Findings Of Fact Richard Young is a registered building contractor holding license number RB0027773. Young does business as H. H. Johnson and Associates. On July 16, 1976, Young, in behalf of H. H. Johnson and Associates, entered into a contract for the construction of a single family residence with Anthony Ventura aid his wife, Patricia Ventura. This contract called for the construction of said residence within six months. On or about December 25, 1976, the Ventura's moved into the house which had not been finished by Johnson without the approval of the contractor. After Ventura had moved in, Young obtained a certificate of occupancy from the local building authorities and continued to finish the house. Thereafter, certain problems developed with final finishing work on the house, specifically, a drainage problem involving the driveway and garage. Ventura, who had occupied the house, would not go to closing and make payment of the final draw as payment on the construction. In an effort to correct the drainage problem, a concrete cap was poured in the garage of the Ventura residence. This concrete cap subsequently cracked and there were other problems relating to it. It was at this point that Ventura made a complaint to the Cape Coral Licensing Board. The Cape Coral Board arranged a meeting between Ventura and Young. At the meeting between Ventura and Young, officials and members of the Cape Coral Building Construction Board ware present. This meeting resulted in an agreement as stated in the letter of the Board dated June 30, 1977 (Exhibit 7) This letter lists specifically the agreement between Ventura and Young which was intended to resolve the complaint pending before the Board. The letter stated as follows: Dear Mr. Young, In our meeting on Thursday past it was my understanding that the following agreement was reached regarding the Ventura home. The garage floor was to be replaced and the hot water heater elevated to proper level. A drain was to be installed just in front of the garage door. Door to utility room from garage was to be swung in the opposite direction to open out. Any other warranty items such as the wall settlement, cracks and etc., were to be corrected under the normal warranty. Mr. Ventura and yourself were to agree on a sum to be placed in escrow to insure completion. This item is strictly between you and he and does not involve the City of Cape Coral at this point. Sincerely, /s/ Mr. Herbert J. Werner, Director Department of Community Development HJW/lec cc: Mr. Ventura, complainant Mr. Jack Scheall, Chairman of the Board On the following day, July 1, 1977, Mr. E. G. Couse, legal counsel for Mr. Young, received a letter from Barbara A. Burkett, counsel for Mr. Ventura. See Exhibit 10. This letter indicated a dispute between Ventura and Young regarding credits for costs incurred by Ventura because of an alleged delay In construction, and certain material liens. Exhibit 10, a letter reflects that the amount of the final draw was $6,594, that Ventura asserted that Young was entitled to only $4,231 and that Young asserted a claim to $5,930. Burkett, in behalf of her client, proposed payment of the final draw in the amount of $6,994 to an escrow agent who would immediately disburse $2,762 directly to Mr. Ventura and disburse the remaining balance of $4,321 to H. E. Johnson and Associates upon completion of repairs as specified in the letter (Exhibit 10) and upon written acknowledgement of Mr. Ventura that tie repairs had been made and were satisfactory. In addition to the items listed in the letter of June 30, the Burkett letter lists repairs to the tile in the bathroom and repairs to a large sliding glass door in the pool area which also were to be repaired. Because of his inability to reach any agreement with Ventura, Young refused to perform any of the repairs listed in Werner's letter of June 30, 1977 although he did make repairs to the bathroom. The conflict existing between the parties over the escrowed amount were brought to the attention of the Board by Mr. Couse as reflected in the minutes of the Board meeting of September 21, 1977 (Exhibit 1). The Board's position was stated by Mr. Kirby on page 2 of the minutes wherein Mr. Kirby stated that the Board's responsibility in the matter was to determine whether poor workmanship existed and that the matte of financial obligations did not lie within the jurisdiction of the Board. The Board then determined that the contractor was guilty of poor or faulty workmanship and thereby was in violation of Section 5-1/2-21 of the Cape Coral Code. The Board thereafter suspended the license of R. M. Young d/b/a H. H. Johnson and Associates for a period of 30 days effective immediately. This decision of the Board was appealed to the City Council pursuant to the Cape Coral Code which remanded the Board's order for reconsideration of the penalty. As a result of the remand, another hearing was held on January 11, 1978. The minutes of this meeting reflect that Mr. Young and Mr. Couse were not present. See Exhibit 3. At this second proceeding additional evidence was taken to include statements by Mr. Ventura that he had not seen Mr. Young up until the time or the hearing, that the concrete contractor, Grimsley, had told him that he would repair the driveway and that the garage floor had been repoured and the repair was satisfactory to the customer. Bared upon Ventura's testimony and the testimony of others at this new proceeding, the Board voted to revoke the license of Young. This meeting resulted in the issuance of two orders, Exhibits 4 and 5. Exhibit 5 was identified as an order issued in error revoking Young's license for a period of 90 days. This order is dated January 11, 1978. On January 12, 1978 another order was issued which revoked Young's license effective January 11, 1978. These orders of the Board were appealed to the City Council on the basis of the failure of notice by Mr. Young. The City Council, having reviewed this, granted the appeal and referred the matter back to the Board to conduct another hearing at which Mr. Young could appear. This resulted in a hearing, the minutes of which were filed as late filed Exhibit A. This meeting was conducted on March 15, 1978. At this meeting Mr. Rollings, representing Mr. Ventura and Mr. Couse, representing Mr. Young were permitted to make argument to the Board. Mr. Rollings represented that all of the items the Board had requested the contractor to perform had been done two days prior to the meeting of March 15, 1978. Mr. Rollings represented that the concrete subcontractor had the work on his own accord. Mr. Rollings indicated that Mr. Ventura did not feel the Board should relieve Mr. Young of any possible punishment and that the Board's responsibility was to make the contractor responsible for his work and not to settle money disputes and things of this nature. Mr. Couse argued that the work had been done and the delay was solely the result of the finance dispute between Young and Ventura. The Board heard the testimony of Grimsley and then having heard the arguments of counsel, Jack Scheall, a member of the Board, moved and it was seconded, that "the appeal be denied". Mr. Kirby, a member of the Board, asked "what the denial was for exactly." Mr. Tolisano, a member of the Board, replied, "the license was still revoked." A voice vote was taken and the motion carried.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer concludes that the penalty assessed by the local Board was inappropriate and procedurally incorrect; that the increase in the penalty was without factual basis based upon the facts presented at the last hearing before the local Board. Therefore the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Board take no action upon this complaint. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barry Sinoff, Esquire 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 E. G. Couse, Esquire Suite 202 Courtney Building 2069 First Street Post Office Drawer 1647 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902
Findings Of Fact The Coral Reef Yacht Club is a non-profit Florida corporation with an active membership of over five hundred (500) families. The purpose of the club is to encourage water sports such as boating, fishing and skindiving. The club presently has a waiting list of approximately forty to fifty members wanting wet slips for their boats. Historically the boats berthed in Coral Reef's docks have been a fifty- fifty mixture of sail and power craft with a length between 22 to 45 feet. It is anticipated by the club that similar craft will use the new slips if constructed. Since the club's beginning 25 years ago it has leased submerged land for all of its docking facilities from the City of Miami, the fee simple owner. In June 1979, the lease agreement was renegotiated to add the submerged land over which the proposed project would be constructed. In consideration for that addition the club deeded an 18 foot strip of its property to Miami for a bicycle path parallel to South Bayshore Drive. The site of the proposed project is in that part of Biscayne Bay known colloquially as Dinner Key. Dinner Key is well suited to marina development. It had been a Pan American Clipper base in the 1930's. It is close to population centers and provides direct access to the Atlantic Ocean without passing through drawbridges. The Dinner Key area is delineated by a crescent of spoil banks which were created by dredging of channels out toward the deep water of Biscayne Bay, a navigable state water. These banks create a sheltered area for the mooring and berthing of small craft. Other marina facilities in the Dinner Key include Biscayne Yacht Club (56 slips), Dinner Key Marina (330 slips), Monty Trainer's (40 slips), Merrill-Stevens (56 slips), and the City of Miami Docks (50 slips). Coral Reef's dredge and fill application was filed with DER on July 10, 1979. It was denied on November 21, 1979 for the following reasons: The project would eliminate a productive and diverse seagrass bed in a 1.8 acre area. The removal of the seagrasses would result in a degradation of water quality contrary to Section 17-3.061 and 17-1.121, Florida Administrative Code. The project would interfere with the conservation of fish and wildlife contrary to Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. The proposal would conflict with the intent of the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve Act [Section 258.165(3), Florida Statutes] to preserve the bay in its natural condition. The project as proposed in Coral Reef's application is to expand its present marina facility of 72 slips by adding 4,290 square feet of docking to accommodate 27 additional wet slips. In order for there to be an adequate draft of 7 feet, 6,400 cubic yards of submerged bottom would be dredged from an area of approximately 1.8 acres (200 ft. by 400 ft.). The spoil resulting from the dredging would be piped to an existing spoil bank 600 feet to the southeast of the site. Coral Reef proposes to stabilize the spoil by planting salt resistant grasses and shrubs on it. At present the Club's docks extend 460 feet out into Biscayne Bay. The proposed addition would add another 213 feet. At the final hearing Coral Reef amended its application by proposing to add rip-rap in piles 3 feet high and 12 feet center-to-center to be placed only under the main walkway of the new proposed dock area. DER was given the opportunity to request a continuance of the final hearing to have time to evaluate the amendment, but no continuance was necessary. The site of the proposed dock expansion has two distinct biological regimes. Under tic existing dock where there has already been dredging there is little bottom life but a considerable population of fish. The number of marine organisms is limited. There are no larger plants and there is approximately 1 inch of silt on the bottom. In the area of the proposed dredging the bottom is covered by a great number of invertebrates--mollusks and crustaceans. There are thick seagrass beds giving approximately 55 percent coverage over a sandy bottom. Turtle grass (thalassia testudinum) and cuban shoal weed (halodule wrighti) predominate there. The sea grasses ace important to the environment because (a) they are the base of the detrital food chain; (b) they provide erosion and turbidity control; and (c) they serve as a nursery ground and refuge for numerous marine organisms and small fish. The spoil island on which Coral Reef proposes depositing the new spoil has a stand of Australian pines and a fringe of red, white, and black mangroves, primarily on the west side of the island. The fauna over the grass beds in the proposed dredging area consist of fish such as french grunts, snappers, great barracuda, and the commercially valuable pink shrimp. If the proposed dredging takes place, the grass beds will be destroyed. They will not re-establish themselves because at the new bottom depth of 7 feet there will be insufficient light for repropogation. To prevent damages to the sea grasses which surround the spoil island measures must be taken to prevent the new spoil from washing off the island and smothering the grass. Coral Reef proposes retaining the spoil on the island by a 1.5 foot high sand bag dike on the east side of the island where most of the 6,400 cubic yards of spoil will be deposited. At no point would the slope of the spoil exceed 1 to 20. Turbidity curtains are proposed to be used during the time the spoil is deposited. No significant environmental damage is expected to result from this placement of the spoil. It is possible that the placing of rip-rap under the newly constructed docks as proposed would create a habitat for the small and medium size fish in the Dinner Key area. The surface of the rip-rap would provide a suitable substrate for marine fouling organisms such as barnacles to grow on, and if the interstices of the rubble are large enough, fish could find shelter there. The rip-rap proposal is offered to mitigate the admitted environmental damage which would result from the dredging. There is however, no way to determine either qualitatively or quantitatively if the benefit of the rip-rap would compensate for the harm of dredging. The importance of the seagrasses is well established while the environmental benefits provided by the rip-rap is only speculative at this time. The Miami Area has an acute shortage of boat slips. It is estimated by the Comprehensive Marina Development Study (February 1979) prepared by the Greenleaf/Telesca firm for the City of Miami that by 1985 there will be a shortage of 3,350 wet and dry boat slips. The City of Miami supports the proposed expansion of Coral Reef facilities as an aid in ameliorating the slip shortage. If the Coral Reef Marina were expanded, it is likely that some of the Coral Reef members who presently have their craft in public marina facilities would move them to the new Coral Reef slips, but no reliable estimate of the number of public slips which would thus be vacated has been made.
Recommendation For the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation enter an order denying Coral Reef's application in File No. DF12-21762 to expand its marina facilities by dredging and filling in Biscayne Bay. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Paterno, Esquire TAYLOR BRION BUKER & GREEN 1451 Brickel Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether, with respect to each application filed, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (Florida Housing) review and decision-making process in response to the Request for Applications 2020-201 (RFA) was contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, the agency’s rules or policies, or the RFA.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Section 420.5099 designates Florida Housing as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program (commonly referred to as “tax credits” or “housing credits”) was enacted to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. These housing credits are awarded competitively to housing developers in Florida for rental housing projects which qualify. The effect is to reduce the amount that the developer must otherwise borrow. Because the total debt is lower, the housing credit property can (and must) offer lower, more affordable rents. Developers also covenant to keep rents at affordable levels for periods of 30 to 50 years as consideration for receipt of the housing credits. The demand for housing credits provided by the federal government exceeds supply. The Competitive Application Process Section 420.507(48) authorizes Florida Housing to allocate housing credits and other funding through requests for proposals or other competitive solicitations, and Florida Housing has adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 to prescribe the competitive solicitation process. Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing allocate its competitive funding through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3). Applicants for funding request, in their applications, a specific dollar amount of housing credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of ten years. Applicants normally will sell the rights to the future stream of income housing credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the applicant entity) to an investor to generate the amount of capital needed to build the development. The amount an applicant can receive depends on several factors, such as a certain percentage of the projected total development cost; a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated areas of some counties. These are just examples of the factors considered, and this is by no means an exhaustive list. Housing credits are made available through a competitive application process that starts with the issuance of an RFA. An RFA is considered to be a “request for proposal” as indicated in rule 67-60.009(4). The RFA in this case was issued on August 26, 2020, and responses were due November 5, 2020. The RFA was modified September 11, 2020, and October 12, 2020, but with no change with respect to the response deadline. Through the RFA, Florida Housing expects to award up to an estimated $15,275,810 of housing credits to proposed developments in medium-sized counties, and up to an estimated $1,453,730 of housing credits to proposed developments in small counties. Florida Housing received 84 applications in response to RFA 2020-201. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to the Florida Housing Board of Directors (Board). The Review Committee found 79 applications eligible and five applications ineligible for funding. Through the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, 10 applications were preliminarily recommended for funding. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. The federal government enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CCA) in December 2020, and as a result, an additional $3,367,501 in housing credits became available for affordable housing for Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, and Bay Counties, which were impacted by Hurricane Sally. The staff at Florida Housing recommended using the CCA funding to award housing credits to additional highest-ranking eligible applications in qualified disaster areas, subject to the county award tally, regardless of the county size in RFA 2020-201 and developed a chart listing its CCA funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On January 22, 2021, the Board met and considered the recommendations of the Review Committee and staff for RFA 2020-201. At approximately 2:50 p.m. that day, all of the applicants in RFA 2020-201 were provided notice that the Board determined whether applications were eligible or ineligible for consideration of funding, and that certain eligible applicants were preliminarily selected for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process. Notice was provided by posting on the Florida Housing website two spreadsheets: one listing the Board-approved scoring results in RFA 2020-201; and one identifying the applications which Florida Housing proposed to fund. In the January 22, 2021, posting, Florida Housing announced its intention to award funding to 24 applicants, including The Villages, Pinnacle at Hammock Springs, and Rosemary Place. Petitioners timely filed Notices of Protest and Petitions for Formal Administrative Proceedings. All Intervenors have been properly recognized as such. The terms of RFA 2020-201 were not challenged. RFA 2020-201 Ranking and Selection Process The RFA contemplates a structure in which the applicant is scored on eligibility items and obtains points for other items. A summary of the eligibility items is listed in Section 5.A.1. of the RFA, beginning at page 71. Only applications that meet all of the eligibility requirements will be eligible for funding and considered for the funding selection. This challenge does not raise any issues with respect to the point totals awarded to the applicants. The RFA has four funding goals: The Corporation has a goal to fund five Medium County Developments that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal outlined in Section Four A.11.a of the RFA, with a preference that three of the Applications meet the criteria outlined in Section Four, A.11.b(1) of the RFA to be considered submitted but not awarded in RFA 2019-113, and two of the Applications meet the criteria outlined in Section Four, A.11.b(2) of the RFA to be considered not submitted in RFA 2019-113. The Corporation has a goal to fund one Development that qualifies for the Local Revitalization Initiative Goal outlined in Section Four A.5.i of the RFA. The Corporation has a goal to fund two Developments with a Demographic commitment of Family that select and qualify for the geographic Areas of Opportunity/ SADDA Goal outlined in Section Four A.10.a(1)(d) of the RFA. The Corporation has a goal to fund one Development that qualifies for the SunRail Goal outlined in Section Four, A.5.e.(5) of the RFA. *Note: During the Funding Selection Process, outlined below, Developments selected for these goals will only count toward one goal with one exception: If an Application that was selected to meet the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Goal or Local Revitalization Initiative Goal also qualifies for the SunRail Goal, the SunRail Goal will also be considered met. (Jt. Exh. 1, pp.75). At page 76 of Joint Exhibit 1, the RFA also sets forth the sorting order to be used when selecting applications to meet the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal: The highest scoring applications will be determined by first sorting together all eligible Priority I Medium County Applications from highest score to lowest score, with any scores that are tied separated in the following order. This will then be repeated for Priority II Applications: First, counties of the Applications that (i) qualified for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal in FRA 2019-113 and (ii) were invited to enter credit underwriting will receive lower preference than other Medium Counties competing for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal. This affects the following counties: Brevard, Lee, Santa Rosa, Sarasota, and Volusia. The remaining counties will receive higher preference. Next, by the Application’s eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.10.e. of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application’s eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.10.e of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application’s Leveraging Classification, applying the multipliers outlined in Item 3 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications having the Classification of A listed above Applications having the Classification of B); Next, by the Application’s eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Funding Preference which is outlined in Item 4 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); And finally, by lottery number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. Next, the RFA sets forth the sorting order for selecting applications to meet the Local Revitalization Initiative Goal. It then sets for the sorting order after selecting applications to meet the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal (LGAO Designation) and Local Revitalization Initiative Goal. The RFA includes a funding test where a) small county applications will be selected for funding only if there is enough small county funding ($1,453,730) available to fully fund the Eligible Housing Credit Request Amount, and b) medium county applications will be selected for funding only if there is enough medium county funding ($15,275,810) available to fully fund the Eligible Housing Credit Request Amount. The RFA outlines a specific County Award Tally based on Priority Levels as follows: Priority I County Award Tally As each Priority I Application is selected for tentative funding, the county where the Development is located will have one Application credited towards the County Award Tally. The Corporation will prioritize eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that meet the Funding Test and are located within counties that have the lowest County Award Tally above other eligible unfunded Priority I Applications with a higher County Award Tally that also meet the Funding Test, even if the Priority I Applications with a higher County Award Tally are higher ranked. Priority II County Award Tally As each Priority II Application is selected for tentative funding, the county where the proposed Development is located will have one Application credited towards the County Award Tally. The Corporation will prioritize eligible unfunded Priority II Applications that meet the Funding Test and are located within counties that have the lowest County Award Tally above other eligible unfunded Priority II Applications with a higher County Award Tally that also meet the Funding Test, even if the Priority II Applications with a higher County Award Tally are higher ranked. (Jt. Exh. 1, pp. 78-79) The RFA outlines the selection process at pages 79-81 as follows: Five Applications that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal Applications that were submitted in RFA 2019- 113 but not Awarded The first three Applications that will be considered for funding will be the highest ranking eligible Medium County Priority I Applications that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal that were submitted in RFA 2019- 113 but not awarded, subject to the Funding Test and County Award Tally. Priority I Applications will continue to be selected until this preference is met. If there are no remaining eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that qualify for this preference, then the process will continue using Priority II Applications until this preference is met. Applications that were not submitted in RFA 2019-113 The next Applications that will be considered for funding will be the highest ranking eligible Medium County Priority I Applications that qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Goal that were not submitted in 2019-113, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. Priority I Applications will continue to be selected until this Goal is met. If there are no remaining eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that qualify for this Goal, then the process will continue using Priority II Applications until this Goal is met or until it is determined that there are not eligible unfunded Applications that can meet this Goal. One Application that qualifies for the Local Revitalization Initiative Goal The next Application selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority I Application that qualifies for the Local Revitalization Initiative Goal, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. If there are no eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that qualify for this Goal, then the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority II Application that qualifies for the Local Revitalization Initiative Goal will be selected, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. Two Family Applications that qualify for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/ HUD-designated SADDA Goal The next two Applications select [sic] for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority I Family Applications that qualify for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/ HUD-designated SADDA Goal, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. Priority I Applications will continue to be selected until this goal is met. If there are no remaining eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that qualify for this Goal, then the process will continue using Priority II Applications until this Goal is met or until it is determined that there are no eligible unfunded Applications that can meet this goal. One Application that Qualifies for the SunRail Goal If an Application that was selected to meet the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Goal described in a. above or Local Revitalization Initiative Goal described in b. above also qualifies for the SunRail Goal, this Goal will be considered met without selecting an additional Application. If none of the Applications selected to meet the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Goal or Local Revitalization also qualify for the SunRail Goal, the next Application selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority I Application that qualifies for the SunRail Goal, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. If there are no eligible unfunded Priority I Applications that qualify for this Goal, then the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority II Application that qualifies for the SunRail Goal will be selected, subject to the Funding Test and the County Award Tally. The next Applications selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority I Small County Applications that (i) can meet the Small County Funding Test and (ii) have a County Award Tally that is less than or equal to any other eligible unfunded Small County Priority I Applications. If Small County funding remains and no unfunded eligible Small County Priority I Application can meet the Small County Funding Test, then the process will continue using Priority II Applications until this Goal is met or until no unfunded Small County Priority II Application can meet the Small County Funding Test. If Small County funding remains and no unfunded eligible Small County Applications can meet the Small County Funding Test, no further Small County Applications will be selected, and the remaining Small County Funding will be added to the Medium County funding amount. The next Applications selected for funding will be the highest ranking eligible unfunded Priority I Medium County Applications that (i) can meet the Medium County Funding Test and (ii) have a County Award Tally that is less than or equal to any other eligible unfunded Medium County Priority I Applications. If Medium County funding remains and no unfunded eligible Medium County Priority I Applications can meet the Medium County Funding Test, then the process will continue using Priority II Applications until this Goal is met or until no unfunded eligible Medium County Priority II Applications can meet the Small County Funding Test. If Medium County Funding remains and no unfunded eligible Medium County Application can meet the Medium County Funding Test, no further Applications will be selected and the remaining funding will be distributed as approved by the Board. After the description of the sorting process, the RFA specifies: Funding that becomes available after the Board takes action on the Committee’s recommendation(s), due to an Applicant withdrawing, an Applicant declining its invitation to enter credit underwriting or the Applicant’s inability to satisfy a requirement outlined in this RFA, and/or provisions outlined in Rule Chapter 67-48, F.A.C., will be distributed as approved by the Board. All 84 applications for RFA 2020-201 were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. The Fletcher Black Application During the scoring process, Florida Housing determined that the Fletcher Black application was eligible for funding, but ineligible for the LGAO Designation. Fletcher Black was not selected for preliminary funding. If Fletcher Black’s application was eligible for the LGAO Designation, it would have been selected for funding. It would have been selected as the second of the three developments selected for the LGAO Priority I applications that qualified for the preference for those development applications submitted in RFA 2019-113, but not awarded as outlined on pages 69-70 of the RFA. Additionally, if Fletcher Black is eligible for the LGAO Designation, then The Villages and Pinnacle at Hammock Springs will be displaced from funding. In order to qualify for the LGAO Designation and Goal, applicants must “demonstrate a high level of Local Government interest in the project via an increased amount of Local Government contributions in the form of cash loans and/or cash grants.” The RFA outlines the types and amounts of contributions from Local Governments that will be accepted to meet the LGAO Designation. Fletcher Black’s proposed development is in Bay County. Therefore, Fletcher Black would be required to demonstrate a contribution of at least $340,000 to be considered for the LGAO Designation. The RFA at page 67 expressly limits the number of applications from the same government jurisdiction as follows: Limit on the number of Applications within the same jurisdiction A proposed Development may only qualify where a jurisdiction (i.e., the county or a municipality) has contributed cash loans and/or cash grants for any proposed Development applying for this RFA in an amount sufficient to qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Designation. A Local Government can only contribute to one Application that qualifies for the Local Government Area of Opportunity Designation, regardless of how the contribution is characterized. Any single jurisdiction may not contribute cash loans and/or cash grants to more than one proposed Development applying for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Designation. If multiple Applications demonstrate Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding from the same jurisdiction and those Applications qualify for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Designation, then all such Applications will be deemed ineligible for the Local Government Areas of Opportunity Designation, regardless of the amount of Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding or how the contribution is characterized. However, Local Governments may pool contributions to support one Application (i.e., the county and the city may provide contribution to the same Development and each Local Government will submit its own form as an Attachment to the Application). Page 68 of the RFA describes the requirements for demonstrating LGAO funding: In order to be eligible to be considered Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding, the cash loans and/or cash grants must be demonstrated via one or both of the Florida Housing Local Government Verification of Contribution Forms (Form Rev. 07-2019), called “Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan” form and/or the “Local Government Verification of Contribution -- Grant” form. The forms must meet the Non-Corporation Funding Proposal Requirements outlined in 10.b.(2)(a) above, the qualifying funding must be reflected as a source on the Development Cost Pro Forma, and the applicable form(s) must be provided as Attachment 16 to the Application. Applications are not required to reflect the value (difference between the face amount and the net present value of the payment streams) on any Local Government Verification Forms. Similarly, Section 10.b.(2)(a) of the RFA specifies that, Note: Eligible Local Government financial commitments (i.e., grants and loans) can be considered a source of financing without meeting the requirements above if the Applicant provides a properly completed and executed Local Government Verification of Contribution – Grant Form (Form 0702019) and/or the Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan Form (Form 07-2019). Fletcher Black submitted a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Grant Form (Grant Form) from the City of Panama City in the amount of $340,000. Fletcher Black’s Grant Form was executed by Greg Bridnicki, as the Mayor of Panama City and “Approved as to Form and Correctness” by Nevin Zimmerman, City Attorney. Fletcher Black’s request for funding from Panama City was placed on the agenda for the City of Panama City City Commission’s August 25, 2020, meeting, and approved by the City Commission, which authorized Mr. Bridnicki to sign the Grant Form. Fletcher Black had obtained a similar LGAO Form in the previous year using the same established process. Fletcher Black did not submit any documentation in the RFA Application regarding the process used to gain approval of the grant. However, no party identified any requirement in the RFA that such a description must be included in the Application. Fletcher Black cannot be faulted for not supplying something that is not required. Another Applicant, Panama Manor App. No. 2021-074C, submitted a Grant Form from the City of Panama City in the amount of $340,000 executed by Michael Johnson. Mr. Johnson’s title is listed as the Director of Community Development/CRA/CDBG/SHIP. During the scoring process, Florida Housing’s scorer found that since both Fletcher Black and Panama Manor submitted documentation for the LGAO Designation from the same jurisdiction, the City of Panama City, according to the terms of the RFA, both applications were deemed ineligible for the LGAO Designation. The Grant Form submitted by both Fletcher Black and Panama Manor contains the following instruction regarding who is authorized to sign the form on behalf of the local government: This certification must be signed by the chief appointed official (staff) responsible for such approvals, Mayor, City Manager, County Manager/ Administrator/ Coordinator, Chairperson of the City Council/Commission or Chairperson of the Board of County Commissioners. … One of the authorized persons named above may sign this form for certification of state, federal or Local Government funds initially obtained or derived from a Local Government that is directly administered by an intermediary such as a housing finance authority, a community reinvestment corporation, or a state-certified Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO). Other signatories are not acceptable. The Applicant will not receive credit for this contribution if the certification is improperly signed. To be considered for points, the amount of the contribution stated on this form must be a precise dollar amount and cannot include words such as estimated, up to, maximum, not to exceed, etc. Michael Johnson was not authorized by the City of Panama City to sign the Grant Form. Greg Bridnicki, as Mayor of Panama City, is an authorized signatory. Panama Manor’s request was not submitted to the City Commission for approval. Because the Grant Form was improperly signed, Panama Manor should not, by the terms of the RFA, receive credit for the LGAO Designation. Had Panama Manor’s application received the LGAO Designation, it would not have been selected for funding because its lottery number was too high. Michael Johnson is the Director of Community Development for the City of Panama City. While he is an employee for the City of Panama City, he also performs duties for Bay County through an interlocal agreement between the city and the county. The Grant Form submitted for Panama Manor stated on its face that it was signed on behalf of the City of Panama City, but Mr. Johnson testified that the form was supposed to reflect that it was for Bay County. Mr. Johnson testified that over the last 17 years, he has executed approximately 40 forms for applications for funding from Florida Housing. He acknowledged that there are multiple types of forms that may need signatures from city or county officials to complete a Florida Housing application, such as zoning forms and infrastructure-verification forms, as well as local government contribution forms. Since Florida Housing changed its process to use RFAs in 2013, Mr. Johnson could not recall if he signed the Grant Forms or whether the city manager did. He could not confirm signing a single Grant Form for either the city or the county since 2013. Mr. Johnson believed that he had the authority to sign Grant Forms on behalf of both the city and the county. Mark McQueen, the City of Panama City city manager and Mr. Johnson’s boss, does not share his belief. According to Mr. McQueen, whose testimony is credited, Panama City committed only to the Fletcher Black property, took no official action with respect to Panama Manor’s application, and Mr. Johnson was not authorized to sign the Grant Form committing funds on behalf of the City. When Mr. Johnson realized that the Panama Manor Grant Form stated that it was signed on behalf of Panama City as opposed to Bay County, he called the legal department for Florida Housing to explain the error. He testified that he spoke with several people at Florida Housing, including Jean Salmonson, David Weston, and someone in the multi-family development section. Mr. Johnson was not sure of the dates when these telephone calls were made, but it appears that the telephone calls were after the submission of the applications but before the posting of funding selections. Marissa Button is Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Programs. She testified that Florida Housing is aware of the contention that the form submitted by Panama Manor was signed in error and should have reflected that it was signed on behalf of Bay County. She was also aware that according to Mr. McQueen, Mr. Johnson did not have the authority to sign a Grant Form on behalf of the City of Panama City. She stated: Q. How does that information impact Florida Housing’s scoring decision? A. This --at this juncture it does not impact Florida Housing’s scoring determination as to the Panama Manor or Fletcher Black being designated as LGAO goal. … We take the requirement of the RFA specifically references the – the submission of what – when there’s a submission of multiple applications from the same jurisdiction, and so we, Florida Housing, consider that as of – as of the application deadline what this applicant has submitted is a form executed on behalf of the City of Panama City. To change the designation, which I understand from Mr. Johnson’s testimony it was a mistake, he intended to issue on behalf of Bay County and reflect that, we interpret that to be a – an improper amendment or modification to the application after the application submission. So we do not consider it to change the scoring designation of the – of either the Panama Manor application or the resulting consequence to the Fletcher Black application. * * * Q. Now, Fletcher Black may argue that it’s unfair to treat its application as ineligible for the LGAO designation and goals when the Fletcher Black [application] did not contain an error. What would your response be to that? A. You know, my response is, we score the application in accordance with the terms of the RFA. The applications are responsible for all parts of that – that RFA with regard to their application submission. It’s clear in this RFA that there would be a consequence if other applications were submitted from the same jurisdiction for an LGAO designation. And, unfortunately, that’s the mistake that happened, but the fairness – it is a fair process because we are – we are administering the RFA as it has been, you know – as the terms exist to the public and to the fellow applications that came in for funding. So, I – I do believe it’s unfortunate that that consequence impacts their application; however, it is – it is fair because that’s the consequence if it happens. (T-39-40, 45-46). Panama Manor’s application did not demonstrate local government funding because the Grant Form was not signed by someone with authority to do so. The RFA specifically states that “[o]ther signatories are not acceptable. The Applicant will not receive credit for this contribution if the certification is improperly signed.” Where forms signed by local government officials are challenged, Ms. Button indicated that Florida Housing has in the past relied upon or deferred to local government officials to address the propriety of the forms signed. The issue usually arises with forms related to zoning or other facets encompassed in the Ability to Proceed forms. Here, the credible testimony of local officials is that the Grant Form for Panama Manor was intended to reflect a funding commitment from Bay County and the signator on Panama Manor’s Grant Form was not authorized to sign on behalf of the City of Panama City. It would be contrary to competition if Panama Manor were allowed to amend its application to correct the Grant Form. It is appropriate to disregard Panama Manor’s Grant Form, given the inaccuracies contained therein. If Panama Manor’s application is not selected for the LGAO Designation because of its failure to demonstrate that the City of Panama City is providing local support for Panama Manor’s project, then there is only one application with a valid Grant Form from the City of Panama City, and that is Fletcher Black. Ms. Button testified that it would provide a competitive advantage to Fletcher Black if Fletcher Black were considered for the LGAO Designation. However, she stated that applicants are responsible for all parts of their application submission. Fletcher Black did not make an error in its application and is not requesting that it be amended in any way. It is asking that the application be considered as submitted, just as other applications are considered. Florida Housing’s decision to find Fletcher Black ineligible for the LGAO Designation is clearly erroneous, in light of the clear demonstration that Panama Manor did not demonstrate a local funding commitment from the City of Panama City, and Fletcher Black is the only entity that did so. The Rosemary Place Application Florida Housing deemed the Rosemary Place application to be eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, preliminarily selected Rosemary Place for funding. One of the requirements for eligibility under the RFA is that applicants demonstrate Site Control by providing a properly completed and executed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Site Control Certification form (Site Control Form). For the Site Control Form to be considered complete, the applicant must attach documentation demonstrating that it is a party to an eligible contract or lease or is the owner of the subject property. Applicants can demonstrate Site Control by providing documentation that meets the requirements in the RFA for an eligible contract, deed or certificate of title, or a lease. The RFA specifies at pages 39-40 that an eligible contract must meet the following conditions: It must have a term that does not expire before May 31, 2021 or that contains extension options exercisable by the purchaser and conditioned solely upon payment of additional monies which, if exercised, would extend the term to a date that is not earlier than May 31, 2021; It must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance; The Applicant must be the buyer unless there is an assignment of the eligible contract, signed by the assignor and the assignee, which assigns all of the buyer’s rights, title and interests in the eligible contract to the Applicant: and The owner of the subject property must be the seller, or is a party to one or more intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, or conveyances between or among the owner, the Applicant, or other parties, that have the effect of assigning the owner’s right to sell the property to the seller. Any intermediate contract must meet the criteria for an eligible contract in (a) and (b) above. The RFA notifies applicants that Florida Housing’s review of the Site Control documents is limited. At page 40, the RFA states: Note: The Corporation will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation. During scoring, the Corporation will rely on the properly executed Site Control Certification form to determine whether an Applicant has met the requirement of this RFA to demonstrate site control. The Corporation has no authority to, and will not, evaluate the validity or enforceability of any eligible site control documentation that is attached to the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process. During credit underwriting, if it is determined that the site control documents do not meet the above requirements, the Corporation may rescind the award. The RFA also requires that, for the purpose of demonstrating Site Control, “documentation must include all relevant intermediate contracts, agreements, assignments, options, conveyances, intermediate leases and subleases. If the proposed Development consists of Scattered Sites, site control must be demonstrated for all of the Scattered Sites.” A “scattered site” is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67- 48.002(106) as “a Development site that, when taken as a whole, is comprised of real property that is not contiguous (each such non-contiguous site within a Scattered Site Development, is considered to be a “Scattered Site”). For purposes of this definition ‘contiguous’ means touching at a point or along a boundary. …” Rosemary Place submitted a properly completed and executed Site Control Form which was accepted by Florida Housing during its review, scoring, and ranking process. As an attachment to its Site Control Form, Rosemary Place attached a Purchase and Sale Agreement (Rosemary Place Agreement) between Kyle McDorman as the Seller and RM FL XX Prime, LLC (the applicant entity for Rosemary Place) as the Purchaser. The Rosemary Place Agreement has a term that does not expire before May 31, 2021, and states that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance. The Rosemary Place Application identified the address of the proposed development as “690’ N of intsctn of 331-Bus & Azalea Dr on W side of 331- Bus; within city limits of Freeport, FL (Walton County).” (J-16, page 5). The Development Location Point, consisting of latitude and longitude coordinates was correctly identified, and the Rosemary Place Application stated that the proposed development did not consist of scattered sites. Exhibit A of the Rosemary Place Purchase and Sale Agreement identifies the property as follows: That Thirteen (13.0) Acres situated in the City of Freeport, FL (Distrct 2); Section 10, Township 1S, Range 19, and which is part of Walton County, FL Parcel 10-1S-19-23000-009-0020 which is further described in the land records of Walton County, FL as 210FT SQ FT IN THE SE/C OF THE W1/2 OF THE NE1/4 OF SW1/4 IN SEC 10-1S-19W, 204-184, 1204-279, 2660- 2976, 3084-4417 and which is recorded in that Warranty Deed from Grantor Aaron M and Rachel N Sloan Elkins to Grantee Kyle J. McDorman which Warranty Deed is recorded in the land records of Walton County, FL at Book 3084 and Page Number 4417. The Property is further described and identified as the shaded area denoted with an X in the image below. Based on the Walton County Property Appraiser map, the shaded area denoted with an X is contained within Parcel No. 10-1S-19-23000-009-0000, which is owned by the Seller, Kyle McDorman, as opposed to Parcel No. 10- 1S-19-23000-009-0020. Timshell contends that the shaded area denoted with an X overlaps parcels outside of Parcel No. 10-1S-19-23000-009-0000. Timshell contends that the submitted Site Control documentation submitted by Rosemary Place is not consistent with the requirements of the RFA because of the uncertainty of the property that is actually being purchased and where the proposed Development site is actually located. Timshell also contends that the Rosemary Place Purchase and Sale Agreement, as written and submitted to Florida Housing, denotes scattered sites which were not disclosed by Rosemary Place in its application. Rosemary Place contends, and Florida Housing agrees, that the shaded area denoted with an X on Exhibit A to the Rosemary Place Agreement sufficiently identifies the property being purchased through the agreement as the Development site. Moreover, the visual depiction of the property is consistent with the written description of the development location in the Rosemary Place Application at J-16, page 5. The Rosemary Place Application does not depict scattered sites. Even assuming that the parcel number included in Exhibit A were part of the purchase reflected in the Sale and Purchase Agreement, an eligible contract may involve the purchase of multiple properties or a larger parcel of property than will be developed. What is most important is that the documents show where the development will be located, which Rosemary Place’s application demonstrates, and that the applicant will have control over the location. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing did not consider the Rosemary Place Application to be proposing a scattered sites development. Rosemary Place affirmatively stated that it was not proposing a scattered sites development; did not list coordinates for scattered sites; and did not identify the location of scattered sites on other forms required by the RFA. Exhibit A to the Purchase and Sale Agreement contains typographical errors in the written description of the property being sold. Stewart Rutledge, who prepared the Purchase and Sale Agreement, testified credibly that parcel numbers are listed on the Walton County Property Appraiser website, and that to see a particular parcel description, the user clicks on the parcel number he or she wants to see. When preparing the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Mr. Rutledge mistakenly clicked on the parcel number immediately above the parcel number he wanted, and he did not notice the error. The parcel number reflected in the Purchase and Sale Agreement references another parcel owned by the seller, Kyle McDorman. Florida Housing considered the typographical error within Exhibit A that results in the listing of the wrong parcel number and property description to be a waivable minor irregularity because the error did not result in the omission of any material information; did not create uncertainty that a term of the RFA was met; and did not adversely impact Florida Housing or the public. The same could be said for other typographical error in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, such as capitalizing the word “property” when it should not have been. Ms. Button also noted that the RFA does not require applicants to submit a land survey of the proposed development site with its application. The RFA states that Florida Housing reserves the right to waive minor irregularities. A minor irregularity is defined in rule 67-60.008 as: those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Timshell presented the testimony of Stephen Rutan, a professional land surveyor. Mr. Rutan believed that, based on the property description in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the proposed development site overlapped with another parcel not owned by the seller. Mr. Rutan did not perform a professional land survey and admitted that the boundary lines in his informational Exhibit (Timshell Exhibit 4) were not completely accurate. Given that the measurements that Mr. Rutan provided were estimates and not the result of a survey, and the testimony by Mr. Rutledge that the parcel identification was the result of a clerical error, Mr. Rutan’s testimony is given little weight, and does not demonstrate that the error in the Purchase and Sale Agreement included in Rosemary Place’s application created any real uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met. Florida Housing’s determination that the error in Rosemary Place’s application was a waivable minor irregularity is not clearly erroneous. Madison Oaks East, Madison Oaks West, and Madison Grove Florida Housing determined that the Madison Oaks West, Madison Oaks East, and Madison Grove Applications were eligible for funding but ineligible for the “submitted but not awarded in RFA 2019-113 Preference.” Madison Oaks West, Madison Oaks East, and Madison Grove were not selected for preliminary funding. Within the LGAO Designation and Goal, the RFA contained preferences for funding. One of those preferences was for developments that were submitted but not awarded in RFA 2019-113 (the 2019-113 Preference). In order to qualify for the 2019-113 Preference, an Applicant must meet the following requirements: The question at 11.b.(1) of Exhibit A must reflect confirmation that the Development was submitted but not awarded in RFA 2019-113; The Application in RFA 2019-113 must have provided a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan or Grant form demonstrating the minimum Local Government Areas of Opportunity Funding Amount outlined in RFA 2019-113; The Development Location Point and latitude and longitude coordinates for all scattered sites stated at question 5. of Exhibit A for the proposed Development must be located on the same site(s) as the Application submitted in RFA 2019-113. These coordinates do not need to be identical to the Application submitted in RFA 2019-113. All entities that are Principals for the Applicant and Developer(s) disclosed on the Principal Disclosure Form submitted for the proposed Development and the Application submitted in RFA 2019-113 must be identical; and The Application submitted in RFA 2019-113 was not invited to enter credit underwriting. Florida Housing scored Madison Oaks East, Madison Oaks West, and Madison Grove as qualifying for all requirements of the 2019-113 Preference except for the requirement that “[a]ll entities that are Principals for the Applicant and Developer(s) disclosed on the Principal Disclosure Form submitted for the proposed Development and the Application submitted in RFA 2019-113 must be identical.” (Identical Principals Requirement). The Principals disclosed on the Principals Disclosure Form for Madison Oaks West, Madison Oaks East, and Madison Grove in RFA 2019- 113 were identical to the Principals disclosed in the applications submitted for RFA 2020-201. The plain language of the RFA only requires that the “entities that are Principals for the Applicant and Developer(s) be identical.” The plain language of the RFA does not require that the Applicant and Developer entities be identical to those listed in the 2019-113 application. Madison Oaks West, Madison Oaks East, and Madison Grove met the requirements for the 2019-113 preference. However, even though Madison Oaks East, Madison Oaks West, and Madison Grove are eligible for the 2019-113 Preference, they would not be selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. The Villages Florida Housing determined that The Villages Application is eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, The Villages has been preliminarily selected for funding. During scoring, Florida Housing reviewed the Villages’ Zoning Form and determined that it met the requirements of the RFA to demonstrate appropriate zoning. Madison Oaks East, Madison Oaks West, and Madison Grove alleged in their Petitions that The Villages failed to demonstrate Ability to Proceed and appropriate zoning as required by the terms of the RFA. Prior to hearing, Madison Oaks West, Madison Oaks East, and Madison Grove withdrew their challenge to The Villages’ eligibility for funding. However, should Florida Housing determine, as recommended, that Panama Manor’s Grant Form did not demonstrate a funding commitment from Panama City, then Fletcher Black would receive funding as opposed to The Villages and Pinnacle at Hammock Springs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order as to Case No. 21-0515BID, finding that Fletcher Black is eligible for the LGAO Designation, and awarding funding to Fletcher Black, subject to the successful completion of credit underwriting; that with respect to Case Nos. 21-0516BID, 21-0517BID, and 21-0518BID, finding that Madison Oaks East, Madison Oaks West, and Madison Grove are eligible for the 2019-113 Preference, but are not selected for funding; and with respect to Case No. 21-0520BID, finding that the decision to award funding to Rosemary Place was not clearly erroneous, and the error in its application was a minor waivable irregularity. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Timothy Schulte, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. 315 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 3000 (32802) Orlando, Florida 32801 Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2021. M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tiffany A. Roddenberry, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Ronald Miller, holds a Florida teaching certificate numbered 464113, covering the area of physical education. During the 1980-81 school year he was employed as a teacher of physical education at Miami Coral Park Senior High School in Miami, Florida. He was also hired that year by Miami Coral Park Senior High School to be an assistant basketball coach for the junior varsity basketball team and an assistant coach for the varsity football team. At the beginning of that school year, the head coach for the varsity basketball team, Mr. Edward Joyner, was delayed in his arrival at school. For this reason during the first three or four weeks of school, Mr. Miller was appointed to take Mr. Joyner's place in coaching the varsity basketball team as well. This was the first year of Mr. Miller's assignment as a full-time teacher. The Petitioners are, respectively, the School Board of Dade County, a public agency charged with the hiring, employment and regulation of the operations, activities and practices of teachers it employs to instruct students in the Dade County Public School System. The Education Practices Commission is an agency of the State of Florida within the Department of Education and is charged with the duty of licensing and regulating the licensure status, practice and practice standards of teachers in the State of Florida. During the 1980-81 school year, as in the recent past, Coral Park Senior High School had a club called the Cagerettes which assisted the school's junior varsity basketball and varsity basketball teams by helping to raise funds for different functions as well as to work with the coaching staff performing such services as taking statistics during games. Members of that group were selected from the student body after "tryouts" where the individual applicants were judged on their personality and participation. Cindy Castillo was the captain or president of club for the 1980-81 school year. This was her third consecutive year as a member of the club and her second year as its president. Cindy Castillo approached Mr. Miller shortly after he became employed and after the school year began and asked him to be the faculty sponsor for the club. He had had no previous experience as a club sponsor for any school, but based upon Miss Castillo's representations concerning his insignificant duties as club sponsor, he agreed to become the sponsor of the club. One of the initial witnesses called by the Petitioner was Mr. Doug Wycoff. Mr. Wycoff was an instructor in the English Department at times pertinent here to and also acted in the capacity of athletic business manager for Coral Park Senior High School. As athletic business manger, Mr. Wycoff was required to oversee the financial business and accounting for monies received by the athletic department. These duties included overseeing ticket sales, crowd control, personnel at athletic events, overseeing fund raising efforts and managing the money received therefrom and in general assisting the athletic director. Mr. Wycoff testified that the high school maintained its banking accounts with the Sun Bank. Any monies derived from fund raising activities should go to him as a member of the athletic office in charge of finance and then they would be deposited with the school treasurer. The treasurer typically makes deposits on a daily basis via the Wells Fargo Armored Express Company. At all times material to these proceedings the practice was to segregate all accounts with the bank so that each different sports activity and the personnel involved therein would have their own account and otherwise maintain constant accessibility to the account. Prior to the commencement of the 1980-81 school year, Mr. Wycoff gave general instructions to all faculty members involved with the athletic program regarding who to contact should they have any questions regarding their involvement with a fund raising activity and how to account for the money. Although it was the witnesses' opinion that the Respondent had been present at that meeting, the Respondent denied it and the record does not establish whether or not the Respondent was present at that particular meeting. A condition precedent to the establishment of any fund raising activity of the high school, or a club or a group operating under the auspices of the school, required that the sponsor of the group obtain approval from Mr. Wycoff. The school records reveal, through Mr. Wycoff's testimony, that there were only two functions which had previously been approved for the basketball team. One was a car wash held at the beginning of the year in question and the the second was an M & M candy sale which took place later during the spring of the 80-81 school year. The approval for the car wash was obtained from Mr. Wycoff by the Cagerette captain, Miss Castillo. Near the close of the 80-81 school year the school principal ultimately learned that other fund raising activities had been conducted for which substantial sums of money had been received, which had been unapproved fund raising activities. The generated proceeds were received and unaccounted for by the Respondent. The car wash took place on or about September 27, 1980. Mr. Wycoff issued to Miss Castillo one hundred tickets with a prestamped price of $1.50 on each ticket for sale of car washes. The car wash was a success and generated approximately $900 in gross proceeds Two hundred dollars of that (apparently checks) was turned over to Mr. Wycoff, the balance in cash was retained by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted receiving perhaps $200 to $300 within a few days after this event. The Respondent explained ;to Miss Castillo and the other students involved in the car wash activity, that the monies were going to be held by him for the benefit of the Cagerettes and the basketball team in a special account at a bank near his home. On October 4, 1980, a car wash was held by the Cagerettes with the help of the Respondent. Mr. Wycoff was not requested to approve this endeavor, nor were the funds raised therefrom ever accounted for to Mr. Wycoff or any other employee or official of the school. Approximately $256 was generated and the proceeds were placed in the Respondent's custody at his request. The Respondent admitted that with regard to this fund raising effort he received approximately $247. On approximately October 11, 1980, at the instance of the Respondent and without prior knowledge or approval from Mr. Wycoff, the Cagerettes and basketball players held a donut sale. The total proceeds of that sale approximated the sum of $900. Cynthia Castillo took $594 of that sum to pay the vendor of the donuts and the balance, in the approximate sum of $311, was turned over to the Respondent. The Respondent admitted that he received approximately $300 from that fund raising activity. A second donut sale was held a short time later, also not approved by Mr. Wycoff or any personnel in his office. Approximately $368 were generated from that venture which was initially given to Coach Joyner. The record in this proceeding does not reflect what became of that $368, but it was not included in the sum ultimately the subject of criminal proceedings against the Respondent. In the fall of 1980, the Respondent suggested and initiated a procedure whereby members of the Cagerettes would pay monthly dues. This was a practice that was followed with the dues set in their approximate amount of $2 per member per month. These dues were collected for approximately one month and the monies were turned over to the Respondent in the amount of between $30 and $40. The Respondent never accounted for this money. The Respondent also initiated a procedure whereby the members of the Cagerettes would take up donations from individual girls for "penny week." These donations were taken up in the form of pennies on Monday; nickels on Tuesday; dimes on Wednesday; quarters on Thursday; and dollars on Friday. This activity grossed approximately $43 which was turned over to the Respondent and never accounted for. The initiation of this program on his own by the Respondent without approval of any one in authority was in direct conflict with rules promulgated by the school. Prescribed receipt books were to have been obtained from Mr. Wycoff and used so as to avoid any accounting for the money. This was not done. The Respondent also conducted another fund raising project whereby he solicited donations from students of $1 each for the purchase of athletic socks. At least one student made such a donation, but no socks were purchased. Mr. Wycoff established that no such collection project came to his knowledge and that the athletic department purchases and provides socks for its junior varsity teams at no cost to its members, thus the alleged need for donations to purchase athletic socks was false. During the course of the the 1980-81 school year, both the Respondent and his fellow coach and colleague, Mr. Joyner, made several attempts to have a banquet in honor of the basketball team and Cagerettes. Because of the lack of financing, the banquet never came to fruition. This was because certain funds raised by the above-mentioned fund raising projects during the year were unaccounted for by the Respondent, thus the banquet was severely under-financed. Additionally, several students paid to Mr. Miller at least $10 per banquet ticket for anticipated attendance of themselves and their respective guests. When the banquet was finally cancelled, the Respondent did not return their ticket purchase money. Mr. Lopez established that he was a student at that time and a member of the varsity basketball team. He purchased three tickets at $10 each, payable in cash, and was never refunded when the banquet was cancelled. JoAnn Oropesa paid the Respondent cash for banquet tickets, but was never refunded her money. She made demand on the Respondent for her money and the Respondent informed her that he would make a refund by check in the mail at the end of the school year. He failed to do so. During the school year the Cagerettes and the basketball team agreed with Coach Joyner to have a skating party at a neighboring commercial skating rink. In order to fund this event, the students involved agreed to sell tickets at the price of $3 per ticket. Mr. Wycoff was not advised of this money raising effort either and never received any money for an accounting, therefor, from either Respondent or Coach Joyner. JoAnn Oropesa sold all ten tickets assigned to her at $3 per ticket. The Respondent acknowledged receipt of the monies from that fund raising activity, representing that the money would be used for the banquet in lieu of the skating event which was cancelled, Ultimately, these monies were never returned to JoAnn Oropesa or other students purchasing tickets. Manuel Martinez purchased tickets for the skating party and never had a refund, being merely told by the Respondent to "wait." The same student, Manuel Martinez, established that the Respondent solicited members of his class on more than one occasion to make contributions to a touring gospel singing group of which he was a member and that in consideration for this donation a student could receive an "A" for a test or make-up work. The Respondent also offered that "detentions" or "make-up requirements" could be taken off a student's record, for any of the classes in which the student was enrolled with the Respondent, in return for such donations. The testimony of Manuel Martinez was corroborated by Raphael Lopez, another student of the Respondent's, who established that the Respondent solicited students for contributions to his gospel group in return for enhancement of their grades. Marilyn Munne observed the Respondent soliciting students for contributions to his gospel group in consideration for which he would have a detention "dropped off" which would automatically result in a better grade. The Respondent ultimately proved unable to account for the proceeds of the money generated by the various fund raising projects outlined above and caused resulting concern to the various witnesses testifying on behalf of the Petitioners. Miss Castillo estimated that at least $1,700 had been placed in the Respondent's custody, exclusive of the $368 which she had given to Coach Joyner and which was apparently not accounted for either. Even by the Respondent's own admission he received at least between $900 and $1,100 from these fund raising projects that school year. The testimony of Miss Castillo and other witnesses establishes that the Respondent represented that those monies were to held in a special account for the benefit of the Cagerettes and the basketball team. The Respondent by his own admission acknowledged that he told Miss Castillo that he would "possibly" place the monies in such an account. The Respondent did not have a bank account and did not customarily maintain one. He testified that he maintained a "strong box" used as a depository within his own home. The Respondent testified that he placed the subject money in a green plastic zippered bag (Respondent's Exhibit A) up until the time it was supposedly removed by persons unknown who, according to the Respondent, stole his car on or about February 8, 1981. The Respondent testified that he was about to go spend the night with a friend and put the subject zippered plastic bag or case into his car, went back into the house to get some more belongings and the car was stolen while he was inside. The car was not recovered until some days later and the money was gone, although the plastic bag remained in or returned to the Respondent's possession and was made Exhibit A in this proceeding. The Respondent did not demonstrate that any efforts were made to replace the money prior to his being prosecuted for its disappearance. He did not, for instance, establish that he made any effort to file a claim against his automobile insurance carrier in order to see that the students were recompensed. Ultimately, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, filed a one count felony Information charging the Respondent with grand theft. The victim in that case was alleged to be the Petitioner's chief witness, Miss Cynthia Castillo. The Respondent, in that criminal proceeding, never went to trial, offering instead to enter into an agreement with the State Attorney to go into the "pre-trial intervention program" which is apparently a sort of probationary status coupled with a court enforced reimbursement of at least $1,700 to the Dade County School Board. The entire scenario described above concerning the fund raising efforts, diversion of the funds generated by them and the Respondent's ultimate refusal or at least inability to account for the whereabouts of those funds and his ultimate criminal prosecution for diversions of the funds became a matter of knowledge of a number of students and parents at the school as well as Mr. Wycoff, Desmond Patrick Gray and other members of the Dade County School Board's administrative staff. It should be noted that although no conviction has been entered against the Respondent in the criminal proceedings referred to above, it has been established without question that he took the cash portions of the funds generated by the various above-described fund raising efforts into his possession, failed to properly account for them, failed to place them in a bank account and failed to deliver them over to Mr. Wycoff or other responsible authorities. He exhibited adequate knowledge of whom he should have delivered the funds to because he only retained the cash portions of the monies generated by each fund raising effort, turning over the non-fungible checks to those entitled to them.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That with regard to case No. 81-2115, the petition of the School Board of Dade County against Ronald Miller, the Respondent, Ronald Miller, be dismissed from his employment with the School Board of Dade County and forfeit all back pay. It is, further RECOMMENDED: With regard to case No. 82-1234, the petition of the Education Practices Commission, Department of Education, Ralph D. Turlington, Commissioner against Ronald Miller, that Ronald Miller have his Florida teaching certificate No. 464113 permanently revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Neimand, Esquire Attorney for School Board 3050 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33137 Craig Wilson, Esquire Attorney for Education Practices Commission 315 West Third Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Sarah Lea Tobocman, Esquire 1782 One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Dr. Leonard M. Britton, Superintendent Dade County Public Schools 1410 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Donald L. Griesheimer, Executive Director Department of Education Education Practices Commission The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER (SCHOOL BOARD) ================================================================= SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2115 RONALD MILLER, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this licensing dispute, Respondent, South Florida Water Management District (District), has proposed to deny an application of Petitioner, Everglades Surveying Joint Venture (Everglades), for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE) under the District's Supplier Diversity & Outreach Program (Program). If the application is approved, Petitioner would be listed on the District's contract solicitation and vendor lists as a minority contractor. In its proposed agency action, as later amended, the District contends that the application should be denied because: the minority owner fails to meet the criteria in Rule 40E-7.653(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code; the documents provided by Petitioner "do not support that the day- to-day operations are controlled by the minority applicant, nor is there evidence that the minority applicant possesses the authority to direct the management and policy of the business"; the minority business does not meet the size standard of a small business as required by Section 288.703, Florida Statutes; and the minority owner does not possess the necessary license to qualify the firm in its area of specialty as required by Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code. In simpler terms, the District has contended that Petitioner's application is deficient in the areas of "management and control, the size standards[,] and the licensure." Petitioner disputes these allegations and contends that it meets all criteria for certification. As to the remaining requirements for certification in Rule 40E-7.653(4), (7), (8), and (9), Florida Administrative Code, the parties have stipulated that all of these criteria have been satisfied. The Minority Owner's Corporate Structure Ray J. Berryman, an Asian-Pacific American, is the minority owner seeking certification. Mr. Berryman is a professional engineer who has been in the engineering and surveying business for almost forty years. After working with other engineering firms for over a decade, in 1975 he started his own firm in California. At that time, the firm was known as Berryman & Stevenson, but its name was later changed to BSI Consultants, and then to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. The firm provides civil engineering and surveying services to public agencies on the West Coast. In 1994, Mr. Berryman acquired a Florida corporation known as Henigar & Ray, Inc., which was engaged in the business of providing surveying and civil engineering services. Although the company initially operated under the name of Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, in 1998 Mr. Berryman changed its name to Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (BHI), the same name as the California corporation. Mr. Berryman serves as director, chief executive officer, and operating manager of BHI. The firm's headquarters are in Orlando, and it has branch offices in Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Ocala, and West Palm Beach. In March 1994, Mr. Berryman formed a Nevada holding company known as Berryman & Henigar Enterprises (BHE), in which he owns 77.5 percent of the stock and serves as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. BHE owns all of the stock in Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the California corporation); Berryman & Henigar, Inc. (the Florida corporation); Employment Systems, Inc., a "staff easing company" incorporated in California in 1992; BHE Technical Staffing, a Nevada corporation; and Therapy Network, a Nevada corporation. However, BHE Technical Staffing and Therapy Network are no longer in business. Consolidated financial statements are issued for all of the companies. BHE was formed for the purpose of serving as a vehicle "to allow a relationship to exist" between the Florida and California corporations. After BHE was formed, Mr. Berryman changed the name of both the Florida and California firms (Henigar & Ray, Inc., and BSI Consultants, respectively) to Berryman & Henigar, Inc., one a Florida corporation, the other a California corporation, so that he could have "the strength, if you will, of both companies with a similar name." Except for a few administrative personnel, BHE has no other employees and it performs no professional services. Besides being the owner of BHE and the wholly-owned subsidiaries named above, Mr. Berryman also is a majority owner of at least one affiliated company known as GovPartner, a California firm providing "e-Government solutions for cities, courts, and governmental agencies." Whether Mr. Berryman controls other affiliated companies was not disclosed at hearing. Other MBE Certifications In June 1996, or before the District had a rule on MBE certifications, Henigar & Ray, Inc., doing business as Berryman & Henigar, applied with the District for certification as a MBE to provide civil engineering, surveying, environmental sciences, and construction management services. The application was approved, and a one-year certification was issued. The District then changed from a one-year to a three-year certification, and after an application for recertification was filed in 1997, Henigar & Ray, Inc., was reissued a certification that expired in 2000. By then, the District had adopted a rule which required, among other things, that the minority owner have a professional license in all fields in which the certification was granted. Through what the District calls an "error" or oversight, it failed to note that Mr. Berryman did not hold a professional surveyor's license, and it erroneously continued to certify BHI in the area of surveying. On August 26, 1999, the firm was given "graduated" status, which meant that it was no longer eligible for continued participation in the District's Program as a prime contractor due to the business having a net worth of more than $3 million and/or an average net income of $2 million after federal taxes for the preceding two years. However, the firm could still be counted (as a subcontractor) towards a prime contractor's goal attainment. In November 2000, the firm, then known as BHI, again applied for recertification as a registered vendor. The application was approved on March 1, 2001, for another three-year period, this time in the areas of surveying, civil engineering, and construction management. Whether BHI is still in the graduated status is not known. Besides holding MBE status with the District, BHI has been certified as a MBE with several local governments in Florida, including the City of Tampa, City of Orlando, Tampa Port Authority, and Orange County. Copies of BHI's applications filed with those governmental entities have been made a part of this record. The Joint Venture As an Asian-Pacific American, Mr. Berryman qualifies for minority status. Although not disclosed by the parties, but presumably because BHI has graduated status, and cannot serve as a prime contractor, or because its certification as a MBE in surveying may be taken away, Mr. Berryman desires to become a District MBE through another legal entity and provide surveying services as a prime contractor on the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project (CERP) now being undertaken by the District. Before filing his application, Mr. Berryman considered three options: filing as a corporation, a partnership, or a joint venture. He chose a joint venture since it gives the entity "the ability to have control outside of a corporate board." According to Mr. Berryman, even though the joint venture is theoretically controlled by a control board, under the make-up of the venture established here, that board can only represent "what Berryman & Henigar, Inc. commands and requires it to represent." Mr. Berryman also desired to have other members in the joint venture who would "provide a unique geographical location for projects being performed by [CERP]," and thus enhance its "probability of obtaining work through the District as a minority." To this end, Everglades was formed as a joint venture pursuant to a Joint Venture Agreement (Agreement) executed on October 12, 2001. So that Everglades would have a "formidable surveying company that would be able to win work," its members included BHI; GCY, Inc. (GCY), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; Jeffrey C. Cooner and Associates, Inc. (Cooner), a Florida corporation providing surveying services; and Southern Mapping Technology, Inc. (Southern Mapping), a Florida surveying corporation. According to the Agreement, the ownership of the joint venture is as follows: BHI - 51 percent GCY - 16.33 percent Cooner - 16.33 percent Southern Mapping - 16.33 percent Mr. Berryman opted for BHI to have 51 percent ownership in the joint venture so that he would control the entity. At the same time, however, he desired to give the other participants as much ownership as possible without giving up control. The Agreement establishes a Board of Control (Board) which has the responsibility and authority for the conduct and management of Everglades to approve and execute contracts, formulate and determine the policies of Everglades, approve consultants and subcontractor agreements, approve budgets and schedules, determine the allocation of work among members of Everglades, and decide all other matters necessary to its operations. After the joint venture's formation, five individuals were appointed to the Board: Mark A. Stokes and Steve Sharpe, both BHI employees appointed by Mr. Berryman; George C. Young, Jr., of GCY; Jeffrey C. Cooner of Cooner; and James S. Richmond of Southern Mapping. All members of the Board are non-minorities. In response to the District's proposed denial of the application, in May or June 2002, or six or seven months after it was filed, Mr. Berryman assumed a seat on the Board, replacing Mr. Sharpe.1 However, because of a District policy that no amendments to an application will be considered after the application is filed, the District has not taken into account this change in the Board's membership. Petitioner has not challenged the use of that policy. Paragraph 4.3 of the Agreement provides that the Board "shall reach decisions by simple majority vote of total votes cast. BHI shall cast 51 votes; GCY shall cast 16 votes; Cooner shall cast 16 votes; and Southern Mapping shall cast 16 votes." Thus, BHI has ultimate control over all of Everglades' decisions. At the same time, however, there is nothing in the Agreement which says that the Board must consult with Mr. Berryman, and obtain his approval, before a decision is taken. Rule 40E-7.653(5) Criteria Paragraph (5) of the rule requires, among other things, that the applicant establish that the minority owner "possess[es] the authority to control and exercise dominant control over the management and daily operations of the business." The District contends that Mr. Berryman does not exercise such control since he does not sit on the Board, Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe, both non-minorities, are the individuals who actually cast votes on behalf of BHI, and nothing in the Agreement requires Mr. Stokes and Mr. Sharpe to consult with Mr. Berryman before they make a decision. In reality, Mr. Berryman has absolute control over all of the decisions made by Mr. Stokes, who occupies one of the two BHI seats on the Board. This was confirmed by Mr. Stokes at the hearing and was not contradicted. Even if Mr. Sharpe (who has been replaced by Mr. Berryman) were still on the Board, he would be subject to the same constraints. This is because Mr. Berryman has made it clear that he would quickly replace any BHI Board member who did not vote in accordance with his wishes. Since BHI (and Mr. Berryman) effectively controls the joint venture through 51 percent of the Board's voting power, it is found that the minority owner exercises dominant control over the management and daily operations of the joint venture, as contemplated by the rule. Rule 40E-7.653(6) Criteria Subparagraphs (6)(c) and (d) of the rule require that the applicant establish that "the net worth of the business concern, together with its affiliates, does not exceed five (5) million [dollars]," and that it "employs two- hundred (200) or fewer permanent, full-time employees," respectively. In determining the net worth, the same rule provides that the District shall "consider the most recent federal tax returns or annual financial statements for the business." After concerns were raised by the District over BHI's net worth and number of permanent employees, BHI filed a letter with the District on April 2, 2002, indicating that it had 118 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,460,176.00. On June 6, 2002, its counsel also filed an affidavit by BHE's Controller, together with consolidated financial reports for the year ending March 29, 2002, reflecting a negative net worth of $1,293,435 for BHE and all of its subsidiaries, including BHI. Counsel also provided an affidavit by the BHE Benefits Coordinator listing 96 full-time BHI employees as of May 17, 2002. In separate documents submitted earlier by the other joint venture participants, the net worth and number of permanent, full-time employees of each of those participants were as follows: GCY - $553,000.00 and 25 employees as of November 30, 2001; Cooner - $300,000.00 and 8 employees as of December 31, 2001; and Southern Mapping - $527,000.00 and 6 employees as of December 31, 2001. While the fiscal years of the participants are not identical, collectively these figures produce a total positive net worth of all Everglades members (including BHE, the parent of BHI) of $86,565.00 and less than 200 full-time employees at or about the date the application was filed. Despite this showing by Everglades that it met the net worth and size thresholds for a MBE, over the past two years BHI has made a number of filings with the District and other governmental entities which caused the District to doubt the veracity of the numbers submitted by Everglades and to ultimately deny the application. For example, in its application for recertification filed with the District in November 2000, BHI reflected that it then had a positive net worth of $1,013,790.00 and 305 full-time employees. In a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor dated October 23, 2001, BHI indicated that its net worth was $1,012,979.00 and that it employed 102 permanent employees. Almost identical numbers were shown in other filings made with the District on November 1, 2001, April 18, 2002, May 24, 2002, and May 31, 2002. However, in a Statement of Intent to Perform as a MBE Subcontractor executed by a BHI corporate officer (Mr. Stokes) on June 18, 2002, and filed with the District, the net worth of BHI was shown as $4,106,000.00 and the number of permanent, full-time employees was given as 350. Assuming these latter figures are accurate, Everglades would have a total net worth exceeding $5 million and more than 200 full-time, permanent employees, both of which exceed the thresholds permitted by the rule. In addition, on April 3, 2000, BHI filed certification documents with Orange County reflecting that it had 305 full-time employees and a positive net worth of $123,415.00. Identical figures were reflected in a filing made with the City of Tampa on April 3, 2002. In contrast, in a MBE certification filing made with the City of Orlando on May 20, 2002, which included net worth and number of employees for the latest three-year period, BHI represented that it had 97 employees in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, and that its net worth for those years was a negative $898,676.00, a negative $1,376,645.00, and a negative $1,586,216.00, respectively. To add to the confusion, in an undated document filed with the City of Tampa, BHI indicated that it had 345 full-time employees and 35 part-time employees. However, in a June 12, 2002, filing with the Tampa Port Authority, BHI indicated that it had 116 full-time employees and a negative net worth of $1,586,216.00. Mr. Berryman conceded that the different filings were "embarrassing" and confusing, and he attributed them to mistakes by careless or untrained in-house personnel. As to the document reflecting a net worth of BHI in excess of $4 million, it was established that a secretary erroneously filled out the document and Mr. Stokes hurriedly signed it without verifying the numbers. Mr. Berryman also maintained that the numbers submitted by BHI to the District in the April 2, 2002, letter, as supported by the financial reports and affidavits filed on June 6, 2002, are the most accurate reflection of its net worth and number of employees. This assertion is accepted since all of the filings over the years (except the one on June 18, 2002) have consistently indicated that the net worth of BHI is far less than the $5 million threshold. Moreover, the more credible evidence supports a finding that the number of permanent, full-time employees of BHI and the other joint venture participants is less than 200. Based on these considerations, it is found that Everglades meets the net worth and employee thresholds prescribed by the rule. Professional Licensure Requirement Rule 40E-7.653(5), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the minority owner (Mr. Berryman) seeking certification "be the license holder, or the professional license holder" in the specialty for which certification is sought. Here, Everglades seeks to provide surveying services. The application filed with the District identified five BHI individuals who had professional surveying licenses which authorized the work, all non-minorities. Mr. Berryman was not identified as being one of them. The rule itself is clear and unambiguous and requires no interpretation. Since its adoption in late 1996, the District has consistently construed it to mean just what it says -- that in order for a minority owner to be certified, the owner must have a professional license in the area being certified. This interpretation of the rule was not shown to be unreasonable or clearly erroneous. Therefore, because Everglades intends to provide surveying services, Mr. Berryman, as the minority owner, must hold a surveyor's license under Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, in order to qualify as a MBE. While it is true that Mr. Berryman is a registered professional engineer (under Chapter 471, Florida Statutes) in the State of Florida (as well as 3 other states), and he can perform almost all of the surveying services under his engineering license,2 he does not hold a Florida surveyor's license, as required by the rule. While this result may seem unfair and based on highly technical grounds, it is consistent with the plain requirements of the rule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order denying the application of Everglades Surveying Joint Venture for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 2002.
The Issue Whether petitioner has standing to request consent of use of marine bottoms? Whether the site in question lies within the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park? Whether petitioner's application for consent to dredge in two places east of Angelfish Creek should be granted, under Chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes (1989) and Chapters 16D and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Angelfish Creek in Monroe County runs virtually due east from Card Sound (which opens into Biscayne Bay just north of Angelfish Creek) to Hawk Channel, which hugs the upper Florida Keys at the edge of the Atlantic Ocean. The "creek" or strait separates Key Largo and Angelfish Key on the south from Palo Alto Key to the north. Three flashing red lights and other navigational aids mark a channel traversing the saltwater pass between sound and ocean. Petitioner South Florida Waterways Improvement Foundation, Inc. (SFWIF) is a non-profit corporation owing its existence chiefly to John A. Bott, a public spirited boater known in some circles as the "king of luggage racks." T.134. Mr. Bott, whose home at the Ocean Reef Club fronts on Card Sound, (T.145), owns "a 63 Ocean Sports fisherman, a 22 Mako and a 16-foot dinghy." Id. He once ran aground in his big boat in the Angelfish Creek channel. Respondents are state agencies charged with managing state lands in general, including submerged lands like those underlying Angelfish Creek and further east where petitioner proposes to dredge; and state parks in particular, including the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park, a pioneering and world- renowned "underwater park," about whose northern boundary the parties are in dispute. Petitioner Named for Predecessor Boats navigated Angelfish Creek as early as March 13, 1945, the date of an aerial photograph received as petitioner's Exhibit No. 8. But Angelfish Creek was first dredged (T.154) only after the Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit in the wake of approval by Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) on March 12, 1968, approval which is reflected on page 469 of Volume 36 of the official minutes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. After expiration of the original permit, a non-profit corporation, South Florida Waterways Improvement Foundation, Inc. (proto-SFWIF) applied for and received permission to dredge "190 cubic yards of material from an area [in the mouth or slightly easterly of Angelfish Creek] 350 feet long by 60 feet wide." T.159. On December 30, 1975, DER issued a dredging permit to proto- SFWIF. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. On January 22, 1976, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit to proto-SFWIF for the same project. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13. After dredging took place as authorized, proto-SFWIF "was allowed to dissolve for failure to pay or failure to file the corporate annual reports." T.164. Proto-SFWIF paid for spoil it removed to uplands (which, when deposited, ceased to belong to it) but "did not [ever otherwise] own any property." T.164. After Mr. Bott engaged Tallahassee counsel, another non-profit corporation, petitioner SFWIF, was formed, in 1990. SFWIF owns no property in Monroe County, either. Mr. Bott and twelve other members of Key Largo's Ocean Reef Club, some of whose boats draw several feet, are members of SFWIF. Two were also members of proto-SFWIF, and at least one, Mr. Bott, owns waterfront property within a few miles of the proposed site. William J. Roberts, the lawyer who formed SFWIF, together with others in his office, serve as SFWIF's corporate officers. Park Boundaries The overwhelming weight of evidence adduced at hearing establishes that the site SFWIF proposes to dredge lies within the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. When the then newly formed DER issued a dredging permit to proto- SFWIF, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, it did so on the mistaken assumption "that the project was not in an aquatic preserve, and . . . not within the boundaries of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park." T.162. (At the time, SFWIF, the petitioner in the present case, was not in existence. Nor did respondents make any representations directly to proto-SFWIF.) DER may have relied on advice from Jack W. Pierce, then an attorney for DNR, in his letter of August 18, 1975, which stated: "In my opinion, these rules would not affect the maintenance dredging on Angel Fish Creek as that is not on Key Largo." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17. But, when expressly addressing the question of park boundaries, Mr. Pierce's letter stated simply that "the boundaries . . . are those set out in the Presidential Proclamation of 1960 plus those described as set forth in the Dedication of the Trustees dated September 21, 1967, . . . ." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 17. Successive Dedications On December 3, 1959, the Trustees dedicated "for park, recreational and preservation purposes, . . . [a] portion of the outer Continental Shelf situated seaward of a line three geographic miles from Key Largo." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 23. The Presidential Proclamation of 1960 stated similar federal intentions with respect to the same "portion of the outer Continental Shelf." Known as the Key Largo Coral Reef, this offshore tract has a perimeter of some 21 miles. The northern end of its landward edge lies slightly north (and three miles east) of the northernmost point of Key Largo. In describing the offshore dedication by metes and bounds, the Trustees put the northwesternmost point at "Can Buoy '21' (approximate Latitude 25o20'06" N., Longitude 80o12'36" W.) southeast of Old Rhodes Key." Id. Can Buoy "21" has since been lost. A new day marker, No. 23, has replaced it, although possibly at a slightly different point, viz.: Latitude 25o 20' 08.58967" N., Longitude 80o 12' 34.5983" W. T.419; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 22. The current marker is 2.58967 seconds (approximately 260 feet) north and 1.4017 seconds (less than 140 feet) east of what was described as the approximate location of Can Buoy "21" in 1959. If, as a witness testified is likely, the 1959 coordinates were rounded to the nearest tenth of a minute, the apparent discrepancy may be attributable to rounding. In any event, under no analysis advanced, would a difference of 295 feet (to take the hypotenuse) prove significant, for present purposes. T.336. In the dedication of 1959, the Trustees described the southern, as well as the northern, end of the western or landward edge of the original, offshore tract with some specificity. The southern end of the landward edge of the original offshore tract, also some three miles east of the island, lies south of the northern tip of Key Largo, but well north of the island's southern tip. The southern boundary of the original, offshore tract runs approximately east-west, while its northern boundary runs more or less southeast-northwest, as it reaches the northwestern corner. By the time the Trustees dedicated additional sovereignty lands on September 21, 1967, Key Largo Coral Reef had come to be known as John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. On that day, the Trustees added: Those submerged tidal bottom lands in the Atlantic Ocean lying between [what was then] the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park and Key Largo including the submerged land in Largo Sound and the various inlets along the easterly coast of Key Largo. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 24. While preserving to their owners "any riparian rights and interest," the Trustees extended the park landward from the original offshore tract to the shore of Key Largo, without, however, listing coordinates of latitude and longitude for the northernmost and southernmost points on shore. Lying Between The southern boundary of the original, offshore tract is on a line approximately perpendicular to Key Largo's Atlantic shoreline. Surveyors who have considered the problem apparently agree that extending the southern boundary of the original tract to the shore of Key Largo appropriately defines the southern edge of submerged lands lying "between" the island and the original, offshore tract. But the northern boundary of the offshore tract, if extended landward, would proceed northwesterly and come ashore somewhere on Rhodes Key, well north of the northernmost point of the offshore tract, and still further north of the northern tip of Key Largo. T.532. Before the present controversy arose, DNR engaged James Weidener, a professional land surveyor "to survey basically the Pennekamp Park and to provide boundary maps . . . and then as part of that to locate and monument both the north and south boundaries." T. 528. As part of this project, Mr. Weidener and others working with him conducted mean high water surveys at points along the eastern shore of Key Largo and extrapolated a boundary between state-owned bottom lands and uplands in private ownership. In locating the northernmost point on Key Largo, however, Mr. Weidener did not rely on a mean high water study. Instead he chose the northern edge of tidally washed mangroves or "the apparent edge of vegetation" (T.537) that extended probably 40 to 60 feet north of the mean high water line. Nothing in the record raised the possibility that the point he chose was more than 100 feet north of the mean high water line. By joining this point with marker No. 23, he defined the northern boundary of the submerged lands "between" Key Largo and the original tract. Even before the Weidener survey, a sign had been erected "only 30 or 40 feet off the line," (T.533) which the surveyors ultimately decided on. The piling holding the sign stands 34.45 feet off the line. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. The north side of the sign "says entering Pennekamp State Park. On the south side it says entering Biscayne National Park." T.530-531. The line between the northernmost point on Key Largo and marker No. 23 is depicted as (A) in Appendix B to the recommended order. The site at which petitioner proposes to dredge lies south of the northerly boundary described in the Weidener survey and depicted as (A) in Appendix B. If a point 100 feet further south than the one Mr. Weidener identified as the northernmost point on Key Largo is connected to the marker, the resulting line lies well north of the proposed site. T.565. If a point 260 feet south of marker No. 23 is connected to a point 100 feet further south than the one identified by Mr. Weidener as the northern tip of Key Largo, the resulting line still lies north of the proposed site. The scaled drawing attached as Appendix B requires these inferences, although these variants of line (A) are not depicted there. Forensic Surveying In preparing for litigation in the present case, petitioner engaged a surveyor, George Cole, who assembled Petitioner's Exhibit No. 22. Citing "Hayes v. Bowman, Fla., 91 So.2d 795 and Bliss v. Kinsey, Fla. 233 So.2d 191," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 22, p. 2, Mr. Cole testified that "these cases suggest the best courses [sic] of action is one that's perpendicular to the channel out here if this indeed was a riparian rights case." T.344. But, since the Trustees took care, in expanding the park, to preserve to their owners "any riparian rights and interest," the location of the northerly boundary of the tract dedicated in 1967 has nothing to do with riparian rights; and lines (C) and (D) depicted in Appendix B have no support in the record, aside from Mr. Cole's unfounded speculation. Line (B) depicted in Appendix B, also proposed by Mr. Cole, reflects the same methodology Mr. Weidener employed (in the sense of joining a point on Key Largo to marker No.23), but proceeds on the assumption that the northernmost point on Key Largo of relevance is at the mouth of an inlet known as Pumpkin Creek. Mr. Cole conceded that "Key Largo does indeed go further to the north, but . . . [testified that] this portion up here is obscured and shielded from the Atlantic Ocean by Angelfish Key and this is Pumpkin Creek and various other creeks. These are distinct, discrete islands. They have their own land mass. They are not Key Largo." T.342-3. But Angelfish Key (and Little Angelfish Key) resemble El Radabob Key in this regard. El Radabob Key is the largest of the small islands lying alongside Key Largo in the Atlantic Ocean. All witnesses testifying on the point agreed that submerged land lying between Key Largo and El Radabob Key fell within the Trustees' 1967 dedication of "submerged land in . . . [the Atlantic Ocean including] the various inlets along the easterly coast of Key Largo." Similarly, as Key Largo tapers to a northern point, Angelfish Key and Little Angelfish Key lie on its Atlantic side, separated from it (and each other) by narrow, elongated inlets of the ocean. T. 535, 537. The submerged bottoms of these elongated inlets, no less than the submerged bottom lands in Key Largo Sound, comprise part of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. Poorly Marked Although charts overstate the controlling depth, the channel in Angelfish Creek is already the best channel connecting the Atlantic Ocean to inland waters north of Snake Creek and south of Government Cut. Tavernier Creek to the south and Broad and Caesar Creeks to the north are also navigable by small craft. Of course, weather and low tides make navigation more difficult everywhere they have an effect. Depicting depths at mean low water, Respondents' Exhibit No. 2B maps the ocean bottom in the vicinity of markers Nos. 2A and 3A, including the eastern end of the channel petitioner seeks to widen. The two formations petitioner proposes to dredge aside, depths within the channel vary from 4.9 to 13 or 14 feet, at mean low water. The topographical survey features one-foot contours (between five and fifteen feet below mean low water) and reports hundreds of soundings. Respondents' Exhibit No. 2B. A shoal lies inside the channel about 15 feet from the southerly edge, some 30 feet easterly of green day marker No. 3A. In the worst spot, fossilized coral lies under only 3.5 feet of water at mean low tide. Boats run aground there as well as on another ledge of fossil coral on the other side of the channel, near marker No. 2A. At the latter site, Mr. H. R. Pender once measured the depth at five feet (T.125); and mean low water is shown at 5.4 feet. Whether dredging would actually increase boat traffic was not established, although dredging would permit the channel to handle more traffic. The narrower and more serpentine a channel becomes, the smaller the vessels it can accommodate. But traffic could be routed around these shoals by repositioning markers Nos. 2A and 3A, or by adding markers. Outside the channel opposite marker No. 2A is a deep hole; there is ample water into which to shift the channel. Opposite marker No. 3A outside the channel, depths at mean low water are as low as 5.6 feet. Although that is deeper than places in the mouth of the channel, it might be preferable simply to narrow the channel by moving marker No. 3A the few feet necessary to locate it channelward of the out-cropping of "fossil coral [or] calcium carbonate rock," (T.382) petitioner proposes to dredge. Environmental Effects The DER permit conditions specify turbidity screens, limit dredging to slack and incoming tides, and require deposition of spoil upland. Biota in the vicinity can withstand "spurts of turbidity," in any event. Tidal currents have scoured the channel, removing most fine particles, but intermittent northwesters flush slugs of particulate matter from Card Sound through Angelfish Creek. The project site is on the order of a mile from the nearest active coral reef in the park, but a few small colonies of coral, both hard and soft (gorgonian) grow where petitioner proposes to dredge, as do algae, marine grasses, and perhaps other alcyonarians. Dredging would displace these individuals but create a new and deeper hard substrate for colonization by like organisms. A representative of DER is to help pick which fossil coral to remove. Marine life, if established at a greater depth, would less likely suffer interference from boats' 60- to 100-feet long running aground. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14. Groundings entail the risk of fuel spills. Traces of presumably toxic bottom paint have been found on fossil coral near the surface. But these hazards would also be greatly reduced if markers Nos. 2A and 3A were repositioned, or additional markers placed, to mark the outcroppings, so boaters could avoid them.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended: That respondents deny petitioner's application for consent to dredge. That respondents specifically initiate relocation of markers Nos. 2A and 3A or take other steps to mark the channel appropriately. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX A TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4285 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 56, 57, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 and 97 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 58, 59, 60 and 71 are immaterial. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, no causal connection between the letter and the permit was proven. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 18, the owner's testimony was largely hearsay. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 21, the shallows are a hazard on account of the markers' location. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the adequacy of the width would depend on the vessel. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, no fatality occurred from grounding. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 30 and 32, see finding of fact No. 24. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 33, such an event blocked the channel for "another large vessel." T.38. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 36, Mr. Bott had only one grounding. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 37 has been adopted, in substance, but proto-SWFIF is now defunct. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 38, a new corporation was organized. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 39, at least one nonprofit corporation obtained such permits. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 40, 50, 70, 74 and 76 have been rejected. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 41, while apparently accurate, the proposed finding is not supported by the citation to the record. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 53 and 73, the evidence showed that the new marker was likely at the same spot as the old. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 54, 55, 72, 75 and 77 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 79, the effect of possibly increased traffic in larger vessels was not considered. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 81, the testimony was "on the order of" a mile. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 96 so-called is actually a proposed conclusion of law. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 98 and 99, the proposed dredging is contrary to administrative rules which, at least in the absence of a rule challenge, express public policy definitively. Respondents' proposed findings of fact were not separately numbered, but have been addressed, in substance, in the findings of fact. APPENDIX B TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4285 (From Petitioner's Exhibit No. 22) COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Routa, Esquire P.O. Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6506 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire John W. Corrigan, Esquire 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS-35 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gardner, Exec. Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
