The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a physician in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Board of Medicine, through the Agency For Health Care Administration, and formerly the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the practice of medicine and the licensing of physicians in this state. Respondent has been a physician licensed in Florida under license number ME 003824. Starting on January 12, 1988 and continuing thereafter until on or about March 16, 1988, Respondent treated Patient #1 for a condition known as Dupuytren's Contracture of the left hand. This conditions results in the thickening of scar tissues and contracture of fibrous bands in the palm and fingers which pulls the fingers into the palm and constricts their ability to flex or straighten out. Patient #1 had suffered from this condition since 1982. In 1984, a surgeon in New Jersey performed Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery on the patient's right hand, but the results were not altogether satisfactory. Respondent first saw Patient #1 on January 12, 1988. At this initial visit, Respondent discussed the implications of the proposed surgical procedure and advised the patient of the possible adverse consequences thereof. He noted that because the patient had delayed seeking treatment for the left hand, there was a strong possibility of complications as a result of surgery which could involve nerve damage and infection in addition to a possibility of vascular damage and necrosis of the tissue of the hand. On February 10, 1988, Respondent performed a Dupuytren's Contracture release on the patient's left hand at the Gulf Coast Orthopedic Center, (GCOC). This surgery is a complicated, delicate and difficult procedure which in the instant case, was made even more difficult by the extent of the existing contracture of the patient's hand. After the completion of the surgery, Respondent placed Patient #1 on Keflex, an antibiotic, and also prescribed Darvocet for pain. Respondent saw Patient #1 again on February 11, 1988. At this time, the patient was complaining of pain in the hand and of the tightness of the bandage. Respondent examined the wound at this time, cleaned it, placed a plastic platform splint on the hand and re-bandaged it. The patient was also prescribed Percodan for pain and advised to continue the Keflex at a 1,500 mg/day dosage. Patient #1 returned to Respondent again on February 12, 1988, still complaining of pain and that the bandage was too tight. After again examining the hand, Respondent re-bandaged it, placing gauze between the patient's fingers and the splint. He also gave the patient another prescription for Percodan for the pain. On February 17, 1988, the patient again came to the Respondent's office for his third postoperative checkup. When Respondent removed the bandage, he noticed a small greenish area on the palm which was exuding what appeared to be white pus. Respondent thoroughly cleaned the wound by placing the hand in a whirlpool bath of water and Betadine solution for approximately 45 minutes. He did not culture the green area or the white exudation. When he released the patient that day, however, he increased the Keflex dosage to 2,000 mg/day but refused to give him a prescription for additional Percodan for the pain. Instead, he told him to take extra strength Tylenol. He also told the patient to keep the hand elevated but did not suggest the patient call in the event of pain. Respondent did not see Patient #1 again until February 24, 1988 even though the pain had increased during that period. The patient, however, did not call the Respondent to complain, believing the increase in pain was the result of the removal of the prescription for Percodan and the substitution of a lesser strength substance, Tylenol, therefor. The patient assumed, from the Respondent's prior comments, that the pain was normal and to be expected. When Respondent saw Patient #1's hand again on February 24, 1988, he became excited because it appeared there was infection in the left palm which had spread to the PIP joint of the middle finger at which point there was some necrosis. Respondent appeared upset because the Patient had not called him when the pain continued or increased. Patient #1's wife had asked that the patient do so, but the patient decided to wait until the next scheduled appointment on February 24, 1988. At this time, Respondent removed the sutures from the patient's hand and irrigated the wound with a mixture of saline solution and an antibiotic, Kepsol. A culture was also taken at this time. Since Respondent did not have hospital admitting privileges in the area, he arranged through Dr. Alea, an associate in his clinic who did have such privileges, to have Patient #1 admitted to Bayonet Point Hospital for treatment of the infection. The treating physician there was Dr. K. Sundaresh, an infectious disease specialist. The admission was on February 24, 1988. Dr. Sundaresh placed Patient #1 on prolonged antibiotic treatment, obtained a bone scan to document any infection, and directed debridement, incision and drainage of the wound. The bone scan report indicated that Patient #1 "most likely" had developed osteomyelitis, a bone infection, at the base of the middle finger on the left hand. X-rays taken around the same time, on March 1, 1988, revealed findings consistent with osteomyelitis. Following the hospital admission, Respondent departed for Arizona for three days to attend a previously scheduled medical seminar, returning on February 27, 1988. While he was gone, however, Respondent spoke daily with Patient #1 by telephone and consulted with the physicians who were treating him. Dr. Alea suggested that Patient #1 be examined by another orthopedic physician, Dr. Moss, but when Dr. Moss came to see Patient #1 in the hospital, he was told the patient had already seen Respondent. The consult report prepared by Dr. Moss reflects no consult was had because the patient "wants treatment as now arranged under Dr. Bonati." Records of GCOC indicate that on March 1, 1988, Respondent spoke with patient #1's daughter by telephone indicating that if the patient did not come to the clinic that day, he would be released from Respondent's care. In fact, the patient did go to see Respondent on March 1 and 2, 1988 on pass from the hospital, but claims he did not refuse treatment by Dr. Moss. When Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 1, 1988, after noticing a greenish material on the patient's left palm which he thought might be pseudomonas, he elected to continue the antibiotic treatment that was initiated in the hospital. When the patient was released from the hospital on March 4, 1988, the wound was healing well. Dr. Sundaresh arranged for the patient to continue the intravenous antibiotic treatments through a home nursing services. The final diagnosis at the time of discharge was osteomeleyitis of the middle finger of the PIP joint on the left hand due to pseudomonas aeruginosa infection. Respondent saw Patient #1 in his office on March 7, 9, and 16, 1988, after the patient's discharge from the hospital. The patient was scheduled for another visit on March 22, 1988, but cancelled that appointment and also elected to discontinue the physical therapy Respondent had prescribed for him at GCOC. The hospital records show that while there, Patient #1 received daily physical therapy treatments consisting of whirlpool treatments to the hand and sterile dressings, starting on his admission on February 24, 1988, but no range of motion exercises. The physical therapy prescribed at GCOC by Respondent starting on March 8, 1988 included range of motion exercises which he continued until March 15, 1988. At the time of the last visit, on March 16, 1988, Respondent noted that the patient's wounds were healing well, but there was some limited range of motion. One of Petitioner's experts, Dr. Nadler, a board certified orthopedic surgeon with over 17 years experience, who is in practice with Dr. Angelides, to whom he refers all his hand surgery cases, opined that the standard of care for orthopedic surgery such as performed here by Respondent would be for the surgeon to have the ability to admit and follow the patient in a hospital if complications should arise. At very least, the surgeon should have the ability to make arrangements for another orthopedic surgeon to follow the patient in his absence. According to Dr. Nadler, it is not at all unusual for infection to occur in Dupuytren's Contracture release surgery. He concluded that Respondent fell below the standard of care when he performed a complicated surgical procedure on Patient #1 without having the personal ability to admit his patient to a hospital or to follow his patient's progress in the hospital in the event complications, such as an infection, should occur. He also concluded that Respondent's failure to have another orthopedic surgeon available to follow the patient while in the hospital was below standards as well. This opinion was shared by Petitioner's other expert, Dr. Visconti, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who, by his own admission, however, is not a hand surgeon specialist. Respondent's expert, Dr. Angelides, a board certified orthopedic surgeon who specializes exclusively in surgery to the hand and upper extremity, indicated that the presence of a green wound which exudes pus is consistent with infection. The standard of care for treating such an infection consists of cleaning the wound, obtaining cultures of the suspected infection, and seeing the patient again within a day or two for follow-up examination. In Angelides' opinion, Respondent's leaving the bandage on Patient #1's hand from the time of surgery on February 17 through February 24, without taking it off to check on the course of infection was not the way he would have handled the situation. However, he did not go so far as to state the Respondent's failure to do so was inappropriate, and he could find no impropriety in the way Respondent managed this case. Recognizing that the case presented here was about as severe an example of Dupuytren's Contracture as can be seen, Dr. Angiledes opined that the result achieved by Respondent was quite good considering the severity of the problem. He was not put off by the development of necrosis here, accepting that as a common complication in cases of this nature. He was satisfied by Respondent's calling in an infectious disease specialist and with the continuation of antibiotics administration after discharge through home health care. In his opinion, the surgery was appropriate and the ensuing complications common. The admission of the patient through an intermediary was not, to him, inappropriate so long as, as here, the patient continued to be seen by an infectious disease specialist. In substance, Dr. Angelides could see no problems with this case that were not properly handled and nothing that could have been done that was not done.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case finding Respondent not guilty of the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and ordering it dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. 30. & 31. Accepted. 32. - 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. - 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. 39. & 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. & 42. Accepted. 43. Accepted and incorporated herein. 44. & 45. No more than recitations of evidence. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as a classification of Respondent's treatment as "inappropriate." The deposition cited as authority for that comment does not support it. However, the action described and the time frame in question are accurately noted. Accepted. Accepted as a recitation of the witness' testimony. Rejected as to the description "well supported." & 52. Accepted as restatements of testimony. Accepted. See "50" above. Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not an evidentiary Finding of Fact. - 14. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 15. - 18. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 19. & 20. Accepted as restatements of testimony. 21A. - O. Not proper Findings of Fact. These are more Proposed Conclusions of Law which are drawn by the Hearing Officer independently in that portion of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven A. Rothenberg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33610 Paul B. Johnson, Esquire Johnson & Johnson, Post Office Box 3416 Tampa, Florida 33601 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Professional Regulation, should pay the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., attorney fees and costs under Section 57.011, Fla. Stat. (1989), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, the parties stipulate that the Petitioner is a "prevailing small business party" and that reasonable fees and costs exceed $15,000, the statutory cap. The only remaining issue under the statute is whether the Respondent was "substantially justified" in filing the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 90- 5986 against the Petitioner. 1/
Findings Of Fact On or about June 7, 1988, a complaint was filed against the license of the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., subsequent to closure of a professional malpractice liability claim against him without payment of indemnity. The substance of the complaint was that, on January 1, 1986, Woodson saw and performed a hysterectomy on a patient who had presented at the emergency room at University Community Hospital in Tampa, Florida, with heavy and continuous vaginal bleeding. The complaint stated that post-surgery the patient developed Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) and died. The complaint questioned whether Woodson failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. By letter dated June 30, 1988, the Department of Professional Regulation (the Department or DPR) notified Woodson that it had received the complaint and that it was initiating an investigation. DPR subpoenaed the hospital records which revealed that the patient arrived at the UCH emergency room at 5:28 a.m. on January 1, 1986, with at least a three-day history of vaginal hemorraging. An emergency room physician saw the patient, gave her two units of packed blood cells, and admitted her to Woodson's service. Woodson was called at approximately 8:30 a.m. and saw the patient later that morning. The patient's admission to surgery to determine the cause of the bleeding and perform necessary procedures was delayed until at least approximately 2:00 p.m. because the patient refused to consent to a dilation and curettage (D and C); she was insisting on a hysterectomy only. She finally consented to a D and C to be followed by a hysterectomy if Woodson found it to be medically necessary. During this delay, the patient continued to bleed and was transfused with two more units of packed blood cells at approximately 1:45 p.m. After the consent was given, there was a further delay, not explained by the records, until approximately 6:00 p.m. in getting the patient to surgery. The patient continued to bleed. Surgery took almost five hours. During surgery, the patient's bleeding got worse, and she was transfused with four more units of whole blood during the surgery. The DPR investigator was unable to ascertain from the hospital records the reason for the length of the surgery. The DPR investigator attempted to arrange an interview with Dr. Woodson and his attorney on or about February 28, 1989. The appointment was cancelled. When the DPR investigator contacted Woodson to reschedule the interview, Dr. Woodson questioned why DPR was pursuing the complaint when the malpractice claim was closed without payment of indemnity. Dr. Woodson agreed to be interviewed but expressed his preference that the investigator first review the "extensive depositions" taken in the malpractice litigation. 4/ Having already determined to request an expert evaluation of the case, the investigator decided to postpone the interview with Dr. Woodson. On July 10, 1989, the DPR asked a probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine to authorize the retention of an expert in gynecology to review the information obtained through investigation to that point in time to assist in the determination whether Woodson's treatment of the patient fell below that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On July 22, 1989, the probable cause met and authorized the expert review. On or about November 2, 1989, the DPR requested an expert review by Doris N. Carson, M.D., a Board-certified gynecologist with extensive surgical experience, including emergency room experience. Dr. Carson reviewed the hospital records supplied by DPR, some of which were difficult to read. By letter dated November 20, 1989, Dr. Carson reported her impressions. Dr. Carson believed the records supported Dr. Woodson's diagnosis and ultimate course of treatment. In the patient's condition, the proper course of treatment was to attempt to stop the vaginal bleeding by doing a D and C; a hysterectomy only should have been attempted if the D and C did not stop the bleeding. However, Dr. Carson perceived other problems that were not explained to her satisfaction by the hospital records. First, Dr. Carson did not see anything in the records to justify the length of the surgical procedures performed by Dr. Woodson. She reported: Careful review indicated that the subject attempted to remove the fibroids vaginally, and when this only increased the bleeding, then decided to do a laparotomy. The uterus, although enlarged, was not huge and the procedure as described seemed to move along without difficulty. When, however, the time is reviewed five hours would indicate very serious problems of technique or what seems more likely a lot if indecision about how to proceed. Evidently there was no physician surgical assistant, and the subject proceeded alone. In retrospect better operationg room help should have been available. Second, Dr. Carson felt that the patient received too much whole blood replacement during the course of the day and the surgery. Her reading of the hospital records indicated to her that five units of whole blood were given to the patient in addition to four units of packed cells. She felt: "Packed cells altogether would have been a better choice in light of the volume given to the patient." Her concern was that "volume overload," rather than ARDS, may have resulted ultimately in the death of the patient. However, she disclaimed the necessary expertise to render a conclusive opinion on the question and recommended that, if the DPR wanted a conclusive opinion on the cause of death, it should have a specialist in intensive care or a respiratory expert review the records. Dr. Carson had some difficulty with the delay in getting the patient to the operating room. The records indicated that at least some of the delay was caused by the patient's unwillingness to give consent to the recommended D and C. But Dr. Carson nonetheless had concerns that the delay added to the amount of blood transfused. Dr. Carson closed her letter with this remark: "In conclusion: A poorly done sugical proceeding below the recognized normal level of care." For reasons not apparent from the evidence presented, DPR did not interview Dr. Woodson before asking the probable cause panel to find probable cause and file a draft Administrative Complaint against Dr. Woodson based on Dr. Carson's expert review and the rest of the investigative report, including the hospital records. The draft Administrative Complaint, drawn in two counts, sought to discipline Dr. Woodson under Count I for failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in two respects: first, for allegedly causing volume overload in the patient by ordering units of whole blood, instead of packed blood, to replace the patient's blood loss; and, second, for allegedly taking too long, without justification, to perform the necessary surgery. Count II alleged that Woodson failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, specifically with respect to ordering whole blood instead of packed units and with respect to the length of the surgical procedures. The probable cause panel considered the matter at its meeting on June 22, 1990. Counsel for the panel pointed out that the "extensive depositions" Woodson had indicated he wanted the DPR investigator to read before Woodson was interviewed were not in the packet of materials reviewed by the panel. 5/ But members of the panel indicated that they had reviewed the material that was in the packet and that they thought the information contained in it was adequate to make a probable cause determination. One of the doctors on the panel called it a "horrendous case." She felt that Woodson had "swamped out the patient" and had performed "inappropriate types of fluid therapy and blood therapy." The other member mentioned the "five-hour operating time . . . without any real explanation." The panel's attorney pointed out the part of the report of investigation that referenced the patient's refusal to consent to Dr. Woodson's proposed surgery and asked whether it constituted "any semblance of an explanation for a delay?" It is not clear from the transcript of the probable cause proceeding how the panel resolved the attorney's question, but the panel voted to find probable cause notwithstanding the question. 6/ There is information in the materials reviewed by Dr. Carson, and by the probable cause panel, which tends to explain some of the time it took for Dr. Woodson to perform surgery on the patient. Some of this partially exculpatory information was difficult to read and decipher in the records. Some of the partially exculpatory information was acknowledged by Dr. Carson and may also have been taken into account independently by the panel. Notwithstanding this partially exculpatory information in the record, the finding of probable cause was substantially justified.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a medical doctor, in his treatment of Patient M.A., failed to keep legible medical records in violation of section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2007); prescribed or administered inappropriate or excessive quantities of controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes (2007); committed medical malpractice by practicing below the standard of care in violation of section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2007); failed to perform a statutory or legal obligation placed upon a licensed physician in violation of section 458.331(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2007); and violated any provision of chapter 458 or chapter 456, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto in violation of section 458.331(1)(nn), Florida Statutes (2007), as Petitioner alleges in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint; if so, whether (and what) disciplinary measures should be imposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Paul M. Goldberg, M.D., violated sections 458.331(1)(g) and (nn), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts IV and V of the Complaint; Dismissing Counts I-III of the Complaint; Imposing $20,000 in administrative fines; issuing a reprimand against Dr. Goldberg's medical license; requiring Dr. Goldberg to complete the "Laws and Rules" Course; suspending Dr. Goldberg's medical license until such time as Dr. Goldberg undergoes a "UF CARES" evaluation; and placing Dr. Goldberg's license on probation for three years under indirect supervision with 100 percent chart review of cosmetic surgery patients and 25 percent chart review of all other patients. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2015.
