Findings Of Fact Respondent issued a Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings against Jesus Abauza, also known as Jesus I. Valdez, on May 16, 1989, (the "assessment"). The assessment was made for the tax imposed on the unlawful transportation of approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. The tax base in the assessment is the retail value of the cocaine. The retail value of the cocaine was estimated in the amount of $1,341,000 by multiplying the weight of the cocaine by the retail price listed in the Florida Department Of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") memorandum in effect at the time for Broward and Dade counties. The price per kilogram listed in the FDLE memorandum was $14,900. The FDLE memorandum became effective on May 4, 1988, and was the current price list used by the FDLE on May 8, 1989, when Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Tax was assessed against the tax base at the rate of 50 percent and in the amount of $670,500. A 25 percent surcharge was assessed in the amount of $335,250. The total tax assessed in the amount of $1,005,750 is the sum of the amount of tax due at the rate of 50 percent and the amount of tax due for the 25 percent surcharge. An additional 50 percent penalty was assessed in the amount of $502,875. The total tax and penalty assessed in the amount of $1,508,635 is the sum of the tax due ($1,005,750) and the penalty ($502,875). A Warrant For Collection Of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax (the "warrant") and a Corrected Warrant (the "corrected warrant") was issued against Petitioner on the same day as the assessment. The warrant and corrected warrant are identical except for the addition of Petitioner's social security number in the the top right corner of the corrected warrant and a note in the right margin of the corrected warrant stating: This CORRECTED WARRANT is being re-recorded to reflect the correct amount of tax lien as being $1,005,750.00. Interest will accrue at the rate of $330.66 per day beginning 6/2/89 thru date of satisfaction of lien. 11/26/91[.] The amount stated in the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant as the tax due is $1,005,750. The amount stated as the penalty due in all three documents is $502,875. The amount stated as the total and grand total due in all three documents is $1,508,625. The note in the right margin of the corrected warrant, however, eliminates the 50 percent penalty by stating that the corrected amount of the "tax lien" is $1,005,750. Interest accrues on the tax due at the rate of one percent per month. The amount stated in the bottom left corner of the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant, as the "Daily Interest Rate" is $329.86. The correct per diem amount of interest is $330.66. 5/ Interest begins accruing on the 21st day of the month following the month for which the tax is due.6 The tax was initially due in May, 1989, when the assessment was issued. Although the corrected warrant states that interest accrues from "6/2/89", interest actually began accruing on June 21, 1989. The assessment was mailed to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested. Petitioner received the assessment, but the date of receipt cannot be determined from the evidence of record. 7/ Petitioner unlawfully transported approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. Petitioner was arrested by officers in the Metropolitan Dade County Police Department (the "Police Department") on May 8, 1989, and charged with possession of cocaine. In the criminal case against him, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the Police Department based upon the alleged illegality of the police officer's investigatory stop of the car Petitioner was driving. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Petitioner successfully appealed the trial court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. The district court's denial of the motion to suppress was reversed in United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. May 22, 1991), and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The district court granted the motion to suppress and scheduled the criminal case for trial during the two week period beginning September 23, 1991. 8/ Petitioner stipulated in the Supplemental Pretrial Stipulation that he did not admit or stipulate that any of the matters set forth in the stipulation were factually correct. The findings of fact made in this Recommended Order, however, are substantially the same as the factual account contained in the official transcript of the criminal proceedings and reported by the appellate court in Valdez as the basis for its reversal of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress. On the afternoon of May 8, 1989, Detective Jerry Houck and Special Agent Steven Hills were conducting the surveillance of a residence (the "residence" or "house") located in Miami, Florida from an unmarked police car. Detective Houck and Special Agent Hills were part of a Police Department narcotics investigative team led by Detective Francisco Trujillo. Detective Trujillo was not personally present at the residence but monitored the events which occurred at the residence over the police radio in his unmarked vehicle. Detective Trujillo was assisted by Officer Douglas Almaguer, a uniformed police officer for the Police Department who was in a marked patrol car. Detective Houck observed a Honda Accord automobile (the "Honda") driven by Petitioner stop in front of the residence. Petitioner got out of the car, knocked on the front door of the house, and entered the residence. Detective Houck was unable to observe the events which took place inside the house. While Petitioner remained inside the house, two men later identified as Jose and Jorge Fernandez came out of the residence. They moved two cars parked in the yard and positioned the Honda so that its trunk was in close proximity to the front door of the residence. Jose and Jorge Fernandez opened the trunk of the Honda, reentered the residence, and reappeared within the next few minutes outside the house carrying plastic garbage bags which appeared to Detective Houck to be fairly heavy. The two men placed the garbage bags with their contents in the trunk of the Honda. They reentered the residence and quickly reappeared carrying additional bags which they also placed in the trunk of the Honda. Shortly thereafter, Valdez came out of the residence, got into the Honda, and drove away. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that: [W]e were conducting an investigation and we had a vehicle we wished for him to follow, and if that person was to commit a traffic infraction which he normally cites somebody for, we wished for him to stop the vehicle. If that occurred, and he did stop the vehicle, I wanted him to ask the occupant of the vehicle for consent to search the vehicle, and I instructed him to ask if he would consent to a search. Officer Almaguer did not recall that he had been directed by Detective Trujillo to stop the Honda only for something which constituted the kind of traffic offense for which he would ordinarily stop a driver. Over the police radio, Detective Houck provided Detective Trujillo with the description and tag number of the Honda and notified Detective Trujillo when Petitioner drove away from the house. Detective Houck left his surveillance position at the residence and followed the Honda to 122nd Avenue. At that point, Detective Trujillo identified the Honda and Detective Houck confirmed the identification. As Petitioner approached the intersection of 8th Street and 122nd Avenue, Detective Trujillo was positioned across the intersection. Officer Almaguer was directly behind Detective Trujillo in his marked patrol car. Petitioner made a right turn against a red traffic light signal and violated the right-of-way of a vehicle approaching through the green traffic light signal. The approaching vehicle slowed abruptly in order to avoid a collision with Petitioner's Honda. Neither Detective Trujillo nor Officer Almaguer were able to state the speed at which the approaching vehicle was traveling before it slowed down, and neither officer heard any screeching of the tires of the approaching vehicle. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that Petitioner was the subject of the narcotics investigation. Officer Almaguer followed the Honda for 18 blocks from the intersection where the traffic violation had occurred and then stopped Petitioner. Detective Trujillo parked two blocks away from the point of the stop and observed Officer Almaguer conduct the stop. Officer Almaguer approached Petitioner and asked for Petitioner's driver's license and registration. Petitioner produced his driver's license but stated that the car was loaned to him by a friend. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner if Petitioner knew why he had been stopped. Petitioner answered "yes." Officer Almaguer requested permission to search the car, and Petitioner consented. Officer Almaguer found five sealed trash bags inside the trunk of the Honda. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner what was inside the bags. Petitioner replied that it was cocaine. Officer Almaguer arrested Petitioner, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car until Detective Trujillo arrived at the point of the stop. Officer Almaguer issued Petitioner a citation for violation of the right-of-way. Detective Trujillo then advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Officer Almaguer's stop of Petitioner's vehicle was unreasonably pretextual, and Petitioner's consent to search was not voluntarily given. Officer Almaguer would not have pursued Petitioner's Honda, stopped it, and issued a traffic citation, but for Detective Trujillo's instructions that the Honda was the car which the narcotics investigation team wanted stopped. Officer Almaguer ordinarily did not search a vehicle for a violation of right-of-way, or even ask its driver for consent to search the vehicle. Officer Almaguer had no reason to ask for permission to search the vehicle based solely on the traffic violation he observed. Petitioner's consent to the search was tainted by the illegal, pretextual stop and detention. The contents of the five bags seized by the Police Department when Petitioner was arrested were tested by a chemist for the Police Department. The contents of the five bags weighed approximately 90 kilograms. Samples of each kilogram from the bags were tested and found to contain cocaine. The percentage of cocaine and purity of the cocaine was not determined.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest in the amount determined by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The facets herein are undisputed. On May 31, 1973 Petitioner purchased Thomas Concrete Company, and on February 28, 1973 Petitioner purchased Kelly Builders, Inc. Both companies were forthwith liquidated and federal income tax returns were filed in which depreciation in excess of fair value of the properties was recaptured for federal tax purposes. In his state corporate income tax returns Petitioner claimed deduction for that portion of the recaptured depreciation which occured prior to November 2, 1971, the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Statute. These deductions were disallowed by the Department of Revenue, that portion of the tax relating to Thomas Concrete Company was paid under protest, the portion relating to Kelly Builders, Inc. was not paid, and this petition was filed. In 1974 Petitioner sold real property on which it made a substantial capital gain. In computing its federal income tax the full capital gain was reported. However, that portion of its capital gain accruing prior to November 2, 1971 was excluded from its Florida corporate income tax and the assessment of $50,494.75 was levied against Petitioner by Respondent, Department of Revenue for the full amount of the capital gain as income received in 1974. The two issues here involved are whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220 F.S. on depreciation taken prior to the effective date of Chapter 220, and subsequently recaptured, and whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220, F.S. for the full amount of capital gain realized on property held prior to the effective date of Chapter 220 where part of appreciation occurred prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law.
Findings Of Fact Allis-Chalmers Corporation (ACC), Petitioner in Case 82-2774, is a Delaware corporation commercially domiciled in West Allis, Wisconsin. ACC operates in Florida at the following locations: U.S. Highway 1 opened 2/1/77 Grant (Industrial Pump Division) 5200 Kennedy Blvd. closed 10/30/78 Tampa (Industrial Pump Division) 406 Rio Street opened 11/1/78 101 Federal Place opened 5/1/80 Tarpon Springs (Cement & Mining System Division) (The locations listed are those operating during the audit period. Other locations closed prior to or opened after the audit period.) ACC makes sales of tangible personal property to Florida customers directly from the locations at (b) and (c) and also makes sales to Florida customers from these two locations where the property is shipped from out-of-state locations to the Florida customers. ACC is a diversified company which manufactures and markets the following items: (a) agricultural equipment; (b) hydropower equipment; (c) coal gasification systems; (d) ore conveyors, crushers and screening equipment; (e) bulk material-handling equipment, such as ship self-unloaders; (f) stackers and reclaimers for steel mills; (g) compressors and pumps; (h) cement and asphaltic concrete production equipment (i) valves for units larger than household or commercial plumbing installations; (j) systems for the direct reduction of iron ore; (k) kilns and coolers; (l) lawn and garden equipment; and (m) lift trucks and industrial tractors. The amount in dispute is as stated in the Petition and is not an issue in these proceedings. The only issue is the method of computing the intangible taxes. ACC contends the tax base should be the net accounts receivable based on sales transacted in Florida divided by sales transacted everywhere else. The department contends the ratio should be Florida-destination sales divided by sales everywhere else. The issue is the "business situs" of the intangibles. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation (ACCC), Petitioner in Cases 82-2816 and 82-2817, is a Wisconsin corporation doing business in Florida. It is the wholly-owned subsidiary of ACC and its principal business is financing the sale or lease of equipment by ACC dealers. Case 82-2816 involves an income tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1977-1979. The item in dispute involves treatment given to "waiver interest" in arriving at the ratio by which federal income tax is multiplied to determine state income tax due. This issue applies to the denominator of that equation, hence the higher the figure the lower the tax. On occasion ACC, as a marketing tool, agrees to forego interest on either retail or wholesale financing for a period of perhaps six months. If these notes are assigned to ACCC, ACC must pay the waived interest to ACCC that its dealer or the dealer's customer would otherwise have paid. This is charged to ACC at the rate of one and one-half times the cost of funds to ACCC plus the actual cost of insurance. This rate is one percent to three percent per annum less than ACCC would charge the original debtors for the same period. The difference takes into account the elimination of bad debts and the simplified collection from one source instead of many. Therefore, as contended by ACCC, this "waiver interest" is thus already net of the "expenses of the recipient related thereto." The department contends that "waiver interest," and ACCC's explanation thereof, merely reflects the fact that a reduced rate of return "interest" is charged by ACCC with respect to the higher quality risk attendant to its relationship with its parent, ACC. As to ACCC's interest expense as a cost carrying the underlying receivables, the department contends that the ratio of ACCC's interest expense as applied is an appropriate adjustment as none is reflected elsewhere as a cost of carrying "waiver interest" generating receivables. As to the related bad debt expense, the department contends it merely applied the overall bad debt information ACCC used in determining its underlying federal taxable income and, that in its use of such data, the department did not find evidence wherein ACCC in its determination of its federal bad debt expense, distinguished between classes of risks which may be in its aggregate receivables, including the receivables giving rise to the "waiver interest." Thus, the department contends that directly related expense includes interest expense and bad debt expense. By the department's calculation, "waiver interest" as an item in the sales denominator has been reduced by 61 percent to 70 percent in various years to reflect these two categories of directly related expense as mandated by Section 214.71(3)(b) Florida Statutes, and Section 220.44, Florida Statutes. The issue is what constitutes directly related expense to inter-company income. There is no dispute on the numbers. Either the return numbers or the audit numbers on this item will prevail. Case 82-2817 involves an intangible tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1979-1981. During the audit period ACCC was represented in Florida by one employee whose duties were to call on ACC Florida dealers to persuade these dealers to use ACCC for financing sales they made, to keep these dealers supplied with necessary forms, and to give advice to these dealers if complicated or difficult financing situations arose. This representative worked out of the Atlanta office but lived in Florida, the state for which this representative was responsible. Buyers of ACC equipment with good credit ratings can generally obtain bank financing at better rates than are offered by ACCC. The dealer is not required to assign conditional sales contracts to ACCC (via ACC) but is encouraged to do so. The sales contracts for Florida buyers of equipment delivered to Florida are the intangibles upon which the tax here involved was based. When a dealer sells a piece of equipment on which the buyer wants financing by ACCC, the dealer has the retail customer fill out the purchaser's statement and execute three additional forms that are provided by ACCC. Under his franchise agreement with the parent corporation, the dealer is required to use appropriate precautions in conducting financing transactions, to warranty the truth and completeness of statements in the documents and their enforceability, and to repurchase the paper on demand in the event of default. The dealer forwards the executed documents to ACCC's Atlanta branch office for review and approval before any extension of credit to the customer. In Atlanta ACCC's branch manager, acting under a power of attorney from the parent corporation, accepts the document on behalf of the parent corporation, and tenders them to himself as agent for ACCC. If the paper meets the ACCC requirements as to form, terms, execution and credit-worthiness, as defined in the Master Credit Agreement between the parent corporation and ACCC, he then accepts the documents on behalf of ACCC. In some instances he conducts a supplemental credit inquiry by mail or telephone to assure ACCC's requirements are met. His acceptance of the documents for ACCC constitutes in effect the purchase and receipt of the obligation. The customer receives his financing, and the appropriate credits are transferred from ACCC to the parent corporation to the dealer's inventory account. The dealer receives an additional credit as an incentive to recommend ACCC's financing services to his customers. ACCC files the signed financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State to protect its security interest under U.C.C. Article 9, and pays the appropriate filing fee. ACCC also files continuation statements in the event the account is extended or refinanced beyond five years. The customer makes his installment payments reflecting the base price plus a time-price differential or finance charge by mailing the payments to ACCC's Atlanta lock box. ACCC furnishes him coupon books or reminder notices by mail. In the event a customer account becomes overdue, ACCC takes limited enforcement action by issuing dunning letters. ACCC, through its Florida Finance Representative, contacts the delinquent customer by telephone or in person, and arranges in appropriate cases for extensions or refinancing of the initial obligation, using printed forms with ACC's name prominently displayed thereon. In the event the customer defaults, ACCC has authority to repossess and resell the security, to sue on the note, or to amend, extend, renew or release the customer's obligations. In practice ACCC rarely, if ever, exercises these powers, but simply resells the paper to the parent corporation which takes the actions described above. The agreement between Allis-Chalmers and its dealers is that of buyer and seller and this agreement specifically provides the dealer is not an agent of Allis-Chalmers and is without authority to bind the company. In Case 82-2817 Petitioner contends that no tax is due because it is not transacting business within the state. The department contends that tax is due because the original contracts, which have been assigned once or twice depending upon whether they were wholesale or retail, have acquired a business situs in the state since they arose from, or are issued in connection with, the sale of tangible personalty in this state. In the event the department prevails, the parties have stipulated to the manner in which the modified tax shall be computed, for this case only. This stipulation is not material to the issues involved and is not replicated herein.
The Issue Whether Respondent properly assessed a tourist development tax, penalty, and interest against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Tax Collector is empowered to impose a tourist development tax (“TDT”) on the privilege of renting, leasing, or letting “for consideration of any living or accommodations in any hotel, apartment hotel, motel, [or] resort motel.” § 125.0104(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. The Tax Collector is the entity operating pursuant to Palm Beach County Ordinance, Chapter 17, Article III, Section 17-111 through 116, and is authorized to impose TDT at a six percent rate on taxpayers. See also § 125.0104(4)(a), Fla. Stat. As part of its duties, Respondent audits taxpayers and attempts to recover TDT owed. At all times material to this case, Homing Inn was a 103-room hotel located in Boynton Beach, Florida. As a taxpayer and operator of a hotel that rents rooms, Homing Inn was subject to audit of its revenues by Respondent. Respondent initiated an audit against Petitioner for the period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019 (“audit period”), to determine if Petitioner had properly remitted TDT, as reflected on Petitioner’s TDT returns. In July 2019, Suzanne Englhardt (“Englhardt” or “Auditor”), revenue auditor, was assigned to conduct Homing Inn’s audit. Englhardt started the audit of Homing Inn by conducting pre-audit research, which included her looking up Petitioner on Sunbiz, the property appraisers’ website, and preparing an audit notice. On or about July 3, 2019, Englhardt sent Homing Inn a certified notice informing Petitioner that their account had been selected for a Tourist Development Audit (“audit”) of Petitioner’s books and records. In the notice, Respondent requested Homing Inn “make available all records, receipts, invoices, and related documentation” to review for the audit. Petitioner complied with Respondent’s request for records and provided bank statements for November 2017 through June 2019; federal income tax returns for years 2016, 2017, and 2018; and room revenue reports, which were typed pages of purported revenue reported by Petitioner on its TDT returns. After Homing Inn provided the records, Englhardt reviewed the submitted documentation and found that Homing Inn failed to maintain records of sales at the hotel. As a result, Englhardt used the best information supplied and available to conduct the audit, Petitioner’s federal tax returns and bank statements. She did not utilize Petitioner’s revenue reports during the audit because no source documents were provided to support or back up any of the listed numbers typed on the revenue reports. 2018 Englhardt started the audit by reviewing Petitioner’s 2018 gross income reported on its supplied federal income tax return in the amount of $1,122,076.00. Englhardt compared the supplied 2018 bank deposits on the bank statements that amounted to $1,122,048.73 to the federal income tax return. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2018 TDT returns, which amounted to $653,202.13. Homing Inn did not provide Respondent any documentation to account for the difference in reported income. Next, Englhardt decided that since the gross revenues on the federal income tax return and the bank deposit statements balanced, she presumed TDT and sales tax were included. After she backed out the six percent TDT and seven percent sales tax, the Auditor ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $992,963.48 that she utilized to calculate the additional TDT. Englhardt calculated the additional TDT by subtracting the income reported by Petitioner on the TDT returns, $653,202.13, from the gross adjusted amount she established, $992,963.48, and determined that the total unreported income was $339,761.85. She then charged a six percent rate of TDT, which lead to the additional TDT of $20,385.68 for 2018. Englhardt calculated the remaining years of the audit with the same methodology. 2016 When auditing 2016, Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s 2016 federal income tax return provided and determined that Petitioner’s gross income was $1,042,188.00. However, when the Auditor looked at the income reported on the 2016 TDT returns, the amount differed, and the reported income on the TDT returns was $724,929.42. Englhardt backed out the TDT and sales tax from the income reported on the federal tax return and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $922,290.27. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income and determined the total 2016 unreported income was $197,360.85. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed, Englhardt charged the six percent rate by $197,360.85 for an additional $11,841.53 owed. 2017 Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s 2017 federal income tax return and determined the gross income reported was $1,032,331.00. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2017 TDT returns, which amounted to $658,435.37. Englhardt backed out TDT and sales tax from the income reported on the federal tax return and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $913,567.26. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income to determine the total 2017 unreported income was $255,131.89. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed, Englhardt charged the unreported income of $255,131.89 by the six percent rate for an additional $15,307.91 owed. 2019 Englhardt reviewed Homing Inn’s bank statements from January 2019 to June 2019 to determine the 2019 gross income. The total deposits reported were $614,992.28. Englhardt also reviewed Petitioner’s 2019 TDT returns, which amounted to $350,925.07. Englhardt backed out TDT and sales tax from the income reported from the deposits on the bank statements, and ultimately calculated and arrived at the adjusted income of $544,240.96. Next, Englhardt subtracted the reported income on the TDT return from the adjusted income and determined the total 2019 unreported income was $193,315.89. To determine the additional TDT taxes Homing Inn owed for 2019, Englhardt charged the unreported income of $193,315.89 by the six percent rate for an additional $11,598.95 owed. After completing the audit, Englhardt added the unreported income for each year and the TDT amounts owed. She found that Homing Inn had a total unreported income of $985,569.97 and owed an additional TDT of $59,134.20 from the audit period. On or about September 27, 2019, the Tax Collector issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes to Petitioner (“Notice of Intent”) and advised Petitioner of the additional TDT in the amount of $59,134.20 owed. The Notice of Intent also notified Homing Inn that Respondent also sought a penalty and interest and provided, in pertinent part: The $59,134.20 total tax due was carried over from the Summary of Tax Due scheduled to the Calculation of Tax Penalty and Interest spreadsheet. The floating rate of interest on tax due is based on the applicable rates established by the Florida Department of Revenue, which is currently an annual rate of 9%. As also prescribed by the State due to findings previously identified in a prior audit, penalty is assessed at 100% of tax due per Florida Statute 212.07(3)(b). As of 09/30/2019, Mata Chorwadi Inc., d/b/a: Homing Inn, currently owes a total of $125,460.97 in tax, penalty and interest. On or about December 16, 2019, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (“NOPA”). Petitioner requested and was granted an extension until April 14, 2020, to respond to the NOPA. On or about April 11, 2020, Petitioner timely protested Respondent’s audit findings. Petitioner’s protest letter claimed that the unreported revenue was made up of Homing Inn’s snack sales sold for $1.00 each; coins collected from a laundromat; proceeds from additional room cleaning services; and proceeds from charges for lost room keys. Petitioner informed Respondent in the protest letter that all the unreported revenue was deposited in the hotel’s bank account. Petitioner requested that Respondent fully abate the penalties and interest for reasonable cause and not willful neglect pursuant to section 213.21(3)(a), Florida Statutes. To support its position in the protest, Petitioner produced purchase receipts from Sam’s Club, which included purchases for snacks and cleaning supplies, and produced a laundry room collection log allegedly showing the coins collected from the laundromat at Homing Inn. Homing Inn did not produce any documents to show any revenue allegedly earned for additional cleaning services or lost room keys. On or about May 4, 2020, Respondent issued the Notice of Decision denying Homing Inn’s protest letter and sustaining the assessment. The Tax Collector considered Homing Inn’s argument and documents, but determined that Petitioner did not provide any proof that the snacks, coins listed on the collection log, or other expenses accounted for the unreported revenue since the Tax Collector was not provided any documents from Homing Inn relating to alleged revenue for additional cleaning services or lost room keys, sales receipts, or bank deposit slips that correspond to verify the amounts listed on the collection log. On June 3, 2020, Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion”). Homing Inn disputed the assessment and penalty and asked that it be reevaluated. Homing Inn again asserted in its Motion that the unreported revenue consisted of snack sales, revenue from the laundromat, revenue from additional cleaning services, and revenue from lost room keys. However, Petitioner did not provide any additional documents to support its position. On June 9, 2020, Respondent issued a Notice of Reconsideration-Final Assessment (“Notice of Reconsideration”) denying the Motion and sustaining the assessment since no new information was provided by Petitioner. The Tax Collector also notified Petitioner in the Notice of Reconsideration how to appeal the Tax Collector’s decision if Homing Inn was not in agreement with the tax assessment and stated, in pertinent part: If the taxpayer is not in agreement with the assessment, pursuant to Florida Statute 72.011, Mata Chorwadi Inc. may contest the assessment by “filing an action in circuit court; or, alternatively, the taxpayer may file a petition under the applicable provisions of chapter 120.” As a settlement offer, Petitioner remitted a $28,000.00 check to Respondent dated June 8, 2020, that had “paid in full” on the memo line. Respondent returned the check to Homing Inn since the amount was not for the assessment due. Afterwards, Petitioner remitted a second check in the amount of $28,000.00. Respondent applied the $28,000.00 to the total outstanding balance of Homing Inn’s tax. On July 17, 2020, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Chapter 120 Hearing contesting tax, penalty, and interest from the Tax Collector’s assessment in the Notice of Reconsideration and requested a hearing. Audit History In 2007, Homing Inn had been audited by the Tax Collector. The first audit resulted in Petitioner owing additional TDT based on unreported revenue. The current audit is the second audit of Homing Inn for TDT. Hearing At hearing, Englhardt testified that at the beginning of the audit, Petitioner informed her that all records before November 2017 were destroyed in a flood and could not be provided. Englhardt testified that snack sales, laundry coins, key card replacement monies, and room cleaning proceeds were not revenues subject to TDT. However, she explained during the hearing, that Homing Inn failed to provide any documents to demonstrate sales or revenue for the items they were asserting, so she was not able to make any of the revenue deductions Petitioner requested. At hearing, Englhardt addressed in detail each item Petitioner was contesting and all of the documentation Homing Inn provided the Tax Collector requesting a reduction of the assessment amount determined from the audit. Englhardt started with Homing Inn’s purchase receipts for the snacks supplied. On the point of snacks, Englhardt testified that she asked Homing Inn for sales receipts during the conference they had so that she could adjust for the snacks. However, Homing Inn never provided any sales receipts. Englhardt explained that the receipts supplied by Homing Inn demonstrated expenses, not revenue, so she could not use the documents supplied for the audit. Englhardt also explained that she did not use the coin laundry log because Homing Inn did not provide any deposit slips to back up those alleged deposits. She needed additional source documentation to delineate that particular revenue stream, and Petitioner failed to provide documentation to substantiate any of the items on the log. Englhardt explained further that she was not able to use the alleged extra cleaning charge proceeds for the audit because there was nothing to quantify it. There was no audit trail, folios, sales receipts, or anything to demonstrate any such payments. Englhardt also explained that the alleged charge of $5 per lost key was considered. She testified that she saw the purchase receipt for the room keys but could not use it because nothing showed revenue for lost keys. There were no customer bills, folios, or credit card receipts. Englhardt testified she had to conduct the audit following section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, because if records were unavailable, she was to make an assessment from an estimate based on the best information available, which for Homing Inn were the federal income tax returns, TDT reports, and bank statements that she used. Englhardt also testified that she considered Homing Inn’s request to reduce the assessment amount, but denied it, because there was no documentation to make any reductions or adjustments. At hearing, Englhardt also addressed the interest and penalty the Tax Collector was imposing. She explained that the penalty is 100 percent, according to the statute, if there is a previous audit finding as there had been with Homing Inn. She also testified that interest is “never compromised.” Englhardt also testified that she applied the $28,000.00 remitted by Homing Inn to the tax, which reduced their TDT of $59,134.20 to $31,134.20, but the penalty amount was still the $59,134.20, and $7.66 per day interest. At hearing, Homing Inn produced purchase receipts for snacks and cleaning supplies, Exhibit 3; a laundromat collection log, Exhibit 4; purchase receipts for key cards, Exhibit 5; a list showing charges for room damages and a list of additional cleaning services, Exhibit 7; and a copy of a check that represented repayment for a loan, Exhibit 6. Homing Inn used its corporate representative, Dipika Shah (“Shah”), to testify at hearing. Shah explained that her husband owns Homing Inn, and she works at the desk occasionally, but mainly runs errands and purchases items needed for the hotel. Shah testified that all income collected from the snacks, key cards, and other revenues are deposited in one bank, PNC Bank. Shah explained that the computer system checks guests in and out. There are four or five people that work at the desk. She testified there are weekly customers, and the weekly rental comes with one cleaning. If a customer wants an additional cleaning, it is an additional $20.00 per room cleaning. Shah also testified that there is an additional charge for any room damage, but often times the damage amount is not paid. Shah described the Homing Inn’s coin-operated laundromat on the hotel premises contained four washers and four dryers. She explained that her husband pulls the coins out of the machines, logs the amount collected, rolls up the coins, and makes laundromat deposits in the Homing Inn general bank account. Shah admitted that she has no personal knowledge of what her husband has collected. Shah verified the purchase of 5,800 room key cards at hearing. However, she admitted there was no receipts for sales of lost keys in the amount of $5.00 each to customers. Shah also explained that Homing Inn has snacks for purchase. Shah testified that Homing Inn does not keep records of snacks sales and most of the snack purchases are cash. Shah testified that their accountant prepares the TDT returns monthly. Shah testified that she is unsure if the business maintains a general ledger and has never seen a profit and loss statement for the business. Findings of Ultimate Fact In this case, the Tax Collector established that the audit giving rise to this proceeding was properly conducted. After reviewing the records Homing Inn submitted for the audit, the Auditor determined that the amounts on the bank statements and federal tax returns matched, but the amounts listed in Homing Inn’s TDT returns were underreported. Homing Inn failed to provide the Auditor with any records to account for the difference between the federal income tax and TDT returns. The Auditor correctly performed Homing Inn’s audit using an acceptable methodology of assessing unreported revenue based on the federal income tax returns, bank statements, and income reflected in the TDT returns. During the audit, Petitioner failed to supply requested records to the Tax Collector that accurately reflected sales at the hotel or source documentation that explains any of the contested unreported revenue. Therefore, the Auditor could not use Petitioner’s supplied documentation as part of the calculations for the audit to reduce the assessment amount. Additionally, the record is void of any evidence to support reducing the assessment amount for any snack sales, laundromat revenue, cleaning revenue, key sale monies, and room damage proceeds. Shah’s limited involvement and knowledge in the daily operations of Homing Inn did not allow her to present relevant firsthand testimony or competent evidence to support Petitioner’s assertions. Therefore, the Auditor properly determined Petitioner’s TDT liability utilizing the method in section 212.12(5)(b), which allows the Auditor to rely on an estimation for the assessment when the taxpayer fails to provide records for the audit, and the Tax Collector’s assessment of $59,134.20 tax is proper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Palm Beach County Tax Collector, enter a final order directing Mata Chorwadi, Inc., d/b/a Homing Inn, to pay the Tax Collector’s assessment for $31,134.20 of TDT; $59,134.20 of penalty; and $12,444.95 of interest, accruing at $7.66 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Orfelia Mayor, General Counsel Palm Beach County Tax Collector 301 North Olive Avenue Post Office Box 3715 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-3715 Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Joseph C. Moffa, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Manshi Shah, Esquire 6525 Jessy Court Lake Worth, Florida 33467 Jonathan W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Hampton C. Peterson, General Counsel Palm Beach County Tax Collector 301 North Olive Avenue Post Office Box 3715 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-3715
Findings Of Fact In the original corporate income tax report submitted by Florida Power Corporation for the 1973 tax year the tax was computed using the federal income tax base. This included various depreciation methods and schedules in which accelerated depreciation had been claimed for federal tax purposes by Petitioner in years prior to 1972 and the initiation of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law. By using accelerated depreciation schedules authorized by the federal tax laws, higher depreciation is allowed in the early years of an asset's useful life, leaving a lesser amount of depreciation to be charged off for tax purposes in the latter years of an asset's life. Essentially, Petitioner here contends that depreciable assets acquired prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law were depreciated on accelerated schedules for federal tax purposes, but upon the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law had value in excess of that shown on the federal tax schedule. By requiring taxpayers to use the same depreciation schedules for Florida taxes that are required for federal taxes Petitioner contends it is being penalized for the accelerated depreciation taken before the Florida income tax became constitutional. As an example of Petitioner's position it may be assumed that a depreciable asset was acquired for $100,000 with a useful life of 10 years, three years before the Florida Income Tax Law was passed. Also assume that during this three-year period from acquisition a double declining balance depreciation was taken for computing federal income taxes. Depreciation taken for the first year would be $20,000, for the second year $16,000 and for the third year $12,800, leaving a basis for further depreciation of $41,200 for this asset with seven years useful life remaining. For federal tax purposes Petitioner takes depreciation each year based upon initial cost less accumulated depreciation. Because this value decreased rapidly for the first three years in the assumed example and the excess depreciation thereby generated was not usable in reducing Florida taxes, Petitioner contends it is discriminated against in being required to, in effect, use the book value for federal tax purposes in computing its Florida income tax. Petitioner presented additional examples of reported income for federal income tax purposes which it claims should be exempt from Florida Income Tax. The specific deductions from which the $619,697 refund was computed were not broken down to show how much resulted from the accelerated depreciation schedules which commences prior to January 1, 1972, and how much was derived from these additional examples, some of which were given simply as an example of deferring income for tax purposes. Prior to January 1, 1972, Petitioner purchased some of its bonds prior to maturity and at a discount. As an example if Petitioner purchases $1,000,000 face value of these bonds for $800,000, it has realized a $200,000 gain which it must report as income for federal income tax purposes. These same federal tax rules allow Petitioner to elect to pay the income tax in the year received or spread it equally over the succeeding ten year period. Petitioner elected to spread the income over the succeeding ten year period and each year add $20,000 to its reported income for federal income tax purposes. Since the income was realized before January 1, 1972, Petitioner contends this is not subject to federal tax purposes. With respect to overhead during construction of depreciable assets the taxpayer is allowed to charge these costs off as an expense in the year incurred or capitalize these expenses. If the taxpayer elects to capitalize these expenses they are added to the cost of the constructed asset and recovered as depreciation as the asset is used. Petitioner elected to charge these expenses in the year incurred rather than capitalize them. Had they been capitalized originally, Petitioner would, in 1973, have been entitled to recover these costs in its depreciation of the asset. In its amended return it seeks to treat these costs as if they had been capitalized rather than expenses prior to January 1, 1972. Although apparently not involved in the amended return, Petitioner also presented an example where changes in accounting procedures can result in a gain to the taxpayer which is treated as income to the taxpayer, which he may elect to spread over future years in equal increments until the total gain has been reported.
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a policy of Respondent prohibiting Respondent’s employees from engaging in preparation of federal income tax returns for profit during off-hours constitutes a rule subject to promulgation requirements of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are employees of the Department of Revenue (DOR) who wish to prepare federal income tax returns. They assert they wish to prepare the returns on a pro bono basis and for hire in their non-working time for persons who are not required to file any tax returns with the State of Florida, and who are not required to pay court-ordered payments of child support. Each of the Petitioners is employed with the Respondent as a Tax Auditor II, III, or IV, and each is a Career Service employee with permanent status. Petitioners’ primary work function for the Respondent entails auditing State tax returns filed with DOR by business entities. Victor Novoa holds a bachelors degree in finance, and has 20 years experience working in the accounting field, including nine years auditing experience with the Respondent. Ana Socarras has a bachelor’s degree in the accounting field, and has been employed with the Respondent as an auditor since 1994. She has 15 years experience working in the accounting field. Enrique Altuzarra is a licensed Certified Public Accountant. He has more than 25 years experience in the area of accounting and auditing. Lander Carn holds a master’s degree in taxation, is a licensed Certified Public Accountant, and has 15 years experience in the accounting and auditing fields. Petitioners became aware, following their employment by Respondent, of Respondent’s policy prohibiting its employees from preparation of federal income tax returns for compensation during their non-working time. Respondent’s policy has been consistently disseminated to employees through group meetings with employees and in memoranda circulated by management to employees. Pro bono preparation of federal tax returns is permitted in some situations. Respondent’s policy is expressed also in Respondent’s “Code of Conduct” which is published to all employees. The policy provides: (2) Outside Preparation of Tax Returns and Other Forms Preparation of tax returns and other forms required by the Department of Revenue or the Internal Revenue Service, whether compensated or uncompensated, for persons other than family members is not permitted. Respondent also states the policy in its auditor’s manual in the following language: The Department has a policy specifically prohibiting all employees from preparing any state or federal tax returns, reports, declarations or documents, or otherwise [sic]engage in accounting, use, analysis or preparation of any financial records for consideration, or [sic] sign such tax document for compensation, gift, or favor. Respondent’s policy has found expression in Respondent’s official writings, monthly newsletter to employees, and memoranda addressed to employees and management. Statements of the policy have been systematically communicated to agency personnel with the intent and effect of prohibiting employee preparation of federal tax returns for compensation in the course of secondary employment and implemented with the direct and consistent effect of law. Respondent’s Code of Conduct literally prohibits any exception to the policy prohibiting participation by an employee in preparation of federal tax returns for pay during off-duty hours for anyone other than family members. Respondent’s Employee Handbook also makes it clear that any employee engaging in such conduct, absent specific approval, faces disciplinary action “up to and including dismissal.” As established by testimony of Glenn Bedonie, an employee of Respondent in various, highly responsible, management positions, and William P. Fritchman, a participant in development of the policy and Respondent’s former chief of personnel for 23 years, there has been no instance in which any employee has ever been permitted to prepare federal income tax returns “for hire” during off-duty time. As stipulated by the parties, Respondent has not adopted, in compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, the policy of refusing to allow employees to prepare federal tax returns for hire in secondary employment. Petitioners do not contemplate and do not desire to prepare federal tax returns in circumstances that would present a conflict of interest with their employment with Respondent. They do not seek to prepare tax returns for individuals who own a business, who are required to file state returns, and who are subject to audit by Respondent. Confidential tax information possessed by Respondent is not available to the Petitioners or other auditors within Respondent’s employment. Such information must be requested from a Computer Audit Analyst or a Senior Tax specialist on a specific taxpayer which the particular auditor has been assigned to audit. If deemed appropriate, the information may be made available to the auditor. Similarly, confidential tax information obtained by Respondent from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is adequately safeguarded from ready abuse by employees by requiring an auditor to justify the need for such information to a series of supervisory personnel. Respondent presented no creditable or persuasive evidence that it would be impractical or unfeasible to enact its present policy in compliance with requirements of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, by failing to pay sales tax and local government infrastructure surtax, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a Final Order upholding its assessment against Petitioner in full, including all taxes, penalties, and interest statutorily due until date of payment for both the sales and use tax and the local government infrastructure. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1998.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex when Respondents denied Petitioner's application to rent an apartment.
Findings Of Fact Mizner Park, located in Boca Raton, Florida, is a mixed use complex, consisting of apartments, retail stores, and offices. The apartment complex is owned and managed by Crocker Downtown Development Associates. Ms. Terrill Jaroszewicz (Jaroszewicz) is the property manager for Mizner Park. Ms. Mary Sims, who reports to Jaroszewicz, is in charge of the residential apartments in the complex. At the time in question, Ms. Jan Pratt (Pratt) was a leasing consultant for the apartments. Pratt's duties included taking applications from prospective tenants, processing the applications, and gathering the necessary information needed to make a decision on whether to approve the application. When Pratt had completed processing the application, she would take the application package to Sims, who would review the package and make a decision on whether to approve the application. Respondents, collectively referred to as Mizner, required that prospective tenants fill out an application form, agree to have a credit check performed, provide sufficient information to verify their current income, agree to a check of the tenants' residency history for the past two years, pay a $50, nonrefundable fee for processing the credit check, and provide a security deposit. Mizner wanted to rent its apartments to tenants who had a good credit history, had a monthly annual income of at least three times the amount of the lease amount, and had a good history as a tenant. On June 15, 1994, Petitioner, Sanford J. Gubernik (Gubernik), who is a male, met with Pratt and filled out an application to lease an apartment at Mizner Park. Gubernik had omitted his social security number when he completed the application. Pratt advised him that it would be necessary to have his social security number in order to do the credit check. Gubernik was reluctant to give Pratt his social security number and to have a credit check done. He gave Pratt a check for $50 for the credit check and a check for $885 as a security deposit. Gubernik is an independent contractor who works for a number of sunglass and eyewear companies. His annual income varies each year. When he filled out the application, Pratt asked Gubernik to provide her copies of his income tax returns for the last two years so that she could verify his income for the last two years. Pratt had a credit check run on Gubernik. Mizner's computers were down on the day that the credit check was performed so the company performing the credit check mailed her a copy of the credit report rather than having her receive the report via the computer, which was the normal method that Pratt received credit reports on prospective tenants. Gubernik had two federal income tax liens, which showed up on his credit report. One lien was dated October, 1993 in the amount of $10,058, and the other lien was dated February, 1991 for $36,829. Pratt advised Sims of the tax liens. Sims told Pratt that she should contact Gubernik and advise him that his credit was a problem. She further advised Pratt that if the credit report was correct and that Gubernik had not satisfied the liens or was not in good standing with the Internal Revenue Service that his application would be denied. Gubernik had traveled to New Orleans to visit clients. While there he received a message on his cellular telephone that Pratt needed to talk to him. He called Pratt and she advised him that there was a problem with his credit report and he should call the credit reporting company and get a copy of the report. Gubernik advised Pratt that the problem was two tax liens. Pratt advised him that they would hold the apartment but that he needed to come in and get the issue of the tax liens resolved by showing that he was trying to pay off the liens. When Gubernik returned from New Orleans he took copies of his income tax returns to Pratt. She advised him that she needed verification that he was making payments on the liens. Gubernik became very irate and told Pratt that he had never had a problem because of the tax liens and that he had no intention of paying them. Pratt advised Gubernik that his application was denied because of the tax liens. Still upset, Gubernik requested to see the manager. Sims was not in the office on that day so Pratt took the application file to Jaroszewicz and told her that a gentleman wanted to talk to her about the denial of his lease application. Jaroszewicz reviewed the application and immediately saw that the problem was the tax liens that appeared on the credit report. Pratt showed Gubernik to Jaroszewicz' office. Gubernik was visibly upset. Jaroszewicz told him that there was a problem with his credit report and that Mizner could not approve his lease application. Gubernik offered to pay his rent in advance. However, prepayment of rent was against Mizner's policy because of accounting reasons and the possibility of poor payment in the future when the prepayment amount was depleted. Gubernik offered to have his rent deducted from his monthly checks that he received from a sunglass company. Mizner's policy was not to have the rent deducted from the tenant's paycheck because the employee could change employers. Gubernik became more and more upset as the conversation with Jaroszewicz continued. Finally Jaroszewicz told Gubernik that there was no need to discuss the matter any further and showed him to the door. The apartment which Gubernik tried to rent was leased to a male in August, 1994. On June 2, 1994, a female applied to Mizner to rent an apartment. A credit check was done and revealed that the prospective tenant had two tax liens totalling approximately $36,000. The female's application was denied by Mizner because of the tax liens. In 1994, Mizner's first time rentals were divided about equally between single males, single females, and families. Gubernik claims that his application was denied not because he had tax liens but because he was a man. Mizner contends that the only reason that Gubernik's application was denied was because he had two tax liens for over $40,000 which represented meant to Mizner that Gubernik had a bad credit history.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Crocker Downtown Development Associates, Terrill Jaroszewicz, and Mizner Associates, Ltd. did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Sanford J. Gubernik and denying his petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Sanford J. Gubernik 212 Northwest 4th Avenue Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Patrick M. Muldowney, Esquire Shutts & Bowen 20 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Modern Tool and Die, (MTD), is a privately held corporation engaged in manufacturing equipment. In 1965 they started the manufacture of bumper guards which required electroplating. They entered into agreements with MPC pursuant to which MTD erected two buildings adjacent to their plant which they leased to MPC in which to do the electroplating of the bumper guards. MPC is also a privately held corporation and there is no common ownership of these two companies. The two buildings built for MPC's occupancy were partitioned, compartmented and wired as desired by MPC and at its expense. Florida Power Corporation supplied electricity to the complex through the main transformer of MTD. In 1965 and to a lesser extent now, electricity rates per kilowatt-hour (kwh) were lowered with increased usage of electricity. Since both MTD and MPC are large users of electricity they obtain a cheaper rate if all electricity used is billed from the master meter serving MTD. Accordingly, and at the recommendation of the power company, additional transformers and meters were placed at the two buildings occupied by MPC and read monthly at or about the same time the master meter is read by the power company. The kw used at the two buildings is forwarded by MPC to MTD each month. The latter, upon receipt of the power company bill, computes the cost of the power per kwh and in turn bills MPC for its portion of the bill based upon the usage forwarded by MPC to MTD. Upon the commencement of this working agreement between these two companies in 1965 MPC, pursuant to an oral lease, has paid rent to MTD monthly at the rate of approximately $2,400 per month. It has also paid to MTD its pro rata cost for the electricity used each month. The rent is invoiced each month on the first of the month as in Exhibit 3 and paid by the 10th by MPC. Sales tax is added to the rent and remitted to DOR. Electricity usage is also invoiced by MTD to MPC on or about the 20th of the month and paid by MPC on or about the first of the following month. (Exhibit 4). Sales tax on the electricity used is paid by MTD to Florida Power Company who presumably remits this to DOR. During the 15 years these two companies have shared the cost of electric power they have been audited numerous times; the arrangement was made known to the auditors; and no auditor, prior to the present, suggested that the cost of electricity was part of the rent paid by MPC upon which sales tax was due. Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 1) in the amount of $9,747.34 is based upon the cost of electricity billed to MPC during the period of the audit December 1, 1976 through November 30, 1979 multiplied by 4 percent sales tax plus penalties and interest. The parties stipulated to the accuracy of this amount. They differ only as to whether the tax is owed.
