The Issue The issues presented here concern the propriety of the Respondent's action in its decision to reject all bids submitted for Project 72906-9109, Duval County, thereby excluding the bid of the Petitioner which was the apparent low bid in this process.
Findings Of Fact Alfair Development Company, Inc. (Alfair), is a company owned by Maggie Alford. This company is certified as a "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" under the terms of Chapter 337, Florida Statutes. This recognition is for benefit of contractual work done for the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. Alfair, together with two other companies who are "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises," responded to a bid opportunity from the Department of Transportation identified as Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. The other two bidders were ILA Construction Company, Inc., of Daytona Beach, Florida, and Highway Valets, Inc., of Norwalk, Ohio. This project was for the construction of concrete sidewalks and curb cut ramps, installation and repair. The contract was for competition solely among contractors who had been certified as "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" by the Office of Minority Programs within the Department of Transportation. As such, it is referred to as a "set-aside" job. In a "set-aside" project, bids are accepted from these "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" in furtherance of the requirements of Section 339.0805, Florida Statutes, which mandates that not less than 10% of the amounts expended from the State Transportation Trust Fund shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. When the bids were opened related to Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County, Alfair was the apparent winner having offered the lowest bid among the three competitors. However, there was a problem with the bid submission by Alfair and the others, in that Alfair's bid was 70% above the pre-bid estimate of the Department of Transportation concerning the expected price that the agency would have to pay for this project. The other two bidders were even higher, but within the range of the 70% above the pre-bid estimate. The pre-bid estimate had been derived by resort to a manual at the Department of Transportation referred to as the Contract Maintenance Administration and Inspection Manual. Within that manual the pre-bid estimate is found, as it was here, by examining historical workload and/or work needs survey information and development of that information and retention of that information through a computation book. That book includes appropriate forms, square yards, per linear feet, etc., for each item of activity to be paid for in the contract. The form to be used in this process shows the project number, the county, the section number of the roadway to be worked, the method of calculating estimated quantities and specific project location, if known. In this arrangement prior contracts of a similar sort to that contemplated in this instance are reviewed in trying to anticipate the contract costs on this occasion. That approach was followed in making the pre-bid estimate in this project. When the comparison was made of those figures it was a comparison to the immediately preceding years' contract for similar work against the work called for in the subject project at hand. In addition, the Department of Transportation contacted concrete companies to make sure that the concrete cost had remained the same. It also verified that minimum wage requirements had not changed from the prior year to the year in question. At hearing, the only rebuttal which the Petitioner offered to this approach of pre-bid estimate was the attempt to present certain documents which were denied admission as evidence in that the representative of the Petitioner, James D. Alford, III, husband to Maggie Alford, was not shown to be sufficiently apprised of contracting matters to explain those exhibits and show how they would tend to rebut the method of pre-bid estimate by the Department of Transportation. The exhibits standing alone did not lend themselves to the interpretation that they were competent rebuttal. When the degree of difference between the pre-bid estimate and the quotes by the bidders was examined by employees within the Department of Transportation, the belief was expressed that the bids were so out of keeping with the pre-bid estimate as to put to question the advisability of contracting with the apparent low bidder, Alfair. The Department felt that it needed to make certain that its pre-bid estimate was not flawed in some fashion and a determination was made to undergo reevaluation of the initial perception held about the bids offered before making a decision. Nonetheless, the impression was created in the mind of Barry D. Bunn, District Contract Administrator for District II, Department of Transportation, that he was expected in his employment to notice that the bids had been rejected. As a consequence on October 25, 1988, the bidders were advised that all bids were rejected for the project. On that same date, an advertisement was placed in the local newspaper that the project was being resolicited for bid purposes and through the advertisement the "set-aside" was deleted. This meant that for purposes of the re-advertisement of October 25, 1988, a general class of bidders could respond, to include "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises." Having been made mindful of this error, Bunn contacted the newspaper where the advertisement had been placed and told them to take that advertisement out of circulation. This occurred on October 26,1988. On that same date further correspondence was directed to the bidders, to include Alfair, in which it was stated that the bids had not been rejected, identifying that the bids were undergoing a reevaluation process. That reevaluation process did not change the initial impression by the Department of Transportation concerning the quotations received as being too far in excess of the Department's pre-bid estimate. Consequently, on November 1, 1988, a further notice of bid rejection was dispatched. That notice did not describe the reason for the rejection, but upon inquiry Mr. Alford was informed that the basis of the rejection was that the bid quotations were too costly when compared to the pre-bid estimate. Under inquiry the Department of Transportation did not identify the details of that explanation in the sense of saying what items they resorted to for drawing that conclusion and the Alfair company did not seek to gain a further explanation of their reasoning through prehearing discovery. The Department of Transportation had refused to give any further information to the Petitioner about this in the course of the telephone conversation between Mr. Alford and an employee in the Lake City, Florida Office of the Department of Transportation based upon the Department's belief that Section 337.168, Florida Statutes exempts it from having to state the pre-bid cost estimate until a contract has been entered into concerning the project. Nonetheless, it was revealed in the course of the hearing what the difference between the bid quotation of Alfair and the pre-bid estimate had been, as well as identifying the methods for deriving that difference. When Alfair received the notice of rejection of its bid it filed a timely notice of protest followed by a timely petition in protest. In addition, the Petitioner posted the appropriate amount of bond under Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to allow it to pursue this case. The pleadings by the Petitioner are not particularly informative but the sum and substance off the allegations as demonstrated in those pleadings and as set forth by remarks of the representative at hearing, identify the belief held by the Petitioner that the Department of Transportation in rejecting the Alfair bid has been unjust, illegal, dishonest and arbitrary. Moreover, Alfair through its representative found fault with the refusal to reveal to him over the phone the methods of arriving at the pre-bid estimate and the general belief that the Department allows the participation in the bidding process and in the award of contract related to "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" of persons who are not registered or licensed as contractors through the offices of the Department of professional Regulation within the State of Florida. None of these claims were shown to be meritorious through the proofs submitted at hearing. The Department of Transportation seeks the award of costs under the provisions of Section 337.11(3)(b), Florida statutes. The evidence in this hearing reveals that the salaries of the two witnesses who testified for the Department of Transportation, namely Russell O. Davis and Barry D. Bunn, were $125.80 and $130.00, respectively, per day. These employees were involved in the hearing process for one day. In addition to salary costs the State had to pay these employees $62.50 each for per diem allowance in that the witnesses were from out of town. The cost of attendance at hearing by the court reporter is $67.50.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order be entered which rejects all bids and allows the re-advertisement of Project No. 72906-9109, Duval County. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted a Memorandum in which an indication is given concerning the Project 72906-9109, Duval County, as to the scope of that project-and an explanation in the mind of the representative of Petitioner as to the reason for "set-aside" projects. An accusation is made that the Department of Transportation has tried to avoid bringing black businesses into the mainstream of Florida economy. This is not borne out by the proof. An accusation is made which was not proven at hearing and is not relevant to the resolution of this dispute concerning the contributions to the Florida tax base made by the black community and businesses. This contention together with the allegation that the Department of Transportation is using tactics to deny a small percent.age of tax dollars to recirculate into the black community for economic development and by such arrangement promotes institutional slavery was not proven. Reference to rejection of all bids on October 18, 1988 is at odds with the facts of this case. Further, there is no indication in the facts of this case that for the first time in history a black-owned company was going to cross economic a threshold within the district in terms of gaining business and that the agency rejected the bids to avoid this. Further reference to the procedural history of this case and the fact that corrections had to be made to the process of notification of rejection of all bids is not sufficient reason to overturn the decision to reject all bids. Reference within the Memorandum/Argument to the need to post a bond as being done because it would cause an economic hardship on a black-owned company is rejected as a grounds of argument in that the requirement of bond is a matter of law imposed upon all companies black or otherwise. The fact that office holders within the State Legislature were called upon by the Petitioner to ascertain the status of this project and that the Department of Transportation went through the process of correcting "the initial rejection of bids in favor of a reevaluation phase, has been explained in the fact finding elated to the sequence of events and the procedures involved in rejecting all bids. Reference to the failure to describe the reasons for rejection beyond the fact that the bids were too high has been described in the- fact finding. No evidence was shown that the refusal to indicate the reason in detail or to refer to the source of the data was in the interest of somehow favoring white prime contractors over black contractors. There is some other indication within this Memorandum concerning the meeting of goals for "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises" and the concern that the Department of Transportation is using minority individuals instead of minority businesses to meet those goals. There was no indication that the Department of Transportation acted inappropriately in its attempts to gain a contract in this case, or that it generally has participated in a process which the Petitioner refers to dualism in preferring minority persons who are not licensed by the Department of Professional Regulation to engage in the construction business over those who are. Moreover, Section 489.103(1), Florida Statutes, states that the license provisions of Florida law, do not pertain to contractors who are working on bridges, roads, streets and highways and services incidental to that work. Comments about training and apprenticeship found within the Memorandum were not proven in the course of the hearing and are not sufficiently relevant to the inquiry at hand; that they need be considered in resolving this dispute. The suggestion that the Department of Transportation intends to put the contract back out for award in some arrangement other than a "set-aside" is correct in the sense of the intentions expressed in the ad of October 25, 1988; however, that advertisement was not carried forward and the oral indication was made by an official of the Department of Transportation at hearing, that the contract would remain "set- aside" if the Department were allowed to readvertise at some point beyond the outcome of this hearing. Finally, the suggestion that if the second bidder in this case had been a non-black company or individual, the Department would have awarded the project to that entity was not borne out in the proof. Respondent's facts are subordinate to the facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Alford, III 1348 Davis Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Marilyn McFadden, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S.-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact On or about June 3, 1987, DOT advertised that it would receive bids on State Project No. 97870-334, etc. in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties to improve portions of the Florida Turnpike. On June 24, 1987, bids were received by DOT from Gilbert, State Paving and Archer Western Contractors. The apparent low bidder at bid opening on June 24, 1987, was Gilbert and State Paving was apparent second low bidder. DOT was informally advised by John Beck, an attorney representing State Paving, that Gilbert's bid was believed to be unbalanced and the appropriate officials referred the issue to the DOT Bureau of Estimates to look into the low bid to see if it was unbalanced to the detriment of the State. Review of the Gilbert bid began with an internal analysis of the bid prices in comparison to the DOT Estimate of the Work. All bid prices above or below a certain percent of the engineer's estimate of costs were prepared in a computer printout and those items were checked by the consultants on the project. Basically, the major items in the project, which comprises some 400 bid items, were broken down to 10 groupings and the bids for each item in these groups was prepared for the three bidders and tabulated in Exhibit 2. The DOT Technical Committee reviewed the bids and concluded there was no unbalancing in Gilbert's bid which was detrimental to the State. This recommendation was approved by the Awards Committee which had also been furnished the information in Exhibit 2 by the consulting engineer for the project. Based upon this information, the Awards Committee concluded that the awards should go to Gilbert as no unbalancing detrimental to the State was found. Specification made a part of all DOT bid proposals provide that DOT may reject an unbalanced bid. As a matter of policy, DOT only rejects unbalanced bids deemed contrary to the interests of the State. Bids may be unbalanced in numerous ways. One significant method is known as front loading where the bidder submits a high bid for the work to be done at the beginning of the project such as clearing and grubbing and low bids for the work done later in the project. If successful in getting the award, this bidder would have excess profits on the clearing and grubbing which could draw interest while the less profitable later work was being done. Another variant is to study the plans and specifications to see if the quantities listed in the bid proposal are accurately reflected in the plans and specifications. If not, those items for which the bid proposal shows more than the plans and specifications reasonably required can be bid low, and for those items by which the bid proposal shows less than actually will be required can be bid high. Since the contractor is paid by the units used, those excess units at a higher price would result in more profit for the contractor yet allow him to submit an overall lower bid. For example, if the bid proposal contains two similar items for which the request for proposal estimates 100 each will be required, and the bidder concludes that only 50 will be required at Site A and 150 at Site B, he submits a low bid for Site A and a high bid for Site B. If the fair price for these units is $10 each, and the bidder bids $5 per unit for Site A or $500, and $15 for Site B or $1500, the total bid price is $2000, but if the bidder only installs 50 at Site A he would be paid $250 and install $150 at Site B for which he would be paid $2250. His total compensation would be $2500. In competitively bid contracts, such as the instant project, contractors modify their prices by taking a calculated risk that certain items bid on will not need to be accomplished and submit a nominal bid of $1 or 1 cent for such an item. By definition, such a bid is unbalanced, but if the item so bid has to be provided, the contractor has to provide this service at the bid price. The only evidence submitted by Petitioner tending to show Gilbert's bid was unbalanced to the detriment of the State was testimony, objected to and sustained, that the plans and specifications showed more of certain units would be needed than the estimated quantities on the bid proposal, which constituted the basis for the bids submitted. Such evidence constitutes a challenge to the bid specifications and is untimely. Gilbert's witness who prepared the bid submitted by Gilbert adequately explained the basis for bids submitted by Gilbert on the challenged items. The document entitled "This is Not an Addendum," clearly states on its face that "an addendum may follow containing the following information." No bids are solicited thereby and for no item contained thereon is the State obligated to contract. This document was provided all bidders before bids were open and no unfair advantage to anyone or detriment to the State was shown. In a project containing some 400 bid items, many modifications of the contract during construction is required to cover unforeseen circumstances that arise. While it would be better to get competitive bids on every bit of work done on this project, in this imperfect world unforeseen items will appear. The document complained of attempts to alert the bidders to some anticipated work not foreseen when the bid proposal was prepared, but it is not a part of the bid solicitation.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should award a contract to Intervenor to provide physical and occupational therapy services to approximately 1,300 exceptional education students who qualify for such services in 77 public schools in Brevard County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Intervenor is the incumbent contractor for physical and occupational therapy services provided to Respondent. Intervenor has provided such services to Respondent for approximately six years. On February 24, 1999, Respondent issued its request for proposals ("RFP") for occupational and physical therapy services. The RFP consists of eight unnumbered pages. Ten companies responded to the RFP. However, only the proposals of Petitioner and Intervenor are at issue in this proceeding. A four-member evaluation committee ranked each proposal on the basis of six categories. The six categories were: experience; qualification; recruiting ability; location of office; and responsiveness. The evaluation committee also considered the hourly rate and mileage to be charged by each proposer. The evaluation committee met as a body. Each member of the committee then returned to his or her respective office to complete a scoring sheet. The scoring sheet listed each proposer's name in a column down the left side of the sheet and the six categories for evaluation from left to right across the top of the sheet. A column down the right side of each sheet listed the hourly rate to be charged by the proposer identified in the column down the left side of the sheet. The RFP does not prescribe a scoring formula to be used in completing the scoring sheets. In relevant part, the RFP merely states: . . . The Selection Committee shall rank the firms in order of preference and will submit its recommendation to the Superintendent for his consideration. The [Board] will bear responsibility for the selection of the Contractor and will decide which bid [sic] is most appropriate for Brevard schools and their students. The Superintendent will recommend a therapy service provider which will be presented to the . . . Board for approval at a regular or special Board meeting. RFP at unnumbered page 8. All four members of the evaluation committee ranked Intervenor's proposal first and Petitioner's proposal second. However, the hourly rate in Petitioner's proposal was the lowest of all proposers, at $34.75, and $4.25 less than the $39 hourly rate quoted in the proposal submitted by Intervenor. The proposal submitted by Intervenor charged mileage in addition to the hourly rate while the hourly rate quoted by Petitioner included mileage. Before May 11, 1999, when the Board selected Intervenor as the proposer, the evaluation committee met. The committee asked Respondent's buyer assigned to the contract if the committee was required to recommend the proposal with the lowest price. The buyer advised the committee that the contract was for professional services and did not require the committee to recommend the lowest-priced proposal. The committee determined that Ms. Eva Lewis, one of its members and the Director of Program Support for Exceptional Student Education in Brevard County, should telephone Intervenor and ask if Intervenor would match Petitioner's price. Ms. Lewis telephoned Mr. Rick McCrary, the manager for Intervenor, and asked if Intervenor would accept the contract price of $34.75. After consultation with his superiors, Mr. McCrary agreed to the straight-rate price of $34.75. On May 11, 1999, Ms. Lewis presented the recommendation of the evaluation committee to the Board. The Board asked Ms. Lewis if Intervenor's price was the lowest price. Ms. Lewis disclosed that the evaluation committee preferred the proposal submitted by Intervenor, asked Intervenor to lower its price to meet that of Petitioner, and that Intervenor agreed to do so. The Board voted unanimously to select Intervenor as the proposer to be awarded the contract. The parties directed most of their efforts in this proceeding to the issues of whether competitive bidding requirements apply to the proposed agency action and whether the scoring formula used to rank the proposers complied with those requirements. Petitioner asserts that the selection of Intervenor by the Board violates the competitive bidding provisions in Section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes (1997). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated). Intervenor and Respondent contend that Section 120.57(1), rather than Section 120.57(3), controls the Board's selection of Intervenor for the contract. Although the document used by Respondent to obtain proposals from vendors describes itself as an RFP and describes the responses as either proposals or bids, Respondent and Intervenor suggest that the document is not an RFP but merely a "solicitation." Respondent and Intervenor further argue: . . . that the . . . Board . . . did not attempt to comply with the requirements for competitive procurement under Section 120.57(3) or Chapter 287. . . . And . . . that the . . . Board was never required to comply with those statutes. . . . these are contracts for professional, educational and health services, contracts uniquely and specifically exempted from [the] competitive bid procurement process. Transcript ("TR") at 40. It is not necessary to reach the issue of whether Section 120.57(1) or the competitive procurement provisions in Section 120.57(3) and Chapter 287 control Respondent's selection of Intervenor as the proposer to be awarded the contract. In either event, the proposed agency action is contrary to the specifications in the RFP. Assuming arguendo that Section 120.57(3) and Chapter 287 do not apply to the contract at issue in this proceeding, Respondent failed to comply with RFP specifications. As Intervenor and Respondent point out in their joint PRO, Section F.8. of the RFP states: The . . . Board . . . and the selected proposer will negotiate a contract as to terms and conditions for submission to the . . . Board for consideration and approval. In the event an agreement cannot be reached with the selected proposer in a timely manner, then the . . . Board reserves the right to select an alternative proposer. (emphasis supplied) Intervenor and Respondent are also correct that the phrase "negotiate a contract as to terms and conditions" includes terms and conditions such as the contract price. Contrary to the provisions of Section F.8., the Board did not first select a proposer at its meeting on May 11, 1999, and then negotiate a contract price with the selected proposer. Rather, the evaluation committee negotiated a contract price with Intervenor before May 11, 1999, and the Board then selected Intervenor as the successful proposer. The evaluation committee is not the Board and does not have authority to act on behalf of the Board. As the RFP states, the evaluation committee has authority only to: . . . rank the firms in order of preference and . . . submit its recommendation to the Superintendent for his consideration. The [Board] will bear responsibility for the selection of the Contractor and will decide which bid [sic] is most appropriate for Brevard schools and their students. The Superintendent will recommend a therapy service provider which will be presented to the . . . Board for approval at a regular or special Board meeting. RFP at unnumbered page 8. The last sentence in Section F.8. makes clear that the right to select a proposer is the sole province of the Board and not the evaluation committee. Even if one were to ignore the legal distinctions between the evaluation committee and the Board and the authority of each, the RFP specifications fail to provide adequate notice to potential proposers of the true purpose for the RFP. As Respondent and Intervenor state in their joint PRO: . . . the . . . Board used the proposals it received to test the market for physical and occupational therapy services in Brevard County. The . . . Board then used the information it developed from the proposals as negotiating leverage to obtain a price concession from its incumbent contractor. The . . . Board's negotiation tactics permitted it to secure the superior vendor at the price of an inferior vendor. PRO at 33. The RFP fails to disclose that Respondent intended to use potential proposers to obtain negotiating leverage with the incumbent contractor. The failure of the RFP to disclose its purpose violates fundamental principles of due process, adequate notice, and fairness to potential proposers. It creates a gap between what agency staff knew of the Respondent's intent for the RFP and what potential proposers could know from reading the specifications in the RFP. The failure of the RFP to disclose its true purpose suggests that its authors recognized the chilling effect such a disclosure would have had on the response of potential proposers. The lack of responses from potential proposers, in turn, would have frustrated Respondent's intent to "secure the superior vendor at the price of an inferior vendor." Assuming arguendo that Section 120.57(3) controls the contract award at issue in this proceeding, Respondent's proposed agency action violates relevant provisions in Section 120.57(3)(f). In relevant part, Section 120.57(3)(f) provides: In a competitive procurement contest, other than a rejection of all bids, the Administrative Law Judge shall conduct a de novo proceeding to determine whether the agency’s proposed action is contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, the agency’s rules, or policies, or the bid or proposal specifications. The standard of proof for such proceedings shall be whether the proposed agency action was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, or arbitrary, or capricious. . . . (emphasis supplied) As previously found, the proposed award of the contract to Intervenor is contrary to the RFP specifications, including specifications for the evaluation and selection process described in paragraphs 7 and 17, supra. The proposed agency action is clearly erroneous within the meaning of Section 120.57(3)(f). It violates fundamental notions of due process, adequate notice, and a level playing field for all proposers. All of the proposers who were induced by the terms of the RFP to expend the time, energy, and expense required to prepare and submit proposals were entitled to rely in good faith on the specifications in the RFP and to require Respondent to adhere to its own specifications. The proposed agency action is also contrary to competition within the meaning of Section 120.57(3)(f). The economic incentive to respond to an RFP would likely diminish over time if the proposed agency action were to persist. Potential proposers would eventually recognize the RFP process as a device intended to reduce the contract price of the incumbent provider rather than as a bona fide business opportunity for potential proposers to gain new market share. Such an economic environment would not likely induce potential proposers to incur the time and expense necessary to prepare and submit proposals. The pool of potential proposers would shrink, and Respondent would lose negotiating leverage with the incumbent vendor. The likely result would be an erosion of negotiating leverage and an accretion in costs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding that the selection of Intervenor for the contract award is contrary to the RFP specifications and contrary to competition. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. David Sawyer, Superintendent Brevard County School Board 2700 Judge Fran Jamieson Way Viera, Florida 32940-6699 Harold Bistline, Esquire Stromire, Bistline, Miniclier, Miniclier and Griffith 1970 Michigan Avenue, Building E Cocoa, Florida 32922 Jonathan Sjostram, Esquire Steel Hector and Davis, LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward J. Kinberg, Esquire Edward J. Kinberg, P.A. 2101 South Waverly Place Suite 200E Melbourne, Florida 32901
The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Respondent's proposed award on BID No. HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc., should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department was the state agency responsible for the solicitation of bids for and award of contracts for the construction of state buildings in Florida. Both Greenhut and Dunn are qualified contractors who are certified to bid on state construction contracts in general and this procurement in particular. In December, 1991, the Department issued an advertisement for bids for the project in issue herein, the construction of the Kirkman Complex Addition Data Center in Tallahassee, Florida. According to the Advertisement for Bids, all bids "must be submitted in full accordance with the requirements of the Drawings, Specifications, Bidding Conditions and Contractual Conditions, which may be examined and obtained ..." from the Department's designated architect/engineer, Clemons, Rutherford and Associates, Inc. in Tallahassee. Section B-21 of the request for proposals (invitation to bid) reads, in pertinent part: The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the owner. Bids received on this project were originally scheduled to be opened and read aloud on January 15, 1992 with the tabulation and Bid Award Recommendation to be posted the following days at the location where the bids were opened. The proposal as originally issued called for the submittal of a Base Bid with four Alternates, 1a, 1b, 2, and 3. Alternate 1a was a deduct for merely extending the existing Johnson Controls System to incorporate the new work instead of providing a totally new and independent control system. Alternate 1b called for adding furniture and landscaping for certain of the rooms shown on the drawings; Alternate 2 called for adding a "shelled" fourth floor as described in the proposal; and Alternate 3, as originally issued, called for: Add a complete fourth floor as indicated in drawings including the finished interior partitions with full HVAC, Plumbing and Electrical Service. Include furniture and landscaping for rooms 414 and 419. (Includes items in Alternate No. 2) As a result of questions received from prospective bidders at the pre-bid conference which indicated some confusion as to the meaning and intent of the Department regarding Alternate No. 3, by letter to all prospective bidders, dated January 8, 1992 the Department's architect indicated: Alternate #3 shall be the fourth floor complete, as shown on drawings, which includes items in Alternate #2. Addendum #1 to the request for bids, dated January 10, 1992, clarified Item 1-3.6), PROPOSAL FORM, of the PROJECT MANUAL to ADD to "Alternate #3", "(Include items in Alternate #2)". Item #2-1 of Addendum #2, dated January 16, 1992, deleted the sentence changed by Item #1- 3.6, and revised the sentence to read as follows: This includes any items required in addition to Alternate #2 to complete the remainder of the work for the Fourth Floor. Information contained at the beginning of each Addendum calls the bidders' attention to the change and indicates that failure to incorporate it may result in disqualification. The due date for bids was extended at the instance of the Department. Both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted bids for this project as did several other concerns on January 23, 1992. Greenhut's base bid was $4,139,000 with a deduct of $63,600 for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b, 2, and 3 of $69,500, $239,000, and $209,000 respectively. Greenhut's total bid, therefore, through Alternate 3, was $4,592,900. Dunn's base bid was $4,079,000 with a zero deduct for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b through 3 of $67,000, and $428,000. Dunn's total bid, therefore, was $4,574,000 for a difference of $18,900. Greenhut's bid was submitted on a form which provided for the base bid, the deduct for 1a, and the additions for 1b. 2 and 3 with the figure for 3 being those costs in addition to those identified in Dunn's bid was submitted on a prior form which provided for a base bid, a 1a deduction if any, (there was none), and additions for 1b, 2, and 3 with the figure for 3 including the figure listed for 2. An initial review of Dunn's bid form, then, showed a base bid of $4,079,000, no 1a deduction, a 1b addition of $67,000, a 2 addition of $311,000, and a 3 addition of $428,000. This letter figure included the $311,000 figure for Alternate 2, which should have been deducted from the bid during tabulation. When the bids were opened on January 23, 1992 by Mr. Everline, each figure on each bid was read off and listed on the bid tabulation form in the appropriate area. No attention was given at that time to the appropriateness or correctness of the figures listed on each bid form, nor was any attention paid to any other technical requirement of the procurement. This was merely a transfer of figures from the bid form to the tabulation form, and when this was done, Mr. Everline announced to all in attendance, including many contractor representatives, that the "apparent low bidder" was Greenhut. In arriving at that conclusion, Mr. Everline added all of Dunn's figures together without deducting the $311,000 listed for Alternate 2, a figure which was included in the $428,000 figure listed for Alternate 3. This resulted in an incorrectly large total bid for Dunn. Sometime later that day, a representative of Dunn contacted Mr. Everline to indicate that Dunn had inadvertently bid on the wrong form which precipitated its misleading presentation. Mr. Everline properly declined to discuss the matter and referred the Dunn representative to the Department's legal counsel. Sometime thereafter, when the bids had been tabulated and reviewed for responsiveness and legal qualification of bidders, Mr. Everline suggested to representatives of DHSMV that in order to forestall a protest, only so much of the project as extended through Alternate 2 be awarded. DHSMV officials, however, had sufficient funds available for the entire project, including some additional funds, if necessary, for cabling, and insisted they wanted the entire project awarded. The Department's legal counsel, upon review of the situation, concluded that the Dunn's actual bid intent was clear to include the amount listed for Alternate 2 within that listed for Alternate 3, and not to consider the two as additives to each other. It further concluded that Dunn's use of the improper form on which to submit its bid was immaterial and afforded it no improper competitive edge over other bidders. Therefore, it was concluded that Dunn was the low responsive bidder and, on February 4, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Award to Dunn. Thereafter, Greenhut filed its Petition For Hearing taken as a protest to the award. Both the Department and Dunn agreed that Greenhut had standing to protest the award and that the protest was timely filed. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of General Services enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Greenhut Construction Company, Inc., in regard to the proposed award of contact in bid number HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 21st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1297 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. Accepted. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. Argument and not Finding of Fact except for 1st sentence which is accepted. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 3. Accepted. 4. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. & 8. Accepted. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. FOR THE INTERVENOR: Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 19. Accepted. 20. & 21. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 24. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Emmanuel, Esquire 30 South Spring Street Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, Florida 32596 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr., Esquire 315 S. Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Suite 307, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General Counsel Department of General Services Suite 309, knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the Department’s action to reject all bids submitted in response to DOT-RFP-20-5003-DAA, relating to asbestos abatement, demolition, and removal services, is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts (verbatim) The Department is an agency of the State of Florida tasked with procuring the services for Districtwide Asbestos Abatement and Demolition and Removal Services for Right of Way property under the Department’s supervision by law. The Department published a bid solicitation for DOT-RFP-20-5003- DAA, seeking bids to provide District Five Asbestos Abatement and Demolition and Removal Services for FDOT. The RFP included specifications, qualification requirements, instructions on what would be required of responders, a bid price proposal sheet, and the award criteria. Cross Construction and Cross Environmental submitted bids in response to the RFP. Cross Construction’s and Cross Environmental’s bids were evaluated by the Department. There is no debate, challenge, or disagreement raised in the Petitions with regard to the Technical Scores submitted by the responding firms to the RFP, only disagreement on three pay items. On June 15, 2020, the Department’s Selection Committee reviewed and discussed the information presented as to the Technical and Pricing scores of the Responding firms, asked for an additional bid item analysis, and indicated that it would reconvene at a future date for a decision. On June 22, 2020, the Selection Committee reviewed, discussed, and confirmed the recommendation presented by the results of the Technical Review Committee scorings and the Project Manager’s Bid Price analysis and selected Cross Construction and Cross Environmental as Intended Awardees. The Selection committee also found that Johnson’s Excavation and Services Inc., [Johnson] and Simpson Environmental LLC [Simpson] were deemed non-responsive due to irregular, and unbalanced pay items prices. On August 24, 2020, the Department’s Selection Committee decided to cancel the Procurement with the intent to readvertise with adjustments to the Scope and Pricing Structure and decided to reject all proposals. Additional Findings of Fact The “three pay items” referenced in paragraph six of the stipulated facts are the items that ultimately caused the Department to reject all bids in the instant dispute. The three pay items are collectively referred to as mobilization pay items. The RFP directs that bids are to contain two parts. Part I is the technical proposal, and Part II is the price proposal. Section 30.3 of the RFP provides that proposers “shall complete the Bid Price Proposal Form No. 2 and submit [the form] as part of the Price Proposal Package … [and that] [t]he Procurement Office and/or the Project Manager/TRC will review and evaluate the price proposals and prepare a summary of its price evaluation.” Five bidders submitted proposals in response to the RFP. One bidder did not advance beyond the initial review phase because its technical proposal did not meet minimum bid standards. The remaining bidders were CCS, CES, Simpson, and Johnson. Price proposals submitted by each of the remaining bidders were evaluated by the Department. Section 3 of the RFP provides a general outline of the process associated with awarding the contract. The steps are: “Pre-Proposal Conference; Public Opening (Technical Proposals); Price Proposal Opening & Intended Award Meeting; and, Selection Committee Meeting Summarizing Evaluations and Determining Anticipated Award.” The agenda for the “Price Proposal Opening & Intended Award Meeting,” as established by the RFP, provides as follows: Opening remarks of approx. 2 minutes by Department Procurement Office personnel. Public input period – To allow a reasonable amount of time for public input related to the RFP solicitation. At conclusion of public period, the Technical evaluation scores will be summarized. Announce the firms that did not achieve the minimum technical score. Announce the firms that achieved the minimum technical score and their price(s) as price proposals are opened. Calculate price scores and add to technical scores to arrive at total scores. Announce Proposer with highest Total Score as Intended Award. Announce time and date the decision will be posted on the Vendor Bid System (VBS). Adjourn. Section 30.4 b. of the RFP provides that a proposer can be awarded a maximum of 30 points for its price proposal. This section also provides that “[p]rice evaluation is the process of examining a prospective price without evaluation of the separate cost elements and proposed profit of the potential provider.” On June 15, 2020, the selection review committee met publicly for the purpose of opening price proposals and announcing an intended award. Price proposals were opened, and the eligible bidders received the following price scores: CCS - 11.09; CES - 13.22; Johnson - 19.76; and Simpson - 30. In terms of total score, which combined both the technical and price scores, Simpson received a score of 113.00, which was the highest score, followed by CES (107.55), CCS (103.76), and Johnson (101.76). After opening and considering the price proposals of the respective bidders, the selection committee did not announce an intended award at the meeting on June 15, 2020, but instead requested that the project manager “do further analysis on the pay items for any potential imbalance.” The project manager, through a staff member, performed the additional analysis and determined that Johnson and Simpson submitted “irregular, unbalanced pay items” which resulted in their respective bids being deemed non- responsive and thus not eligible for award. The “irregular, unbalanced pay items” are the three mobilization pay items at issue in the instant matter, and are identified on the bid price proposal sheet as items AB200, AB201, and AB202. Simpson bid $400 for item AB200, $100 for item AB201, and $50 for item AB202. Johnson bid $250 for item AB200, $250 for item AB201, and $100 for item AB202. CCS bid $1 for item AB200, $1 for item AB201, and $1 for item AB202. CES bid $1 for item AB200, 75 cents for item AB201, and 50 cents for item AB202. The Department, in evaluating the bidders’ mobilization pay items, considered costs associated with abatement two structures, a 1,500 and 2,250 square feet structure respectively. For the 1,500-square-foot structure, CCS’ AB200 mobilization costs totaled $1,500. For the 2,250-square-foot structure, CCS’ AB201 mobilization costs totaled $2,250. For the 1,500-square-foot structure, CES’ AB200 mobilization costs totaled $1,500. For the 2,250-square-foot structure, CES’ AB201 mobilization costs totaled $1,687.50. For the 1,500-square-foot structure, Johnson’s AB200 mobilization costs totaled $375,000. For the 2,250-square-foot structure, Johnson’s AB201 mobilization costs totaled $562,500. For the 1,500-square-foot structure, Simpson’s AB200 mobilization costs totaled $600,000. For the 2,250-square-foot structure, Simpson’s AB201 mobilization costs totaled $225,000. On June 22, 2020, the selection committee reconvened and announced CCS and CES as intended awardees of the contract. The Department also announced at this meeting that Johnson and Simpson were “deemed non- responsive due to irregular, unbalanced pay item prices.” On June 24, 2020, Simpson filed a Notice of Protest wherein the company informed the Department of its intent to formally protest the intended award of contracts to CCS and CES. On or about July 6, 2020, Simpson filed with the Department its “formal written petition of protest.” Although Simpson’s formal protest is dated July 6, 2020, CCS and CES contend that Simpson’s protest was actually filed on July 7, 2020, thereby making the protest untimely by a day. The Department did not refer Simpson’s formal protest to DOAH for final hearing, but instead considered the issues presented by Simpson in its protest and then attempted to negotiate a resolution with Simpson, CCS, and CES. Those efforts were unsuccessful. The question of the timeliness of the formal bid protest filed by Simpson is not before the undersigned. Nevertheless, the undisputed facts as to Simpson’s protest, as demonstrated by the record herein, are as follows. On June 24, 2020, Simpson filed notice of its intent to protest the RFP. On June 29, 2020, CCS received notice that a bid protest was filed with respect to the RFP. On July 1, 2020, CES filed a public records request “for public records related to the bid protest made to the” RFP. On or about July 6, 2020, Simpson filed its formal written protest with respect to the RFP, and although the evidence is not clear as to the date, it is undisputed that the Department received affidavits from Simpson explaining the factual circumstances surrounding the filing of the company’s formal written protest. On July 15, 2020, the Department notified CCS and CES that “in response to the Formal Written Protest filed by Simpson Environmental Services, the Department will hold a settlement conference” on Friday, July 17, 2020. On July 21, 2020, Simpson, CES, and CCS notified the Department that they “reached an agreed upon settlement proposal.” On August 11, 2020, the Department, after considering the settlement proposal for several weeks, notified Simpson, CES, and CCS that the Department would discuss the RFP at a public meeting to be held on August 24, 2020. As previously noted, it was during the meeting on August 24, 2020, when the Department announced that all proposals received in response to RFP were rejected. CES, on or about July 1, 2020, submitted to the Department a public records request wherein the company sought a copy of documents related to Simpson’s protest. In response to the request, the Department provided CES a copy of the formal written protest filed by Simpson. It is undisputed that the initial copy provided to CES by the Department did not show either the date or time of receipt of the document filed by Simpson. At some point after the settlement conference, the Department provided to CES a date and time stamped copy of Simpson’s formal written protest. There was no evidence presented explaining the circumstances or the process which resulted in the Department providing different copies of Simpson’s formal written protest to CES, and the remaining evidence does not provide a sufficient foundation to reasonably infer that the Department acted with nefarious motives when providing different versions of the documents to CES. Simpson’s formal protest contains the following statement with respect to the price proposal that the company submitted in response to the RFP: Petitioner’s individual bid price items were based in fact, were reasonable and were in conformity with standard industry rates for similar asbestos abatement and demolition and removal projects. Petitioner’s bid price items were also patently similar to bid price items that Petitioner has previously submitted in response to past FDOT proposal requests that ultimately resulted in the corresponding contracts having been awarded to Petitioner. Indeed, Petitioner has a longstanding relationship with the FDOT as Petitioner has previously contracted with FDOT as a vendor performing asbestos abatement services on numerous projects over the course of the past eight years. Petitioner’s price items for bid proposals have remained consistent for each of its past projects with FDOT. Petitioner’s price items for the instant bid proposal did not differ or vary in any material aspect from those proposed by Petitioner for previous projects that FDOT has deemed reasonable. Michelle Sloan works for the Department as a district procurement manager, and was assigned to manage the instant RFP. Ms. Sloan testified that because Simpson protested the Department’s intended decision to award the contracts to CCS and CES, and specifically referenced in its protest “that their bid for mobilization was in conformance with industry standards, as well as previous bids submitted to the agency that were deemed responsive,” she conducted additional review of the Simpson and Johnson bids. Ms. Sloan testified that after reviewing the RFP, the price sheets related thereto, Simpson’s protest, and the additional analysis of the pay items conducted following the June 15, 2020, selection committee meeting, she concluded that material ambiguities existed in the RFP’s mobilization pay items and recommended to the district secretary that the Department “reject all [bids] and re-advertise with a revised pricing sheet and instructions.” On August 24, 2020, the selection committee, following public notice, accepted Ms. Sloan’s recommendation, rejected all proposals, and canceled the procurement with the “intent to re-advertise with adjustments to the Scope and Pricing structure.” A review of the credible evidence demonstrates a rational basis for the conclusions reached by Ms. Sloan and members of the selection committee. Exhibit C of the RFP is titled “Price Proposal/Detailed and Contractual Price Sheet.” The first page of this document provides a general description of the asbestos removal and abatement pay items. The general pay items are as follows: AB100 Fees [as] determined from the Department of Environmental Protection based upon regulated material. AB200 One-time fee necessary to mobilize for full isolation, per parcel, when abatement with isolation is required. AB300 Fees to be charged by square feet for preparation [of] structure before abatement can commence. AB400 Fees to be charged by square feet, to abate asbestos from various surfacing material such as ceiling, walls, beams, plaster, sheetrock and fireproofing using conventional containment methods. AB500 Fees to be charged either by square foot, linear foot or fittings to abate asbestos from various mechanical systems such as boilers, stacks ducts, fittings, pipes, flutes and flanges. AB600 Fees to be charged either by square foot, linear foot or fittings to abate asbestos from various mechanical systems such as boilers, stacks, ducts, pipe, fittings and jackets which involve the use of a Glove bag. AB700 Fees to be charged by square foot, to abate asbestos from various roofing materials such as cement roof shingles, flashing, rolled roof, felts, wood shingles and mobile home coating. AB800 Fees to be charged by square foot or piece to abate asbestos from various materials such as floor tile, mastic adhesive, sheet vinyl, carpet, wood sub- floor, concrete sub-floor, vibrator dampers, wallboard, metal ductwork and sinks with insulation and heat shields (light fixture). AB900 Fees to be charge[d] by landfill for asbestos disposal. The bid price proposal sheet, which is form number 2 of the RFP, provides a listing of specific pay items related to the general “AB ---” items listed in Exhibit C to the RFP. Below is an example of some of the specific pay items listed on the bid price proposal sheet: [See table on next page] Item Number Description (A) Estimat ed Quantit y Unit (B) Unit Pric e Total Bid Amount (A x B) ASBESTOS REMOVAL ABATEMENT AB200 Mobilization for structures less than 2,000 Sq. FT. 1 SQ. FT. AB201 Mobilization for structures [from] 2001 – 5000 Sq. FT. 1 SQ. FT. AB202 Mobilization for structures over 5001 Sq. FT. 1 SQ. FT. AB300 Mask and Seal 1 SQ. FT. AB401 Remove ACM plaster/lathe including all surface materials 1 SQ. FT. AB501 Remove insulation from fittings 1 LF. AB603 Remove insulation from boilers, stacks or ducts piping 1 LF. AB703 Remove roofing cement 1 SQ. FT. AB810 Remove carpet and mastic adhesive 1 SQ. FT. AB820 Remove sinks with insulation 1 SQ. FT. AB901 Non-Friable 1 SQ. FT. General pay item category AB200, as described on Exhibit C, does not reference a “unit of measurement,” but instead notes that items within this category are to be determined on a “one-time – per parcel” basis. When the AB200 general pay item category is compared to the specific pay items for this category enumerated on the bid price proposal sheet (i.e., AB200, AB201, and AB202), it is evident that the unit of measurement “square feet” is listed as the basis for calculating the bid amount for this item when no such unit of measurement is stated for this item on Exhibit C. Comparatively, general pay item categories AB300 through AB800 each expressly references a specific unit of measurement (i.e., square foot, linear foot, or by the “piece”), and these units of measurement carry over to and are consistently reflected on the bid price proposal sheet for the specific pay items enumerated therein. By inserting a unit of measurement (i.e., square feet) in the mobilization pay items listed on the bid price proposal sheet, when the general description on Exhibit C instructs that they are “one-time, per parcel” pay items, the Department created a material ambiguity in the bidding process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby Recommended that the Department of Transportation issue a final order in Case Nos. 20-4214 and 20-4216 finding that the rejection of all proposals in response to Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-20-5003-DAA was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing the two petitions. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Dell Dolan, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 (eServed) Richard E. Shine, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Brian A. Leung, Esquire Holcomb & Leung, P.A. 3203 West Cypress Street Tampa, Florida 33607 (eServed) Diane E. H. Watson, Esquire Cross Environmental Services, Inc. Post Office Box 1299 Crystal Springs, Florida 33524-1299 (eServed) Kevin J. Tibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
The Issue The issues to be considered in the course of this Recommended Order concern the question of whether Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. or White Construction Company, Inc. should be accepted as a successful bidder on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida, as advertised by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Transportation, (DOT), advertised for bids on State Project No. 53050-3514, Jackson County, Florida. This was a project in which DOT had determined that 10 percent of the funding within the State Department of Transportation Trust Fund, as allotted for the project, would be devoted to economically disadvantaged individuals, also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE). This decision was in keeping with Section 339.081, Florida Statutes. Consequently, interested bidders were called upon to submit bids reflecting a DBE participation of a minimum of 10 percent of the bid submitted. Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. (Baxter) and White Construction Company, Inc. (White) responded to the bid opportunity. The bids were opened on July 25, 1984, and Baxter's bid was the apparent low bid. The bid amount was $882,641.25. White was the second low bidder offering a bid of $928,353. Both bids were within the DOT estimate of construction costs. When the bids were reviewed, Baxter's bid was rejected by DOT based upon the belief that the bid failed to meet the DBE 10 percent requirement or to offer explanation of good faith attempts by Baxter to comply with the DBE contract requirement amount. See Section 14-78.03(2)(b)4., Florida Administrative Code. No other claim of error was made by DOT on the subject of the acceptability of the Baxter bid. The White bid is conforming. In preparing the bid, bidders are required to use DBE Utilization Form No. 1 to reflect the amount of DBE participation as a percentage of the overall bid estimate. In submitting its form as part of its bid blank, Baxter indicated that the total project cost was $884,000, and indicated that Ozark Striping, a DBE subcontractor, would be given $20,000 of that work or 3 percent, and that Glenn Powell, DBE subcontractor, would be afforded 7 percent of the total contract in the amount of $55,000. The total percentage according to Baxter is 10 percent, thus meeting the required DBE participation. This form is found as part of the joint Exhibit No. 1 offered by the parties. In fact, the Ozark Striping participation was 2.26 percent, and the Glenn Powell participation was 6.22 percent, for a total of 8.48 percent of the estimate reflected in the Form No. 1. Contrasted against the actual estimate of $882,641.25, these projections constitute 8.49 percent of that estimate. Thus, they are less than the 10 percent required. Given the fact that this DBE projection is less than the 10 percent, and in the absence of any attempt to offer a good faith explanation why Baxter failed to comply with the requirement, the bid was rejected for this irregularity. The Contract Awards Committee of DOT, when confronted with the irregularity of the Baxter bid, then determined to recommend the rejection of all bids. This was in keeping with the fact that the difference between the unsuccessful apparent low bid, with irregularities, and the second low bid exceeded 1 percent of the contract amount. At the time of this decision to reject all bids, DOT felt that the difference would justify re-advertising the bids. That policy position had been abandoned at the point of final hearing in this cause, wherein DOT expressed the opinion that it would be better served to accept the bid of White, and not re-advertise, again for cost reasons. In the face of the initial action to reject all bids and in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes, Baxter and White appealed that decision and by that appeal requested recognition as a successful bidder. This led to the present Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing. Baxter has never attempted to offer a good faith explanation of its non-compliance. It chooses to proceed on the theory that the mistake in computation can be rectified by allowing Baxter to submit a supplemental Form No. 1, bringing its total above the DBE requirement. In its contention, Baxter indicates that Glenn Powell could have provided $126,000 of the DBE goal, which is in excess of the 10 percent requirement. Baxter also alludes to the fact that it had contacted other DBE enterprises, such as Oglesby and Hogg, Michael Grassing, and J.E. Hill. All told, Baxter indicates that if given the opportunity, it would allow $146,000 of DBE participation to include $126,000 by Glenn Powell, and $20,000 by Ozark. This comment is suspect, given the lack of compliance in the initial bid response, and the realization that within that bid response on the item related to Glenn Powell, the original amount of work attributed to Glenn Powell was $100,000, and was struck through in favor of the $55,000, leaving a fair inference that Baxter was attempting to meet the DBE goal with a projection as close to the 10 percent as could be achieved. They fell short because in adding the $20,000 for Ozark, and the $55,000 for Glenn Powell, the addition in the Form No. 1 showed $85,000, which is more than 10 percent of the $884,000 shown on the form, when in fact the two amounts were $75,000, and less than the 10 percent required. Baxter characterizes its mistake in computation as a technical error, which can be remedied without harm to the bid process. The Baxter position must be examined in the context of action by DOT relating to compliance with DBE requirements. Prior to June 1984, a time before the subject July 25, 1984 bid opening, bidders had been allowed to amend the Form No. 1 to show compliance with the DBE requirements or demonstrate good faith efforts of compliance. That amendment as to compliance through listing of the DBE subcontractors or submission of good faith effort documentation had to be offered within 10 days per former Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code. Beginning with the June 1984 bid-lettings, all documentation had to be submitted with the bid, reflecting compliance or describing good faith efforts at compliance per Section 14-78.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 1984. This change was brought about to prevent the apparent low bidder, as indicated at the point of bid-letting, from shopping the quotations by the DBE's found in its original quote against other quotes from DBE's not listed in the bid documents initially submitted, and by amendment to the DBE statement prejudicing the former DBE group. The change was also made to avoid the possibility that the apparent low bidder could evade his bid by rendering it non-conforming, in the sense of refusing to submit the required documentation of compliance with DBE requirements or to the offer of a good faith explanation of non-compliance after the bid-letting. The change of May 1984, removed the possibility of bid shopping and bid avoidance. Both versions of Section 14-78.03, Florida Administrative Code, pre and post May 1984, indicate that failure to satisfy the DBE requirements or offer a showing of a good faith attempt at compliance, would result in the contractor's bid being deemed non-responsive, and cause its rejection. Baxter has been able to comply with the DBE goals of DOT in its bidding prior to the present controversy.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, the Respondent was licensed as a general contractor, holding license number CG C003564, qualifying WSCON Corporation. On or about September 27, 1990, the Respondent, acting on behalf of WSCON Corporation, entered into a contract with Emilio and Jennie Delgado to build an addition to the Delgado's residence at 13562 Southwest 286th Terrace, Miami, Florida, for a price of $12,756.00. On or about January 5, 1991, the parties to the contract agreed to a change order which increased the contract price by $1,248.00, to a total of $14,004.00. The Respondent obtained a building permit for the job from Dade County and the Respondent began work on the job about a month after signing the contract. The Delgados made payments to the Respondent pursuant to the contract in the total amount of $10,500.00. The final payment was due upon completion of the job. The Delgados never made the final payment because the Respondent never finished the job. After about September or October of 1991, the Respondent performed no further work under the contract. At that time, the Respondent had completed the majority of the work, but there was still some work that remained to be completed. 1/ The Respondent discontinued performing work called for by the contract because of financial problems he was having due to his not having received certain funds owed to him by Dade County. He offered to continue working on the job if the Delgados would advance him sums under the contract that were not yet due, but the Delgados refused to do so. The Delgados never discharged the Respondent. The Delgados completed the job themselves, paying a total of $6,046.21 to various suppliers of labor and materials other than the Respondent. 2/
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charges alleged in Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint; Finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing the following penalty: an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and a one year period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June 1994.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Close Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), (Close) was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder in the Request For Bid (RFB) Number 6000000262, whether the subject contract should be awarded to the Petitioner, and, concomitantly, whether the Respondent agency's decision to award the contract to the Intervener, Worth Contracting, Inc. (Worth) was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District is a public corporation authorized under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. It issued a request for bids for the refurbishment and automation of certain facilities in Broward County, Florida. Close is a construction company duly authorized to do business in the state of Florida. It was one of the bidders on the procurement represented by the subject request for bids and is the Petitioner in this case. This dispute had its beginnings on June 5, 2009, when the Respondent issued RFB number 6000000262. The RFB solicited construction services for the refurbishment and automation of two facilities in Broward County. The procurement would involve the installation of new direct-drive electric pumps at the Respondent's G-123 Pump Station in Broward County, along with the construction of an equipment shelter and the replacement of a retaining wall with a poured concrete retaining wall, as well as refurbishment of "pump flap gates." The RFB also requested construction services for the replacement of gates at the Respondent's S-34 water-control structure in Broward County. Both facilities would thus be automated so that they can be remotely operated from the Respondent's headquarters in West Palm Beach. After issuance of the RFB, two addenda were supplied to vendors and were posted. The first addendum was posted on or about June 19, 2009, concerning a change in specifications for flap gates and is not the subject of this dispute. Addendum No. Two was electronically posted on or about June 30, 2009. It amended the technical specifications of the RFB by deleting Section 11212 regarding measurement of payment of electric motors/belt-driven axial flow pumps. That addendum also added a new measure and payment to Subpart 1.01 of the technical specifications to provide for an owner-directed allowance of $40,000.00 to provide for the potential need for certain electrical utility work to be done by FPL in order to complete the project. Addendum No. Two added an additional term to the RFB in providing that the $40,000.00 allowance price "Shall be added to the other costs to complete the bid." The second Addendum also stated, "The allowance price shall be used at the discretion of the District and, if not used, will be deducted from the final Contract Price." That addendum also directed bidders to replace the original Bid Form 00320-2, which had been enclosed with the RFB, with a new Bid Form, 00320R1-2. The new Bid Form is identical to the original form except that the schedule of bid prices contained in paragraph four, on page 003201-2, was altered to itemize the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance. The original form had contained a single line for the bidder's lump sum bid price, whereas the revised form provided for a lump sum bid amount to be itemized and a base bid amount, which required the bidder to enter on the form the amount of its bid, then add the discretionary cost amount and write the sum of those two numbers on a third line. In paragraph four of the new bid form there is re- printed language concerning the use of the discretionary allowance which appeared on the face of Addendum No. Two. Other than the change to paragraph four and the alteration of the page numbers to include an "R" in the page number, the revised bid form is identical to the original bid form. The other bid documents were not altered in any manner by Addendum No. Two. The deadline for bid submissions was Thursday, July 9, 2009, at 2:30 p.m. The Petitioner timely submitted its bid to the District. In submitting its bid however, the Petitioner used the original bid form which had been enclosed with the RFB. The bid form submitted was an exact copy of the bid form furnished by the District which Close had printed from the electronic copy of the RFB received from the District. The Petitioner did not substitute the revised bid form, attached to Addendum No. Two, for the original form in submitting its bid. The Petitioner's bid was deemed non-responsive by the District and was rejected on the basis that Close had failed to submit the bid on the revised form required by Addendum No. Two. Thereafter, the District, at its August 13, 2009, meeting, approved award of the bid to Worth. The intent to award was posted electronically on or about August 14, 2009. The persuasive evidence establishes that Close received both addenda to the bid documents. It was aware of the Addendum No. Two, and it accounted for all of the changes to the technical specifications made in both addenda in the preparation of its bid. The evidence shows that Close was aware of the $40,000.00, owner-directed cost allowance and that it incorporated it in the formulation of its total bid price. Thus, Close's final bid amount was $3,751,795.00. That number included the $40,000.00 cost allowance at issue, added to the bid documents by Addendum No. Two. The internal bid work sheets, prepared by personnel of Close, identified and itemized the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance as a component of the final bid price. The persuasive evidence thus establishes that Close's final bid amount did include the $40,000.00 cost allowance. Moreover, the written notes of witness Christopher Rossi, the estimator for Close, show the $40,000.00 amount as an "FPL Allowance." Both Mr. Rossi and Mr. Boromei, the Vice President for Close, who prepared the bid, explained that the $40,000.00 was understood by Close to be a cost allowance, that it would only be charged to the District to the extent that it was actually used, at the District's discretion. If it were not used, it was to be deducted from the overall contract price. Addendum Two specifically provides that the discretionary cost allowance was to be used only at the discretion of the District and that the unused portion would be deducted from the contract amount. When Close submitted its bid it mistakenly submitted it on the original bid form and failed to exchange the bid forms as directed in Item Two of Addendum No. 2. In paragraph one of both bid forms, however, the bidder is required to specifically fill out, acknowledge and identify all addenda. By doing so the bidder expressly agrees to build the project in conformance with all contract documents, including all addenda, for the price quoted in the bid. Close completed this paragraph, specifically identified both Addendum One and Addendum Two, and specifically agreed to strictly conform, in performance of the work to the plans, specifications and other contract documents, including Addendum Nos. One and Two. Paragraph one was not changed by the addition of Addendum No. Two and it is identical in both the original and the revised forms at issue. Paragraph one of the original and the revised bid forms constitutes an agreement by the bidder to perform and construct a project "in strict conformity with the plans, specifications and other Contract Documents. . . ." The addenda are part of the contract documents and are expressly referenced as such in this agreement. Both bid forms, the original and the revised, include paragraph eight, which clearly states that the bidder will post a bid bond to secure and guaranty that it will enter into a contract with the District, if its bid is selected. Paragraph eight was unchanged by Addendum No. Two and its terms are identical in both Bid forms at issue, including the form that Close signed and submitted as its bid. The persuasive evidence shows that in submitting its bid, whether on either form, Close committed itself to the identical terms as set forth in the identical contract documents agreed to by Worth and the other bidders. The evidence established that Close intended to bind itself to the terms of the RFB, and all terms of Addendum No. Two, including the discretionary cost allowance term. Close considered itself bound to enter into a contract for the price of its bid if selected by the District. It likewise considered that the price of its bid, would only include the cost allowance if the discretionary allowance was implemented by the District. Upon the opening of the bids, the firm of Cone and Graham, Inc., was identified as the lowest bidder. Cone and Graham's bid was in the amount of $2,690,000.00. Close was the second lowest bidder, with a bid of $3,751,795.00. The third lowest bidder was Worth Contracting, Inc., with a bid of $3,898,410.00. Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information and to even meet with some District staff following the opening of its bid. The additional information it was allowed to provide concerned technical specifications of the pumps proposed in its bid. Through this verification process conducted with the Agency, Cone and Graham ultimately convinced the District to permit them to withdraw its bid without forfeiting their bid bond. This left the Petitioner, Close, the lowest bidder, at $146,615.00 less than the bid submitted by Worth, the initially-awarded bidder. Close's bid, upon review, was rejected as non- responsive due to its failure to exchange the original Bid form with the revised Bid form, as indicated above, in spite of the fact that Close had also agreed to adhere to the entirety of Addendum No. Two on the face of the Bid form. Thus the recommended award to Worth for the above-referenced additional amount of bid price was adopted by the District, engendering this protest. James Reynolds, the Contracts Specialist for the District, conceded that it was apparent on the face of Close's bid that a mistake had been made in the use of the original form, rather than the revised form. He conceded there was an inconsistency between Close's clear acknowledgement of and agreement to the terms of the contract documents, which expressly included Addendum No. Two and Close's apparent mistaken use of the original Bid form. Under the express terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB, "The Bid shall be construed as though the addendum(a) have been received and acknowledged by the bidder." Mr. Reynolds admitted, however, that he did not apply the terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB in his review of Close's bid and did not construe the bid in the manner provided in the RFB to resolve the apparent inconsistency. He reasoned that Close had used the wrong bid form and looked no further. The District's Procurement Manual provides a procedure whereby a bidder may correct inadvertent mistakes in its bid. Under the terms of Chapter 5-5 of that manual, where the District knows or has reason to conclude, after unsealing of bids, that a mistake may have been made by a bidder, the District "shall request written verification of the bid." In such a circumstance the bidder "shall be permitted the opportunity to furnish information in support of the bid verification as long as it does not affect responsiveness, i.e., the bid substantially conforms to the requirements of the RFB as it relates to pricing, surety, insurance, specifications and any other matter unequivocally stated in the RFB as determinant of responsiveness." See Joint Exhibit 7,6 pages 61 and 62, in evidence. Mr. Reynolds admitted in his testimony that he did not follow the procedure set forth in the manual for verifying a bid because, in his view, that would be allowing an impermissible supplementation of Close's bid. Ms. Lavery, in her testimony, in essence agreed. The Procurement Manual expressly required the District, upon recognizing the mistake and an inconsistency apparent on the face of Close's bid, to verify that bid and to provide Close with the opportunity to furnish information in support of bid verification. Thus, by the express terms of the manual, a bidder must be given an opportunity to clarify mistakes. The Procurement Manual expressly permits a bidder under these circumstances to correct any "inadvertent, non- judgmental mistake" in its bid. Chapter 5 of the Manual provides that "a non-judgmental mistake" is a mistake not attributable to an error in judgment, such as mistakes in personal judgment or wrongful assumptions of contract obligations. Inadvertent technical errors, such as errors of form rather than substance, are considered non-judgmental errors." See Joint Exhibit 7, page 62, in evidence. It is patently apparent that Close's use of the original bid form, inadvertently, while also unequivocally acknowledging and agreeing to the entirety of Addendum No. Two, represented a non-judgmental mistake. Both of the District witnesses, however, testified that the policy regarding mistakes was not followed and Close was not given an opportunity under the District's policy to provide additional information to support verification of the bid. Although Close failed to substitute the revised Bid form for the original Bid form, as called for by Addendum No. Two, its bid was substantively responsive to the technical specifications and requirements of the RFB, and the irregularity is technical in nature. The parties stipulated that the use of the original form, rather than the revised bid form, was the sole basis for Close being determined to be non-responsive by the Agency. In accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.301, in Chapter 5 of the District's Procurement Manual, the District reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in a bid. A material irregularity is defined by the District's policy as one which is not minor in that it: (a) affects the price, quality, time or manner of performance of the service such that it would deprive the District of an assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to the specified requirements; (b) provides an advantage or benefit to a bidder which is not enjoyed by other bidders; or (c) undermines the necessary common standards of competition. See Joint Exhibit 7, page 58, in evidence. The preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that the irregularity in Close's bid did not affect the price of the bid or truly deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be entered into and performed according to all the terms of the RFB, including addenda. The evidence established that Close actually included the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance in its final bid price. It merely did not show it as a separate itemization, because it did not use the revised form providing that itemization line. The fact that the discretionary allowance was itemized in the revised bid form, as part of the bid amount, does not equate to an effect on the contract price as a result of Close's using the original Bid form. Close's error, by mistakenly submitting its bid on the original bid form, did not alter the price of its bid. The evidence clearly established that the bid price for Close's bid would be the same regardless of which form it used. Moreover, the preponderant, persuasive evidence establishes that the use of the original Bid form by Close did not deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance with the all bid documents. Close's bid, secured by its bid bond, clearly acknowledged and agreed to the express terms of Addendum No. Two in their entirety, which included the terms under which the discretionary cost allowance could be applied. Close considered itself bound to the terms of the RFB and assured the Agency that it was so bound by the written acknowledgement and agreement it submitted to the Agency as part of its bid, concerning the elements of Addendum No. Two. The evidence demonstrated that Close understood that the $40,000.00 amount was a discretionary cost allowance and that Close would not be entitled to it unless the District decided to use it. Despite the opinion of Agency witnesses to the contrary, the error in Close's bid was a technical one and non- material because it did not confer a competitive advantage upon Close. Close's use of the wrong form did not alter the price of its bid. Its mistake in the use of the original bid form could only change the relative, competitive positions of Close and Worth if the amount of the discretionary cost allowance was greater or equal to the difference between those two bids, i.e., the $146,650.00 amount by which Worth's bid exceeded the bid of Close. 1/ The bid of Worth exceeds Close's bid by an amount far greater than the amount at issue in the discretionary cost allowance identified in Addendum No. Two and expressly itemized in the revised Bid form, i.e. $40,000.00. The District contends that Close gained some competitive economic advantage over other bidders by having the means by which it could optionally withdraw its bid, based upon alleged non-responsiveness, in not substituting the revised Bid form which would contain the itemization of the $40,000.00 cost allowance. It is difficult to see how it could gain a competitive advantage versus other bidders through some perceived ability to deem itself non-responsive, at its option, and withdraw its bid, thus denying itself the contract. The competitive bidding laws are designed to prevent a firm from gaining a competitive advantage in obtaining a contract versus the efforts of other bidders, not in depriving itself of the opportunity to get the work. Moreover, concerning the argument by the District that this may confer the advantage to Close of allowing it to withdraw its bid at its option and still obtain a refund of its bid bond; even if that occurred, it would not confer a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other bidders. It would merely involve a potential pecuniary advantage to Close's interest, versus that of the Agency itself, which obviously is not a bidder. Moreover, it should again be pointed out that Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information concerning its bid elements, and even to meet with the District staff, following the opening of the bids. It was then allowed to withdraw its bid without forfeiting its bid bond. If the District had inquired, by way of verification of Close's bid, as to whether the discretionary cost amount was included in it's bid, that inquiry does not equate to allowing Close to unlawfully supplement its bid. Indeed, if in response to such an inquiry, Close announced that the discretionary allowance was not included in its bid, its bid at that point would be materially non-responsive to the specifications. If Close was then allowed to supplement its bid by changing its price to add the allowance, such would indeed be an unfair competitive advantage and a violation of law on the part of Close and the Agency. The evidence does not show that such happened or was proposed by any party. If a verification inquiry had been made and Close announced that, indeed, its bid price did include the subject discretionary cost allowance, without further response to the specifications being added, then no competitive advantage would be afforded Close and no legal violation would occur. In fact, however, as pointed out above, the verification request, pursuant to the District's policy manual, was never made. This was despite the fact that the District's witness, Mr. Reynolds, acknowledged that the use of the original bid form was an apparent mistake on the face of the bid, when considered in conjunction with Close's express agreement to construct the project in strict conformance with all contract documents, and particularly with regard to Addenda Numbers One and Two. The non-judgmental mistake, involving use of the original bid form in lieu of the revised bid form, could have been easily clarified by a verification inquiry. That policy was not followed, based solely on the fact that the wrong bid form was used, even though the preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that in all material and substantive respects the bid was a conforming, responsive bid and included in its price the discretionary cost allowance. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the mistaken use of the original Bid form was a non- material irregularity under the District's policies and the terms of the RFB. The District's actions in failing to uniformly apply its own bid verification policy when, in fact, it had allowed verification to one of the other bidders, and when, according to its own witness, it perceived an apparent mistake, was clearly erroneous. It is true that Close may not supplement its bid by changing material terms, but it is permitted to verify whether, in light of the mistaken use of the original Bid form, its bid price, as submitted, included the $40,000.00 discretionary allowance or not. Providing such "yes or no" type of additional information in order to clarify, and only clarify, information already submitted in the bid, in response to an inquiry by the District does not constitute "supplementation" of the bid for purposes of Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). NCS Pearson, Inc. v. Dept of Education, 2005 WL 31776, at page 18 (DOAH, Feb. 8, 2005). Even without verification of the bid, the bid on its face agrees to compliance with all terms and specifications, including Addendum No. Two. It is thus determined that there is no material irregularity. The bid submitted by Close does not afford it any competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other bidders and it is responsive.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the South Florida Water Management District, awarding the subject contract for RFB 6000000262 to the Petitioner herein, Close Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2010.
