Findings Of Fact South of the intersection of Blue Angel Parkway and Gulf Beach Highway in southwest Escambia County lies the wooded, 69-acre tract, designated "Site F," onto which ECUA proposes to dispose up to three million gallons of wastewater a day. Petitioner Westerman operates a marina nearby. The individual intervenors own houses in the vicinity as, apparently, do other members of the intervening association. A state agency with wide ranging environmental responsibilities, DER permits construction of wastewater treatment facilities in conformity with its rules. Sewage disposal is one of several utility services ECUA provides residents of Escambia County. A Trip to the Beach Under orders from DER and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to cease discharging directly into Bayou Chico ("a very impacted body of water ... [with] very difficult problems" T. 101), ECUA proposes to build a pumping facility and install enough 24-inch pipe to enable it to send effluent from its wastewater treatment plant in Warrington to Site F, for "rapid rate" land application. Upgraded since DER and EPA forbade direct discharges into Bayou Chico, the Warrington plant now employs advanced treatment techniques to remove most phosphorous and nitrogen from its effluent. Nevertheless, in order to mollify regulators, ECUA has plans to ship the effluent through some seven miles of pipe to Site F. In the opinion of its executive director, ECUA is "an easy target . . . . Whether it's practical or fair is really not the question." Id. He feels, "cost is not a factor" (T. 102) that the regulatory authorities have taken into account. Sandy Soils Site F straddles a coastal ridge, vegetated dunes that separate Garcon Swamp from Big Lagoon. Elevations vary from 29 feet above mean sea level at the crest of the ridge to nine feet above mean sea level in the swale that traverses the property. Highly permeable surficial sand extends to depths ranging between 20 and 35 feet below grade. Under the surficial sand, a layer of silty sand, extending down 55 to 60 feet, overlies another layer of very clean sand, much denser than the surficial sand. At depths of 90 to 110 feet, a clay aquiclude undergirds these sandy strata. Using field and laboratory test results, experts put the average hydraulic conductivity of the surficial sands at 35 feet per day, of the silty middle sand layer at 10 to 15 feet per day, and of the clean but dense sands on top of the clay at 5 to 10 feet per day. In addition to laboratory results, two pump tests support these conclusions. Results of two other pump tests indicating hydraulic conductivity of 4.7 and 5.0 feet per day were dismissed as unreliable. Sand caving in compromised at least one of these tests. As far as the record reveals, no bench-scale or pilot-scale hydraulic testing took place. According to DER's Mr. Reinning, there was "more soil testing on this site than [he had] seen on any other permit event." T.II. 217. Although the soils on the site are "relatively uniform," (T.II. 212) no layer of sand is perfectly uniform. Mr. Jacobs, one of ECUA's consultants, testified that a boring on one of the proposed pond sites revealed a one-foot layer of sand and organics with a vertical hydraulic conductivity of one foot per day. T.I. 245. Perhaps Mr. Jacobs was referring to boring B-2, which, according to the log, reflects a two-foot interval of peat and decaying wood, at a depth of slightly more than 13 feet. ECUA's Exhibit 2. No other boring gave evidence of this layer. The nearest bore hole to B-2 was more than 200 feet away. Expert testimony that the borings did not indicate an "extensive pocket," and gave no reason to fear a "per(c)hed water table," (T.II. 214) was not controverted. Construction Plans ECUA proposes to construct 16 percolation ponds or cells on Site F. Seven pairs of cells would be terraced on a north-south axis, with an eighth, noncontiguous pair at an angle in the southwestern portion of the property. Cell bottoms, at elevations ranging between 16 and 27 feet above mean sea level, would have a surface area aggregating some 23 acres (1,027,900 square feet.) ECUA would erect a perimeter fence and install warning signs. Except for valves, "no mechanical equipment [would be) involved in the disposal site," T.123, nor are "bright lights," id. planned. Water flowing into percolation ponds does not create an aerosol. Odors are not foreseen. Encircling each infiltration basin, berms three to three and a half feet higher than the cell bottoms would contain effluent and deflect sheet flow. Except for rain falling directly into the cells, stormwater would not reach the percolation cells. Chances that effluent augmented by rainfall would overflow the berms are remote. A 100-year, 24-hour return storm would not interrupt operation of the facility. No percolation pond site lies within the 100-year flood plain. No percolation basin is to be located within 500 feet of a potable water supply well or class I or class II surface water; or closer than 100 feet to the boundary of the property. Situated within some 20 acres of wetlands, a brackish pond lies about 1,000 feet from the nearest cell planned, between Site F and Big Lagoon into which the pond opens. At the nearest point, Big Lagoon itself comes within 1200 feet of a planned percolation cell. A swale or slough bridged by Blue Angel Parkway runs southwesterly north and west of the main phalanx of percolation ponds ECUA proposes, then turns a corner and runs southeasterly, separating the two cells proposed for the southwest portion of the property from the others. The nearest percolation pond is to be built about 100 feet from wetlands associated with the swale. Loading Rates ECUA plans to direct wastewater into half the cells one week and the remainder the next, alternating like the squares on a chessboard. The exact cycle is not a condition of the construction permit, however, and computer modelers assumed loading cycles consisting of two two-day periods. As applied to the total bottom area of percolation cells, the average daily loading rate for three million gallons a day (mgd) would amount to 2.91 gallons per square foot. Because half the ponds would be resting at any given time, ponds receiving effluent would experience inflow at an average rate of 5.82 gallons per square foot. In deciding the length of the loading cycle, as "the soil gets lower in permeability you have to really stretch your time for loading out, because it takes the water much longer to get out of the loading area." T.I. 188. But, with respect to the long-term capacity of the system, "the period of loading and resting . . . really doesn't significantly affect . . . how the site is expected to perform." T.II. 222. In the absence of bench-scale or pilot-scale tests heretofore, the applicant "intend[s] to load test this site, because just for the various concerns, because it is a big site." T.I. 189. Groundwater Effects Class G-II groundwater under the site now flows generally southerly toward the brackish pond and Big Lagoon. An expert put the rate of flow under the site at .22 feet per day, but concluded that the rate increased to approximately a half foot a day between Site F and Big Lagoon. As far as is known, groundwater under the sites proposed for the infiltration ponds rises no closer to the surface than six to nine feet, even under wet conditions, although the evidence by no means conclusively established that it would never rise higher. Some groundwater emerges in the swale during wet periods, and flows in the swale as far as the brackish pond, to which other groundwater makes regular, direct contribution. At the edge of the lagoon, further out in the lagoon and possibly in the Gulf of Mexico, still other groundwater comes up as springs. At least initially, the sandy soils would accept effluent readily. Until and unless actual experience showed that the facility could handle the three mgd for which it is designed, the plan is to dispose of no more than 2.5 million gallons of effluent a day. Before equilibrium is attained, ongoing disposal of effluent would gradually raise the level of groundwater under the site, inducing, on the preexisting, sloping surface of ambient groundwater, a mound, on which 16 smaller mounds (corresponding to the loading nozzles discharging wastewater into the percolation ponds) would superimpose themselves, half swelling, like so many goose eggs, half subsiding, at any given time. Adding effluent should not materially alter the ultimate direction of flow. For the most part, even groundwater flowing in other directions off the mounds induced under the site would eventually turn south toward the lagoon. But a steeper gradient should speed up the flow. Percolating effluent would increase the volume not only of seepage into the swale but also of subterranean flow reaching both the brackish pond and the lagoon. Increased seepage upslope from the slough would flow down into the swale, along the stream bed, and into the brackish pond. Monitoring As modified at hearing, ECUA's monitoring plan contemplates eight wells and four surface water monitoring points from which water samples would be periodically taken for analysis, to determine levels of nitrogen, phosphorous and other chemical and biological constituents of concern. Once the facility began operating, no well would yield "background" samples uninfluenced by the effluent. T. I. 221. The wells are all to be located on ECUA property and, therefore, close enough to the percolation ponds to receive ground water flows radiating from the mounds adding the effluent would induce. Final Destination Effluent emerging in seepage, perhaps as much as 75 percent of the total (T. III. 47), could reach Big Lagoon, by way of the swale and the brackish pond, soon after regaining the surface of the land. Wetland vegetation would filter such flows, already diluted underground and sometimes by stormwater runoff, on their way to the lagoon. Effluent that mixed with groundwater traveling to Big Lagoon underground would not show up in the lagoon for months or years. But when it arrived, much diluted and after such attenuation of pollutants as the largely inorganic soils afforded, it would also contribute to subtle changes in the waters of Big Lagoon. Virtually all effluent would ultimately end up in Big Lagoon. T.I. 234; T.III.45. Two channels connect Big Lagoon to Pensacola Bay to the east, and a single, more constricted channel connects it to Perdido Bay to the west. Tides influence the circulation of the Class III water within Big Lagoon, variously calculated to amount to some ten or eleven billion gallons of clean salt water. Through Pensacola Bay and Perdido Bay, Big Lagoon communicates with the Gulf of Mexico. As the tide rises, water from the adjacent bays enters the long and narrow reaches of Big Lagoon, at either end. As the tide ebbs, water in the lagoon (including a significant portion of bay water introduced by the preceding tide) flows out either end. ECUA's expert's claim that tides flush the lagoon in less than nine days did not take this back-and-forth movement into account, or look specifically at the four-billion gallon basin into which the brackish pond overflows. Big Lagoon lies south of the mainland and north of Perdido Key, one of the barrier islands paralleling the coast. These islands and waters north of them, extending as far as the southern boundary of the intracoastal waterway, comprise the Gulf Islands National Seashore. By rule, the waters of Big Lagoon south of the intracoastal waterway have been designated Outstanding Florida Waters. Two to three hundred yards wide, the intracoastal lies not far offshore the mainland. Water Quality Analysis of a single ground water sample revealed nutrient levels, but neither the applicant nor DER developed any data specific to Big Lagoon about nutrient levels there. Chemical analyses done on four samples of lagoon water (at petitioner's expense) revealed no nitrate nitrogen above detection levels in any of the samples, and no ammonia nitrogen above detection levels in three of the four samples, but disclosed 0.08 parts per million in the fourth. Three of the four samples contained 0.02 parts phosphorous per million, while the fourth had phosphorous in a concentration of 0.03 parts per million. Tests with water taken from Big Lagoon showed that the addition of both nitrogen and phosphorous compounds (but not the addition of one without the other) coincided with algal growth in one of four sets of samples, each set including a control in which such growth did not occur. In other samples of lagoon water into which algae were introduced, the addition of nitrogen, either alone or in combination with phosphorous, seemed to cause blue-green algae to predominate, instead of the dominant, indigenous pennate diatoms. In these experiments, ammonia chloride was added to produce nitrogen concentrations of 17.5 grams per liter, six times greater than would be allowed in the effluent, as much as 17 times greater than the concentration petitioner's expert predicted for wastewater reaching the lagoon, and two orders of magnitude above ambient levels. The experimenter also added sodium phosphate dibasic heptahydrate to create phosphorous concentrations of four grams per liter, which is also two orders of magnitude above levels naturally occurring in Big Lagoon. Special permit conditions limit (on an annual average) total nitrogen in effluent sent to Site F to 75 pounds per day, and phosphorous to one milligram per liter, which would amount to 25 pounds in three million gallons, the maximum daily flow. Permit conditions also prescribe limits for acidity and alkalinity (pH must be greater than 6.0 and less than 8.5), suspended solids, and biochemical oxygen demand. Basic dis- infection is required. Assuming ECUA disposed of three mgd at Site F, up to 25 pounds of phosphorous could be added to the estuary daily, on average, or more than a ton of phosphorous quarterly, if steady state were attained. Although three times as much nitrogen might occur in the effluent, oxidation and reduction would cause some nitrogen to enter the atmosphere as a gas instead of remaining dissolved until it reached the estuary. Not only organic components of the soil but also organic matter arriving in the effluent and accumulating on pond bottoms would contribute to denitrification. Salinity in the brackish pond would decline. A DER employee, Mr. Swartz, testified that placing three mgd of effluent in the planned percolation ponds "would not result in degradation of the surface water," (T. II. 127) citing "our experience here in Florida." Id. Whatever may be said as regards the brackish pond, no evidence gave substantial reason to question the accuracy of this opinion as it relates to waters south of the intracoastal waterway.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DER deny the application, without prejudice to the filing of another after successful bench-scale or pilot-scale hydraulic testing and after ECUA has made arrangements for a ground water monitoring well from which samples unlikely to be affected by the effluent may be drawn. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 8, 13, 14, 16 and 18 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Most of petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15 accurately recites testimony adduced, but Shuba testified that algal growth has been stimulated by nutrient concentrations comparable to those Dohms said would occur in water entering Big Lagoon, not in concentrations likely to exist once this wastewater-bearing contribution mixed with other water in the lagoon. Petitioner presented information about nutrient levels in lagoon water at hearing. Computer modeling suggested break out, which has been considered. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 17 and 19 accurately recite the testimony. DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42 and 43 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the rate of flow increases south of the proposed pond sites. With respect to DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 7 and 8, seasonal high ground water elevations were not shown conclusively. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 9, the aquiclude lies 90 to 110 feet below the surface. With respect to DER's proposed finding of fact No. 14, the rule requires a five-day rest. With respect to DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 33, 34 and 35, the current rules do require mounding analysis, and there seemed to be a consensus that ground water enhanced by effluent would seep to the surface downslope from the ponds. With respect to DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 36 and 37 and 44, free form agency action is technically immaterial. With respect to DER's proposed findings of fact Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 41, effluent would have mixed with groundwater before reaching Big Lagoon, but increased levels of nitrogen and phosphorous could be detected, as a result. ECUA's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 36, 37 and 38 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to ECUA's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 13, 21 and 32, the evidence showed that it was not unlikely that effluent, after percolating through pond bottoms and mixing with groundwater, would seep to the surface down slope. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 7, proposed cell bottom elevations fall in this range. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 9, the evidence did not establish that the high water table will always be nine feet below the pond bottoms. With the induced mound, ECUA's proposed finding of fact puts it at one to two feet. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 14, the tidal range is too high and the calculation ignores the back and forth movement of waters at either end of the lagoon. With respect to ECUA's proposed findings of fact Nos. 18 and 19, the current standard pertains total nitrogen. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 22, freeboard will vary with rainfall and effluent levels. ECUA's proposed findings of fact Nos. 29, 30, 31 and 34 relate to subordinate matters. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 33, more than one analysis was done. With respect to ECUA's proposed finding of fact No. 35, the applicant has given reasonable assurance. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Kievit, Esquire Lester M. Westerman 10451 Gulf Beach Highway Pensacola, FL 32507 James Mullins 11001 Gulf Beach Highway Pensacola, FL 32507 Susan Guttman 11315 Sea Glade Drive Pensacola, FL 32507 Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire 15 West Main Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Joseph W. Landers, Esquire 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32302 Stephen K. Hall, Esquire Asst. General Council Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 =================================================================
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that application number 07256-F be APPROVED subject to the special conditions set forth above. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of July 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July 1987.
Findings Of Fact In September, 1985, Armand J. Houle purchased an 80 acre tract located eight miles east of the Naples toll booth on State Road 84 and approximately two miles north of Alligator Alley. The purpose of buying the property was to mine the limestone rock thereon, through a borrow pit, for the purpose of selling it as road base to the State of Florida Department of Transportation for use in the construction of 1-75 (Alligator Alley extending from Naples to the Florida east coast). While no contract has existed or currently exists, correspondence between the Department of Transportation and counsel for the Petitioner indicates that approximately 800,000 cubic yards of fill will be required in the immediate area and that Petitioner's proposed borrow pit would be the ideal source of this rock. Prior to making the purchase, Mr. Houle's associate, Raymond Chester, contacted both the Department of Transportation concerning the potential use of the rock and representatives of the Department of Environmental Regulation. The response he received from these agencies led him to, believe that a borrow pit might well be permitted and the effort should be pursued. After Mr. Chester and Mr. Houle became partners in the property, they contacted county officials and received zoning and other local permits for the facility. It was only after this, when DER was approached again that the applicants were advised a permit would not be issued. Mr. Houle agrees that, if the permits as requested were granted, he would accept a prohibition against further development of the property after removal of the rock and fill, would allow access to the restored lakes to the public for fishing and recreation; would agree to an appropriate restoration plan for the site; and would ensure compliance with the restoration plan stipulated by the Department. After the property was purchased in late 1985, Mr. Houle approached Daniel W. Brundage, the vice-president of an engineering firm in Naples, with a view toward developing the property in question as a borrow pit. Plans were developed for application for permits with the County and Mr. Brundage, consistent therewith, visited the site on several occasions. He found some vegetation off from the site which could be related to wetlands and contacted a representative of DER with whom he went to the site to look it over. This agency representative, Mr. Beever, concluded that the property was a jurisdictional wetland. Mr. Brundage nonetheless felt confident enough to begin work with the County to secure a permit to convert this land, classified as agricultural, to mining property. Consistent with his efforts, the request for conversion went through a four step process on the way to the County Commission which included approval by (1) the Water Management Advisory Board, (2) the Environmental Advisory Council which recommended same changes accepted by the Petitioner, (3) the Subdivision Review Committee, and (4) the Coastal Area Planning Council. All four subagencies recommended approval and thereafter the County granted its permit for work to begin. Assuming all permits are issued, the property will be developed in two stages. In stage one the site will be cleared of vegetation, and the top soil on Phase I, the western 40 acre parcel, removed and used to construct a berm around the entire perimeter of the site as well as between the two 40 acre parcels. The berm will be entirely within property boundaries and used to isolate any water removed from the active phase within the site so that it does not flow onto adjoining property. The eastern 40 acre tract, (Stage II) will be used for water storage during the excavation of Stage 1. It is anticipated that no water will leave the site during construction of either stage with the exception of extraordinary waterfall during rainfall or hurricane. Before any water is discharged, it will go into a storage configuration so that any sediment therein would settle to the bottom before discharge. The discharged water will be filtered through hay bales or filter screens to avoid any turbidity in the surrounding water. The design of this holding capacity in the filter system is sufficient to accommodate the water of a 25 year storm. As Stage I is completed, Stage II will be opened, and the ground water from Stage II pumped back to Stage I for storage. A similar storage and filtration system will be utilized around Stage I. Primary access to the property will be along the western boundary of 8 Mile Canal, but if this is not allowed, Petitioner proposes to build a single span bridge across the 8 Mile Canal at 40th Street to allow access to the property. After the lime rock has been excavated, the berm will be removed and the side of the property graded to form the banks of a 56 acre lake for recreational purposes. The edge of the lake will be a meandering slope at a ratio of 10:1 which will be assured by survey to be in compliance with the County plan. The lake, which will have a maximum depth of 20 feet, will be excavated at a depth ratio of 2:1 from the edge of the slope to the bottom of the lake. During excavation and prior to restoration, heavy equipment will be used for the removal of the rock such as drag lines, back hoes, motor graders, and bulldozers and an area within the boundaries of the site will be isolated and set up for fueling and maintenance. It will be floored with a membrane to prohibit oil and fuel from getting into the ground as a result of accidental spills. Storage tanks for fuel and oil will be above ground and available for immediate inspection. Waste facilities will be in the form of porta-potties and any water falling in this maintenance area will be drained to a low sump within the membraned area for storage until evaporation or safe removal. In the event of a heavy rainfall, water can be stored and anti-sedimented and cleaned and, if necessary, operations can be temporarily stopped. Mr. Brundage indicates that he has never seen any standing water on the site during his five visits nor has any standing water ever been reported to him. He is aware of no historical or archaeological sites on the property, and at no point would rock be mined within 50 feet of the property line. Dr. Durbin Tabb, a botanist, was retained by the Petitioner to prepare a plan for restoration of the site after mining operations were complete. In preparing his plan, he visited the site on several occasions finding varying plant life, much of which was grasses and rushes. In the north was a pine lowland where he saw palmettos scattered in the grassland as well as a few dwarf cypress trees. He also observed a small cluster of cabbage palms in the southern portion of the eastern tract and noted that the currently existing berm along the eastern boundary of the eastern tract is currently being invaded by exotic plant life including the Brazilian pepper. Dr. Tabb found little evidence of recent surface water accumulation; mollusk residue showed no evidence of recent viability; and he found no crawfish burrows which, if present, would show a water table near the surface. Other visitors to the site, however, did find crawfish burrows. The marsh soil shows that, at some time in the past, it was wet enough to support a soil-forming community. This is no longer' the case according to, Dr. Tabb. The process was stopped by the formulation of the Golden Gate Canal System in the 1960's. The existing marsh does, however', hold sufficient water to support the growth of muhli grass. Dr. Tabb's restoration plan is his best estimate of how the property can be restored to its previous condition by replanting native species found in the area. The program will include littoral zone vegetation to provide shelter and a feeding zone along the water's edge which does not now exist. The plan calls for the saying of the marsh soil. Since neither DER nor the client responded to his plan, when submitted, with any suggestions or corrections, he assumed it was approved. Dr. Tabb, who is also an expert in estuarian biology and zoology, concluded that the area on which this site is located is a very poor habitat for deer and panther. The red cockaded woodpecker has no trees on the property which it specifically desires and the property is a poor or nonexistent habitat for the indigo snake and the Everglades snake. It might, however, constitute a habitat for the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, but this bird has never been seen in this inland area. Panthers cross the area as do bears, but the presence of the excavated lake would be no more hindrance to them in their crossing than would the presence of Alligator Alley and the proposed 1-75. The area with sawgrass and muhli grass, which is dominant throughout the Golden Gate area, is called a "dry prairie" as opposed to a "wet prairie." While some of the same plants exist, it is somewhat different in that there are no viable wetlands wildlife organisms currently existing on the property. In Dr. Tabb's opinion, the property has lost its wetlands characteristics and only the marsh soil's water retention permits the life of the grasses currently existing. Wading birds would use the site later but do not currently utilize the area where excavation would take place. In Dr. Tabb's restoration plan, the slope to the lake would be replanted with saw and muhli grasses down to the litoral zone. From there on to the water, a palette of normal wet grasses would be planted to serve as feeding sites and roasting sites for the birds. In addition, an island planted with willows would be constructed off shore in the lake. Deer currently visit the area. They are not currently supported on the land though Mr. Barnett, of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, indicated that they come out of the pine flats at night to feed on the grasses on the prairie. These deer form a large portion of the food chain for the panther, and Dr. Tabb does not consider it conceivable that the project, replanted and restored, would in any way adversely impact the Florida panther or the birds in issue here. In Dr. Tabb's opinion, it is questionable whether the site comes under the jurisdiction of DER based on the grasses present because he cannot find the water connection to confer jurisdiction. Dr. Tabb has not seen standing water on the site as he has seen on two other sites within the area where DER has granted permits for rock pits. On a site like this, the vegetation changes with the seasons. This site is not now connected to the canal along Alligator Alley by vegetation. There may have been a vegetation connection in the past, but as one goes up toward the site from the canal, the grass changes gradually from low pineland grasses found on higher ground to the lower sawgrasses found on the site in question. In Dr. Tabb's opinion, if Mr. Houle's property is to be considered a wetland, it is a transitional wetland. Turning to the issue of loss of habitat, if one assumes that portion of the property that will be converted to a lake will be denied to the panther, this is not the case for the deer which, in this area, is considered to be aquatic. Any denial of the lake area would constitute a very small negative impact compared to what is going on in other areas of Collier County. Admitting that there is a requirement to consider the cumulative impact of a project, in Dr. Tabb's opinion, this project would constitute a "may impact" situation. There is no definitive evidence as to what would happen, and he would be more concerned if the area were now a good panther habitat. It is not, however, and in fact it is no more than a habitat for the grasses which grow there. As to the wetlands issue, the only sign of exotic plant invasion is in the disturbed area around the canal which was installed approximately 18 years ago. The absence of these exotic species is, in Dr. Tabb's opinion, a clear indication that there is no flowing or standing water since the site is too dry for the germination of the seeds. There will be some removal of the biomass by the excavation of the lake. This biomass, consisting of grass primarily, is consumed by fire every year or so and insects eat it as well. Admittedly, some of the biomass is being eaten by animals of some nature and that which is converted to a lake will be removed. There is a trade-off, however. Dr. Martin Roessler, a marine biologist, prepared a report, on the water quality of the adjacent 8 Mile Canal, and other water bodies in the area. In preparation of his report, he took water samples in the areas in question, read literature on the water quality in the area, and looked at water quality data provided by U.S. government agencies and private companies. On the several visits he made to the site, he has not seen any surface water. The first time he could get water only in the adjacent canal, and he also got some water from the land borings done by Dr. Missimer on the site. Dr. Roessler is familiar with State standards for water quality and, in his opinion, the turbidity standards would not be disturbed because there was no water on the ground to be sheet flow. All water was at least three feet underground and, in addition, Petitioner has agreed to properly sod or otherwise treat the berms he will build to prevent erosion and any resultant turbidity either off-site or in the 8 Mile Canal. Dr. Roessler also does not believe the project would violate the oil and grease standards. There is nothing inherent in the mining process to bring into play oils and greases except for the possible problem in refueling and maintenance operations. In that regard, Petitioner has shown how he will provide against that by placing a membrane to prevent any oil, grease or other contaminant from getting into the ground. This area does not contain the organic mulch which produces natural oils and greases. The water near the surface of the lake will contain sufficient dissolved oxygen to meet State standards without problem. In the summer months when the dissolved oxygen count is low, generally, the lake bottom water may not meet State standards, but that happens quite frequently, naturally, across the entire area. Dr. Roessler believes that the dissolved oxygen requirements of 2.5 at the surface and .5 at the bottom will most likely be met in the lake created by this project. Concerning the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), he concludes the operation in the quarry will not artificially decrease the available oxygen below the required amount. The BOD demand in this area would not be threatened by the lake. As to the iron standard and other toxic substances, Dr. Roessler does not believe that the project will create a violation of the standard nor will any runoff increase dissolved iron in adjacent waters. Hydrogen sulfide and pharasulfide standards will similarly not be violated. Sulfides are found only in trace amounts, if at all, in natural waters. In deep limestone lakes the chemical structure is not conducive to the formation of the acidic compounds. In short, Dr. Roessler believes the water in the mine would be very similar to that found in other rock quarries in the area. These lakes are a dominant portion of the recreational fresh water fishing availability. This instant lake also will, in time, upon development of the food chain for the fish, become an equivalent fishing habitat. Dr. Roessler concurs with Dr. Tabb regarding the flora on the site, which he observed himself. This site is 15 to 18 miles from marine or estuarian waters and to reach them one would have to go down a series of canals and past a saline dam to the coast. Any runoff from the site in question would have, if any, a minuscule effect on marine waters. This site was originally a wet prairie which was drained by the Golden Gate Canal System. As such it is a relatively poor habitat for life forms generally found in cypress wetlands. Creation of this lake will, in the opinion of Dr. Roessler, enhance the game, fish, and recreational activity of the area. It would be a benefit to the animal population to have a water source for drinking during drought. There would be no adverse effect on public health, safety or welfare. Turning to the major issue of water, Dr. Thomas Missimer, a hydrogeologist specializing in ground water, visited the site, examining the canal on the east side, and the soils and rocks exposed. He took soil borings and examined the site hydrology to see what fluctuations occurred in the water levels due to rainfall. Mr. Missimer, took numerous readings from September 18 through November 5, 1987 during a period of wet weather including a tropical storm. He carefully compared the site geology to other sites he had studied and compared the flow of water through the soil. He compiled existing information on chemistry in the streams in the area to see what the natural conditions were. He looked at other man-made lakes in the area which were previously borrow pits. As a result of his studies, he concluded that the groundwater level throughout the entire period never got higher than three feet below the land's surface and often was five feet below. During the previous July through September, 34 inches of rain fell in the area which was, in his opinion, average to above average. There is some evidence, however, to indicate that rainfall in the area was approximately 33 percent below average during the period. Nonetheless, Mr. Missimer took a measurement the day after a tropical storm had deposited three inches of water on the land. The water level at that time was still three feet below land level, and there was no standing water. Both the three foot and the five foot level are well below the top of the berm sloped at 10:1 as is proposed in the restoration plan submitted by Dr. Tabb. This site has, from a hydrological standpoint, been greatly affected by the installation, of the 8 Mile Canal and the canal system to the north. As, a result of this activity, standing water has not existed for many, years since the dredging of those canals. If de-watering is a necessary portion of the mining plan, any waters removed thereby would be retained in the impoundment area described by Mr. Brundage and switched back and forth. As proposed, the plan can completely avoid any impact to off-site property by water runoff. Construction of the pit and the lowering of the water level thereby will not have a major impact on the groundwater in the surrounding areas. Any effect would taper off as the distance increased from the site and would be of little significance. This proposal would also have little, if any, impact on groundwater quality. In Mr. Missimer's opinion, water quality is currently good and will stay good. This type of rock mine is very common in the area incident to construction. Some have been used as a source of potable water by The City of Naples; by Deltona Utility Company for Marco Island; and the south area of the County. These resources are still being used. There is little difference between those currently being used as potable water sources and the proposed lake here. Mr. Missimer also indicates the project will have little impact on the sheet flow of water. Sheet flow no longer exists here because of the canals and roads already existing. If there were a sheet flow created by a very heavy rain, this pit would have no impact on it. The water level in the lake will be approximately the same as exists in the ground currently and in the 8 Mile Canal. There should be no shoaling in the canal due to the project, and the presently existing spoil bank on the west side of the canal already prevents flow into the, canal from this land. If this pit is properly constituted and maintained, and if proper mining procedures are followed there should be no effect on the 8 Mile Canal to the east or the Alligator Alley Canal to the south. There is no surface water connection currently existing between this site and either canal. As to the issue of dissolved oxygen, the currently existing groundwater on the site and in the surrounding area has little or no dissolved oxygen in it. Water coming into the lake will be groundwater low in dissolved oxygen, which is identical to the water which currently goes into the canal system. The canal gets very little oxygen from the wind because it is so narrow. The lakes to be constructed, on the other hand, will get a large amount of oxygen from the 56 acres of water exposed to the open air. Consequently, construction of the lakes would increase the dissolved oxygen content of the water in the area, at least in the lakes, down to a level of several feet. This is a positive factor. Mr. Missimer recognizes, however, that during the dry seasons, when the lake is fed solely by groundwater generally low in dissolved oxygen, the lake water which has been converted to surface water may fail to meet the Department's surface water standards for dissolved oxygen. Warmer weather generally results in lower dissolved oxygen readings and, admittedly, Respondent's readings were taken in December when the dissolved oxygen levels are higher. As a result, the comparative samples which were taken in December are not necessarily indicative of what will be the situation in the lake, year- round. Respondent's witnesses present a more dismal picture of the effect of Petitioner's proposed project. Mr. Bickner, an Environmental Supervisor with DER's Bureau of Permits and himself an expert in water quality, zoology, and ecosystem biology, first became involved with this project while the permit request was being processed in late 1986. This application was a standard form project because of the quantity of material to be excavated. As a part of his processing, Mr. Bickner requested evaluations of the project from other agencies and divisions within DER and, on the basis of his personal evaluation and the recommendations he received, concluded that the application was not permittable. He recommended it be denied. Mr. Bickner considered Petitioner's application under the provisions of Chapter 403.918, Florida Statutes, which requires a two step evaluation. In the first step, the project must be determined to meet water quality standards. If it does, as a second stage, the project must be determined not to be contrary to the public interest. The major water quality standard in issue here was that of dissolved oxygen along with that concerning BOD and other deleterious substances. The water body involved was classified as a Class III Water under the provisions of Rule 17-3.121, Florida Administrative Code, since it was designed to be a recreational, fish and wildlife habitat. The standards contained in the statute and the rule relate to surface water as opposed to groundwater and, as to the public interest question, Chapter 403 provides a list of seven factors which must be evaluated. In this determination the agency has wide latitude and no one factor is controlling. In evaluation, agency personnel try to look at the project overall. Specifically, the project cannot cause or contribute to an existing water quality violation. In evaluation, agency personnel do not look at the project by itself. They must keep in mind that other projects exist or are proposed for the area. This is known as the cumulative impact of the project which is provided for in Section 403.919, Florida Statutes. As to the variance requested, this is also provided for by statute. The criteria require that the petition be based on some specific ground. In the instant case, the ground utilized by Petitioner was that there was no alternative to the dissolved oxygen level proposed. Granting of a variance is totally within the discretion of the Department even if Petitioner can show grounds therefor. Mr. Bickner was at the site only once. He approached from the south. At the low end of the approach was a mixture of wetlands and upland vegetation, but as he got toward the site the upland species dropped off and only the wetland species only remained. These were primarily sawgrass, cattails, and the like. He was satisfied that there was no obvious break in jurisdiction, and the testimony of Mr. Beever confirmed that jurisdiction over the site was gained through the wetlands character of the property from the site down to the Alligator Alley Canal, which is considered a water of the state. The site consists primarily of sawgrass and muhli grass with minor amounts of other grasses. The site seems to rise toward the 8 Mile Canal where there is an invasion of Brazilian peppers and other exotic species. Mr. Bickner was looking for upland species and found only one specimen of one species, a few of another, and no invasion of slash pine on the site at all. As a result, he concluded that the site was not an upland site. There was no standing water on the site at the time Mr. Bickner visited it, but the soil was wet to the surface. In addition, there was a large number of recently dead shells in low spots which had held water. There were some tracks of a large animal and a large number of smaller animal tracks and scats (scats are animal droppings). He also saw some birds which were too far away to identify and observed what he thought were crayfish tunnels near the cypress trees. Mr. Bickner found evidence of dried periphyton widely scattered over the site. Periphyton, an algae which attaches itself to other plants and which in times of inundation, forms sheets across the water connecting one plant to another, is a sign of previous inundation. The other plants on the site were not showing water deprivation stress, and there was no evidence of upland species invasion. All of this leads Mr. Bickner to conclude that the area has plenty of water and this opinion was enhanced by the lushness of the plants' growth. This, along with the high diversity of plant life, indicated to him a healthy ecosystem. To Mr. Bikner, the fact that the area was not currently inundated is not significant. In this particular area there are wet and dry seasons and, even in the dry season such as existed at the time of his visit, the soil was wet. The signs he saw indicated to him there has to be standing water on the site at some time. His visit was in January, which is well within the dry season. As to water quality, Mr. Bickner does not believe that the water quality standards will not be violated. In fact, by the nature of the project, Petitioner has, in Mr. Bickner's opinion, assured that it will be violated. A 20 foot deep pit must, in his opinion, result in low levels of dissolved oxygen below standards. Any water below seven foot in depth has little dissolved oxygen. Most dissolved oxygen is in the surface water, and there is little exchange between deep and surface waters. As a result, he concludes that the groundwater has low dissolved oxygen, a fact confirmed by Mr. Missimer. Dissolved oxygen is the only source of oxygen for fish and aquatic animals. Without dissolved oxygen, the fish die. There are currently no fish on the property. Mr. Bickner was also concerned with the biochemical oxygen demand which would further reduce the oxygen levels in the water. He was further concerned with the hydrogen sulfide levels coming from deterioration of plant material in the bottom of the pit, and iron which he found to be already in the groundwater. Mr. Bickner contends that during construction of the pit petro- chemicals will be introduced into the water, and that during the construction period the on-site water will have increased turbidity which will most likely be transmitted off-site as the pit is de-watered. There are management procedures which can reduce the risk, but none can avoid it entirely. Mr. Bickner is satisfied that the water quality standards will not be met. It is so found. Mr. Bickner also evaluated the property from the public interest standpoint, and in that regard he is satisfied there is a substantial potential for damage to adjacent properties by de-watering. Based on his experience and observation of other projects, he is satisfied there is no way to keep people employed on the site from using adjacent property for parking and vehicle maintenance. The witness believes that the 56 acres of habitat removed by the lake, and the remaining acres, which will be replanted, will be permanently impacted. While he admits that the property as it currently exists, may not be a prime habitat for the panther, there is some evidence which indicates panthers do cross it. He is concerned that the applicants submission here does not sufficiently answer all the questions as to impact on the public interest. The mechanics of the maintenance yard, soil storage and other potential areas of trauma are not explained satisfactorily, and Mr. Bickner does not see how all that is proposed can fit on the site. As a result, in his opinion, there must be some off-site impact. As to cumulative impact, since the valuable rock does not lie only under Petitioner's property, owners of the surrounding property may want to mine their properties as Petitioner proposes to do. If that happens, Mr. Bickner cannot explain how the Department can deny these subsequent applications. If the current application is permitted, taken together with the others, there would be a serious effect on the panther population. This opinion is not supported by evidence, however. If the public interest test is the only basis for disqualification of the project, (here the water quality test is also not met) a permit can still be granted if the applicant agrees to take appropriate mitigation steps at the site. Mr. Bickner is of the opinion that the applicant's mitigation plan to create the 100 foot wide shelf around the lake is not the same type of system which currently exists, will not fulfill the same function as the present property, and is not sufficiently large to replace what is being lost. One basis for granting the variance suggested by the Petitioner was the public interest, (the material was to be used for a public road), and the other was that there was no alternative way to get the material. While it is possible the rock would be used for public road, Mr. Bickner was concerned no assurances were given by the Petitioner that it would be. No contract has been signed yet, and Mr. Bickner is not satisfied that the letter from the Department of Transportation, indicating the rock there would suit its purpose, is sufficient indication that a contract would be signed. There is a possibility of making the pit shallower, which would permit the dissolved oxygen content of the lake water to meet state standards, but even if that problem were solved, Mr. Bickner is not satisfied that Petitioner has met the public interest test. Respondent has granted three permits and a variance to the Department of Transportation to build a portion of I-75 across Alligator Alley in Collier County. These permits are for the dredging of canals parallel to the roadway and to develop a borrow lake of 73.1 acres to be excavated to a depth of from 6 to 9.7 feet. The variance in question applies to all three projects and relates to the dissolved oxygen level. The DOT variance was applied for on the basis that no practical means for avoidance of the pollution existed. The Department of Transportation did not request a variance for BOD or for toxic and deleterious substances or iron. Mr. Bickner, admitted that these permitted projects would possibly have the same problem of oils and greases as he foresees with Petitioner's project. Nonetheless, he concludes that Petitioner's project should not be permitted, even though the Alligator Alley canals are already below standards, because to do so would contribute to a currently existing violation. Mr. James Beever, an Environmental Specialist with the Department of, Environmental Regulation, visited the site on several occasions, both on the ground and from the air. He observed much of the same flora and fauna observed by the other visitors who testified in this case and took color photographs of the area which portray the character of the property. All of the plants he discovered on the site are on the DER jurisdictional list and, on at least one occasion, from the air, he saw standing water on the site. In his opinion, the property is a fresh water wet prairie system which is admittedly drier than it should be. The plants he saw on the site indicate the jurisdiction of DER if there is a connection to other waters of the state, and in Mr. Beever's opinion, there is connection through the flow of sheet water south from the site to the I-75 (Alligator Alley) canal; then, east to the 8 Mile Canal; then south to the Fuqua Union Canal which empties southwest to the Gulf of Mexico. In his opinion, therefore, this is definitely jurisdictional land, and it is so found. The site supports an underground system of roots as well as the upper portion of the, plants existing thereon. He observed periphyton and many other animal tracks and scats. He also saw signs of regular inundation such as numerous snail shells, and he is satisfied there is no indication of a change in the area from the wetlands to an upland area. Admittedly, the area has been dry for a while. Even after Hurricane Floyd in 1987, there was no standing water. The site is, in his opinion, definitely productive, however. The vegetation existing thereon stabilizes the soil and provides food for snails, insects and crayfish which are on the bottom of the foodchain for other life forms on the property. The grasses provide a habitat for animals such as cotton rats, roosts for birds, pollen for insects, all which, themselves, become food for the larger animals. This wetland is a part of a large wetland prairie system and part of the Fuqua Union drainage basin, and acts as a filter for the water system for the area. According to Mr. Beever, most borrow pits like this are located on uplands which then provide rain water lakes. The instant pit, however, is in a wetlands area and if built, he believes, will engender violations during the mining operation. Groundwater coming in will contain iron and hydrogen sulfide which will combine with the dissolved oxygen in the water and further deplete the already low oxygen levels. All of this will constitute a violation of the rules regarding waters of the state since the waters within the pit would fall within that category. Mr. Beever is also concerned with the `bridge over the 8 Mile Canal and the turbidity connected with its construction and removal. In substance, Mr. Beever is convinced that construction of the project will create violations of the water quality standards for the area. As to the public interest, the wetlands character of the site will be completely lost. The vegetation will be removed, and the animals utilizing it will either leave or be destroyed. After, construction, some natural healing will occur, but a long-term maintenance program will be required to provide even different functions for the land than those which currently exist. In that regard, Mr. Beever is convinced that the applicant's proposed restoration plan is not acceptable. It will not replace the lost functions of the site; it will replace the species removed with a different ecosystem; it will provide a habitat for different species of animals and birds; it will adversely affect the shoaling and erosion in the lake itself (this is found to be without merit); it will have some adverse effect on the property of others; and will have an adverse cumulative impact on the area. The habitat will not be used any more by endangered species such as the wood stork and the panther. Even assuming, arguendo, the plans were suitable, in Mr. Beever's opinion, the project would not work here because of the lack of information on what the actual water level of the lake will be. The plant species proposed may not remain because of possible changes in water level in the lake. In addition, the marl berms will dry out over the three years of their life while the pit is being worked, and form a location for a lot of invasive upland plants. Much of Mr. Beever's concern is shared by Mr. Barnett, of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, who indicated that birds now frequently use the area for nesting and feeding because of its wetlands character. Endangered species such as the Florida panther cross it from time to time as does the Florida black bear. Human encroachment reduces the panther's territory and reduces the area for forage of deer, which are the principal food of the panther. The bigger issue, however, is the cumulative impact. The 80 acres is not so important by itself, but to permit its removal would set a precedent for future encroachment by others. Mr. Barnett's experience is that restoration plans are quite often not successful. Even the successful ones, however, replace the removed system with a different system, and the species which now use the property would find it much less desirable as changed. Specifically, the bear, the deer, and the panther would find it unusable as proposed. At the present time, the deer spend their days in the pines forest to the north of the property, coming out onto the area, in question only at night to feed. It is during the night that the panther stalks. As presently constituted, this property is of no benefit to the wood stork or the red cockaded woodpecker. The Cape Sable sparrow could use it but does not. The development of Golden Gate Estates to the north and east and south of the property has a two pronged effect on the area in question. The southern portion of Golden Gate Estates has been abandoned, but the central and northern portions will be developed. On the one hand, it is likely that the increased population to the north and east will make the Petitioner's property less desirable and make access to it more difficult for the wildlife currently utilizing it. On the other hand, removal of the northern and central portions of Golden Gate from usable area for the panther and other species make it more important that Petitioner's area, which Barnett claims is not likely to be developed, remain as an animal habitat to offset the encroachment of the development area. There is no evidence to support this prediction of non- development, however. History tends to indicate otherwise.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be issued a dredge and fill permit as requested and a variance to the state water quality standards as identified in the request. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1469 AND 87-4404 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner 1 - 2. Accepted. 3 - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. Accepted. 8. Accepted. 9 - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. Accepted. 16 - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18 - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. Accepted. 21 - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Not a Finding of Fact. 25 - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27 - 28. Accepted and incorporated herein, except for finding it is likely that more wildlife will use the site after construction. Rejected as speculation. 29 - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31 - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36 - 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. 39. Accepted and incorporated herein. 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. Accepted. 43 - 44. Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. For the Respondent 1 - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4 - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10 - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18 - 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. 21. Accepted and incorporated-herein. 22 - 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. 26 - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34 - 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. Rejected as contra to evidence presented. 37 - 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42 - 43. Rejected. 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. 45 - 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. 48 - 60. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. Accepted in part - (temporary). Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Unproven. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Routa, Esquire ROBERTS, EGAN & ROUTA, P.A. 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard Grosso, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact The Applicant, John E. Bravo, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dockage facility. The proposed facility will consist of a 910 foot pier with a "T"-shaped platform structure extending perpendicular in two directions from the seaward end of the pier, all of which is designed to accommodate 56 boat slips, restricted to the use of pleasure boats only. The proposed project site is located on the southeast side of "Long Point" and would extend into the waters of East Bay, which is a tidally influenced water body in Bay County, Florida. The project site lies in Class II waters of the State. The waters involved are not approved for shellfish harvesting, however, but rather are under a shellfish harvesting prohibition imposed by the Department of Natural Resources. The portion of East Bay involved also lies within the Intracoastal Waterway. The waterway is approximately 6,000 feet wide at the site of the proposed docking facility. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward. The bay bottom is characterized by profuse seagrass for approximately 500 feet waterward of mean high water. Beyond that point, the seagrass (Cuban Shoal Grass) dissipates and disappears. The first 400 feet waterward of the mean high water line at the location of the proposed dock, is shallow and not truly navigable. The water then deepens to approximately five feet at mean low water some 525 feet from the shore. This distance from the shore marks the beginning of the area where no significant amount of seagrass exists and where the boat docking slips and mooring pilings would be installed in a waterward direction down the remaining length of the proposed dock. The water depth continues to increase to approximately 20 feet at the proposed location of the end of the dock. The dock would be constructed of pilings driven into the bay bottom supporting the decking of the walkway portion and "T" portion of the dock. The "T" would be installed on the seaward end of the dock, perpendicular to the walkway portion of the dock with most of the boat slips installed and operated at that point. The length of the docking facility is dictated by the fact that the Applicant seeks to locate the boat slips in a manner so that all boats will be moored and operated well beyond existing seagrasses. In fact, the length of the dock is more than absolutely necessary to accomplish this purpose since water depth and avoidance of seagrasses could accomplished with the dock ending approximately 700 feet from the mean high water line. In an abundance of caution, however, in order to avoid the possibility of propeller dredging and prop wash damaging the bottom substrates and grasses, and since the Intracoastal Waterway is over a mile wide here, the Applicant elected to design the dock in the length and configuration proposed. Such will cause no unreasonable impediment to navigation. In this connection, the Applicant has agreed to post Coast Guard- approved safety lights on the dock which will warn boats of its presence in hours of darkness. Further, the dock does not extend far enough into the 6,000 foot wide Intracoastal Waterway to pose a hazard to barge and other boating traffic in the Waterway. Some of the Petitioner's witnesses revealed that shrimp boats pull their nets during shrimping operations closer than 900 feet to the shore line and in the vicinity of the grass beds. While the presence of the dock may alter the trawling pattern of shrimp boats and the operations of other commercial fishermen, as well as water skiing and boating by members of the public, this may in fact have a beneficial effect by promoting the public interest in preserving marine habitat and the conservation of marine resources by preventing some damage to the grass beds. Such marine grass beds are valuable nursery areas for fishes and other marine animals, the effects upon which must be considered in weighing the various statutory indicia of the public interest which must be satisfied before granting a dredge and fill permit. Further, because the dockage facility at issue would be an isolated one with no significant similar docks in the immediate vicinity, the likelihood that it would pose a navigational hazard to water skiiers, fishermen, shrimpers, and other commercial and recreational interests is rather insignificant. Water Quality The water quality issues posed by a project such as this typically involve the water quality parameters of dissolved oxygen, nutrients, bacteriological quality, turbidity, oils, greases, fuel, paint or varnish, solvents and heavy metals, as contemplated by the below-cited rules concerning general surface water quality criteria and the specific rules related to Class II surface waters. The project site is located in Class II surface waters of the State. Those Class II waters are classified by the Department of Natural Resources as "not approved" for shellfish harvesting. The zone of the Class II waters of East Bay in which shellfish harvesting is not approved extends some two miles eastward of the project site. Marinas and dockage facilities such as this one, which will accommodate fairly large boats in significant numbers, typically pose potential pollution problems involving deposition of nutrients in State waters in the form of fish carcasses and offal, garbage and human wastes. Additionally, boats can pose pollution hazards because of attendant dumping of grease, oil and fuel residues in marina waters as well as the deposition of trash in various forms such as paper and plastic items as a result of human use of the boats and the marina facility itself. Perhaps the most severe potential problem is the deposition of human fecal matter into the water as a result of the flushing of marine heads on the larger boats, which the dockage facility will accommodate in the slips as designed. The fecal coliform bacteria which emanate from the deposition of human wastes into the waters around such a dockage facility can be concentrated in oysters and other shellfish to such an extent as to cause severe illness, permanent disability or even death in humans. Consequently, in order to avoid this problem in a magnitude which would violate the water quality parameter in the rule cited below for bacteriological quality, substantial measures must be taken with a project such as this to avoid the deposition of human wastes from the dockage facility itself and from the boats using the slips. In furtherance of this end, the Applicant proposes to allow no live- aboard vessels to be occupied over night while moored at the docking facilities. Live-aboard vessels are deemed to be those with sleeping accommodations and marine heads. The Applicant also proposes to employ a full-time dock master seven days a week, eight hours a day to ensure that all dockage users are familiar with dockage rules, and who would enforce them, especially that prohibiting any discharges from vessels using or docking at the marina. The rules would be incorporated in the dockage lease agreements. The dock master would be responsible for the clean up and correction of all unauthorized discharges. In view of the potential for sewage discharges from marine heads, even with sewage pump-out facilities and the other restrictions on the use of live-aboard type boats, the additional protective measure of requiring a sewage pump-out line and pump-out equipment, including a storage tank and a means to direct sewage pumped from boats into the upland sanitary sewer system, should be imposed as an additional condition. Additionally, the restriction against over night stays aboard boats, the discharge of marine heads into the marina waters and the requirement for use of the sewage pump-out system should be publicized on large, easily legible signs at various points on the pier so that all boat slip renters or users can be on notice of the restrictions and the dock master's and the Department's enforcement of them. Additional potential sources of nutrient and bacteriological degradation of the dissolved oxygen content and bacteriological integrity of the surface waters involved can be posed by the deposition of fish carcasses and parts, as well as food wastes and other garbage in the marina waters. In order to prevent this, the Applicant has proposed to provide fish cleaning stations located on the upland and to require all fish carcasses and other related wastes to be placed in upland containers and not disposed of in the Class II waters at the dock site. Additionally, waste containers will be located along the length and perimeter of the dock facility for garbage, with regular emptying of the containers enforced by the dock master to prevent spillage. In connection with the upland fish cleaning sites to be installed, the drainage waters or waste water from fish cleaning stations should be directed into an upland disposal system so that it may be ensured that the water does not get back into the Class II waters of the bay. In addition to the above measures, pump-out facilities and equipment will be provided by the Applicant for used engine oil removed from boats and oil and water from boat bilges. These wastes, under agreed-upon conditions, would be transported by pipeline to the upland to a storage tank pending proper disposal. Trash, garbage and other refuse will be deposited in dumpsters for removal by municipal garbage disposal services. No fueling facilities or fueling of boats will be allowed. Additionally, oil spill clean up materials will be maintained on the marina site in sufficient quantities to allow clean up of the maximum spill expected from the largest boat typically using the marina pursuant to the leases for the boat slips. In order to further lessen the possibility of spills of oils, greases and fuels, the permit should be conditioned (as should the leases) upon no boat maintenance being performed at the marina site other than minor engine adjustments. In this context, an additional enforcement measure will be in the boat slip rental agreements themselves. The agreements will contain restrictive provisions requiring lessees to properly handle and dispose of fish carcasses and wastes, used engine oil, bilge water and requiring them to comply with sewage pump-out and refuse disposal conditions enumerated above. Upon completion of the facility, the dock master will manage and accomplish maintenance of the various items of equipment, such as the pump-out facility, on an eight hour a day, seven day per week basis and will enforce the restrictive provisions incorporating the above conditions in the boat slip rental agreements. Those restrictive provisions should include putting the lessees on notice that violation of any of the conditions enumerated above and in the boat slip leases will result in a breach of the lease and removal of their vessel from the marina and reporting of the violation to regulatory authorities. The various expert witnesses agreed that the proposed permit conditions enumerated above, if enforced, would adequately protect water quality as to the above parameters at issue. The Class II water quality standards will not be violated by the installation and operation of the project as proposed, provided the above conditions are strictly enforced and adhered to. Mr. Jack Taylor, the expert witness for the Petitioner, agreed that the above measures would reasonably ensure that the marina will not cause pollution and contravention of Class II water quality standards, but feared that enforcement problems would prevent such conditions from prevailing. In view of the measures enumerated above which will be undertaken by the Applicant to ensure that water quality standards are adhered to, including the liberal use of warning signs for marina customers and slip lessees, the use of a full-time dock master to enforce the conditions and including the enforcement measure of putting the conditions as restrictions in the slip rental leases, it has been shown that the enforcement will be reasonably adequate. An additional and important enforcement measure can be incorporated into this project, however, by requiring the Applicant to submit an operation and maintenance plan for the marina and requiring a monitoring program under the auspices of the Department for at least a year of operation in order to ensure that the project operates as it is proposed under the above-delineated conditions. The Department has continuing enforcement power and the monitoring program would, with regular monthly inspections, allow early detection and correction of any water quality violations, to and including the voiding of the permit and the closing of the marina operation should violations prove severe and uncorrectable. 1/ Such a monitoring program and marina operation and maintenance plan should be required as a condition to granting of the permit. 2/ Finally, it should be pointed out that the area of East Bay where the project would be built is Class II shellfish prohibited waters. The proposed project itself will not likely adversely affect shell fishing to the extent of closing additional waters if the above water quality safeguards are imposed as conditions on the permit and on the marina operation. This is especially true because the boundary line of the shellfish approved water to the east is at least two miles away, which distance incorporates a substantial mixing zone in the open waters of East Bay to sufficiently dilute pollutants which might emanate from the marina or other sources to levels such that the shellfish waters presently open will not be subject to any further closures by the Department of Natural Resources, as a result of this installation. The primary reason the shellfish waters in the immediate vicinity of the proposed project are closed to harvesting is the presence of the Military Point Sewage Treatment Plant which discharges its effluent into the waters of East Bay, such that the DNR's dye flow studies reveal that a 5.1 square mile buffer zone around that plant is necessary for closure to shellfish harvesting to ensure that the public health is not adversely affected by consumption of shellfish from the waters in that buffer area. That buffer area includes the proposed marina site. Additional significant pollution sources include fecal coliform bacteria, oils and greases and other contaminants associated with rainfall events and resultant urban runoff from the City of Parker and surrounding areas, including septic tank leachate and petroleum residues. These influences also currently add to the reasons why shellfish harvesting is precluded in the area of the proposed facility. It was not demonstrated that the addition of the marina and the boats operating under the above strict conditions will result in any additional closures to shellfish harvesting in surrounding, presently approved areas as a result of any water quality degradation posed by the subject project. Public Interest The public interest criteria-enumerated at Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which are actually at issue in this proceeding concern: (1) whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, welfare or property of others, (2) whether it will adversely affect conservation of fish and wildlife, including their habitats, (3) whether the project will adversely affect navigation, water flow or cause harmful erosion or shoaling, (4) whether it will adversely affect fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in its vicinity, and (5) whether the current condition and relative value of the functions of the natural area involved at the project site will be adversely affected by the proposed activity. There is no issue or dispute raised concerning the permanence of the project for purposes of criteria number 5 under this subsection, nor as to number 6, concerning historical and archaeological resources. Concerning criteria numbered 1-4 and 7, of this subsection, it has been demonstrated that the project will not likely affect the public health, safety, welfare or the property of others if constructed and operated according to the conditions delineated herein. Some members of the public testifying on behalf of the Petitioner objected to the interference they feared the dock would cause with their jogging along the shoreline and feared an impediment to their use of the area for water skiing. This is the only dock in this vicinity, however, and such interference is minor. It will be well lit in order to avoid impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness in terms of the public's ability to safely operate boats in the area. There is some potential for the project adversely affecting conservation of fish and wildlife or their habitats in that, if boats are permitted to operate in the vicinity of the dock and use the dock for mooring, loading and unloading purposes, and the like, closer than 500 feet off shore, harmful propeller washing or dredging of the bottom sediments and seagrasses growing therein will result. If such erosion of the bottom and seagrass growth begins occurring, it will adversely affect and gradually destroy the area as a habitat for fish and other marine life, which is of particular importance since such Cuban Shoal Grass stands are quite beneficial as nursery areas for fish and other organisms. Thus, if boating activity were allowed unimpeded around the dock, including in the near shore area within 500 feet from the mean high water line, the resultant erosion and propeller damage to the seagrass beds in the bottom would indicate that, as to criteria 2 and 3 of the above subsection, that the project would not be in the public interest and would be contrary to the public interest. This same consideration is true with regard to the fourth criteria concerning whether the project adversely affects fishing and recreational values or marine productivity for similar reasons. If marine habitat is disrupted or destroyed in whole or in part in the vicinity of the dock due to erosion and other damage caused by boat and propeller contacts with the bottom or prop wash near the bottom, then as to this criteria, concerning marine productivity and recreational value, the project will be contrary to the public interest also. To the extent that nursery areas for fish and other valuable marine organisms are destroyed, the recreational value in terms of quality of fishing will certainly be diminished. The "current condition and relative value of functions" being performed by the area of marine habitat affected by this project must also be considered. In a like vein, this particular area constituting dense growths of seagrasses has a relatively high functional value as a marine habitat and, particularly, a nursery for marine animals. This current condition and value of the area should be accorded a fairly high status in weighing and balancing the various considerations used in determining whether the project is or is not contrary to the public interest. If the boats which are to use the marina upon its construction and operation are permitted inside the grass bed area, roughly within 500 feet of the shore, then clearly the considerations mentioned above will be the subject of adverse effects caused by the boats' operation which in turn is a direct result of the installation of this marina, the dock and the slips. In view of the reasonable likelihood of the project causing some of the adverse effects mentioned above, resulting from contact by boat propellers and boat hulls with the grass beds or erosive prop wash caused by operation of boats in water so shallow that the propellers are too near the bottom, the Applicant has agreed to a condition which will effectively remove boats from the seagrass bed area, provided it is strictly enforced. That condition would provide that boats and the slips in which they would be moored cannot be landward of 600 feet off shore of the mean high water line along the sides of the seaward extending dock. All boat slips are to be located seaward of that point. The Petitioners, however, raised a valid point that, the dock being so long, the natural tendency of boat operators would be to moor their boats along the sides of the dock as close into shore as boat operation is possible in order to more easily load and unload their boats. In order to prevent this problem from occurring, therefore, an additional condition should be imposed on the permit which would provide that the sides of the dock be enclosed by a fence out to the 600 foot mark and of such a configuration and type as to prevent boat operators from mooring boats to the sides of the dock and gaining ingress or egress from their boats on the dock shoreward of the 600 foot point mentioned above. In other words, if it is made impossible to enter or leave a boat from the dock in the area of the seagrass beds, this would substantially reduce the likelihood that the seagrass beds would be damaged by boats using the dock. Additionally, prominent signs should be posted on or in the vicinity of the dock announcing the necessity to avoid operating boats landward of the point mentioned above and the necessity of avoiding contacting the seagrass beds with boats or boat propellors. If this condition is adhered to and strictly enforced, as even Petitioner's expert witness concedes, it will prevent the chief source of adverse effects upon the public interest. An additional consideration in determining whether or not this project is contrary to the public interest concerns its effect upon navigation. This has already been discussed in the above Findings of Fact. Since this would be the only dock in the immediate area, it is found that the presence of the dock, even though it extends a significant distance seaward of the shore line, will still not pose a significant impediment to navigation. Additionally, as has been pointed out above, the public interest might be served in a positive way by the installation of the dock to the extent that it might prevent shrimp boats and other fishing boats pulling nets from using the shallow seagrass area which will help prevent uprooting and other damage to the grass beds caused by the nets and associated fishing gear. Finally, it should be pointed out that to a certain extent the project will positively serve recreational values and the public welfare, in the context of balancing the various public interest considerations, because at least half the boat slips will be reserved for public use and because the addition of such a marina or docking facility will enhance the public's ability to obtain recreational value from the State waters involved in East Bay by improving marine access to those waters for fishing, boating, skiing and other purposes. In short, reasonable assurances have been provided that the project is not contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the application of John E. Bravo for the dredge and fill permit at issue be GRANTED, provided that the terms and conditions enumerated in the above Findings of Fact are incorporated in the permit as mandatory conditions. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner and developer of a parcel of land located on the eastern side of the northern end of Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. Located in the middle of that parcel is a dead-end east-west canal approximately two feet deep at its eastern end where it opens to the Atlantic Ocean and approximately twenty feet deep at its western dead-end. The canal is approximately fifty feet wide. A plug at the mouth of the canal previously prevented boat traffic from entering and exiting the canal. Petitioner's predecessor in title permitted the plug to partially erode, and Petitioner's president had some of the boulders which helped form the plug removed. The digging of the canal, the placement of the plug, and the partial removal of the plug were performed without benefit of state and federal permits. Petitioner's development plan is that twenty single-family homes will surround the canal, with each home being serviced by a septic tank and a boat dock. On the oceanside of the partial plug is a small depressed area which was dredged at the same time that the canal itself was dredged. Surrounding that depressed area is very shallow water. Petitioner proposes to remove the plug from the existing canal and shallow the canal to a uniform depth of -10 feet and two years later to a uniform depth of -6 feet. Petitioner further proposes to dredge an access channel from the mouth of the canal northward for a distance of approximately 480 feet where it would join with an existing channel. The access channel proposed to be dredged would be approximately fifty feet wide and six feet deep at low tide. The area to be dredged to create the access channel is classified as Class III waters, is within the Florida Keys Special Waters, and is also classified as Outstanding Florida Waters. The waters outside the existing canal where Petitioner proposes to dredge the access channel are also located within John Pennekamp State Park, the site of a natural coral reef. Due to the disparity in depths between the shallow waters outside the existing canal which are only one or two feet deep and the depth of the existing canal which is as deep as twenty feet, the canal itself experiences a very long flushing time. The lengthy flushing time causes the waters in the existing canal to fall below minimum state water quality standards The area proposed to be dredged for the navigational access channel is thickly vegetated by a productive seagrass and algae community. The area is in excellent condition, and the seagrass and algae community is very healthy. The seagrass and algae communities serve as habitat for thousands of organisms, including juvenile lobster and other small plants and animals; serve as a food source for animals; stabilize sediments through their root structures; reduce pollution by filtering pollutants from the water; are a natural feature of the John Pennekamp State Park, and are part of the ecological unit that is important for the survival of reef corals. The proposed dredging of the access channel would destroy an area of approximately one-half acre. Excessive turbidity is often a problem with dredge and fill activities, and reef coral need clear water for survival. Once dredged, the proposed access channel would not be expected to revegetate. Further, the proposed dredged channel will violate state water quality standards for dissolved oxygen. The proposed navigational access channel would connect the mouth of the existing canal with the Post channel to the north of Petitioner's property. The Post channel dug in approximately 1971 is also six feet deep, violates state water quality standards for dissolved oxygen, and has never revegetated even though replanting of vegetation has been attempted. The destruction of the one-half acre area of healthy productive habitat would adversely affect fish and other marine wildlife, resulting in a decrease in fishery production and marine productivity. The residential subdivision will be a source of pollutants from, among other things, septic tanks, fertilizers, stormwater run-off from paved areas, boats, and boat engines, into the existing canal in violation of state water quality standards for Class III waters and would lower the ambient water quality of the adjacent Outstanding Florida Waters. The long flushing time of the canal, even if shallowed as proposed, will result in the waters of the canal failing to meet state water quality standards. Any pollutants or organic material entering or blown into the canal will remain in the canal to be broken down by bacteria which consume oxygen, resulting in low dissolved oxygen in violation of state water quality standards. Further, pollutants will be exported periodically into the receding waters outside the canal, resulting in degradation of those Outstanding Florida Waters. The project is not in the public interest since the project will result in water quality violations and in the destruction of an area of highly productive shallow water habitat. The adverse cumulative impacts of allowing riparian landowners along the Florida Keys to dredge access channels are overwhelming.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Denying Petitioner's application for a permit for its proposed project, and Dismissing Intervenor Izaak Walton League, Mangrove Chapter, as a party to this proceeding. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of November, 1989. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-1813 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 2(a) have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2(b) and 2(d) have been rejected as not being Supported by the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 2(c) has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 and 12-22 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact numbered 1- 13, 16, 18, 20, and 21 have been adopted either verbatim or in Substance in this Recommended Order. Intervenor's proposed finding of fact numbered 15 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Intervenor's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela P. Garvin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cayetano F. Alfonso, President Sunland Estates, Inc. 17400 Northwest 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33056 Maureen B. Harwitz, Esquire 2390 Bayview Lane North Miami, Florida 33181 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact The proposed project is a six-lane, combination low and high level bridge crossing Mill Cove and the St. John's River in Duval County, Florida. The project entails construction of approximately 6,000 feet of low level trestle-type bridge structure and approach spans beginning on the south side of Mill Cove and extending across the Cove to the northern edge of Quarantine Island, an artificial spoil island; 3,000 feet of high level bridge crossing the main channel of the St. John's River; and northern approach spans touching down on Dame Point on the northern shore of the St. John's River. In order to construct the proposed project, JTA is required to obtain a water quality permit and certification from DER. JTA filed its application with DER, accompanied by supporting data, including several studies performed by professional consultants. After review of the application, DHR filed notice of its intent to issue the requested water quality permit and certification, and Petitioners filed a timely request for a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes, to oppose the issuance of the permit and certification. Petitioners are various groups and individuals concerned about water quality in the St. John's River and the Jacksonville area. Petitioners' standing to seek relief in this proceeding was stipulated by all parties. Construction of the project will result in: filling of approximately .07 acres of wetlands to construct the south abutment on the shore of Mill Cove; dredging of approximately 185,000 cubic yards of material from Mill Cove to create a 4,400 foot long, 190 foot wide barge access channel, with a five foot navigation control depth parallel to the low level portion of the project; temporary filling of approximately .3 acres of wetlands above mean high water on the south shore of Quarantine Island to provide construction access to the island, which area is to be restored upon completion of construction; construction of a diked upland spoil containment site approximately 31 acres in size above mean high water on Quarantine Island to retain all dredge spoil associated with the project; construction of a temporary dock at the northern end of Quarantine Island for access and staging purposes, which is to be removed on project completion; and filling of approximately 16,000 cubic feet of material waterward of mean high water for rip-rap protection around main piers in the St. John's River. Dredged materials will be removed by hydraulic dredges. The St. John's River and its tributaries have been designated Class III waters by DER in the project area. The project involves dredging below mean high water and filling above mean high water, and is a dredge-and-fill project for purposes of Chapters 403 and 253, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code, and is regulated by DER. The project is an element in a proposed eastern bypass around the City of Jacksonville. It is expected that, as a result of the project, existing area industry will receive more efficient transportation service, commuter trip miles from southeastern Jacksonville to northern Jacksonville will be reduced, transportation routes to education facilities will be improved, and tourist traffic will be routed around downtown Jacksonville, reducing miles traveled to nearby beach resorts and thereby relieving downtown congestion. The benefits to costs ratio of the project appears positive and beneficial to Duval County and Jacksonville, in that for every dollar spent to construct the project, $2.80 could be returned to the community in the form of increased economic activity and more efficient transportation. Testimony clearly established that the state waters in the project area are currently severely degraded and are not likely to meet Class III water quality standards. Violations of Class III standards for dissolved oxygen and some heavy metals, such as mercury, presently exist as background conditions in the St. John's River and Mill Cove. Further, a water quality analysis performed by DER in the project area indicates high background concentrations of heavy metals and PCB's in both the water column and sediments in the project area. When the pro posed project is analyzed within the context of these existing background water quality conditions, it appears highly unlikely that any impact from the project will further degrade existing conditions. The project as currently designed includes plans for total containment of spoil material resulting from dredging activity on the upland portions of Quarantine Island. There will be no direct discharge of dredge $materials from this containment area into the receiving waters of the state. JTA performed a water and sediment analysis of the project area, the purpose of which was to determine the existence and concentrations of specific pollutants that could adversely impact Class III waters if reintroduced into the aquatic system. JTA employed a consultant whose analytical program was designed in consultation with DER and complied with all standard testing procedures required by Rule 17-3.03, Florida Administrative Code. This analysis identified three primary-project activities where control of toxic and deleterious materials was critical: turbidity control; upland spoil containment; and direct discharge of spoil water to state waters. Sediments in the Mill Cove area are extremely fine and may be resuspended in the water column in quantities that could violate state water quality standards if dredging is done improperly. It appears from the evidence that any turbidity problem can be avoided by employing silt curtains and hydraulic dredging during channel excavation. Silt curtains should adequately retain turbidity below levels which would violate state water quality standards, in view of the fact that the JTA study hypothesized a "worst-case" condition for projecting turbidity and pollutant concentration by assuming no upland spoil containment, silt curtains or reasonable mixing zone. Although use of silt curtains and hydraulic dredging cannot absolutely guarantee zero-discharge of suspended sediments from the dredging area, the proposed system of turbidity control is adequate to provide reasonable assurance of non-violation of state water quality standards. Due to the existing toxic background conditions in Mill Cove, DER imposed a permit condition requiring spoil from dredging activities to be completely contained in an upland landfill-type site, with no overflow that could allow effluent to return to waters of the state. The upland dike system proposed in the project application is designed to retain all spoil material and water without direct discharge into state waters. Testimony established that the proposed dike system is designed to hold far more spoil material than the proposed project will generate. Although the dike system is to be constructed from dredged material previously deposited on Quarantine Island, it appears from the testimony that these materials were dredged from the main channel of the St. John's River and are cleaner and sandier in character than sediments in the Mill Cove area. The dike system, in conjunction with natural percolation and evaporation, is adequately designed to retain dredge spoil on the upland portion of Quarantine Island, and can reasonably be expected not to release toxic and deleterious substances into receiving waters of the state. It is also significant that a condition of the requested permit requires project water quality monitoring to afford continuing assurance that the project will not violate standards contained in Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. These standards and the conditions required to achieve them have been included in DER's letter of intent to issue the permit for this project. It is specifically concluded from the evidence that project dredging will not release toxic and deleterious substances into Class III waters in violation of state water quality standards, and that project dredging in Mill Cove incorporates reasonable safeguards for spoil disposal and turbidity control so as to assure non-violation of state water quality standards. JTA plans to use a direct discharge method to dispose of storm water from the bridge. Storm water will fall through 4-inch screened holes called "scuppers" placed at regular intervals along the bridge surface directly into either Mill Cove or the St. John's River. JTA was required to provide in its application reasonable assurance that storm water runoff from the Project would not exceed applicable state standards for turbidity, BOD, dissolved solids, zinc, polychlorinated biphenols, lead1 iron, oils or grease, mercury, cadmium and coliform. To this end, JTA submitted a study entitled Effect of Rainfall Runoff from Proposed Dame Point Bridge on Water Quality of St. John's River. This study analyzed the chemical composition of storm water runoff from an existing bridge, comparable in both size and design, to the proposed project, which crosses the St. John's River south of the City of Jacksonville. This study adequately established that storm water runoff into the St. John's River across the length of the proposed bridge will not degrade the water quality of the St. John's River below current water quality standards. All but three of the parameters tested in the study were within standards contained in Chapter 17-3, Florida Administrative Code. The remaining three pollutants were either not automobile-related, or would not violate applicable water quality standards after a reasonable opportunity" for mixing with receiving waters. One of these pollutants, mercury, is not automobile-related, and the concentration of mercury discovered in bridge runoff test samples was essentially the same as that measured in rainfall samples. The sampling for mercury was performed using the ultrasensitive "atomic absorption" method, which is capable of measuring tenths of a part per billion of mercury. Another method, the "Dithizone" method, is a technique recognized as effective by DER, and would have, if utilized, yielded a result within the "none detectable" standard contained in Rule 17-3.05(2) , Florida Administrative Code. As to the remaining two pollutants, coliform and lead, testimony established that a dilution rate of 400 to 1, after mixing with receiving waters, would not result in violation of applicable Class III water standards. Testimony also clearly established that water circulation in the project area would result in the requisite dilution ratio of approximately 400 to 1. The storm water runoff study was performed on a bridge similar in all important characteristics to the proposed project, and therefore validates the scientific methodology utilized to determine the expected impact of runoff from the proposed project on water quality in the St. John's River. The applicant has provided in its permit application the best practicable treatment available to protect state waters in the design of both the low and high level portions of the proposed bridge. Extensive research and analysis of design alternatives for both the low and high level portions of the bridge were undertaken by JTA and its consultants prior to selecting the proposed design for the bridge. JTA prepared and submitted to DER, as part of the application process, a document entitled Summary of Construction Techniques in Mill Cove, Dame Point Expressway. This document analyzed and summarized the available construction and design alternatives for the low level trestle portions of the project. The analysis included consideration of overhead construction, construction from a temporary wooden structure parallel to the project, and construction from barges using a shallow channel parallel to the project. The design chosen will cost more than one million dollars less than the next alternative, and will cut construction time by two years over the next alternative design. Given the demonstrated need for the proposed project, the already degraded water quality in the project area, the safeguards for water quality contained-in the project design, and the savings to be realized in both cost and time of construction, the design presently contained in the application is the best practicable. Both Petitioners and JTA have submitted proposed findings of fact. Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 4 have been substantially adopted herein. JTA's Proposed Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 7 have also been substantially adopted. To the extent that proposed findings of fact submitted by either Petitioners or JTA are not adopted in the Recommended Order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
The Issue This case presents two questions for consideration. The first question concerns the Petitioners' contention that the grant of the permit at issue must be considered contemporaneously with the matters of file in the application made by the Respondent, The Deltona Corporation, with the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, File No. 64-24208, pending before the Department. From the point of view of the Petitioners, should this contemporaneous review process be afforded, then the current permit would not be granted due to the alleged deficiencies associated with the application, File No. 64-24208. The second question to be answered in this case concerns the dispute between the Respondents on the issue of water quality monitoring as a condition to granting the permit sought herein. The Respondent Department would have the applicant monitor in six lakes in the area of the project and the applicant would restrict its monitoring activity to three lakes in the project area. The Petitioners support the Department in its position on the monitoring question. 1/
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, The Deltona Corporation, has made application with the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, to effect drainage system improvements to a land locked conveyance network which consists of the enlargement and regrading 990 lineal feet of existing channel cross- section and the installation of additional culverts and control structures at road crossings. The project also involves repairs and replacement of a damaged culvert. The work would be accomplished by land based equipment transported to the work site by existing overland routes. The excavated sand fill would be placed on upland property owned by The Deltona Corporation. The details of the project and data related to the geographical area may be found in the Joint Exhibit I admitted into evidence. The date of the application for permit is December 12, 1979. On January 25, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation sent out a notice of the pending review by the Department of the permit application. After receipt of that notice, attorney for the Petitioners, on February 12, 1980, wrote to the Department expressing the objection to the project made by property owners in the area of the project site, together with a list of those owners found in an attached Petition of owners' names and addresses. A copy of this letter and attached Petition may be found as Joint Exhibit No. VII admitted into evidence. Subsequent to the receipt of the statement of objections, the Department issued a construction permit dated April 30, 1980, subject to conditions. A copy of this permit may be found as Joint Exhibit No. VIII admitted into evidence. The Petitioners, through their counsel, then filed a formal petition dated May 6, 1980, which was the vehicle utilized in establishing the details of this dispute and was the basis for the Department Secretary forwarding the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration by a hearing officer in keeping with the provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The hearing was conducted on October 16, 1980, and the Petitioners' position was more specifically defined in the course of that hearing and the claim as described in the issue statement of this order constitutes the substance of the Petitioners' position. 2/ Joint Exhibit No. I; petitioners' Exhibit No. 1 and Respondent Deltona's Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 constitute sketches and aerial photographs of the general project area. Joint Exhibit No. 1 identifies the work area with more particularity. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 indicates the desired flow pattern of the water through the various lake systems and indicates whether the flow is by gravity flow or pump flow. This drawing depicts the proposed channels and structural improvements that would be involved. The Department has indicated that all the regulatory concerns which it has about the project associated with Permit No. 64-26478-4E, the permit in question, have been adequately addressed, subject to the conditions set forth in the permit document. Joint Exhibit Nos. V and VI; Respondent Deltona's Exhibit Nos. 5, 6 and 7; and the Petitioners Exhibit No. 2 are exhibits pertaining to water quality concerns, to include sample results. The testing and other information provided indicates that the project as contemplaced, would meat the regulatory parameters set forth in Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. The Department in expressing its concern that continued water quality monitoring be conducted has indicated that it feels that future periodic monitoring should be done in Jenkins Pond, Lake Big, Lake Diana, McGarity Lake, Sidney Lake and Lake Mitnik. The Respondent Deltona would only conduct this monitoring in the first three lakes named. By looking at the Respondent Deltona's Exhibit No. 2, it could be seen that all of the aforementioned lakes would be in the same basic flow pattern. Of the system of lakes, the area around McGarity Lake is the most highly developed and and has the greatest potential for causing unacceptable pollution. That pollution could be carried through the other lakes within the system as described in view of the potential of the system, if the project is built, to convey a greater volume of water at a higher rate of flow. A more expansive water quality monitoring system within six lakes as opposed to three lakes would increase the opportunity to discover potential hazards from pollutant at an earlier data. This is particularly so by using lakes such as McGarity Lake where there is a higher level of developmental build-out.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent, E. Speer and Associates, Inc. (the "Applicant"), should be granted a permit for the construction of a permanent docking facility pursuant to Sections 403.91-403.929, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 17.
Findings Of Fact Whether Quantified Hydrographic Studies Are Necessary For All Marina Applications To Provide Reasonable Assurance That Flushing Is Adequate To Prevent Violations of Water Quality Standards Speer's Exceptions Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion (stated as a finding of fact) that it is not possible to demonstrate adequate flushing without "quantifying flushing rates and pollutant dispersal rates using objective methods and appropriate hydrodynamic data." (R.O. at 20, 22-24, 47, 49-50, 54, 57-58; F.O.F. Nos. 33, 35, 38-39, 40, 43-45, 64, 66, and 69) It is clear from the tenor of the entire recommended order that the Hearing Officer believes that as a matter of law an expert's opinion is not sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that flushing will be adequate to prevent violations of water quality standards unless that opinion is based on quantified conclusions generated by objective methods and appropriate hydrodynamic data. (R.O. at 47, 49-50, 57-58) Thus, for example, the Hearing Officer opines that quantification of flushing rates and pollutant dispersal rates using objective measurements of appropriate hydrodynamic data is an essential element of the prima facie showing required to be made by the applicant. (R.O. at 47; C.O.L. No. 11) The Hearing Officer places great significance an the following excerpt from the opinion in 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Reculation, 552 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. den., 562 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1990): 1800 Atlantic filed 34 exceptions to the recommended order, most of which were denied in the Department's final order . . . . The final order approved and adopted most of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the recommended order and denied the permit. The following stated rulings and reasons there for are significant to the issues on this appeal. (emphasis added) We must note at this point that there is no finding of fact in the hearing officer's recommended order that quantifies how productive the marine habitat may be in this case, and no record support for the suggestion that there would be some quantifiable diminution in the quality of the marine habitat attributable to this project [footnote omitted]. (emphasis added) Exception 23 filed by 1800 Atlantic challenged the hearing officer's finding that the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, fishing or recreational values, and marine productivity in the vicinity . . . The Department rejected this exception based upon the hearing officer's general statements, without any quantification whatsoever, of adverse effects upon these matters . . . (emphasis added) 1800 Atlantic, 552 So.2d at 951-952. I do not concur that 1800 Atlantic stands for the proposition that quantified hydrographic measurement of flushing is in all cases an essential element of a prima facie showing that a marina project will not cause violations of water quality standards. Notwithstanding the above noted statement of the court in 1800 Atlantic that "there is no finding of fact . . . that quantifies 'how productive the marine habitat may be' . and no record support . . . that there would be some quantifiable diminution in the quality of marine habitat attributable to [the] project," 552 So.2d 951, the court did not reject the finding that the project adversely affected the conservation of fish and wildlife, fishing or recreation values, and marine productivity. Indeed, had the court rejected the above finding due to lack of quantified findings the court would never have gone on to reach the issue of mitigation because in 1800 Atlantic mitigation could only become relevant if the applicant was unable to provide reasonable assurance that the project satisfies the public interest criteria of Section 403.918(2) (a), Florida Statutes. See Section 403.918(2)(b), Florida Statutes. I do agree that in some cases quantified hydrographic studies of flushing may be required in order to provide reasonable assurances. Thus, in Rudloe v. Dickerson Bavshore, Inc., 10 FALR 3426 (DER Case No. 87-0816, June 9, 1988), my predecessor held that a dye tracer study was necessary to provide quantitative information about dilution rates and directions on dispersion of pollutants emanating from a proposed marina site which was in "close proximity" to Class II waters approved for shellfish harvesting. 10 FALR at 3447-48. However, the need for such quantified studies must be determined on a case by case basis and is not required as a matter of law for all marinas. 5/ Far me to determine as a matter of law that experts may establish a fact only by certain types of evidence would be an unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the scientific domain of the expert. Thus, in Kralik v. Ponce Marine, Inc., 11 FALR 669, 671 (DER Final Order, Jan. 11, 1989), my predecessor held that expert testimony with regard to flushing does not lack credibility just because a hydrographic study had not been conducted. Of course, the finder of fact has the ultimate say on how much weight an expert opinion should be given if it is not based on a quantified study. Thus, whether an expert testifying on adequacy of flushing has conducted a quantifiable hydrographic study merely goes to the weight of the evidence. Kralik, 11 FALR at 671. I only conclude that a quantified hydrographic study for a proposed marina is not in all cases essential for a showing of reasonable assurances that water quality standards will not be violated. Accordingly, to the extent that the Hearing Officer's findings of fact state that a quantified hydrographic study is required in all cases as a prima facie element of a showing of reasonable assurance that a project will not violate water quality standards, I reject such statement as a mislabled and incorrect conclusion of law. Reasonable Assurance That Flushing Is Adequate To Prevent Violations of Water Quality Standards I read Speer's Exceptions Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in whole or in part as taking exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that under the facts of this case a quantified hydrographic study was needed in order to provide reasonable assurance that the project would not cause violations of water quality standards, and that because such a quantified hydrographic study had not been conducted, reasonable assurances had not been provided. (F.O.F. Nos. 33, 35, 38- 39, 40, 43-45, 64, 66 and 69) As noted by the Hearing Officer, the applicant's expert testimony concerning the adequacy of the flushing consisted of general statements describing visual observations of river and tidal flows which, together with past experience and knowledge of the general area of the project, formed the basis for the experts' opinions that a quantified hydrographic study was not necessary for this project. (R.O. at 22-23) Thus, far example, Mr. Charles C. Isiminger, accepted as an expert in marina design and hydrographic engineering testified that based on his knowledge of the area, its riverine and tidal flows, a hydrographic documentation was not needed to provide reasonable assurance that the project would not cause water quality violations. Mr. Isiminger also testified that any pollutants entering the water from the marina would be flushed out of the area within one tidal cycle. (Tr. at 65-66, 70, 77- 79, 93, 110, 125, 128, 134) Mr. Thomas Franklin, an environmental supervisor from the Department testified that: the hydrographic survey was not really necessary due to the location of the project being in open waters and in close vicinity to the Inlet with a large volume of tidal waters moving in this area, plus the fact that it was further enhanced by flushing due to the St. Lucie River being -- basically coming around Hell Gate point [sic] and funneling out into this estuary. (emphasis added) TR at 437. Other experts also testified that the area was well flushed and that a quantified hydrographic study was not needed in this case. (Jacqueline Kelly, Tr. at 187; John Meyer, Tr. at 319, 322, 341; Gerald Ward, Tr. at 44749) 6/ Speer asserts that the Hearing Officer's finding that a quantified hydrographic study is required in this case cannot stand in light of the unrebutted expert testimony that the marina site will be well flushed and that the rate of flushing provides reasonable assurances the water quality standards will not be violated. I have found no competent substantial evidence in the record which would support a finding that under the facts of this case a quantified hydrographic study is required. I did note that in Footnote 21 of the Recommended Order (R.O. at 20) the Hearing Officer states: Tidal range is only one of the types of data used to quantify flushing rates and pollutant dispersal rates. See TR at 78. Other appropriate data include: overall flow rates, mid tide flow, flow amplitude (the magnitude of the flow without regard to direction, i.e., speed as opposed to velocity), horizontal current distribution, downstream plume characteristics, and field verification using a dye tracer. All of this data is needed to fully describe and quantify flushing rates and pollutant dispersal rates. (citing testimony of Mr. Isiminger at Tr. 88-94) At first blush this may appear to be competent substantial evidence supporting a finding that a quantified hydrographic study is necessary in this case. However, when the testimony is read in its complete context, it is clear that Mr. Isiminger is testifying as to what is necessary to do a hydrographic study when one is needed, and is not testifying that such a study is needed in this case. (Tr. 88-94). I also note that the record contains a memo written by Dr. Kenneth Echternacht, a hydrographic engineer employed by the Department. (Tr. at 67-70) This memo was admitted without objection. (Tr. at 23) The memo states in part that "without . . . hydrographic documentation, reasonable assurance cannot be given that the project will not cause problems." (Tr. at 70; Pet. Exh. No. 10) 7/ Dr. Echternacht was not called as a witness at the hearing and the letter was not offered as evidence of the opinion of Dr. Echternacht or the Department at the time of the de novo hearing. To the contrary, the above noted testimony of Mr. Franklin and the testimony of Jacqueline D. Kelly, an environmental specialist of the Department accepted as an expert in evaluating impacts of environmental dredge and fill projects (Tr. at 187, 195; R.O. at 3), clearly establish that at the time of the de novo hearing the Department was of the opinion that further hydrographic documentation was not needed. The Hearing Officer noted that Mr. Meyer testified that the flushing is a "very, very complicated dynamic situation." (Tr. at 320). The testimony was as follows: Q. So you don't know for sure whether the currents here impact this at all or stay offshore from it? A. Oh, the currents definitelv affect it, and you do have interchange -- as I mentioned before, a very high rate of interchange on a daily basis on every tide. Q. Are you saying that the current that flows through here every day flows right through the site? A. We're dealing with two different things here. We're dealing with your currents, your general migration of waters from the estuary from the inland areas down. You're also dealing with tidal effects coming in and out, and it's a very, very complicated dynamic situation. For me to try to tell you exactly how these things work would be impossible without having a very, very long drawn-out expensive study done on the entire area, and I have not reviewed any studies like that. Tr. at 319-20 (emphasis added) When taken in its context it is clear that Mr. Meyer is testifying that there is a very high rate of exchange on a daily basis on every tide. The fact that he viewed the exact details of the flushing as very complicated in no way retracted his statement that there was a very high rate of exchange on every tide. My review of the record leads me to concur with Speer that no testimony, either on direct, cross-examination, or examination by the Hearing Officer, nor any other evidence was introduced to rebut the expert testimony presented by Speer and the Department that flushing on the site was adequate to provide reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated. 8/ As a general rule, the trier of fact may not arbitrarily reject uncontroverted evidence as proof of a contested fact. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. G. & J. Investments, 506 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. den., 515 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1987); City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel, 352 So.2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); In Re: Estate of Hannon, 447 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). This does not mean that a mere scintilla of unrebutted evidence is sufficient to establish a contested fact in an administrative hearing. At least in the context of administrative proceedings, the unrebutted evidence still must be competent substantial evidence to support a finding of fact. 9/ There is no suggestion that the Hearing Officer rejected the unrebutted testimony of the experts of Speer and the Department as not being competent substantial evidence. In fact, in the light of the testimony of Mr. Isiminger (Tr. at 65- 66), Mr. Ward ( Tr. at 447-449), Mr. Meyer (Tr. at 238- 239), and Mr. Franklin (Tr. at 345-350), it is beyond peradventure that there is competent substantial evidence to support a finding that flushing is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the marina will not cause violations of water quality standards. It is clear from the context of the Recommended Order that the Hearing Officer believed that reasonable assurance had not been provided only because he believed that a quantified hydrographic study was required as a matter of law. Although I reject the Hearing Officer's conclusion that a quantified hydrographic study must be conducted as a matter of law for all marina applications, I must still determine whether a quantified hydrographic analysis is required under the facts of this case. In Rudloe v. Dickerson Bayshore, 10 FALR 3426 (DER Final Order, June 9, 1988) it was held that a hydrographic study was not adequate because it did not include a quantified dye tracer study. Id., 10 FALR at 3448. In Rudloe, as in this case, the marina was located in Class III waters, but near Class II waters. However, in Rudloe, the marina site was much closer to the Class II waters (approximately 1,700 feet in Rudloe (10 FAIR at 3430) as compared to approximately 8,000 feet in this case). (R.O. at 16, F.O.F. No. 26) Also, the Rudloe case is significantly different from this case in that competent substantial expert opinion was presented in Rudloe that the marina would adversely impact the Class II shellfish harvesting area. See Rudloe, 10 FALR at 3433-35, 3437-38 (testimony of DNR expert that operation of marina would result in closure of waters to the harvest of shellfish; testimony of Dr. Robert Livingston that the hydrographic drogue studies conducted were inadequate.) In this case, neither expert nor lay testimony was offered by Barringer to show that operation of the marina would result in violation of water quality standards or have any adverse impact on the Class II shellfish waters. 10/ I conclude that the facts of this case as found by the Hearing Officer are not sufficiently similar to the facts of Rudloe so as to justify holding as a matter of law a quantified hydrographic study is necessary to establish the required reasonable assurances. Since the record contains competent substantial evidence that flushing is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the marina will not cause water quality violations, and since there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's contrary finding, I must accept the exception of Speer and reject the Hearing Officer's findings of fact to the contrary. In this case I note that I am not so much rejecting findings of fact as rejecting a conclusion of law. As I noted, the Hearing Officer's finding is really based on a conclusion of law which I reject. This leaves only unrebutted competent substantial evidence that there will be adequate flushing to provide reasonable assurance that the operation of the marina will not result in water quality violations. There is no rational basis to reject this unrebutted competent substantial evidence. Therefore, I must accept as proven that the applicant has provided the reasonable assurances that operation of the marina will not result in water quality violations. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock; City of St. Petersburg; Estate of Hannon; supra, Effect On Class II Waters Speer's Exceptions Nos. 7 and 8 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurance that the marina would not have a "negative effect" an the Class II waters of the St. Lucie Inlet and the Great Pocket. (F.O.F. No. 43) Rule 17-312.080(6)(b), Fla. Admin. Code provides: The Department also shall deny a permit for dredging and filling in any class of waters where the location of the project is adjacent or in close proximity to Class II waters, unless the applicant submits a plan or proposes a procedure which demonstrates that the dredging or filling will not have a negative effect on the Class II waters and will not result in violations of water quality standards in the Class II waters. In this case expert testimony was presented by Speer and the Department that due to the distance of the marina site from the Class II waters (8,000 feet) the marina site was not in close proximity to the Class II waters, and due to the rapid flushing of the area, the construction and operation of the marina would neither have a negative effect nor would result in violations of water quality standards in the Class II waters of St. Lucie Inlet and the Great Pocket. (Isiminger, Tr. at 96, 126-27; Meyer, Tr. at 254-55) I find that the record contains no competent substantial evidence to rebut the evidence introduced by Speer and the Department that the marina will have no negative effect on Class II waters and will not result in violation of water quality standards in Class II waters. Accordingly, I must accept Speer's exception and reject the Hearing Officer's finding. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock; City of St. Petersburg; In Re: Estate of Hannon; supra. Reasonable Assurance That Operation Of The Marina Will Not Result In Prop Dredging Or Violations Of The State Water Quality Criterion For Turbidity Speer's Exceptions Nos. 1, 2, 9-12, and 16 in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurance that the boat traffic from operation of the marina would not cause prop dredging or violations of the water quality criterion for turbidity. (F.O.F. Nos. 33-34, 45, 48, 52-53, 64, and 67) 11/ On one hand, there was testimony that the depths of the marina, in combination with the size of boats allowed in the various slips, would allow for a one foot clearance from the bottom of the boats to the bottom of the marina, and that this clearance, in combination with speed limits in the marina, would provide reasonable assurance that operation of the marina would not result in prop dredging or turbidity violations. (Isiminger, Tr. at 104-107, 118; Meyer Tr. at 263-65, 299, 304- 305; Kelly, Tr. at 189-190; Ward, Tr. at 460) On the other hand, Bruce Graham, admitted as an expert in marine biology testified that: "A large boat, three feet from the bottom, I think would resuspend sediment." (Graham, Tr. at 378). The Hearing Officer, noting that when asked if one foot clearance is sufficient to prevent prop dredging and resultant turbidity violations, a Department witness, testified: I would have to say that we simply don't have enough documentation to know this for a fact. We know that a foot gives us a degree of comfort that there will not be prop wash. In certain instances -- a tug boat, for instance, you know, with huge engines, you're going to have prop wash over a much -- over a large area and with probably much more than a foot of clearance. But for the normal, typical marina a foot, as I say, gives us a degree of comfort that we have settled on. Neyer, Tr. at 264. The Hearing Officer concluded that the witnesses of Speer and the Department could not explain the reasons or efficacy of the "one foot policy" except to say that in their experience the one foot policy was adequate to prevent prop dredging and turbidity violations. (R.O. at 28 n.35)0 The Hearing Officer thus found that Speer and the Department failed to "prove up" the one foot policy -- i.e., failed to elucidate and explicate the reason for the policy. 12/ Clearly the Hearing Officer placed more weight on the testimony of Mr. Bruce Graham than that of Isiminger, Meyer, Kelly and Ward. Since I cannot say that the testimony of Graham was not competent substantial evidence, I am not at liberty to reweigh the evidence or reject the Hearing Officer's finding of fact. See, Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Sections 120.57(1)(b)10., and 120.68(10), Florida Statutes. Speer contends that Barringer presented no evidence that prop dredging will cause sufficient turbidity to violate the state water quality turbidity criterion of 29 NTUs. 13/ That contention misses the point. The burden is on Speer to establish by the preponderance of evidence that reasonable assurance has been provided that operation of the marina will not result in violations of the water quality criterion for turbidity. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Co., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The Hearing Officer, as the finder of fact, concluded that Speer failed to do so. Accordingly, I reject the exception of Speer and accept the Hearing Officer's finding of fact that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurance that operation of the marina would not cause prop dredging or violations of the state water quality criterion for turbidity. Manatee Impacts and the Public Interest Test Speer's Exceptions Nos. 13 and 17 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that Speer failed to do a quantified study of impacts to manatees and therefore failed to provide reasonable assurance that the marina will not have an adverse impact on manatees, their migratory patterns, and their habitat. (F.O.F. Nos. 61, 64 and 68) The Hearing Officer reasoned as follows: Instead of a traffic study, the Applicant and DER presented evidence in the form of general statements that manatees need not migrate north and south through the approach channel. According to the Applicant and DER, manatees can migrate across the project site by one of two alternative routes. They can migrate in one or two feet of water under moored boats and then under wave breaks on the north and east piers, or they can migrate in the shallow water landward of the west boundary of the project. That evidence was not persuasive and was controverted by competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence that manatees would be deterred from migrating under the project footprint by substantial obstacles in their path. Manatees migrating under the project footprint would be exposed to 86 or more moving boats with powerful engines and drafts of four to five feet in waters covering approximately 20,800 square feet. It could be argued, or course, that 86 or more boats would not be moving in and out of the marina at one time. However, it is impossible to estimate occupancy rates, length of stay, and frequency of boat trips without a traffic study. (R.O. at 35, n. 51) As Speer's exception notes, there was testimony that because of the width of the river and boat speed restrictions in the project area, there would be no adverse impacts an the manatee from the marina. (Kelly, Tr. at 162; Meyer, Tr. at 255-56, 331- 32; Isiminger, Tr. at 130) The St. Lucie/Jupiter/Hobe Sound waterways are a major travel corridor for manatees. (DER Exh. No. 4) Between 1974 and December 1990, there were ten water craft related manatee fatalities within the boating sphere of influence of the project. (DER Exh. No. 4) In order to reduce impacts on the manatees, the proposed permit contains the following specific conditions: S.C. No. 13: The permittee agrees to install and maintain a minimum of one manatee education/display on the main access pier during and after construction. S.C. No. 15: The permittee agrees that any collision with a manatee shall be reported immediately [to DNR and U.S. Fish and wildlife Service]. S.C. No. 18: The permittee shall post four (4) manatee area/slow speed signs, two of which would be spaced along the perimeter pier and two of which would be located on the outside of the marina for all boating traffic to observe within the marina facility. (DER Exh. No. 3) 14/ There was testimony that the piers, once constructed, would not impair the passage of manatees. (Isiminger, Tr. at 114- 115) On the other hand, there was some testimony that manatees may have to go around the project rather than through it. (Meyer, Tr. at 311) The existing boat traffic past the site of the project to the Inlet was "rough1y estimated" at 50 to 100 boats a day. (Meyer, Tr. at 337) The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service determined that "while [the project] may negatively affect, it is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the West Indian Manatee." (Tr. at 120-21) The Hearing Officer concluded that reasonable assurance as to adverse impacts on manatees could not be provided absent a quantified traffic study. (R.O. at 35, n. 51) In Coscan Florida, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 12 FAIR 1359 (DER Final Order March 9, 1990), the Department held that the information needed to determine a marina's impact on manatees and the necessary actions to mitigate such impacts must be decided an a case by case basis. For example, in Sheridan v. Deep Lagoon Marina, 11 FALR 4710 (DER Final Order, Aug. 24, 1989), 15/ a marina sought to expand by adding 113 new wet slips. The marina was required to develop a manatee protection plan far the surrounding portions of the Caloosahatchee River, all new slips were limited to sail boats until the manatee protection plan was implemented and enforced, and power boat occupancy was limited to 75% of the total 174 wetslips in any event. The marina also made available a wet slip for use by the Florida Marine Patrol. In this case there is evidence of significant boat related manatee fatalities in the boating sphere of influence of the proposed marina. There is also evidence of existing traffic of 50-100 boats per day past the project site. In view of the fact that this project would add 86 slips and a public fueling facility, it seems likely that that the project will significantly increase both boat traffic and the threat of manatee collisions. Accordingly, I concur with the Hearing Officer that there is competent substantial evidence to support a finding that further studies are needed to determine what, if any, additional manatee protection conditions are needed to provide reasonable assurance that manatees will not be adversely affected. I conclude that the applicant did not provide reasonable assurance that the operation of the marina will not have an adverse impact on manatees, their migratory patterns, and their habitat, and therefore failed to provide reasonable assurance that the project is not contrary to the public interest. Therefore, I reject the exception of Speer. Cumulative and Secondary Impacts Speer's Exception No. 15 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that the applicant failed to provide reasonable assurance that there will be no adverse cumulative pacts created either by the cumulative effects of the object and existing similar projects, or by secondary pacts of the project itself. (F.O.F. No. 66) 16/ Cumulative impact analysis takes into consideration the cumulative impacts of similar projects which are existing, under construction, or reasonably expected in the future. Conservancy v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, supra; Section 403.919, Florida Statutes. Secondary impact analysis considers the impact of the project itself and of any other relevant activities that are very closely linked or causally related to the permitted project. Conservancy, 580 So.2d at 778; J.T. McCormick v. City of Jacksonville, 12 FALR 960, 980. 17/ Thus, in Conservancy the secondary impact analysis was required to consider the environmental impacts of development of 75 estate homes on an island where the development would be reasonably expected as a result of the permitted laying of a subaqueous sewer line. Similarly, in del Campo v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 452 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the Department was required to consider the environmental impacts of the foreseeable development of an island facilitated by the permitted building of a bridge to the island. In this case there is competent substantial evidence that there are other marinas located 1,750 feet downstream in Willoughby Creek, and 5,000 feet downstream in Manatee Pocket. (R.O. F.O.F. 31; Isiminger, Tr. at 112; Meyer, Tr. at 261) The record contains competent substantial evidence that the cumulative impact of the project and the existing marinas in Willoughby Creek and Manatee Pocket will not result in violations of state water policy. (Isiminger, Tr. at 125; Kelly, Tr. at 167) I cannot say that the testimony of Isiminger and Kelly on cumulative impacts is not competent, substantial evidence. In light of the fact that there is no competent substantial evidence to indicate that cumulative impacts would result in water quality violations, I must accept Speer's exception and reject the Hearing Officer's finding. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock; City of St. Petersbur; In re: Estate of Hannon; supra. As to secondary impacts, the Hearing Officer pointed out that Speer did not introduce any evidence as to whether there would be secondary impacts to water quality as the result of further development or increased utilization of the uplands facilities. (See F.O.F. 66, n.59, R.O. at 39) Such further development or increased utilization of upland facilities is reasonably foreseeable and would be very closely linked or causally related to the building of an 86 slip marina with public fuel services. As noted above, the applicant has the burden of providing reasonable assurances as to cumulative and secondary impacts. Brown v. DER, supra; Conservancy, supra. However, neither the pleadings nor the pre-hearing stipulation raised the issue of the adequacy of the secondary impact analysis. In a case such as this where the Department's notice of intent to issue a permit has been challenged by a third party, the applicant's prima facie case need only include the application and the accompanying documentation and information relied on by the Department as the basis of its intent to issue. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., 396 So.2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The petitioner challenging the permit must identify the areas of controversy and allege a factual basis for its contentions that the applicant did not provide the necessary reasonable assurances. J.W.C., 396 So.2d at 789. See also Woodholly Assoc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 451 So.2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Since Barringer did not identify this issue and did not allege any factual basis for a contention that the secondary impact analysis was inadequate or incorrect, I may not rule on the issue in this order. Miscellaneous Exceptions To Findings of Fact Speer's Exception No. 14 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurance that the project will have no adverse impact on (1) the relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the project, including seagrasses, shell fish, and fin-fish, and (2) recreational and commercial values in the vicinity. (F.O.F. No. 64) Speer contends that this finding is not supported in the record by competent substantial evidence and is contrary to unrebutted testimony of Ms. Kelly and Mr. Isiminger. (Kelly, Tr. at 159, 161-62, 165-67; Isiminger, Tr. at 73) I cannot say that the testimony of Isiminger and Kelly is not competent, substantial evidence, and I find no evidence in the record to rebut the testimony of Kelly and Isiminger. Therefore, I must accept Speer's exception and reject the Hearing Officer's finding. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock; City of St. Petersburg; In re: Estate of Hannon; supra. Speer's Exception No. 3 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that Speer failed to provide a current water quality analysis. (F.O.F. No. 35) A water quality analysis was submitted in April of 1990, shortly after the permit application was filed. (R.O. at 2, 19; F.O.F. No. 34) I find no competent substantial evidence in the record to suggest any reason for believing that the water quality has changed since April of 1990. I agree with Speer that, absent some specific reason for believing that the water quality has changed since the date of a study conducted contemporaneously with the permit application, there is no requirement to provide an updated water quality analysis. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Need For Quantified Hydrographic Study Speer's Exceptions Nos. 1, 7 and 9, in whole or in part, take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law that a quantified hydrographic study was needed to provide reasonable assurances that the operation of the marina would not result in violations of water quality standards and would would not have a negative effect on Class II waters. For the reasons stated in Parts III(1), (2) and (3) above, I accept this exception and reject the above noted conclusions of law. Introduction Of Issues Not Set Forth In Pleadings Or Pre-Hearing Stipulations Speer's Exceptions Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, in whole or in part, take exception to the Hearing Officer's consideration of issues of (1) the need for a quantified hydrographic study, (2) the proximity of the site to Class II waters, (3) turbidity and prop dredging, (4) cumulative impacts, and (5) the need for a quantified study on manatee impacts. For the reasons set forth in Part 111(6) above, I agree that, absent waiver, a petitioner challenging an intent to issue a permit may not raise issues at the hearing which were not raised in the pleadings or pre-hearing stipulations. However, in this case the issue of manatee impacts was raised in the pleadings, and Speer was on notice that it had the burden of proof on that issue. As to the other issues, even if I accepted far the sake of argument that they were not raised in the pleadings or pre-hearing stipulations, Speer failed to timely object to the raising of these issues at the hearing and therefore waived any objection. See Sarasota County and Midnight Pass Society v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 13 FAIR 1727 (DER Final Order, April 4, 1991). Therefore, I reject the above exceptions. Proximity To Class II Waters Speer's Exception No. 2 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that Speer was required to submit a plan which demonstrated that the marina would not have a negative effect on Class II waters. (C.O.L. Nos. 12 and 13) I do not agree that where a proposed marina site is 8,000 feet from Class II waters and where the site is rapidly flushed as noted in Parts 111(1), (2) and (3) above, that the site is in close proximity with the Class II waters within the meaning of Rule 17-312.080(6), Fla. Admin. Code. Accordingly, I accept this exception and reject the above note conclusion of law. Public Interest Test Speer's Exception No. 4 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurance that the project was not contrary to the public interest. (C.O.L. Nos. 17 and 20) For the reasons set forth in Parts III(4) and (5) above, I reject this exception. Cumulative Impacts Speer's Exception No. 5 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that Speer failed to provide reasonable assurances that cumulative impacts would not result in water quality violations, and that such assurances could only be provided by a quantified study. For the reasons set forth in Parts III (1), (2), (3) and (6) above, I accept this exception and reject the above noted conclusions of law. Modification Of Permit Conditions Speer's Exception No. 6 takes Exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law Nos. 24-34. These conclusions of law concern questions of the authority of the Hearing Officer and me to modify the conditions of the permit. I agree with Speer that since none of the parties have requested any modifications, these conclusions of law are irrelevant. 18/ Therefore I accept the exception and reject the above noted conclusions of law as irrelevant. Miscellaneous Speer's Exception No. 8 in part takes exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Speer and the Department failed to provide reasonable assurance as to prop dredging and turbidity violations because neither Speer nor the Department sufficiently proved the basis for the one-foot clearance policy. For the reasons set forth in Part III(4) above, I reject this exception. Speer's Exception No. 8 in part takes exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the question of whether mitigation is adequate is a question of law. I agree with the Hearing Officer and reject this exception. See 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 552 So.2d 946, 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, enter a Final Order denying the application for a permit to construct the proposed project and denying the request for determination of improper purposes. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of June, 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 1550 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1992.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the District should approve FRI's consumptive use permit application, no. 2-019-0012AUR, pursuant to Chapter 40C- 2, Florida Administrative Code The FRI is seeking permission to withdraw an annual average daily rate of million gallons per day (mgd) of water and 762.85 million gallons per year of ground water for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead Sand Mine. Subject to certain limiting conditions to be set forth in the FRI's consumptive use permit, the water is proposed to be produced from three Floridan aquifer wells. District proposed to grant the permit application which was challenged by LBCA, resulting in the formal administrative proceeding. LBCA challenged the issuance of the permit to FRI on the basis of the FRI's alleged failure to comply with the applicable requirements of Chapter 3V3, Florida Statutes (E.S.), and Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), and other applicable law. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 2 that a necessary component of FRI's operation is its withdrawal of approximately 2.09 mgd of ground water for the production of sand. The 2.09 mgd is the average daily usage rate to who the parties stipulated prior to the hearing. The maximum daily usage rate is 3.75 mgd. However, FRI cannot exceed 762.5 million gallons for the year which is an average of 2.09 mgd. (Prehearing Stip. pp. 1,9). In the LBCA Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 25, the LBCA states that the operation "necessitates FRI's pumping allocation of an average daily 2.09 million gallons of water from the Floridan aquifer." Additionally, LBCA acknowledges in its Exception No. 2 that it is "known that approximately 2 mgd are pumped into the system." If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 41-42, 104, 913-914). LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 8 and 28 that the receiving water from the mine site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes and that the surficial aquifer recharge will result in a positive or immeasurable effect on the lakes. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings supported by evidence and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The decision to believe one expert over another is left to the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club v. Orlando Utility Comm., 436 So.2d 383, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Berry v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This exception is rejected because the findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 105, 120-129, 146, 170, 187-190, 208-209, 235, 248, 256-257, 972-973, 1085-1093, 1139). LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 11 that the aquifer characteristics in the Floridan aquifer beneath and around the mine site are relatively uniform. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 180, 926-927). LBCA Exception Number 4 The LBCA takes exception to a mischaracterization of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 13 regarding lake leakance by stating that the hearing officer found that some of the lakes at issue do not have leakance to the Floridan aquifer. In fact, it is contextually clear that the Hearing Officer was referring to "many of the lakes within the region." This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 77-80). LBCA Exception Number 5 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 16 that very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing into the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. In making its argument, LBCA inaccurately attributes testimony to FRI witness Fountain when the referenced testimony was testimony of LBCA witness Boyes. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1145-1146). LBCA Exception Number 6 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 22 and 55 that the data collection effort of FRI and the District was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size and that sufficient site-specific information was developed to be able to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the mine operation. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The findings are supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 103, 201, 238, 918-919; FR Ex. 5). LBCA asserts that FRI did not evaluate the "worstcase" scenario in order to establish permit entitlemet LBCA provides no legal citations to support its exception. LBCA's assertion lacks legal as well as factual support. LBCA has criticized FRI's aquifer performance test and modeling effort without presenting the elusive "worstcase scenario" which presumably would show impacts greater than those modeled by FRI. LBCA seeks to impose a burden of proof which is insupportable in law. It is not FRI's burden to show a violation of the criteria in Chapter 40C-2, Fla. Admin. Code, is a scientific impossibility, only to show that the non-occurrence of such violation is reasonably assured by the preponderance of the evidence in the proceeding. The Corporation of the President v. SJRWMD and City of Cocoa, Case Nos. 89-828, 89-751 (SJRWMD Dec. 13, 1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). An agency cannot assume the worst-case scenario unless that condition is reasonably foreseeable. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe and Gulf Stream Specimen Co. v. Dickerson Bayshore, Inc., 10 F.A.L.R. 3426 (Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, June 8, 1988). As delineated in FRI's response to this exception, FRI and the Distract presented evidence of numerous investigations regarding this application, including testing and analyses of the impact of withdrawals at greater than the average and maximum daily pumping rates. (See Record citations on pp 17-20 of FRI's Response to Exceptions; T. 115-116, 126, 176-177, 918- 920). LBCA failed to present any citation to the record where it presented testimony evincing that another scenario which would result in greater impacts than those predicted by the applicant were reasonably like to occur. LBCA's speculation that another undefined scenario of pumping would show greater impacts was rejected by the hearing officer. The applicant has provided reasonable assurances with regard to the effects of the proposed withdrawal. LBCA Exception Number 7 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's purported inference in Finding of Fact 23 that the aquifer performance test (2T) measured impacts significantly greater than could be expected to occur under "worst case" conditions as a result of the mining operation. The finding actually states "the (aquifer performance) test measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 mgd." As discussed in the ruling on exception no. 6, LBCA's assertion of a "worstcase scenario" has factual support in the instant case. The applicant is required to provide reasonable assurance that the proposed use is reasonable, beneficial, will not impact existing legal uses and is consistent with the public interest. The applicant is not required to evaluate LBCA's unspecified worst case scenario or prove the use will not cause any impacts. Florida Audubon Society, supra..; Rudloe, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-115, 141, 920). LBCA Exception Number 8 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 23 that no changes in the lake levels are attributable to the pumping at the mine. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. In Finding of Fact No. 24, the hearing officer found that the effects of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before and after the ADT test. Therefore, his conclusions are not inconsistent as alleged by the LBCA. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 120-130, 146, 759, 928- 933, 942, 944- 948, 1015-1016, 1122-1123, 1168; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA Exception Number 9 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the actual effects of the pumping will be approximately one half of the observed amounts of the 2T test on an average pumping day. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 113-117, 923-996; Dist. Ex. 5). LBCA's claim that this finding is irrelevant since only a "worstcase" scenario is pertinent is likewise rejected. Initially, it is noted that LBCA cites no legal support for its arguments. Furthermore, there is no requirement in the District's rules governing consumptive use which mandates consideration of only "worstcase" scenarios. Furthermore, an agency cannot assume worst case scenarios unless they are reasonably foreseeable, which determination is a case by case factual issue. See Florida Audubon Society, supra., Rudloe, supra.. LBCA Exception Number 10 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 26 that Dr. Stewart testified that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogenous and isotropic but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 738). LBCA Exception Number 11 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 27 that the maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 129, 182). For the same reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7, the LBCA's claim regarding irrelevancy is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 12 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 28 that a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance and that the drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. The LBCA is simply rearguing their case. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 118-120, 129, 237, 706-708, 758). LBCA's irrelevancy argument is rejected for the reasons stated in the ruling on exceptions no. 9 and 7. LBCA Exception Number 13 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 42 through 54 as being conclusion of law rather than findings of fact. The LBCA does not cite to the record or make legal argument to support the exception as required by Rule 40C-1 .564, F.A.C. Without said citation or argument, the exception is rejected. Corporation of the President, supra.. The hearing officer's recitation of the individual criteria of Rules 40C-2.301 (2), (4) and (5), F.A.C., serve as introduction to and reference for the specific findings with regard to each criterion to provide clarity in the order. To the extent that expert witnesses presented testimony on the criteria and how the applicant satisfied the criteria through proof, the elements are findings or fact. These additional reasons also serve as ground for rejection of the exception. LBCA Exception Number 14 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 56 that LBCA's referenced exhibits do not correlate with normal conditions when compared with longer periods of time. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. In addition, the hearing officer ultimately did not admit the exhibits and therefore, the Finding of Fact becomes irrelevant. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930- 933, 948, 969; FR Ex. 50A, SOB). Contrary to Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C., LBCA fails to state wish particularity citations to the record or legal basis as required by Rule 40C-1.564, F.A.C., in support of its attack on finding 56 and its inferential attack on findings 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and conclusions 62 and 63. The entire exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 15 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 66 that LBCA's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83 have limited probative value to the extent it is predicated on FRI's rebuttal testimony. The LBCA argues that the rebuttal testimony is of low probative value. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn there from by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the exception is rejected. (T. 1152-1168, 411-416, 930-933, 948, 969). Exception is also taken to Findings of Fact Nos. 32, 36, and 56 and Conclusion of Law 62 because LBCA argues that the testimony on which they are based exceeded the scope of direct examination and the LBCA was not given the opportunity to object. The correct time to object was when the alleged improper testimony was elicited. The LBCA did not object to preserve the record and therefore, has waived the objection. Section 90.104(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Finally, LBCA asserts that it was denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony in violation of Section 120.57(1)(b)4., Fla. Stat. To the contrary, LBCA was not denied the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony but failed to request surrebuttal and consequently failed to preserve any denial of that request by an objection on the record. (T. 1188-1190). Since LBCA never requested surrebuttal, the hearing officer never denied that request and, therefore, LBCA's argument is without merit. Furthermore, pursuant to the order of presentation under Rule 40C- 1.5434(1), F.A.C., which is followed in a permitting proceeding (applicant, petitioner, district), LBCA's entire case tended to be in the nature of rebuttal to the applicant's case. While the hearing officer did state that he did not ordinarily allow surrebuttal (T. 1169) before the rebuttal testimony was concluded, LBCA never affirmatively requested to present surrebuttal evidence or testimony nor did LBCA proffer any such evidence or testimony. Since no proffer was made of any relevant surrebuttal testimony which LBCA contends was excluded, and no objection was made in the record to LBCA's belief that it was prohibited from adducing surrebuttal evidence, it is now precluded from complaining about this perceived adverse ruling. King v. Estate of King, 554 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Holmes v. Redland Construction Co., 557 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990); Roberts v. Hollway, 581 So.2d 619 (a. 4th DCA 1991); Diaz v. Rodriguez, 384 So.2d 906 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 16 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Findings of Fact 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63. Findings of Fact 18, 19, 21, 52 and 55 and Conclusions of Law 62 and 63 are discussed in subsequent exceptions and therefore arc not addressed in this ruling on exceptions. LBCA's exception to Finding of Fact 20 fails to state with particularity any supporting citations to the record or legal argument as required by Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C., and is therefore, rejected. LBCA takes exception to Finding of Fact 17 that the hearing officer incorrectly refers to three distinct water quality studies. In fact, the hearing officer actually refers to "numerous analyses" LBCA also objects to the reference to "unknown persons" in the finding and apparently to the statement: "They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels of certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992." Clarification that HRS personnel conducted sampling in 1989 and 1992 is provided; however, since these personnel were never specifically named, to that extent the hearing officer's reference to "unknown persons" is accurate. (T. 1035, 379). The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 102-103, 130- 133, 451, 1023-1037, 1041- 1048, 1151-1152). LBCA Exception Number 17 The LBCA takes exception to that part of the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 18 that states: "This theory was predicated on... an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond." LBCA fails to prove any supporting transcript citations in violation of Rule 40C- 1.564 (3), F.A.C. In Finding of Fact 18, the hearing officer reached the conclusion that none of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., supra.. This Board cannot judge credibility of witnesses or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 133, 575, 1024-1025). LBCA Exception Number 18 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 19 by arguing that water quality on the mine site says nothing about off site impacts and positing that the finding is predicated on certain speculation. LBCA offers no helpful record citations supporting these allegations. Expert testimony established that water quality sampling by FRI and the District of the surficial aquifer at the locations chosen was where water quality impacts would be most likely to be revealed and consequently was a conservative approach. (T. 133, 144, 1029-1030, 1061, 1073). This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 130-139, 141-144, 575-576, 1028-1031, 1061-10 65, 1073, 1136-1139). LBCA Exception Number 19 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 by stating that it misleadingly implies that 212 homes were tested for water quality by HRS. To the contrary, the hearing officer's finding states "12 out of 212 homeowners" (emphasis added) south of the mine site were tested, not 212. In addition, the exhibits referenced do not reflect the testing of 212 homes. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 167-168, 379, 990, 1036-1037, 1041, 1048-1050, 1052-1053). LBCA Exception Number 20 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 on the basis that it is a legal conclusion which misrepresents and misapplies the state water quality standards. However, LBCA cites no authority or record citation for the argument as required by Rule 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C. The finding actually states "with the exception of one well... the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese"; clearly, this is a factual statement. This exception, under the guise of an unsupported legal argument, goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence which, incidentally, includes explanation and citation to the relevant exception/standard. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that official recognition was taken of chapter 17-520, F.A.C. The exception is rejected. (T. 1034, 1041, 1077-1078; Prehearing Stip. p 12; Rules 17- 520.420(2) and 17-520.200(11), F.A.C.) LBCA Exception Number 21 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 21 that the 1989 water quality samples by HRS were unreliable because of the uncertainty regarding the sampling technique protocol. This exception erroneously states there was no evidence of sampling protocol used by HRS. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 1039-1049). LBCA Exception Number 22 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 52 that the receiving body of water will not be seriously harmed, by characterizing the finding as being predicated on an unproven theory that the surficial aquifer receives all groundwater discharged from one site. LBCA has failed to read the entire finding which clearly reveals that the hearing officer did not confine his consideration to the surficial aquifer. He found that water quality standards would not be violated in the surfical aquifer, where the highest concentrations of any potential contaminants would appear, then they would not be violated in any intermediate aquifer similarly, no violations would occur in one Floridan aquifer. The decision to believe one expert over another is the role of the hearing officer, and the decision cannot be altered absent a complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be reasonably inferred. Fla. Chapter of Sierra Club, supra.. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 105, 141-142, 1025-1030, 1034-1035). LBCA Exception Number 23 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 55 that water quality sampling was collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond. In their responses to this exception, FRI explicitly notes it has no response to this exception and District counsel concedes that although water quality samples were taken from the dredge pond and a water budget was calculated for the dredge pond, these two procedures were not linked to one another. The testimony of FRI witnesses is that water quality sampling and data to determine the water budget for the dredge pond were performed. (T. 76, 103). Counsel for FRI and the District have stipulated that the testimony does not support the finding that the water quality samples were used to evaluate the water budget. Since, as stipulated, this portion of the hearing officer's finding is not supported by any evidence in the record, the exception is accepted. LBCA Exception Number 24 The LBCA takes exception to the nearing officer's Finding of Fact 55, arguing that the applicant did not perform an environmental assessment of Lake Brooklyn, and thus cannot fairly draw any conclusions about its operation's impact on that lake. The Finding of Fact describes the site-specific information which supports the application. The pertinent part of the finding states: "FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes." To the extent Lake Brooklyn is encompassed by use of the term "area lakes", the existence of an assessment of the impacts to Lake Brooklyn is supported by expert testimony. (T. 281, 899). Additionally, the finding is otherwise supported by competent substantial evidence. (T. 266-280). The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 25 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 31 which states in pertinent part: "petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring." LBCA is essentially complaining that the entirety of Dr. Stewart's testimony should be credited not just a portion. The role of the hearing officer is to consider and weigh all the evidence, resolve conflicts and judge credibility of the witnesses. The hearing officer apparently did not view all of Dr. Stewart's testimony in the same manner as LBCA's attorney; such is his legal prerogative. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 784-786, 145- 146, 232-233, 285-286, 288-289, 897-898, 1085). LBCA Exception Number 26 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Finding of Fact 24 that the rate of decline (in Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes) during the APT test was not distinguishable from the declines which occurred before or after the test. LBCA provides no record citations to support its argument that since the hearing officer rejected its use of certain APT data in an attempted correlation between pumping and Lake Brooklyn levels, that all the APT data was entirely discredited and could have no value in an analysis regarding Spring, White Sands or Gator Bone Lakes. If a hearing officer's finding is supported by any competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred, then it cannot be disturbed. Berry, supra.. This exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. The finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the exception is rejected. (T. 941-948, 1015-1016, 1123, 1168). RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW LBCA Exception Number 1 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 62 and 63 and Findings of Fact 42 through 54 (which LBCA alleges should be conclusions of law) that FRI has established its entitlement to the permit. LBCA argues that the applicant failed to present sufficient information about conditions at Lake Brooklyn. LBCA's numerous "factual" statements in this exception are unsupported by record citations. The burden of proof in an administrative hearing falls initially upon the party asserting the affirmative of an issue, i.e. entitlement to a permit. Rules 40C-1.545 and 40C-2.301(7), F.A.C.; Capeletti Brothers v. Department of General Services, 432 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The party must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Florida Audubon Society v. South Florida Water Management District, 13 F.A.L.R. 4169 (undated). The applicant's burden is to establish reasonable assurances that the proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. Section 373.223, Fla. Stat. The burden of reasonable assurances is not one of absolute guarantees. City of Sunrise v. Indian Trace Community Dev. Dist., 14 F.A.L.R. 866 (January 16, 1992). The impacts which are reasonably expected to result from issuance of the permit must be addressed, not potential impacts or those that might occur Hoffert v. St. Joe Paper Co., 12 F.A.L.R. 4972 (December 6, 1990); Chipola Basin Protective Group Inc. v. Florida Chapter of Sierra Club, 11 F.A.L.R. 467 (Department of Environmental Regulation, December 29, 1988); Florida Keys Citizen Coalition v. 1800 Atlantic Developers, 8 F.A.L.R. 5564 (Department of Environmental Regulation, October 17, 1986). Once the party asserting the affirmative, FRI, has presented its prima facia case, the burden shifts to the LBCA to present contrary evidence. 1800 Atlantic Developers, supra.; Hoffert, supra.. LBCA cites Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Mobil Chemical Co., 481 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) in support of the exception. In Booker Creek, the Court held that additional testing, beyond that offered by the applicant, should have been done before the permit could be issued. Booker Creek was limited to its unique set of facts by the case of Berry v. Dept. of Env. Regulation, 530 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The Berry Court, in dealing with a dredge and fill permit, refused to extend the Booker Creek holding to such permits, noting that the permit under consideration in Berry, was not a pollutant discharge permit. The permit in issue here also is not a pollutant discharge permit. More importantly, like the applicant in Berry, FRI offered evidence of extensive testing and analysis regarding where water comes from and goes to at the mine site and in the surrounding vicinity. Finding of Fact No. 55. LBCA incorrectly argues that the modeling information submitted by FRI has no applicability to impacts at Lake Brooklyn, because the model "did not include Lake Brooklyn". Particularly, in view of findings of fact 23, 28, 31-36 (exceptions to which have been previously rejected), it is apparent that the hearing officer rejected LBCA's view of the "facts" stated in this exception. While the model boundary (which is based on water level data for Floridan wells in the region (T. 164)) is between Lake Brooklyn and the pumping wells at the mine, the drawdown at the model boundary is based on a distance-drawdown relationship that relates to the pumping rate at the mine. The 1991 transient model showed that within the 9 square mile boundary, the impacts at the boundary were no more than 0.1 feet. (T. 129, 178). The reduced boundaries in the 1992 model accurately predicted what was happening at the mine site. (T. 178). The distance-drawdown relationship established by the model shows that the drawdown contour ceases before the model boundary is reached and therefore, before Lake Brooklyn is reached. (FR Exs. 5, 22). Impacts to Lake Brooklyn were also assessed through the review of water levels in the Floridan aquifer well (C- 120) between 1960 and 1992. (T. 928-933). The data showed that water levels in the well at Lake Brooklyn actually continued to rise when the 1989 and 1991 pump tests were conducted. (T. 411-412, 931-933; SJRWMD Ex. 13). In addition, when the pumping wells at the mine were turned off, the water level in the well at Lake Brooklyn did not recover. This indicates that there were outside influences for the fluctuation in the well. (T. 415, 933). The data does not show impacts from the pumping at the sand mine. (T. 942). LBCA also erroneously states that groundwater in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine. (See ruling on LBCA's factual exception 5). As listed in responses to LBCA's factual exceptions, particularly those regarding exceptions 8 and 12, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the bindings regarding no adverse impact to Lake Brooklyn. The hearing officer found that the applicant met its burden or proof in Conclusion of Law 62. In Conclusion of Law 63, the hearing officer concluded that the LBCA did not meet its burden of presenting contrary evidence that the withdrawals at the sand mine correlate with the decline in water levels at Lake Brooklyn. The exception goes to the weight of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom by the hearing officer. This Board cannot reweigh conflicting evidence, judge credibility of witnesses, or otherwise interpret the evidence to reach a desired result. Heifetz, supra.; Freeze, supra.. This exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 2 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 that additional permit conditions in the case of a water shortage or a shorter permit duration are not necessary. The LBCA is reargue their case in the exception. The District has authority to require FRI to reduce its water use during a water shortage within the seven year life of the permit. Sections 373.175 and 373.246, Fla. Stat., and Rules 40C-2.381(2)(a)2. and 40C-21.271, F.A.C. Rule 40C-2.381(2)(a)2., F.A.C., which is incorporated into the permit as a limiting condition, states: Nothing in this permit should be construed to limit the authority of the St. Johns River Water Management District to declare a water shortage and issue orders pursuant to section 373.175, F.S., or to formulate a plan for implementation during periods of water shortage, pursuant to section 373.246, F.S. In the event a water shortage, is declared by the District Governing Board, the permittee must adhere to the water shortage restrictions, as specified by the District, even though the specified water shortage restrictions may be inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this permit. (emphasis added). Rule 40C-21.271, F.A.C., General Water Use Restrictions, specifies the restrictions which may be imposed during a water shortage on all water users and states, in pertinent parts: The Board may order use of general water use restrictions and the water use restrictions specified in Part VI for the appropriate water shortage phase for each affected source class. Further, the Board may order any combination in lieu of or in addition to the restrictions specified in Part VI of the restrictions described in Subsection (3), by use or method of withdrawal class, within each source class, if necessary to achieve the necessary percent reduction in overall demand. (emphasis added). General water use restrictions which may be imposed include provisions that facilitate the right of water users in an area to make voluntary agreements among themselves, with the concurrence of the Board or the Executive Director, providing for the mutual reduction, sharing, or rotation of use; restrictions on the total amount of water that may be used, diverted, impounded, extracted, or withdrawn during any day, month, or year during the declared shortage; restrictions on the timing of use, diversion, impoundment, extraction, or withdrawal of water; restrictions on pumping rates and schedules or diversion rates and schedules; or such other provisions or restrictions as are necessary to protect the water resources from serious harm. With the above cited authority, the District can require the withdrawals at the sand mine to be reduced during periods of water shortage within the seven year term of the permit by reducing the total amount withdrawn, controlling the schedule of withdrawals or "by other restrictions which arc necessary to protect the water resources." The hearing officer's conclusion is consistent with the rules and statutes which govern the Board. The exception is rejected. LBCA Exception Number 3 The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63 and Finding of Fact 47 that FRI satisfied the criteria regarding water conservation measures. See Rule 40C-2.301(4)(e), F.A.C. The LBCA reargues the facts which the hearing officer found to support the conclusion. However, the LBCA offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of FRI. In addition, the LBCA cites no authority that the hearing officer's conclusion is contrary to law. Florida Audubon Society v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 9 F.A.L.R. 565 (October 31, 1986). LBCA also renews its attack on the allocation amount, essentially iterating its factual exception which is rejected for the reasons set forth therein. It is improper for this Board to retry the case after the hearing has concluded by altering findings and reweighing evidence. Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc., 376 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). LBCA's exception lacks any record citations or legal authority in support of this exception. The conclusion and finding are supported by competent substantial, and uncontroverted, evidence and the exception is rejected. (T. 43-52, 106, 234- 237, 988-989, 1103- 1104, 1111, 1132-1133) LBCA Exception Number 3 (sic). The LBCA takes exception to the hearing officer's Conclusion of Law 63, by arguing that the use of water from the surficial aquifer requires a separate permit. Section 40C-2.051, F.A.C., states: No permit shall be required under the provisions of this rule for the following water uses: Withdrawals of ground or surface water to facilitate construction on or below ground surface ..., in the following circum- stances: ground water may be withdrawn if it is recharged on site to the aquifer from which it was withdrawn by either infiltration or direct injection; surface water may be withdrawn only from wholly owned impoundments or works which are no deeper than the lowest extent of the uppermost water bearing stratum and which have no surface hydrologic connection off site, and the surface water must be recharged on site to the uppermost water bearing stratum by either infiltration or direct injection. This exemption from permitting is applicable here, and therefore, no additional permit is required. An agency's interpretation of its rules is afforded great weight. Franklin Ambulance Service v. DHRS, 45 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). LBCA offered no auth-orty or evidence that the District's interpretation is contrary to established law. This conclusion is supported by competent substantial evidence. The exception is rejected. (T. 38-39, 105, 249, 972, 1101-1102). RULINGS ON EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONTAINED IN POST- HEARING EVIDENTIARY RULING LBCA excepts the hearing officer's rulings in Finding of Fact No. 56 and Conclusion of Law No, 66 excluding LBCA exhibits nos. 61, 64, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82 and 83 as inadmissible for failure of LBCA to comply with subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., regarding use of summaries of evidence. LBCA takes exception to FRI's objection post-hearing alleging that the exhibits had been admitted. In fact, the exhibits were not admitted at hearing. The LBCA's citation to the transcript is not the hearing officer's ruling on the exhibits. The hearing officer did not admit the ten exhibits on the record, as he did with every other exhibit that he admitted. The LBCA's assertion that it believed the exhibits were admitted is belied by LBCA's failure to list them as admitted in its Proposed Recommended Order on page 3. Therefore, LBCA's claim that FRI's continuing objection was a surprise is without merit. LBCA asserts that FRI cannot make a post-hearing objection to the exhibits in its Proposed Recommended Order and infers gnat FRI's objection to the admission of the exhibits was not preserved at hearing. Rule 40C-1.561, F.A.C., provides for the submission of legal briefs along with proposed findings of fact and conclusions or law. For matters that remain pending at the close of a hearing, a party may file a legal brief in support of its position. FRI did not object to the opinion testimony of the LBCA expert witness, only to the graphic depictions of such testimony. (T. 356). LBCA stated at hearing that the excluded exhibits were simply graphic depictions of the expert's opinion testimony. (T. 354). The record is abundantly clear that FRI preserved its objection to the exhibits and the hearing officer reserved ruling on their admission until the recommended order was issued. (T. 353, 358, 360, 363, 369, 370, 375, 377, 524, 531, 537, 1079-1080, 1178). LBCA essentially asserts that the exhibits are not "summaries" and therefore not subject to subsection 90.956, Fla. Stat., which, of course, the fact-finder found otherwise. LBCA's reliance on Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) is misplaced. Marks did not hold that expert testimony is not subject to subsection 90.956, but only that an expert is not required to utilize subsection 90.956 when presenting underlying data relied on for his opinion. The hearing officer found that the hydrographs were summaries and the underlying information was not indicated on the summary. The hearing officer allowed FRI time to review the data and present rebuttal. The fact-finder is entitled to great latitude in admitting or excluding summary evidence. Wright v. Southwest Bank, 554 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1977)(trial court without jury is entitled to great latitude covering the admission or exclusion of summary evidence). LBCA has failed to show that the hearing officer abused this discretion in excluding the exhibits. LBCA also takes exception that LBCA was denied rebuttal, or surrebuttal, on FRI's rebuttal case. As discussed in the ruling on LBCA's Exception 15, LBCA failed to request rebuttal of FRI's case. The hearing officer allowed cross-examination and LBCA did not offer any additional evidence from LBCA witnesses. Since the LBCA never requested to offer rebuttal testimony, then the hearing officer could not and did not deny that request. It is well-settled that an objection must be preserved during an administrative proceeding or it will be deemed waived. DeMendoza v. First Federal Savings and Loan, 585 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(even if mistake was made in trial, party's waived its right to appeal the issue since it failed to call the deficiency to the court's attention during trial); Yachting Arcade, Inc. v. Riverwalk Condominium Assoc., 500 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(party's failure to object to matters at administrative hearing made those matters unreviewable, even though party claimed fundamental procedural errors, it failed to show how it was prejudiced by any such action or omission; National Dairy Products, Corp. v. Odham, 121 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1959). Therefore, LBCA's exception based on the denial of rebuttal is rejected. LBCA argues that-the proper vehicle for the objection was a motion for rehearing. LBCA does not cite authority for its assertion. Since the hearing officer never ruled on the admissibility, there was no order on which to base a motion for rehearing. Nevertheless, the alleged error, if any, of excluding the exhibits, was harmless. Sims v. Brown, 574 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1991)(exclusion of manual was harmless since experts testified to the same matters in the manual); Little v. Banker's National Life Insurance Co., 369 So.2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(harmless error to exclude letter since witnesses otherwise testified at length as to its contents and conclusions). The LBCA expert testified extensively regarding the basis of each excluded exhibit and the information it depicts in relation to the conclusions of his expert opinion which the hearing officer weighed in rendering his factual findings and conclusions. (T. 346, 349, 351, 352, 358, 359, 364, 366, 371, 373, 411, 456, 457, 458, 481, 486, 501, 504, 507, 509, 511, 512, 516, 517, 518, 519, 542). The hearing officer concluded that even if the exhibits had been admitted it would not have altered his factual findings stating that they had limited probative value. (Conclusion of Law No. 66). Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON RECOMMENDED ORDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 120.59(2), FLA. STAT. LBCA asserts that the hearing officer failed to comply with subsection 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., by not providing a sufficiently explicit ruling on each of the parties' proposed findings of fact. Section 120,59(2), Fla. Stat., requires "a ruling upon each proposed finding" The Appendix to the Recommended Order does not contain an omnibus "blanket" ruling on all of LBCA's proposed findings which the courts have found inadequate. Cf. Island Harbor beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Health Care Management, Inc. v. DHRS, 479 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Appendix clearly contains a ruling upon each of LBCA's proposed findings. Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., requires no more. LBCA relies on Island Harbor Beach Club v. DNR, 476 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), to support this argument. Island Harbor Beach Club, differs significantly from this case. The order Island Harbor Beach Club did not individually address each specific proposed finding as the Recommended Order in this case does. The only reference to proposed findings made in the Island Harbor Beacon Club order was a single paragraph which stated: The parties proposed findings of fact have been considered and where unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, cumulative, or subordinate. This differs from the Recommended Order in the instant case which specifically addresses each proposed finding and specifies where (by paragraph) in the Recommended Order that proposed finding is addressed. It is elementary to then read the paragraph referred to in the Recommended Order to determine what portion of the proposed finding was accepted. More applicable to this case is the case of Schomer v. Department of Professional Regulation, 417 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The order in Schomer did not contain specific rulings on each proposed finding submitted by the Appellant. The substance of the final order, however, demonstrated that each finding had been considered and ruled on. The Court noted that, for purposes of complying with Section 120.59(2) Fla. Stat., It would not elevate form over substance." An agency need not Independently quote verbatim each proposed finding and independently dispose of that proposed finding; rather, it is sufficient that the agency provide in its decision a written foundation upon which the reviewing court may assure that all proposed findings of fact have been consider and ruled upon and not overlooked or concealed. Id. at 1090. The Court held that it could discern from the substance of the order that each of the proposed findings were addressed, and to the extent the technical requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., were departed from, the departure did not materially impair the fairness or correctness of the proceedings. Id. at 1091. LBCA merely has to compare the hearing officer's findings with its proposed findings to discern those portions accepted. Therefore, the exception is rejected. RULING ON MOTION FOR REMAND Pursuant, to Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., LBCA has filed a Motion for Remand asserting that newly discovered evidence establishes that a finding by the hearing officer is inaccurate because of allegedly false testimony by District expert witness, Dr. Larry Lee. The hearing officer found that Lake Brooklyn had been in a period of decline before and after the 1989 aquifer pump test and that due to rainfall deficits Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least 18 to 24 months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The hearing officer determined that the rate and character of declines during the pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before and after the test. Thus, he found that impacts to Lake Brooklyn water levels from the pumping were indistinguishable from the declines due to drought. (Finding of Fact No. 30). LBCA asserts that a newly discovered Department of Transportation (D.O.T.) survey, dated October 11, 1988, shows that Brooklyn Bay was not segregated from the remainder of the lake due to drought conditions prior to the 1989 aquifer pump test as testified by Dr. Lee and seeks the Board to remand the issue to the hearing officer for consideration of this new evidence. The only reasons for remand regarding fact finding are if an erroneous legal conclusion by a hearing officer warrants taking of evidence on the issue, or if a factual issue was never ruled upon by the hearing officer. See Miller v. Dept. Envt'l Reg., 5504 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(agency's modification of legal conclusions necessitated factual findings on issue which hearing officer had initially disregarded as irrelevant) and Cohn v. Dept. of Prof. Reg., 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(when the hearing officer fails to find a specific fact, agency must remand to the hearing officer to do so). Clearly, neither of these reasons have any application to Petitioner's arguments. Although subsection 40C-1.512, F.A.C., provides that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to District administrative proceedings to the extent not inconsistent with Chapter 120 or Chapter 40C-1, the applicability of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is problematic and inconsistent with a subsection 120.57 proceeding. First, the civil procedure rule only applies to final judgments and in this subsection 120.57 administrative proceeding LBCA is attempting to apply the civil procedure rule to a nonfinal recommended order. Second, LBCA has not expressly excepted Finding of Fact No. 30 as not supported by competent substantial evidence or that a Board rule or policy has been incorrectly interpreted /1 , but actually seeks the Board to allow LBCA to supplement the record after remand with new facts for the hearing officer to weigh in applying those facts to the applicable District rules. Thus, unlike a trial court, Finding of Fact No. 30 cannot be altered by this Board if supported by any competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); School Board of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The Board may only consider whether the findings actually made by the hearing officer are sustained by the evidence, and whether, if so, they support the recommended legal conclusions. Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Unlike a judge with plenary and equitable powers in a judicial setting, this Board, under Chapter 120, cannot authorize fact- finding after a hearing's conclusion except in the most narrow circumstances, none of which are applicable to the motion before the Board. Cf. Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous legal interpretation); Cohn, supra.. (may remand if a necessary factual issue was not determined by the hearing officer); Friends of Children v. DHRS, 504 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(may remand if hearing officer makes erroneous evidentiary ruling). In effect, LBCA wants to utilize a civil procedure rule for the Board to authorize additional fact-finding on a matter already considered by the hearing officer regarding a finding supported by competent substantial evidence. Section 120.57, Fla. Stat., simply does not authorize the Board to take such action. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. Stat.; Dept. of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)(chapter 120 does not allow additional or cumulative evidence on matters already considered and the APA does not envision a never-ending process). Consequently, the application of Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is inconsistent with Chapter 120 and LBCA is free to raise any alleged error at hearing on appeal of the final order. Even assuming Rule 1.540(b), Fla. R. Civ. P., is applicable to this subsection 120.57 proceeding, LBCA has failed to clearly establish the extraordinary circumstances warranting the granting of its motion. The material issue of whether FRI's proposed pumping would impact the area lake levels already effected by a rainfall deficit was expressly raised by LBCA in its initial petition for hearing as far back as August 1992 and was also an issue stipulated in the Prehearing Stipulation prior to the February 1993 hearing. (Petition for Administrative Hearing paragraph f. 2, 3, 4.; Prehearing Stip. paragraphs B. 2, G. 1). Consequently, LBCA had over five months prior to hearing to elicit all relevant evidence to that Issue. If Rule 1.540(b) was applicable, LBCA's burden would be to clearly establish the following to receive relief: (1) it must appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the-result if a new trial is granted; (2) that it has been discovered since the trial; (3) that it could not have been discovered before one trial by the exercise of due diligence; and (4) that it is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching. City of Winter Haven v. Tuttle/White Construction Inc., 370 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); King v. Harrington, 411 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev denied, 418 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1982). The predicate for LBCA's motion is that Dr. Lee's testimony regarding the lake separation was false, therefore LBCA could not have exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged new evidence. LBCA has filed no express exception with record support establishing that Finding of Fact No. 30 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the Board by law cannot alter that factual finding. Section 40C-1.564(3), F.A.C.; Section 120.37(1)(b)10., Fla. Stat.; Freeze, supra.. Consequently, Dr. Lee's testimony is not false. Importantly, Dr. Lee's testimony was not the only evidence supporting this finding. LBCA's own witness, the president of the association, testified that Brooklyn Bay had been segregated for four or five years from the main part of the lake and that he had been able to walk across the lake without getting wet for the last four or five years. (T. 863, 870). Likewise, LBCA's own expert stated that Lake Brooklyn's condition between 1989 to 1991 had receded to such an extent as it was no longer a continuous lake. (T. 317). Accordingly, the predicate for LBCA's motion is factually inaccurate and misplaced. Furthermore, LBCA must clearly establish that even though the exercise of due diligence before the hearing, it would not have discovered the 1988 D.O.T. survey. Brav v. Electric Door-Lift Inc., 558 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(movant's burden to establish due diligence); Plisco v. Union Railroad Co., 379 F.2d 15 (3d DCA 1967)(motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence is granted only where extraordinary circumstances are present). Even though the effects of FRI's proposed pumping on lake levels in time of rainfall deficit was an issue dating back to August 1992, LBCA asserts that it could not have obtained the survey prior to hearing in February 1993 "because of the logistics of requesting public records and the delay in delivery of same." LBCA could have reasonably anticipated that witnesses would testify regarding the disputed issue, particularly its own witnesses, and obtained the survey with the exercise of due diligence. LBCA offers no basis why D.O.T. would not have supplied the survey as required by law or that LBCA could not obtain it and, in fact, the public records law contains a provision for obtaining immediate relief if a request for records is denied. See subsection 119.11, Fla. Stat. In Florida Audubon Society v. Ratner, 497 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), a 1981 judgment had been entered finding that limestone mining would be inconsistent with the water management purposes of a water management district's flowage easement on platiff's property. Plaintiff sought a new trial because of newly discovered opposing evidence in a 1980 Corps of Engineers report on the effects of limestone mining. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court agreed finding that the granting of such motions was disfavored and that the report was prepared in September 1980 well before the trial and judgment in June 1981 and could have been discovered prior to the with the exercise of due diligence. Likewise in this proceeding, the proffered D.O.T. survey was prepared in October 1988, nearly four and one-half years before the February 1993 hearing and LBCA has failed to show that due diligence would not have discovered the survey prior to the administrative hearing in this proceeding. See also, Morhaim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 559 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(no new trial granted based on post-judgment affidavits regarding evidence on known issue that could have been discovered prior to trial). LBCA also asserts that Dr. Lee misrepresented the contents of Clark's "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida" regarding its conclusions and his opinion concerning the separation of Brooklyn Bay from Lake Brooklyn and thus prejudiced LBCA's case. LBCA argument is an attack on the weight of the conflicting evidence which is the job of the hearing officer to resolve. An expert witness is not required to disclose the facts and data underlying his opinion. Marks v. Marks, 576 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). LBCA could have cross examined Dr. Lee regarding the separation. LBCA was aware of the "Clark Report" (T. 844) and even anticipated testimony regarding water levels in its case in chief (T. 846). Indeed, the report was listed by LBCA as its Exhibit 13 in the Prehearing Stipulation, although LBCA chose not to introduce it into evidence during the hearing. Dr. Lee testified not once but twice about the location of the staff gauge (T. 946 and 962-966). On cross, LBCA did not inquire about the location of the staff gauge or the lack of water beneath the bridge. (T. 991-1017). It was LBCA's burden to challenge the factual basis for Dr. Lee's opinion. City of Hialeah v. Weatherford, 466 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). An insufficiency in the expert opinion offered, if any, should have been addressed in cross-examination by LBCA, not by a post-hearing motion. LBCA alleges that the outcome would be different if the DOT survey were part of the evidence. The Board cannot accept new evidence or rule on the admissibility of evidence which was not presented to the hearing officer. The Finding of Fact to which LBCA refers states six reasons why the correlation between the pumping at the sand mine and its effects on Lake Brooklyn water level were not established. See Recommended Order, Finding of Fact 32. The location of the staff gauge in Brooklyn Bay rather than Lake Brooklyn was one of those six. LBCA's error was in not knowing the location of the staff gauge (T. 418-420) rather than the testimony of Dr. Lee. Therefore, LBCA's allegation that but for the testimony of Dr. Lee, the hearing officer would have found differently is unfounded. The mere chance that the hearing officer might have found differently is insufficient to remand the hearing for additional fact finding. Cluett v. Dep't of Professional Regulation, 530 So.2d 351, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The courts look with disfavor on motions based on newly discovered evidence because to look with favor would bring about a looseness in practice and encourage counsel to neglect to gather all available evidence for a first trial by speculating upon the outcome, and then, being defeated, become for the first time duly diligent in securing other evidence to cure the defects or omissions in their showing upon the first trial. Rushing v. Chappell, 247 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Henderson Sians v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 397 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). It is well-settled that no abuse of discretion occurs on the part of an agency by refusing to direct a remand to receive evidence which could have been introduced during the course of the original proceedings. Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) LBCA has failed to clearly establish a right to relief and therefore the motion is denied. RULING ON MOTION FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD LBCA has filed a Motion for Official Recognition and to Supplement the Record seeking the Board to accept into evidence the October 11, 1988 D.O.T. survey which was the subject of LBCA's Motion for Remand and also the U.S.G.S. publication "Report of Investigations No. 33-Hydrology of Brooklyn Lake Near Keystone Heights, Florida", by Clark, also referenced In LBCA's Motion for Remand. The Board is not a fact-finder in this subsection 120.57 proceeding and it is reversible error for the Board to supplement the record through post-hearing evidence. Section 120.57(1)(b)10, Fla. stat., Marks v. Northwest Florida Water Management District, 566 So.2d 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)(court refused to take judicial notice of factual matter based on records that could have been offered at administrative hearing); Nest v. Dept. of Professional Regulation 490 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Shongut v Mark, 173 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)(Where matters raised on motion for relief from judgment could have been available to movant during trial proceedings, denial of motion was not abuse of discretion); Weaver, supra.. Moreover, the Motion for Remand has been denied. LBCA's post- hearing motions will be available as part of the record of this proceeding for purposes of any appeal which may be pursued. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: The Recommended Order dated June 4, 1993, attached hereto as Exhibit A, is adopted in its entirety except as modified by the final action of the Governing Board of the St. Johns River Water Management District (Ruling on LBCA Exception 23). Florida Rock Industries' application for consumptive use permit no. 2-019-0012AUR is hereby granted under the terms and conditions as provided herein. The post-hearing Motion for Remand, Motion for Official Recognition and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by LBCA are hereby denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of July 1993, in Palatka, Florida. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT By: JOE E. HILL CHAIRMAN RENDERED this 14th day of July 1993. By: SANDRA L. BERTRAM ASSISTANT DISTRICT CLERK
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Florida Rock Industries (FRI or applicant), a Florida corporation, operates a nine hundred and eighty acre sand mine known as the Goldhead Sand Mine (Goldhead) in Clay County, Florida. The mine is located approximately six miles northeast of Keystone Heights and fifty miles southwest of Jacksonville. FRI has operated the mine since 1958. With the exception of eighty acres of land owned by FRI, the remainder of the land on which the mine is located is owned by Carroll-Phillips Investors and has been leased to FRI since 1973. The mine lies within the jurisdictional boundaries of respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (District), a special taxing district created by the legislature and charged with the responsibility for administering and enforcing permitting programs for consumptive uses of water. FRI is accordingly subject to the District's regulatory authority. As a necessary component of its operation, FRI withdraws approximately 2.09 million gallons per day (MGD) of groundwater from the Floridan Aquifer which is used in the production of sand. This use of water is made pursuant to a consumptive use permit (no. 2-019-0012U) issued to FRI by the District on December 11, 1984, and which allows it to consume 762.85 million gallons per year of groundwater for hydraulic dredging, cleaning and purification of sand at the Goldhead mine. The permit was issued for seven years. In order to continue groundwater withdrawal and use, FRI has applied to the District for a seven-year renewal of its permit with no request for an increase in allocation. That request, which has been identified as application no. 2-019-0012AUR, is the subject of this proceeding. After conducting a review of the application, making site inspections, and performing various studies and analyses, on July 28, 1992, the District, through its staff, gave notice of its intent to approve the application with certain conditions. Thereafter, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, Lake Brooklyn Civic Association, Inc. (petitioner), a nonprofit corporation made up of property owners in adjacent areas of Clay County, filed a petition under Subsection 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, seeking to contest the proposed action. Petitioner is a citizen of the state and has an interest in activities that may injure or harm the state's water resources. Thus, it has standing to bring this action. As twice amended, the petition generally alleged that the consumptive use would (a) cause an unmitigated adverse impact on adjacent land uses, including a significant reduction in water levels in Lake Brooklyn and Spring, Gator Bone, and White Sands Lake, which lie generally to the south and southwest of the mine site, (b) cause a deterioration in water quality, (c) cause economic or environmental harm, and (d) be for purposes other than operating a sand mine. The broad three-pronged test to be used in determining whether the permit should be issued is whether the proposed consumptive use is a reasonable- beneficial use, whether it will interfere with presently existing legal uses of water, and whether it is consistent with the public interest. In addressing this test, the parties have presented extensive expert testimony involving highly technical subject matter. As might be expected, the experts reached different conclusions as to whether the criteria have been met. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence, and this accepted testimony is recited in the findings below. The Mining Site Operations The entire mine site is around 7,000 feet east to west, about one mile north to south in a rectangular shape, and lies within the lake region of northeast Florida. The mine's product is silica sand used for concrete and masonry mortar for construction throughout northeast Florida. As such, it produces an economic benefit to the region. The mine is located on one of the few sites in the northeast Florida area with deposits suitable for construction purposes and is the closest sand mine to the Jacksonville market. In 1958, FRI installed three ten-inch diameter production wells in the center of the mine site. One well is 450 feet deep while the other two are 460 feet deep. The 1984 permit authorizes withdrawals of 762.85 million gallons of water per year, an average rate of 2.09 MGD, and a maximum rate of 3.75 MGD. This rate is consistent with the amount of water used at other mines in north Florida and is based on FRI's projected maximum annual use. The use is industrial commercial for sand mining while the source is the Floridan Aquifer, the lowest acceptable water quality source available capable of producing the requested amount of water. Water use withdrawal from the three wells is monitored by in-line flow meters installed in 1991 as a water control and conservation measure. The pumping rate depends on the number of fixtures and valves open in the system at the time of pumping. However, the actual rate of water production cannot be varied at any of the pumps since the wells are connected to "on or off" pumps. The need for water in the dredge pond and processing plant dictates how long FRI will have a pump in operation. Water from the wells is first discharged into a dredge pond, twenty feet deep, which is an approximately 155-acre excavation lake located in the southwest portion of the mine site. In periods of low water, the water is used to float the dredge, which requires some three feet of water to float, and in conjunction with a bulldozer, to wash sand down from the bank toward the dredge. After the dredge sucks up sand and water from the bottom of the pond, this mixture is slurried to an on-site processing plant where more water is added to sort and wash the sand. The end product (silica sand) is then loaded onto trucks which haul the product to the market. After processing, the moisture content of the sand product is only 5 percent. The tailings (unusable waste product) and wash water are then routed by a slurry pipe to settling areas and eventually recirculated through a system of ditches, canals and water control structures back into the dredge pond. No chemicals are used in the operation. Although FRI's contract with the lessor of the property requires it to maintain the dredge pond elevation at a specified elevation, this requirement cannot be fulfilled during drought conditions. The mining operation is a closed system to the extent there is no point source (surface water) discharge from the system. Even so, a significant amount of water loss occurs during the process, mainly through percolation into the ground. Other water loss occurs through evaporation. The receiving water from the site is primarily the surficial aquifer which recharges the downgradient lakes, including Gator Bone, White Sands, and Spring Lakes. Water may also travel through the surficial aquifer into the sinkholes on site and thence to the Floridan Aquifer. However, not all water is lost to sinkholes in the settling area because they are filled with fine materials. This is confirmed by the fact that water returns to the dredge pond. The mining operation has not affected this pattern. The lakes in the region are replenished solely by rainfall, either by direct rain on the lakes or through water seeping through sands. FRI plans to mine approximately thirty additional acres at the Goldhead Site during the next seven years. To this end, it has secured a management and storage of surface waters permit from the District which allows construction of this additional acreage. It also has acquired an industrial waste water discharge permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation. It is expected that within the next two to four years, FRI will abandon the current dredge pond and start a new one on the north side of the property to accommodate mining operations, or in the alternative, extend the current pond to the north. Water conservation A water conservation plan has been submitted by FRI. Measures already implemented include (a) using in-line flow meters to monitor amounts of withdrawal, (b) not pumping for more than seventeen hours per day to prevent exceeding the maximum allotment per day, (c) regularly monitoring withdrawals to ensure allocations as not being exceeded, (d) extending the plant discharge further past the sinkholes in the settling area to maximize return water to the dredge pond, (e) raising water levels in the settling area to facilitate flow back to the dredge pond, (f) during periods of drought using bulldozers instead of water spray to break loose sand formations, (g) curtailing production when further production would cause the plant to exceed allocations, (h) replacing water-cooled bearings in plant machinery with bearings that do not require water, and (i) restricting dredge mobility to allow operation in shallower water. No other water conservation measures are economically, environmentally or technologically feasible. Hydrogeologic characteristics at the mine site The mine site, which is located within the Upper Etonia Creek surface water drainage basin, generally slopes from 200 feet NGVD on the north to 120 feet NGVD on the south, and is underlain, in order, by approximately 10 to 50 feet of sand (known as the surficial aquifer), 200 feet of dense, moist clay (known as the Hawthorn Formation), and then a highly transmissive limestone formation (known as the Floridan Aquifer). The surficial aquifer flows from north to south across the site while water falling on the site primarily moves downgradient through the surficial aquifer. There are five sinkholes on the site, all having predated the mining activities, which may provide a conduit for recharge from the surficial aquifer to the Floridan aquifer. Except where the Hawthorn formation, a confining unit to the Floridan aquifer, is breached, recharge through the Hawthorn formation is very slow because of the dense clays of that formation. Aquifer characteristics within the Floridan aquifer beneath the site and immediately adjacent thereto are relatively uniform. As noted earlier, 5 percent of the water leaves the mine site as moisture in the sand product. The remaining 95 percent of water is immediately recharged on site to the surficial aquifer through various impoundments, and after entering the surficial aquifer, that portion of the water which is not recirculated to the dredge pond for reuse in the mining process moves either vertically into the Hawthorn formation, vertically into the Floridan aquifer through a sinkhole, downgradient through the surficial aquifer to one of the lakes south of the mine, or evaporates. It is noted that notwithstanding the mining operations, the flow in the surficial aquifer system still parallels the topography as it existed prior to mining, and the same saturated thickness within the surficial aquifer exists on site as existed before mining occurred. Hydrogeologic Characteristics of the Region The region in which the mine is located is very high in topographic altitude indicating that it is a groundwater recharge area. Like the mine site, the region has three distinct geologic units underlying the surface, including sands and clayey sands (surficial aquifer), thick clays (Hawthorn formation) and limestones and dolomites (Floridan aquifer). The Hawthorn unit serves as a confining unit or semi-confining unit between the surficial aquifer, or water table, in the upper unit and the Floridan aquifer in the lower unit. When solution channels develop within the limestones in the lower unit, the openings can cause the overlying units to collapse, forming sinkholes. Thus, when the Hawthorn formation is breached by the development of a sinkhole, water can move rapidly through the overlying units to the Floridan aquifer. Many of the lakes within the region exist over collapsed features within the limestone units beneath them and are referred to as sinkhole lakes. The rate of recharge from each lake depends on the rate of leakance into the Floridan aquifer. Some lakes leak fast, others not at all. For example, Lake Brooklyn fluctuates about two feet, Lake Johnson about thirteen feet, and Pebble Lake about thirty feet. Lake Brooklyn, which lies several miles to the southwest of the mine, is the fourth lake in a chain of lakes consisting of Blue Pond, Sand Hill Lake, Lake Magnolia, Lake Brooklyn, Keystone Lake, Lake Geneva, Oldfield Pond, and Half Moon Lake. All of these lakes are in a different surface water drainage sub-basin within the larger Upper Etonia Creek Basin than the mine site. The lakes above Lake Brooklyn in the chain are at higher elevations than Lake Brooklyn, and when rainfall is sufficient, water flows from Blue Pond to Sand Hill Lake, to Lake Magnolia, and then to Lake Brooklyn through Alligator Creek. Direct rainfall and surface water inflows from Alligator Creek represent the most significant sources of water to Lake Brooklyn. Other pertinent lakes in the area are Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes, which lie almost directly along the mine site's southern boundary and are each less than a mile from the mine's dredge pond. During the period records have been maintained for water levels in Lake Brooklyn, it has fluctuated over a range of slightly more than twenty feet. Although average rainfall within the Upper Etonia Creek Basin is approximately fifty-one inches per year, during the period from 1974 through 1990 the basin experienced a continuing period of below normal rainfall resulting in a cumulative deficit of rainfall for this period of minus seventy-eight inches. Since 1988, the lake region has experienced a severe drought. Because the lakes in the region have risen or fallen in correlation with periods of below normal or above normal rainfall, lake levels have fallen dramatically in recent years. Water levels in Lake Brooklyn began declining in 1974 at the same time the period of below normal rainfall began and continued declining until 1991, a year in which the region experienced above normal rainfall. These low water levels were exacerbated by the cessation of surface water inflows from Alligator Creek in late 1988 which continued until late 1992 when such flows resumed. The cessation of surface water flows into Lake Brooklyn during the period from 1988- 1992 were a direct consequence of the extended period of below normal rainfall in the region. Finally, very little, if any, of the groundwater flowing in the Floridan aquifer beneath Lake Brooklyn flows toward the mine site. Water Quality Impacts Numerous analyses have been conducted to determine water quality of the site, water quality in nearby homeowners' water systems, and water quality impacts of the proposed consumptive use. They include analyses conducted by the District in 1989 and 1992, including sampling of water quality and an analysis of the background levels for certain parameters, and an assessment of data from HRS testing in March 1989 and May 1992. In addition, FRI conducted water quality sampling on site in eight wells, the dredge pond and a settling pond. Finally, petitioner reviewed water quality samples from off-site private water supply wells taken on March 1, 1989, and on July 22, 1992, by unknown persons. As to this latter sampling, petitioner had no knowledge of the protocol used in obtaining the 1989 samples and offered no evidence of reliability of the 1992 data. Thus, the reliability of its assessment is in doubt. None of the water quality samples taken from the mine site indicate a violation of state water quality standards. However, petitioner posits that a chemical reaction is likely occurring at the deeper levels of the dredge pond, possibly causing undissolved iron in sediments to become dissolved, and then traveling in solution through the clays of the Hawthorn formation into transmissive units and finally to off-site homeowners' wells which may be in those units. This theory was predicated on the results of 1989 HRS sampling which revealed some wells near White Sands Lake experienced elevated levels of iron and manganese, and an assumption that a chemical reaction was occurring because herbicides were used in the dredge pond. However, only one application of a herbicide occurred, and that was in 1990, or one year after iron was detected in the off-site homeowners' wells. Petitioner agreed that the 1990 application of herbicide could not have affected the 1989 sampling. It also agreed that these reactions were less likely to be occurring in a pond with water flowing through it. In this case, water is circulated through the dredge pond by being pumped into it, pumped out of it, and allowed to flow back into the pond. FRI determined that no state water quality standards were exceeded for iron, manganese, zinc, turbidity, total dissolved solids, chloride and nitrate in the surficial aquifer and Hawthorn formations at the site. The wells used for monitoring water quality were installed and sampled using standard quality assurance techniques. Water quality from the surficial aquifer was emphasized because if iron or manganese were present in the water, it would most likely be detected in wells in the surficial aquifer because they are detected in wells immediately downgradient of the source. If the chemical reaction is occurring, water leaving the dredge pond is contaminated, and such water will follow the path of least resistance by going either to the Hawthorn formation or the surficial aquifer. Because of the geologic properties of the Hawthorn, this path is the surficial aquifer. At least 70,000 gallons per day enter the surficial aquifer from the bottom of the dredge pond. Since contaminated water would receive water quality treatment by absorption of the Hawthorn but not in the surficial, water in the surficial aquifer represents the worst case scenario as to the possible presence of contaminated water. The chemical reactions which petitioner believes may be occurring in the deeper portions of the dredge pond require the presence of an acidic environment and reduced oxygen levels in the water. FRI's water quality testing indicates that water in the dredge pond is not acidic, but rather is neutral. Therefore, any reaction which might be occurring could not be on a large enough scale to affect water quality. Moreover, even if the reactions were occurring, it was established that the clays in the Hawthorn formation would absorb iron, and such absorption would not take place in the surficial aquifer. Therefore, it is found that there would be no adverse impact to groundwater including the surficial aquifer and that water quality standards will be met. Although petitioner presented evidence that in 1989 HRS testing of 12 out of 212 homeowners south of the mine site indicated that three homeowners had iron concentrations in excess of state drinking standards and two had manganese concentrations in excess of state drinking water standards, this is insufficient to prove that the mining operation has an adverse impact on water quality. To begin with, some of the wells sampled were thirty to fifty years old even though the life expectancy of a well is fifteen to twenty years. Some were constructed of galvanized steel pipe, and those wells also indicated high turbidity levels. High turbidity levels are caused by a number of unrelated factors and will result in increased iron levels that are not representative of the quality of the groundwater in the formation, but rather of the iron-laden sediments in the formation, or from the casing material. With the exception of one well (the Sutton well), the water from the homeowners' wells did not exceed background water quality for iron and manganese. The elevated iron and manganese concentrations in the Sutton well are caused by a number of factors other than the mine. Then, too, a proper sampling technique may not have been followed during the 1989 sampling event thus rendering the results unreliable. Finally, properly constructed monitoring wells should be used to assess the quality of the groundwaters, and the wells sampled in 1989 and 1992 were not of that type. The Mine's Impact on Water Levels Perhaps the issue of primary concern to members of petitioner's organization is whether the mining operations have contributed to the decline in water levels of nearby lakes, including Lake Brooklyn. This is because of serious declines in the levels of those water bodies over the past years, and a concomitant decrease in the value of homes which surround the lakes. In an effort to resolve this and other water level issues, the parties made numerous studies of the current and anticipated water level impacts from the site. This data collection effort was far more extensive than is normally conducted for a mine of this size. They included aquifer performance tests by FRI and the District, steady state and transient computer modeling of impacts on the Floridan and surficial aquifers by FRI, an analysis of correlations of pumping and water level changes in lakes and aquifers by FRI and petitioner, photolinear and fracture trace analyses of structural conditions by FRI and petitioner, a stratigraphic analysis of a geologic core retrieved from the site by FRI, installation of deep and shallow wells for groundwater monitoring by FRI, groundwater flow mapping by FRI, review of literature by all parties, review and analysis of rainfall data by all parties, analysis of evaporation data by the District and petitioner, and an analysis of geophysical logs from wells by FRI and the District. Aquifer performance tests Aquifer performance tests, which enable hydrologists to reach conclusions regarding the characteristics of the aquifers tested, were conducted in January 1989 by the District and June 1991 by FRI. In a typical pump test, an aquifer production well pumps at a constant rate, while water levels are monitored in observation wells at specified distances from the pumping well. In this case, the tests measured effects of pumping from the mine production wells for periods ranging from 78 hours to 108 hours at approximately twice the average rate of 2.09 MGD. The zone of influence of pumping was measured at wells placed at the property boundaries, at Gold Head State Park, east of the mine, as well as wells to the south of the mine for the 1989 tests. During the 1989 tests, lake levels for Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes were recorded. The effects of pumping were approximately equal for wells spaced approximately equal distances along the east, south and west. Thus, for purposes of analysis, the Floridan aquifer was considered isotropic and homogeneous. This is consistent with assumptions commonly made by geologists in Florida. Computer models were calibrated with actual results of these tests to account for variations caused by this assumption. The District has concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that no changes in the levels of the lakes are attributable to pumping. Further, the aquifer itself will not be harmed by the use of the amount of water requested in the application. The tests indicate the maximum amount of drawdown in the Floridan aquifer from pumping at twice the average rate is 0.1 to 0.6 foot in neighboring wells. Effects of actual pumping will be approximately one-half the test observed amounts on an average pumping day. For example, based on the 1989 test results, drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer at the boundary of the FRI property during an average day of pumpage should not exceed 0.2 to 0.3 feet while drawdowns beneath Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes to the south of the mine should be less than 0.2 feet. The tests provide actual measurements of the effects of pumping. Indeed, all three lakes were declining before the 1989 test began and continued to decline after the test was ended. However, the rate of decline during the seventy-eight hours of the test was not distinguishable from declines which occurred before or after the test. Computer modeling As a supplement to the aquifer performance tests, FRI performed computer modeling to determine effects of the water withdrawal and use on the Floridan and surficial aquifers. These models are used by hydrologists to predict impacts associated with a particular source of stress, such as pumpage, to an aquifer and, in this case, occurred in three phases. The first was an impact model which determined the drawdown in the Floridan aquifer. The second occurred as a result of questions raised by residents of the sand mine area and included a "steady state" model simulation of impacts of the Floridan and surficial aquifers. The third occurred as a result of questions raised by petitioner and included new data along with both a "transient state" and "steady state" simulation. All three phases of modeling were consistent in finding that the effects of pumping are non-existent or negligible, that is, a predicted drawdown in various locations of the Floridan aquifer of from less than 0.1 to 0.3 feet on an average pumping day, and they corroborated the drawdowns observed during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests. Petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart criticized FRI's 1992 "steady state" computer modeling on the grounds FRI had insufficient data to conduct the modeling, the constant head boundaries were set too close to the pumping, a transient model should have been run, and the modelers assumed that the Floridan aquifer is isotropic and homogeneous. However, Dr. Stewart failed to review or consider (a) any technical data or information gathered since September 10, 1992, (b) the 1991 transient model, (c) the December 1992 transient model, (d) the computer disc for the July 1992 steady state model, (e) the December 1992 steady state model, (f) the December 1992 calibration, (g) the basis for setting the constant head boundaries, or (h) the data from the 1989 and 1991 pump tests. All of this data was part of the evidence FRI's experts used in formulating their opinions. Dr. Stewart agreed that he could not form any conclusions on this data and that the Floridan aquifer is rarely completely homogeneous and isotropic, but that he and other modelers regularly make that assumption. The modeling was calibrated to replicate actual subsurface and pumping conditions. Maximum drawdown in the Floridan aquifer under normal pumping conditions is modeled to be 0.1 to 0.2 feet beneath White Sands Lake. This is drawdown with no replacement, although there will be leakance back to the Floridan aquifer through sinkholes on the site and surcharge to Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes through the surficial aquifer. The impact to the Floridan is minor compared to normal water level fluctuations in that aquifer of 3 to 5 feet per year. In fact, barometric pressure changes can cause water level changes of up to one foot per week. Lake levels Because many of the lakes in the area leak downward, water levels in the lakes could be affected by the changes in levels in the Floridan aquifer. Indeed, for lakes connected to the Floridan aquifer, changes in the level of the potentiometric surface (or pressure) in the Floridan aquifer can have an impact on the level of the lakes. However, a decrease in lake levels will be less than that of the decrease in the Floridan aquifer, depending on the rate of leakance. Consequently, even if Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes do leak to the Floridan aquifer, the amount of decline in lake levels attributable to pumping at the mine will be less than the 0.1 to 0.2 foot modeled by FRI. This drawdown effect will not accumulate over time, but rather will remain constant after reaching steady state conditions. Even if levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes are affected by drawdowns in the Floridan aquifer, that effect will be more than offset by surcharge to the surficial and Floridan aquifers from the dredge pond. The net effect to the lakes would be either positive or immeasurable. This is confirmed by the computer modeling results. Lake stage and precipitation data for Spring, White Sands and Gator Bone Lakes indicates that these lakes, like other lakes in the region, rise and fall in correlation with precipitation patterns. For example, in 1991, a year with above normal rainfall, Spring Lake rose 4.1 feet in elevation, White Sands Lake 2.9 feet in elevation, and Gator Bone Lake rose 3.5 feet in elevation. Similarly, water levels were monitored before, during and after the 1989 aquifer performance test in a portion of Lake Brooklyn known as Brooklyn Bay. Because of low rainfall, Brooklyn Bay was separated from the main body of Lake Brooklyn for at least eighteen to twenty-four months before and during the 1989 aquifer performance test. The lake had been in the midst of a long term decline both before and after the test, and the rate and character of declines during the period of pumping were not distinguishable from the declines occurring before or after the test. It is accordingly found that the impacts on water levels in Lake Brooklyn, if any, as a result of pumping from the Floridan aquifer are immeasurable. According to petitioner's witness Boyes, activities at the mine have an influence on water levels in Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes by "increasing the rate of decline". However, the witness could not quantify the degree of impact but stated the impacts during the 1989 aquifer performance tests were a decline of .03, .03 and less than .03 foot, respectively, for each lake. The witness also opined that, based on District staff guage readings during the 1989 aquifer performance testing, pumping at the mine resulted in a .04 foot decline in lake level for Lake Brooklyn during the 1989 testing period. This decline had a net result of .8 acre decrease in the previously 600 acre plus Lake Brooklyn. By comparison, the drought caused a decline of 162 acres in 1989 and an additional 158 acres in 1990. It is noted that the decline in each lake would be less during average pumping conditions, or about one-half of the .04 foot decline, since average pumping is one-half of the aquifer performance test pump rate. Finally, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart opined that there is insufficient data to determine whether any impacts to lake levels are occurring. It is found, however, that these drawdowns are less than the .1 to .2 foot modeled by FRI and should have no significant adverse impacts on water levels. Preferential flow theory Petitioner presented evidence of a purported correlation between pumping at the mine and water levels in a Floridan aquifer well located on the southwest side of Lake Brooklyn, 4.3 miles from the mine, and lake levels in Brooklyn Bay, 3 miles from the mine. According to petitioner, this serves as proof of a "preferential flow pattern" in the Floridan from Lake Brooklyn to the mine, and that this preferential flow results in a .04 to .05 foot drawdown in the Floridan aquifer at Lake Brooklyn. However, this correlation is deemed to be incorrect for several reasons. First, if a true correlation existed, recovery from pumping effects would occur after pumping ceased, but the Lake Brooklyn well showed recovery in the Floridan aquifer prior to cessation of pumping, and did not recover when pumping stopped at the end of the 1989 aquifer performance testing. Second, if the premise is correct, impacts from pumping would occur in wells closer to the pumping earlier than in wells farther away, but the Lake Brooklyn well, 4.3 miles from pumping, showed drawdown began before that of the Goldhead well, only 1,000 feet from pumping. Third, levels for the Lake Brooklyn well should have declined during both the 1989 and 1991 aquifer performance tests but the levels rose during the 1991 tests. As to the water level changes in the well during the 1989 test, witness Boyes believed these may reflect declines due to hydrologic conditions rather than the pump test. Fourth, if a true correlation existed, impacts would be experienced following the same hydrographic pattern as pumping, but the Lake Brooklyn well's hydrographics did not correlate to the pumping schedule at all times of the year. It should also be noted that at least two other large scale water users are withdrawing water from wells within 1.25 miles from the Lake Brooklyn well and may affect that well's water levels. Further, the variations in the well may be explained by many other variables, such as barometric pressure changes, diurnal fluctuations in water levels, rainfall, and pumping from closer wells. Finally, Brooklyn Bay is now physically separated from Lake Brooklyn, and it was improper for petitioner to rely on lake level information from Brooklyn Bay to support its theory regarding Lake Brooklyn. To further support its hypothesis that a preferential flow path exists between the mine and Lake Brooklyn, petitioner utilized a "photo linear analysis" or "fracture trace analysis", which is based on an interpretation of surface topographic features to determine the presence of subsurface hydrogeologic features such as solution channels in the limestones of the Floridan aquifer. However, without extensive subsurface testing, which is not present here, such analyses are only interpretative to determine what, if any, subsurface features are present and their hydrogeologic effect. It is noted that subsurface fractures are present less than 50 percent of the time, and if present, the features may be hydrologic barriers as well as preferential flow paths. According to witness Boyes, a photolinear feature (fracture) exists from Lake Brooklyn through Spring Lake and across the mine property to Goldhead State Park. If such a feature did exist, however, the drawdown during the aquifer performance tests and other pumping would be greater adjacent to Spring Lake than adjacent to Lake Brooklyn. This was not observed. Moreover, petitioner's witness Dr. Stewart thought the photolinear was only inferred and had a lower degree of confidence that it exists. FRI's witness Fountain established that elongated surface features are more likely to demonstrate linear subsurface features. Both witness Boyes and Dr. Stewart agreed with this conclusion. That being the case, the postulated Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear is not demonstrated, and continuation of the elongated axis of Lake Brooklyn and Brooklyn Bay would bypass the mine site altogether. Because no investigations have been conducted to demonstrate that these postulated photolinear features exist, and the more reliable results of the aquifer performance tests indicate otherwise, the preferential flow path theory is deemed at best to be highly speculative. If the Lake Brooklyn-mine photolinear feature offered a preferential flow path as opined by witness Boyes, the resulting drawdown would be elongated with a zone of influence extending from the mine westward toward Lake Brooklyn. Therefore, areas closer but not on the feature would experience less drawdown than areas farther away which are on the feature, the zone of influence would extend from the mine's wells through Spring Lake toward Lake Brooklyn causing declined water levels along the feature, and areas closer to the pumping wells, such as Spring Lake, would experience a greater decline than areas farther away, such as Lake Brooklyn. However, evidence offered by petitioner shows that the water levels between Lake Brooklyn and the mine are actually higher than in surrounding areas. Finally, even if petitioner's preferential flow path theory were true, there is no evidence that the pumping from the mine is resulting in significant and adverse impacts as required by District rules. Therefore, it is found that the sand mine does not cause significant and adverse impacts on the water levels in the Floridan aquifer or on the water levels of Lake Brooklyn or Gator Bone, White Sands or Spring Lakes. Rather, the lake levels in each of the four lakes in issue here are directly or indirectly a function of rainfall. Intermediate and surficial aquifers Whether an intermediate aquifer is present beneath the mine site is subject to dispute. All parties agree that, on a regional scale, the Hawthorn formation contains some discontinuous water-bearing lenses that in some places produce water in quantities sufficient for household use. The lenses occur in carbonate deposits in the formation, although not all carbonate deposits or all water bearing units will necessarily transmit water. The evidence is less than persuasive that the Hawthorne formation contains carbonate units which are present on the sand mine site as transmissive beds. This finding is based on FRI's review of on-site core boring information and other data from the site. In addition, this finding is corrorborated by District witness Lee, who concluded that water from the site is not discharging into the Hawthorn, but rather into the surficial aquifer. This is because clays comprising the Hawthorn have low permeability, causing water to flow laterally through the surficial aquifer rather than into the Hawthorn. With respect to impacts to the surficial aquifer, FRI presented evidence that during mining operations, the surficial aquifer will be surcharged by up to five feet. When mining operations cease, water levels will return to natural conditions. This evidence was not contradicted. Impacts on Property Values and Recreation Testimony regarding the property values for lake front properties on Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes was offered by petitioner's witness Price. He established that values have declined since mid- 1989 as a result of a loss of recreational value suffered as water levels have receded. However, witness Price stated that he would not expect a 0.1 foot drop in lake levels to negatively affect property values. Since the declines predicted by petitioner are far less than a 0.1 foot drop, it is apparent that FRI's water use will not result in harm to property values in the area. Similarly, while it is true that declining water levels have impaired recreational uses of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, White Sands and Spring Lakes, FRI's water use cannot be blamed for such impairment. Environmental Impacts The anticipated impacts of the water use on the wetlands and wildlife resources of the area were addressed by FRI witnesses Peacock and Lowe. According to Peacock, who analyzed the wetland vegetation, the dominant species and their adaptions, the wildlife resources and their adaptions, and the general ecology of the area, the water levels in the adjacent lakes have historically fluctuated greatly, and wildlife that use the lakes have adapted to these fluctuations. His opinion that the mine's water use will not have any significant adverse impact on the environment of Lake Brooklyn and Gator Bone, Spring or White Sands Lakes is hereby accepted. Based upon witness Lowe's inspection of the three downgradient lakes, his past knowledge of Lake Brooklyn, the aquifer performance tests, and Dr. Lee's conclusion that the maximum drawdown in the lakes would be 0.1 foot, Lowe opined that the proposed water withdrawal will not cause environmental harm. In addition, such a drawdown will not adversely affect off-site vegetation or cause unmitigated adverse impacts on adjacent wetlands or other types of vegetation. These conclusions were not contradicted and are hereby accepted. Compliance with rule criteria To obtain a consumptive use permit, an applicant must give "reasonable assurance" that the proposed water use is a reasonable beneficial use, will not interfere with any presently existing legal use of water, and is consistent with the public interest. These broad criteria are further explained by criteria enunciated in Rule 40C-2.301(3)-(6), Florida Administrative Code, and sections 9.0 et seq. and 10.0 et seq. of the Applicant's Handbook adopted by reference in Chapter 40C-2, Florida Administrative Code. Findings as to whether these criteria have been satisfied are set forth below. To obtain a renewal of a consumptive use permit, an applicant must first give reasonable assurance that the proposed use of water is a "reasonable beneficial use". For a use to be considered reasonable beneficial, the criteria enumerated in Rule 40C-2.301(4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code, must be satisfied. First, paragraph (4)(a) of the rule and section 10.3(a) of the handbook require that the water use must be in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, and the quantity requested must be within acceptable standards for the designated use. The evidence shows that FRI has used a reasonably low amount of water necessary to continue operations at the mine, it has implemented some water conservation methods and tried or considered others that proved to be inefficient or not economically feasible, and the requested amount of water is within acceptable standards for sand mines operating within the District. Then, too, some ninety-five percent of the water pumped from the wells is recirculated for reuse in the mining process or is recharged back into the surficial and Floridan aquifers on site. Finally, there is no surface discharge of water outside the mining site. Accordingly, it is found that this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(b) of the rule and section 10.3(b) of the handbook require that the proposed use be for a purpose that is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. The proposed use of the water is to produce sand used in construction materials. This is a reasonable use of water and results in an economic benefit to the region by producing a valuable product. Accordingly, it is found that the use is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. All parties have stipulated that the Floridan aquifer is capable of producing the requested amounts of water. This satisfies paragraph (4)(c) of the rule and section 10.3(c) of the handbook which impose this requirement. The next criterion, paragraph (4)(d), as amplified by section 10.3(d) of the handbook, requires that "the environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use must be reduced to an acceptable amount." The evidence shows that during mine operations, the surficial aquifer is being surcharged by up to five feet. When they cease, the water levels return to natural conditions. The maximum drawdown anticipated in the Floridan aquifer at the property boundary was 0.3 feet and less than or equal to 0.1 feet for most of the area outside the mine site. At most, this equates to a maximum lake level decline of 0.04 feet at Lake Brooklyn, 0.03 feet at Gator Bone and White Sands Lakes, and less than 0.03 feet at Spring Lake. Thus, FRI's usage of water has had, and will have in the future, little, if any, immediate or cumulative impact on the levels of the area lakes. Further, the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that these lowered lake levels or aquifer levels will not result in environmental or economic harm to the area. In addition, the District has proposed to incorporate into the permit a condition that FRI implement a detailed monitoring plan which will detect any overpumping causing lake level changes and a concomitant adverse impact to off-site land uses. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(e) and section 10.3(e) require the applicant to implement "all available water conservation measures" unless the applicant "demonstrates that implementation is not economically, environmentally or technologically feasible." The rule goes on to provide that satisfaction of this criterion "may be demonstrated by implementation of an approved water conservation plan as required in section 12.0, Applicant's Handbook: Consumptive Uses of Water." Because FRI's water conservation plan insures that water will be used efficiently, as required by section 12.3.4.1. of the handbook, this criterion has been met. The next paragraph provides that "(w)hen reclaimed water is readily available it must be used in place of higher quality water sources unless the applicant demonstrates that its use is either not economically, environmentally or technologi-cally feasible." Since the unrebutted testimony establishes that reclaimed water is not readily available to the mine site, it is found that paragraph (4)(f) has been satisfied. Paragraph (4)(g) of the rule and section 10.3(f) of the handbook generally require that the lowest acceptable quality water source be used. Since the evidence shows that the Floridan aquifer is the lowest acceptable quality water source, this requirement has been met. Paragraphs (4)(h) and (i) provide that the consumptive use "should not cause significant saline water intrusion or further aggravate currently existing saline water intrusion problems" nor "cause or contribute to flood damage." The parties have stipulated that these requirements are not in dispute. The next paragraph provides that the "water quality of the source of the water should not be seriously harmed by the consumptive use." The uncontradicted evidence shows that the source of the water for the proposed use will not be seriously harmed from either saltwater intrusion or discharges to the Floridan aquifer. Paragraph (4)(j) and section 10.3(g) have accordingly been met. Paragraph (4)(k) and section 10.3(k) require that the water quality of the receiving body of water "not be seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. In this case, there is no surface water discharge from the mine site. Thus, the only relevant inquiry here is whether the receiving water (surficial aquifer) will be "seriously harmed" by the consumptive use. To determine compliance with this criterion, the District compared water quality samples from the mine site and surrounding areas with the DER monitoring network to ascertain whether state water quality numerical standards and natural background levels were exceeded. The relevant standards are found in Rule 17-520.420, Florida Administrative Code. Monitoring data from eight wells and from the dredge pond indicate there are no water quality violations resulting from the sand mine operations. Petitioner has contended that water from the dredge pond provides a significant source of water to an intermediate aquifer, which would also be a receiving body of water. However, the evidence shows that any contaminants resulting from the dredge pond flowing into an intermediate aquifer will also be contained in the surficial aquifer. The clays of the Hawthorn formation would absorb and filter out iron and manganese as they traveled to a water transmissive zone. Therefore, the concentrations sampled in the suficial aquifer downgradient from the dredge pond represent the highest concentrations. Since the concentrations in the surficial aquifer do not violate water quality standards, the same finding as to concentrations in the intermediate aquifer can be made. Further, the rule criteria require consideration of the future water use's effect on water quality, and if the intermediate aquifer is in fact a receiving water as contended by petitioner, the reactions which could cause water quality violations are presently occurring. There is no reason to believe they would cease if the mine ceases operation, and the mining operation adds oxygen to the water, which reduces the possibility of the reaction described. Therefore, this criterion has been satisfied. The parties have stipulated that the requirements of paragraph (4)(l) have been fulfilled. Finally, rule 40C-2.301(5)(a) provides that a proposed consumptive use will not meet the criteria for issuance of a permit if such proposed water use will significantly cause saline water encroachment or otherwise cause water flows or levels to fall below certain minimum limits set forth in the rule. The evidence shows that, to the extent these criteria are applicable and in dispute, they have been satisfied. Miscellaneous The contention has been made that insufficient site-specific information was submitted by the applicant to determine the effects of the proposed use of water at the sand mine. In this regard, the evidence shows that FRI consultants installed monitoring wells, performed core borings, and took soil samples at the site. The geology of the site was verified by core boring, review of geologic logs and drilling wells. Slug tests were performed to measure the hydraulic conductivity of the material in which the monitor wells were set, and a step drawdown analysis was performed to measure hydraulic conductivity. A number of monitoring wells to measure water levels data were installed before and after running the 1991 aquifer performance tests, and groundwater modeling in both the transient and steady state modes were run using data that was collected in the field. In addition, water quality samples were collected to evaluate a water budget for the dredge pond, and FRI conducted an assessment of the environmental impacts to the wetland and wildlife resources of the area lakes, including White Sands, Spring and Gator Bone Lakes. Besides this submission and analysis, the District reviewed United States Geological Survey (USGS) topographic maps, potentiometric maps and aerial photographs of the area, water levels of the surrounding lakes, potentiometric surfaces in Floridan and intermediate aquifer wells, geophysical logs for wells, rainfall records, the core generated by FRI consultants, and scientific literature relied upon in making consumptive use permitting assessments. It also monitored the 1991 aquifer performance test and reviewed the resultant model. Before and after submission of the application, the District conducted aquifer performance testing at the site and evaluated the 1991 aquifer performance test conducted by FRI consultants. Finally, the District assessed water quality impacts of the sand mine in 1989 and in the present by site visit, sampling of the Floridan production well and dredge pond, and reviewing sampling data from both monitor wells and homeowner wells. It also reviewed information on water quality data gathered from other sand mines and applied data from the DER background monitoring network. Therefore, the contention that insufficient site-specific information was submitted and considered is rejected. Petitioner has offered into evidence petitioner's exhibits 61, 64, 65, 71, 75, 76, 78-80, 82 and 83. A ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits was reserved. The exhibits, which are based on data collected by the District and the USGS, are hydrographs showing water levels from lakes and monitoring wells during so-called "normal mine operations" on selected dates in 1988, 1989 and 1991. Although FRI was given copies of the exhibits ten days prior to hearing, it was not informed of the source of the data until final hearing. As it turned out, petitioner's witness had reviewed records over an extensive period of time and selected two or three days out of that time period as being representative of "normal" conditions. However, FRI established that, when longer periods of time were reviewed, the correlations alleged to exist by the graphs did not in fact exist and thus they did not represent normal conditions. Attorney's fees and costs FRI has requested an award of attorney's fees and costs on the theories petitioner interposed various papers and brought and participated in this action for "an improper purpose" within the meaning of Subsections 120.57(1)(b)5. and 120.59(6), Florida Statutes. In addition, petitioner has filed a motion for sanctions on the ground four motions filed by FRI were filed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Subsection 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes. It may be inferred from the totality of the evidence that petitioner did not intend to participate in this proceeding for an improper purpose. Likewise, the same inference may be made with respect to the four motions filed by FRI. Therefore, fees and costs (sanctions) are not warranted for either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the District granting application number 2-019-0012AUR as proposed by the District in its notice of intent to approve the application issued on August 6, 1992. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 4th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5017 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 15-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 25. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7 and 8. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 27-28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 31-33. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 36-42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 14-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 52-53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding 23. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 59-61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 64-71. Partially accepted in findings of fact 32-36. 72. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 73-74. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 75. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 76-77. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 11. Rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. See finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. 83-120. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 121-139. Partially accepted in findings of fact 25-27. 140-144. Rejected since even if true, the impacts are not significant. 145. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 146-158. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18-20. 159-171. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 172-177. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. Respondent (District): 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 2-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1, 3 and 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 17-18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 19-22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. 24-40. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12-16. 41-51. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11. 52-59. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 60-64. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 67-69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 72-73. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 74-77. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 80-81. Partially accepted in findings of fact 23 and 24. 82-83. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. 84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 85. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. 86-90. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. 91. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. 92-94. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 95. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. 96. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 97-100. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 101. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 102-103. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 104-121. Partially accepted in findings of fact 19 and 20. 122-130. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 131-133. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 134-138. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 139. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. 140-141. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 142. Partially accepted in finding of fact 48. 143. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. Respondent (FRI): Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. 22-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 35. 29-30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. 31-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 42-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. Partially accepted in finding of fact 41. Partially accepted in findings of fact 40 and 41. 49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 42. 52. Partially accepted in finding of fact 43. 53. Partially accepted in finding of fact 44. 54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 45. 55. Partially accepted in finding of fact 46. 56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 47. 57-58. Partially accepted in finding of fact 49. 59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 51. 60. Partially accepted in finding of fact 52. 61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 54. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Patrice Flinchbaugh Boyes, Esquire Post Office Box 1424 Gainesville, Florida 32602-1424 Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Wayne E. Flowers, Esquire Jennifer L. Burdick, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Marcia Penman Parker, Esquire Emily G. Pierce, Esquire 1301 Gulf Life Drive Suite 1500 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
