The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against a medical doctor on the basis of alleged violations of paragraphs (d), (g), (k), (m), (n) and (t) of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The violations charged relate primarily to allegations that the Respondent improperly ordered and performed certain allegedly unnecessary tests, failed to keep appropriate records, and deceived and exploited a patient.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Eric Dale Rosenkrantz, M. D., is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0045339. The Respondent's last known address is 12900 N.E. 17 Avenue, Suite 205, North Miami, Florida 33181. The Respondent is board certified in Internal Medicine and he is board eligible in Cardiovascular medicine. On October 18, 1989, a Health Fair was held at the Diplomat Mall in Hallandale, Florida. The Health Fair had been advertised by distribution of a written news release. The Respondent did not participate in the preparation of the news release, nor had he seen a copy of the news release prior to the date of the Health Fair. The news release read, in pertinent part: . . . Make good health a priority in your life. It's much better to take a few tests and learn effective disease prevention than to fall victim to a crippler. As a community service, Diplomat Mall sponsors a free Health Fair on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday (October 17-19). The public may take advantage of free screenings, a low cost cholesterol test and receive helpful advice. Dr. Lloyd Morris, who also serves as the Health Fair Coordinator, will offer cholesterol tests for five dollars. In addition, he'll conduct spinal screenings. If you're having trouble listening and not catching every word, check with the Hearing Aid Center's expert for a hearing test. A local cardiologist will consult with visitors regarding their health patterns and will give carotid artery tests. For those battling to stop smoking, there will be a unique Stop Smoking Computer. Dental screenings and information on cosmetic dentistry will be available. Dr. Braverman will examine and evaluate eyes and eye problems. NSA will provide a pure water display illustrating the dangers of untreated waters. COLOR ME THIN, an innovative consulting service will provide clinical nutritional counseling and discuss colors in relation to energy levels of the body. Representatives of the Medical Alert System will also be in attendance during the free Health Fair at the Diplomat Mall, located on East Hallandale Beach Boulevard in Hallandale. (Emphasis added) The Respondent participated in the Health Fair described above. The Respondent was the only cardiologist who participated in that Health Fair. 4/ In connection with the Health Fair the Respondent did not have any signs offering free testing or any other free services. During the course of the Health Fair described above, the Respondent had a booth in the mall. He and his technologist were demonstrating a diagnostic ultrasound machine, which visualizes internal and external carotid arteries on a screen, and were handing out papers regarding risk factors for heart disease. On October 18, 1989, while the Health Fair was in progress, E. G. went to the Diplomat Mall where, among other things, she saw the Respondent's booth. Prior to going to the mall that day, E. G. had seen a newspaper advertisement about the Health Fair, but she had not seen the press release described and quoted above. E. G. approached the Respondent's booth where she communicated with one or more of the people who were attending the booth. As a result of those communications, 5/ the Respondent was escorted to the Respondent's office in the mall. At the Respondent's office E. G. provided her health insurance card to the Respondent's nurse. The nurse made a photocopy of the card and returned it to E. G. The nurse then took a preliminary screening medical history from E. G. by asking E. G. a series of questions and noting the responses on a printed form. 6/ The preliminary medical history given by E. G. included that she was 64 years old, had suffered a prior heart attack, was a diabetic on medication, had a history of heart disease in her family, and had a personal physician named Dr. Gorin. E. G. also related current symptoms of dizziness, numbness in her hands and feet, and shortness of breath. The preliminary history form included a place for the patient's signature at the bottom of the form. Immediately above the signature line the following statement appears on the form: I completely understand that the follow-thru test for arterial blockage (if deemed necessary by the examining physician of this program) will be billed to my insurance carrier or Medicare. I understand that this assignment of my health insurance is extended as a courtesy to me to avoid up front out-of- pocket costs. E. G. signed the form at the place indicated immediately under the statement quoted immediately above. After signing the form described above, E. G. was escorted to an examination room where she was further questioned about her medical history and current symptoms by the Respondent. E. G. repeated to the Respondent that she was suffering from shortness of breath, numbness in her left arm, and dizziness which lasted for several minutes at a time. E. G. also told the Respondent that she had not seen Dr. Gorin for a long time and that it had been a long time since she had undergone a complete examination. After eliciting her history and current symptoms, the Respondent conducted a physical examination of the patient E. G. The physical examination included taking her blood pressure, measuring her respiratory rate,examination of her eyes, neck, carotid sounds, and chest, cardiac auscultation, and palpation of her extremities for pulses. The Respondent's findings on examination were that the patient E. G. had a normal blood pressure, a pulse rate of 78, a respiratory rate of 18, arcus senilis, a bruit on the left carotid artery, a laterally displaced point of maximum intensity, a heart murmur, and decreased pulses in her extremities. Arcus senilis is a sign of arteriosclerosis, which is a thickening of the arterial vessels. Arteriosclerosis is the most common cause of coronary artery disease. A laterally displaced point of maximum intensity is a finding that is common in hypertensive patients. A heart murmur is indicative of some back flow or other insufficiency of one of the heart valves. Decreased pulses in the extremities is indicative of a possible arterial blockage. On the basis of the history he obtained from the patient and the results of his physical examination of the patient, the Respondent reached the following preliminary diagnostic impression: "Hypertensive cardiovascular disease, myocardial ischemia, mitral regurgitation, claudication, and cerebral insufficiency." On the basis of his preliminary impression, the Respondent recommended that the patient E. G. undergo the following tests: cardiac doppler (echocardiogram), carotid imaging, upper arterial doppler, venous doppler, atrioventricular 1000 venous, and atrioventricular 1000 arterial tests. The patient E. G. agreed to undergo the recommended tests, which were then performed by a technologist employed by the Respondent. 7/ The patient's history and the results of the physical examination of the patient were a sufficient basis for going forward with the tests recommended by the Respondent. Each of the tests was justified by the patient's symptoms and by the results of the physical examination of the patient. Each of the tests was reasonably calculated to assist the Respondent in arriving at a diagnosis of patient E. G.'s condition. In view of the patient's symptoms and the findings during the physical examination, it was not a departure from accepted standards of care for the Respondent to recommend the tests described above and have them performed on the patient E. G. All of the tests described in Paragraph 14, above, are tests commonly used by cardiologists for the purpose of diagnosis. Many cardiologists perform those tests in their own offices, rather than send patients elsewhere for such testing. The Respondent's medical records regarding the patient E. G. are sufficient to justify the course of treatment for the patient. Those records contain all information a subsequent treating physician would need to know about the Respondent's treatment of the patient. The records do not depart from accepted standards of care. The Respondent subsequently billed E. G. $3,230.00 for the recommended tests and other services. E. G.'s insurance company rejected payment for the subject tests because her insurance coverage had expired.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1994.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came on for consideration before the Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency”), which finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency issued a letter of disqualification to the Petitioner. (Exhibit 1) 2. The Petitioner requested a formal hearing and the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). 3. The parties have since entered into a settlement agreement (Exhibit 2), which is adopted and incorporated by reference. Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 4, The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The letter of disqualification is WITHDRAWN and the Agency shall change the Petitioner’s status to “eligible” in the Agency’s background screening system. 5. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees, This matter is closed. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this o2/_ day of 2012. CL Elizabeth Dudék, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Filed August 21, 2012 2:32 PM Division of Administrative Hearings
Other Judicial Opinions A party that is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek judicial review which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the agency clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofjhis Final Order was served on the below- named persons/entities by the method designated on this day of 25 2012. ‘oop, Agency Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) TT. aylor Haddock, Supervisor Background Screening Unit Bureau of Long Term Care Services Agency for Health Care Administration Electronic Mail Sharon K. Jones, Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) E.T, Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Mark A, Dresnick, Esquire One Datran Center, Suite 1610 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7817 U.S. Mail
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to regulate the practice of medicine within the State of Florida. At all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, Respondent is and has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0017104. On April 21, 1986, the Board of Medical Examiners, now known as the Board of Medicine (Board), issued a final order which provided for the following conditions in connection with a stipulated disposition of an administrative dispute involving the Respondent. In pertinent part, that order required: the Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000 in payments of $2,000; that the Respondent's license to practice medicine in Florida be placed on probation for a five year period; and that a monitoring physician make regular visits to Respondent's office and submit appropriate reports to the Board regarding Respondent's performance. On August 10, 1987, the Board of Medicine entered a final order which accepted the recommended order entered by a Hearing Officer on July 6, 1987. That recommended order found that the Respondent had violated the terms of the prior final order previously entered in a disciplinary proceeding (the final order described in paragraph 3). The Board imposed a three month suspension in connection with the violations and further clarified the terms of Respondent's probation. On March 1, 1988, the Board of Medicine filed a final order which extended Respondent's suspension for an additional 90 days in connection with additional violations of chapter 458 related to his failure to comply with the terms of the probation previously imposed upon him. On June 21, 1988, the Board of Medicine filed a final order which suspended Respondent's license to practice medicine until completion of continuing medical education courses and further specified that upon completion of the license suspension, Respondent's license to practice medicine would be on probation for a period of five years. That final order amended the due dates for the payment of the installments of the administrative fine to require a $2000 payment no later than December, 1988, and a $2000 payment no later than June, 1989. Subsequently, the Respondent requested that the terms of probation be modified and on March 22, 1989, an Order was entered by the Board of Medicine which granted several modifications to the terms of Respondent1s probation. That order provided that Dr. John S. Curran would serve as Respondent's supervising physician for Respondent's practice of pediatric medicine. On September 19, 1989, Dr. Curran wrote to the Board of Medicine to request that he be released from any further supervision responsibility for the Respondent. That letter provided, in part: Please be advised that I have received information that Dr. Archie Jones has closed his practice in Lutz, Florida. I last submitted a report late July 1989 when I visited his office and I reviewed all patient files. He informs me that he has seen between five and ten patients since the time of my review and the closure of his office approximately 12 August 1989. It is my understanding that he intends to move to the state of Georgia. I would respectfully request release from any further supervision responsibility for Dr. Jones effective the date of closure of his office. On November 14, 1989, Dorothy Faircloth as Executive Director for the Board of Medicine notified the Respondent that Dr. Curran had written requesting release from any further supervision responsibility. Further, that letter advised Respondent that: You are advised that according to the Final Order of the Florida Board of Medicine you may only practice under the supervision of a board certified pediatrician approved by the Board. To practice without the proper supervision is in direct violation of the Final Order and is grounds for further disciplinary action. The letter described above was received by the Respondent on November 27, 1989. On November 28, 1989, Respondent executed a Petition for Modification of Payment Schedule which requested an extension of time for payment of the balance of the fine amount due November 30, 1989. Respondent sought a payment date of May 30, 1990 for the final $2000 payment owed. That petition provided, in part: 4. That because of adverse publicity which negated patients, Respondents was forced to close his office in July of 1989 and has not been able to secure employment since that date. A letter written by Respondent to his landlords on stationery styled "Lutz Pediatric Center" stated: "It is with a heavy heart that I write to say that I have had to close the Lutz Pediatric Center as of 9/8/89." That letter was dated September 14, 1989. A second letter written by Respondent "To whom it may concern" provided that: "As of 8/11/89 my office at the above address will be permanently closed for the practice of pediatrics." This letter was purportedly written on July 30, 1989, to advise the Department of the closure of the Respondent's office and his new mailing address of P.O. Box 757, Safety Harbor, Florida. On November 28, 1989, the Respondent telephoned in a prescription for a patient, D.T., to Freddy's pharmacy in Tampa, Florida. This prescription, for a legend drug known as Keflex, was requested for an adult friend of the Respondent's for whom Respondent had not made a medical examination nor received a fee for his services in connection with the prescription. On February 17, 1990, the Respondent received a notice that his request for an extension on the payment of the administrative fine had been denied. That notice requested that Respondent submit the remaining $2000 to the Board office within five days of the receipt of the letter. On February 21, 1990, the Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition in the Middle District of Florida. The discharge of debtor was entered by that court on May 25, 1990. Initially, Respondent was uncertain as to whether the administrative fine which had been due November 30, 1989, would be discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings. He paid the $2000 into his attorney's escrow account pending resolution of the legal issue. The exact date of that payment is uncertain. However, on June 20, 1990, Respondent, through his attorney, remitted the final $2000 payment to the Board of Medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that the Respondent, Archbold M. Jones, M.D., violated Section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license for a period of two years. DONE and ENTERED this 29 day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed this 29 day of November, 1990 with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3591 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 4, it is accepted that the Respondent was to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $8,000 with installments of $2000. Otherwise, rejected as irrelevant or immaterial to the allegations of this case. It is undisputed that the final $2000 payment was not remitted by Respondent until June, 1990. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are accepted in substance. To the extent that a clarification of the terms of Respondent's probation were required incidental to a subsequent disciplinary action, paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted in that it accurately depicts the action taken by the probationary committee, however, that information was not contemporaneously shared with Respondent. The Respondent was, by then, not practicing at the Lutz Pediatric Center and therefore not in need of supervision (theoretically) since he was not supposed to be practicing. That he did so by issuing the prescription on November 28, 1989, is the crux of this case. As explained in paragraph 6 above, paragraph 12 is accepted. It should be noted that Respondent was not to be practicing medicine at the time in issue (November 28, 1989) at all. With regard to paragraph 13, it is accepted that the Respondent did not have an office at the Lutz address in October, 1989; otherwise, rejected as inaccurate statement of fact. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 15 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is accepted but the Respondent has presented a reasonable explanation for the failure to timely remit the payment. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. With regard to paragraph 20, it is accepted that at the time the prescription was telephoned in, Respondent's Lutz office was closed; otherwise rejected as speculation or irrelevant since at that time Respondent was not supposed to be practicing medicine at all. With regard to paragraph 21, it is accepted that Respondent by prescribing the substance practiced medicine other than as required under the terms of his probation. Otherwise, rejected as contrary to the evidence or irrelevant. See comments above. Paragraphs 22 and 23 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. Paragraph 3 is accepted but is irrelevant since at the time the prescription was made Respondent knew that Dr. Curran had requested to be released because Respondent was closing his office and would not be in the practice of medicine. But for Respondent's insistence that the office would be closed, Dr. Curran would not have requested release. Paragraph 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent's account of whether he would or would not have issued the prescription was totally incredible. Respondent took the position that telephoning the prescription was not practicing medicine, a totally fallacious assertion. But for his license, Respondent would not be privileged to request prescriptions on behalf of others. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 6, the exact time Respondent notified the Board or the Department became aware of Respondent's accurate address is not established by this record. It is accepted that the Board did have access to Respondent's whereabouts at all material times. Otherwise the paragraph is rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 are rejected as irrelevant or argument; see comment to paragraph 6 above. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 12, it is accepted that Respondent requested an extension within which to pay the final $2000 installment. Otherwise, rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence. Paragraph 13 is accepted. Paragraphs 14 and 15 are rejected as irrelevant, argument, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraph 16 is accepted in substance; the exact date the monies were placed in escrow is not known. With regard to paragraph 17, it is accepted that ultimately the Respondent remitted the final $2000 payment and that such payment was made approximately one month after the discharge was entered by the bankruptcy court. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb Chief Trial Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 730 South Sterling Street Suite 201 Tampa, Florida 33609 Jerry Gottlieb GOTTLIEB & GOTTLIEB, P.A. 2753 State Road 580, Suite 204 Clearwater, Florida 34621 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue On April 17, 2015, Respondent, Department of Health, issued a Notice of Agency Action Denial of License Renewal ("First Denial Notice"), notifying Petitioner, Alicia Chilito, M.D., that it had denied her application for renewal of her physician license. Thereafter, on May 19, 2015, Respondent issued an Amended Notice of Agency Action Denial of License Renewal ("Second Denial Notice"), reiterating, and stating alternative grounds for, its denial of Petitioner's physician license. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's decision and the matter was referred to DOAH to conduct a hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1). The final hearing initially was scheduled for August 14, 2015, but pursuant to motions, was set for December 16, 2015. On August 14, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, contending that there were no disputed issues of material fact to be resolved in a hearing conducted under section 120.57(1). This motion was denied by order issued on September 1, 2015, on the basis that disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether Petitioner was entitled to renewal of her license by default pursuant to section 120.60(1). On December 11, 2015, Respondent filed Department of Health's Motion in Limine, seeking to limit the scope of the final hearing. A telephonic motion hearing was conducted on December 15, 2015, the day before the final hearing. The undersigned granted the motion and excluded evidence that may be offered at the final hearing to challenge the underlying factual basis on which the Termination Final Order was entered. The final hearing was held on December 16, 2015. Joint Exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted into evidence. Petitioner did not present any witnesses. Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 10 were tendered but not admitted, and were proffered for inclusion in the record. Respondent presented the testimony of Heidi Nitty. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence without objection and Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6 were admitted over objection. Official recognition was taken of the Final Order issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") in the case of Agency for Health Care Administration v. Alicia Chilito, M.D., Case No. 12-571PH (AHCA November 4, 2013) and the Order Granting Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction in the case of Agency for Health Care Administration v. Alicia Chilito, M.D., Case No. 12-0859MPI (Fla. DOAH July 12, 2012). The one-volume Transcript was filed on January 8, 2016, and the parties were given until January 19, 2016, to file proposed recommended orders. The parties timely filed proposed recommended orders, which were duly considered in preparing this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alicia Chilito, M.D., is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida pursuant to License No. ME 74131. Respondent, Department of Health, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, including licensing physicians pursuant to chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2015). Petitioner timely filed a Renewal Notice, which constituted her application to renew her physician license.1/ Respondent received Petitioner's Application on January 5, 2015. Respondent did not, within 30 days of receipt of her application, request Petitioner to provide any additional information that it was permitted by law to require, nor did it notify her of any apparent errors or omissions in her application. Accordingly, Petitioner's application was complete on January 5, 2015, by operation of section 120.60(1), for purposes of commencing the 90-day period for Respondent to approve or deny her application.2/ The 90-day period from Respondent's receipt of Petitioner's complete application expired on or about April 6, 2015.3/ Heidi Nitty, a government analyst I with Respondent, was involved in the review of Petitioner's application. Her specific role in the application review process was "reviewing court documents and other orders for possible denial of renewal and also recording [Respondent's] final orders in the national practitioner database." In the course of Nitty's review, she determined that Petitioner previously had been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program. Accordingly, she entered a "do-not-renew modifier" to Petitioner's license application file in Respondent's computer system. On January 20, 2015, Petitioner called Respondent to inquire about the status of her application. She was referred to Ms. Nitty, who was not available to speak to her at that time. Petitioner and Nitty exchanged calls over the course of that day, but did not speak to each other until January 21, 2015, when Petitioner again called, and that time, reached, Nitty. At that point, Nitty verbally informed Petitioner that her application "was being denied" due to having previously been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program. On April 17, 2015——some 102 days after Petitioner filed her complete application——Respondent issued its First Denial Notice, notifying Petitioner that it was denying her application. The First Denial Notice stated that Petitioner's license renewal was being denied pursuant to section 456.0635(2)(e) because she was listed on the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General's List of Excluded Individuals and Entities.4/ On May 19, 2015——some 134 days after Petitioner filed her complete application——Respondent issued its Second Denial Notice, again stating its intent to deny Petitioner's application. However, the Second Denial Notice stated that Petitioner's license renewal was being denied pursuant to section 456.0635(3)(c) because she had been terminated for cause from the Florida Medicaid Program pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the Termination Final Order issued by AHCA on March 6, 2014. The stated basis for AHCA's March 6, 2014, Termination Final Order was that Petitioner previously had been terminated from the federal Medicare program and the Florida Medicaid program. The Termination Final Order is a final order issued by AHCA, who is not a party to this proceeding. Petitioner disputes the underlying factual basis for AHCA's Termination Final Order and claims that, in any event, she did not receive the notice, issued on January 17, 2014, that AHCA was proposing to terminate her from the Florida Medicaid program; thus, she did not challenge the proposed termination. Although Petitioner has raised these challenges to the Termination Final Order in her Petition for Hearing Involving Disputed Issues of Material Fact filed in this proceeding, the undersigned is not authorized to "reopen" AHCA's Termination Final Order and revisit its factual and legal underpinnings5/ so declined to take evidence on those issues at the final hearing in this proceeding.6/ Petitioner asserts that because Respondent's First Denial Notice and Second Denial Notice both were issued more than 90 days after Respondent received her complete application, she is entitled to licensure by default under section 120.60(1). Respondent counters that the 90-day period for approving or denying Petitioner's license commenced on February 4, 2015, so its First Denial Notice was timely issued. Respondent further asserts that, in any event, Nitty's statement to Petitioner during their January 21, 2015, telephone discussion satisfied the "90-day approval or denial requirement" in section 120.60(1), so that Petitioner is not entitled to issuance of a renewed license by default. It is undisputed that AHCA did not issue the written notices of its decision to deny Petitioner's license renewal until well after April 6, 2015. Therefore, unless Nitty's statement to Petitioner on their January 21, 2015, telephone call constituted Respondent's denial of Petitioner's application within 90 days after its receipt, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of her license by default, pursuant to section 120.60(1). The evidence establishes that when Nitty told Petitioner on January 21, 2015——notably, in response to communication that Petitioner initiated——that her license "was being denied," Respondent had not yet made its final decision to deny her application, so had not yet "approved or denied" Petitioner's license. Nitty's role in the application review process was limited to determining whether Petitioner previously had been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program, and, if so, to draft a denial letter for review and approval by her superiors. That is precisely what she did. Based on her confirmation that Petitioner had previously been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program, Nitty drafted a denial letter, which was then sent up Respondent's "chain of command" for approval or rejection, and, ultimately, for signature by Respondent's Deputy Secretary for Administration. The "chain of command" included her immediate supervisor, the bureau chief, the division director, and legal counsel——any and all of whom had the authority to reject her recommendation. To that point, Nitty acknowledged that the denial letter she drafted had "some rewrite issues" and that her supervisor, had, in fact, rewritten the letter. Nitty was not the person authorized by Respondent to make its final, binding decision to approve or deny Petitioner's application, and she did not know who actually made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's license renewal. Thus, at bottom, when Nitty told Petitioner that her license "was being denied," she was only conveying her preliminary assessment, as application review staff, that Petitioner's application was being denied. Nitty's communication of her preliminary assessment could not, and did not, constitute Respondent's "approval or denial" of Petitioner's application.7/ Thus, Respondent did not approve or deny Petitioner's application within the 90-day approval/denial period. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.60(1), Petitioner's application is "considered approved." There is no evidence showing that, as of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner had notified Respondent's agency clerk of her intent to rely on the default license provision in section 120.60(1).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that: (1) acknowledges that Petitioner's application for renewal of License No. ME 74131 is considered approved pursuant to section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, and (2) directs Respondent's agency clerk, upon Petitioner's notification to said agency clerk that complies with section 120.60(1), to issue Petitioner's license, which may include such reasonable conditions as Respondent is authorized by law to require. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2016.
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner seeks to recover his attorney's fees and costs incurred when defending an action brought against him by the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine. The issue for determination is whether Respondent, the state agency charged with regulation of the professional conduct of physicians in the State of Florida, was substantially justified with regard to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner, a licensed physician, in DOAH Case No. 90-4205, DPR Case No. 89-05921, and whether, in the absence of such substantial justification, Petitioner is entitled to the award of the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought, or if there exists special circumstances which would make an award unjust.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state agency which initiated a proceeding with the filing of an Administrative Complaint against Ronald F. David, M.D. As stipulated, Petitioner's Attorney's Fees and Costs are not unreasonable. Petitioner was the prevailing small business party in the underlying case, Department of Professional Regulation v. Ronald F. David, M.D., DOAH Case No. 90-04205, DPR Case No. 89-05921, when the case against Dr. David was dismissed on January 25, 1991. As stipulated, there are no known circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. The one remaining issue of fact to be determined is whether sufficient evidence was presented to the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine to support a finding of probable cause against the Petitioner, and whether the Panel properly considered that evidence. S. A. was a premature infant who had a patent ductus arteriosus (PDA). Petitioner, a pediatric surgeon with credentials to do general surgery, pediatric surgery, and chest surgery, was consulted by S. A.'s pediatrician. Petitioner, in turn, consulted Dr. Johnston, a thoracic cardiovascular surgeon, concerning surgery to close S. A.'s PDA. Dr. Johnston performed the surgery with Petitioner as assistant surgeon on May 31, 1986, at the Orlando Regional Medical Center. Petitioner had assisted in numerous such surgical procedures in the past but did not hold himself out as competent to perform them on his own. At surgery the left pulmonary artery was mistakenly ligated instead of the PDA. S. A.'s condition deteriorated and tests indicated the probable mistaken ligation. The baby was transferred to Shands Hospital where she died before a second operation could be performed. Autopsy revealed the mistaken ligation and the pathologist implicated the compromised cardiopulmonary system as a cause of death. No anatomical anomalies of the vessels were noted at autopsy. On the basis of a closed claim report to the Department of Professional Regulation, the circumstances surrounding the death of S. A. were reviewed by a physician employed by the Department's Division of Medical Quality Assurance. Petitioner was informed of this review on January 13, 1989. Review of the medical records resulted in cases being opened against three of the seven physicians who participated in the care of S. A. Petitioner was notified of the case by certified mail on August 1, 1989. Petitioner was interviewed on August 10, 1989. Dr. Johnston was interviewed by the same investigator on August 25, 1989. According to the investigator's notes, Petitioner stated that Dr. Johnston did not consult him during the surgery, that the anatomy did not appear to be the same as in prior cases, but that he did not question Dr. Johnston's decision as to which vessel to ligate. Dr. Johnston stated that he asked Petitioner to examine the anatomy when he (Johnston) had located what he thought was the ductus, and that Petitioner obliged by examining the operation field, but did not object to the procedure. The medical records of S. A. were obtained by subpoena from the Orlando Regional Medical Center. On February 5, 1990, both Petitioner's and Dr. Johnston's investigative files were sent to Dr. William Price, a thoracic and vascular surgeon, for his review. The letter requesting his opinion clearly separates the actions of Petitioner and Dr. Johnston to be considered. On February 21, 1990, Dr. Price's analysis stated, "The assistant, Dr. Ronald David, should have been accomplished enough to recognize the proper anatomy, but the ultimated [sic] responsibility was not his." (Respondent's exhibit 2, 3) The cases, Department of Professional Regulation v. Ronald F. David, M.D., DPR Case No. 89-05921, and Department of Professional Regulation v. Alan Johnston, M.D., DPR Case No. 89-05922, were prepared for the Probable Cause Panel meeting scheduled for May 11, 1990. Materials were sent to the three Panel members and their counsel at least one week in advance of the meeting. Materials sent to the panel included the complete investigative case file, including any exhibits, and a recommendation from the Department. Present at the meeting of the Panel on May 11, 1990 were: Dr. Robert Katims, Chairman of the Probable Cause Panel, Dr. Marilyn Wells and Mr. Gilbert Rodriguez, members of the Panel; Ms. Catherine Lannon, Assistant Attorney General and counsel to the Panel; Mr. Carlos Ramos and Ms. Stephanie Daniel, attorneys from the Department of Professional Regulation, and Mr. Brian Lynch, Administrative Assistant at the Department, whose duty it was to prepare and distribute materials for the Panel's consideration. Ms. Lannon instructed the Panel members to direct any questions concerning their legal duties and interpretation of laws or rules to her. She cautioned the Panel members that any factual questions concerning the investigation or why a certain recommendation was made were to be directed to the Departmental attorneys. She asked if the members had sufficient time to review all the materials sent to them; each member replied in the affirmative. And she cautioned the members that it must be clearly stated or implied from the record that the members are making independent judgments on the cases and that they are discussing the correct case. The Panel first considered Dr. Johnston's case. The Department recommended that an Administrative Complaint be filed alleging that Dr. Johnston practiced below the standard of care in that, "[He] inadvertently ligated the left pulmonary artery instead of the patient ductus arteriosus, by relying on the anesthesiologist's observation that the murmur had disappeared and the surgical assistant's failure to object or recognize the proper anatomy." (Respondent's exhibit 1, page 4-5) The Panel was informed that Petitioner's companion case was on the agenda. The Panel at this time discussed Petitioner at some length, including Petitioner's role as the referring physician, that Petitioner assisted at the surgery, that Petitioner was not a chest but a pediatric surgeon, and that Dr. Johnston and Petitioner disagreed as what was said and done by whom at the operation. Dr. Wells acknowledged that the surgeon in charge in the "captain of the ship"; the Chairman, Dr. Katims, in response to a question from Ms. Lannon, denied that the assistant surgeon is exonerated from all responsibility. Thereupon Probable Cause was found in Dr. Johnston's case and the Panel voted to file an Administrative Complaint. (Respondent's exhibit 1, page 7-8) The Panel later in the meeting considered Petitioner's case. The Department had recommended that Probable Cause be found and a letter of guidance be issued. Mr. Ramos presented the basic facts to the Panel. Both physicians on the Panel immediately disagreed with the Department's recommendation and requested an Administrative Complaint to be filed against Petitioner. The Panel affirmed its two main concerns: that Petitioner referred the patient to Dr. Johnston, and that at surgery Dr. Johnston said he specifically asked the Petitioner to review his ligation. (Petitioner's exhibit 4, page 6-7) Consideration of the transcripts of both Dr. Johnston's and Petitioner's cases reveals that there was considerable discussion and awareness by the panel of the specifics of S. A.'s case, that they were quite sensitive to the fact that Petitioner was the assistant surgeon and that he denied he was asked to verify the procedure. The vote was unanimous that Probable Cause be found and that an Administrative Complaint be filed against Petitioner. The Administrative Complaint was duly filed on May 22, 1990, alleging Petitioner fell below the standard of care by failing to object to any part of the procedure performed by Dr. Johnston and by failing to point out the proper anatomy for ligation. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) In a subsequent meeting of the Probable Cause Panel, the Department presented it's recommendation that Petitioner's case be closed without prosecution based on a second expert's opinion that " . . . ligation of the wrong vessel was a known but although unfortunate complication of this procedure but not necessarily below the standard of care . . . " (Petitioner's Exhibit 12, 1). This recommendation was eventually accepted. The ultimate dismissal of the complaint does not negate the fact that at the time that probable cause was found, the panel had sufficient and competent information upon which it made its decision. It had conflicting statements by the two physicians; it had an expert's opinion; and it had extensive medical reports. It was not required to seek out sufficient evidence to assure success in a formal hearing on the complaint.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner achieved a passing score on the Laws and Rules Part of the August 13, 1993, Optometry Examination and thereby receiving an overall passing grade.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying the relief sought by the Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this day 18th of February, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5809 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner, James R. Coppola's Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner did not number his proposed findings of fact; however, I have taken the liberty to number them 1 through 14, beginning with the second full paragraph. Proposed findings of fact 1 and 3 are covered in the Preliminary Statement of the Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 2, 11 and 13 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed findings of fact 4 - 10, 12 and 14 are rejected for the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 7 - 19. Respondent, Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent has broken his proposed findings of fact into three categories and numbered each category separately; however, I have taken the liberty to renumber them 1 through 20, beginning with number 1 under Statement of the Case through 5 under Second Challenge. The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(3,4); 8-9(10); 10(12); 11(18); 12(9); 14(7); 15(10); 16(14); 17(15); 18(18) and; 19-20(14). Proposed findings of fact 2 - 7 are covered in the Preliminary Statement of the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 13 is adopted in Finding of Fact 10, except that portion concerning the statement that the language "not to exceed $2500" does not appear in Chapter 21Q-15, Florida Administrative Code, which is rejected. See the language of Chapter 21Q-15, Florida Administrative Code, in Finding of Fact 10. COPIES FURNISHED: James B. Coppola 254 Felton Avenue Port Charlotte, Florida 33952 William M. Woodyard, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Board of Optometry Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
