Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Central Phosphates, Inc. ("CPI"), a Delaware corporation, engaged in the business of processing phosphate and manufacturing phosphate fertilizer. Petitioner rents and operates a phosphate fertilizer processing plant which is located in the vicinity of Plant City, Florida (the "Plant"). At issue in this proceeding is whether a sales tax under Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), is due on the rental of the Plant. The Plant was constructed in 1974. The construction was financed in an arrangement involving CF Realty, a sister company of CPI which is wholly owned along with CPI by CF Industries, Inc. CF Realty originally purchased the equipment and other personal property that constitute the Plant from certain contractors. CF Realty then sold the Plant to Plantlease Corporation ("Plantlease"), a New York for profit corporation. Plantlease is a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Guarantee Company, a New York lending institution. Plantlease was organized solely and specifically to acquire title to the Plant and to lease the Plant back to CPI, which would operate the Plant. Plantlease paid for the Plant by assuming CF Realty's indebtedness on the construction loan and by paying some additional cash. Plantlease then leased the Plant to CPI for an initial term of 15 years. At the end of this initial term CPI has the right to elect to extend the lease for an additional two years or it may elect to purchase the Plant from Plantlease. At the end of the first extended term, CPI has the option of renewing the lease for a second renewal term of two years, or purchasing the Plant. If the lease is extended to the full 19 years, CPI is entitled to purchase the Plant at the end of that term. CPI makes quarterly rental payments to Plantlease pursuant to the lease. Since the first payment of rent in May, 1975, CPI has also been paying to Plantlease a sales tax of four percent of the amount of each payment pursuant to Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977). Plantlease, in turn, has remitted these payments to the Florida Department of Revenue with which it has registered as a dealer. Plantlease, as a potential claimant of a refund of the allegedly erroneously paid rental tax, has waived its right to a refund as reflected in its letter dated May 4, 1978, to the Florida Department of Revenue. Since May, 1975, CPI has paid sales taxes into the State Treasury in the amount of $861,322.55 which rental tax along with all other rental tax payments paid on the Plant since May, 1978, would be refunded if CPI were not liable for the rental tax. On May 8, 1978, CPI filed an Application for Refund with the Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida seeking a refund of the amount allegedly erroneously paid by CPI to the State Treasury and giving reasons for the claim for a refund. CPI bases its claim for a refund on the grounds that the Plantlease rental of the Plant to CPI constitutes an occasional or isolated sales transaction under Section 212.02 (9), Florida Statutes (1977). By letter dated May 30, 1978, the Comptroller's Office denied CPI's Application for Refund and determined that CPI's transaction with Plantlease was not exempt from Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (1977), and the regulations pursuant thereto. On or about July 7, 1978, CPI timely filed a Petition for a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1977), hearing on the issue of whether, for aforementioned reasons, a refund was due on the sales tax paid on the Plant. By application dated May 9, 1975, and received by respondent on May 12, 1975, Plantlease applied to respondent for a certificate of registration to engage in or conduct business as a dealer. Item 10 on the form application calls for "Type of Business." In the blank provided, Plantlease's agent has supplied "Rental of personal property." Underneath the blank, in parentheses, are examples of types of businesses, "Grocery, hardware, jewelry " Exhibit A-I, attached to Joint Exhibit No. 2. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Except for the final paragraph, the findings of fact in the recommended order are based on the parties' stipulation, which was received as joint exhibit No. 2. Paragraphs one, two, three, five, nine and ten of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in toto. The first sentence of paragraph four of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as not being supported by the evidence. The second sentence has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph six of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraph seven of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance. Paragraph eight of petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been adopted except for the second sentence, which is actually a proposed conclusion of law. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Alvarez, Esquire Gary P. Sams, Esquire Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams Post Office Box 5617 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the proposed repeal of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69I-44.021 amounts to an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of sections 120.52(8)(b) and/or (e), Florida Statutes, (2015).1/
Findings Of Fact Unclaimed Property The Department is responsible for administering and enforcing chapter 717, Florida Statutes. The aforementioned chapter is entitled as the “Florida Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,” and it requires the Department to: (a) receive unclaimed property; (b) safeguard unclaimed property; and (c) process claims for the return of unclaimed property to its rightful owner. See generally ch. 717, Fla. Stat. Chapter 717 applies to property such as traveler’s checks, money orders, gift certificates, bank deposits, and proceeds from life insurance policies that have been outstanding, unredeemed, or inactive for a certain number of years. See §§ 717.104(1) & (2), .1045, .106, & .107, Fla. Stat. In return for a fee, licensed private investigators, certified public accountants, and attorneys research the Department’s unclaimed property records in order to assist their clients with making claims on unclaimed property. See §§ 717.124, .135 & .1400, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to sections 717.124 and 717.126, Florida Statutes, the Department is authorized to require proof of entitlement, personal identification, and (if applicable) proof of the filer’s authority to act as the claimant’s agent. See § 717.124, .126, Fla. Stat. Also, “the burden shall be upon the claimant to establish entitlement to the property by a preponderance of evidence.” § 717.126(1), Fla. Stat. Section 717.138, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to adopt rules to implement the provisions of chapter 717. The Department has utilized that authority to adopt Florida Administrative Code Rule 69I-20.0021, which sets forth the procedures for filing unclaimed property claims. Rule 69I-20.0021 has several provisions requiring claimants to demonstrate to the Department that they are entitled to the unclaimed property at issue. For instance, rule 69I-20.0021(1) provides that “[c]laims for unclaimed property in the custody of the Department shall be submitted to the Department on the form(s) prescribed and supplied by the Department, together with documentation proving entitlement to the unclaimed property.” (emphasis added). Rule 69I-20.0021(1)(b) mandates that “[a] complete paper format claim shall include the correct claim form identified in this rule, fully completed with all blanks filled in and manually signed and dated by all claimants or the Claimants’ Representative, proof of entitlement, and all supporting documentation as described and required by this rule, and Rule 69I-20.00022, F.A.C.” (emphasis added). Also, rule 69I-20.0021(2) provides that “[t]he Department will only review the merits of a claim that has been deemed complete as filed. The Department will determine whether the claimant has established ownership and entitlement to the unclaimed property.” (emphasis added). Rule 69I-20.0021 also incorporates by reference certain forms. For example, rule 69I-20.0021(4)(a) states that “[c]laims by apparent owners for unclaimed property shall be submitted on Form DFS-UP-106, entitled Claim Filed by Apparent Owner, which is hereby incorporated by reference, effective 1-3-05.” This form must be accompanied by “[p]roof demonstrating that the claimant is the owner and is entitled to the unclaimed property as required by Rule 69I-20.0022, F.A.C.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I-20.0021(4)(c)2. (emphasis added). Also, rule 69I-20.0021(6) states that “[a]ll claims for unclaimed property filed by a Claimant’s Representative shall be submitted on Form DFS-UP-108, entitled Claim Filed by Claimant’s Representative on Behalf of the Claimant, which is hereby incorporated by reference, effective 1-3-05.” This form must be accompanied by “[p]roof demonstrating that the person(s) or entity being represented is entitled to the property being claimed consistent with Rule 69I-20.0022, F.A.C.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I-20.0021(6)(b)4. (emphasis added). Escheated Property The Department also plays a role in administering (and returning to its rightful owner) other types of property governed by other chapters within the Florida Statutes. For instance, the Department is involved with: (a) property resulting from judgments deposited with a court pursuant to section 43.19, Florida Statutes; (b) escheated property gathered pursuant to section 732.107, Florida Statutes; (c) property held by a personal representative pursuant to section 733.816, Florida Statutes; and (d) funds held by a guardian following the death of a ward pursuant to section 744.534, Florida Statutes. When a person dies with an estate but has no known heirs, the decedent’s property escheats to the state. See § 732.107(1), Fla. Stat. That property is sold, and the proceeds (i.e., the “escheated funds”) are paid to the Department for deposit into the State School Fund pursuant to section 732.107(2), Florida Statutes. In 2009, the Department was receiving repeated inquiries from claimants regarding the proper claim forms for property governed by sections 43.19, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534, Florida Statutes. The Department responded by adopting rule 69I-44.021 which establishes a hard copy claim form specifically for the aforementioned properties. Unlike rule 69I-20.0021 which requires a claimant to demonstrate to the Department that he or she is entitled to the unclaimed property in question, rule 69I-44.021(1) requires a potential claimant to simply prove his or her entitlement to a court. That is consistent with provisions within chapter 732 that require courts (rather than the Department) to determine whether a claimant is entitled to escheated property. See §§ 732.107(3) and (4), Fla. Stat. (requiring an action to re- open the administration of probate and prove entitlement to a probate judge, while allowing the Department of Legal Affairs the right of intervention to protect the state’s interests). For those claimants who successfully demonstrate to a court that they are entitled to particular funds, rule 69I- 44.021 incorporates by reference a form (Form #198) that those claimants are to file with the Department.3/ Unlike the situation with claimants using the forms incorporated by reference in rule 69I-20.0021, claimants using the form incorporated by reference in rule 69I-44.021 are not required to prove to the Department that they are entitled to the property in question. In 2013, the Florida Legislature amended section 717.124, to provide that the claims procedure for unclaimed property also applies to property governed by sections 43.19, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534. See § 717.124(8), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]his section applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.”). As a result of an internal review of its rules, the Department determined that rule 69I-44.021 should be repealed given that section 717.124(8), effectively made the procedure set forth in rule 69I-20.0021 applicable to escheated property. Choice Plus Pursues Escheated Property for its Clients Choice Plus is a private investigative agency licensed pursuant to chapter 493 that files claims with the Department as a claimant’s representative (“locator”). In exchange for its services, Choice Plus receives a fee paid from approved property claims. In addition to seeking the recovery of unclaimed property pursuant to chapter 717, Choice Plus also assists in the recovery of funds that have escheated to the State of Florida pursuant to section 732.107. Choice Plus files several hundred claims in Florida for unclaimed property each year. It files five to 10 claims in Florida each year for escheated property. The President of Choice Plus testified during the final hearing that Choice Plus had filed 19 claims for escheated property with the Department using Form #198 and attaching the pertinent documentation. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I- 44.021(2)(a) (providing that “[t]he claim form must be accompanied by a certified copy of the final order or judgment awarding the funds to each claimant, supporting documentation establishing each claimant’s right to the funds, and a government-issued photographic identification issued to each claimant.”). According to the President of Choice Plus, the Department began to require Choice Plus to re-establish entitlement to escheated funds in 2013. In other words, the Department now allegedly conducts its own review of the evidence that a court already found to be sufficient for establishing entitlement. Choice Plus asserts that proving entitlement to escheated funds a second time causes it to spend additional time and money in making a claim. According to Choice Plus, this extra effort adds $5,000 to the cost of the average claim for escheated property. In fact, Choice Plus is currently appealing the Department’s denial of an escheated property claim. That appeal is proceeding under appellate case number 1D15-3184 before the First District Court of Appeal and involves the estate of a deceased Florida resident named Eleanor Rigley.4/ Because Ms. Rigley died intestate and without any known living heirs, the proceeds from the sale of her residence escheated to the State of Florida and were paid to the Department for deposit in the State School Fund. See § 732.107, Fla. Stat. Choice Plus learned of Ms. Rigley’s escheated property and hired a genealogist who found ten individuals related to Ms. Rigley. Choice Plus subsequently entered into contracts with each of the ten individual claimants authorizing Choice Plus to obtain the escheated funds on their behalf. In accord with section 732.107 and rule 69I-44.021, Choice Plus then petitioned the Pinellas County Circuit Court to reopen Ms. Rigley’s estate and declare that the ten Choice Plus clients were Ms. Rigley’s heirs. On June 12, 2013, the Pinellas County Circuit Court entered an Order reopening Ms. Rigley’s estate and declaring the ten Choice Plus clients to be Ms. Rigley’s heirs. The Circuit Court then directed the Department to distribute the funds from Ms. Rigley’s estate to the claimants. On July 12, 2013 and as required by rule 69I-44.021, Choice Plus filed with the Department Form #198, a certified copy of the Pinellas County Circuit Court’s Order awarding the escheated funds to the claimants, supporting documentation submitted to the Circuit Court, and a photocopy of each claimant’s government-issued photo identification. However, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to deny Choice Plus’s claim on January 23, 2014, and ultimately issued a Final Order on June 29, 2015, denying the claim. In that Final Order, the Department allegedly concluded that it has sole jurisdiction to determine the disposition of funds within its possession, including escheated funds held pursuant to section 732.107. Accordingly, the Department concluded that the Circuit Court’s ruling was not binding on it. The Department also allegedly concluded that the denial was justified because Choice Plus failed to submit “appropriate documentation” connecting the individual claimants to Ms. Rigley by a preponderance of the evidence. In the ensuing appeal, Choice Plus argued that the Department’s Final Order must be reversed because the Department does not have the authority to determine entitlement to escheated funds held by the Department pursuant to section 732.107. As for why the Department lacks the necessary authority, Choice Plus argued that section 717.124 is the only provision within chapter 717 that applies to escheated funds held by the Department. The 2013 amendment to section 717.124, which added subsection (8), merely stated that “[t]his section applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.” (emphasis added). In contrast, the amendment did not state that “[t]his chapter applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.” (emphasis added). Thus, Choice Plus argued that the Department cannot apply section 717.126 to escheated fund claims because the Florida Legislature only made section 717.124 applicable to such claims. As noted above, section 717.126 mandates that “the burden shall be upon the claimant to establish entitlement to the property by a preponderance of evidence.” In other words, Choice Plus argued that the Department cannot second-guess the Pinellas County Circuit Court, an argument that carries over into this proceeding. The Department responded in its Answer Brief by asserting that it has correctly determined that the chapter 717 claims process applies to all unclaimed property once it is transferred to the Department, including unclaimed estate proceeds that may eventually escheat to the State of Florida.5/
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the Respondent entered a sales tax assessment in the amount of one thousand four hundred sixty-one and eighty-two one hundredths dollars ($1,461.82) against the Petitioner. In support thereof, Respondent takes the position that payments of $300.00 per charter hour of flying time by the Petitioner to owners of aircraft in order that Petitioner may use said aircraft to provide charter services to third parties are payments for the rental of tangible personal property and therefore subject to a sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner on the other hand, takes the position that it is the agent of the owners of the aircraft and as such, provides services which are exempt from taxation pursuant to Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.71(8), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Robert Capen, President of the Petitioner, testified that Petitioner has verbal arrangements to utilize the services of two jet aircraft to further its charter services. As a charter service, Petitioner transports third persons to a certain destination and provides the fuel and crew in return for an amount ranging from $300.00 to $750.00 per charter hour, depending on the length of the flight. The amount for services paid by third persons are made payable by check or other credit memos to Petitioner and said amounts are reported as income to the Internal Revenue Service. Pursuant to the verbal agreement with the aircraft owners, Petitioner guarantees that the aircraft will be chartered to third persons three hundred (300) hours annually. In return therefor, Petitioner pays the aircraft owners $300.00 per charter hour on a monthly basis. In addition thereto, Petitioner provides crews, maintains, schedules and operates the aircraft for the owners and is responsible for the proper licensing and certification of the aircraft for charter flights. For these services, Petitioner received a management fee in the total amount of $7,500.00 per month from the two owners of the aircraft. Based on the $300.00 per charter hour fee which is paid by Petitioner to the owners, Respondent entered its assessment claiming that the services provided by Petitioner constitute a "lease or rental" as provided in Section 212.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Respondent also points out that the legislative intent as enunciated by the state is that every person is exercising a taxable privilege when leasing or renting tangible property within Florida as set forth in Chapter 212.05, Florida Statutes, and that a tax therefore must be imposed on the gross proceeds of all rentals or leases of tangible personal Property, citing Section 212.11(3), Florida Statutes and Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.71(1), Florida Administrative Code. Based on the facts adduced at the hearing including the testimony of Messrs. Capen, Nelson Brown and James Santimaw, President, Secretary and Treasurer respectively, it appears that this case is governed by the statutory authority contained in Section 212, Florida Statutes, as implemented by Respondent's Rule 12A-1.71, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner urges that its services amount to the creation of an agency relationship between the aircraft owners, the relevant facts tend to show otherwise. For example, Petitioner provides fuel and crew while third persons did not take possession of nor exert any control over the aircraft. As stated, Petitioner charges and receives an amount ranging from $500.00 to $750.00 per charter hour directly from third persons who have no dealings whatsoever with the aircraft owners. In the absence of any evidence tending to show that any type of agency relationship existed other than the statements advanced by Mr. Robert Brown during the course of the hearing, I hereby conclude that the Petitioner's contention that the services which it renders to third parties amount to a rental of tangible property and is therefore a taxable service within the meaning of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's final argument that its charter service amounts to a brokerage arrangement was also considered however this argument must also fall as there was no credible evidence tending to establish that the Petitioner was in any manner acting as broker for anyone other than itself.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law as recited above, it is recommended that the assessment referred to herein he upheld as a valid assessment. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Rod Tennyson, Esquire Ombres, Powell & Tennyson, P.A. Suite 600, Clematis Building 208 Clematis Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Robert L. Shevin Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 457, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) and is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within FREC’s jurisdiction. At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate broker, license number 684990, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker at Florida’s Best Buy Realty & Mortgage Lender, LLC, Post Office Box 551, Winter Park, Florida 32793. On or about February 15, 2007, Respondent entered into a contract to manage the single-family dwelling owned by Jacqueline Danzer. The property is located at 2979 Krista Key Circle, Orlando, Florida 32817 (Subject Property). The agreement was for the period February 15, 2007, until February 15, 2008. Respondent was authorized, under the management agreement, to seek a tenant for the property. Said management agreement authorized Respondent to be compensated at the rate of 10 percent of the rent due during each rental period. On or about March 27, 2007, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement with Veronica Valcarcel to rent the Subject Propery. The tenant applied through the federal Section 8 program, administered by the Orange County Housing and Community Development Division (Agency), for rental assistance in order to rent the Subject Property. Section 8 assists low-income families with their rent. A tenant who qualifies for Section 8 assistance is prohibited from paying more than 40 percent of his or her income for rent and utilities. On April 26, 2007, Respondent, acting on behalf of the landlord for the Subject Property, entered into and signed a “Housing Assistance Payment Contract” or “HAP” contract with the Agency as part of the Section 8 program. The HAP contract provided that for the initial lease term for the Subject Property (for the period April 1, 2007, until March 31, 2008), the initial monthly rent was $1,150 per month. This was determined to be the maximum payment the tenant could pay without exceeding 40 percent of her income. The HAP contract explicitly provides in its terms that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner may not raise the rent to tenant.” Respondent knew that he was prohibited from charging more than the monthly rent stated in the HAP contract. Respondent has had experience in the past with other tenants who participated in the Section 8 program. Respondent has previously signed other HAP contracts which contained the same restrictive language. Under the lease contract that the tenant Veronica Valcarcel signed with the property owner Jacqueline Danzer, the monthly rent would be $1,150 per month. The signature page in the lease contract is not the same page on which the monthly rental amount is written. The property owner Jacqueline Danzer asserts that the initials in the lease contract reflecting a monthly rental of $1,150 were not all her initials. Under the terms of the Exclusive Property Management Agreement, Respondent was being compensated at the rate of 10 percent per month after the first month. A monthly rental amount of $1,500 indicates that the property owner would receive a net of $1,350 per month. The property management agreement provided that Respondent would make payments to the property owner by direct deposit. The property management agreement lists a 12-digit bank account number, with the last four digits of “6034,” into which Respondent was to make direct deposits. At the hearing, property owner Jacqueline Danzer testified that she had received payments from Respondent for the Subject Property to her Bank of America savings account, with the account number ending in “6034.” The last four digits of the account number on the Bank of America Statement match the last four digits on the account number found on the Property Management Agreement. According to the Bank of America records, Respondent made the following payments to the property owner: a) $1,550 on May 9, 2007 b) $1,000 on May 9, 2007 c) $850 on June 12, 2007 d) $1,350 on July 11, 2007 e) $1,350 on September 10, 2007 On September 12, 2007, property owner, Jacqueline Danzer went to see Lois Henry, the manager of the Section 8 department for the Agency. During the course of that meeting, Dnazer advised that Respondent was collecting $1,500 a month rent from the tenant instead of $1,150 a month. On September 12, 2007, during the course of a telephone conference with Jacqueline Danzer and Lois Henry, Respondent admitted that he had been collecting $1,500 monthly rent for the Subject Property, retaining a commission of $150 and depositing the balance in Danzer’s account. Respondent denied making an admission during the telephone conference on September 12, 2007. He also denied that he was collecting $1,500 from the tenant, and further denied that he was violating Section 8 regulations. Respondent’s testimony is not credible. The witness Danzer’s testimony is credible. Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the Housing Assistance Payments Contract. The total amount of investigative costs for the Petitioner for this case, not including attorney’s time, were $874.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; Revoking Respondent’s license, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00; and Requiring Respondent pay fees and costs related to the investigation in the amount of $874.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2009.
