Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed an application with the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Area III, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to construct an enclosure on the fifth floor of the south wing of Petitioner's hospital. The purpose of that enclosure was in contemplation of future available bed space at a time when need for those beds had been documented and approved by the local health system's agency. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 2) In response to a request for further information which was made by the Executive Director of the local health system's agency, Rudolph Nudo, Director of Engineering for the Petitioner, answered that inquiry in writing by correspondence dated September 24, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3) Through the course of that correspondence Nudo indicated that the temporary use of the fifth floor would be for storage, and the fifth floor would be used in a permanent way for storage and expansion of the hospital's wellness and physical fitness programs should a determination be made in the future that additional beds are not needed in the review area of the local HSA. On November 23, 1981 the local HSA wrote to advise Herbert E. Straughn, Medical Facilities Consultant, Community Medical Facilities for Respondent, that the Northeast Florida Area III Health Systems Agency was recommending the denial of the proposed Certificate of Need. That correspondence had as an attachment the legal notices publicizing the public hearing related to the project, staff briefing memoranda and papers involved in the review process. (Respondent's Exhibits 4 through 4d) On January 27, 1982, Thomas J. Conrad, Administrator, Community Medical Facilities of the Office of Health Planning and Development, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, wrote to Charles Vadakin, President-General Manager of Petitioner, to advise Petitioner that the request for a Certificate of Need was being denied. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) This indication of denial had as an attachment the State agency action report. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5) On February 5, 1982, in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Petitioner requested a formal hearing to consider its entitlement to be granted a Certificate of Need to "shell-in" the fifth floor at its facility. On February 17, 1982, the Division of Administrative Hearings received Respondent's request that the Division conduct the formal hearing. That hearing de novo was held on April 8 and 9, 1982. The evidence presented in the course of the hearing addressed the question of whether the proposal for construction by the applicant meets the criteria established in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 10- 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, in particular Rule 10-5.11(1),(3),(4),(6) and (12), Florida Administrative Code. (Those other criteria set forth in Rule 10- 5.11, Florida Administrative Code, have satisfactorily been addressed by the application process or are inapplicable in terms of the subject matter of the given criteria.) Evidence presented also dealt with the subject of whether this Certificate of Need could be granted due to extenuating and mitigating circumstances which exist, notwithstanding the applicant's failure to successfully meet the criteria discussed above. Memorial Hospital of Jacksonville is an acute general care hospital with a 309 bed capacity. The hospital is located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. Petitioner has been granted Certificates of Need allowing the construction of an educational floor, perinatal center on a second floor and the third and fourth floors above those. The third and fourth floors would house an additional thirty-four beds, bringing the total bed count in the hospital to 343 beds. The construction is referred to as the south wing and is depicted at a certain point in the construction through Petitioner's Exhibit 1, a photograph of the area of construction. Memorial's present request for a Certificate of Need would allow the construction of an additional floor, or fifth floor, above the, four floors that have been granted. Memorial Hospital provides critical care, to include trauma cases treated in its emergency room and open heart surgery. In addition, there is a cardiac catheterization laboratory and other general cardiac care, an intensive care unit, a perinatal (birthing) center and other hospital services. The fifth floor, if constructed, would not immediately contain additional beds and would be left with interior partition walls and would be used for storage space in the interim period prior to the grant of any further beds to the Petitioner. The construction on the south wing which had been approved has its origins in Certificates of Need which were the topic of separate applications filed in 1979 and 1980. Specifically, in November, 1979, Memorial filed separate applications for its educational floor, first floor, in the amount of $2,991,000.00 and at the same time, an application for a perinatal unit, second floor, in the amount of $4,352,000.00. The applications were granted in 1980 in the amounts requested. At a later date in 1980, Petitioner filed a separate application for three additional stories; floors three, four and five, and for 106 additional beds, all in the cost amount of $10,656,000.00. This request came about at approximately the same time as a request by St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida, to move its hospital operations to an area in the vicinity of Memorial Hospital. Memorial and St. Luke's, together with the local HSA, resolved the problem of the competing certificate requests by entering into a stipulation and agreement in 1981. By the terms of that agreement, Memorial limited its expansion to two floors instead of three, leaving floors three and four intact. It reduced its bed request from 106 to 34 additional new beds to be installed on one of the two additional floors, with the second additional floor receiving 34 beds from another part of the hospital which was not subject to the Certificate of Need. The second set of beds would be gained by the process of converting existing semi-private rooms to private rooms. Petitioner also agreed not to apply for additional beds until at least six months after the perinatal unit and 34 new medical/surgical beds had been opened. St. Luke's reduced its number of obstetric beds by 20 and it agreed that it would not "shell-in" space for additional beds in its proposed facility. The results of the agreement caused the abandonment by Memorial of its fifth floor request and the reduction of bed requests by 72 beds. The new terms are set out in Certificate of Need No. 1488 pertaining to floors three and four. The project costs were left as originally requested, and that monetary amount was granted. The agreement reached between the local HSA, Petitioner and St. Luke's was premised upon extenuating and mitigating circumstances, especially the possibility of the cost of protracted litigation had the parties not come to an agreement. Following the stipulation and agreement with the local HSA and St. Luke's Hospital, the Petitioner filed the present request for Certificate. The general purpose of that project has been discussed before. The rationalization on the subject of consistency of the project with the local Health Systems' plan and the local annual implementation plan was as follows: The proposed enclosure project is consistent with Health Systems' plan and annual implementation plan for 1980, in that it provides a mechanism for assuring available health care resources at the lowest possible cost consistent with quality service delivery. The proposal guarantees no additional beds will be added until approved by the Health Systems Agency and yet safeguards the most effective option of maximizing current capital investment dollars. This project will allow Memorial Hospital to continue to meet the area's acute health care needs for the next ten years. The project contemplates the expenditure of $1,200,000.00 for cost of construction of "shell-in" space. Need for the subject project was discussed in terms of a reference to "Certificate of Need #1488" which is that Certificate relating to floors three and four of the south wing. The Certificate of Need No. 1488 was based upon an application which included a study concluded in August, 1980, which set forth primary and secondary service areas, census tracts and preliminary 1980 Federal census figures for Duval County gathered by the "Research Department, Florida Publishing Company" and a document to the effect that Memorial had a firm market position, and that health care consumerism was emerging and that there was a strong consumer loyalty-to Memorial. The present application was reviewed by the local Health Agency and the Health Needs and Priorities Committee voted to recommend denial of the proposed project; its Executive Committee also recommended denial of the project. During this review cycle, concerns were expressed about the application in view of the 1981 agreement with St. Luke's and the local HSA in which Memorial agreed not to apply for additional beds for at least six months after the 34 beds which had been approved were in operation. While the present application does not violate the terms of that agreement, it does allow for a large portion of the capital expenditure, i.e., that part devoted to the construction of the "shell-in" of the floor to be achieved and thereby allows for a portion of the capital expenditure related to future beds to be approved. With St. Luke's relocation to south Jacksonville, some time in late 1984 or early 1985, and with the addition of Memorial's construction program that has been approved, 323 beds will be added to the south side area of Duval County in the next few years. In the local HSA staff's opinion, which opinion is accurate, from a community planning basis, there will not be a demonstrated community need for additional beds in the south side any sooner than 1985 and it is more likely that there would be no further bed need before 1990. The local HSA is also concerned that the project would set a precedent for future "shell-in" applications. This concern is borne out by interviews conducted through staff members of that HSA which revealed that seven hospital administrators planned major construction projects in the HSA area, and six administrators indicated that they would ask for "shell-in" space if they thought it would be approved. In specific terms, the local HSA recommended disapproval of the project and did so by written findings alluded to before. In summary, those findings indicated: The Health System's Plan did not address expansion projects which do not directly result in an increase in licensed beds or service but the primary purpose of the fifth floor would be for bed spaces. The Health System's Plan called for a regional rate of 4.3 beds per 1,000 population. Excluding Nemour's Children and St. Johns River Hospital, there were approximately 4.1 beds on the south side and beaches area of Jacksonville. When St. Luke's Hospital (289 beds) relocates to the south side and Memorial opens its 34 new beds, the rate will be approximately 5.2 beds per 1,000 population in 1985. In 1990 the estimated rate would be 5.0 beds per 1,000 population. It was HSA's staff's opinion that there will not be a need on a community planning basis to approve more beds for the south side until the 1990s. The local HSA also indicated that Memorial could be more effective in its specialization. Its recommendation in that regard was that after the current construction of four stories had been completed, Memorial could still have the capability to add additional licensed beds within its presently approved structures, even though it would mean reducing the ratio of private beds to semi-private beds. Specifically, it was recommended by the HSA that: Petitioner reconvert the 34 rooms previously used for semi-private back to semi-private --34 beds Modify the 34 private rooms on the third floor of the new building to semi-private, and --34 beds Modify the 34 private rooms on the fourth floor of the new building to semi-private. --34 beds TOTAL 102 beds These observations and findings are correct, except as they relate to modification of rooms on the third and fourth floors of the new construction. The above-stated suggestion by the local HSA related to the modification to semi-private rooms on the third and fourth floors of the south wing would not comport with the design specifications of those beds as now contemplated by Memorial, in that the private rooms contemplated on those floors did not provide sufficient space to be modified into semi-private rooms. Analysis by HRS adopted and confirmed the majority of the analysis by the local Health Planning Agency. HRS also pointed out in its analysis, and the HRS analysis is accurate, that in view of the fact of excess bed capacity in the planning area through 1985, the adding of potential beds would give Petitioner an undue advantage over facilities should the fifth floor be constructed as "shell-in" space. Furthermore, according to Respondent, construction economies to be realized by Memorial Hospital can only be recognized as legitimate, if there is a community need for the project. Based upon the analysis conducted by Respondent, the project from a community-wide standpoint, under the terms of Section 381.493, Florida Statutes, there is an excess of 238 hospital beds in Duval County through 1985, and possibly into early 1990. Respondent having in mind the bed need situation, concluded that the proposed project was not consistent with bed need standards at the time of review or in the planning future and that the community need to add "shell-in" bed space did not exist absent a recognized bed need, which would not occur before 1985. All of these comments by HRS are correct accounts. It was also concluded by Respondent that there were alternatives for converting private bedrooms to semi-private rooms, increasing capacity without major construction. This is a true understanding of the circumstances except as it relates to the third and fourth floors in the new construction. Based upon the overall analysis, the project application was denied. The conditions at Memorial Hospital are such that it would benefit from an expansion to add a fifth floor at the south wing. Those benefits pertain to the availability of storage and administrative space. The occupancy rate for patients in the hospital during the last year have averaged approximately 90 percent (Petitioner's Exhibit 16), causing both emergency and planned health care services to be delayed due to overcrowding. Federal, State and HSA guidelines call for 80 percent occupancy of nonfederal, short-term care beds, such as provided by Petitioner. There is a need for administrative office space. At the present time some administrative offices are placed in lobbies and hallways and the files for those offices are located in hallways. Intravenous solutions are stored in hallways at present. Testimony by the hospital engineer established a need of 15,000 square feet of space to accommodate storage problems more comfortably. The application seeks 17,500 square feet of space. The alternatives to the construction of the fifth floor related to future bed need and short and long-term storage space would be to forego the expansion, construct the project at a future date, or construct a new building. Construction at a later date could cost as much as an additional $7,000,000.00, constituted of approximately $813,000.00 in construction cost and $6,000,000.00 in loss of gross revenue. These costs are related to completion of the "shell-in" structure after the initial four floors had been completed and assumes loss of revenue related to beds in the third and fourth floors of the hospital, which floors would have to be closed during the construction of the fifth floor at a subsequent time. Construction costs at the present, as set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, at the last sentence of the first page, is estimated to be $.31 per-patient day. There is precedent for granting the "shell-in" space as may be found in Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 8, 9, and 10, related to projects in the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency, Inc. area of responsibility. Respectively, those projects refer to Women's Hospital in Tampa, Florida; St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida; and L. W. Blake Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Florida. In the situation of Women's Hospital, Respondent allowed the construction by installation of necessary structural equipment and fixtures needed to establish 34 single occupancy rooms as double occupancy rooms as a hedge against construction costs for any additional beds approved at a future date. St. Joseph's Hospital was allowed to construct two floors in which 45 beds had been requested, but only 36 beds were granted per floor, leaving additional "shell-in" space which would accommodate nine additional beds per floor, for a total of 18 beds. In the situation at Blake Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Florida, that hospital was allowed to "shell-in" a fifth floor on condition that the structural framework would be completed and that the floor would be left in an unfinished state, that is to say, that the improvements necessary for the utilization of that fifth floor for patient rooms were not allowed to be added. In each instance in which some form of "shell-in" space was granted, the HSA area was overbeded at the time of the grant of certificate. The project is not consistent with the local health systems plan, annual implementation plan, and Florida State Health Systems Plan. (Petitioner's Exhibits 11 through 14 respectively)
The Issue Whether Florida Hospital Medical Center is entitled to reimbursement in the amount preliminarily determined by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a reimbursement dispute regarding bills submitted by Florida Hospital Medical Center to Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company for medical services provided to two individuals involved in work-related accidents; and Whether Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company properly adjusted those bills of Florida Hospital Medical Center in accordance with the requirements of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Florida Hospital is a full-service, not-for-profit hospital system located in Orlando, Florida, that operates a smaller satellite hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Florida Hospital is a “health care provider” within the meaning of Section 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Macy’s and Amerisure are “carriers” within the meaning of Sections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes. The Department has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between carriers and health care providers regarding payments for services rendered to injured workers, pursuant to Sections 440.13(7) and 440.13(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Qmedtrix is a medical bill review company.3/ Case No. 09-6871 R. P., an employee of Macy’s, slipped and fell at work on May 20, 2009, and presented to Florida Hospital Winter Park for evaluation and treatment where medical personnel documented vomiting, brain attack, and brain trauma. After evaluation and treatment, patient R. P. was diagnosed with a bruise to the head and released the same day. On September 16, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to R. P. totaling $5,547.20 to Macy’s for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Macy’s forwarded the bill to its workers’ compensation medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix reviewed the bill by comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by Florida Hospital with examples in the CPT book for billing of emergency department services. Florida Hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 920, which reads “contusion of face, scalp, or neck.” Use of this code means R. P. presented with a bruise or hematoma, but not a concussion. Florida Hospital also reported ICD diagnosis code 959.01 (“head injury, unspecified”) which also means that R. P. did not present with a concussion, loss of consciousness, or intracranial injuries. Florida Hospital’s bill included a charge of $2,417 with CPT code 99285 for emergency department services. The bill also included separate charges for a head CT, and various lab tests, drugs, and IV solutions. According to Mr. von Sydow, the bill was sent through Qmedtrix’s computer program for review, and was flagged for review by a physician. Mr. von Sydow further testified that one of Qmedtrix’s medical director’s suggested that the CPT code of 99285 be reduced. The medical director, who Mr. von Sydow said reviewed the bill, however, did not testify and no documentation of his recommendation was submitted at the final hearing. Qmedtrix determined that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285. Qmedtrix found that, while the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285, its usual charge for an emergency department visit billed with CPT code 99284 is $1,354. Macy’s paid Florida Hospital a total of $2,683.55, which amount included $1,010.24 for the emergency department visit based on [approximately] 75 percent of Florida Hospital’s usual charge for CPT code 99284. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Macy’s (or its designated entity)4/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed,” and has columns designated as “BR Red,” “PPO Red,” “Other Red,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed” column. There is also a column entitled “Reason Code” which sets forth codes, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)3., that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.5/ The “reason code” set forth adjacent to the $2,417.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” There is also another code, “P506” listed in the “Reason Code” column adjacent to the same line item, which, according to the key provided on the EOBR, means “[a]ny questions regarding this Qmedtrix review, please call (800)-833-1993.” “P506,” however, is not a “reason code” listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68L- 7.602(5)(o)3. The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Macy’s pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital in fact billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) for the proposition that “SB-50 amended section 440.13 . . . [revealing] legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographic area.” Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Macy’s also contended that “upcoding” and “unbundling” were additional grounds for adjustment or disallowance that were not identified on the EOBR. The response explained that “upcoding” refers to billing with a procedure code that exaggerates the complexity of the service actually provided; that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services; that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes; that the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285; and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a healthy, young adult patient who sustained a blunt head injury with local swelling and bruising without subsequent confusion, loss of consciousness or memory deficit” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99283. The response requested a determination by the Department that Macy’s payment equaled or exceeded the amount usual and customary for CPT code 99283. On November 13, 2009, the Department, through its Office of Medical Services (OMS) issued a determination (Determination in 09-6871) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $5,547.20 and the carrier reimbursed $2,683.55. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, references a manual not incorporated by rule, and provides CPT codes that the respondent alleges are correct. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $4,160.40 ($5,547.20 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$4,160.40). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Macy’s paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P., and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Macy’s is required to pay for such services, equals $1,476.85. The Determination in 09-6871 did not directly address Macy’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6871 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Macy’s timely requested a hearing. Case No. 09-6872 J. L., an employee of Major League Aluminum, was injured in a work-related accident on the evening of May 3, 2009, and visited the emergency department of Florida Hospital Orlando. After evaluation and treatment, J. L. was diagnosed with a bruise to the knee and released the next morning. On September 23, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to J. L. totaling $2,851 to Amerisure, Major League Aluminum’s workers’ compensation insurer, for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Amerisure forwarded the hospital bill to its medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix for review. Qmedtrix’s medical bill review in this case, as in the companion case, entailed comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book. The hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 924.11, which reads “contusion of . . . knee.” The hospital also reported ICD diagnosis codes 724.2 (“lumbago”), E888.1 (“fall on or from ladders or scaffolding”) and 959.7 (“injury, other and unspecified . . . knee, leg, ankle, and foot.”). Florida Hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 9924 for emergency department services and also billed for X-rays and various drugs and IV solutions. Comparing procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book, Qmedtrix concluded that billing with CPT code 99284 was not appropriate, but that billing with CPT code 99282 was. Qmedtrix also found that, while the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, the average charge in the community for a visit to the emergency department billed with CPT code 99282 is $721. Qmedtrix determined the “usual and customary charge” in the community from its own database compiled by entering all of particular hospital bills into Qmedtrix’s database, along with data from the American Hospital Directory. Qmedtrix derives the average charge in the community based upon zip codes of the hospitals. Amerisure paid Florida Hospital a total of $1,257.15, which amount included $524.70 for the emergency department visit codes based on 75 percent of what Qmedtrix determined to be the average charge in the community for CPT code 99282. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Petitioner Amerisure (or its designated entity)6/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed Charges,” and has columns designated as “FS/UCR Reductions,” “Audit Reductions,” “Network Reductions,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed Charges” column. There is also a column entitled “Qualify Code” which sets forth reason codes that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.7/ The code set forth adjacent to the $1,354.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99282 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99284 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Hospital Manual. Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Amerisure pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital, in fact, billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon, supra. Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Amerisure contended “upcoding” as an additional ground for adjustment or disallowance that was not identified on the EOBR. As in the companion case, the response explained “upcoding,” that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services, and that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes. The response further stated that the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a patient with a minor traumatic injury of an extremity with localized pain, swelling, and bruising” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99282. The response requested a determination by the Department that Amerisure’s payment equaled or exceeded the usual and customary charge for CPT code 99282. On October 20, 2009, the Department’s OMS issued a determination (Determination in 09-6872) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $2,851.00 and the carrier reimbursed $1,257.15. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. Therefore, the charges, as billed by the hospital, did not constitute billing errors. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $2,138.25 ($2,851.00 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$2,138.25). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Amerisure paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Amerisure is required to pay for such services equals $881.10. The Determination in 09-6872 did not directly address Amerisure’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6872 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Amerisure timely requested a hearing. Alleged “Upcoding” for Emergency Department Services The Petitioners’ responses in both cases allege that Florida Hospital “upcoded” its bill for emergency department evaluation and management services. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital, however, reported alleged “upcoding” as an explanation for the Petitioners’ adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. While the Dispute Determinations by the Department do not directly address the carrier’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding” raised in the Petitioners’ responses, they found that “Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment[, and that] [o]nly through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill.” According to Mr. von Sydow, who was offered by Petitioners as an expert in billing, coding, reimbursement, and payment issues,8/ the “reason codes” that workers’ compensation carriers are to use pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602, do not mention “upcoding,” and therefore an EOBR could not be generated with a reason code explaining reduction or disallowance based on “upcoding.” The following reason codes, however, are included in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602: 23 – Payment disallowed: medical necessity: diagnosis does not support the services rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: documentation does not substantiate the service billed was rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: level of evaluation and management service not supported by documentation. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital includes reason code 23, 40, or 41. And neither EOBR explains or otherwise suggests that that Florida Hospital’s level of billing was not supported by medical necessity, services rendered, or sufficient documentation. In fact, Petitioners did not disallow reimbursement and do not contend that reimbursement should be denied for any services rendered by Florida Hospital to R. P. and J. L. on the grounds that the billed services were not medically necessary for the injured employees’ compensable injuries. In addition, Petitioners did not adjust or disallow payment for any of the billed procedures on the grounds that the procedures were not provided. In sum, the EOBR’s did not give Florida Hospital notice that alleged “upcoding” was an issue. Even if Petitioner’s EOBR’s gave Florida Hospital notice that it was asserting “upcoding” as a reason to reduce or adjust the hospital’s bill, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Hospital utilized the wrong code in its billing for emergency department evaluation and management services. The CPT® 2009 Current Procedural Terminology Professional Edition, (Copyright 2008), (CPT book), is adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(3)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-7.020(2). The CPT book sets forth the procedure codes for billing and reporting by hospitals and physicians. The CPT book sets forth CPT codes ranging from 99281 through 99285 used to report evaluation and management services provided in a hospital’s emergency department, described as follows: 99281: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; and Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self limited or minor. 99282: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. 99283: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. 99284: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity, and require urgent evaluation by the physician but do not pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. 99285: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; and Medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity and pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. Mr. von Sydow testified that a Qmedtrix “medical director,” reviewed Florida Hospital’s bill for services rendered to R. P., but not the medical records, and recommended that the hospital’s charge for emergency department services under CPT 99285 be “re-priced” to Qmedtrix’s determination of the “usual and customary charge” for CPT 99284. Mr. von Sydow acknowledged the need for physician review for some cases (as opposed to review by non-physician coders) by testifying, “The more complicated the medicine, the more likely it is that he [a medical director at Qmedtrix] wants to see it.” Despite Qmedtrix’s original determination to “reprice” the bill from CPT code 99285 to CPT code 99284 (reflected in the reduced payment but not explained in the EOBR), Mr. von Sydow opined that the correct CPT code for emergency department services provided to patient R. P. was 99283, as opposed to 99285 billed by the hospital. Mr. von Sydow testified that his opinion was based upon his own review of the medical records, without the assistance of a medical director or medical expert, and review of examples for the CPT codes for emergency department services from the CPT book, and various provisions of ICD-9 and CPT book coding resources. Aside from the fact that Mr. von Sydow’s opinion differed from the purported recommendation of a Qmedtrix “medical director,” Mr. von Sydow is not a physician. Moreover, Qmedtrix failed to provide the testimony of the medical director, or anyone else with medical expertise to evaluate the medical records and services provided or to validate either the opinion of Mr. von Sydow or the original recommendation to “re- price” Florida Hospital’s use of CPT Code 99285 in its bill for emergency department services rendered to patient R. P. Mr. von Sydow offered similar testimony and examples to explain Qmedtrix’s “re-pricing” of Florida Hospital’s bill from CPT code 99284 to CPT code 99282 for emergency services rendered to patient J. L. on behalf of Amerisure. According to Mr. von Sydow, an internal Qmedtrix coder (not a medical director) reviewed the bill for emergency services rendered to J. L. and determined it should be re-priced to the usual and customary charge, as determined by Qmedtrix, using that CPT code 99282. While knowledgeable of the various codes and their uses, given the manner in which preliminary diagnostics under emergency circumstances drives Florida Hospital’s determination of the appropriate CPT code for billing emergency department services, without the testimony of a medical expert familiar with the medical records generated in these cases in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the emergency care rendered to patients R. P. and J. L., Mr. von Sydow’s testimony was unpersuasive. Ross Edmundson, M.D., an employee, vice-president, and medical manager for Florida Hospital, explained that, unlike other settings, hospitals generally do not have the medical histories of patients presenting for emergency hospital services. When a patient comes to Florida Hospital for emergency services, they are triaged by a nurse to determine the level of urgency, then a doctor sees the patient, conducts a differential diagnosis to rule out possible causes, obtains the patient’s history, and then performs a physical examination. While emergency room physicians at Florida Hospital do not decide which CPT code is utilized for the evaluation and management services provided by its emergency department, the various tests and procedures they undertake to evaluate and treat emergency department patients do. James English, the director of revenue management for Florida Hospital explained the process through his deposition testimony. Florida Hospital, like over 400 other hospitals, uses the “Lynx System” – a proprietary system for creating and maintaining medical records electronically. The program captures each medical service, supply, and physician order that is inputted into the electronic medical record. The hospital’s emergency evaluation and management CPT code is generated from the electronic record. A “point collection system” in the Lynx System translates physician-ordered services, supplies it to a point system, and then assigns the CPT code that is billed based upon the total number of “points” that are in the system at the time the patient is discharged from the emergency department. The level of the evaluation and management CPT code (99281 to 99285) that is reported on Florida Hospital’s bill is a direct reflection of the number and types of medical services that a patient receives from his or her arrival through discharge. In light of evidence showing the manner in which emergency services are provided and the importance of medical records in generating the appropriate billing code for emergency evaluation and management services, it is found that Petitioners failed to provide an adequate analysis of the medical records of either R. P. or J. L. to show that the appropriate CPT codes were not utilized by Florida Hospital in billing for those services. On the other hand, both Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute filed by Florida Hospital with the Department attached appropriately itemized bills utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. In addition, medical records for the evaluation and treatment provided by Florida Hospital for both patients R. B. and J. L. supporting the itemized bills were submitted to the Department. These documents were also received into evidence at the final hearing. Florida Hospital’s bills at issue correctly identified the hospital’s usual charges for each individual and separately chargeable item, service or supply, with the corresponding code assigned to such billable items as maintained in Florida Hospital’s “charge master.” In addition, Petitioners concede the compensability of both patients’ work-related injuries and do not dispute whether any service or supply rendered and billed by Florida Hospital for these two cases were “medically necessary.”9/ Unbundling As noted above, in Case No. 09-6871, Qmedtrix’s response to Florida Hospital’s petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute contended “unbundling” as a ground for adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. At the final hearing, Arlene Cotton, the nurse who issued the Dispute Determinations, explained that reason code 63 regarding “unbundling” is inapplicable to hospital billing, as there is no rule that requires hospitals to bundle bill for its services. Mr. von Sydow agreed that reason code 63 was inapplicable. In addition, footnote 2 of Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order states, “they did not pursue the allegations of unbundling.” Therefore, it is found that Petitioners did not prove and otherwise abandoned their claim of “unbundling” as a ground to adjust or disallow reimbursement to Florida Hospital. Usual and Customary Charges The Dispute Determinations issued by the Department found that correct payment in both cases equaled 75% of billed charges, citing “Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., [which] incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Both Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and the Hospital Manual provide that hospital services provided to patients under the workers’ compensation law “shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges.” The Department interprets the term “usual and customary charges” as set forth in the Hospital Manual and Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, quoted above, to mean a hospital’s usual charges of the hospital, whereas Petitioners contend that “usual and customary charges” means the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area. While apparently not contending that Petitioners failed to raise the issue of “usual and customary” charges in their EOBR’s,10/ at the final hearing, the Department argued that “nowhere in [either Macy’s or Amerisure’s] response is the issue of customary charges raised.” A review of the responses filed by Qmedtrix to Florida Hospital’s reimbursement dispute petitions filed with the Department reveal that both raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Mr. von Sydow’s letter attached to both responses state: As you may know, the proposed adoption of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System as a methodology for reimbursing hospitals 60% and 75% of “usual and customary charges” follows from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, No. 1D05-5459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (SB-50 amended section 440.13 to remove all reference to the charges of any individual service provider; this amendment reveals the legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographical area). This court decision requires DFS to define payment rates for out patient service that are uniformly applicable to all hospitals in a given geographic area. In addition, at the final hearing, the Department argued that the petitions for administrative hearing did “not raise as a disputed issue of fact or law whether or not usual and customary charges should apply in this case.” Indeed, a review of the request for relief set forth in the petitions for administrative hearings filed by Petitioners do not mention the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Rather, the relief requested by both petitions for administrative review of the Dispute Determinations, as summarized in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, is: Petitioner[s] seeks reversal of OMS’ Determination(s) and the matters remanded for the Department to: direct payment based upon the actual treatment required/provided and pursuant to the correct CPT code; find that the hospital upcoded and that Petitioner properly reimbursed (or exceeded amount due); and determine that the hospital has the burden of proof to substantiate its billing and the use of the chosen CPT code. Contrary to the Department’s argument, however, both petitions for administrative hearing raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Page 9 of Macy’s petition, in pertinent part states: Petitioner submits that in issuing the above findings OMS failed to consider the holding in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration (wherein the Court determined that reimbursement should not be based solely upon a mathematical equation [as found within the Reimbursement Manual] and applying it to the fee charged by a particular provider; and that by eliminating the reference to any one facility’s charges, the legislature intended that the charges be based on average fees of all providers in a geographical area as opposed to the fees of the particular provider in question). Likewise, review of Amerisure’s petition for administrative hearing reveals that the issue of “usual and customary charges” was raised. Pages 7 and 8 of Amerisure’s petition state, in pertinent part: Further, if the Hospital is permitted to utilize incorrect revenue codes it would be impossible to determine whether the charges are consistent with the Hospital’s own [usual and customary] charges for the service, procedure or supplies in question and, further, whether such charges are consistent with charges by other like facilities (in the same geographical area) for the same services, procedures, or supplies. See One Beacon Insurance, supra. In addition, Amerisure’s petition on page 12 states with regard to the Department’s determination: Such finding was issued without consideration of . . . the amounts charged for the same services in the Orlando area where this hospital is located. Petitioners further preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” in the first paragraph of their statement of position on page 3 of the Joint Prehearing Statement, as follows: Petitioners, Macy’s and Amerisure, take the position that the Determinations must be reversed as the Department has the duty to scrutinize the bills in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital, in fact, charged its usual charge for the services provided, and second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the same community (for the same or similar services) and that the Department failed to do so. As such, Petitioners contend that payment for services provided by Florida Hospital should have been based upon 75% of usual and customary charges, not 75% of billed charges. Therefore, it is found that Petitioners have preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” for consideration in this administrative proceeding. Although preserved, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that their interpretation of “usual and customary charges” should prevail. The Department has consistently interpreted the term “usual and customary charges” as used in the Hospital Manual, Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and rules related to hospital reimbursement under the workers’ compensation law as the “usual and customary charges” of the hospital reflected on the hospital’s “charge master.” The Hospital Manual requires each hospital to maintain a charge master and to produce it “when requested for the purpose of verifying its usual charges. . . .” (Emphasis added). Petitioners did not conduct or request to conduct an audit to verify whether the charges billed by Florida Hospital corresponded with the Florida Hospital’s charge master. In fact, Mr. von Sydow conceded at the final hearing that Florida Hospital’s bills at issue were charged in accordance with Florida Hospital’s charge master. Nor did Petitioners institute rule challenge proceedings against the Department regarding the Hospital Manual, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-7.501. Instead, Petitioners assert that they should be able to reduce Florida Hospital bills based upon a different interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary charges” to mean the average charge in the community as determined by Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is not registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and does not employ any Florida-licensed insurance adjuster, physician, or registered nurse. Qmedtrix earns 12 to 15 percent of “savings” realized by carriers utilizing their bill review services. For example, if a bill is reduced by $100, Qmedtrix is paid $12.11/ Qmedtrix uses a proprietary bill review system called “BillChek.” According to Qmedtrix’s website: BillChek reviews out-of-network medical charges for all bill types in all lines of coverage, including group health, auto, medical, and workers’ compensation. BillChek is a unique specialty cost- containment service that determines an accurate and reasonable reimbursement amount for non-network facility and ancillary medical charges. BillChek incorporates historical data to help determine reasonable payment recommendations across all sectors of the health care industry. All BillCheck recommendations are backed by extensive medical and legal expertise, and supported by Qmedtrix’s experienced Provider Relations and Dispute Resolution teams. According to the testimony of Mr. von Sydow, Qmedtrix collects and maintains data from various sources, including Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the American Hospital Directory (AHD.com), and HCFA 2552’s (data reported to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services on HCFA 2522) in order to construct a database of health care providers’ usual charges. Mr. von Sydow advised that AHD.com data was a principle source for constructing the database. He also advised that AHCA data was included in the database even though Qmedtrix found the AHCA data defective. Examples of data downloaded from AHD.com for Florida Hospital showing a profile of the facility was received into evidence as P-5. The data did not, however, show usual charges for the CPT codes for emergency department services at issue in this case. Petitioners also introduced into evidence Exhibits P-6 and P-7, which contained AHD.com data showing average charges for Florida Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, respectively, for Level 1 through Level 5 emergency room visits (corresponding to CPT codes 99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained that the data was part of the information Qmedtrix used to construct the average charge in the community. Petitioners failed to provide similar AHD.com data for other hospitals in the area Qmedtrix determined to be the “community.” In addition, Petitioners introduced AHCA’s Florida Health Finder Web-site, as Exhibit P-8, which ostensibly included average charges for all hospitals in Florida for the subject emergency department CPT codes (99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained, however, “[w]e find that [the AHCA data] is not refreshed very often, unfortunately, and some other defects in the scrubbing of the data by the agency, which they know, I will say. But this is incorporated in our database to a large extent.” The exhibit was received into evidence for the purpose of helping to explain how Qmedtrix constructed its database, with the recognition that it was largely composed of hearsay. In sum, while Petitioners showed their methodology of constructing the database, other than the AHD.com data for Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, Petitioners failed to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to show the “usual and customary charge” of all providers in a given geographical area as determined by Qmedtrix. In addition, the AHCA data, though characterized by Mr. von Sydow as unreliable, indicates that there is a wide range of differences in emergency room charges between hospitals in Florida. Petitioners’ interpretation of “usual and customary charge” to mean the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area does not take into account an individual hospital’s indigent care, cost of labor, overhead, number of beds, size, age, or various other differences between facilities that could affect amounts each hospital charges for emergency department and other services; the Department’s interpretation does.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order consistent with this Recommended Order that: Directs Macy’s Claims Services to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to patient R. P., and to submit proof of reimbursement of that amount within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received; Directs Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to patient J. L., and submit proof of reimbursement of that amount to the Department within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2001),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rivera was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0054619. Dr. Rivera is an anesthesiologist. On May 11, 2002, Patient A.V., an 82-year-old male, presented to the emergency room of Gulf Coast Hospital (Gulf Coast) with complaints of shortness of breath. A.V. had a history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. A.V. was admitted to the hospital by Michele Candelore, D.O. Gulf Coast is a small community hospital with approximately 150 beds. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center (Southwest), a larger tertiary care hospital, is located three to five miles away from Gulf Coast. On May 16, 2002, Dr. Rivera provided anesthesia services to A.V. in association with a bronchoscopy. As a result of providing services to A.V., Dr. Rivera was familiar with A.V.’s medical conditions and risk factors for anesthesia. On May 18, 2002, Tracy Vo, D.O., was the physician on call at Gulf Coast. She was providing coverage for A.V.’s physician, and, around noon on that date, she discharged A.V. Dr. Vo left Gulf Coast and received a call between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m. that A.V. was complaining of abdominal pain and nausea. Dr. Vo ordered tests for A.V., including an abdominal ultrasound. Dr. Vo arrived at Gulf Coast between 5:15 and 5:30 p.m. She found A.V. to be hypotensive with rapidly decreasing systolic blood pressure. The results of the ultrasound showed that A.V. had a 5.3 centimeter abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) with a surrounding collection of fluid. An AAA is a life- threatening condition. Dr. Vo transferred A.V. to the intensive care unit (ICU), where she began infusions of fluids and dopamine in an attempt to elevate A.C.’s blood pressure and to resuscitate him. Dr. Vo requested a surgical consult. Dr. Harry Black, the on-call surgeon was not available, and the consult was referred to Dr. DeMoya, a general surgeon who was covering for Dr. Black. Dr. DeMoya was in surgery at another hospital and could not come to Gulf Coast. He was advised that A.C. had an AAA. Dr. DeMoya recommended that A.C. be transferred to Southwest, which was better equipped to handle an AAA. Dr. Vo felt that A.C. was too unstable to transfer at that time. In order to rapidly pump fluids into A.C., Dr. Vo asked the supervising nurse to contact the on-call anesthesiologist for a consult for placing a central line. A central line is a catheter that is passed through a vein, ending up in the thoracic portion of the vena cava or in the right atrium of the heart. Dr. Rivera was an employee of Dr. John Patrick, who was the chief of Anesthesiology at Gulf Coast. Dr. Patrick was out of town on May 18, 2002, and Dr. Rivera was the on-call anesthesiologist. Being on call means that the physician gets called when anesthesia services are needed. Dr. Rivera was contacted concerning the placement of a central line for A.V. Dr. Rivera got to Gulf Coast between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. He went to the bedside of A.V. and recognized A.V. from having provided anesthesia services to A.V. earlier in A.V.'s admission. Dr. Rivera told Dr. Vo that he did not feel comfortable placing a central line and refused to do so. Although he had been taught as a resident to place a central line, he had not placed a central line since his residency in 1983. Dr. Vo asked the supervising nurse, Ellen Haviland, to continue her efforts to locate a vascular surgeon. Nurse Haviland contacted Dr. Brian Kurland, a vascular surgeon. Dr. Kurland agreed to come to Gulf Coast. Nurse Haviland told Dr. Rivera that Dr. Kurland was on his way to the hospital, and Dr. Rivera said that if Dr. Kurland was on his way that Dr. Kurland could place the central line. Dr. Kurland told the nurse to make sure that the patient and his family wanted the patient to undergo the surgery because of the severity of the operation and the risk of not having a successful outcome. He also ordered that the operating team be mobilized. After speaking with Dr. Kurland, Nurse Haviland went to the surgical supply room to make sure that the grafts needed for the operation were available. Dr. Vo told Dr. Rivera that Dr. Kurland was coming and that she was going to transfer A.V. to the operating room. General anesthesia is necessary for an AAA repair. Dr. Rivera recommended that A.C. be transferred to another hospital and refused to provide anesthesia to A.C. because he felt that the risk of giving anesthesia at Gulf Coast was unacceptable. Dr. Rivera noted his recommendation in the progress notes for A.V. at 7:00 p.m. Dr. Rivera then left the hospital and went home. He did not attempt to contact Dr. Kurland directly to advise Dr. Kurland of his concerns and that he was not going to provide anesthesia services. Dr. Kurland arrived at the hospital and went directly to the operating room, where he expected to find the patient and the operating team. However, no one was in the operating room. Dr. Kurland went to the ICU, where A.C. was. Dr. Kurland was advised that A.V. was not in the operating room because Dr. Rivera had refused to do the anesthesia. Dr. Kurland telephoned Dr. Rivera and told Dr. Rivera that although A.V. was a high-risk patient and would probably die, the best chance for saving A.V.’s life was to perform the surgery at Gulf Coast rather than transferring A.V. to another hospital. Dr. Rivera refused to come to the hospital to provide the anesthesia services. Dr. Kurland told the nursing staff to try to get another anesthesiologist and the chief of surgery. Dr. Kurland spoke with Dr. Patrick and told him that A.V. needed to have emergency surgery. Dr. Kurland placed a central line in A.V. to facilitate the giving of medications and fluids. Dr. Kurland told A.V.’s family that because they could not get an anesthesiologist that they had two options, either not to operate and let A.V. pass away or transfer him to another hospital for surgery. It was decided to transfer A.V. to Southwest. The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel were called to transfer the patient. When the EMS staff arrived, A.V. was intubated. Shortly thereafter, A.V. went into cardiac arrest and unsuccessful efforts were made to resuscitate A.V. A.V. was pronounced dead at 8:16 p.m. After talking with Dr. Kurland, Dr. Patrick called Dr. Rivera and told him to go to the hospital and provide the anesthesia because Dr. Kurland had declared an emergency and was going to perform surgery. Dr. Rivera obeyed Dr. Patrick because Dr. Patrick “was paying his paycheck” and left his home to go to the hospital. Shortly after his conversation with Dr. Rivera, Dr. Patrick was advised that A.V. had died. Dr. Patrick called Dr. Rivera and told him not to go to the hospital because A.V. had died. John Downs, M.D., testified as an expert witness for Dr. Rivera. He is a professor at the University of South Florida. Dr. Downs is a nationally recognized expert in anesthesiology, but the last time that he was an on-call anesthesiologist in a small community hospital similar to Gulf Coast was in 1985. It was Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr Rivera did not violate the standard of care by leaving the hospital, by refusing to perform anesthesia services, and by not telling Dr. Kurland that he was not going to do the anesthesia prior to Dr. Kurland’s telephone call to him. It was Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr. Rivera was not required to give the anesthesia because the patient would die. Dr. Down’s opinion misses the mark. A.V. was in a life or death situation. Without surgery, A.V. was going to die. A.V. was not stable enough to transfer to another hospital; thus, emergent surgery was necessary if there was going to be any chance for survival. Dr. Down’s opinion that Dr. Rivera was not required to perform the anesthesia services is not credited. Minnea B. Kalra, M.D., testified as the Department’s expert. Dr. Kalra has practiced for approximately 30 years and has practiced as an on-call anesthesiologist in small community hospitals similar to Gulf Coast. In 2002, she was practicing as an on-call anesthesiologist in a 150-bed community hospital comparable to Gulf Coast. She has been the on-call anesthesiologist called to treat emergency AAA’s in small facilities such as Gulf Coast. It was Dr. Kalra’s opinion that Dr. Rivera should have tried to get someone else to place the central line if he was unable to do so. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera violated the standard of care by not staying at the hospital when he knew that Dr. Kurland, a vascular surgeon, was on his way to the hospital. An AAA calls for surgery, and it was Dr. Rivera’s duty to stay with the patient and provide the necessary anesthesia. Dr. Kalra testified that Dr. Rivera’s last chance to do his duty and agree to provide anesthesia was when Dr. Kurland advised Dr. Rivera by telephone that he was taking A.V. to surgery. Dr. Rivera failed to perform his duty when he told Dr. Kurland that he was not going to do the anesthesia. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera had a duty to remain at the hospital until Dr. Kurland arrived so that he could discuss his concerns and the risks of providing anesthesia to A.V. directly with Dr. Kurland. Dr. Rivera failed to perform his duty. Dr. Kalra opined that Dr. Rivera had a duty to help find someone to provide anesthesia services such as placing the central line when Dr. Rivera could not place the central line because of lack of competence and would not provide surgical anesthesia services. Dr. Rivera was the on-call anesthesiologist, and it was his responsibility to provide the services or assist in finding an anesthesiologist who could provide the services. Dr. Rivera failed to do his duty. Dr. Kalra’s opinions that Dr. Rivera did not provide care to A.V. at a level a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and circumstances is expected to meet are credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Rivera violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; suspending his license for one year followed by a two- year probation on whatever terms the Board of Medicine sees fit; imposing a fine of $10,000; requiring that Dr. Rivera complete three hours of continuing medical education in medical ethics and five hours in risk management; and requiring that Dr. Rivera complete 100 hours of community service. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2008.
The Issue Whether J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was an "employee" of Northwest Florida Community Hospital for purposes of the State of Florida retirement system?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Board of Trustees"), is the governing body of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. Petitioner, Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commissioners"), is the governing body of Washington County, Florida, and the owner of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. The Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is the agency charged with responsibility for administering the Florida retirement system established by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Operation of Northwest Florida Community Hospital Prior to February of 1988. The Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital"), is a small, rural acute-care hospital located in Chipley, Washington County, Florida. During the mid-1980's, the Hospital suffered from a financial crisis that threatened its continued existence. As a consequence thereof, it was concluded that the Hospital should be sold. A contract was negotiated and entered into for the sale of the Hospital to National Healthcare, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "NHI"). As a part of the contract entered into with NHI, NHI was to operate the Hospital before the contract for sale was completed. J. Glenn Brown was an employee of NHI. NHI assigned Mr. Brown to the Hospital to act as the administrator of the Hospital. As administrator of the Hospital, Mr. Brown was the top manager of the Hospital. Mr. Brown, while employed by NHI, acted as the administrator of the Hospital from September 1986, until approximately September or October of 1987. At some time prior to February 1988, the contract for sale of the Hospital to NHI was cancelled and the Board of Trustees began to operate the Hospital. The Consulting Contracts. On or about February 1, 1988 the Hospital and Mr. Brown entered into a Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "First Contract"). Petitioner's exhibit 1. Mr. Brown agreed in the First Contract to operate the Hospital. Mr. Brown operated the Hospital pursuant to the First Contract until its expiration. Although the term of the First Contract ended January 31, 1991, Mr. Brown continued to operate the Hospital. A second Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Contract"), was entered into on or about May 29, 1992 between Mr. Brown and the Hospital. The Second Contract applied to the period February 1, 1992, through February 1, 1993. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between the end of the First Contract and the beginning of the Second Contract. The differences between the First Contract and the Second Contract (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Consulting Contracts"), were not substantial other than the amount of the annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown. The Treatment of Mr. Brown for Purposes of the Florida Retirement System. During the period of time that Mr. Brown operated the Hospital from February 1, 1988 until he departed in the fall of 1992, the Hospital treated Mr. Brown as an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system. Although the Hospital could have requested a determination of Mr. Brown's status for purposes of the Florida retirement system, the Hospital was not required to do so. The Hospital, as it was authorized to do pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, made the initial decision to treat Mr. Brown as an independent contractor. After Mr. Brown had left the Hospital, an audit of the Hospital was conducted by the management review section of the Division. As a result of the audit, the Division raised a question about the status of Mr. Brown for purposes of the Florida retirement system. As a result of the audit of the Hospital, the Division required the Hospital to submit a Florida Retirement System Employment Relationship Questionnaire form requesting a determination of Mr. Brown's status as an employee or independent contractor. The Hospital did so. See Respondent's exhibit 2. The Division reviewed the Questionnaire and determined that Mr. Brown was an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system, and so notified the Hospital. The Hospital filed a request for a formal administrative hearing to contest the Division's determination that Mr. Brown was an employee. Based upon the foregoing, it is the Division that is attempting to change the status quo in this matter. But for the Division's audit and requirement that the Hospital file a Questionnaire, the Hospital's treatment of Mr. Brown as an independent contractor for purposes of the Florida retirement system would have been final. Services to be Provided by Mr. Brown Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts and Mr. Brown's Relationship with the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown, referred to as the "consultant" in the Consulting Contracts, agreed to provide the following services: 1:1 The Hospital hereby contracts with Consultant to provide services to the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to properly and efficiently run the Hospital for the purpose of providing quality healthcare to the citizens of Washington County and a more productive business operation. 1:2 Consultant hereby contracts with the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to provide the Hospital advice, expertise and a more efficient and productive business operation. The Consulting Contracts also contained the following provision pertaining to Mr. Brown's operation of the Hospital: 2:1 Consultant agrees to devote such of his time and efforts to the performance of such services as are necessary to perform and achieve the objectives set forth in Article I above. Consultant agrees that he will not directly or indirectly render any service of a business, commercial or professional nature to any other Hospital in Northwest Florida, whether for compensation or otherwise, during the term of this Agreement without the prior written consent of the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. Consultant agrees to comply with the Hospital's policies, rules and regulations as determined from time to time by the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. It was the intent of the Hospital and Mr. Brown that he would act as an independent contractor, and not an employee, in performing the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown was to, and did, provide his services personally. Mr. Brown did not operate through a corporation or other business entity. Between February 1988 and the Fall of 1992, Mr. Brown administered the Hospital in essentially the same manner that he had prior to 1988 while employed by NHI. The Board of Trustees established policies for the operation of the Hospital during the term of the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown carried out policies adopted by the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown was involved in the formulation of policies by the Board of Trustees and he advised the Board of Trustees concerning policies it adopted. The Board of Trustees had little experience in operating the Hospital. The day- to-day operations of the Hospital had been handled by NHI prior to entering into the First Contract. Prior to NHI's operation of the Hospital, the Hospital was administered by Hospital Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as "HCA"). HCA had operated the Hospital through an employee, Buel Sapp. The Board of Trustees, therefore, relied heavily on Mr. Brown and his expertise in developing polices and for his efficient operation of the Hospital. The manner in which Mr. Brown administered the Hospital was also largely the same as the manner in which the Hospital has been administered by the person who replaced by Mr. Brown. The new administrator has been treated as an "employee" by the Hospital. Training. Mr. Brown was a professional hospital administrator with a number of years of experience operating hospitals, including the Hospital. In light of Mr. Brown's experience, especially at the Hospital, training was not required when Mr. Brown undertook the services contemplated by the First Contract. Integration. The services to be performed pursuant to the Consulting Contacts were integral to the operation of the Hospital. Mr. Brown performed services normally performed by an "administrator" or top manager of any hospital. Manner In Which Mr. Brown Performed Services. Mr. Brown did not hire any assistants or employees to assist him in the performance of the services required by the Consulting Contracts. The Consulting Contracts did not prevent Mr. Brown from using the services of others to carry out the services to be provided. Although Mr. Brown was ultimately obligated to insure that the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts were provided, the manner in which services required by the Consulting Contracts were to be carried out was not specified. Continuing Relationship. Mr. Brown was required, as a condition of the Hospital entering into the First Contract, to move to Washington County. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was obligated to perform services for the Hospital for a period of four years. The First Contract expired February 1, 1991. The Second Contract obligated Mr. Brown to perform services for the Hospital for a period of one year. The Second Contract was effective February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991 and February 1, 1992, although the First Contract had expired and the Second Contract had not yet been entered into. The evidence failed to prove why Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991, and February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown performed services for the Hospital after he left NHI for between 3 and 4 years. Mr. Brown's Working Hours. Mr. Brown's working hours were not specified in the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown, therefore, was not legally required to perform services during any set period of time. Mr. Brown generally performed services for the Hospital from the early morning until the early evening. Mr. Brown's hours were consistent with the hours worked by employees of the Hospital. Mr. Brown did not keep time-sheets indicating the hours he worked. Nor did Mr. Brown use, or "punch," a time-clock which employees of the Hospital used. Full-Time or Part-Time Work. Mr. Brown was not required to work any set amount of hours pursuant to the Consulting Contracts. The services expected of Mr. Brown pursuant to the Consulting Contracts reasonably contemplated that Mr. Brown would perform services full- time, only if necessary. The Consulting Contracts also provided that Mr. Brown was not required to perform services on days he attended seminars or meetings to improve his position. The Consulting Contracts also required that Mr. Brown make himself available "for all reasonable meetings, engagements, and any and all other reasonable attempts by the Hospital to promote the Hospital." Mr. Brown did not receive annual or sick leave. Mr. Brown did not work at the Hospital every day of the week. During some weeks, he only worked three or four days. Where Mr. Brown Performed Services. Although not specifically required to do so, Mr. Brown performed the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts essentially on the premises of the Hospital. In order to effectively administer the Hospital, it was necessary that Mr. Brown be available at the Hospital. Reports from Mr. Brown to the Hospital. Mr. Brown regularly reported to the Board of Trustees and kept the Board informed of his actions. Compensation for Mr. Brown's Services. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $70,555.00. The annual fee was paid biweekly in twenty-six equal installments. Payments were made on the last day of every other week. The annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown pursuant to the First Contract was agreed upon during negotiations based upon the average salary paid to administrators of similarly sized hospitals who were serving as employees, and adding thereto the amount of withholding tax, retirement contributions and other amounts which would be paid on behalf of an "employee." Had Mr. Brown been hired as an "employee", presumably he would have only been paid an amount based upon the average salary of other employee/administrators. Pursuant to the Second Contract Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $98,770.00. The annual fee was paid monthly on the first day of each month and upon the submission of an invoice from Mr. Brown. The Consulting Contracts also provided the following: Consultant hereby acknowledges and agrees that he is an independent contractor individually liable for self employment and all other taxes of any nature due on the fees paid by the Hospital to Consultant. Payments of Mr. Brown's annual fee were made to him by the Hospital out of a separate account and not the Hospital's "payroll" account from which Hospital employees were paid. Payments were made at the same time that Hospital employees were paid. The Hospital also paid for group health insurance for Mr. Brown. Health insurance benefits provided to Mr. Brown were the same benefits provided to Hospital employees. The Hospital also paid for disability insurance for Mr. Brown and a life insurance policy larger than provided to Hospital employees. Mr. Brown's Expenses; Tools and Materials; Investment. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital paid dues Mr. Brown was required to pay to maintain "membership in applicable organizations or associations deemed necessary for promotion of the Hospital " The Hospital paid expenses incurred by Mr. Brown to attend meetings and seminars on new federal and state health care regulations which impacted the operation of the Hospital. The Hospital paid Mr. Brown a vehicle allowance of $250.00. The Hospital also provided Mr. Brown with an office, furniture, office supplies, a secretary (who was an employee of the Hospital) and with telephone and other services necessary to operate as the administrator of the Hospital. The office provided to Mr. Brown was the office used by the Hospital administrator. Other then Mr. Brown's education, Mr. Brown did not have any substantial investment in his position with the Hospital. Capital investment necessary for Mr. Brown to carry out his duties was provided by the Hospital. Profit and Loss Potential. In light of the fact that Mr. Brown was guaranteed payment for his services and the lack of investment and expenses Mr. Brown was required to provide, there was no reasonable potential Mr. Brown would incur a loss. Mr. Brown operated as an individual. Offer of Services to the General Public. The Consulting Contracts prohibited Mr. Brown from providing his services to others in "Northwest Florida." Mr. Brown was, therefore, free to perform services elsewhere. During the term of the Consulting Contracts, Mr. Brown did perform services for other companies located outside of Florida. Article X of the Consulting Contracts provided, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Consultant further agrees that he shall not participate, directly or indirectly, individually or as a partner, shareholder, employee, agent, consultant, officer, director or otherwise, in any other business where such participation will in any manner interfere (as reasonably determined by the Board of Trustees and Consultant) with the business of the Hospital or which ultimately, in the final opinion of the Board of Trustees, could result in the integrity of the Hospital being subject to doubt. Right to Terminate Mr. Brown and Mr. Brown's Right to Quit. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services for "good cause" as determined by majority vote of the Board of Trustees and "upon sixty (60) calendar days written notice of termination to the Consultant." The Hospital was required, however, to pay Mr. Brown for four months of service. The Hospital also had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services if he were convicted of a felony, required to take treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, engaged in activity harmful to the reputation of the Hospital or failed to comply with the terms of the Consulting Contract. Mr. Brown was authorized by the Consulting Contracts to terminate his services upon sixty days written notice. The Consulting Contracts provide that the agreement terminated upon the death of Mr. Brown. Weighted Consideration of the Facts. Several of the facts in this case indicate that Mr. Brown was an independent contractor of the Hospital and several of the facts indicate that he was an employee. Based upon a weighted consideration of the facts in this case, it is concluded that Mr. Brown operated as an independent contractor, and not an employee, for the Hospital.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order concluding that J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was not a compulsory member of the Florida retirement system pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1635 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 2 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7-8. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 10. See 11-13 and 38-39. The First Contract expired January 31, 1991, and not January 31, 1992. Accepted in 16 and 24. Accepted in 35. Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. 9 Accepted in 26, 42-43, 52, 57 and 63. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 68. Accepted in 48. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 30-31. Accepted in 3. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 9 and hereby accepted. 4 Accepted in 10,53-54, 58-59 and 62. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 23 and 69. The first sentence is not relevant. 8 Accepted in 41-42, 44, 47, 52-53 and 63. See 41-43 and hereby accepted. Although Ms. Ward did testify consistent with this finding of fact, the testimony was not sufficiently detailed to conclude that Mr. Brown and Mr. Mason provided services in exactly the same manner. Accepted in 61. 12 Accepted in 11-14, 38-39 and 55. Accepted in 14, 25 and 66. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 60-61. See 73. See 53-62. The conclusion on page 10 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 William S. Howell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 187 Chipley, Florida 32428 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (“the Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10202, which was filed by East Florida Healthcare, LLC (“East Florida”), and preliminarily denied by the Agency. 1. East Florida filed Application No. 10202 seeking a CON to establish a 100-bed acute care hospital to be located in Broward County, District 10. 2. On December 10, 2013, the Agency published notice of its decision to preliminarily deny East Florida’s CON Application No. 10202. 3. On December 30, 2013, East Florida filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding contesting the Agency’s preliminary denial of its CON Application 10202, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) and assigned DOAH Case No. 14-0126CON. 4. On December 31, 2013, South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Healthcare System (“MHS”) filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding in support of the Agency’s preliminary denial of East Florida’s CON Application 10202, which too was forwarded to the DOAH and assigned DOAH Case No. 14-0120CON. Filed February 18, 2014 10:39 AM Division of Administrative Hearings 5. On January 13, 2014, MHS then filed a motion to intervene in the East Florida case, DOAH Case No. 14-0126CON, in support of the Agency’s preliminary denial of East Florida’s CON Application No. 10202. 6. On January 24, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order in the East Florida case, DOAH Case No. 14-0126CON, granting the motion to intervene and permitting MHS to intervene in the East Florida case subject to the terms of the order. 7. On January 27, 2014, MHS filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of its Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding in this case. It is therefore ORDERED: 8. The Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding filed by MHS in this case is dismissed. This Final Order does not affect the intervention of MHS granted in the East Florida case, DOAH Case No. 14-0126CON. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this / 7 day of Pela auss} , 2014. Deectete_ Elizabeth DuWek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition of Michelle C. Phillips in DOAH Case No. 00-1794; FCHR Case No. 98-0713. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Edward R. Gay, Esquire Law Firm of Edward R. Gay, P.A. 1516 East Concord Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Richard A. Durose, Esquire Joseph W. Beatty, Esquire Foley & Lardner Post Office Box 2193 Orlando, Florida 32801-2386
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a black female, was hired by Respondent on May 2, 1978. Petitioner was employed as a psychiatric aide until June 12, 1981. From June 13, 1981 until Petitioner's dismissal by Respondent on October 17, 1985, her primary duties consisted of working with severely mentally ill patients as a Human Services Worker II at Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was a permanent employee of Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor at the time of the incident was Dan Gibbs, a black male. On September 2, 1985, Petitioner volunteered to work a consecutive eight (8) hour shift from 11:00 p.m. on September 2, 1985 until 7:00 a.m. on September 3, 1925. Petitioner's primary duty was to observe A. G., a suicidal patient, on a one-on-one procedure throughout the entire shift. The one-on-one procedure requires the observer to remain within arms reach of the assigned patient at all times without interruption. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 3, 1985, Emma Jordan, a white female registered nurse and Geri Knowles, a white female security officer, found the Petitioner asleep in the T.V. Room of Ward Nine (9) with her feet propped up on a chair, a pillow behind her back and a cover over her. Petitioner's co- worker, Freddy Jones, a probationary employee, was also found sleeping and was subsequently terminated by Respondent for sleeping on the job. Two patients, including A. G., were also asleep. A. G., the patient assigned to Petitioner for a one-on-one procedure, was no less than ten (10) feet from Petitioner. Ten (10) feet is more than arms length. There was sufficient light from the nurses' station and the television for Jordan and Knowles to determine that Petitioner was asleep. Jordan and Knowles observed Petitioner sleeping for about two (2) minutes before she was awakened by Jordan. After Petitioner was awakened, Jordan, whose duties included caring for patients on Ward Nine (9), questioned Petitioner about who was responsible for carrying out the one-on- one procedure and was informed by Petitioner that both she and Freddy Jones took turns. When Jordan attempted to explain the safety violation, Petitioner responded with "you ain't my supervisor, mother fucker." From this point, the exchange between Petitioner and Jordan escalated with Petitioner using more obscenities and making actual physical contact with Jordan. Additionally, Petitioner encouraged Jordan to "Fight like a woman, mother fucker." Both Dan Gibbs and Freddy Jones had to intercede and physically restrain Petitioner on two (2) occasions. Petitioner had previously been suspended for three (3) days in August, 1982 for sleeping while on duty. Prior to this incident, Petitioner was aware of Respondent's personnel policy concerning disciplinary action for sleeping on the job. Respondent's disciplinary rule provides for a "written reprimand or up to thirty days suspension or dismissal" for sleeping on the job. With each subsequent occurrence of the same violation, the rule imposes a more severe discipline. A predetermination hearing was held by Respondent on September 26, 1985 and Petitioner was subsequently discharged by Respondent on October 17, 1985 for sleeping on the job and malicious use of profane language. The evidence in the record does not reflect a similar instance where an employee (black or white) had been accused and disciplined for sleeping on the job while observing a patient on a one-on-one basis and exhibiting conduct such as the Petitioner exhibited in this instance. Respondent's hospital had, prior to September 3, 1985, suspended both black and white employees for sleeping on duty and subsequent to this incident dismissed a white male employee for sleeping on duty while assigned to a one-on- one supervision of a patient. There was no evidence to support Petitioner's contention that her termination was "retaliation" by Respondent because she had successfully challenged an earlier termination by Respondent for abandonment of position. The evidence clearly established that Respondent reinstated Petitioner after receiving additional information from Petitioner without the matter going to hearing. The evidence clearly establishes that Petitioner was discharged because she was found sleeping on the job while assigned to a suicidal patient on a one-on-one basis and for use of malicious profane language. The evidence clearly establishes that Respondent's actions were not inconsistent with previous disciplinary actions taken against other employees, both black and white, with similar offenses. There was insufficient evidence to show that Respondent's actions taken in discharging Petitioner were motivated by impermissible racial consideration.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Joann Postell has failed to establish that she was discharged due to her race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), and that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 12th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2391 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.(a)(b) That Petitioner was employed by Respondent and terminated for sleeping on the job is adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 13. The balance of the introductory sentence is rejected as not being a finding of fact but that Petitioner's argument that her dismissal was discriminatory. Rejected as not stating a fact but only why Petitioner denied being asleep. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. 2. Rejected as being argument rather than a finding of fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 5. Adopted in Finding of Facts 4 and 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1a. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David A. West, Esquire Legal Counsel Northeast Florida State Hospital Macclenny, Florida 32063 Carl G. Swanson, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact Cilla McCray, is a resident of Gadsden County. The parties have stipulated that on December 3, 1977, she was admitted to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital in an emergency medical condition, and that the treatment performed by the hospital was of an emergency nature. The parties have further stipulated that the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital is a regional referral hospital within the meaning of Section 154.304(4) , Florida Statutes (1977). Cilla McCray was admitted to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital on December 3, 1977, and was discharged on January 9, 1978. The total bill for her services amounted to $8,753.80. The Hospital submitted a bill to Gadsden County in the amount of $1,521.48 for the services. This latter amount is the maximum allowed to be billed in accordance with the Florida Health Care Responsibility Act. Gadsden County has refused to pay the bill, contending that the patient was not indigent. The patient has not paid the bill. Cilla McCray is married to Lawrence McCray. They have three children but only two of them reside at home. The oldest child is not supported by his parents. During the six months preceding the hospitalization of Cilla McCray her husband had average earnings of $80.00 per week as a logger. Mrs. McCray had earned a total of $732.60 for employment during the six months prior to her hospitalization. The McCray's thus had average monthly earnings during that period in excess of $450.00 per month.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered rejecting the bill submitted by the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital for medical services performed for Cilla McCray. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Shaw Curry, Esquire Post Office Box 706 Quincy, Florida 32351 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Gadsden County Courthouse Quincy, Florida
