The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Frederick L. Roberts (Respondent) was a licensed Florida mortgage broker, holding license number MB 316324569. In November 1993, a friend of the Respondent, Alan Petzold, introduced Tami Aaronson to him. Ms. Aaronson owned property in Maryland and was interested in securing a mortgage on the Maryland property to provide funding for a Florida home for herself and her son, Jarrett. According to Ms. Aaronson, Mr. Petzold is the father of a minor son, Jarrett Aaronson. The Respondent believed that such was the case at the time he met the family. The Respondent met several times with Ms. Aaronson. The Respondent gave a “Flagship Mortgage Company” business car to Ms. Aaronson. The business card had the Respondent’s name printed on it. The Respondent had been briefly employed by Flagship Mortgage Company, but apparently was not so employed at the time he met Ms. Aaronson. Frederick L. Roberts (Respondent) received check number 0170, dated November 22, 1993, from Tami Aaronson as “Custodian for Jarrett Aaronson” in the amount of three thousand dollars. The notation on the check states that it is for “refinancing.” Ms. Aaronson believed the check was payment for services the Respondent would render in obtaining refinancing of the Maryland property. There was no written agreement between the Respondent and Ms. Aaronson, or between the Respondent and Mr. Petzold. The Respondent completed no written documentation related to the Aaronson transaction. The Respondent did not place the Aaronson deposit into a segregated escrow account. The Respondent did not record the Aaronson deposit into an escrow transaction journal. During the period he held the Aaronson funds, the Respondent worked on unrelated business, and traveled to China for about thirty days. The Respondent performed no work on behalf of Ms. Aaronson, Mr. Petzold, or Jarrett Aaronson. There is no evidence that the Respondent intended to perform any work on behalf of Aaronson/Petzold. The Respondent asserted that he asked for a three thousand dollar “deposit” as a means of discouraging the couple from asking for his assistance. The assertion is not credible. The Respondent asserts that the three thousand dollars he received from Ms. Aaronson was a deposit against travel expenses he would incur during his examination of the property in Maryland. The assertion is not supported by credible evidence. In the spring of 1994, the Respondent received a telephone call from Ms. Aaronson. The Respondent asserts that he believed Ms. Aaronson to have called him from a mental hospital. For whatever reason, at that time he determined that he no longer wanted to be involved in the Aaronson/Petzold situation. Shortly after receiving the Aaronson phone call in spring 1994, the Respondent also received a call from a Department of Banking and Finance investigator, apparently looking into a complaint received from Ms. Aaronson. The Respondent thereafter contacted Mr. Petzold and made arrangements to return the funds to him. According to a notarized statement dated May 9, 1994, the Respondent returned the three thousand dollars to Jarrett R. Aaronson and Alan C. Petzold. The Respondent testified that the money had been returned on May 8, 1994 to Mr. Petzold. The Respondent offered into evidence a document dated May 8, 1994, purporting to be a receipt received from Mr. Petzold for return of the funds. The signature is not notarized. The Respondent did not return the Aaronson deposit to Tami Aaronson. There is no evidence that Ms. Aaronson authorized the return of the three thousand dollars to Mr. Petzold. There is no evidence that Ms. Aaronson authorized the return of funds to Jarrett. Ms. Aaronson has not received any part of the three thousand dollars allegedly refunded. There is no evidence that the funds have been redeposited into the minor child’s custodial account. The Respondent asserts that he was not acting as a mortgage broker and was merely investigating the property to determine whether the Aaronson property could be used as a source of funds for the purchase of Florida property. The Respondent asserts that had a refinancing situation arisen, he would have referred Ms. Aaronson to another licensed person who would assist in the actual refinancing. The assertion is not supported by credible evidence. The Respondent asserts that in the spring of 1994 he had reason to believe that Ms. Aaronson had been hospitalized in a mental facility, and therefore he returned the funds to Mr. Petzold. The rationale for the failure to return the funds to the appropriate party is not persuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order suspending the mortgage broker license held by Frederick L. Roberts until the following conditions are met: Payment to Tami Aaronson of $3,000 plus appropriate interest calculated from November 22, 1993. Payment of an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000. After compliance with the above conditions, the license suspension shall be lifted, and a two-year probationary period shall begin RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Clyde C. Caillouet, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance 4900 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 103 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Michael W. Carlson, Esquire Carlton Fields Ward Emmanuel Smith & Cutler, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Hon. Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jack D. Osborn (Osborn), a resident of Longwood, Seminole County, Florida, applied to Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Agency), for licensure as a mortgage broker. On the face of the application, and by an attached narrative explanation, he properly revealed that three Department of Professional Regulation (DPR, now Department of Business and Professional Regulation) complaints were pending against his contractor's licenses. The administrative complaint in DPR Case #89-6241 alleges that Osborn received $4,620.00 for construction of an in-ground spa, but abandoned the job. The complaint in Case #90-2647 alleges that Osborn failed to pay suppliers and subcontractors in a pool construction job, resulting in a lien being filed, and he abandoned the job. The complaint in Case #89-12623 alleges that Osborn failed to pay subcontractor DeSilva on several pool construction jobs, failed to complete several jobs, and failed a couple of local building department inspections in the jobs. The three administrative complaints were filed by the DPR in August and September 1990 and all three relate to jobs undertaken by Osborn in 1989. The three complaints allege violations of section 489.129(1)(k), F.S. (abandoning a construction project); section 489.129(1)(j), F.S. (failure to supervise); section 489.129(1)(m), F.S. (fraud, deceit, gross negligence, incompetency or misconduct); section 489.129(1)(h), F.S. (mismanagement or misconduct), and section 489.129(1)(d), F.S. (code violations in work completed). None of the complaints has gone to hearing, or been referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. All three were still pending as of the date of the hearing in this case. In March 1991, an attorney with DPR sent Osborn's attorney a letter offering a stipulation, subject to approval by the Construction Industry Licensing Board, that the department would dismiss all charges except failure to supervise, in return for a $1,000 fine and probation, should the license be reactivated later. Osborn credibly explains that his business, Bright Water Pools, Inc., was placed in serious financial jeopardy by the embezzlement, over time, of approximately $100,000 by a former bookkeeper employee, Joann Camp. A 106-count Information, dated October 5, 1992, in Eighteen Judicial Circuit case #G88-2709 CFA, State of Florida v. Joann Camp, alleges forgeries and petit and grand theft with the intent to injure or defraud Jack Osborn and various named banks. (See Petitioner's Exhibit #1) The resolution of the criminal case is unknown. The impact on the company was devastating. It was forced to pay bills slowly, causing higher prices for labor and materials; rumors of the firm's financial viability affected sales. In an effort to save the company, Osborn refinanced his home and took out a corporate bank loan for which he is personally liable. The business failed, and the difficulties reflected in the allegations of the DPR complaints are a result of the failure. The sole basis of the agency's intended denial of Osborn's mortgage broker's license application is the pendency of the DPR complaints alleging fraud or dishonest dealing. The agency's procedure is to deny licensure whenever there is such an unresolved complaint. This policy applies without regard to the age of the complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that the agency enter its final order granting Jack D. Osborn's application for registration as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Cassandra A. Evans, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of Comptroller Department of Banking & Finance The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Jack DeWayne Osborn 303 Pickering Court Longwood, Florida 32779 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking & Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Stipulated Facts, Supplemental Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a final order that the following disbursements from the Mortgage Broker Guaranty Fund be made Payee on the claims against Polk Investments, Inc.: Amount Amendolaro $ 2,661,22 Victorias 10,000.00 Fournier, Janice 10,000.00 Wilson 1,334.71 Ledfords 6,573.09 Fournier, Robert 10,000.00 Murphy 4,715.49 Murphy as Trustee 4,715.49 Total $50,000.00 RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dennis P. Johnson, Esquire SHELNUT AND JOHNSON, P.A. Suite One Belvedere Professional Center 1525 South Florida Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33806-2436 Cristy F. Harris, Esquire HARRIS, MIDYETTE & CLEMENTS, P.A. Post Office Box 2451 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2451 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The basic allegations of the complaint having been proven or admitted, the sole question at hearing was one of mitigation.
Findings Of Fact Rivers is a licensed general and a licensed pool contractor. All the complaints against Rivers arose in relationship to his pool contracting activities. Rivers did begin construction of two pools in Levy County without first obtaining a building permit as required by the Levy County Building Code, a certified copy of which was identified by the Levy County Building official. Rivers paid a late fee in both instances. Although in one instance all inspections were made, in the second instance no inspections were possible because construction was essentially complete when the construction was discovered by the Levy County Building official. Rivers did fail to pay materialmen on two pools although he received payment in full for the jobs. His failure resulted in materialmen's liens being placed on the property, although Rivers provided each owner a written statement that all bills had been paid. Rivers admitted that he had not paid the materialmen because he lacked funds to do so. His contract with both parties for construction of a specified pool contained a provision stating that he would provide them an affidavit that all labor and material had been paid prior to receipt of final payment on the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Residential Pool Contractor's License and General Contractor's License of Norman Rivers be suspended for a minimum of ninety (90) days and that thereafter be reinstated upon his satisfying the Board of his ability to meet his financial obligations. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488 9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J.K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Mr. Norman Rivers 1710 South East 19th Street Ocala, Florida 32670
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in (License) Case No. 92-2942: Whether or not the application for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender filed by BOYER MORTGAGE CORPORATION should be granted or denied. The issues in (Disciplinary) Case No. 92-2943: Whether or not any disciplinary action should be taken against the individual mortgage broker's license held by FREDDIE Z. BOYER and BOYER MORTGAGE CORPORATION for violating various sections of Chapter 494 F.S. pertaining to mortgage brokers and correspondent mortgage lenders.
Findings Of Fact The time frame material to both cases is November 1991 through January 1992. At all times material, and currently, Freddie Z. Boyer was licensed with DBF as an individual mortgage broker, but he was and is not currently formally associated with any licensed mortgage brokerage business, mortgage lender, or correspondent mortgage lender. Mr. Boyer was formerly associated with First Coastal Mortgage Corporation, Inc. (First Coastal) as its principal and qualifying broker. The foregoing facts are found despite Mr. Boyer's testimony that he considered himself associated with First Coastal at all times material and considered himself still associated with First Coastal as of the date of formal hearing. In making the foregoing findings of fact, the undersigned has not relied on Mr. Hancock's and Ms. Poff's testimony to the effect that they "had been told" that First Coastal no longer exists or went out of business; this was unsubstantiated hearsay. Nonetheless, Mr. Boyer's testimony is clear that he, personally, ceased to function as an individual mortgage broker for First Coastal in October 1991, after an internal dispute with the two other owners of First Coastal who hold/held two-thirds of the stock of First Coastal. Mr. Boyer was/is a one-third stockholder of First Coastal. Mr. Boyer also testified that he had used his individual mortgage broker license to apply for First Coastal's corporate mortgage broker or mortgage lender license (it is not clear which) and that such a license had been issued to First Coastal upon his application and that thereafter that license was converted to the name and use of his two other partners because he had withdrawn as qualifying broker for First Coastal. He has left his individual mortgage broker's license on record with First Coastal but admittedly was not brokering loans through First Coastal at any time material to the instant cases. Mr. Boyer further testified that he incorporated and commenced business operations of Boyer Mortgage Corporation on October 17, 1991 to originate, sell, service, and transfer residential mortgages in Florida. All of the exhibits in evidence involving solicitation of mortgage loans name Boyer Mortgage Corporation, not First Coastal, as the mortgage lender or as the entity making inquiries and list Freddie Z. Boyer as the loan officer or broker. On December 27, 1991, DBF received an application from Boyer Mortgage Corporation for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender. The application disclosed that Mr. Boyer is the President-Secretary of Boyer Mortgage Corporation. At formal hearing, Mr. Boyer confirmed this to be true and that he also owns one-third of Boyer Mortgage Corporation. Question 7 on the application asks: Does the applicant have net worth of at least $25,000? (Documentation of net worth must be filed with this application. Audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by an independent certified public accountant are required.) This question was answered in the affirmative. The application filed by Respondent Boyer on behalf of Boyer Mortgage Corporation was accompanied by an October 15, 1991 audit letter and financial statements to show that the corporation had the required $25,000 net worth. The October 15, 1991 audit letter which was submitted with the application contained the alleged signature of John M. Chancellor, Jr., Certified Public Accountant (CPA). The audit letter and financial statements were prepared on letterhead stationery purportedly that of Mr. Chancellor and predated incorporation of the corporate applicant, Boyer Mortgage Corporation. Mr. Chancellor testified by deposition that he did not conduct an audit of Boyer Mortgage Corporation and did not prepare the audit letter or financial statements which were submitted by Mr. Boyer and Boyer Mortgage Corporation with the corporation's correspondent mortgage lender application to DBF. There is no dispute on this issue. Mr. Boyer testified that he, personally, prepared the audit letter and financial statements and signed John M. Chancellor, Jr.'s name to the audit letter. He also admitted he never contacted Mr. Chancellor to receive permission to sign his name. Mr. Boyer is a licensed CPA in the State of Florida. Although Mr. Boyer claimed at hearing that he had a current CPA business relationship with Mr. Chancellor which would permit Mr. Boyer to sign his "partner's" name to audits, Mr. Chancellor denied that any business relationship or any partnership existed between them as of the date of the audit, the financial statements, or the application for licensure by Boyer Mortgage Corporation. Although Mr. Chancellor admitted he had formed some type of CPA firm with Mr. Boyer in Louisiana in 1974 or earlier, Mr. Chancellor also testified that he, personally, had ceased to be licensed as a CPA in Louisiana in 1989. Mr. Chancellor has never been licensed as a CPA in Florida. Upon the foregoing, it is found that Mr. Boyer's assertion that he believed he had the legal right to audit his own business (Boyer Mortgage Corporation) and to sign Mr. Chancellor's name to the audit and financial statements upon which Boyer Mortgage Corporation's application for Florida correspondent mortgage lender licensure was based is neither credible nor legally correct. The fact that Boyer and Chancellor apparently never actually ran any CPA business out of a common location and had only sporadically seen each other over the last several years renders incredible Mr. Boyer's protestations that he always had a legal right to sign a partner's name to anything. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Boyer did not have actual knowledge that Mr. Chancellor had ceased to be licensed as a CPA when he signed Mr. Chancellor's name to the audit and financial statements submitted with Boyer Mortgage Corporation's application for licensure, Mr. Boyer still was not excused at law or by the dictates of common business sense from making reasonable inquiry to determine that fact. When Mr. Chancellor ceased to be licensed as a CPA in 1989, that fact alone terminated any CPA association he had with Mr. Boyer as of that date, and it is not necessary for the undersigned to go further and unravel all the non-dispositive sub-issues raised herein concerning whether or not Mr. Boyer or another person forged Mr. Chancellor's signature on a 1974 partnership agreement for the CPA firm or whether or not Mr. Chancellor was bound by that agreement to give Mr. Boyer 30 days written notice of Mr. Chancellor's withdrawal from their Louisiana CPA firm. The fact that Mr. Boyer and Mr. Chancellor may have had some other business relationship or operated out of some other corporation or partnership in the past is immaterial. Their other active business relationship also ended many years prior to the time frame and events relevant to this proceeding and has nothing to do with it. Mr. Boyer's self-serving testimony that some CPA Board authorized him to sign Mr. Chancellor's name is mere hearsay upon which no finding of fact may be based. Signing someone else's name in order to lead the DBF licensing authority to believe that an "independent certified public accountant" had audited Boyer Mortgage Corporation's financial statements when, in fact, Mr. Boyer himself merely "rubber stamped" his own work is clearly misleading and constitutes a material misstatement in connection with the application. Despite Mr. Boyer's protestations that generally accepted principles of CPA practice (GAAP) permit such camouflaging of the truth, no persuasive evidence to that effect was presented at formal hearing to rebut the clearly misleading nature of the materials themselves. It is noted that the accuracy or falsity of the financial statements themselves was not proven at formal hearing, but the falsification of the licensure application by way of Mr. Boyer's deliberately misleading the licensing agency into believing independent CPA materials were being submitted when these materials were not independent at all has been clearly and convincingly proven. During the period of November 1991 through January 1992, Boyer Mortgage Corporation and Mr. Boyer solicited and accepted approximately thirty-four applications for mortgage loans without Boyer Mortgage Corporation being licensed as a mortgage brokerage business, a mortgage lender, or a correspondent mortgage lender, and without Mr. Boyer being associated with First Coastal or any other mortgage brokerage business. As previously noted, all applications in evidence show involvement of Boyer Mortgage Corporation; none show involvement of First Coastal. Also, Boyer Mortgage Corporation's application for correspondent mortgage lender was not even filed with DBF until December 27, 1991 (See, Findings of Fact 1-2 supra). It is further noted, however, that upon being warned by the Comptroller's Office that he could not do business, Mr. Boyer was cooperative and did not "close" thirty-three of these potential loans. One loan was closed for Marc and Janice Gillard in November 1991, and Boyer Mortgage Corporation received an origination fee and a portion of the discount points therefor. Despite the prior warning from the Comptroller's Office, Mr. Boyer authorized one of his Boyer Mortgage Corporation subordinates to close the Gillard loan through another lending institution because "Mr. Gillard was a friend" and Mr. Boyer "did not want them to lose their home." Boyer Mortgage Corporation and Mr. Boyer charged and received fees for credit reports and appraisals on two of the thirty-four loan applications. With regard to those fees, Mr. Boyer and his corporation were essentially only a conduit to appraisers and credit reporting services for small amounts of money. Perhaps $150, at most, was retained by Respondents. Although the evidence falls short of any fraud against any of the loan applicants during that three month period of time, Boyer Mortgage Corporation and Mr. Boyer were also providing good faith estimates to applicants, obtaining appraisals and credit reports, submitting invoices, requesting verification of deposits from banks, and requesting verification of employment on the mortgage loan applicants. As such, Boyer Mortgage Corporation was acting as a mortgage broker without a current active license and Mr. Boyer was acting as a mortgage broker without being associated with a mortgage brokerage business in contravention of statute. The evidence, however, does not establish that either Respondent acted as a correspondent mortgage lender.
Conclusions The burden of proof in a license application case is upon the applicant. See, Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Herein, the parties adopted all of the evidence from DOAH Case No. 92-2943, the disciplinary case, and therefore all of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law (except for the burden of proof) set out supra for DOAH Case No. 92-2943 are applicable to to DOAH Case No. 92-2942 as well. Boyer Mortgage Corporation's audit and financial statements were neither proven accurate nor inaccurate, so Boyer Mortgage Corporation cannot prevail in the license application case for that reason alone. Also, DBF has affirmatively proven that there was a material misstatement with regard to the independence of the CPA performing the audit and signing the financial statement and that these documents do not meet generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute sufficient grounds for denying, in DOAH Case No. 92-2942, the application for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender filed by Freddie Z. Boyer o/b/o Boyer Mortgage Corporation pursuant to Section 494.0072(1)(f) F.S. RECOMMENDATION IN CASE 92-2943 It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order: Finding Respondent Freddie Z. Boyer guilty of violating Sections 494.0033 and Section 494.0041(2)(p) and subject to discipline as provided in Section 494.0041(1) F.S. Finding Respondent Freddie Z. Boyer, guilty of violating Sections 494.0063, 494.0025(5), 494.0041(2)(c), (j) and (p) and 494.0072(2)(c), (j) and (p) F.S. and Rule 3D-40.250 F.A.C. and subject to discipline pursuant to Section 494.0041(1) and 494.0072(1) F.S. and revoking his individual mortgage broker's license; Finding the Respondent Boyer Mortgage Corporation, guilty of violating Section 494.0063, 494.0025(3) and (5), 494.0041(2) (k) and (p), 494.0072(2)(c) (j), and (p), and Rule 3D-40.250 F.A.C. and subject to discipline pursuant to Section 494.0041(1), 494.072(1) F.S. and ordering it to cease and desist all mortgage brokerage business. RECOMMENDATION IN CASE NO. 92-2942 It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order denying the application for licensure as a correspondent mortgage lender filed by Boyer Mortgage Corporation. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NOS. 92-2942 and 92-2943 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) DBF's PFOF: 1-14 Accepted except to the degree they are unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative to the facts as found in the Recommended Order. The date in the PFOF has been corrected to correspond to the record. Boyer and Boyer Mortgage Corp.'s PFOF: Response to Post-hearing Order 1-2, 4-5 Accepted. 3, 6-7 Rejected as either not supported by the record or as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found in the Recommended Order. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected as not supported by the record and/or legalarguement. Statement One This seems to be legal argument or conclusions of law and has been treated as such without rulings pursuant to Sections 120.59(2) F.S. Statement Two Rejected as statements of another state's law, materials not in evidence, and misstatements concerning the content of John M. Chancellor's deposition. Statement Three Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret S. Karniewicz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Freddie Z. Boyer Boyer and Boyer Mortgage Corporation P. O. Box 5560 Destin, Florida 32540-5560 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, including the duty to sanction those licensed under the Mortgage Brokerage Act (the Act) for violations of the Act. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Joan N. Harnagel (Ms. Harnagel), was a registered mortgage broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. HA 517383319. There was no evidence that Ms. Harnagel's registration has been previously disciplined by Petitioner. Respondent Meridian Mortgage Group, Inc. (Meridian) first became a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida in September, 1988, with Respondent Joan N. Harnagel (Ms. Harnagel) serving as its vice-president and principal mortgage broker. Between September, 1988, and August, 1992, Meridian was a mortgage brokerage business in the State of Florida and held license No.HB 880000176-00. Meridian has held no active license as a Florida mortgage broker since August, 1992. There was no evidence that Meridian's registration has been previously disciplined by Petitioner. In September 1988, Meridian bought a Florida mortgage brokerage company named Bay Pointe Mortgage. At the time of this purchase, Ms. Harnagel was the principal mortgage broker and was responsible for the daily operations of Bay Pointe as its general manager. Upon Meridian's purchase of Bay Pointe, Ms. Harnagel served as Meridian's principal mortgage broker in Florida and continued her responsibility for the daily operation of Meridian's activities in Florida. Until July 15, 1989, Ms. Harnagel had no ownership interest in Meridian. The owners of Meridian between September 1988 and July 15, 1989, were Majorie Mohr and Larry Mohr of Carmel, Indiana. On July 15, 1989, Ms. Harnagel assumed ownership of Meridian and continued to serve as its principal mortgage broker and general manager responsible for daily operations. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Ms. Harnagel was the principal mortgage broker of Meridian and was responsible for its daily operations, which included the hiring and firing of employees, the ordering of appraisals and credit reports for customers, and the preparation of good faith estimates. Petitioner conducted an examination of the Respondents Harnagel and Meridian for the period inclusive of January 1, 1989, through April 30, 1990. As a result of the investigation, Petitioner prepared and forwarded to Respondents a report of its investigation. Subsequently thereto, Petitioner prepared and served on Respondents an "Administrative Complaint, Notice of Intent to Issue Order to Cease and Desist, Intent to Revoke Licenses and Notice of Rights" which is the charging document for this proceeding. 1/ PAR PLUS VIOLATIONS There is a difference between a mortgage broker's origination fee and a lender's discount fee. A mortgage broker's origination fee is a fee charged by the mortgage broker for finding a loan for the applicant. A discount fee is a fee charged by the lender to a borrower for doing the paperwork on a loan and is usually expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed. A discount may be considered as prepaid interest to the lender to cover the lender's expenses in making the loan. In the typical transaction that does not involve "par plus", the mortgage broker's origination fee is paid to the mortgage broker by the borrower at closing either by separate check or out of the proceeds of the closing. A "par plus" transaction is one in which the mortgage broker's origination fee is paid to the mortgage broker by the lender instead of by the borrower. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a composite exhibit and pertains to a transaction involving borrowers Oscar and Arlene Carlsen. Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is a composite exhibit and pertains to a transaction involving borrowers J. Richard and Sara Pooler. The first page of each exhibit is the good faith estimate that was completed by Ms. Harnagel. The good faith estimate is normally given to a borrower when the borrower first comes to the mortgage broker's office and applies for a loan. The purpose of the good faith estimate is to make full disclosure of what fees are going to be charged to the borrower. The second and third pages of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 constitute the Settlement Statements for each transaction and was prepared by the respective closing agents for these transactions. The Settlement Statement should reflect all costs that were paid by the buyer and the seller in the transaction being financed. The Carlsen transaction was a "par plus" transaction since Meridian's mortgage brokerage fee was paid by the lender. The Pooler transaction was also a "par plus" transaction since Meridian's mortgage brokerage fee was paid by the lender. By failing to respond to requests for admissions, Respondents admitted 2/ that in the Carlsen transaction and in the Pooler transaction neither Meridian nor Ms. Harnagel disclosed to the borrowers Meridian's participation in a "par plus" program. Both the Carlsen and the Pooler transactions closed in December 1989. ESCROW FUND VIOLATIONS - RESIDENTIAL 3/ Respondents received the following sums from the following borrowers on the following dates: BORROWER AMOUNT DATE K. Carrol $525.00 06-07-89 R. Williams $400.00 11-28-89 J. Gentile $270.00 06-30-89 C. Saffer $270.00 05-15-89 J. Mark $270.00 02-22-89 G. Norton $275.00 07-14-89 F. Sloss $275.00 03-02-89 W. Nachman $275.00 02-27-89 E. Ward $270.00 04-26-89 H. Rosen $310.00 04-24-89 J. Morris $825.00 06-30-89 S. Lewis $270.00 03-24-89 E. Fuller $485.00 05-01-89 G. Fleming $270.00 03-30-89 J. Bishop $270.00 03-28-89 P. Bifulco $270.00 04-10-89 E. Zulueta $270.00 05-26-89 L. MacCalister $325.00 06-21-89 T. Nangle $275.00 01-26-89 I. Rybicki $270.00 03-31-89 I. Rybicki $275.00 03-07-89 The foregoing sums were received by Respondents from borrowers to pay for credit reports and appraisals. Respondents should have placed these funds in the escrow account Meridian maintained at Sun Bank. Instead of being used for the intended purpose, these funds were placed in Meridian's operating account at Sun Bank and were used to pay Meridian's overhead. At all times pertinent hereto Respondent Harnagel was the principal mortgage broker for Meridian and knew that these sums were not being placed in escrow, knew that the funds should have been placed in escrow, and knew that these funds were not being expended for credit reports and appraisal reports. Ms. Harnagel asserts that the practice of placing these funds in Meridian's operating account was dictated by Meridian's out-of-state owners. Ms. Harnagel knew this practice violated the Mortgage Brokerage Act and asserts that she repeatedly informed the Mohrs of this problem. Notwithstanding her acknowledged violation of the Act, she continued to collect these fees and continued to place these fees in Meridian's operating account. The great majority of these transactions occurred prior to Ms. Harnagel assuming ownership of Meridian on July 15, 1989. As a result of these practices, Meridian became indebted to at least two appraisal companies, Duffy and Associates (Duffy) and Diamond Realty and Appraisal Company (Diamond). Neither appraisal company had been fully repaid as of the time of the formal hearing. Duffy and Associates is owed a total of $4,000 by Respondents for work that was performed on the order of Respondents. At least six of the appraisals for which Duffy has not been paid were ordered after Ms. Harnagel assumed ownership of Meridian. In each of these transactions Respondents collected the amount necessary to pay for the appraisal, but, instead of paying for the appraisals, spent the amounts as part of the operating account on overhead expenses. Ms. Harnagel paid Diamond the sum of $1,500 as partial payment of the accumulated debt to Diamond. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondents owed Diamond the sum of $1,675 plus interest and attorney's fees. THE COMMERCIAL LENDER: VICTORY ENTERPRISES TRUST The proposed lender for each of the four commercial transactions at issue in this proceeding was an entity referred to as "Victory Enterprises Trust". The principals of this trust were Thomas Telford, Harold McDonnard, Harold Meridon, and a man identified as Mr. Carpenter. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION ONE: GOLDEN HILLS Golden Hills is one of the four commercial projects that was at issue in this proceeding. A group of individuals including Robert Hastings, Doug Ollenberger, and Jeffery Kollenkark formed a partnership to purchase, refurbish, and develop a golf course and its surrounding property known as Golden Hills. This partnership, initially known as EBBCO Partnership and later incorporated under the name of Fore Golf Management, Inc., discussed with Ms. Harnagel the financing that would be required for the project. Ms. Harnagel suggested to this borrower a possible joint venture with a potential lender, the Victory Enterprises Trust, and requested a deposit in the amount of $12,000. Ms. Harnagel did not identify her lender to the borrower. This borrower deposited with Meridian the sum of $12,000 on or about September 28, 1989, with conditions that may be summarized as follows: The money was to be placed in Meridian's escrow account. The money was to be "100 percent refundable" if the joint venture partner did not fund the project or if terms of funding were not acceptable. Signatures from both parties to the joint venture would be required to release the funds from escrow. This money was not to be considered an application fee, but as a deposit for closing costs of the proposed joint venture. Any funds remaining were to be returned to Fore Golf Management, Inc. At no time did the Golden Hills borrowers authorize Ms. Harnagel to remove any of the funds from her trust account. On October 2, 1989, Ms. Harnagel wrote Robert Hastings a letter that included the following: Friday, September 29, 1989, Sun Bank received the Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) and deposited in MERIDIAN MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. TRUST ACCOUNT. These monies are used for prudent expenses needed to bring FORE GOLF MANAGEMENT, INC. an acceptable commitment. THE MONIES ARE REFUNDABLE if the commitment is not acceptable. (Emphasis in the original) On February 1, 1990, Mr. Hastings wrote Ms. Harnagel a letter that included the following: ... For about five months we have been attempting to put together a deal on Golden Hills. You have had our $12,000.00 since 9/29/89. To date no commitment has been brought to us. We do not mind continuing to try, but we do not wish to continue with this indefinitely. It is our wish that you suggest a time frame within which the project is completed and funded, or unless extended in writing by both parties, all agreements are null and void and all monies are refunded. On March 3, 1991, the Golden Hills borrowers demanded that Respondents return the $12,000 deposit, noting that the Golden Hills property had been sold to another entity approximately six months previously and that no commitment from Respondents or their lender had been forthcoming. Thereafter, the Golden Hills borrowers sent Dr. Kollenkark to Florida from California in an effort to collect the deposit from Respondents. On March 11, 1991, Ms. Harnagel wrote to Dr. Kollenkark a letter that provided, in part, as follows: The Trust does not want to return the monies as they felt they bought a commitment but that you were unable to obtain a viable contract. As I have said to you when we were told in December, 1990 that Golden Hills had definitely been sold. I told you that I would pay the $13,000 and get the money through the legal department. The reference to the Trust in Ms. Harnagel's letter of March 11, 1991, is to the Victory Enterprises Trust. The reference to the sum of $13,000 was an error and should have been $12,000. There was no evidence as to whether the deposit was transferred from Meridian's trust account to the proposed lender as implied by the letter of March 11, 1991. Ms. Harnagel testified that the money was transferred to Meridian's operating account and expended on Meridian's operating expenses. Ms. Harnagel admitted that the sum deposited by the Golden Hills borrowers should be refunded, but that she has been unable to do so. Her position that using the money to fund her operating expenses was authorized by the agreement with the Golden Hills borrowers is rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Although the record establishes that Ms. Harnagel expended considerable time and effort to secure funding for the Golden Hills borrowers, the record is equally clear that she was not entitled to use the deposit to fund her overhead expenses. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION TWO: GENESIS CORPORATION The second commercial transaction involved the funding of two hotel projects with the Genesis Corporation as Respondents' borrower. By letter dated December 15, 1989, the Genesis Corporation deposited with Meridian the sum of $1,500. Paragraph two of the transmittal letter is as follows: 2. The Funding must be to Genesis Corp. satisfaction. The Application Fee of $1,500. is refundable, if Genesis Corp. is not Completely Satisfied with the Funding. The principals of Genesis Corporation did not provide certain financial statements requested by Respondents. Consequently, Respondents were unable to secure financing for the two hotel projects. After the request for the financial statements was made, Respondents did not hear further from the Genesis Corporation. Respondents expended the deposit made by the Genesis Corporation for its operating expenses. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION THREE: RIVER RUN The third commercial transaction involved River Run Limited Partnership (River Run), which proposed to develop a golf course in North Carolina. As part of the transaction, Meridian required the borrower to pay an advance fee of $10,000.00 to be placed in Meridian's trust account. This deposit was subject to the following conditions: The deposited fee may be used by the lender (an unidentified trust) or by MERIDIAN MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. in conjunction with the lender to conduct an inspection of the property and for other prudent and reasonable expenses necessary to bring the BORROWER an acceptable loan commitment. For all monies spent a full accounting of such expenses will be made to BORROWER. If no loan commitment is offered within fifteen (15) days of the last signature date of this agreement, the entire application fee will be refunded unless otherwise agreed to by both parties to this agreement. Should an offer be made by the lender that, for any reason, is unacceptable to the BORROWER, the BORROWER shall have the right to reject such an offer and the entire application fee shall be refunded to the BORROWER. In such an event, the BORROWER shall be obligated to notify MERIDIAN MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. within five (5) working days of receipt of such offer that the offer is rejected, otherwise the deposited funds will be forfeited and will become the property of MERIDIAN MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. The foregoing agreement between Meridian and River Run was extended so that Meridian was given until November 15, 1989, to obtain the financing. The $10,000 deposit to Meridian was paid on behalf of River Run by Nate Bowman. No financing for River Run was secured by Respondents. Mr. Bowman demanded a refund of the deposit and subsequently obtained judgment against Respondents for the $10,000 deposit. As of the formal hearing, Respondents had not satisfied the Bowman judgment or otherwise refunded the deposit to River Run. Ms. Harnagel asserted that the following circumstances were the reason that the River Run transaction did not close: The trust that was to be the lender asked for financial statements that were not provided. There was a lawsuit between certain of the partners of River Run. A financial officer would not relinquish certain tax returns for one of the partners of River Run. There was a concern about River Run's ability to repay the money. Ms. Harnagel stated that of the $10,000 that was deposited into Meridian's trust account, she only retained the sum of $3,500 and that the balance went to the lending trust. The $3,500 that was retained by Ms. Harnagel was expended. There was no accounting for these expenditures. Likewise, there was no accounting for the sums paid to the lending trust. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION FOUR: CHAPEL HILL The fourth commercial transaction involved a group of borrowers represented by Michael Grdina, an attorney in Ohio, who desired to obtain financing for the construction of a series of projects that will be referred to as the Chapel Hill complex. Subsequent to a telephone conversation between Mr. Grdina and Ms. Harnagel, Ms. Harnagel sent a letter dated November 16, 1989. This letter reflected that Respondents represented a Trust and that the Trust was interested in participating in a joint venture with Mr. Grdina's clients. The letter contained certain requirements imposed by the Trust and provided, in part, as follows: A Seventy-Five Hundred ($7,500.00) application fee be placed in MERIDIAN MORTGAGE GROUP, INC. TRUST ACCOUNT. These monies are used for prudent expenses needed to bring Chapel Hill Commerce Center an acceptable commitment. If the commitment is not acceptable the monies are refundable. In response to that letter of November 16, 1989, Mr. Grdina wrote Ms. Harnagel a letter on behalf of his clients and enclosed a check for the sum of $7,500. Mr. Grdina's letter became the agreement between the parties as to the status of the $7,500 deposit paid to Respondents by Mr. Grdina. That letter omitted the language in Ms. Harnagel's letter of November 16, 1989, pertaining to the use of the deposit "for prudent business expenses". Mr. Grdina's letter of December 1, 1989, provided, in part, as follows: By wire transfer to Meridian's trust account the entities [Mr. Grdina's clients] have placed with you a Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) refundable good faith deposit. If an entity accepts a proposal for funding from sources identified by you, and such entity does not close the transaction for reason other than the fault of the lender, the good faith deposit will be forfeited as liquidated damages for expenses and fees incurred in the transaction. The initial agreement between Harnagel and Grdina contemplated that Harnagel's Trust would provide financing for Grdina's clients. By letter dated February 23, 1990, Mr. Grdina accepted the offer that the transaction be modified so that the Trust would secure 100 percent of the loan by a lending institution by depositing with the lending institution certificates of deposit. As additional consideration to the Trust, the Trust would become entitled to 25 percent equity participation in the construction project. The letter of February 23, 1990, did not modify the status of the deposit paid by Mr. Grdina on behalf of his clients. The loan to Mr. Grdina's clients did not close because the lending institution with whom Ms. Harnagel and Victory Trust dealt would not fund the loan. Thereafter, Mr. Grdina demanded return of the $7,500 deposit. As of the date of the formal hearing, that deposit has not been refunded. Although Ms. Harnagel argues that she was entitled to keep the deposit, that argument is without merit since none of the conditions precedent to her entitlement to the deposit occurred. CUSTOMER OVERCHARGE Respondents admitted that two customers were charged brokerage fees, origination fees, and/or discount fees which were greater than those disclosed on the Good Faith Estimates. On the Morris transaction, a fee of $450.80 was estimated, but the fee actually assessed at closing was $2,240, an overcharge of $1,790. On the Rosen transaction a fee of $1,773 was estimated, but the actual fee assessed was $1,871.50, for an overcharge of $98.50. Both overcharges resulted from charges imposed by a lending institution and neither overcharge resulted in inappropriate payments to Respondents. WALL STREET JOURNAL ADVERTISEMENT Respondents placed an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal on February 16, 1990. This advertisement did not contain the address of Meridian as required by law. The deletion of Meridian's address was the fault of the Wall Street Journal. INVESTIGATION OF LENDING SOURCE Ms. Harnagel testified without contradiction that she made efforts to verify the reliability of the Victory Enterprises Trust and its principals. She learned of this potential lender through an advertisement the Trust had placed in the Miami Herald. Neither the Trust or the principals were required to be licensed in Florida. Her efforts included having her attorney and her bank officer make inquiries to verify the reliability of the proposed lender. Petitioner argues that Respondents should have made further inquiry after the loan to the Golden Hills borrowers was not forthcoming from this lender. Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents breached any standards imposed upon them to investigate the reliability of lenders so as to prove that Respondents are incompetent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that all licenses and registrations issued either to Joan N. Harnagel or Meridian Mortgage Group, Inc., be revoked. It is further recommended that an administrative fine be imposed against Joan N. Harnagel in the amount of $25,000. It is further recommended that a separate administrative fine be imposed against Meridian Mortgage Group, Inc., in the amount of $25,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1993.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for a mortgage broker's license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Application and Reasons for Denial Applicant is a 52-year-old former mortgage broker who resides in Dade County, Florida. He was first licensed as a mortgage broker in Florida in 1959. His license remained in effect until it expired in 1976. He reapplied for registration as a mortgage broker in December, 1976. In June, 1977, the Department denied his application despite Applicant's attempt to withdraw his application in January, 1977. (P-1, R-6, R-7.) On March 18, 1981, Applicant filed another application with the Department for a license to act as a mortgage broker. That application is the subject of this proceeding. The Department seeks to deny it on grounds that the Applicant is insolvent; that he had a final judgment entered against him in a civil action on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit; and that he lacks the requisite competence, honesty, truthfulness, and integrity to act as a mortgage broker in Florida. II. Insolvency Applicant is insolvent and deeply in debt. His insolvency arises out of his association with a company known as Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation ("Guardian Mortgage"), a mortgage brokerage firm operating in Dade County. He was secretary/treasurer and one of several mortgage brokers who worked for that company. Prior to its going out of business in 1976, it and its several brokers were accused of numerous financial misdealings. Between 1974 and 1980, over 31 civil lawsuits were filed against Applicant concerning financial transactions in which he was involved; most of the transactions occurred in connection with his employment at Guardian Mortgage. As a result of these lawsuits, and his failure to defend against them (on advice of counsel) , final judgments in excess of $500,000 have been entered against him and remain unpaid. Applicant has not attempted to pay off any of these judgments, although his codefendant, Archie Struhl, has made efforts to satisfy some of them. (Testimony of Lipsitt, Haber; R-4, R-5, R-6.) After Guardian Mortgage ceased operations, Applicant ran a hotel and orange grove operation in Central America. His wife was a preschool teacher. He has not earned any money beyond that necessary to meet his basic needs. (Testimony of Haber.) In the past, the Department has ordinarily refused to issue mortgage broker licenses to applicants who are insolvent. The reason for this policy is that the public "could be injured if a man [mortgage broker] did not have sufficient monies to back him up . . ." Tr. 144.) The only exception to this policy of denying applications on grounds of insolvency is when an applicant has shown that he is making an honest effort to satisfy and pay off the outstanding judgments. (Testimony of Ehrlich.) III. Civil Judgment of Fraud Entered Against Applicant In April, 1977, a civil action was filed by Murray Ritter against three codefendants: Applicant, Archie Struhl, and Guardian Mortgage. (Circuit Court of Dade County, Case No. 77-10849, Division II.) Count II of the complaint alleged that the defendants committed fraud by failing to invest $10,000 in a first mortgage and, instead, converted the money to their own use. On July 20, 1977, the circuit court, upon plaintiff's motion, entered a Final Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the three defendants. The judgment awarded plaintiff $10,000 in compensatory damages, $5,000 in punitive damages, and court costs of $63, for a total of $15,063. (R-5, R-6.) IV. Experience, Honesty, Truthfulness, Integrity, Competency, and Background of Applicant Applicant was a licensed mortgage broker for many years. The Department acknowledges that his experience in mortgage financing is adequate. (Testimony of Ehrlich.) Applicant denies that he ever engaged in wrongdoing as a mortgage broker, that he knew of improprieties occurring at Guardian Mortgage, or participated in a cover-up. He denies that he ever misrepresented facts or acted dishonestly as a mortgage broker. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Applicant lacks honesty, truthfulness, or integrity. (Testimony of Haber.) However, Applicant has not demonstrated that he has the requisite background and competence to engage in financial transactions involving mortgage financing. Civil judgments were entered (by the Circuit Court of Dade County) against Applicant in the following cases, each of which involved mortgage financing, unsecured loan transactions, or real estate investments negotiated by Applicant: Irvings S. Philipson, et al. v. Venus Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 74-1320. Dr. Seymour Z. Beiser, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No. 76-24374. Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association of Miami v. Brenda Alexander, et al., Case No. 75-16230. City National Bank of Miami v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No. 75-39444. Leon Earler, et al. v. Venus Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 76-22138. Jesus Suarez v. Leonard Gordon, et al., Case No. 76-26381. John J. Nussman, et al. v. Melvin J. Haber, et al., Case No. 76-30569 (12). County National Bank of North Miami Beach v. Sid Shane, et al., Case No. 77-27909 (14). Herman Mintzer, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, Case No. 76-16842. Melvin Waldorf, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, Case No. 76-16344. Florence Margen v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No 76-39412. Biscayne Bank v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et el., Case No. 76-39857 (8). Harry Jolkower, et al. v. Archie Struhl, et al., Case No. 77-19172. Hilliard Avrutis v. Archie Struhl, et al., Case No. 32494. Julius Wladawsky, et al. v. Melvin J. Haber, et al., Case No. 76-22554 (14). Taken as a whole, these judgments support an inference that Applicant lacks the competence and background necessary to act as a responsible mortgage broker in Florida. 2/ (Testimony of Ehrlich; R-4, R-5.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application for a mortgage broker's license be DENIED. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1982.
The Issue The issue is whether the Office of Financial Regulation should approve Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 42 years old. He served 10 years in the United States Air Force and is a veteran of the first Gulf War. Petitioner is a partner in a small business that offers executive recruiting services, Internet-based real estate advertising services, and mortgage brokerage services. Petitioner’s role in the business is “more on the IT side” and involves “a lot of phone work” as well as “the website, data base management [and] things like that.” On October 14, 2003, Petitioner submitted to the Office an application for licensure as a mortgage broker. Question No. 5 on the application asks whether the applicant has “pleaded nolo contendere, been convicted, or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude.” Petitioner answered “no” to Question No. 5. Petitioner’s negative answer to Question No. 5 was based upon his understanding that the question was referring only to financial crimes, such as stealing money or extortion, and crimes involving drugs. Petitioner was not attempting to conceal his criminal history from the Office through his negative answer to Question No. 5. Indeed, at the time he submitted the application, Petitioner knew that the Office would conduct a background screening and learn of his criminal history because he was required to, and did, submit a set of fingerprints with his application. Petitioner’s understanding regarding the scope of Question No. 5 was not reasonable in light of the following definition of “moral turpitude,” which appeared immediately below the question on the application form: “Moral turpitude involves duties owed by persons to society as well as acts contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals.” This includes, but is not limited to theft, extortion, use of mail to obtain property under false pretenses, tax evasion, and the sale of (or intent to sell) controlled substances. Petitioner did not contact the Office prior to submitting his application to get clarification regarding the scope of Question No. 5, nor did he discuss the issue with legal counsel. Petitioner’s negative answer to Question No. 5 was a material misstatement of his criminal history. On October 21, 1997, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of one count of lewd and lascivious conduct for “handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen years” (a second degree felony), one count of false imprisonment (a third degree felony), one count of aggravated assault (a third degree felony), and three counts of misdemeanor battery. On that same date, Petitioner was sentenced to two years of community control followed by eight years of probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count, two years of community control followed by three years of probation for the false imprisonment and aggravated battery counts, and one year of community control for the battery counts. The sentences ran concurrently. Petitioner is still on probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count and, as a result of his conviction on that count, he is a registered sex offender. Petitioner’s probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count runs through October 2007. The Office first learned of Petitioner’s criminal history after it received the results of the background screening conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement based upon the fingerprints submitted by Petitioner with his application. Thereafter, consistent with its standard practice, the Office requested an explanation from Petitioner regarding his criminal history. In May 2004, Petitioner provided a “Statement of Facts” to the Office in which he described the circumstances of his criminal offenses as follows: In October on a Saturday night [I] went into my stepdaughter bedroom and touch [sic] her private areas. I still think about standing at the door and knowing what I was about to do was wrong but I did it anyway. [My wife] and I were having problems and that was the last straw. I had been sleeping in our room and the tension was very high. [My wife] confronted me about what I had done and I of course denied it. The argument escalated and I lost control of my temper and threatened her if she did not shut up. I went to the bedroom and she followed me this is when I struck her the first time and told her to leave me alone. [My stepson] tried to defend his mother and I spanked him and grab [sic] him by his arms and carries [sic] him to his room. Likewise with [my stepdaughter]. I grabbed the keys to the car to leave and [my wife] told me if I took the car she would call the police and tell them that I had stolen it. I then threw the keys at her and grabbed her and threw her to the ground and told her that she would not want to get the police involved. She picked up her keys and tried to get her and the children out of the house and I would not let them leave. She pleaded with me to calm down and that I take care of the problems that I had created. I brought up the many things that she had done that had led up to that night. She told the kids to go back to their room and prepare for school the next day and that everything would be okay. I told her to go to our room and not say another word and she complied with my request. I eventually calmed down and we went to bed. The next day she took me to work as was the normal routine. Later on that day I was arrested and taken to jail. Petitioner expressed remorse for these offenses, both in the Statement of Facts and in his testimony at the final hearing. His remorse appeared to be sincere. Petitioner’s offenses were not acts of youthful indiscretion. He was 33 years old at the time and, as reflected in the Statement of Facts and as reaffirmed in his testimony at the hearing, Petitioner fully understood at the time that what he was doing was wrong. Petitioner’s offenses were extremely serious and are morally and socially reprehensible. Petitioner's stepdaughter, whose “private areas” he touched, was only 11 years old at the time, and his stepson, who he spanked and grabbed for trying to defend his mother from Petitioner, was only nine years old at the time. As Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony at the final hearing (Tr. 108, 119), the relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter involves a special amount of trust and sexual contact between an adult and an 11-year-old child -- which is the essence of his lewd and lascivious conduct offense -- is contrary to good morals. Petitioner’s original Order of Probation, entered on October 21, 1997, required him to participate in and successfully complete domestic violence counseling and sex offender counseling. Petitioner testified that he successfully completed those counseling programs. Petitioner has not undertaken any volunteer work or other community service since his offenses. He testified that his status as a sex offender on probation makes it difficult for him to do so. Petitioner remained out of trouble with the law from the time that he was placed on probation in October 1997 through October 2005, when he was arrested for an alleged probation violation. A circuit court proceeding involving the alleged probation violation was still pending at the time of the final hearing. The alleged probation violation was based upon an affidavit of Desiree Washington, who was Petitioner’s probation officer in October 2005. The affidavit stated in pertinent part: [O]n 10-20-04, [Petitioner] was instructed not to have any contact with any child under the age of sixteen unless approved by this officer or the sentencing court and [Petitioner] did fail to carry out this instruction by having contact with four of Heather Fisher [sic] children, as told to this officer on 10-4-05 by Sherri [sic] Connelly of DCF. Petitioner testified that he was never given the instructions referenced in Ms. Washington’s affidavit, and it is questionable whether those oral instructions, if given, are consistent with the written conditions of Petitioner’s probation imposed by the court.1 Those issues are being litigated as part of Petitioner’s probation violation proceeding. The information that Ms. Washington was “told . . . by Sherri [sic] Connelly of DCF” is summarized in a letter from Ms. Connelly to Ms. Washington dated October 4, 2005, which states in pertinent part: In April 2005, I advised [Ms. Fisher] that the children were not to be unsupervised with [Petitioner]. At that time they did admit that he did spend time with the children but always supervised by the mother who knows of his offense. On 9/27/05 I received a new report on the children. All four [sic] the children stated that [Petitioner] does watch them sometimes when their mother goes to work. The boys all reported that he is mean and had hit them with his hand, belt, and paddle. [D.F.] and [J.F.] also reported that he slapped and slammed [J.F.]’s head in to the ground. [J.F.] reported that [Petitioner] is at their house every night when they go to bed but not in the morning. Those allegations were based upon Ms. Connelly’s interviews with Ms. Fisher’s children, who are ages 10, seven, five, and four. Petitioner disputes the allegations in the letter, except for the first and second sentences. Petitioner’s testified that he has never had unsupervised contact with Ms. Fisher’s children and that he has never disciplined or struck the children. That testimony was corroborated by Ms. Fisher’s testimony, and there is no credible evidence to the contrary in the record because the children did not testify at the final hearing and Ms. Connelly’s testimony regarding their statements was uncorroborated hearsay.2 The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter, which resulted in Ms. Fisher’s children being removed from her custody, are being litigated in circuit court as part of a dependency proceeding involving Ms. Fisher, her children, and the Department of Children and Families. The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter regarding the alleged abuse of Ms. Fisher’s children by Petitioner are not material to the pending probation violation proceeding because Ms. Washington unequivocally testified (Tr. 180-81, 190) that Petitioner was “violated” solely for having contact with the children, and not for the alleged abuse. Petitioner had not been charged with child abuse or any other crime based upon the allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter as of the date of the final hearing, and it is unknown whether such charges are forthcoming from the local State Attorney. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s arrest for the probation violation and/or the removal of Ms. Fisher’s children were in any way connected with the Office’s review of Petitioner’s license application. There was not, as Petitioner implied in his testimony at the hearing, a conspiracy between the Office, his probation officer, and/or the Department of Children and Families against him and/or Ms. Fisher. Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his criminal offenses, and he appears to be sincere in his efforts to turn his life around. By all accounts, he has been forthcoming with his friends and employers regarding his criminal history, and he goes out of his way to comply with the conditions of his probation. Petitioner's friends testified that they would trust him with their money.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a mortgage broker’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact In his application for registration as a mortgage broker (Exhibit 2), David Stain, Petitioner, in response to question 7 "Have you any judgments against you?" answered "No". By letter dated May 12, 1980 (Exhibit 1), Respondent advised Stein that background investigation revealed numerous judgments against him and stated it would he necessary for Stein to advise why he chose to answer question 7 in the negative. After receiving no response from Stein, Respondent, on 2 July 1980, entered a Final Order denying Stein's application for registration as a mortgage broker. Grounds given in this Order were based upon numerous unsatisfied judgments entered against Stein in Pennsylvania. Exhibit 3, a composite exhibit of court records from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, shows judgements entered against David Stein and in favor of: Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (2), Diner's Club, Ford Motor Credit Company, Charles Arnold, Alan Shaffer, Carl Kronander, and CNA Financial Corporation.
