem. Your work order copy provides the best proof as to when the problem was first reported. [Respondent's exhibits 3 and 15]. Consistent with the foregoing rule, the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, which is charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes under the Lemon Law, has consistently construed the provisions of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer, and has excluded any mileage accrued on the vehicle prior to its delivery to the consumer when calculating the "Lemon Law rights period." [See e.g., Respondent's exhibits 5, 8 and 9]. Since the Lemon Law was enacted, there has been no change in the definition of "Lemon Law rights period," or the Department's rule, until the passage of Chapter 92-88, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1992. Under such law, the "Lemon Law rights period" was amended to read as follows: (9)(7) "Lemon Law rights period" means the period ending 18 months 1 year after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. Here, the proposed rule is designed to reflect the change in the "Lemon Law rights period" from one year or 12,000 miles to 18 months or 24,000 miles, occasioned by the aforesaid amendment to Chapter 681. The Department's interpretation of the "Lemon Law rights period" concerning "miles of operation" to relate to operation by the consumer remains, however, consistent with its prior rule and interpretation.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On or about October 1, 1994, Petitioner purchased from Triangle Auto Center Inc., d/b/a Toyota of Hollywood (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealer"), a Broward County, Florida automobile dealer, a used 1994 Chevrolet Cavalier, which had been driven 7,726 miles. Petitioner had been told by the Dealer, before the purchase, that the vehicle had been used by its previous owner "to drive documents to the airport." At the time Petitioner purchased the vehicle, it was still under factory warranty. Thereafter, various problems developed with the vehicle, the worst and most persistent of which involved the vehicle's tires and brakes. These problems have yet to be completely remedied. Petitioner reported the problems she was experiencing with her vehicle to the Dealer. The Dealer told Petitioner that it was unable to help her. At the Dealer's suggestion, Petitioner telephoned and wrote letters of complaint to the manufacturer of the vehicle. The manufacturer advised Petitioner to file a complaint/arbitration request with the Better Business Bureau's Auto Line program (hereinafter referred to as the "BBB program"), an arbitration program in which the manufacturer participates. Petitioner followed the advice she was given and filed a complaint/arbitration request with the BBB program. On September 29, 1995, the BBB program sent Petitioner a letter notifying her that the arbitrator who had heard her case had determined that she was not entitled to any relief from the manufacturer. The letter further advised Petitioner of the following: The enclosed decision is not binding on the consumer. The consumer may reject this decision and, if eligible, may pursue arbitration with the Florida New Vehicle Arbitration Board administered by the Office of the Attorney General. To obtain information about eligibility for the state run program, the consumer should contact the Division of Consumer Services' Lemon Law hotline at 1-800-321-5366. Please be advised that Section 681.109(4), F.S., provides that the consumer must file the request for arbitration within 6 months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, or within 30 days after the final action of a certified dispute-settlement procedure, whichever occurs later. Petitioner rejected the arbitrator's decision. On October 23, 1995, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated November 9, 1995, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made in accordance with Section 681.109 Florida Statutes to reject [her request because her] vehicle was not purchased new in Florida."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1996.
The Issue This issue on this case is whether the Petitioner filed a timely Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Findings Of Fact On December 30, 1993, William Coyle took delivery of a new 1994 Pontiac Bonneville. At the time the car was delivered to Mr. Coyle, the odometer indicated that the vehicle had been driven five miles. Soon after taking delivery of the vehicle, Mr. Coyle began experiencing problems with the car, including failure of the car ignition on several occasions, and a malfunctioning oil pressure indicator. On repeated occasions, Mr. Coyle returned the car to the dealer for repair. According to Mr. Coyle, the dealer was unable to fix the problems with the car. On or about July 7, 1995, Mr. Coyle filed a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form. Although Mr. Coyle mistakenly dated the form as "7/7/94," the evidence establishes that the form was actually filed in 1995. Filing a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form triggers a final opportunity for a vehicle manufacturer to correct the alleged defect. One copy of the notification form goes to the manufacturer. A second copy of the form goes to the Office of the Florida Attorney General. After the Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form was filed, the vehicle apparently was not repaired to Mr. Coyle's satisfaction. As set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, a consumer's rights under the Lemon Law extend for 18 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, and may possibly be extended an additional 6 months for those problems which have not been corrected in the initial period. Based on the repair records, Mr. Coyle's vehicle had been driven in excess of 24,000 miles by October 7, 1994. Assuming that Mr. Coyle was entitled to a six month deadline extension as provided by law, Mr. Coyle's Lemon Law rights expired on April 7, 1995. The applicable statute provides a period of six months following the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period by which a consumer must file a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. Mr. Coyle's Request for Arbitration was required to be filed not later than October 7, 1995. Mr. Coyle filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board on December 12, 1995. By letter dated December 28, 1995, Mr. Coyle was notified by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, that his request for arbitration was being rejected. As grounds for the rejection, the letter states: The lemon law rights period, as defined by Chapter 681, F.S., is 18 months or 24,000 miles, whichever occurs first, and may possibly be extended an additional 6 months for those problems which have not been corrected in the initial rights period. The Request for Arbit- ration should be received by this office with- in 6 months of the conclusion of the lemon law rights period or any extended time allowances. The attached Invoice number 6946, dated 10-07- 94, reflects that the mileage at the time of that repair to be 27,494. Since 24,000 miles apparently were exceeded prior to 10-07-94, your initial rights period ended at some point before that date. If a 6 month extension was allowed following the end of your rights period, the expiration of that extension would have occurred prior to 04-07-95. This would require that your Request for Arbitration be received by this office prior to October 07, 1995. Your application was signed December 05, 1995, post- marked 12-07-95, and received by this office 12-12-95. Reviewing all these dates, it is concluded that your application was not sub- mitted in a timely manner and must be rejected.... The evidence establishes that Mr. Coyle's Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board was not filed by the proper deadline and must be rejected. Mr. Coyle asserts that he filed a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification on or about July 7, 1995, and that such notice is sufficient to qualify as a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. A Motor Vehicle Defect Notification is a separate document from a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. The forms are filed with different agencies. The filing of a Motor Vehicle Defect Notification does not constitute a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1996 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0744 The Petitioner did not file proposed findings of fact. To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the Respondent. The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 1, 10. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 William Coyle, pro se 2403 Vandervort Road Lutz, Florida 33549 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, Florida's "lemon law."
Findings Of Fact Petitioner took delivery of the motor vehicle at issue on December 31, 1996, at which time she received information on the requirements of Florida's "lemon law." Petitioner began to have trouble with the vehicle almost immediately. She notified the dealer that there was a serious problem, and Palm Kia in Ocala, Florida, performed some repairs. The Ocala dealer's repair shop did not inform her that the problem was a computer failure. Sometime during the next 18 months, there was a second period during which the car was in some repair shop. Petitioner first contacted the Department on January 8, 1999, by telephone. She was informed that the statutory time period for requesting arbitration under Florida's "lemon law" had expired, and the suggestion was made that she try contacting the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner testified that she would have filed a request for arbitration with the Department in January 1999, if the Department had not referred her to the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner signed her first and only written request for arbitration on February 2, 1999. This written request for arbitration by the Board was received by the Department on February 11, 1999. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner indicated that her vehicle had reached 24,000 miles "around the end" of 1997. However, at formal hearing, Petitioner confirmed that on January 19, 1998, the mileage on her vehicle was 32,763. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner did not provide proof that she had provided written notice of the alleged defect to the manufacturer, Kia Motors, within the "lemon law" rights period. Petitioner testified that sometime in the 18-month period specified by Florida's "lemon law" she had telephoned the manufacturer to complain about her car. However, Petitioner also testified that she did not notify the manufacturer by certified letter of the nonconformity until October 1998. Petitioner testified that on December 28, 1998, Gatorland Toyota in Gainesville, Florida, requested that the motor vehicle be towed to them. The motor vehicle had been towed the previous day, Sunday, December 27, 1998, to Billy Shell's Garage because Kia was closed and the motor vehicle could not be locked away. The motor vehicle was not diagnosed by Gatorland Toyota as having a computer problem until the first part of January 1999. Petitioner took possession of her vehicle in January 1999. At that time, she notified the dealer by telephone that the engine light was on. The car has continued to have difficulties.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order upholding the February 25, 1999 denial of Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner’s request for arbitration under Florida’s Lemon Law was timely submitted.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, (DOA), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the administration of the Florida New Car Lemon Law. This law provides for compulsory arbitration in those cases where the vehicle qualifies under the terms of the statute. Petitioner, Greco Carreras, purchased a new, 1994 Ford Ranger truck on June 8, 1994 from Ernie Hare Ford in Tampa, Florida. Thereafter, it was necessary for him to take the vehicle in for service, due to transmission and clutch problems. These visits were: March 1, 1995 Howard Smith Ford, OK 20,591 mi. Aug. 15, 1995 Ernie Hare Ford, Tpa., FL 31,935 mi. Jan. 23, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 37,071 mi. Apr. 1, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 41,450 mi. May. 20, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 45,964 mi. Oct. 8, 1996 “ “ “ “ “ 52,521 mi. Petitioner had put 24,000 miles on his vehicle, by his own admission, sometime in May 1995. In any case, from the above dates and mileage points, it is clear that the 24,000 mile point was reached before August 15, 1995 when he had 31,935 miles on it at the time he first brought the vehicle in to the Florida dealer who sold it to him for service. On or about December 9, 1996, Petitioner executed and forward to the DOA a Request for Arbitration by the Florida Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. This request for was received in the Department on December 12, 1996. Under the provisions of Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes, the “Lemon Law rights period” is defined as: the period ending 18 months after the date of the original delivery of a motor vehicle to a consumer or the first 24,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first. Consumers are required to request arbitration within 6 months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, or within 30 days after the final action of a certified procedure, whichever occurs later. Ford Motor Company has no certified procedure in Florida. Therefore, the deadline for filing is six months after the expiration of the rights period. That would have been January 14, 1996 (18 months after Petitioner took delivery of the vehicle) or in May, 1995 (when he reached 24,000 miles on the vehicle, whichever came earlier. In this case, giving Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, his initial rights period was determined to have ended on or before August 15, 1995, when he put 24,000 miles on his car as evidenced by the repair receipt from Ernie Hare Ford reflecting 31,935 miles on the vehicle when it was brought in for service. The initial Lemon Law rights period may be extended for an additional six months if items of nonconformity which are reported to the dealer within the original period, remain uncorrected at the end thereof. The Department assumed that Petitioner qualified for this extension. This extended the time to February 15, 1996. Consumers have up to six additional months after the expiration of the Lemon Law rights period, as extended, to file for relief under the statute. In this case, Petitioner had until August 15, 1996 to file his request for arbitration. The copy of Petitioner’s request which was received into evidence reflects that he signed it on December 9, 1996, and it was received in the Department on December 12, 1996. This is more than three and a half and almost four months beyond the filing deadline in this case, and constitutes the Department’s basis for denial of Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Petitioner claimed at hearing that the reason he filed his request for arbitration was because the vehicle he purchased was a lemon. Though he purchased it new, it has been in the shop for repair of the same problem more than three times. Notwithstanding the wording of Florida’s Lemon Law in the pamphlet he was given at the time he purchased the car, Petitioner has some problem with the wording used and the way the 18 month/24,000 mile criteria are applied. Because of the fact that he had almost 24,000 miles on the vehicle the first time he brought it in for repair on March 1, 1995, less than nine months after he took delivery of it, he feels use of the 18 month criteria would have given him greater opportunity to find out what he needed to do. No doubt, he contends, had he filed for arbitration right after the third visit for the same problem, in January 1996, he would have been timely. However, he was being generous to the dealer in allowing them to try to fix the problem, an unfortunate mistake on his part. Petitioner also claims he was advised by an unidentified representative of the Department with whom he spoke by telephone after the September 1996 repair, (sometime in early December 1996) that he was still within the time constraints of the statute. At that time, he claims, he advised the individual with whom he spoke of the repair history of the vehicle and how many miles the vehicle had been driven. He was, apparently, wrongly advised.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer services enter a final order denying Petitioner’s Request for Arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law as untimely filed. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Greco Carreras 10420 North 22nd Street Tampa, Florida 33612 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Pl-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: On June 16, 1993, Petitioner took delivery of a new 1/ 1994 Mitsubishi Galant ES that he had leased (for a 42-month period) from Potamkin Mitsubishi (hereinafter referred to as "Potamkin"), a Florida Mitsubishi Motors of America (hereinafter referred to as "Mitsubishi") dealership. Thereafter, problems developed with the vehicle's braking system, which caused the steering wheel to vibrate. Petitioner, who, under his lease agreement, was responsible for having the necessary repairs made to the vehicle, reported these problems to Potamkin. Potamkin was unable to completely remedy these problems within 18 months of the date of delivery (hereinafter referred to as the "18-month post- delivery period"). During the "18-month post-delivery period," Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles. The problems that Petitioner reported during the "18-month post- delivery" period still persist today. On or about January 24, 1995, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the manufacturer of the vehicle, Mitsubishi, requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the continued substantial defects" plaguing the vehicle. The defects were not remedied. On June 21, 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. By letter dated June 26, 1996, the Department advised Petitioner that "a determination ha[d] been made in accordance with Chapter 681.109(6) Florida Statutes, and Rule 2-32.009(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, to reject [his request because t]he request was not submitted in a timely manner."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for arbitration because it is time-barred. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of December, 1996. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1996.
