The Issue Whether Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 457, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) and is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within FREC’s jurisdiction. At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate broker, license number 684990, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker at Florida’s Best Buy Realty & Mortgage Lender, LLC, Post Office Box 551, Winter Park, Florida 32793. On or about February 15, 2007, Respondent entered into a contract to manage the single-family dwelling owned by Jacqueline Danzer. The property is located at 2979 Krista Key Circle, Orlando, Florida 32817 (Subject Property). The agreement was for the period February 15, 2007, until February 15, 2008. Respondent was authorized, under the management agreement, to seek a tenant for the property. Said management agreement authorized Respondent to be compensated at the rate of 10 percent of the rent due during each rental period. On or about March 27, 2007, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement with Veronica Valcarcel to rent the Subject Propery. The tenant applied through the federal Section 8 program, administered by the Orange County Housing and Community Development Division (Agency), for rental assistance in order to rent the Subject Property. Section 8 assists low-income families with their rent. A tenant who qualifies for Section 8 assistance is prohibited from paying more than 40 percent of his or her income for rent and utilities. On April 26, 2007, Respondent, acting on behalf of the landlord for the Subject Property, entered into and signed a “Housing Assistance Payment Contract” or “HAP” contract with the Agency as part of the Section 8 program. The HAP contract provided that for the initial lease term for the Subject Property (for the period April 1, 2007, until March 31, 2008), the initial monthly rent was $1,150 per month. This was determined to be the maximum payment the tenant could pay without exceeding 40 percent of her income. The HAP contract explicitly provides in its terms that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner may not raise the rent to tenant.” Respondent knew that he was prohibited from charging more than the monthly rent stated in the HAP contract. Respondent has had experience in the past with other tenants who participated in the Section 8 program. Respondent has previously signed other HAP contracts which contained the same restrictive language. Under the lease contract that the tenant Veronica Valcarcel signed with the property owner Jacqueline Danzer, the monthly rent would be $1,150 per month. The signature page in the lease contract is not the same page on which the monthly rental amount is written. The property owner Jacqueline Danzer asserts that the initials in the lease contract reflecting a monthly rental of $1,150 were not all her initials. Under the terms of the Exclusive Property Management Agreement, Respondent was being compensated at the rate of 10 percent per month after the first month. A monthly rental amount of $1,500 indicates that the property owner would receive a net of $1,350 per month. The property management agreement provided that Respondent would make payments to the property owner by direct deposit. The property management agreement lists a 12-digit bank account number, with the last four digits of “6034,” into which Respondent was to make direct deposits. At the hearing, property owner Jacqueline Danzer testified that she had received payments from Respondent for the Subject Property to her Bank of America savings account, with the account number ending in “6034.” The last four digits of the account number on the Bank of America Statement match the last four digits on the account number found on the Property Management Agreement. According to the Bank of America records, Respondent made the following payments to the property owner: a) $1,550 on May 9, 2007 b) $1,000 on May 9, 2007 c) $850 on June 12, 2007 d) $1,350 on July 11, 2007 e) $1,350 on September 10, 2007 On September 12, 2007, property owner, Jacqueline Danzer went to see Lois Henry, the manager of the Section 8 department for the Agency. During the course of that meeting, Dnazer advised that Respondent was collecting $1,500 a month rent from the tenant instead of $1,150 a month. On September 12, 2007, during the course of a telephone conference with Jacqueline Danzer and Lois Henry, Respondent admitted that he had been collecting $1,500 monthly rent for the Subject Property, retaining a commission of $150 and depositing the balance in Danzer’s account. Respondent denied making an admission during the telephone conference on September 12, 2007. He also denied that he was collecting $1,500 from the tenant, and further denied that he was violating Section 8 regulations. Respondent’s testimony is not credible. The witness Danzer’s testimony is credible. Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the Housing Assistance Payments Contract. The total amount of investigative costs for the Petitioner for this case, not including attorney’s time, were $874.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; Revoking Respondent’s license, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00; and Requiring Respondent pay fees and costs related to the investigation in the amount of $874.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2009.
The Issue Petitioner and Lyell Hintz protest the Department's intent to award the bid for Lease No. 550-0209 to Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc. Issues derived from the pleadings, the joint prehearing stipulation and the evidence and argument at hearing are: Whether Petitioner has standing to protest the bid award; Whether Petitioner and Lyell Hintz have waived the right to contest evaluation criteria; If not, whether those criteria are valid; Whether the Respondent has properly applied the criteria to the bid proposals; Whether Southeastern's bid was nonresponsive; Whether Southeastern changed its bid after opening; Whether Petitioner's bid was defective for failure to include a waiver of existing lease; Whether the bid should be awarded to Lyell Hintz or Petitioner; and Whether all bids should be rejected and the lease re-bid.
Findings Of Fact The Bid Solicitation On or about January 31, 1991, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised its request for proposals (RFP) for a full service lease for its District Five, Operations and Planning Office, Public Transportation Office and Construction Office. The RFP is identified as lease #550:0209. Specifications include net square footage of 13,640 + 3% (13,231 - 14,049), divided into 90% office and 10% storage space, to be available by July 1, 1991, or within 30 days of notice of bid award, whichever occurs last. The space is to be available in a northern section of Orange County designated on a map attached to the RFP, in the Winter Park/Maitland/Orlando area surrounding the intersection of Lee Road and I-4. The following evaluation criteria (award factors) are included in the RFP: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using total present value methodology for basic term of lease... (weighting: 15) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors). (weighting: 10) Provision of the aggregate square footage on a single floor. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two floors. (weighting: 25) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operation planned for the requested space. (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors) (weighting: 10) Offers providing 100 s.f. of street-level secured storage. (weighting: 10) * * * [deleted criteria given 0 weight and not relevant] Option period rental rate proposed is within projected budgetary restraints of the department. (weighting: 15) Accessibility to an I-4 Interchange. (weighting: 15) total award factors = 100 (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 7 of 10) Paragraph D.1., General Provisions, includes a notice that failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), F.S., constitutes a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, F.S. The notice references an attachment which includes the text of Chapter 90-224, Laws of Florida, requiring posting of a bond at the time of formal written protest. Paragraph D.6.A., General Provisions states: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representatives(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the agent is to execute the lease, the authority must be supported by a properly executed Power of Attorney. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility, i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. If there is an existing lease extending beyond the required availability date for all or any portion of the premises being offered to the agency a release of the applicable lease must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 8 of 10) Paragraph D.8., General Provisions, provides the Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Paragraphs D.12 and 13, General Provisions, establish a March 4, 1991 bid opening and a February 11, 1991 preproposal conference, respectively. On the RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal form, below the bidder's signature space, there is a list of required attachments and notice that failure to include such, if applicable, "...shall render the proposal nonresponsive and such proposal shall be rejected". (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 10 of 10) The relevant attachments include a map with location of the facility, photograph, floor plan, authorization as agent for bidder, and release of existing leases. The RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal Form was furnished to the DOT by the Department of General Services (DGS). As permitted, DOT made some modifications to the criteria to meet the specific needs of the agency. No protests of the bid solicitation were filed by any party. The Bid Responses Four proposals were timely received at the bid opening deadline, March 4, 1991: Clayton's Realty (Petitioner) submitted two proposals, Lyell Hintz submitted one proposal, and Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., submitted one proposal. Clayton's bid for its building at 611 Wymore Road, Winter Park ("Clayton Bldg.") offers 13,984 square feet for $1,136,200.00 for the five-year rental period and $1,398,400.00 for the option years. Some of DOT's offices are already in this building. Clayton's bid for its building at 5600 Diplomat Circle, Orlando, ("Promenade Building") offers 14,049 square feet at $965,868.75 for the 5-year rental term, and $1,229,287.50 for the option period. Both of Clayton's buildings offer space on two floors. Lyell Hintz offers 14,049 square feet at 1241 S. Orlando Avenue, Maitland. The five year rental cost is $895,623.75, and the option period rental is $1,123,920.00. All of the space is offered on a single first floor. Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., offers 14,049 square feet in the Adlee Building at 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, for $1,009,139.67 for the 5- year rental term and $1,288,012.32 for the option period. Southeastern contends that it is offering 100 square feet of storage space on the first floor and the remainder of space on the second floor. Committee Analysis of the Bids An evaluation committee comprised of four DOT employees met on March 6, and March 12, 1991, to evaluate the bids. Their evaluation included a visit to each site with pre-established questions. The four employees were Nancy Houston, District Five District Director for Planning and Public Transportation; Donna Sovern, Ms. Houston's Administrative Assistant; Jim Hamelin, Resident Engineer in charge of construction in District Five; and Steven J. Nunnery, Office Manager for District Five Construction. The committee had prior experience in the leasing process on only one occasion. In November 1990, this same lease #550:0209 was bid. Lyell Hintz and Southeastern were the bidders. All bids were rejected after it was discovered that Southeastern's bids included typewritten language added by the bidder and in conflict with standard requirements. No protest was filed from that agency decision. In the November bid the committee simply utilized the criteria provided in the DGS packet. Later the Committee learned that criteria could be modified by the individual agency. With this understanding, the Committee changed the criteria for the March 1991 bids to provide that space be offered on no more than two floors, rather than two buildings; that points would be awarded for offers of 100 square feet of street level storage space, rather than all space on the street level; and that accessibility to an I-4 Interchange would be an additional evaluation factor. The committee felt these criteria appropriately addressed agency need to collocate programs and share facilities, to have ground floor storage for heavy samples and equipment, and to provide easy access by field staff and others using I-4 regularly. The committee devised a methodology for awarding points to each bidder in each category described in paragraph 3, above. The methodology is stated in the minutes of the evaluation committee meeting dated March 6, 1991. For item no. 1, the committee awarded 15 points (the highest) to the lowest bid. The percentage of difference between each bid and the lowest bid was multiplied by 15 to determine the point value. Hintz received 15 points; Clayton (Promenade Building) received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and Clayton (Clayton Building) received 12 points. For item no 2, the committee stated it would take into account the design and other factors in the description of this item, including the parking requirement addressed in the invitation to bid. Southeastern received the maximum, 10 points; Hintz received 8 points; and the two Clayton buildings received 6 points each. As part of the November bid process, when the agency initially intended to make the award to Southeastern, Nancy Houston's husband, an architect in private practice, prepared without charge a layout of Southeastern's building to see if Southeastern could meet DOT's needs. At Clayton's and Southeastern's requests, that layout was provided to the bidders, except for Hintz. Since Hintz' building is basically a shell, and he assured DOT he would make the renovations they needed, Ms. Houston did not feel that he needed the floor plan. After the bids were rejected in November, the layout became a public record, available to anyone upon request. However, Ms. Houston opined at hearing that they could not get a good layout that would work for the Hintz building. This contradicts Mr. Hintz' testimony that the suggested floor plan attached to the RFP could easily fit in his building. The floor plan attached to the RFP is not the same floor plan prepared by Ms. Houston's husband for the Southeastern building and the fact that Hintz' building is a shell capable of a vast variety of layouts impeaches Ms. Houston's opinion. Item no. 3 requests aggregate square footage on a single floor, with fewer points for space on two floors. The committee methodology was to give 25 points for space on one floor and "reduction given accordingly" for two floors. (Joint Exhibit #6, attachment A, page 1) Hintz and Southeastern were each granted 25 (maximum) points. Although various committee members testified that two floors should have warranted 1/2 the points, or 13, Clayton's buildings were awarded 16 points each. Southeastern is not proposing to provide all space on one floor, as it is offering storage on the first floor and office space on the second floor. The committee considered this worthy of full points, as all of the office space is on one floor. Item no. 4 is related to environmental factors such as aesthetics of the building and surrounding areas. The committee methodology states that aesthetics of the building and area would be considered along with "...the economical factor relating to the conduct of our everyday activities from and in each space proposed." (Joint Exhibit #6, Attachment A) Southeastern was awarded 10 points (maximum); Clayton's Clayton Building and Promenade Building were awarded 6 and 8 points respectively; and Hintz was awarded 3 points. Item no. 5 relates to provision of 100 square feet of storage on the street level. The committee methodology provides that full ten points will be awarded if this is met; if not, the score would be "adjusted accordingly". Each bid was awarded the full 10 points. The committee members learned that Southeastern was willing to provide street level storage when they made their site visit and inquired. The space was not described in Southeastern's written proposal. Item no. 11 relates to rental cost for the option period. The methodology adopted by the committee for this item is the same as for item no. Hintz, the lowest bidder for the option term, received 15 points; Clayton's Promenade Building received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and the Clayton Building received 12 points. Item no. 12, accessibility to an I-4 Interchange, is worth 15 points maximum. For its methodology the committee devised a formula of granting the closest building a full 15 points. The I-4/Lee Road interchange was selected as the reference hub. The Clayton Building, .2 miles from the interchange, was given 15 points. Southeastern's building .6 miles away, three times as far, was given 1/3 value, 5 points; the Promenade Building, .4 miles away, or twice as far, was given 1/2 full value, or 7.5, rounded to 8 points; and Hintz' building, 2 miles away, or 10 times as far, was given 1.5 points, rounded to 2. The total values thus awarded by the committee were: 86 points to Southeastern; 78 points to Hintz; 77 points to Clayton (Clayton Bldg.); and 76 points to Clayton (Promenade Bldg.). The committee, after meeting on March 6th and making its awards, decided to meet again on March 12th, after obtaining more information on phone service, zoning regulations, crime, and bidder's previous experience in renovations. Although some additional information was obtained and the committee did meet again, it determined that the additional information (not clearly related to any of the seven criteria above) did not warrant changing any of the scores. The committee recommended award of the lease to Southeastern. Southeastern's Bid Allegedly Defective Southeastern's bid is signed by Gilmore E. Daniel, Vice President of Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., as agent for the owner, Cynwyd Investments, a partnership which operates under about 150 different partnerships. The building in issue is owned by an entity designated "Adlee Building, Cynwyd Investments General Partnership". Attached to Southeastern's bid is a letter on Cynwyd Investments letterhead, dated February 7, 1991, addressed to Mr. Gil Daniel, re: Adlee Building, 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, Florida, stating: As leasing and managing agent for the above captioned property, you are hereby authorized to negotiate on our behalf with the State of Florida in order to procure the Department of Transportation as a tenant in our building. (Joint Exhibit #5) The letter is signed by Stephen Cravitz, CSM. Although the language of the letter is inartful (the agent was not "negotiating" a lease), the intent is plain on its face that the agent procure a lease. This is sufficient to convey authority for Gil Daniel to act on behalf of the owner. The requirement of the RFP, paragraph 6.A. is met. (see paragraph 5, above) There are several tenants currently occupying space proposed to be leased to DOT under lease no. 550:0209. There are three "agreements" attached to Southeastern's bid proposal for three tenants. Each agreement provides the tenant will move by April 15, 1991 "...contingent upon the landlord being the successful bidder for the State of Florida Department of Transportation lease no. 550:0209, and having an executed lease with the State." (Joint Exhibit #5) The tenants have not moved, but neither has the contingency been satisfied; and when or if it is, the tenants will move. These agreements are sufficient "release" to meet the requirements of RFP paragraph 6.A. The remaining tenant does not have a lease. Clayton's Bid Allegedly Defective Clayton's bids did not include any releases from tenants. There is a tenant currently in part of the space offered in the Clayton Building. There is also a lease agreement dated August 28, 1989, between the Claytons and Canam Steel Corporation describing a lease term of three years and termination date of September 14, 1992. Edward Fielding, Jr. is Director of Operations in the Leasing Department for Charles and Malcolm Clayton. He is well aware of the requirements for state leasing as he and the Claytons have been involved for several years in leasing space to state agencies. Canam Steel Corporation provided a letter in April 26, 1990, stating that it is closing its Orlando operation and requesting that its lease be terminated. It still occupies the space, but Edward Fielding is assured that it wishes to leave, and will do so immediately upon approval by Clayton. The lease and release was not included with the bid packet, as Fielding properly determined that it was no longer binding on the landlord. The Clayton Building bid does not violate the requirement of RFP, Paragraph 6.A. F. Alleged Bias of the Committee in Favor of Southeastern and Improper Award of Points Hintz and Clayton contend that the bid process was thoroughly tainted with a bias in favor of an award to Southeastern. Clayton did not respond to the November bid; Hintz did, and did not protest the earlier process, although he apparently brought to DOT's attention the language added to Southeastern's bid response that led to the rejection of all bids and reinitiation of the process. The committee changed its evaluation criteria when it learned that DGS's form criteria are not binding on the agency. The committee's alterations and addition of the I-4 accessibility requirement were intended to better meet the specific needs of the programs that would be using the space. The changes did not specifically benefit Southeastern; it was neither the closest nor next closest building to the I-4 interchange. For those criteria which could be objectively quantified, such as rental rate and proximity to I-4, the committee attempted in good faith to devise formulae. That the point spread for the I-4 criteria was substantially wider than for rental rates does not invalidate those formulae. For those criteria requiring a subjective analysis, the conformance/design and environmental factors, Petitioner and Hintz failed to prove the committee's point awards were patently wrong or fraudulent. One committee member, James Hamelin, admitted that Clayton should have received 13, rather than 16 points for providing space on more than one floor, but that error, if it indeed was an error, inured to the benefit of Petitioner and made no impact on Hintz, the next highest scorer. None of the floor plans presented by the bidders with their proposals are attached to the exhibits received in evidence, and those floor plans are not part of the record in this proceeding. One committee member, Donna Sovern, admitted that all of the square footage proposed by Southeastern was initially on the second floor. When the site visit was made and the committee discussed the space, Southeastern offered 100 square feet of storage on the first floor. (Transcript, pp 200-201) Because of this, Southeastern was awarded the full 10 points for Item No. 5, requiring 100 square feet of street-level secured storage. Allowing Southeastern to change its bid thus provided an advantage of 10 additional points. Assuming that the change was appropriate, Southeastern should not have also received the full 25 points for Item No. 3, provision of aggregate square footage on a single floor, since the remainder of its space is on the second floor. The award of points in these two items by the committee is inconsistent and erroneous. Page 4 of 10 of the RFP describes the space to be included in the 13,640 square feet to be leased. The description includes storage areas. (Joint Exhibit #1) The bidders were on notice that "aggregate" square footage includes storage space. The total number of points awarded to Southeastern must be reduced by either 10 (the after-the-fact storage space on the first floor) or 9 (the difference between the full 25 points and 16, the points awarded to Clayton for space on two floors). This results in a total of either 76 or 77 points for Southeastern. In either case, Hintz becomes the highest scorer, and Clayton and Southeastern are tied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order awarding lease no. 550:0209 to Lyell Hintz. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 7. - 5. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in summary in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. and 11. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Southeastern's name is typewritten. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 33, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 19. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraphs 20 and 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21, 26 and 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 37. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as irrelevant as points were not awarded or subtracted for the additional factors. Rejected as irrelevant. Lyell Hintz' Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 21. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 31 and 32. - 11. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the weight of evidence. The letter attached to the bid was sufficient authority. 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 13. and 14. 15. Adopted Adopted in in paragraph 25. paragraphs 3 and 25. 16. Adopted in paragraph 38. 17. - 21. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 22. 22. Rejected as argument rather than finding of fact. 23. Rejected as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. 24. Adopted in paragraph 3. 25. - 34. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 23, 14 and 16. 35. and 36. Adopted in paragraph 38. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 24. - 50. Rejected as immaterial. According to the evidence these factors did not change the committee's evaluation. 51. - 53. Rejected as immaterial and, as to the DGS requirement, unsupported by the record. Respondent and Southeastern's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraphs 18 and 19. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, specifically the RFP which unambiguously included all storage and office space in the "aggregate." - 19. Rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the record. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in part in paragraph 34, but the letter requesting its lease be terminated is sufficient release. Adopted in part in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin L. Beaman, Jr., Esquire 605 North Wymore Road Winter Park, FL 32789 Wings L. Benton, Esquire P. O. Box 5676 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5676 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 423 Country Club Drive Winter Park, FL 32789 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is entitled to documentary stamp tax in accordance with Section 201.02, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $1,450.50 and a penalty in the amount of $1,450.50 under Section 201.17, Florida Statutes; and documentary surtax under Section , Florida Statutes, in the amount of $531.85 and penalties thereon in the amount of $531.85, pursuant to Section 201.17, Florida Statutes; as entered by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, on a transaction between Petitioners and Stam-Mil, Inc., are proper.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners were the stockholders of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. Among the assets of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., were the rights under a sublease undertaken between B.G.L. Corporation and Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. dated September 25, 1976 and recorded in Official Record Book 5663, at page 261 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. This sublease was an amendment to a sublease which was dated June 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 5768, Page 176 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, between B.G.L. Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessor, and KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessee. One of the conditions of Gallagher's lease obligation was responsibility for the payment of a mortgage dated May 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 4592, at Page 161, of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, from KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation to Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky, as amended by agreement dated August 30, l65 between KSJ Corporation and Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky. Pursuant to a plan of liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. that corporation executed and delivered to Petitioners an assignment of the lessee's interest in the aforementioned lease to which Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. was a party. The assignment of lease can be found as Exhibit A to the petition filed by the Petitioners. The contents of such assignment are found to be fact. By letters of July 30, 1975 and March 10, 1975, the Respondent indicated its intention to assess tax in the amount of $326.10 upon the document representing the assignment between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners. The amount of documentary stamp tax was premised on the aforementioned mortgage which at the time of the proposed assessment was valued at $108,750. In addition the Respondent indicated its intention to impose a penalty in a like amount of $326.10. The assignment was in fact executed, pursuant to a plan of liquidation, which plan is shown as Petitioner's Exhibit C attached to the petition. The Petitioners' Exhibit C is established as fact. Petitioners in receiving the assignment in liquidation Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. received such assignment in proportion to their stock holdings in that corporation. Subsequent to the assignment of leases and agreement between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners a further assignment was made between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. of the same property, which took place on December 16, 1974. The Petitioners executed and delivered to Stan-Mil, Inc. a Florida corporation, the assignment of lease of lessee's interest in a lease, as shown in Petitioner's Exhibit A attached to its petition challenging the assessment in the transfer of Petitioners' interest to Stan-Mil, Inc. The facts of Exhibit A are admitted. The assignment was excluded pursuant to an agreement for the sale of a restaurant (Gallagher's Restaurant) , the lease assignment being of the assets of the restaurant which was sold. A copy of the closing statement, upon the sale of the restaurant, a copy of the bill of sale of all assets sold and a copy of an appraisal report allocating the purchase price for the restaurant, among all of the assets sold is attached as Petitioner's Exhibit D to the petition challenging the assessment on the transaction between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. The facts of Exhibit D are admitted. The Respondent, through its letter of March 8, 1976, proposes to assess documentary stamp tax under 201.02 F.S. in the amount of $1450.50 and a penalty in like amount under 201.17 P.S. In addition the letter notices a proposed assessment of documentary surtax under 201.021 F.S. in the amount of $531.85 and a penalty of $531.85 pursuant to 201.17 F.S. These amounts represent the tax on the appraised value of the lease-land and building in the amount of $83,500.00 and the leasehold improvements in the amount of $400,000.00. These lease-hold improvements are to be distinguished from such tangible items as furniture, fixtures, equipment, dishes and silverware, which were separately appraised in the valuation of the assets of the restaurant, known as Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. The Petitioners are challenging the proposed assessment of tax on the transaction between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc.
Recommendation It is recommended that the documentary stamp tax in the amount of $1450.50 and a like penalty of $1450.50, and the documentary surtax in the amount of $531.85 and a like penalty of $531.85, as assessed against the Petitioners, be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire 1003 DuPont Building 169 E. Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Caroline E. Mueller, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Stephen A. McLeod, is holds a license that makes him eligible to act both as a real estate broker and as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida. Between February, 1989, and March 12, 1990, the Respondent operated as the broker for McLeod Realty Group, Inc., a/k/a MRG, Inc. (MRG), a real estate brokerage of which he was the sole owner and corporate officer. At some point before March 12, 1990, the Respondent and MRG agreed to locate a commercial lease in Tampa, Florida, for Harold Calhoun, doing business as HC Associates. Subsequently, the Respondent contacted Theodore Blauvelt concerning an open listing that a limited partnership called SB II/Fidelity Silo Bend #008 had for the lease of 30,000 square feet of space which the limited partnership owned in an industrial park in Tampa. Blauvelt was the President of a TCC Tampa Industrial #2, Inc., a Trammell Crow Company which was the general partner of the Silo Bend #008 limited partnership. On March 12, 1990, the Respondent deactivated the broker license of MRG, and the Respondent went to work as a broker-salesman for another broker, Centres Commercial Realty Group, Inc. (Centres Commercial). Nonetheless, and despite the deactivation of the license under which the Respondent had been authorized to act as the broker for MRG, the Respondent and MRG continued to act as a broker separate and apart from Centres Commercial. It is not clear from the evidence exactly when the Respondent and MRG initiated negotiations between HC Associates and the limited partnership and became the procuring cause of any lease that might be concluded between them. But it is found that negotiations probably were initiated after March 12, 1990. Negotiations clearly continued after March 12, 1990. On or about May 7, 1990, HC Associates and the limited partnership concluded negotiations for a lease on the 30,000 square feet of space, and the limited partnership executed a Broker Commission Agreement with MRG, Inc., under which the limited partnership would pay MRG a $45,000 commission, payable half on execution of the lease and half when HC Associates occupied the leasehold space. On May 9, 1990, HC Associates signed a Lease Agreement for the 30,000 square feet of space, and Blauvelt secured and delivered to the Respondent a $22,500 check on an account of the Crow Trammell Companies, made payable to MRG, for the first half of its commission. The Lease Agreement was fully executed when Blauvelt signed it on behalf of the lessor on May 16, 1990. The May 16, 1990, Lease Agreement had a start date of June 1, 1990. However, it also provided for a $400,000 "Tenant Finish Allowance," payable $75,000 on May 21, $100,000 on June 1, and $225,000 on July 1, 1990. On or about June 14, 1990, Blauvelt and McLeod executed a second "Lease Agreement" for the 30,000 square feet of space. They testified that Blauvelt's company lost the May 16, 1990, Lease Agreement and that they had to execute a duplicate. Calhoun was out-of-town when the question of having to execute another Lease Agreement came up, and he authorized the Respondent to take care of whatever details were necessary. He did not specifically authorize the Respondent to sign Calhoun's name, or anyone's name other than the Respondent's, to the second Lease Agreement. On June 14, 1990, the Respondent signed the name Mark Thompson, purportedly as vice-president of HC Associates, as lessee on the second Lease Agreement. Blauvelt testified that he thought the Respondent had the authority to sign on behalf of HC Associates. Blauvelt did not know who Mark Thompson was. Mark Thompson was not vice-president of, or in any way connected with, HC Associates. The Respondent and Calhoun testified that the Respondent knew Thompson as being in the same business as Calhoun (liquidating foreclosed assets) and that the Respondent suggested to Calhoun that Calhoun and Thompson should collaborate in the business of HC Associates. Calhoun actually never met or spoke to Thompson. Although the Respondent and Blauvelt testified that the second Lease Agreement was for the sole purpose of replacing the lost first Lease Agreement, they made significant modifications. First, the start date was postponed to November 1, 1990. Second, without explanation, the provision regarding the $400,000 "Tenant Finish Allowance" was deleted. Nonetheless, the $400,000 was paid to Calhoun in accordance with the first Lease Agreement. Calhoun in turn paid those sums over to the Respondent, who testified that he acted as HC's "consultant" in supervising the tenant improvements. In accordance with the second Lease Agreement, on November 1, 1990, Blauvelt's company paid MRG the second half of its commission under the Broker Commission Agreement. Like the check for the first half of the commission, the check for the second half of the commission, in the amount of $22,500, was drawn on a Trammell Crow Companies account and was made out to MRG, Inc. The Respondent cashed both commission checks. He did not pay any part of the commissions over to Centres Commercial, the broker for whom he worked. He testified that Centres Commercial did not want any of MRG's commissions, and the DBPR did not call as a witness, or even interview, anyone from Centres Commercial to contradict the Respondent. The Respondent testified that Centres Commercial was not interested in any part of the commission for two reasons: first, it hired the Respondent as a tenant representative; second, it did not want to be liable for anything the Respondent or MRG had done before Centres Commercial hired the Respondent. Although HC Associates was paid the entire $400,000 "Tenant Finish Allowance," HC Associates and the Respondent only have been able to account for approximately $82,000 as actually having gone into lease improvements. Although MRG was paid the entire $45,000 commission, it is unclear whether HC Associates ever actually occupied the leased premises. The lessor has sued HC Associates, Calhoun, the Respondent, and Blauvelt for breach of the lease and on various other grounds. As of the time of the final hearing, no one knew the whereabouts of the purported Mark Thompson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and 475.42(1)(a), and therefore also Section 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1989); (2) imposing a $1,000 fine on him; (3) suspending him for four years; (4) requiring him to complete 30-hour broker management course; and (5) placing him on probation for one year after being reinstated. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3509 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted but conclusion of law, subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 3.-6. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. (It was not clear how much "negotiation" was required, but there were significant changes between the two versions of the Lease Agreement.) Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven that HC never took possession; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. (For purposes of these rulings, consecutive numbers have been assigned to the unnumbered paragraphs starting on page 2 of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact.) Accepted and incorporated. Accepted that "tenant representation" is one way to describe it, but subordinate and unnecessary. Conclusion of law. First two sentences and first clause of the third sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence, unintelligible. (Not a complete sentence.) The rest is rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (It was not clear how much "negotiation" was required; but, technically, there were "negotiations" because there were significant changes between the two versions of the Lease Agreement.) Subparagraph 1: Rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence that the Respondent procured the lease before March 12, 1990; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Subparagraphs 2-3: Rejected as conclusion of law. Subparagraph 4: First sentence, rejected as conclusion of law; second sentence, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated that Centres Commercial agreed to the disbursement to MRG; otherwise, rejected as conclusion of law and argument. Conclusion of law. First sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. As to fraud, irrelevant and unnecessary since fraud was not charged. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. (However, as found, the evidence was that HC transferred the money received from Trammell Crow over to the Respondent.) First sentence, conclusion of law; second sentence, irrelevant and unnecessary since fraud was not charged. First sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (It was not the Respondent's only "mistake.") Otherwise, as to fraud, irrelevant and unnecessary since fraud was not charged. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR-Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Stephen A. McLeod Post Office Box 76325 St. Petersburg, Florida 33734 Darlene F. Keller Director, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Linda Goodgame, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the real estate profession and for the licensing of real estate professionals. Respondent was, at all times material to the issues herein, a licensed real estate salesman in this state. He was issued salesman's license 0419038 and from August 27, 1990 through September 2, 1991, was an active salesman with Scarlett Faulic & Associates located in Indian Shores, Florida. From September 3, 1991 through September 30, 1991, he was a salesman with Arn Realty Group, Inc., also in Indian Shores. Effective October 1, 1991, his license became inactive due to non-renewal and remained in that status until he renewed it on April 16, 1992 when he affiliated as a salesman with First Gulf Beach Realty, Inc. in Indian Rocks Beach, Florida. From July 28, 1992 to the date of the hearing, he was an active salesman with Bobby Byrd Real Estate, Inc. in Clearwater. Sometime prior to June 13, 1991, Ted Plihcik, presently a resident of Coram, New York and formerly the owner/occupant of the property in issue which is located in Pinellas County, Florida, met the Respondent at a garage sale at Respondent's home. Because Mr. Plihcik intended to move out of the area, he entered into a listing agreement with Respondent on behalf of Arn Realty's predecessor, under which the firm was either to rent or sell the property. This agreement was to expire on December 31, 1991, and there is no evidence it was cancelled prior to expiration. Sometime after Mr. Plihcik moved to New York, he received a telephone call from Respondent in which Respondent said he had a couple to rent the property for the rental amount previously stipulated, $650.00 per month, from which Respondent was to get a commission of 10%. Respondent indicated he would take a deposit from the tenants and that he had a signed lease. Prior to his departure, Mr. Plihcik had started to make some renovations to the property's garage. He had redone the bathroom area and was planning to make another room out of the garage. However, he never got around to completing the job or to putting in the windows. He had decided to change it back into a garage, and in fact the prospective tenants wanted a garage rather than another bedroom, so he directed Respondent to hire someone to finish the reconversion. At Plihcik's request, Respondent got several estimates for the work which Plihcik felt were too high. At that point, Respondent offered to do the work himself. Plihcik agreed and gave Respondent authorization to use the deposit money to pay for necessary materials and consistent with that agreement, on September 14, 1991, by letter, Plihcik authorized Arn Realty Group to release money to Danley for the "alterations and repairs he is doing to my property...." Because the Isabelles did not pay the full two month deposit, Mr. Plihcik later revised the authorization to allow Respondent to use rent money as well, but he did not relieve Respondent from the requirement to turn any money received as rent over to Arn Realty upon receipt and thereafter get payment from the company. It is obvious that Plihcik was under the opinion that the deposit money Danley had received from the tenants had been turned over to the broker, Arn Realty. Mr. Plihcik tried unsuccessfully repeatedly to contact the Respondent requesting a copy of the lease agreement, copies of receipts for materials purchased for the garage work, or anything else pertinent, even sending at least one letter by certified mail, the receipt for which bore what Plihcik recognized as Respondent's signature. He received no responses. Sometime in early August, 1991, Deborah Isabelle and her husband rented Mr. Plihcik's house through Respondent and put up a [portion of the 1st and last month rent. They also signed a lease which called for rent at $525.00 per month but, notwithstanding many requests for one, never received a copy. Each time they asked, Respondent would say he would get them one but he never did. At the time they rented the property, the garage was under repair and, after some negotiation, it was orally agreed upon that the work would be completed by move-in time, September 1, 1991. At one point, Respondent asked the Isabelles to pay the rent in cash because it would be easier for him to buy the things needed for the repair work he was to do. They acceded to this request for a while, writing some checks to the supermarket for cash to pay Respondent, but got only one receipt. Because they were uncomfortable with this cash arrangement, they asked Respondent for the name of the owner of the property and he replied, merely, "Ted." On one occasion, mail for Mr. Plihcik from a real estate agency came to the house. Ms. Isabelle thereafter got Mr. Plihcik's New York address from the County records, contacted him, and asked him if he had received his rent. She received a negative reply. She also asked him about the lease they had signed and he related he had not received one of those, either. In fact, when she called, Mr. Plihcik didn't know who she was he had never heard their name. During that conversation, Ms. Isabelle advised Mr. Plihcik that they had not received any of the things Respondent had promised; that he was also asking them for cash; and was frequently at the house. Mr. Plihcik said he'd take care of it but no more was done. In November, 1991, Ms. Isabelle set up a three way telephone call between the Isabelles, Mr. Plihcik and the Respondent. During that call, Respondent claimed he was doing the work promised; that he had mailed Mr. Plihcik some money in cash several weeks previously and could not understand why it had not been received. The lease agreement, at paragraph 6, dealing with maintenance and grounds upkeep, purports to require the Isabelles "... to help convert 3rd bedroom back to garage in lieu of $650.00 rent." Though Respondent contends the rent was reduced from $650.00 per month, as was called for in the listing agreement, to $525.00, conditioned upon the tenants' help with the work on the garage conversion, there is no evidence that Mr. Plihcik ever agreed to accept less than the $650.00 per month rent. In addition, Ms. Isabelle claims they did not agree to do any work and the lease did not contain that provision at the time they signed it some 2 or 3 weeks after they moved in. It is found that Respondent's contention is without merit even though Mr. Isabelle did take down some 2x4's so he could install his tool bench. Over the period of their occupancy, the Isabelles paid Mr. Danley a total of $1,531.50 by check directly or by check written for cash and turned over, as well as an additional $400.00 in cash. Six hundred dollars of the checks were made payable to Arn Realty, and it appears they were deposited to that company's account. The balance of the checks and the cash were either payable to Respondent directly or, in the case of the Kash & Karry checks, written for cash to give to him. Of the $400.00 Arn Realty check, $300.00 was paid over by company check to Respondent for repairs to the instant property on the same day as the Isabelles' check was deposited to the company account. Respondent admits he received a total of $1,355.00 from the Isabelle's, either directly or indirectly, but claims all of it was used for work on the house. He also claims he is still owed $1,001.00 from Mr. Plihcik which includes $630.00 in real estate commission owed the broker. Nonetheless, Mr. Plihcik claims he received none of the money paid to Respondent, nor has Respondent presented any evidence to show the money was spent on either materials or labor for the garage reconversion. Mr. Arn, the broker supervising Respondent during the time is issue here claims he had no knowledge Respondent had obtained a tenant for Mr. Plihcik before he got Plihcik's letter. His records show a listing agreement for the property which calls for a rental commission in the event the property were leased by the company. In this case, the commission would be paid to the company, not the salesman, and would be deposited to the company's escrow account for later split with the associate involved. At no time would it be appropriate for the sales associate to collect and disburse funds without going through the broker and he would not do it that way. He did not authorize it here. Mr. Arn admits to having written at least one check to Respondent from money's received from the tenant for work to be done on the Plihcik property. He released that money only after he received a letter from Mr. Plihcik authorizing the release of funds to Respondent. All the money he received from the checks he received in August, 1991, in the amount of $600.00, was paid out to Respondent for repair costs. When he subsequently received a letter from Mr. Plihcik regarding cash which Respondent claimed he had mailed directly but which was not received, Mr. Arn replied in writing that he had not authorized Respondent to either receive or disburse funds directly. The Isabelles moved out of the house in either December, 1991 or January, 1992. By that time, Respondent had done very little work on the property. Some building materials were still on the property which Mr. Plihcik said he had left there. They are sure Respondent had not provided it. Mr. Carl Carpenter, a registered contractor and home inspector examined the property in question in March, 1992 for a potential purchaser. At that time, he found the garage in the process of being converted to a room. The framing had been installed as had the windows, and the sheet rock was partially installed. There was also a small bathroom which was not operating properly. It was his opinion that the construction was progressing from garage to room, and not the opposite. Mr. Carpenter was also of the opinion that to convert the room back to a garage would cost somewhere in the range of $600.00 and should take about 2 days. It would about double that to reinstall the bath. The bath he saw on the property was old. Respondent offered an estimate to reconvert the garage from a contractor obtained in August, 1991 which showed a total price of $1,606.00. While this is substantially more than the price cited by Mr. Carpenter, whose estimate seems rather out of line, cost is not the issue. The important part of Carpenter's testimony relates to his belief that the work in progress seemed more of conversion to a room rather than return to a garage and tends to indicate Respondent had done little if any work on the property. Ms. Sutton, the Division's investigator, interviewed Respondent 3 times regarding this matter and found his statements to be inconsistent. While he claimed he had done some work on the property and had not finished it, he could not give her the exact amount he had received from the Isabelles. He also gave her a list of what he had spent the money he had received on, but had no receipts from workers or suppliers to back it up. Mr. Danly claimed he had sent cash to Mr. Plihcik but denied receiving any cash payments from the Isabelles. He claimed he gave them receipts for what they gave him, but they have no memory of receiving any. Mr. Danley takes no issue with the facts as outlined by Ms. Isabelle except as to the remodeling of the garage which he claims is not covered by the restrictions contained in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. He claims that the payments made by the Isabelles were authorized by Mr. Plihcik to be kept by him as compensation for the repair work on the garage and not to be transmitted to Plihcik as owner because the work needed to be done and Plihcik did not have the money to pay to have it done. He also asserts that the lease was signed by the Isabelles with the requirement in it that they would help with the work as a condition of reducing the rent. He delayed starting on the remodeling until he got the money from Mr. Arn, which, at least in part, was as early as August 29, 1991. When he got that check, he started work. Originally, he states, he hired 2 young men to do the dry-wall, but the bathroom had to be framed before the dry wall could be installed. Then the water heater was installed and the power line installed for that, all of which he claims he did himself. The framing and closing up of the old door to the kitchen was done by Respondent with the assistance of a contractor. All of this, he asserts, was done in September and October, 1991, contrary to the Isabelle's claim that the only work done prior to their departure was the installation of some dry wall. Some materials were already in place but some of that had been damaged and had to be replaced. He claims he had 3 helpers to do all this work and paid them in cash. The sink was put back into its original position and he got the material to reinstall the toilet which he was unable to do because of back problems. Mr. Danley denies ever asking the Isabelles for cash or loans. He claims the only payments he received were in the form of checks payable to him or to Arn, and all money received from them was used for the work. He also admits to collecting the rent due in October which, he claims, was used for the restoration project. The only checks introduced into evidence not payable to Arn or Danley are 3 payable to Kash & Karry and of these, two are endorsed by Daniel Isabelle and one bears no endorsement at all. These are the checks which Ms. Isabelle claims were made to provide cash for Respondent at his request. Taken together, the evidence as presented by both sides tends to support Ms. Isabelle's story. Mr. Danley claims he did not finish the work because he could not find a door for the garage. He claims to have called many places but was unable to find a single garage door. A call to a Scotty's building supply store in that area revealed a single garage door was readily available, though by special order. Finally, he bought one from a builder in St. Petersburg for $235.00 which was paid in cash. The price included installation the following morning, and the site was already prepared. However, the builder never showed up with the door and he lost the payment. On balance, Respondent's account of the matter, unsupported as it is by any direct evidence beyond his own testimony, is found to be less than credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission suspending Respondent, Paul Andrew Danley's license as a real estate salesman in Florida for a period of 3 years under such terms and conditions as are considered appropriate by the Commission; imposing a total administrative fine of $2,000.00; and imposing a reprimand. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-5598 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. Accepted. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. Accepted and incorporated. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. Accepted but redundant with 4. 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. Accepted. 24. & 25. Accepted. 26. Accepted but not material to any issue. 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. Accepted but mot material to any issue. 36. & 37. Accepted and incorporated herein. 38. - 40. Accepted. 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. 43. - 46. Accepted and incorporated herein. 47. Accepted. 48. - 53. Accepted and incorporated herein. 54. - 56. Accepted and incorporated herein. 57. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. A - E. Considered more to be either argumnent on the state of the evidence or conclusions of law. Not accepted as a statement of fact as finally found. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Gilbert P. McPherson, Esquire 1822 Drew Street, Suite 8 Clearwater, Florida 34625 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
Findings Of Fact Mini-Warehouses At Kendall, Ltd., d/b/a A+ Mini-Storage (Petitioner) is a business located in Dade County, engaged primarily in the rental of storage space. Petitioner employs 20 to 21 employees and has been operating for 13 to 14 years. Petitioner's property on which its business is located consists of approximately four acres and abuts property owned by the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent), known as Parcel 0739, which contains approximately .0986 acres. On June 28, 1985, Petitioner executed a written lease agreement leasing Parcel 0739 from Respondent. The lease terms provided that it was a year-to- year lease, automatically renewable yearly until terminated by either party upon a 30-day notice, and that the yearly rental cost was $2,400 plus tax. Petitioner leased Parcel 0739 from Respondent because the parcel provides better access to Petitioner's property from the rear and prevents water from encroaching onto Petitioner's property. The same lease agreement was renewed yearly until 1991. In 1991, prior to the expiration of the lease, Respondent notified Petitioner that a new lease form would have to be executed. Respondent provided Petitioner with its Lease Agreement Form 225-080-03, OGC-00031, dated 7/92 (Form Lease) for execution. The Form Lease was developed by Respondent's Office of General Counsel and the General Counsel of each of its Districts, so that there would be a standard lease form statewide with minimal review by Respondent. The Form Lease contains blanks to be completed by Districts to comport with their specific situations. The Form Lease dramatically changed the terms and conditions of leasing Parcel 0739. Petitioner attempted to modify Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Form Lease, but Respondent refused to agree to any modifications. Paragraph 6 of the Form Lease provides: 6. Indemnification. Lessee shall indemnify, defend, save and hold Lessor, its agents and employees, harmless of and from any losses, fines, penalties, costs, damage, claims, demands, suits and liabilities of any nature, including attorneys fees (including regulatory and appellate fees), arising out of, because of, or due to any accident, happening or occurrence on the leased land or arising in any manner on account of the exercise or attempted exercise of Lessee's rights hereunder, whether the same regards person or property of any nature whatsoever, regardless of the apportionment of negligence, unless due to the sole negligence of Lessor. Lessee's obligation to indemnify, defend, and pay for the defense or at the Department's option, to participate and associate with the Department in the defense and trial of any claim and any related settlement negotiations, shall be triggered by the Department's notice of claim for indemnifica- tion to Lessee. Lessee's inability to evaluate liability or its evaluation of liability shall not excuse Lessee's duty to defend and indemnify within seven days after such notice by the Department is given by registered mail. Only an adjudication or judgment after the highest appeal is exhausted specifically finding the Department solely negligent shall excuse performance of this provision by Lessee. Lessee shall pay all costs and fees related to this obligation and its enforcement by the Department. Department's failure to notify Lessee of a claim shall not release Lessee of the above duty to defend. Under Paragraph 6, Respondent intended to limit lessee's liability to its (lessee's) own negligence or damages it causes. Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease provides: 8. Eminent Domain. Lessee acknowledges and agrees that its relationship with Lessor under this Lease is one of Landlord and Tenant and no other relationship either expressed or implied shall be deemed to apply to the parties under this Lease. Termination of this Lease for any cause shall not be deemed a taking under any eminent domain or other law so as to entitle Lessee to compensation for any interest suffered or lost as a result of termination of this Lease, including but not limited to (i) any residual interest in the Lease, or (ii) any other facts or circumstances arising out of or in connection with this Lease. Lessee hereby waives and relinquishes any legal rights and monetary claims which it might have for full compensation, or damages of any sort, including but not limited to special damages, severance damages, removal costs or loss of business profits resulting from its loss of occupancy of the leased property specified in this Agreement, or adjacent properties owned or leased by it, when any or all such properties are taken by eminent domain proceedings or sold under the threat thereof. This waiver and relinquishment applies whether (i) this Lease is still in existence on the date of taking or sale; or, (ii) has been terminated prior thereto. Under Paragraph 8, Respondent did not intend for the lessee to waive any of its eminent domain rights or relinquish such rights subsequent to the termination of the lease, which would be improper. Presently, Respondent refuses to lease the Parcel to Petitioner unless Petitioner executes the Form Lease without modification. However, at hearing Respondent admitted that it has no intention of requiring Petitioner to agree to Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease. Rule Chapter 14-19, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth Respondent's rules on right-of-way property management. Rule 14-19.002 provides that the purpose of Chapter 14-19 is to set forth standardized methods for, among other things, the leasing of surplus property owned by Respondent. In 1992, the Form Lease was incorporated by reference in Rule Chapter 14-19. Rule 14-19.0012 specifically provides that the Form Lease is one of the forms incorporated by reference in and made a part of Chapter 14-19. Moreover, Rule 14-19.013 requires the Form Lease to be used for short term leasing. Chapter 14-19 is silent as to whether the Form Lease must be used in any of Respondent's other lease situations. Rule 14-19.013, Florida Administrative Code, does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Respondent has a Right Of Way Manual (Manual) for statewide use. Chapter 10, Section 6 of the Manual, entitled "Right of Way Property Leases" and effective January 21, 1993, provides in its "Purpose" section that the purpose of Section 6 is to establish uniform procedures for leasing property owned by Respondent. Also, the Manual's "Procedure" section mandates the use of the Form Lease for all of Respondent's leases. Prior to this mandate, Respondent had no standard lease form for its leases. In October 1992, Respondent required the Form Lease to be used in surplus property leases. The Form Lease is applicable statewide and implements procedures and policies involved in leasing surplus property. Parcel 0739 is considered by Respondent to be surplus property. The Manual is silent as to whether the Form Lease may be modified. Since the implementation of the Form Lease for surplus property, Respondent's District Offices have modified the Form Lease but rarely. In the rare instances when modification has been made, it has been on a case-by-case basis and only with approval of the District General Counsel. Respondent's Office of the Right-Of-Way Administrator under which the responsibility for leasing falls has no authority to approve or disapprove modifications made to the Form Lease by District Offices. However, Respondent's Office of General Counsel does have such authority, but it has not exercised its authority in any of the District situations in which the Form Lease has been modified. Even though there have been modifications to the Form Lease by Respondent's District Offices, although rare, no District Office has modified Paragraphs 6 or 8. Respondent admits that Petitioner has standing in this proceeding.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not the actions of the petitioner in amending its lease agreement resulted in increased costs which are reimbursable by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services through an interim rate request.
Findings Of Fact Hallandale is a licensed nursing home facility located in Hallandale, Florida, and at all times material hereto, Hallandale was certified to and was participating in the Florida Medicaid Program. The participation was subject to a standard nursing home provider agreement entered into by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Hallandale provides nursing care for Medicaid recipients and receives as payment the recognized rate of Medicaid reimbursement established for Hallandale by HRS in accordance with the applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and guidelines. The agreement may be cancelled by either party after giving thirty (30) days notice. In 1971, Hallandale entered into a lease agreement with the owners of the nursing home facility and began operating the nursing home. The lease called for a payment of $84.00 per month, per bed, had no escalation clause, and would not expire until 1986. At the time the lease was negotiated, the owners had been operating the nursing home themselves at a loss. To avoid bankruptcy or having to sell the property at a loss, the owners leased the property to Hallandale. However, within seven or eight years the owners began to put pressure on Hallandale to renegotiate the lease because the owners did not think they were getting a fair return on their investment. In 1981, the owners and Hallandale entered into negotiations to amend the terms of the lease to provide an increased rental rate and an extension of the lease term. The negotiations were not successful, and finally, by letter dated July 6, 1983, the owners issued the following ultimatum: "Although the lease has a renegotiation clause six months prior to expiration, we must renegotiate the terms and conditions of this lease immediately. The partnership has made a decision that we will definitely not renew or extend your lease unless we can come to some satisfactory arrangement regarding terms and conditions, effective immediately." On December 13, 1983, Hallandale and the owners entered into an amendment to the original lease. The amendment increased the lease payments and extended the lease until August of 1998. The amended lease provided for a minimum rental of $110 per month, per bed, as of September 1, 1983, with increases in the rental every year thereafter. Saul Lerner has been president of Hallandale since 1975 and has been associated with the facility since it was first leased in 1971. Mr. Lerner is an astute businessman who has been involved in a variety of businesses for forty years. He was chiefly responsible for renegotiating the lease with the owners. Although the lease was renegotiated due to the owners' threats to sell the facility, 1/ Mr. Lerner did not merely accede to the owners' demands. There were several offers and counteroffers made before the final agreement was reached, and the renegotiated lease provided for a considerably lower rental rate than that demanded by the owners. Prior to entering into the lease amendment Mr. Lerner consulted with people in the industry, had a MAI appraisal performed, discussed the situation with James Beymer, a real estate broker specializing in nursing home and health related facilities, consulted with his accountants who had been in the health care field for 13 years, and talked with Sebastian Gomez of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Mr. Lerner consulted with his business associates, and the pros and cons of renegotiating the lease were carefully considered. Hallandale's determination to renegotiate the lease in 1983 was a reasonable and prudent business decision. By agreeing to increased rental payments for the three years that remained on the original lease, Hallandale gained an additional 12 years to operate the facility. This permitted Hallandale to project its costs and plan for the future. It could make additions and improvements to the building, buy new equipment, and provide for stability in staffing. On the other hand, had Hallandale refused to renegotiate the lease, it faced an uncertain future. There was a strong possibility that the owners would not be willing to renew the lease when it expired, which would result in Hallandale's losing the equipment and improvements it had put into the building. In addition, the owners were threatening to sell the property, and even though Hallandale had the right of first refusal, it would have had difficulty in obtaining the money required to purchase the property. Further, Hallandale realized that even if the owners would be willing to negotiate a new lease in 1986, Hallandale would not have the same leverage or bargaining power in 1986 as it had in 1983. Hallandale has participated in the Medicaid program continuously since 1971. At the time of the hearing the facility had 142 patients, of which 45 were Medicaid patients. 2/ Hallandale has never refused a Medicaid patient, and some of the patients have been there 8 or 9 years. The Medicaid patients are treated the same as the private patients, to such a degree that no one knows which patients are Medicaid patients. Although the agreement with HRS allows a provider to leave the Medicaid program with 30 days notice, Hallandale has no intention to ever discontinue participation in the Medicaid program. The extended term of the renegotiated lease is not only advantageous to Hallandale, it is also beneficial to Hallandale's patients, including Medicaid patients. It secures continuity of care for the patients and ensures that the patients will not have to be moved to a new facility in 1986. The transfer from one facility to another can be a very traumatic event for an elderly person; some patients have died within weeks of a transfer. Further, the patients benefit immediately because the extended term of the lease allows Hallandale to make improvements to the facility and buy equipment that it would not have been able to do without the security of a long term lease. The lease payments called for by the new lease are not out of line with lease payments made by similar institutions. Mr. Lerner looked at other lease payments being made in the community and found that $110 per bed per month was not an exorbitant amount. James Beymer leased nursing home facilities that were not as nice as the Hallandale facility for $138 per bed per month $166 per bed per month, and $225 per bed per month. Had Hallandale purchased the facility for $3 million, the price asked by the owners, the cost per month per bed would have been over twice the amount of the lease payment. 3/ Lease payments are included in a facility's "fixed costs." The fixed costs also include depreciation, real estate taxes and insurance. The state places a cap on reimbursement rates for fixed costs. In June 1983, prior to the renegotiation of the lease, Hallandale's fixed costs were $4.61 per patient day; under the renegotiated lease, the fixed costs would be $5.16 per patient day. Thus, even with the higher lease payment, the fixed costs are considerably under the state cap of $12.50 per patient day. A provider's reimbursement rate is determined by HRS from a cost report submitted by a provider. The rate is a prospective per diem rate. If, during the prospective period, the provider incurs an increase in costs, the provider has a right to submit an interim rate request to HRS. The Department uses the same principles to determine whether costs submitted in an interim rate request should be allowed as in determining whether costs submitted in a cost report should be allowed. Lease payments are allowable expenses under the Medicaid program subject to the Medicaid cost reimbursement principles. In calculating Hallandale's per diem rate, HRS allowed Hallandale $84 per month lease cost for each Medicaid patient in the facility based on the 1971 lease. Prior to executing the new lease, Hallandale contacted HRS to inquire if the new lease cost would be allowable and was informed that the new costs would probably not be allowable. On November 9, 1983, Hallandale submitted an interim rate request to cover the increased cost of the new lease payments. The interim rate request was procedurally correct. By letter dated May 30, 1984, HRS denied the interim rate request because "...the lease cost was negotiated for investment related reasons and is not related to patient care." On June 25, 1984, Hallandale filed its petition for a formal administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the interim rate increase requested by Hallandale be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985.