The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael E. Langton, violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, Constitution of the State of Florida, by his activities and contacts with staff of the Department of Community Affairs on matters dealing with the Community Development Block Grant Program?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent. The Respondent, Michael E. Langton, took office as a member of the Florida House of Representatives, on October 22, 1985. The Respondent has continuously served as a Florida state representative since October 22, 1985. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent served as a public officer subject to Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, of the Constitution of the State of Florida. Since October, 1981, the Respondent has been a grants consultant. The Respondent formed, owned and was employed by Langton Associates, Incorporated. Upon taking office as a Florida state representative in 1985, the Respondent requested an opinion of the Commission concerning his continued work for Langton Associates, Incorporated. The opinion of the Commission indicated that the Respondent could continue to work as a grants consultant but that he should not personally appear before state agencies. Langton Associates, Incorporated. The Respondent has been the sole stockholder of Langton Associates, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Langton Associates"), since it was formed in October, 1981. The corporation is a for-profit-corporation. Among its functions, Langton Associates provides consulting services to governments eligible to apply for grants under the Community Development Block Grant Program and assists governments in preparing and submitting applications for grants under the program. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent was paid a salary from Langton Associates for his services to, and on behalf of, the corporation. The salary paid to the Respondent has been determined by the Respondent. Although the salary varies from year-to-year, it averages approximately $50,000.00 a year, including 1988, 1989 and 1990. The City of Macclenny, Florida, was among the clients of Langton Associates. Macclenny paid Langton Associates $12,000.00 a year for five to six years, including 1988. Income paid to Langton Associates by its clients was deposited in a business account from which the Respondent's salary was paid. During the five to six years prior to July, 1990, Langton Associates made approximately $350,000.00 for services to its clients. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent, through Langton Associates, provided services to a number of local governments. Several of these local governments paid Langton Associates an annual fee. The average fee was approximately $30,000.00 a year. Other clients of Langton Associates paid on a per grant application basis approximately $3,000.00 per grant application. The Community Development Block Grant Program. The Community Development Block Grant Program (hereinafter referred to as the "CDBGP"), is a Federal government program whereby funds are provided to States to use to improve small local communities. Funds received for the CDBGP in Florida are administered by the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), through the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development. Funds for the CDBGP are received and are distributed for four categories of grant projects: (1) housing; (2) neighborhood revitalization; (3) economic development; and (4) commercial revitalization. CDBGP funds are intended to be used in part to assist small local governments to revitalize homes and neighborhoods. Each year the Department adopts administrative rules governing the CDBGP and the manner in which annual funds are to be distributed in Florida. The Department's revised administrative rules provide the steps to be followed in each annual funding cycle. The procedures for determining which small governments receive CDBGP funds generally include the following steps: An applicant workshop is held at the beginning or the middle of the funding cycle; An opening date is established for when Applications are to be submitted; A closing date is established for when Applications are scored and awards of funds are made; Applications are initially ranked according to their scores; Site visits are conducted by the Department; Applications are ranked again. These rankings can be challenged; and Funds are awarded. The Secretary of the Department makes the final decision as to how CDBGP funds are awarded. All applications for CDBGP funds are "self-scored" prior to filing. Each applicant determines, based upon objective standards, the score of its application and informs the Department of the score on the application. When applications are filed they are initially ranked by the Department based upon the self-score determined by the applicant. Applications may be filed on behalf of small cities of less than 50,000 population or small counties of less than 200,000 population. Applications for CDBGP funds are technically filed by eligible applicants--a county or city. Private individuals and businesses are not eligible to apply for grants from the Department under the CDBGP. Applications are prepared 90 to 95% of the time by consultants, including Langton and Associates. The following question is included on applications from which it may be determined if an application was prepared by a consultant: "Who was the agency or firm responsible for preparing the application?" The eligible county or city for which an application is submitted is considered the "applicant." If a consultant prepared and filed an application on behalf of an applicant, however, it was common for Department staff associated with the CDBGP to refer to the consultant and/or the government entity as the "applicant." Although the number of consultants in Florida who prepared applications for CDBGP awards varied from year to year, there have been approximately six to ten consultants in Florida preparing applications for CDBGP awards. During 1988, there were a total of approximately 276 local governments which were eligible for awards under the CDBGP. Only a small number of these entities, however, actually filed applications for awards. The Department does not consider the identity of any consultant involved in filing a CDBGP application in determining which applicants should be awarded CDBGP grants. Following the filing of applications for CDBGP grants, additional information is not to be provided to the Department unless requested. Nor are arguments to be presented to the Department in support of any application. Target Area Maps and Gerrymandering. Applications filed during the 1988 (as well as prior years) annual funding cycle for CDBGP funds for the housing category were required to include a "target area map". A "target area map" was an area map of the local community of the applicant depicting the specific area that the proposed grant activities were to be conducted in. Therefore, a target area map for a housing grant would identify on the area map the specific houses for which the funds were being requested. Prior to the 1988 annual funding cycle many target area maps had been submitted which included oddly shaped target areas. These oddly shaped target areas were not square or rectangular; instead, the target area was drawn in such a way that houses that qualified for CDBGP funds were included and those that did not qualify, even if located right next door to a qualified house on the same block, were excluded. "[A]pplicants would draw their target area boundaries in such a way to exclude housing units that would adversely affect their score." Lines 24-25, page 73, and line 1, page 74, Transcript of September 30, 1991-October 1, 1991, Formal Hearing (hereinafter referred to as the "Transcript"). This practice was referred to as "gerrymandering." There had been concern and debate in and outside the Department concerning whether gerrymandering should be allowed. There were some who were not concerned about, or bothered by, gerrymandering because the use of gerrymandering to identify a target area did not cause persons who were not in need to be directly benefited from CDBGP funds. For example, in the housing grant area, only the houses of persons with low enough income levels could directly benefit from the CDBGP. Those that did not qualify for assistance could not be directly benefited even if an impacted area was gerrymandered. There were others, however, who were concerned about and bothered by gerrymandering because the use of gerrymandering allowed applicants to achieve higher scores for their applications by drawing the targeted area in such a way to insure that it included mainly or totally houses that were qualified for funding while excluding unqualified houses in the same neighborhood which would reduce their scores. Persons concerned with, and bothered by, gerrymandering, including the Respondent, believed that the CDBGP intended that only relatively box-shaped geographic neighborhoods should be allowed as the target area. At various times, the Department tried to devise a method of preventing gerrymandering, but could find no reasonable solution. The difficulty with preventing gerrymandering was explained by Lewis O. Burnside, the Director (beginning in January, 1989) of the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development: Every time I talked about target areas when we looked at it -- we tried to deal with target areas to see what shape should they be. Should they be square or circular and should they -- we couldn't find any rhyme or reason for that. Also, our program applies to urban and rural areas. And in rural areas it is quite normal to have a large property value farm across from what used to be tenant lands, where you have very low income people directly across the street from a multi-million-dollar piece of farmland. And so, we could not write anything, one that would give you a non-gerrymandered target area unless it was just arbitrary. We would just have to say it has got to be square, or it has got to be rectangular, and it can be no larger than a certain size. . . . Lines 8-20, page 141, Transcript. Most people associated with the CDBGP, other than the Respondent, did not consider the issue of gerrymandering to be a burning issue or a particularly improper practice. This lack of concern was caused by the fact that the general purpose of the CDBGP was to benefit low and moderate income people and gerrymandering did not circumvent this general purpose. Ultimately, individuals in the houses included in a target area, even in a gerrymandered target area, benefited only if they were in need of assistance as established under the CDBGP. There were members of the Florida Legislature, including the Respondent, who believed that gerrymandering in the CDBGP was inconsistent with the goals of the CDBGP. Through at least the 1988 annual funding cycle, gerrymandering of target area maps was not prohibited by federal or Florida law. The 1988 Funding Cycle. The general procedures for determining how CDBGP funds were to be awarded each funding cycle which are described in finding of fact 18, supra, were followed for the 1988 funding cycle. Legislation concerning the CDBGP was adopted during the 1988 legislative session and was codified as Chapter 88-201, Laws of Florida. As a result of the adoption of Chapter 88-201, Laws of Florida, and as was the practice of the Department prior to each funding cycle, the Department undertook to amend its administrative rules governing the CDBGP, Chapter 9B-43, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 9B-43.003(33), Florida Administrative Code, was renumbered as subparagraph (35) and was amended by the Department by adding the following underlined language: "Target area" means a distinct, locally designated slum or blighted area under Section 163.340, F.S.; or a designated Enterprise Zone under Section 290.065, F.S.; or a distinct locally designated area, totally contained and contiguous in nature, that is characterized by concentrations of low and moderate income persons, wherein low and moderate income persons comprise at least 51 percent or more of the target area population. It was believed in the Department when the Department amended the definition of "target area" in its Rules that gerrymandering had been eliminated or substantially reduced. Although no formal opinion was given, an attorney on the Department's legal staff indicated during a CDBGP application workshop conducted by the Department for the 1988 funding cycle that gerrymandering would no longer be allowed. A representative of the Department instructed potential CDBGP grant applicants during a CDBGP application workshop held sometime after October 11, 1988, the effective date of Rule 9B-43.003(35), Florida Administrative Code, that gerrymandered target area maps would not be permitted. The Respondent and Langton Associates were aware of this representation. At some time subsequent to the workshop at which it was announced that gerrymandering would not be allowed, applications for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle were submitted to the Department. There were a total of thirty-four applications received for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle. Langton Associates submitted applications for housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle for three applicants: (1) Macclenny; (2) Fellsmere, Florida; and (3) St. Johns County, Florida. The target areas proposed with the applications prepared and submitted by Langton Associates for Macclenny, Fellsmere and St. Johns County were not gerrymandered. Langton Associates did not submit gerrymandered target areas because the Respondent did not believe that gerrymandering was proper and because the Department had announced that it would not accept gerrymandered maps. Despite the Department employee's statement during the workshop that gerrymandered maps would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle, most of the target area maps submitted with applications for the 1988 funding cycle were gerrymandered. Only five applications received by the Department did not include gerrymandered target areas: (1) the three applications submitted by Langton Associates; (2) the application of Apalachicola, Florida; and (3) the application of Century, Florida. On December 1, 1988, a memorandum was sent from Earl H. Parmer, Jr., then Director of the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development, to the Department's General Counsel. Mr. Parmer informed the General Counsel of the target area maps which had been filed for the 1988 funding cycle and stated, in part, the following: As you know, the department has been attempting to reduce the grantsmanship in the CDBG program by substantially reducing the gerrymandering of CDBG target areas; however, we question whether our current rule language supports our position. Advocate's Exhibit 7. On December 2, 1988, the following response was given by the Department's legal staff to Mr. Parmer: "Maps appear to be in compliance with Rule." Advocate's Exhibit 7. The Department, therefore, determined that it could not, despite the previous instructions from a Department representative that gerrymandered target areas would not be accepted, prevent the use of gerrymandered target area maps for the 1988 funding cycle. On December 14, 1988, the applications for CDBGP housing grants were initially ranked by the Department based upon the scores determined by the applicants through self-scoring and reported to the Department. Applications were listed by highest score to lowest score. The total 1988 funding cycle housing grant funds available were sufficient to meet the requests for funds of only the top fifteen-ranked applications. There were not sufficient funds to fund those applicants who ranked below fifteenth. The applications filed by Langton Associates ranked as follows, based upon their self determined scores, on the initial ranking: (1) Macclenny was seventeenth; (2) St. Johns was thirtieth; and (3) Fellsmere was thirty-second. The scores for these applicants determined through self-scoring were not high enough to entitle any of the applicants to an award of a housing grant for the 1988 funding cycle. The Respondent's Contacts with Linda Frohock. During December, 1988, the Respondent was informed that most applications for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle included gerrymandered target area maps and that the Department intended to accept those maps. After learning of the Department's acceptance of gerrymandered target area maps, the Respondent telephoned Thomas Yeatman, an employee of the Department. The Respondent left a message requesting that his telephone call be returned. Between December 20 and 31, 1988, Linda Frohock, then Chief of the Bureau of Housing and Community Assistance, in the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development, returned the telephone call the Respondent had made to Mr. Yeatman. This telephone call probably took place on or about December 20, 1988. The Respondent's initial telephone call to Mr. Yeatman and his conversation with Ms. Frohock were the result of his frustration over the fact that the Department was going to allow gerrymandering of target areas. The Respondent had expressed concern over the Department's administration of the CDBGP prior to 1988. The Respondent described his frustration: I called Mr. [Yeatman] and Linda, and I wanted to speak to the secretary as Representative Langton. I made it very clear, I said, I don't care what this is going to cost me politically or financially; you guys have got to stop this craziness. You are disadvantaging tons of cities, cities that are doing this right, they are doing this fair. They have no shot at ever competing for these grants, if you are going to continue this abuse of a program. . . . . Lines 16-24, Page 35, September 12, 1991, Deposition of the Respondent. The Respondent admitted that when he called the Department he intended to put pressure on the Department through his position as a legislator and that he attempted to use his power as a public official to force the Department to take action. The Respondent let it be known to Ms. Frohock that he was calling in his capacity as a legislator. Ms. Frohock informed the Respondent that she was returning his telephone call at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Department and that she would report their conversation back to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Department. During Ms. Frohock's telephone conversation with the Respondent, she took notes of the nature of the conversation. During the telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent was very upset and angry. The Respondent was excited, and he talked loudly and rapidly. The Respondent was angry that his competitors were benefiting by being allowed to submit gerrymandered target area maps while the applications prepared for, and submitted on behalf of, Langton Associates' clients had not included gerrymandered target area maps. The Respondent believed that Langton Associates had lost money in the past because it had not gerrymandered target areas while the Respondent's competitor's had. During the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent indicated the following: He had met with Mr. Parmer in the summer of 1988 and discussed gerrymandering. Mr. Parmer had promised him that gerrymandering would not be allowed. A Department employee had stated at a workshop that gerrymandering would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle. He wanted to be allowed to gerrymander the target area maps Langton Associates had submitted on behalf of its clients or he wanted the Department to require that those applicants that had gerrymandered their target area maps be punished. He indicated that he did not care what it cost him politically or financially to fight the Department's actions. He intended to shut down the CDBGP and see that all of the employees involved in the CDBGP were fired if the matter was not resolved to his satisfaction; "Heads would roll." He indicated that Florida Senator Carrie Meek and Florida Representative C. Fred Jones had asked him to play a major role in the Legislature in revising the CDBGP. He stated that the matter would end up in a court of law. He would get Fred Baggett and Jack Skelding, both of whom are attorneys, to assist him to fight the Department. He indicated that he would stop the 1988 funding cycle by suing the Department. He stated that he would probably only get two grants funded during the 1988 funding cycle. He stated that he would return to his office on January 2, 1989, and would have a legislative committee meeting on January 9, 1989; if he had not heard back from the Department about the problem, he wanted to talk to the Secretary of the Department after his return. If he was not satisfied after talking to the Secretary of the Department, he indicated he intended to speak to the then Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House Designate. The Respondent asked Ms. Frohock to pass his concerns on to the Department's Secretary. The Respondent requested that Ms. Frohock provide him with copies of all target area maps submitted in the housing category and the neighborhood revitalization category for the 1988 funding cycle. These documents were public records. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock made her nervous, in part because he was a legislator. During the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, he did not specifically say that he was calling on behalf of himself, Langton Associates or any local government for which the Respondent or Langton Associates was working. Nor did the Respondent specifically mention being compensated for the call. Despite the foregoing finding of fact, it is obvious that the Department's actions which the Respondent complained of during his conversation with Ms. Frohock had directly affected applicants which had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf during the 1988 funding cycle. It is also obvious that the alternative resolutions of the problem suggested by the Respondent had the potential to benefit those same applicants. In light of the fact that the Langton Associates' three applications were among only five applications out of thirty-four applications filed that were not gerrymandered, it was in the interest of Langton Associates and the Respondent that the Department take the actions the Respondent suggested or some other action to correct the Department's decision to accept gerrymandered target areas. It is also true that the Respondent did not specifically request any change in the scores of the applicants represented by Langton Associates; and that the specific actions recommended by the Respondent were suggested for the "entire set of eligible applicants." But the Respondent's suggestions included the applicants represented by Langton Associates and those applicants stood to gain more from the Respondent's suggestions than those applicants that had filed gerrymandered target area maps; especially if the applicants that had filed gerrymandered target area maps were penalized as suggested by the Respondent. While it is true that the concerns which the Respondent expressed to Ms. Frohock were to some degree concerns which the Respondent or any other legislator could have raised in their capacity as a legislator, the Respondent's actions also could have beneficially impacted clients of Langton Associates that had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf in the funding cycle at issue. The fact that issues may have been raised by the Respondent in his capacity as a legislator does not negate the fact that the raising of those issues before the Department could also have benefitted the clients of his company, Langton Associates. The Respondent's actions in telephoning Mr. Parmer and talking to Ms. Frohock were also considered necessary by the Respondent because of the possible harm to the reputation of Langton Associates caused by the Department's actions. Langton Associates was one of the only consultants that heeded the Department's instructions concerning the use of gerrymandered target areas for the CDBGP 1988 funding cycle. When the Department reversed its position and accepted the gerrymandered target areas proposed by most of the applicants in the 1988 funding cycle for housing, the Respondent had to be concerned about those who would question why Langton Associates had not filed gerrymandered maps. In light of these concerns, the Respondent had to have felt compelled to take some action to force the Department to admit that it had been in error and not Langton Associates, even if the clients of Langton Associates were not directly benefited. Finally, some of the comments and requests made by the Respondent to Ms. Frohock may have been reasonable in light of the events which precipitated the conversation. If the Respondent had not been a member of the legislature who was prohibited from representing others for compensation before a state agency, some of his actions were actions which might be expected of, and considered reasonable if taken by, any consultant in light of some of the Department's actions. Some of the Respondent's actions were taken and some of his comments were made because he believed that the Department's actions had improperly misled Langton Associates. Some of his actions were taken and some of his comments were made, however, solely because of his position and power as a legislator. Following her telephone conversation with the Respondent, Ms. Frohock gave a copy of her notes to, and briefed, the Department's Assistant Secretary. She also gave a copy of her notes to Mr. Burnside. Ms. Frohock also subsequently wrote a memorandum memorializing her telephone conversation with the Respondent. The January 10, 1989, Meeting. Subsequent to the Respondent's telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent requested that a meeting be held with the Secretary of the Department in Representative C. Fred Jones' office. In January, 1989, Representative Jones was the Chairman of the House Committee on Community Affairs, the committee of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over the Department's programs. The Respondent asked Mario Taylor, Staff Director of the House Committee on Community Affairs, to arrange the meeting with the Secretary of the Department. Mr. Taylor obtained approval for the meeting requested by the Respondent from Representative Jones, and Mr. Taylor informed Michael Richardson, the Department's legislative liaison, of the meeting. The meeting requested by the Respondent was scheduled for January 10, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "Meeting"). Mr. Richardson informed the then Secretary of the Department, Thomas Pelham, of the Meeting. Mr. Richardson told Mr. Pelham that the meeting was being held to discuss target area maps and gerrymandering. Mr. Pelham met with Mr. Burnside prior to the meeting to be briefed on the issue and requested that Mr. Burnside attend the Meeting with him. Prior to the Meeting, Ms. Frohock and Mr. Burnside met with Department staff to discuss the gerrymandering issues raised by the Respondent during his telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock. A "discussion paper" was drafted by Ms. Frohock as a result of this Department staff meeting and was dated January 10, 1989. It was agreed by Department staff that the Department had presented faulty instructions concerning gerrymandering during the workshop which took place before applications for the 1988 funding cycle were filed. There were some in the Department that wanted to take this incident into account in any recommended solution to the problem. There were others, including the Department's legal staff, who believed that the Department had done nothing illegal and, therefore, wanted to take no action. The following possible solutions to the gerrymandering issue were discussed and agreed upon by the Department's staff and were discussed in the discussion paper: Allow all applicants to resubmit target area maps (this would benefit the five applicants, including the three Langton Associates' applicants, that had submitted maps that had not been gerrymandered); Give the maximum score for the target area for all the proposals (this would also benefit the five applicants, including the three Langton Associates' applicants, that had submitted maps that were not gerrymandered); and Do nothing and allow any disappointed applicant to follow the Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, process to challenge the Department's actions. This is the option that was ultimately recommended in the discussion paper. The Meeting was attended by Representative Jones, the Respondent, Mr. Pelham, Mr. Burnside, Mr. Taylor and Mr. Richardson. The Meeting was held in Representative Jones' office. Representative Jones agreed to the meeting because he had a number of concerns about the manner in which the Department was administering the CDBGP. Representative Jones was not aware that the Respondent's company, Langton Associates, had filed applications on behalf of its clients which had been affected adversely by the Department's actions in accepting gerrymandered maps. Therefore, Representative Jones was not aware that the Respondent had not requested the Meeting solely in his legislative capacity. During the Meeting the Respondent was hostile, agitated, upset and "seemed about to explode". His manner was threatening. Mr. Pelham described the Respondent's actions as a "tirade". The Respondent did most of the talking during the Meeting: He expressed his displeasure with the Department's administration of the CDBGP and, in particular, the Department's actions in accepting the gerrymandered target area maps. Representative Jones also expressed concern about the Department's administration of the CDBGP. He indicated that he and others, in preparing applications on behalf of local governments for the 1988 funding cycle, had been misled by information presented at a workshop to the effect that gerrymandering would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle. The Respondent stated that "he and others had relied upon that misinformation, and now he feared that they were going to be penalized in the way those applications were scored." Lines 4-6, page 194, Transcript. He stated that he did not believe the Department was administering or interpreting the law correctly, especially with regard to gerrymandering. He stated that the law did not allow gerrymandering. He indicated his displeasure with staff of the Department and indicated that they should all, with one exception, be fired. He demanded that all applications be thrown out; that they should not be scored or acted upon. He suggested that the Department should do nothing until the Legislature could take a look at the problem. He threatened to take legal action to stop the Department if it did not stop the funding cycle. Later during the Meeting, he suggested that the Department accept redrawn target area maps that were not gerrymandered or at least require all the applicants to "play by the same set of rules." The Respondent wanted the Department to halt the 1988 funding cycle process so that legislation prohibiting gerrymandering could be adopted. As of the date of the Meeting, if the Department had halted the 1988 funding cycle process it would not have harmed the applicants represented by Langton Associates. All three applicants had scores at that time which were below the funding ranking cut off score. Without some action by the Department, those applicants did not appear destined to receive a grant for the 1988 funding cycle. While it is true that the suggestions made by the Respondent during the Meeting would apply in general to all applicants, it is also true that if all applicants were required to submit maps that were not gerrymandered, the applicants that had submitted gerrymandered maps would in all probability end up with reduced scores, depending on how their target areas were drawn. The applicants for which applications had been prepared by Langton Associates and two other applicants, on the other hand, would not suffer such a reduction in scores because they had already submitted target areas which were not gerrymandered. Those applicants which had the top fourteen scores for the 1988 funding cycle for housing at the time of the Meeting would have suffered disproportionately if the funding cycle were suspended: their status would have changed from prospective award winner to non-award winner. During the Meeting, although the Respondent did not specifically indicate that the Meeting had been called, or that he was voicing his displeasure, on behalf of himself, Langton Associates or its clients, the Respondent made reference to the fact that he was a consultant and that Langton Associates had prepared applications for local governments that had been filed in the 1988 funding cycle being discussed. This was apparent to the Department employees present at the Meeting. The Respondent, although expressing his concerns in terms of all applicants generally, was nonetheless also concerned about the impact on the Langton Associates' applicants and Langton Associates. The Department employees present at the Meeting were aware of this fact also. The Respondent indicated that unless the Department took the actions he had suggested, Langton Associates and the two other applicants that had not gerrymandered their target areas would be prejudiced. The Respondent, through Langton Associates, could have benefited if any of its 1988 funding cycle grants were approved for funding. For example, applicants which are approved will more often than not hire the consultant that prepared a successful application to administer the awarded funds. Fees for such services can be more profitable than the fees for preparing an application. Therefore, if the Respondent's actions during the Meeting could ultimately result in the awarding of a grant to one of the Langton Associates' clients, the Respondent would have benefited. The Respondent's actions in calling and participating in the Meeting were also considered necessary by the Respondent for the same reasons described in finding of fact 71, supra. As was true of the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, it is true that the concerns which the Respondent expressed during the Meeting were to some degree concerns which the Respondent or any other legislator could have raised in their capacity as a legislator. It is also true that the Respondent's actions also could have beneficially impacted clients of Langton Associates that had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf in the funding cycle at issue. The fact that issues may have been raised by the Respondent in his capacity as a legislator does not negate the fact that the raising of those issues before Department employees could also have benefited the clients of his company, Langton Associates. It is also true that some of the comments and requests made by the Respondent during the Meeting may have been reasonable in light of the events which precipitated the conversation. If the Respondent had not been a member of the legislature who was prohibited from representing others for compensation before a state agency, some of his actions during the Meeting were actions which might be expected of, and considered reasonable if taken by, any consultant in light of some of the Department's actions. Some of the Respondent's actions were taken and some of his comments were made because he believed that the Department's actions had improperly misled Langton Associates. Some of his actions were taken and some of his comments were made, however, solely because of his position and power as a legislator. The 1988 Funding Cycle Awards in the Housing Category. Following the Meeting, Mr. Burnside met with Ms. Frohock and discussed the meeting. Following this discussion, Ms. Frohock, at Mr. Burnside's direction, prepared a revised discussion paper in the form of a memorandum from Mr. Burnside to Mr. Pelham. In the memorandum from Mr. Burnside to Mr. Pelham a fourth option was added: to cancel the funding cycle and start over. Mr. Burnside ultimately decided, after discussion with Ms. Frohock, to recommend that the Department adopt the option included in the original discussion paper described in finding of fact 83b: give the maximum score for the target area for all the proposals. This option was recommended, in part, because Mr. Burnside and Ms. Frohock had determined that awarding all applicants maximum scores for their target areas would not have any real impact on which applicants were ultimately awarded funds for the 1988 funding cycle for the housing category and the option recognized that the Department had made a mistake at the workshop. The option recommended was also chosen, in part, because the Department had taken a similar action in the past and because the Respondent was a legislator. Mr. Pelham ultimately approved Mr. Burnside's recommendation. The decision of the Department as to how to resolve the issues raised by the Respondent concerning the gerrymandered maps received during the 1988 funding cycle for housing was the direct result of the actions of the Respondent described, supra. After approval by Mr. Pelham of the recommended action, Mr. Burnside telephoned the Respondent to inform him of the Department's decision. This conversation took place sometime in February, 1989. After Mr. Burnside explained the decision to the Respondent, the Respondent went over the scores of the applicants and asked how the decision would affect those scores. Mr. Burnside, in response to the Respondent's question, indicated how the decision would impact the score for the application of Macclenny, one of Langton Associates' clients. This conversation took place after site visits had taken place and after an applicant previously ranked above Macclenny had been moved down in the rankings as a result of the site visits. Therefore, Mr. Burnside was able to inform the Respondent that Macclenny was within the fundable range of applicants. The Department's solution to the dispute was based in part on the fact that Macclenny was going to receive an award. The Respondent told Mr. Burnside that the result of the Department's solution, as explained by Mr. Burnside, might be acceptable to him. The Respondent was satisfied even though the solution did not resolve the ultimate problem of gerrymandering. , which the Respondent has suggested was the reason he was so upset about the Department's actions. The Respondent also asked Mr. Burnside whether the Department's decision could withstand a legal challenge. Mr. Burnside informed the Respondent that the Department's legal staff had opined that the decision was defendable. If the problem raised by the Respondent had been raised by any person who was not a member of the Florida Legislature, Mr. Burnside would have recommended to Mr. Pelham that the Department take no action and allow the complaining individual to take legal action. The Respondent, therefore, clearly affected the manner in which the Department administered the CDBGP. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning the Monitoring of CDBGP Grants. During October, 1989, Terri Ganson was employed as a Community Assistant Consultant for the Department. Ms. Ganson's duties included, among other things, monitoring CDBGP grants. During late 1989, Ms. Ganson was responsible for monitoring three CDBGP grants that had been awarded to Marion County (hereinafter referred to as the "Marion Grants"). Ms. Ganson was required to write periodic monitoring reports concerning the Marion Grants. The Marion Grants were being administered on behalf of Marion County by a grant consultant and competitor of the Respondent, Fred Fox Enterprises. Prior to October 30, 1989, Marion County was awarded a fourth grant (hereinafter referred to as the "Fourth Marion Grant"), in the CDBGP. Marion County was seeking bids for the administration of the Fourth Marion Grant. Langton Associates and Fred Fox Enterprises had submitted proposals to administer the Fourth Marion Grant. As of October 30, 1989, Marion County had not yet decided who would administer the Fourth Marion Grant. On October 30, 1989, the Respondent telephoned Ms. Ganson. During this telephone call, the Respondent yelled at her and was very angry and upset. The Respondent believed that Ms. Ganson was cooperating with Fred Fox, his competitor, and he wanted her to stop. The Respondent feared that Ms. Ganson's monitoring reports for the Marion Grants would cause the administration of the Fourth Marion Grant to be awarded to Fred Fox Enterprises. The Respondent did not believe the monitoring reports were critical enough of Fred Fox Enterprises. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Ganson in fact had favored Fred Fox Enterprises. During his telephone conversation with Ms. Ganson on October 30, 1989, the Respondent indicated the following to Ms. Ganson: He was concerned that Marion County would select Fred Fox Enterprises to administer the Fourth Marion Grant because of the monitoring reports Ms. Ganson had written concerning the Marion Grants. He accused Ms. Ganson of siding with Fred Fox. He told Ms. Ganson that she had "probably cost him a $96,000 administration grant because of the way [her] reports were written" Lines 2-4, page 181, Transcript. He demanded that a mistake in Ms. Ganson's monitoring reports for one of the Marion Grants be corrected. He requested that Ms. Ganson send him a copy of the current contracts and milestones, all of the monitoring reports and all requests for modifications pertaining to the Marion Grants. Ms. Ganson told the Respondent that she would check her reports to determine if she had made a mistake and, if so, would correct it. She ultimately determined that she had made a mistake and corrected it. She did not, however, totally modify her reports in the manner that the Respondent had demanded. Ms. Ganson reported the October 30, 1989, telephone conversation with the Respondent in a memorandum to her immediate supervisor. The Respondent's actions in telephoning Ms. Ganson on October 30, 1989, and his comments to Ms. Ganson were intended to avoid the loss by Langton Associates of the administration fees for the Fourth Marion Grant, which the Respondent believed could be $96,000.00. Although the decision as to who administered the Fourth Marion Grant was a local decision, the Respondent attempted to influence that decision by demanding that Ms. Ganson, an employee of the Department, modify her monitoring reports. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Ganson was intended to benefit Langton Associates and, thus, benefit himself. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Ganson was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Ms. Ganson took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning Awards of Multiple Service Grant Contracts. A copy of a letter dated September 22, 1989, was received by the Department. The letter was from Patricia Teems, the business manager of Langton Associates, to the Mayor of the City of Bunnell, Florida. The letter was on the letterhead of Langton Associates. In the September 22, 1989, letter Ms. Teems claimed that the City of Bunnell had awarded an administrative contract in violation of Florida law. In the last paragraph of the contract, Ms. Teems stated the following: Also, by this letter I am requesting DCA make a formal investigation into the procurement practices of the City of Bunnell. The complaint made by Ms. Teems in the September 22, 1989, letter, concerned the award of multi-service contracts. A "multi-service" contract includes the awarding of a contract to administer a grant to the same consultant that prepared the application for which the CDBGP grant was awarded. Under Florida law in effect during 1989, multi-service contracts were prohibited unless the local government awarding such a contract indicted in writing that the multi-service contract was in the best interest of the local government. Mr. Burnside was aware of the September 22, 1989, letter and the request of Langton Associates that the Department investigate its complaint against the City of Bunnell. The Department was investigating the complaint in October, 1989. During October, 1989, Mr. Pelham was walking through a hall in the House of Representatives' office building. The Respondent approached Secretary Pelham and indicated that he wanted to speak to him. During the Respondent's October, 1989, conversation with Mr. Pelham, the Respondent indicated the following: He indicated that the Department was not enforcing one of the laws governing the CDBGP. The Respondent indicated that the problem involved the services that could be performed by someone who contracted with a local government to administer a CDBGP grant. He indicated that he "was being hurt by . . . " the Department's failure to properly enforce the law. He threatened to sue the Department unless the Department enforced the law properly. The Respondent, who spoke in a low-key voice, was firm in expressing his position to Mr. Pelham that the law concerning multi-service contracts should be enforced as the Respondent interpreted the law. Shortly after the conversation with the Respondent concerning multi- service contracts, Mr. Pelham spoke to Mr. Burnside about the conversation. Mr. Burnside explained to Mr. Pelham that Langton Associates had filed a copy of the September 22, 1989, letter to the Mayor of the City of Bunnell and that the Department had been requested to investigate the matter. After Mr. Pelham and Mr. Burnside discussed the Secretary's encounter with the Respondent, they realized that the Respondent had been talking about the City of Bunnell incident when he spoke to Mr. Pelham. Mr. Pelham realized that the Respondent had been suggesting that the City of Bunnell had not followed the correct procedures in awarding the administration contract and the consultant that was awarded the administration contract should not have been the same consultant that had obtained the grant. Mr. Burnside responded on behalf of the Department to the request that the Department investigate the City of Bunnell incident by a letter to Ms. Teems dated January 22, 1990. Based upon information reviewed by the Department, including review by the Department's legal staff, the Department informed the Mayor of Bunnell and Ms. Teems that it had been concluded that the City had not violated the law. Although the Respondent admitted that he was aware that he should not directly request that the Department investigate the City of Bunnell, he approached Mr. Pelham to discuss the matter with him. The Respondent's conversation with Mr. Pelham was intended to benefit Langton Associates because Langton Associates was interested in obtaining the grant administration contract the City of Bunnell had awarded to another consultant and, thus, benefit himself. If the Department had agreed with Ms. Teems' and the Respondent's argument that the City of Bunnell had acted illegally, the City of Bunnell could have been forced to select a different administrator for its grant. The Respondent hoped Langton Associates would be the newly selected administrator. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Mr. Pelham was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Mr. Pelham took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning Certain Department Policies. In January, 1990, Wanda A. Jones, worked in the Department's Bureau of Housing, Division of Housing and Community Development. On January 23, 1990, Ms. Jones attended a CDBGP workshop in Jacksonville, Florida, sponsored by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Respondent was introduced to Ms. Jones during the January 23, 1990, workshop by an employee of Langton Associates. The Respondent began questioning Ms. Jones about the Department's policy that allowed Noma, Florida, to continue to be awarded funds under the CDBGP year after year. Noma is a very small community that had received a number of grants and the Respondent was challenging the Department policy that allowed such a small community such as Noma to continue to receive grants. Ms. Jones attempted to explain the Department's policy to the Respondent. At the time of the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones, the Department was in the middle of a funding cycle. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that any application had been filed by Langton Associates on behalf of any client during that funding cycle. The Respondent became upset with Ms. Jones' responses and raised his voice. The Respondent was aggressive, confrontational and he badgered Ms. Jones. Ms. Jones felt very uncomfortable. Her discomfort was caused in part by the fact that the Respondent was a legislator and he was holding her accountable for Department actions. The Respondent told Ms. Jones that the Department's policy was impacting on his business. By eliminating the situation that allowed governments like Noma to continue to obtain grants, other governments would become eligible to receive CDBGP funds. Some of those governments might include Langton Associates' clients or prospective clients. After Ms. Jones left the Respondent, he again approached her, apologized and then started to berate her again. During this conversation, the Respondent asked if Ms. Jones would speak to him "off the record" and express her personal opinions about Department actions. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones was intended to benefit Langton Associates and, thus, benefit himself. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Ms. Jones took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the Respondent, Michael E. Langton, violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, as alleged in Complaint No. 90-86. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be subjected to public censure and reprimand and be required to pay a civil penalty of $5,000.00 ($2,500.00 for each statutory violation). DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection A. 1 1-3. 2 6-7. 3 8. 4 See 10. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what years the percentages apply. 5 11. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 5. B. 1 13-14 and 21-23. 2 See 25. 3 24. "Gerrymandering" 1 29-30, 38 and 41. 2 32-34. 3 31-33. 4 32-33 and 35. 5 35. 6 See 35. 7 37. The 1988-1989 Funding Cycle 1 18 and 38. 2 18. 3 44 and 51. 4 82 and hereby accepted. 5 46-47. 6 48-49. 7 19, 38 and 52. 8 52-53. 9 The first sentence is not relevant. 54-55. 10 55-56. 11 59. 12 56. 13 57 and 61-63. 14 58 and 61. 15 63. 16 58. 17 62-63. 18 59, 66 and 73. Hereby accepted. See 75 and 80. 21 76-77 and 80. 22 34. 23 81-83. 24 81. 83 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 27 80. 28 84. 29 87. 30 86-87. 31 87. The testimony supporting these proposed findings was too speculative. 52 and hereby accepted. 34 89-90. 35 87 and 89-90. 36 90. 37 Not relevant. 38 92. 39 95, 97 and 101. 40 97. 41 101. 42 104. 43 100-101. 44-45 102. 46-47 Although these findings of fact are true, there could have been a number of reasonable explanations for why the Respondent did not proposed legislation concerning gerrymandering. 48 There proposed findings of fact are generally true. The fact that there are inconsistencies in testimony alone is not why some of the Respondent's testimony was not credible, however. The Respondent's explanation has been rejected based upon the weight of all of the evidence in this proceeding. C. 1 105. 2 Hereby accepted. 3 Not relevant. 4 106. 5 112-113. 6 114. 7 113. 8 114. 9 109-111. 10 113-114. 11 See 113. The evidence did not prove whether Ms. Ganson did or did not intend to favor Mr. Fox. 12 116. 13 118. D. 1-2 112. 3 120-121. 4 Hereby accepted. 5 124-125. 6 126. 7 127. 8 Not supported by the weight of the evidence or not relevant. 9 128. 10 129 and see 130. E. 1 131. 2 132. The meeting took place on January 23, 1990. 3 133 and 135. 4 133-134. 5 134 and 139. 6 See 136. 7 134. 8 138. 9-10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. No weight has been given to the sworn statement of Ms. Jones. 11 Hereby accepted. 12 141. 13 Hereby accepted. 14 139. 15 Hereby accepted. 16 140. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 2 4, 6 and 8. 3 7. 4 13-14 and 16. 5 21-22. 6 22. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The interrogatories were not offered into evidence. See 26. 9 5. 10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The interrogatories were not offered into evidence. 11 27. 12 28. 13 52. 14 57. 15-16 Hereby accepted. 31-32. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent's exhibit 14 was offered and accepted into evidence only for impeachment purposes. Not relevant. 19 14. Hereby accepted. See 32 and 35. Hereby accepted. 23 39-42. 24 Although generally true, the intent of one legislator does not support a finding concerning the intent of the entire Legislature in enacting any law. 25 41. 26 40-42. 27 See 43. 28 44. 29 51. 30 56. 31 See 58. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock was not to raise "numerous complaints regarding the DCA's administration of the CDBG program." 32-36 See 67-72. 37 See 75 and 77-78. The evidence failed to prove that the Meeting was requested by the Respondent to discuss the general administration of the CDBGP. 38 76. 39 85. 40 78. 41 81. 42 79 and 84. 43 87. See 87. Not relevant. See 91. 47 See 87 and 89-90. See 91. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence except as found in 101. See 100-104. 50-51 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Ms. Frohock's sworn statement was hearsay. 52-54 Not relevant. 55 84. 56 Not relevant. 57 See 67-72 and 90-94. 58 124. 59 125. 60 See 120-121. The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 61 See 130-131. 62 112-114. 63 114-115. 64 115. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 118. Not relevant. 67 See 118-119. 68 132. 69 133-134. 70 134. 71 137. 72 137 and 143. 73 See 142. 74 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 51 COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Bonnie J. Williams Craig B. Willis Executive Director Assistant Attorneys General Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Room 2105 The Capitol, Suite 1601 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Tallahassee, FL 32302-0006 Mark Herron, Esquire Jeffrey H. Barker, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson & Moffit 216 South Monroe Street Suite 300 Post Office Box 10555 Tallahassee, FL 32302-2555
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Respondent, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of real estate professionals in Florida. Petitioner was a licensed real estate salesperson in Florida whose license was listed with Horizon Appraisal Service, Inc. in Ft. Myers. In October, 1989, Clyde H. Ward applied to Goldome Realty Credit Corporation for a $40,000.00 fixed rate mortgage on his property located in Ft. Myers. On October 5, 1989, Goldome sent Mr. Ward a commitment letter for a mortgage initially described as a 30 year fixed rate mortgage, but which was, five days later, amended to a 15 year fixed rate mortgage at 10%, conditioned upon, among other things, a satisfactory appraisal. Consistent therewith, Goldome thereafter contacted its regular appraiser in the area, Horizon Appraisal Service, Inc., and requested that an appraisal of the property be accomplished. Horizon assigned the Petitioner, Ms. Wilcox, to conduct the appraisal. The original first page of her report indicated the property was a manufactured house with a crawl space, not situated on a slab. In reality, however, as was noted on the amended first page of the report, as of October 9, 1989, the property was not a manufactured house and was situated on a concrete slab without a crawl space. Goldome denied a fixed rate mortgage to Mr. and Mrs. Ward but offered them a one year adjustable rate mortgage. The Wards accepted this change under protest. A formal denial of the fixed rate mortgage was sent to the Wards on December 18, 1989 by a form which indicated that their application for the fixed rate mortgage had been denied for (1) inadequate collateral, and (2) "we do not grant credit to any applicant on the terms and conditions you request." The "inadequate collateral" basis for denial noted, however, that a mortgage had been offered, accepted and closed with the Wards under an adjustable rate bank loan. On February 16, 1990, Mr. Ward wrote to Goldome expressing his concern over the denial of the fixed rate loan and the basis for denial. In response to Mr. Ward's letter, on March 7, 1990, Mr. Krohe, Goldome's vice president for residential lending, wrote to Mr. Ward and clearly stated that Goldome's denial of the fixed rate mortgage was based on several areas in the appraisal that caused concern. Mr. Krohe specifically pointed out that the fact that the property was described in the appraisal as being a "mobile home" was not the only reason for denial. In his testimony, Mr. Krohe cited several other reasons for denial. One was that the appraiser indicated that the predominant value of homes in the neighborhood was $35,000.00 and Mr. Ward's application was for a mortgage in excess of that. It is Goldome's policy typically to not make a loan in excess of the predominant value since there would be no way to sell the loan in the secondary market. In addition, comments on the appraisal indicated that homes in the area were a mixture of mobile homes and small CBS or frame houses located on paved and graveled roads, and the homes in the neighborhood reflected average maintenance. The zoning classification for the property was MH-3, which permits mobile home use on the property. Further, the room sizes and layout was indicated as "fair to average" and the appraiser pointed out an incurable functional problem with the room layout. This problem related to the fact that the only full bathroom in the house was located between the master bathroom and the second bedroom and could be reached only through one of those rooms. Further, the appraiser indicated there were no recent sales similar to the subject property in the neighborhood and those sales which were comparable were noted to have superior construction and functional utility. Mr. Krohe pointed out that not one of those concerns by itself necessarily would have caused the fixed rate mortgage applied for to be declined. He notes, however, that underwriting is not a science, and all of those reasons combined caused the underwriter to decline the loan. Notwithstanding his receipt of this letter, Mr. Ward filed a complaint with the Division of Real Estate which was referred to Investigator John Harris for inquiry in March, 1990. During the course of his investigation, Mr. Harris spoke only with the Petitioner, Ms. Wilcox, and with Mr. Ward. On or about March 22, 1990, he met with Petitioner at her place of business, Horizon Appraisal Service. During the course of that interview, Ms. Wilcox admitted she had made a mistake on the first page of the appraisal report whereon the property w as described as a manufactured home situated on a crawl space without a slab. She indicated she had corrected the form as soon as she found out about the mistake, occasioned not by a written description but by check marks to pre- printed descriptions which were to be marked if appropriate. The work was done by typewriter, not by pen. Mr. Harris also interviewed Mr. Ward, but did not interview anyone else during his entire investigation even though Ms. Wilcox pointed out that information she had from Ms. Selph and Mr. Krohe indicated that the declination of the loan was not primarily based on this erroneous information. In fact, Ms. Wilcox requested that Mr. Harris contact both Selph and Krohe to verify this but he chose not to do so, relying instead on the information provided to him by Mr. Ward and the March 7, 1990 letter from Krohe to Ward which he interpreted as indicating the denial was based on the description of the property as a "mobile home." That letter does not so indicate, however, and clearly shows that any such classification was not the sole basis for denial of the loan. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Harris considered the fact that Ms. Wilcox admitted to making the mistake as tantamount to an admission of culpable negligence and he recommended that action be taken against her. Thereafter, the matter was referred to a probable cause panel of the Real Estate Commission which, on May 15, 1990, considered the allegations against Ms. Wilcox and, after a review of the file and a presentation by a counsel to the Board, found probable cause. Review of the transcript of the probable cause panel as it relates to Ms. Wilcox reveals that even there, the case was inaccurately described to the panel by its counsel who claims that, "the loan was rejected on the basis of the appraisal which incorrectly described the structure as a manufactured house with a crawl space and no slab." Counsel completely omitted any mention of any of the other bases for denial which were described by Mr. Krohe in his deposition of which the Department was notified but declined to attend, and which could have been determined by an appropriate investigation into the matter. The discussion by the panel members, as documented in the transcript of its meeting, in no way related to the particulars of the alleged misconduct but instead concerned itself primarily with the status of the appraiser. In short, it is clear that the probable cause panel's finding of probable cause was based only on its review of the completely inadequate investigation by Mr. Harris and the slanted comments of the panel's counsel. Nonetheless, an Administrative Complaint was filed against the Petitioner which alleged culpable negligence, breach of trust and misrepresentation and concealment. Prior to the hearing, the Board dismissed the allegation of misrepresentation and concealment. A hearing was conducted on the remaining counts on October 11, 1990 in Ft. Myers before H.O. Parrish. In her Recommended Order dated December 12, 1990, Ms. Parrish concluded that the Department had failed to establish the Respondent committed any misconduct; that Ms. Wilcox had accurately described and evaluated the home within customary ranges; and that the lender verified the reasons for denial of the requested mortgage were not related to the typographical errors pertaining to the type of home, the crawl space, and the slab. Ms. Parrish thereafter recommended a Final Order be entered by the Commission dismissing the Administrative Complaint and such an Order was entered. By Motion dated March 4, 1991, Petitioner's counsel sought reimbursement for the Petitioner of attorney's fees and costs relating to her defense against the allegations made against her in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent has stipulated that the amount claimed for the original representation is reasonable as to both hours claimed and fee per hour. It claims, however, that fees and costs are not reimbursable here because, (1), Petitioner is not a small business entity, and (2), the Division had probable cause to initiate the Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has also submitted an additional affidavit, subsequent to the hearing, in which she claims 7.1 additional hours, at $110.00 per hour, for services rendered subsequent to the final hearing in the original action. Petitioner claims to be an independent contractor to Horizon Appraisal Service, Inc.. She works strictly on commission. She has a desk at the Horizon office and keeps almost all her business information there. She has no other office. She cannot do appraisals for other brokers because she can work for only one broker at a time. She claims to be licensed as an appraiser in Florida but the licensure information on file with the Department of Professional Regulation as of September 4, 1990, reflects she is licensed only as a real estate salesman. By affidavit dated December 6, 1985, and attached to the Independent Contractor Agreement of equal date, Petitioner outlines her working conditions with Horizon. She pays all her own license fees and dues; she is responsible for her own auto and transportation expenses; she pays all her client development costs without reimbursement; she is not required to maintain any set working hours; she takes vacations when she pleases; she is not required to meet any quotas; she receives no minimum salary, sick pay or other fringe benefits; she pays her own income and FICA taxes; and the association with the broker may be terminated by either party at any time. Under the terms of the Agreement referenced above, Petitioner is to get 45% of the fee charged by Horizon for the appraisal done by her. Any lawsuits for the collection of appraisal fees must be maintained only in the name of the Broker, however, since the appraiser is considered to be a subagent. Though the appraiser may conduct the actual appraisal, the Agreement requires that these completed appraisals be submitted to the broker for review, and Mr. Krohe, of Goldome, indicated that his institution would accept only appraisals signed by the broker, not the appraiser. The agreement also stipulates that all clients brought in by the appraiser will result in an additional 10% fee split, and will remain clients of the broker upon termination of the agreement. Notwithstanding the appraiser can take vacations when desired and work when she pleases, she must, however, notify the broker a minimum of two weeks in advance of vacation time and call in on days when she will not be available. The appraiser agrees to a five day turnaround on appraisals, may not solicit listings for the transfer of property other than owned by her, and, significantly, may perform her services only for this broker, Horizon Appraisal Services, Inc.,
The Issue The issues in this protest are whether Respondent's intended action——i.e., deeming Petitioner's application ineligible for funding on the grounds that the amount of capital the applicant's equity proposal states will be invested during construction is insufficient to cover development costs——is contrary to governing statutes, administrative rules, or the specifications of the solicitation; and, if so, whether this erroneous action is contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC is the housing credit agency for the state of Florida whose responsibilities include the awarding of low- income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are distributed pursuant to a competitive process similar to a public procurement that starts with FHFC's issuance of a request for applications.1/ On January 9, 2019, FHFC issued Request for Applications 2019-105 (the "RFA"). Eighteen applications were submitted in response to the RFA on February 6, 2019. A Review Committee was appointed to evaluate the applications and make recommendations to FHFC's Board of Directors (the "Board"). Pursuant to the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, applicants were evaluated on eligibility items and were awarded points for other items. Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.006 provides that "[t]he failure of an Applicant to supply required information in connection with any competitive solicitation . . . shall be grounds for a determination of nonresponsiveness with respect to its Application. If a determination of nonresponsiveness is made by [FHFC], the Application shall be considered ineligible." The RFA sets forth a list of mandatory Eligibility and Point Items that must be included in a response. The RFA expressly provides that "[o]nly Applications that meet all of the Eligibility Items will be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection." As an Eligibility Item, each applicant was required to submit, as part of its application, a Development Cost Pro Forma detailing both the anticipated costs of the proposed development, as well as the anticipated funding sources for the proposed development. In order to demonstrate adequate funding, the Total Construction Sources (including equity proceeds/capital contributions and loans) as shown in the pro forma must equal or exceed the Total Development Costs reflected therein. During the scoring process, if a funding source is not considered or is adjusted downward, then Total Development Costs might wind up exceeding Total Construction Sources, in which event the applicant is said to suffer from a construction funding shortfall (deficit). If an applicant has a funding shortfall, it is ineligible for funding. The Development Cost Pro Forma does not allow applicants to include in their Total Construction Sources any equity proceeds to be paid after construction completion. Instead, the applicant must state only the amount of "Equity Proceeds Paid Prior to Completion of Construction." The pro forma defines "Prior to Completion of Construction" as "Prior to Receipt of a Final Certificate of Occupancy." The RFA requires, as well, that an equity proposal letter be included as an attachment to the application. For a housing credit equity proposal to be counted as a source of financing, it must meet the following criteria: Be executed by the equity provider; Include specific reference to the Applicant as the beneficiary of the equity proceeds; State the proposed amount of equity to be paid prior to construction completion; State the anticipated Eligible Housing Credit Request Amount; State the anticipated dollar amount of Housing Credit allocation to be purchased; and State the anticipated total amount of equity to be provided. (Emphasis added). The Review Committee found 14 applications eligible and four applications ineligible, including the Vistas application. Two applications were recommended for funding: Lincoln Village Apartments and Winchester Place. At a meeting on March 22, 2019, the Board approved the Review Committee's eligibility and funding recommendations. In its application, Vistas requested an allocation of $1,325,000 in housing credits. In formulating its intended action on the RFA, FHFC determined that Vistas is not eligible for an award of housing credits for failing to state in its application that an amount of equity sufficient to cover the anticipated development costs would be invested in the project prior to construction completion. Vistas protests this determination of ineligibility. Due to the limited availability of credits and Vistas' position in the ranking, Winchester Place, a putatively successful applicant, would end up being deselected if FHFC's final agency action were to find Vistas eligible. Thus, Winchester Place has intervened in this proceeding to defend the intended agency action. As Attachment 14 to its application, Vistas submitted an equity proposal letter from RBC Capital Markets ("RBC") executed by David J. Urban (the "Equity Proposal"). In relevant part, the Equity Proposal states: Anticipated Total Equity to be provided: $12,586,241* Equity Proceeds Paid Prior to or simultaneous to closing the construction financing: $2,013,799* (min. 15%) Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion: $7,048,295 Pay-In Schedule: Funds available for Capital Contributions #1: $2,013,799* be paid prior to or simultaneously with the closing of the construction financing. Funds available for Capital Contribution #2 $1,887,936* prior to construction completion. Funds available for Capital Contribution #3 $3,146,560* concurrent with permanent loan closing. Equity Proceeds Paid at Lease Up $4,405,184* Equity Proceeds Paid at 8609 $1,132,762* *All numbers rounded to nearest dollar. The Pay-In Schedule in the Equity Proposal refers to "permanent loan closing" as the moment when Capital Contribution #3 will be made "available." The Equity Proposal does not, however, define or discuss permanent loan closing, and, to the point, does not specify when it is expected to occur. Of potential relevance in this regard is a letter from JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the "Chase Letter"), which is included as Attachment 15 to Vistas' application. Unlike the Equity Proposal, the Chase Letter, if not the last word on the subject, at least sheds some light on the timing of the crucial milestone, i.e., "permanent loan closing." Although the Chase Letter is full of escape clauses and does "not represent a commitment" or "an offer to commit," the document nevertheless outlines the terms for the closing of the proposed construction and permanent loans. The proposed terms call for the payment of a $10,000 Conversion Fee at permanent loan closing and impose preconditions for the conversion from the construction loan to the permanent loan, which include a requirement that there have been "90% economic and physical occupancy for 90 days." No evidence was presented as to the meaning of this language, but the term "physical occupancy" is clear and unambiguous——and it plainly happens after receipt of a final certificate of occupancy, which, under the RFA, is the end point of the construction phase. Winchester Place argues that the Pay-In Schedule casts doubt on whether the entire amount stated in the Equity Proposal's line-item entry for "Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion" ($7,048,295) will be paid before the final certificate of occupancy is issued. According to Winchester Place, the Pay-In Schedule shows that the third capital contribution will be paid after construction completion because the second capital contribution, which is the earlier of the two, is due to occur "prior to construction completion." Thus, Winchester Place contends that Vistas' construction financing sources should be reduced by $3,146,560, thereby creating a construction financing shortfall and rendering the Vistas application ineligible for funding. Winchester Place's argument supports FHFC's intended action but is opposed by FHFC in this proceeding. This turnabout on the part of FHFC is the result of FHFC's intended acceptance, as eligible, of the application that Fountains at King's Pointe Limited Partnership ("Fountains") submitted in response to Request for Applications 2018-110 ("RFA 2018-110"). That proposed agency action is relevant because Fountains had attached to its application an equity proposal letter from RBC whose terms and conditions——other than the dollar amounts and (obviously) the applicant's name——are identical to those of the Equity Proposal for Vistas. During the evaluation of applications under RFA 2018-110, which took place at around the same time as the review of applications pursuant to the RFA at issue here, FHFC's scorer determined that Capital Contribution #3 should be included in the amount of equity proceeds to be paid to Fountains prior to construction completion, with the result that Fountains' application, showing a construction funding surplus, was deemed eligible for funding. The Vistas and Fountains applications, competing in separate solicitations, were scored by different FHFC staff members. The evaluator who scored the financial section of Vistas' application sought advice concerning her interpretation of the Equity Proposal, discussing the matter with FHFC's Director of Multifamily Programs and legal counsel at a reconciliation meeting that occurred before the Review Committee convened; this evaluator encountered no resistance to her plan of making a downward adjustment to Vistas' equity funding. The evaluator of the Fountains application did not likewise discuss her scoring rationale and thus received no input or guidance from FHFC's management. Ultimately, however, because each scoring determination belongs to the Review Committee member herself or himself, inconsistent or conflicting results are possible, as these cases demonstrate. Once in litigation, FHFC discovered that it had reached opposite scoring conclusions based on the same material facts. In this proceeding and in the 2018-110 Protests, FHFC has stressed its desire to take a consistent approach to the identical Equity Proposals. To that end, FHFC has reversed course here and argued that, contrary to its intended action, the Equity Proposal provided by Vistas fully satisfies the requirements of RFA; there is no funding shortfall; and Vistas' application is eligible and should be selected for funding. Deeming Vistas' application eligible would achieve consistency, of course, by giving favorable treatment to the applications of both Fountains and Vistas, which are similarly situated as to the Equity Proposal. Naturally, Winchester Place urges that consistency be found the other way around, through the rejection of both applications, or, alternatively, that the inconsistency be tolerated as the price of affording the agency wide discretion in making scoring decisions. In support of its decision to change positions on Vistas' Equity Proposal, FHFC relies upon the following premises: (i) the Equity Proposal plainly specifies, in the line-item entry for "Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion," the amount to be paid prior to construction completion; (ii) permanent loan closing does not necessarily have to occur after construction completion; and (iii) the information contained in the Pay-In Schedule is not information that is required by the RFA. The disputes arising from the scoring of the Equity Proposal are solvable as matters of law and therefore will be addressed below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order fully implementing its intended action, as no basis for reversal has been established in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, in making an award of a lease for office space, the Respondent acted according to the requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact In February, 1993, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969 ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 18,684 square feet of office space in Jacksonville, Florida, for a period of six years. The space was to house the Office of Disability Determinations ("ODD"), which processes disability claims and determines whether claimants are eligible for Social Security and Supplemental Income benefits. The office has minimal contact with the general public. The RFP provided that all bids were subject to conditions stated within the RFP. Bids not in compliance with RFP conditions were subject to rejection. RFP Article D, General Provisions, Paragraph 8 provides as follows: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids' to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. A pre-bid conference was conducted by the Department on February 16, 1993. Representatives from the vendors involved in this proceeding attended the conference. Bids were opened on March 5, 1993. The Department received five responses, three of which were deemed to be responsive and which were evaluated. The remaining two responses were determined to be nonresponsive and were not evaluated. On or about March 10, 1993, based on the evaluations, the Department proposed to award the bid to Koger Properties, Inc. On or about March 17, 1993, the Department notified the vendors of the intended award. The Petitioners filed timely notices protesting the intended award. TOWNCENTRE PROPOSAL Paragraph 13 sets forth conditions to which a bidder must agree in order to be awarded a bid. Subsection "a" of the paragraph states, "[i]f successful, bidder agrees to enter into a lease agreement on the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form BCM 4054 (Attachment F - Do not complete)." The copy of the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form which was included in the RFP was a poorly reproduced copy. Article III of the Lease Agreement Form provides as follows: III HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING AND JANITOR SERVICES 1.a. The Lessor agrees to furnish to the Lessee heating and air conditioning equipment and maint(illegible) in satisfactory operating condition at all times for the leased premises during the term of the lease at the (illegible) of the Lessor. b. The Lessor agrees to maintain thermostats in the demised premises at 68 degrees Fahrenhe(illegible) the heating season and 78 degrees Fahrenheit during the cooling season; and certifies that boilers the(illegible) been calibrated to permit the most efficient operation. The Lessor agrees to furnish janitorial services and all necessary janitorial supplies for the leased (illegible) during the term of the lease at the expense of the Lessor. All services required above shall be provided during the Lessee's normal working hours, whic(illegible)marily from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding state holidays. Also attached to the RFP was a copy of an addendum to the lease, also poorly reproduced. The addendum provides as follows: Article III, Paragraph III Addendum for Full Service Lease The lessor and lessee mutually agree that the described prem(illegible) leased in this lease agreement shall be available to the department (lessee) for its exclusive use twenty four (24) (illegible) per day, seven (7) days per week during the lease term. T(illegible) space to be leased by the department will be fully occupied during normal working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mo(illegible) through Friday, excluding holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, (illegible) may be fully or partially occupied during all other periods (illegible) time as necessary and required at the full discretion of th(illegible) department. Accordingly, services to be provided by the le(illegible) under the terms of the lease agreement, including electrici(illegible) other utilities, will be provided during all hours of occup(illegible) at no additional cost to the department (lessee). Although the copy of the lease agreement and addendum included in the RFP were poorly reproduced, it is clear that the addendum modifies the paragraph of the lease agreement related to provision of heating, air conditioning and janitorial services to require that HVAC services be provided throughout the premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The proposal submitted by Towncentre included an "Attachment Z" which states as follows: The following represent exceptions and/or clarifications to the terms of the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal Form ("RFP") for the referenced Lease. Except as noted herein, Bidder shall comply fully with the terms of the RFP..." Item #7 of Attachment Z states as follows: The Building in which the space is offered is serviced by central heating, ventilating and air conditioning; therefore, no separate thermostats will be provided in the space other than in the computer room. However, the required temperature standards will be maintained and satisfied. The computer room HVAC shall be available 24 hours a day. Otherwise, after-hours HVAC is billed at $80 per hour. Attachment Z also included additional exceptions to the provisions of the RFP. Contrary to the requirements set forth in the addendum attached to the lease form included in the RFP, the Towncentre proposal included additional charges for after hours uses. The Department determined that the Towncentre proposal was nonresponsive and disqualified the proposal from further consideration. Because the Towncentre proposal includes HVAC charges which are specifically prohibited under the terms of the RFP, the Towncentre proposal is nonresponsive to the RFP. Towncentre asserts that other sections of the RFP indicate that, within the leased premises, only the computer room is required to be heated or cooled on a continuous basis. Vendors had an adequate opportunity to direct questions regarding the RFP to Department officials. There is no evidence that Towncentre sought clarification from the Department related to this matter prior to submitting the bid proposal. In the notification to Towncentre that the bid had been determined to be nonresponsive to the RFP, the Department identified the other exceptions as additional reasons for the determination of nonresponsiveness. At hearing Towncentre introduced no evidence related to the remaining items included within Attachment Z. BRYAN SIMPSON JR. FOR P.V. ASSOCIATES The Simpson bid was deemed to be responsive and was evaluated. The evaluations were performed by three Department employees, Dorea Sowinski, Albert Cherry, and Tom Mahar. On March 9, 1993, the evaluators visited the physical locations of the three responsive bids. (Although the bid had been declared nonresponsive, they also visited the Towncentre site, apparently as a courtesy.) The Simpson space is located in downtown Jacksonville. After completion of the site visits, the evaluators separately and independently completed their evaluation sheets. The evaluators awarded a total of 262 points to Koger Properties and 248 points to Simpson. Page 7 of the RFP sets forth the evaluation criteria which were considered in awarding evaluation points. The RFP stated as follows: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using Present Value methodology for basic term of lease (See D, General Provisions Items 3 and 4) applying the present value discount rate of 5.6 per cent. (Weighing: 35) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 20) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighing: 20) Offers providing contiguous space within preferred boundaries. (Weighing 5) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within one block of the offered space. (Weighing 15) Availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. (Weighing: 2) Proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. (Weighing: 3) Proximity of offered space to other Department activities as well as other public services. (Weighing: 0) TOTAL POINTS: 100 Simpson asserts that the evaluators acted improperly in awarding points in categories 3, 5, 6 and 7. Category 3 relates to the effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Although Simpson asserts that category 3 is vague and ambiguous, there was no objection to the category prior to the submission of the bid responses and the announcement of the proposed lease award. Each evaluator could award up to 20 points in this category for a total of 60 available points. Koger was awarded 55 points. Simpson received 27 points. As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson five points, Albert Cherry awarded Simpson ten points, and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson 12 points. Based on the written memo dated March 10, 1993, identifying the reasons for the recommended bid award, two of the three evaluators considered the Koger space to be located in a safer area than the Simpson facility, and, at least in part, based their point awards on this factor. The two evaluators cite minimal anecdotal information in support of their opinions. The evaluators undertook no investigation related to safety issues and there are no facts to support their opinions. Their award of points for "environmental factors" is arbitrary. Category 5 relates to the frequency and availability of public transportation within one block of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to 15 points in this category for a total of 45 available points. Both Koger and Simpson received the maximum 45 points. RFP Page Two, question 8 provides as follows: Public Transportation availability: BIDDER RESPONSE: (Check appropriate box) Taxi , Bus , Frequency of service closest bus stop . Both Koger and Simpson indicate service by taxi and bus. The Koger proposal indicates a frequency of service as "8 BUSES" and the closest bus stop as "IN FRONT OF BUILDING ON WOODCOCK DRIVE." Simpson indicates a frequency of service as "15 minutes" and the closest bus stop as "front of building." The Department asserts that the Koger level of transportation access, albeit less than that serving the Simpson site, is satisfactory and therefore entitled to an award of all points available. Simpson asserts that the greater availability of public transportation to the Simpson site should result, under the terms of the evaluation criteria, in Simpson receiving more points than the Koger site for this category. The evaluation criteria clearly requires consideration of both the frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation. Simpson asserts that in considering the transportation category, the evaluators should have reviewed local public transportation schedules. Review of such schedules establishes that the Simpson site is served more frequently by public bus transportation than is the Koger site, and further establishes that the number of bus routes directly serving the Simpson property far exceeds the routes serving the Koger site. Simpson did not include the schedules in the RFP response. The Simpson site is also located nearby the downtown public transportation transfer station at which point many, perhaps all, local bus routes connect. Simpson did not denote the location of the transfer station in the RFP response While the evaluation committee is not required to consider the bus schedules in reviewing bid proposals, the evaluation committee failed to consider the substantially greater frequency and availability of public transportation to the Simpson site relative to the Koger site, as set forth in the respective RFPs. The Department's position is contrary to the specific criteria identified in the RFP. The award of equivalent points for transportation access to both Simpson and Koger is unsupported by fact or logic and is arbitrary. Category 6 relates to the availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to two points in this category for a total of six available. Koger was awarded six points. Simpson received one point. When the evaluators rated the adequacy of dining facilities, they considered only those dining facilities which were located within two blocks of the offered space. Such is contrary to the clear terms of the RFP. The Department offered no rationale for the decision to amend the RFP criteria after submission of the proposals. The Simpson RFP response states only that there are adequate dining facilities within walking distance of the offered facility. The Koger response states that there are "three (3) sandwich shops within walking distance in the Koger center and other numerous restaurants within one (1) mile." As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson one point, while both Albert Cherry and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson zero points. Mahar's award was based on his opinion, again based on alleged safety concerns, that employees would be hesitant to walk to nearby restaurants and that driving and parking presented a problem in the downtown location. Cherry voiced a similar opinion. As to alleged safety concerns, Mahar and Cherry again based their opinions on minimal anecdotal information, supported by neither fact nor logic. Neither evaluator undertook any factual analysis of the safety issues relative to the proposed site. Their award of points for this category is arbitrary. On the other hand, Sowinski did not see any restaurants close to the Simpson site during the site visit. In excess of 40 restaurants are located within one mile of the Simpson site. The restaurants provide a variety of dining options both as to expense and fare. Sowinski's failure to observe restaurants located across the street from the Simpson site is, although difficult to understand, apparently a simple mistake on her part. Category 7 relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. Each evaluator could award up to three points in this category for a total of nine available. Simpson offered no evidence that the determination of points awarded for category 7 was inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order DISMISSING the protest filed by Towncentre Venture, and WITHDRAWING the proposed award of lease contract based on the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASES NO. 93-2015BID and 93-2106BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Towncentre Venture Towncentre Venture's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, second sentence is irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected, irrelevant. Taken as a whole, the RFP indicates that HVAC services are to be provided throughout the leased premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The evidence fails to establish that the vendors were confused about the terms of the RFP. There were apparently no related questions addressed to Department personnel during the pre-bid conference or at any time subsequent to the conference and prior to the bid opening. 10. Rejected. Not supported by the document cited which does not identify the attachment by letter. 13. Rejected, irrelevant. The standard form lease included in the RFP was a sample document. None of the blank spaces were completed. 16. Rejected, irrelevant. The attendees at the conference were provided an opportunity to inquire as to all matters. There were apparently no questions asked related to the RFP's requirement that HVAC services be provided throughout the facility during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. 17-18, 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the RFP are clear. 19. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the addendum for full service lease clearly indicate that such HVAC services were to be provided at no additional charge, not just in the computer room, but throughout the entire leased facility. 22. Rejected. The Towncentre bid was nonresponsive to the terms of the RFP. Petitioner Bryan Simpson, Jr., for P. V. Associates P. V. Associates' proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the RFP was issued seeking space for the Jacksonville Office of Disability Determinations. 4, 23, 24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected. The decision to award equivalent points for public transportation access fails to reflect the substantially greater access provided to the Simpson site and is arbitrary. 20-21. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of evidence which establishes no evidence that safety concerns were based on a reasonable evaluation of facts. There are no facts to support the conclusion that the Simpson location if less safe than the Koger site. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Thomas M. Jenks, Esquire Pappas and Metcalf, P.A. 1 Independent Drive, Suite 3301 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Nathan D. Goldman, Esquire Marcia Maria Morales, Esquire 200 Laura Street Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 33202 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (Florida Housing, Corporation, or Respondent) rejection of the funding for the application submitted by Capital Grove Limited Partnership (Capital Grove) was contrary to Florida Housing’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications of Request for Applications 2014-114 (the RFA). If so, whether Florida Housing’s decision to fund the application submitted by HTG Wellington Family, LLC (HTG Wellington), is contrary to governing statutes, rules, policies, or the RFA specifications.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Pursuant to section 420.5099, Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits. The low-income housing tax credit program was enacted by Congress in 1986 to incentivize the private market to invest in affordable rental housing. Tax credits are competitively awarded to applicants in Florida for qualified rental housing projects. Applicants then sell these credits to investors to raise capital (or equity) for their projects, which reduces the debt that the owner would otherwise have to borrow. Because the debt is lower, a tax-credit property can offer lower, more affordable rents. Provided the property maintains compliance with the program requirements, investors receive a dollar-for-dollar credit against their federal tax liability each year over a period of ten years. The amount of the annual credit is based on the amount invested in the affordable housing. Tax credits are made available by the U.S. Treasury to the states annually. Florida Housing is authorized to allocate tax credits and other funding by means of request for proposal or other competitive solicitation in section 420.507(48), and adopted Florida Administrative Code chapter 67-60 to govern the competitive solicitation process for several different programs, including the one for tax credits. Rule 67-60.002(1) defines “Applicant” as “any person or legally-formed entity that is seeking a loan or funding from the Corporation by submitting an application or responding to a competitive solicitation pursuant to this rule chapter for one or more of the Corporation’s programs.” Applicants request in their applications a specific dollar amount of housing credits to be given to the applicant each year for a period of 10 years. Applicants typically sell the rights to that future stream of income tax credits (through the sale of almost all of the ownership interest in the Applicant entity) to an investor to generate the majority of the capital necessary to construct the Development. The amount of housing credits an Applicant may request is based on several factors, including but not limited to a certain percentage of the projected Total Development Cost; a maximum funding amount per development based on the county in which the development will be located; and whether the development is located within certain designated areas of some counties. Florida Housing’s competitive application process for the allocation of tax credits is commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications. In this case, that document is Request for Applications 2014-114 (the RFA). The RFA was issued November 20, 2014, and responses were due January 22, 2015. Capital Grove submitted Application No. 2015-045C in RFA 2014-114 seeking $1,509,500 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of a 94-unit residential rental development in Pasco County (a Medium County), to be known as Highland Grove Senior Apartments. HTG Wellington submitted Application No. 2015-101C seeking $1,510,000 in annual allocation of housing credits to finance the construction of a 110-unit multifamily residential development in Pasco County, Florida, to be known as Park at Wellington Apartments. Florida Housing has announced its intention to award funding to nine Medium County Developments, including Park at Wellington in Pasco County (Application No. 2015-101C), but not Highland Grove Senior Apartments. Florida Housing received 82 applications seeking funding in RFA 2014-114, including 76 for Medium County Developments. The process employed by Florida Housing for this RFA makes it virtually impossible for more than one application to be selected for funding in any given medium county. Because of the amount of funding available for medium counties, the typical amount of an applicant’s housing credit request (generally $1.0 to $1.5 million), and the number of medium counties for which developments are proposed, many medium counties will not receive an award of housing credit funding in this RFA. Florida Housing intends to award funding to nine developments in nine different medium counties. The applications were received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked, pursuant to the terms of RFA 2014-114; Florida Administrative Code chapters 67- 48 and 67-60; and applicable federal regulations. Florida Housing’s executive director appointed a Review Committee of Florida Housing staff to evaluate the applications for eligibility and scoring. Applications are considered for funding only if they are deemed “eligible,” based on whether the application complies with Florida Housing’s various content requirements. Of the 82 applications submitted to Florida Housing in RFA 2014-114, 69 were found “eligible,” and 13 were found ineligible, including Capital Grove. Florida Housing determined that Capital Grove was ineligible on the ground that its Letter of Credit was deficient under the terms of the RFA. A five-page spreadsheet created by Florida Housing, entitled “RFA 2014-114 – All Applications,” identifying all eligible and ineligible applications was provided to all Applicants. In addition to scoring, Applicants received a lottery number to be applied in tie situations, with the lower number given preference. Capital Grove received lottery number 12. HTG Wellington received lottery number 9. On March 11, 2015, the Review Committee met and considered the applications submitted in response to the RFA, and made recommendations regarding the scoring and ranking of the applications to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (the Board). Capital Grove’s Letter of Credit The RFA provides for a Withdrawal Disincentive in which an applicant could either provide a $25,000 check or a $25,000 Letter of Credit that would be forfeited if the application was withdrawn by the applicant before a certain period of time. Applicants so withdrawing would also suffer a deduction from the full developer-experience point total in certain future Requests for Applications issued by Florida Housing. According to specifications in the RFA, any Letter of Credit submitted must be in compliance with all the requirements of subsection 4.a. of Section Three, Procedures and Provisions of the RFA, which provides in pertinent part: 4. $25,000 Letter of Credit. Each Applicant not submitting a $25,000 Application Withdrawal Cash Deposit (as outlined in 3 above) must submit to the Corporation a letter of Credit that meets the following requirements with its Application: a. The Letter of Credit must: Be issued by a bank, the deposits of which are insured by the FDIC, and which has a banking office located in the state of Florida available for presentation of the Letter of Credit. Be on the issuing bank’s letterhead, and identify the bank’s Florida office as the office for presentation of the Letter of Credit. Be, in form, content and amount, the same as the Sample Letter of Credit set out in Item 14 of Exhibit C of the RFA, and completed with the following: Issue Date of the Letter of Credit (LOC) which must be no later than January 22, 2015. LOC number. Expiration Date of the LOC which must be no earlier than January 22, 2016. Issuing Bank’s legal name. Issuing Bank’s Florida Presentation Office for Presentation of the LOC. Florida Housing’s RFA number RFA 2014- 114. Applicant’s name as it appears on the Application for which the LOC is issued. Development name as it appears on the Application for which the LOC is issued. Signature of the Issuing Bank’s authorized signatory. Printed Name and Title of the Authorized Signatory. The Sample Letter of Credit included in Exhibit C, Item 14 of the RFA reads: (Issuing Bank’s Letterhead) Irrevocable Unconditional Letter of Credit To/Beneficiary: Florida Housing Finance Corporation Issue Date: [a date that is no later than January 22, 2015] Attention: Director of Multifamily Programs 227 N. Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Letter of Credit No.: Expiration Date: [a date that is no earlier than January 22, 2016] Issuing Bank: Florida Presentation Office: FHFC RFA # 2014-114 Applicant: Development: Gentlemen: For the account of the Applicant, we, the Issuing Bank, hereby authorize Florida Housing Finance Corporation to draw on us at sight up to an aggregate amount of Twenty- Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00). This letter of credit is irrevocable, unconditional, and nontransferable. Drafts drawn under this letter of credit must specify the letter of credit number and be presented at our Florida Presentation Office identified above not later than the Expiration Date. Any sight draft may be presented to us by electronic, reprographic, computerized or automated system, or by carbon copy, but in any event must visibly bear the word “original.” If the document is signed, the signature may consist of (or may appear to us as) an original handwritten signature, a facsimile signature or any other mechanical or electronic method of authentication. Payment against this letter of credit may be made by wire transfer of immediately available funds to the account specified by you, or by deposit of same day funds in a designated account you maintain with us. Unless we notify you in writing at least thirty (30) days prior to the Expiration Date, the Expiration Date of this letter of credit must be extended automatically for successive one-month periods. This letter of credit sets forth in full the terms of our obligations to you, and such undertaking shall not in any way be modified or amplified by any agreement in which this letter is referred to or to which this letter of credit relates, and any such reference shall not be deemed to incorporate herein by reference any agreement. We engage with you that sight drafts drawn under, and in compliance with, the terms of this letter of credit will be duly honored at the Presentation Office. We are an FDIC insured bank, and our Florida Presentation Office is located in Florida as identified above. Yours very truly, [Issuing Bank] By Print Name Print Title Despite these requirements, Capital Grove submitted an “Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit” issued by PNC Bank National Association (PNC). Capital Grove’s Letter of Credit provides, in pertinent part: Beneficiary: Applicant: Florida Housing Finance Westbrook Housing Corp. Corp. Development, LLC 4110 Southpoint Blvd., 227 North Bronough Street Ste 206 Suite 5000 Jacksonville, Fl 32216 Tallahassee, Fl 32301 ATTENTION: DIR. OF MULTI- FBO CAPITAL GROVE FAMILY PROGRAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IRREVOCABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT OUR REFERENCE: 18123166-00-00 AMOUNT: USD $25,000.00 ISSUE DATE: JANUARY 20, 2015 EXPIRY DATE: JANUARY 22, 2016 EPIRY PLACE: OUR COUNTER RE: FHFC RFA #2014-114 DEVELOPMENT: HIGHLAND GROVE SENIOR APARTMENTS GENTLEMEN: WE HEREBY ESTABLISH OUR IRREVOCABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT NO. 18123166-00-000 IN FAVOR OF FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION FOR THE ACCOUNT OF WESTBROOK HOUSING DEVELOPMENT LLC AVAILABLE FOR PAYMENT AT OUR COUNTERS IN AN AMOUNT OF USD $25,000.00 (TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND AND 00/100 UNITED STATES DOLLARS) AGAINST BENEFICIARY'S PURPORTEDLY SIGNED STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS: "I (INSERT NAME AND TITLE) CERTIFY THAT I AM AN AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND HEREBY DEMAND PAYMENT OF USD (INSERT AMOUNT) UNDER PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION LETTER OF CREDIT NO. 18123166-00-000. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT WESTBROOK HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, LLC HAS FAILED TO COMPLY UNDER THE PROJECT NAME: HIGHLAND GROVE SENIOR APARTMENTS BETWEEN FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND WESTBROOK HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, LLC." Ken Reecy, Director of Multifamily Programs for Florida Housing, personally reviewed all Letters of Credit submitted by RFA applicants, and reported his findings to the Review Committee. The Review Committee recommended finding Capital Grove’s application nonresponsive and ineligible for funding because Capital Grove failed to include a responsive Letter of Credit. The Review Committee also found four other applications ineligible for failing to meet the Letter of Credit requirements, all of which used PNC Bank and involved entities related to Capital Grove, including Westbrook Housing Development, LLC, appearing as Co-Developer. All such PNC Letters of Credit failed for the same reasons. Mr. Reecy and the Review Committee found that the Letters of Credit from PNC Bank (including that submitted by Capital Grove) did not meet the facial requirements of the RFA, in that the Letters of Credit were not in the name of the applicant. The General Partner of the applicant, Capital Grove Limited Partnership, is Capital Grove GP, LLC. The Co-Developer entities are JPM Development, LLC, and Westbrook Housing Development, LLC. Co-Developer Westbrook Housing Development, LLC, a Michigan Company authorized to conduct business within the State of Florida, is a different legal entity from Co-Developer JPM Development, LLC. Mr. Reecy and the Review Committee also found the PNC Letters of Credit (including that submitted by Capital Grove) nonresponsive to the specification of the RFA because the Letters included a condition requiring Florida Housing, in order to draw on the Letter of Credit, to certify that the Co- Developer (and not the applicant) had “failed to comply under the project name: Highland Grove Senior Apartments.” However, under the RFA specifications, the action that is the basis for the presentment of the Letter of Credit is a withdrawal of the application by the applicant, not the developer. Only an applicant may withdraw an application. If the Letter of Credit cannot be drawn upon, the RFA provides that the applicant, “shall be responsible for the payment of the $25,000 to the Corporation; payment shall be due from the applicant to the Corporation within 10 calendar days following written notice from the Corporation.” Applicant Capital Grove is a single-purpose entity that has no assets. In order to collect on the Letter of Credit submitted by Capital Grove, Florida Housing would have to submit a different certification than that called for under the RFA sample letter of credit. According to Kathleen Spiers, Vice President of PNC Bank, to draw down the Letter of Credit, Florida Housing would have to copy the statement outlined in paragraph 2 of the Capital Grove Letter of Credit, sign it, and submit it to PNC to draw upon the letter of credit. At the final hearing, Mr. Reecy testified, “I am not prepared to certify to something that isn’t true. I am not going to certify that the developer didn’t comply by the Applicant withdrawing.” All other Letters of Credit submitted by applicants under this RFA were accepted as responsive. HTG Wellington’s Unit Count HTG Wellington indicated in its application to Florida Housing that its proposed Park at Wellington Development would be 110 multifamily units. In its application for Local Government Support, HTG Wellington described the Development as a 120-unit, multifamily development in five three-story buildings. The RFA requires a minimum $50,000 Local Government Contribution in Pasco County for an applicant to receive the maximum of five points. In order to obtain a Local Government Contribution, tax credit developers must submit an application to Pasco County at least six weeks before the matter is presented to the Board of County Commissioners for approval. Pasco County, in turn, has their underwriter, Neighborhood Lending Partners ("NLP"), organize the applications and create an underwriting package. NLP does not make a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners for funding. Rather, NLP alerts Pasco County if there is a red flag concerning the Development and scores the applications based upon financial stability of the organization, financing of the project, and the development pro forma. HTG Wellington submitted an application for Local Government Contribution to Pasco County in November 2014. The application contemplated a 120-unit development. Impact fees schedules are adopted by the Pasco County Board of Commissioners. Pasco County has established an impact fee rate for affordable and non-affordable development and the difference between the two is multiplied by the number of units to determine the impact fee amount. The impact fee waiver amount approved for Park at Wellington Apartments was $219,600. This amount was calculated based upon 120 units contemplated in November 2014, multiplied by $1830.00, which is the difference between the normal impact fee rate, minus the rate for affordable housing development. The $219,600 figure was used in HTG Wellington’s application. At 110 units (as opposed to 120 units), the total Local Government Contribution available to HTG Wellington is $201,300. Either amount ($219,600 or $201,300) meets the minimum for HTG Wellington to receive five points for its Local Government Contribution. The change in the contribution amount would have no effect on the scoring of the HTG Wellington application. Pasco County’s Manager of Community Development and Officer of Community Development, George Romagnoli, testified that for approximately 15 years, Pasco County has employed a strategy to approve all applications for Local Government Contribution and then let Florida Housing choose which Development will receive tax credits. Pasco County is not concerned about the ultimate accuracy of the number of units submitted for a Contribution –- as stated by Mr. Romagnoli: "We funded 84, 120, whatever. It's really not material to the approval one way or the other." Although Florida Housing approved HTG Wellington’s application before discovering the discrepancy, had Florida Housing discovered the discrepancy in the number of units during the scoring process, the discrepancy would have been deemed a minor irregularity unless the discrepancy resulted in a change in scoring or otherwise rendered the application nonresponsive as to some material requirement and the discrepancy would generally be handled with a simple adjustment to the amount presented on the application Pro Forma, if necessary. Additionally, changes to the number of units in a development may be increased (but not decreased) under certain circumstances during the credit underwriting process which follows the competitive solicitation process. The discrepancy in the number of units does not provide any competitive advantage to HTG Wellington. The discrepancy in the number of units does not provide a benefit to HTG Wellington not enjoyed by others. Florida Housing’s waiver of the discrepancy in the number of units does not adversely impact the interests of the public. HTG Wellington’s Bus Stop The RFA allows an applicant to obtain 18 proximity points, including six points for a Public Bus Transfer Stop. Florida Housing awarded HTG Wellington 4.5 proximity points for its purported Public Bus Transfer Stop. The RFA defines a Public Bus Transfer Stop as: This service may be selected by all Applicants, regardless of the Demographic Commitment selected at question 2 of Exhibit For purposes of proximity points, a Public Bus Transfer Stop means fixed location at which passengers may access at least three routes of public transportation via buses. Each qualifying route must have a scheduled stop at the Public Bus Transfer Stop at least hourly during the times of 7 am to 9 am and also during the times of 4 pm to 6 pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays on a year-round basis. This would include both bus stations (i.e. hub) and bus stop with multiple routes. Bus routes must be established or approved by a Local Government department that manages public transportation. Buses that travel between states will not be considered. In response to this requirement HTG Wellington submitted a Surveyor Certification Form which lists coordinates submitted to qualify for a Public Bus Transfer Stop. The site identified by HTG Wellington as a Public Bus Transfer Stop, however, is not a fixed location where passengers may access at least three routes of public transportation. While another bus stop which serves an additional two routes is within 700 feet, stops cannot be combined for purposes of the RFA. Therefore, the site designated as a Public Bus Transfer Stop by HTG Wellington is not a “fixed location” for purposes of the RFA and HTG Wellington is not entitled to obtain proximity points for a Public Bus Transfer Stop. Not including the 4.5 proximity points for a Public Bus Transfer Stop, HTG was awarded 11.5 total proximity points for selected Community Services. The required minimum total of proximity points for developments located in a medium county that must be achieved in order to be eligible to receive the maximum amount of 18 points as set forth in the RFA is 9. HTG had more than the required minimum total of proximity points to receive the maximum award of 18 proximity points based on its Community Services score alone. The disqualification of HTG’s submitted Public Bus Transfer Stop would have no effect on the scoring or ranking of the HTG Wellington application, nor affect its ranking relative to any other application, nor affect the ultimate funding selection. The RFA requires each applicant to read and sign at Attachment A, an Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement Form (the Form). The signing of the Form is mandatory. Page 5, Paragraph 8 of the Form provides: In eliciting information from third parties required by and/or included in this Application, the Applicant has provided such parties information that accurately describes the Development as proposed in this Application. The Applicant has reviewed the third party information included in this Application and/or provided during the credit underwriting process and the information provided by any such party is based upon, and accurate with respect to, the Development as proposed in this Application. Even though there was a discrepancy in the unit numbers submitted to Pasco County for a Local Government Contribution and its application submitted in response to the RFA, HTG signed the Form. No evidence was submitted indicating that HTG signed the Form with knowledge of the discrepancy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order: Rejecting Capital Grove’s application as nonresponsive and denying the relief requested in its Petition; Concluding that Capital Grove lacks standing to bring allegations against HTG Wellington; and, Upholding Florida Housing’s scoring and ranking of the HTG Wellington application. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2015.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint, and if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Allison Kay Werner (Respondent) was licensed by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Petitioner) as a life and variable annuity contracts and life insurance agent. She was issued license number 106486443 in 1989. Prior to being licensed in Florida, in or around 1981 Respondent was a licensed agent in the State of New York. On February 15, 1991, Ms. Estelle Lewis went to the California Federal Bank (Bank), located at 4601 Sheridan Street, Hollywood, Florida, to redeem a $10,000 Certificate of Deposit (CD) which had matured. Ms. Lewis was 81 years old. Also, she was unemployed even though, in her earlier years, she worked. Through the years, Ms. Lewis engaged in short term, two year investments, not long term investments. Nor did she invest in annuities for her belief was that annuities were for young people who are planning towards retirement. Being a senior citizen and unemployed, Ms. Lewis needed her money for income, using the proceeds from her investments as income. She did not want to tie-up her money for long periods of time. Ms. Lewis approached the teller at the Bank to redeem her CD. The teller referred Ms. Lewis to Respondent to discuss re-investing her money. It was not unusual for a teller at the Bank to refer a Bank customer to Respondent. Also, at times, Bank employees assisted with scheduling appointments with Respondent. Respondent's office was located inside the Bank, within a glass enclosure, and could be seen from the teller's location. A sign identified Respondent's office as Kemper-Invest Financial Corporation for which Respondent was a representative. Respondent provided Ms. Lewis with her business card which only identified Respondent as an Invest Financial Corporation (Invest) representative located at the Bank. No where on the business card was Respondent identified as an insurance agent. No where on the business card were the terms "insurance" or "annuity." Furthermore, Respondent did not inform Ms. Lewis that she was an insurance agent. Ms. Lewis trusted the Bank and her trust extended to Respondent even though Ms. Lewis understood that Respondent was a representative of Invest and not employed by the Bank. Because the Bank teller had referred Ms. Lewis to Respondent and because Respondent's office was located within the Bank, Ms. Lewis believed that Respondent had a connection with the Bank. Without this trust, Ms. Lewis would not have engaged in any business with Respondent. Ms. Lewis informed Respondent that she wanted a two year investment. Respondent was not unfamiliar with discussing investments with senior citizens for most of her clients were age 70 and above. Ms. Lewis agreed upon a two year investment at a return of eight percent. Unbeknownst to Ms. Lewis, she had invested in an annuity which would mature in 20 years. The annuity also had an investment time of seven years, which meant that the annuity could be surrendered without a surrender charge in its seventh year. The maximum issuance age for the annuity was 85 which meant that anyone up to age 85 could purchase the annuity. That same day, February 15, 1991, Respondent completed an account application for the investment, which included writing Ms. Lewis' responses to questions on the application which included Ms. Lewis' age and date of birth. Respondent submitted the application to Ms. Lewis for her review. Ms. Lewis skimmed the application only for responses that she felt were important, i.e., her name and social security number. Finding those items correct, she signed the account application. No where on the account application were the terms "life insurance" or an "annuity" mentioned. Invest Financial Corporation and Kemper Fiancial Services were clearly displayed on the application. Also, the investment objective indicated on the application was growth instead of income. An application for an annuity, referred to as the All Savers Plan on the application, was also completed on that same date. However, this application contained the terms life insurance and annuity. Believing that life insurance or an annuity did not apply to her since neither were requested and were not agreed upon, Ms. Lewis signed this second application. Additionally, on February 15, 1991, Ms. Lewis gave Respondent the $10,000 and Respondent provided Ms. Lewis a receipt for the $10,000. The receipt contained a notation that the money was received for "Kemper All Savers." Invest and Kemper Financial Services were displayed on the receipt. No where on the receipt were the terms annuity or life insurance. As with other annuities sold by Respondent, she received a commission for the annuity that she sold Ms. Lewis. Paying commissions to insurance agents for annuities sold is a common practice. Subsequently, Ms. Lewis received an undated letter of thanks from Respondent for obtaining the services of Invest. The letter was on Invest letterhead, with Kemper Financial Services indicated on it. Additionally, on the letter Respondent identified herself as an Invest representative. The letter made no mention of what services Ms. Lewis had obtained or of life insurance or an annuity. Further, Ms. Lewis received two letters dated February 20, 1991 and February 28, 1991 from Kemper. The letters were on "Kemper Investors Life Insurance Company" letterhead and referenced Ms. Lewis' investment as an annuity. Ms. Lewis did not believe that the two letters applied to her since she had not purchased an annuity or life insurance. Consequently, she ignored the letters. Ms. Lewis received a copy of the annuity policy in the mail but did not read it. She filed it away with the rest of her documents associated with the transaction. Ms. Lewis received account summaries regarding her investment. The summaries indicated that they reflected the activity for an annuity called Kemper All Savers Annuity and that they were from the Kemper Investors Life Insurance Company. The summaries showed the performance of her investment. Ms. Lewis ignored the summaries as reflecting activities for an annuity in which she had invested. She continued to believe that she had not invested in an annuity. On or about February 15, 1993, approximately two years after the transaction, Ms. Lewis returned to Respondent's office located in the Bank to redeem her investment. At that time, Ms. Lewis was informed by Respondent that a penalty fee of $525.89 would be assessed for early withdrawal. Respondent advised Ms. Lewis further that she had an annuity which could be cashed-in at no penalty (no surrender charges) after seven years. The meeting on February 15, 1993, was the first time that Ms. Lewis was informed of a penalty by Respondent. Also, the meeting was the first time that Respondent had informed Ms. Lewis that she had purchased an annuity and that the annuity was a seven year investment. Ms. Lewis did not want to wait the additional years to avoid the penalty and insisted on surrendering what she knew now to be an annuity. Subsequently, Ms. Lewis received her $10,000 plus interest less the penalty. Respondent has vast experience in annuities. She has sold annuities since around 1981 when she was employed with Merrill Lynch and Shearson in New York. At all times material hereto, Ms. Lewis had no mental or physical infirmity which interfered with her mental capacity to think and understand. At all times material hereto, Ms. Lewis could read and write. Ms. Lewis has never been offered restitution or a refund of the penalty.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order suspending the license of Allison Kay Werner for one-year. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)2., (j), and (m), Florida Statutes (2005),1 by allegedly engaging in financial mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer, abandoning a construction project, or committing misconduct or incompetence in the practice of contracting.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of contracting in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a certified general contractor pursuant to license number CGC59204. Respondent is the qualifier of South West Florida Development Corporation (South West) doing business as Back Bay Homes (Back Bay). On February 7, 2006, Respondent executed a contract with Gail and Gary Veith to build a residential home on a vacant lot located at 3218 Southwest 11th Place, Cape Coral, Florida. The contract price was $276,983.00 (the initial contract). The initial contract provided for the construction of a sea wall at a cost of $17,257.00 in addition to the contract price of $276,983.00. On February 7, 2006, Respondent entered into a second contract with Mr. and Mrs. Veith. The only difference between the initial and second contracts was the contract price of each contract. The second contract price was $289,686.00, excluding the sea wall cost of $17,257.00. Mr. and Mrs. Veith secured payment of the construction project with a construction loan from Market Street Mortgage Corporation (Market Street) in the original approximate amount of $412,000.00. The total loan amount was intended to be sufficient to cover the second contract price of $289,686.00 and the amount contracted by Mr. and Mrs. Veith for acquisition of the vacant lot (construction site), which was $128,000.00.2 Clear and convincing evidence shows that Respondent engaged in financial mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to his customers in violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(g)2. Clear and convincing evidence also shows that Respondent committed incompetence and mismanagement in the practice of contracting. The percentage of completion of the residence, which was zero, was less than the percentage of the contract price paid to Respondent, which was 29 percent. Respondent received approximately $84,655.00 in construction loan proceeds from Market Street in two draws. Market Street paid the first draw at closing on May 5, 2006, in the amount of $42,901.20 and paid the second draw to Respondent on June 26, 2006, in the amount of $41,754.00. However, Respondent never commenced construction of the residence. Respondent reported a profit of $48,637.72 on the Veith property and completed only the sea wall at a cost of $17,257.00. Respondent paid the cost of the sea wall and other expenses on the Veith property to keep the net profit at $48,637.72. Other expenses included $420.00 for surveys, $34.34 for blue prints, $1,707.75 for plan drafts, $350.00 for septic engineering, and $3,138.19 for construction loan interest. Respondent was not entitled by the terms of the contract to retain the funds paid to Respondent by Market Street. The loan agreement provided that draws were to be made at the discretion of Market Street based on work completed and materials incorporated into improvements. Respondent never commenced construction of the residence. Respondent did not obtain permits for the job. Mr. Winston testified that when Market Street transferred a single, lump sum deposit to his company in the amount of $41,754.00 on June 26, 2006, he did not know that he was appropriating funds he was not entitled to under the contract. When that testimony is weighed against evidence that the work Mr. Winston had performed was limited to a sea wall costing only $17,257.00, the testimony is persuasive evidence to the trier of fact that Respondent engaged in mismanagement.3 Respondent billed Market Street for payment of the sea wall when Respondent completed the sea wall. However, the draw schedule in the loan documents does not provide a draw payment for the sea wall. Respondent stopped paying construction interest that Respondent was obligated to pay under the terms of the construction loan. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Veith paid construction interest of approximately $13,800.00. Clear and convincing evidence shows that Respondent abandoned the construction project within the meaning of Subsection 489.129(1)(j). Respondent failed to perform any work on the residence for 90 consecutive days without just cause. Respondent did not notify Mr. and Mrs. Veith that Respondent had abandoned the project. Rather, Mr. and Mrs. Veith started receiving requests for payment of construction loan interest. Respondent failed to conduct any construction activity on the project site for more than 90 consecutive days. On May 13, 2008, Mr. and Mrs. Veith received notice that their loan had been assigned from Market Street to Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Company (Gulf Coast). Gulf Coast sent Mr. and Mrs. Veith repeated demands for payment of the construction loan principal and interest. Mr. and Mrs. Veith entered into a transaction identified in the record as a "short sale" in which they sold the construction site, which they originally purchased for $128,000.00, for $20,000.00. The $20,000.00 sale proceeds were paid to Gulf Coast. Mr. and Mrs. Veith have been financially unable to make payments to Gulf Coast. They remain liable for the full amount of the loan, including delinquent principal and interest. Mr. and Mrs. Veith brought a civil action against Respondent. They were unable to sustain the action because they could not afford the attorney fees. Petitioner incurred investigative costs in this matter of $204.26. The investigative costs do not include attorney time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint; imposing the fines enumerated in paragraph 24 of this Recommended Order; requiring Respondent to pay investigative costs in the amount of $204.26; and requiring Respondent to make full restitution to Mr. and Mrs. Veith in the amount of $61,747.72. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2010.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, Construction Industries Recovery Fund ("Respondent"), should reimburse Petitioners for damages caused by a contractor.
Findings Of Fact 1. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for processing claims against it pursuant to Sections 489.140 through 489.143. Petitioners are natural persons within the meaning of Section 489.140(1). Except for the matters to be determined in this proceeding, Petitioners are otherwise eligible to seek recovery from Respondent within the meaning of Section 489.141. Initial Agreement On June 10, 1993, Petitioners entered into a written contract of sale with Klingshirn & Associates, Inc. ("Klingshirn") to construct a home at 6617 Southfork, Titusville, Florida (the "initial agreement"). The total purchase price was $134,000. The home was to be completed by November 24, 1993. The initial agreement required Petitioners to pay $24,000 of the total purchase price from their own funds3 and to make a good faith effort to obtain financing for the remaining $110,000. If Petitioners were unable to obtain financing, Klingshirn reserved the option to provide financing. The terms of financing were prescribed in paragraph 3 of the initial agreement. Paragraph 3 stated: . . . MORTGAGE PROVISION . . . within five (5) days [Petitioners] will make a good faith application with . . . a lender approved by [Klingshirn] for a mortgage loan in the amount set forth above at the prevailing interest rate not to exceed 8 1/2% 30 year and terms of the lender as of closing. If [Petitioners are] not approved for the mortgage within 30 days or any extension [Klingshirn gives them], or if [Petitioners] application is rejected, [Klingshirn] can either provide [Petitioners] with the mortgage on the same terms and conditions as the lender [Petitioners] applied with, or (ii) refund [Petitioners] deposits . . . and terminate this contract. . . . Petitioners and Klingshirn changed the printed text in the initial agreement. They struck through the phrase, "at the prevailing interest rate," and inserted the phrase, "not to exceed 8 1/2% 30 year." Condition Precedent A condition precedent is one which calls for the performance of some act, or the happening of some event, after a contract is entered into upon the performance or happening of which an obligation to perform depends.4 The initial agreement was subject to a condition precedent by its express terms and by oral agreement. The express terms of the initial agreement made the agreement subject to a condition precedent. Petitioners' obligation to perform was expressly dependent on the procurement of financing for $110,000, over a 30 year term, at an interest rate not to exceed 8 1/2 percent per annum. Even if the initial agreement were not expressly subject to a condition precedent, it was subject to such a condition by oral agreement. Prior to and at the time that Klingshirn and Petitioners signed the initial agreement, Petitioners and Klingshirn agreed that the initial agreement would become operative only upon the occurrence of financing. Even if the initial agreement were not subject to a condition precedent, the requisite financing was part of a contemporaneous oral agreement that induced Petitioners to enter into the initial agreement. There was no mutual intent for Petitioners to be obligated unless they procured the prescribed financing from either a commercial lender or Klingshirn. Construction Contract The condition precedent to the initial agreement was never satisfied. The initial agreement never became operative. On July 7, 1993, Petitioners obtained a financing commitment from Harbor Federal Savings & Loan Association in Fort Pierce, Florida ("Harbor"). Harbor agreed to provide financing for $105,000 rather than the $110,000 prescribed in the initial agreement. Petitioners agreed to increase their cash investment. On August 4, 1993, Petitioners and Klingshirn executed a Construction Loan Agreement for $105,000 (the "construction loan agreement"). The construction loan agreement stated: [Klingshirn] hereby . . . agrees to the terms and conditions of the [construction loan], and further agrees that where the [construction loan] conflicts with the terms and provisions of any construction contract existing with Borrower, that the [construction loan] shall control. Petitioners executed the construction loan agreement as borrowers. Klingshirn executed the builder's assent to the construction loan agreement. On August 4, 1993, Petitioners and Klingshirn executed a construction contract within the meaning of Section 489.141(1)(a) (the "construction contract"). The construction contract included the construction loan agreement and those terms in the initial agreement which did not conflict with the construction loan agreement and which Petitioners and Klingshirn adopted when they executed the construction contract.5 The construction contract was executed after July 1, 1993. It controlled the construction of Petitioners' home until it was modified on December 9, 1993. On December 9, 1993, Petitioners agreed to extend the completion date to March, 1994. Klingshirn agreed to repair specified defects and to increase the landscaping allowance. Mismanagement And Misconduct Petitioners did not know that Klingshirn was a corporation engaged in contracting without a qualifying agent in violation of Section 489.119. Mr. Michael R. Harvey, a financially responsible officer of Klingshirn and one of its employees, was licensed as a certified building contractor (the "contractor" or "licensee"). However, the contractor neglected to qualify Klingshirn. The contractor illegally used his license to obtain the necessary building permit on behalf of Klingshirn. He procured the building permit in his own name on August 27, 1993. The contractor knowingly violated Section 489.129. He committed mismanagement and misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to Petitioners in the amount of $58,534.46. The contractor failed to ensure that the home was constructed according to either the plans and specifications of the project or the Southern Building Code. He also failed to remedy the violations. The contractor failed to satisfy subcontractor liens after Petitioners gave him the funds to do so. He obtained at least three draws of unspecified amounts from Harbor. The contractor abandoned the job. He failed to perform work without just cause for over 90 consecutive days when the percentage of completion was less than the total contract price paid to him at the time of abandonment. The project was not completed on November 24, 1993. On December 9, 1993, Petitioners and Klingshirn entered into an Addendum to the initial agreement. The Addendum extended the completion date to March, 1994. The contractor failed to meet the extended deadline. On April 4, 1994, construction ceased. On April 14, 1994, the contractor removed himself and his license from the project. Final Order On August 11, 1995, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed an Administrative Complaint against the contractor alleging violations of Sections 489.129(d), (h), and (k). The Construction Industry Licensing Board (the "Board") entered a Final Order on January 16, 1996. The Final Order found the contractor guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. The Board directed the licensee to pay restitution to Petitioners in an unspecified amount based on violations of Sections 489.129(d), (h), and (k) that occurred on or after July 1, 1993. Civil Action On October 23, 1995, Petitioners filed a civil action against the contractor. Petitioners filed the civil action in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County, Florida. Daniel J. Johnson and Doris S. Johnson v. Michael R. Harvey, Case Number 95-16601-CA-F. On December 1, 1995, the contractor filed a Suggestion of the Pendency of Bankruptcy in the civil case. On November 25, 1994, the contractor had filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida. In Re: Michael R. Harvey, Debtor, Case Number 94-11514-8B7. On March 8, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Discharge of Debtor Order. On December 1, 1995, the bankruptcy trustee notified Petitioners that no assets were available for distribution from the bankruptcy estate except exempt assets. Claim Against Respondent On March 29, 1996, Petitioners filed a claim against Respondent. On June 13, 1996, the Construction Industries Recovery Fund Committee (the "Committee") denied the claim. The Committee determined that Petitioners are required by law to execute a construction contract on or after July 1, 1993, to recover from Respondent. The Committee found that Petitioners executed the required contract on June 10, 1993. On June 14, 1996, the Board ratified the Committee's action. The Board entered a Final Order on August 20, 1996. Payment To Respondent Petitioners paid money to Respondent in statutorily prescribed amounts through a surcharge of one-half cent per square foot of the project. The surcharge is imposed pursuant to Sections 489.140(2) and 468.631. Petitioners received no reimbursement from Respondent. Nor did Petitioners receive restitution from the licensee.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and thereinGRANT Petitioners' claim for recovery against Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1997.
The Issue The issue for determination at formal hearing was whether proposed amendments to Rule 4J-2.002, Florida Administrative Code, are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact An admitted or authorized insurance company is a foreign insurance company which is licensed to do business in its home state and another state which is Florida in the case at hand, or is a domestic insurance company licensed to do business in its home state, here Florida. Examples of such insurance companies are Hartford, Travelers and USF&G. A non-admitted or surplus lines insurance company writes coverage for risks which are not normally written by admitted companies. An example of such a company is Lloyd's of London. A risk is eligible to be placed with a surplus lines insurer if, after diligent effort, the full amount of insurance required to cover the risk cannot be placed with admitted insurers, if the rate offered is not less than or broader than that offered by the admitted insurers, and if the policy offered is not more favorable to the insurer than those offered by admitted insurers which actually write similar coverages on similar risks. The surplus lines' premium is usually higher than the admitted insurer's premium. If an insurance agent is unable to place a risk with either an admitted insurer or a surplus lines insurer, the agent can certify the inability to the Market Assistance Plan (MAP) and request assistance from MAP in placing the risk, which has access to all admitted and surplus lines brokers doing business in Florida. MAP was legislatively created to assist those who are unable to obtain property or casualty insurance and is comprised of all insurers licensed to do business in Florida. The Florida Legislature also created the Florida Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (FPCJUA) to provide coverage for certain risks when the risk cannot be placed in the admitted market, the surplus lines market and MAP, i.e., the voluntary market. The FPCJUA is a residual market or market of last resort. It is comprised of all insurers licensed by the State of Florida to write property and casualty insurance coverage in Florida. After the devastation to Florida from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the premiums for commercial residential coverage greatly increased and became virtually unaffordable. However, coverage was possible if an applicant could afford the premiums being charged. Commercial residential coverage became a hard market which meant that it was hard to obtain insurance for such coverage. Attempting to address the dilemma involving insurance coverage of commercial residential property, in the November 1993 Special Session, the Florida Legislature specifically activated temporary coverage under the Joint Underwriters Association (JUA) for commercial residential properties, i.e., condominium associations, apartment buildings, common elements of homeowners associations and other commercial coverages of residences. As of May 1994, the JUA had not written any coverages for commercial residential properties. Out of approximately 300 to 400 admitted insurance companies in Florida qualified to write commercial residential coverage, only two to five were writing such coverage after Hurricane Andrew. In May 1994, the Department of Insurance by emergency order directed the JUA to write coverages for commercial residential properties under specified guidelines. Without the emergency order, the JUA would not have written coverages for such properties because coverage was being written even though it was being done by only two to five admitted insurance companies and even though the premiums were virtually unaffordable. Finally, the Department of Insurance resorted to a more enduring remedy by seeking to amend Rule 4J-2.002, Florida Administrative Code, to address the dilemma of coverage for commercial residential properties. Foremost, the proposed amendments would modify the FPCJUA's Plan of Operation by temporarily making the coverage for commercial residential property automatically eligible for the FPCJUA without first seeking coverage from the voluntary market. This change would, therefore, transform the FPCJUA, as far as coverage for commercial residential property is concerned, into a market of first resort instead of last resort. Secondly, the proposed amendments would provide for specific deductibles for such coverage. And thirdly, the proposed amendments would provide for the FPCJUA to conduct periodic surveys regarding premiums for such coverage to determine if rates should be adjusted. Standing is not an issue in this proceeding.
