Findings Of Fact Richard H. Blake, Petitioner, was employed by the City of Tallahassee in February of 1981 as a coach operator driving a Taltran bus. During the period between February 1981 and his discharge on May 11, 1982, his attendance had not been good and in April 1982 he was issued a written reprimand (Exhibit 5). The specific incident giving rise to this reprimand was Petitioner's calling in shortly before he was due to take his bus out saying he did not feel like driving. The City has a policy that drivers must notify their supervisors at least one hour prior to the time their run is due out if they are unable to meet that scheduled commitment. The reprimand was given for Blake's failure to comply with this policy. He was directed to report for work, which he did after the supervisor had departed with Blake's bus. Blake did not claim to be sick or ask for sick leave. At the same time this reprimand was issued Blake was directed to report to the Employee Assistance Program for evaluation and help. The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for employees of the City of Tallahassee is operated by Apalachee Mental Health Services. City employees with certain problems affecting their work performance are referred to EAP for evaluation and, if desired by the employee, assistance. The evaluation is not revealed to the employer and the employee is not required to undergo treatment recommended by EAP. The employee referred to EAP is required to go for evaluation. The program is conducted at no cost to the employee and time off is given the employee to go for evaluation and treatment. This program is considered to be a fringe benefit to the employees of the City of Tallahassee. Petitioner reported to EAP as directed and embarked on a rehabilitation program with Apalachee Mental Health Services. No report of Petitioner's evaluation or treatment was made to Respondent. On Monday, May 10, 1982, Petitioner called in around 6:45 a.m. to say he was sick and did not feel like coming to work. The call was made within 30 to 45 minutes before time for his run to start and too late for a relief driver to be obtained. Blakes's supervisor told him to come to work so his bus could go out on schedule. Blake reported as directed, took his bus out and about an hour later (around 8:00 a.m.) called in from his route claiming he was sick and needed someone to relieve him. At the time this call for relief came the Superintendent of Operations, Lloyd McCoy, was at the Taltran depot and he drove a relief driver to Blake's location where Blake was relieved and driven back to the depot by McCoy. Enroute back to the depot McCoy smelled what he thought to be alcohol on Blake's breath and asked Blake if he would consent to a breathalyzer test. Blake agreed to a test and was left in the car while McCoy went into the station to make arrangements with the police. When McCoy came out to tell Blake arrangements had been made for the test, Blake had departed. Later that morning Blake reported to the Police Station but the police would not administer the breathalyzer test without his supervisor being present. Blake then went to the City of Tallahassee Personnel Office where he talked to Beulah Gregory, a Personnel Analyst with the City and Coordinator of EAP. Blake told her he had been told to take a breathalyzer test but would not go unless she went with him. Gregory called McCoy, who met her and Blake at the Police Station, where, at approximately 11:25 a.m. the breathalyzer test was taken by Blake. The test showed a reading of between .05 and .06 percent blood-alcohol. Blake testified that during the period he worked for the City of Tallahassee as a Taltran bus driver he was an alcoholic; that he had been an alcoholic for ten years but did not list this as a handicap on his employment application; that he drank every evening until midnight when he would stop drinking and go to bed so he would be able to work the following morning; that during the weekends while he was not on duty he drank all weekend; that Sunday, May 9, 1982, he drank all day and into the night; that after he went to bed that night at his girlfriend's house he started coughing and had a runny nose; that he started taking Nyquil to help his cough; that between midnight and 7:00 a.m. the following day he drank almost one and one-half bottles of Nyquil; that he did not know Nyquil contained alcohol until after he had taken the breathalyzer test; that when he called in May 10 to say he was sick he had a cough and runny nose; and that it was his cough and runny nose that necessitated him calling for a relief driver after he started his route on May 10, 1982. Between the time he was relieved at his bus until the breathalyzer test was taken Blake took one dose (one and one-half ounces) of Nyquil. A person the weight of Petitioner with the blood-alcohol reading of .055 at 11:25 a.m. related back to 8:00 a.m. when Petitioner was relieved from his run on May 10 would, in the absence of additional alcohol intake after the run started, have shown a blood-alcohol level of .11 percent at 8:00 a.m. A blood-alcohol reading of .10 percent is conclusively presumed to represent intoxication and any person driving a vehicle with that blood-alcohol level will be charged with driving under the influence. The police may arrest and charge a driver with DUI whose blood-alcohol level is .05 and above who is driving erratically or otherwise indicates something abnormal. Following receipt of the results of the blood-alcohol test on May 10, 1982, Petitioner was dismissed as a Taltran bus driver by Respondent on May 11, 1982. No evidence was presented by Petitioner to raise any inference that his race had any relation to his discharge. The evidence respecting race that was presented is that the majority of Taltran bus drivers are black and that the driver hired to replace Petitioner following Petitioner's dismissal was also black. Blake was subsequently rehired by the City of Tallahassee as a Custodian II. He contends that he is now sober and a reformed alcoholic. This testimony was not rebutted.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate Respondent's employment contract due to repeated acts of harassment, gross insubordination, and violations of Petitioner's policies.
Findings Of Fact Until her last day of work on March 15, 2004, Respondent had worked for over 13 years at Stanley Switlik Elementary School (Switlik) in Marathon. Switlik is a public school. For most of her career with Petitioner, Respondent worked as an aid in the exceptional student education (ESE) prekindergarten program. During the 2003-04 school year, Respondent worked as a 1:1 aid to a student in a varying exceptionalities class. At all material times, Respondent was classified as noncertified instructional staff. For at least the past couple of years, Respondent was dissatisfied by much of what took place around her at work and in the local education community. In the past two years, Respondent has filed complaints with three federal agencies (Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), two state agencies (Department of Education and Department of Children and Family Services), and one local agency (Petitioner). The 13 subjects of these complaints include two principals of Switlik, two superintendents of Monroe County Public Schools, various teachers and teacher aids, and a relative of her husband. The record discloses no basis for finding any merit whatsoever in any of these complaints. In June 2002, Respondent walked into a classroom at the Grace Jones Day Care Center, which is a not-for-profit school in Respondent’s neighborhood, and entered a class with sleeping preschool children. Respondent approached the new director of Grace Jones and confronted her about the school's curriculum. The bewildered director spoke to Respondent for a few moments before realizing that Respondent had no children at the school. In the ensuing weeks, Respondent continued to challenge the director about the school’s curriculum, warning her that she needed to change the curriculum or Respondent would shut down the school. One time, Respondent warned the director that “you better watch your white ass.” Seeing the director smoking a cigarette on school grounds during breaks, Respondent began videotaping the director from the street to document what Respondent viewed as illegal behavior. The purpose of Respondent’s actions is unclear, but does not seem to have been the betterment of the educational program at Grace Jones. When children in the custody of a relative of her husband attended Grace Jones, Respondent never volunteered to help at the school. However unclear the purpose of Respondent’s actions, their effect was to frighten the director, the teachers, and the students and disrupt the educational process at the school. The director eventually obtained a judicial order prohibiting Respondent from trespassing onto the Grace Jones grounds. Respondent repeatedly involved herself with the education of the two children who were in the custody of a relative of Respondent's husband. When one of the children was later attending Switlik, while Respondent was employed at the school, Respondent telephoned the child’s guardian and informed her that the child had been misbehaving in school. When the guardian called the principal, the principal stated that the child had not been misbehaving. Respondent was not an aid in the child’s classroom, and she violated Petitioner’s policy in communicating in this fashion directly to the child’s guardian. Later, in January 2004, Respondent informed the guardian and the guardian’s sister, who is the biological mother of the children, that Switlik was failing one of the children. Again, Respondent was not an aid in the child’s classroom, and she violated Petitioner’s policy in communicating in this fashion. Despite receiving a warning from the principal not to disclose confidential student information, Respondent continued to try to obtain educational information about these children, even though she had no right to such information. Frustrated that the guardian would not remove one or both of the children from Switlik, Respondent threatened to call the Department of Children and Family Services and inform them that the guardian was engaged in illegal drug use. Although she may never have followed through on this threat, she did call the Department of Children and Family Services and inform them that the children’s biological mother was residing with them and the guardian, evidently in violation of some sort of prohibition against this living arrangement. The record permits no findings as to whether the guardian was engaged in illegal drug use or the biological mother was residing with her children and the guardian, but the record permits the finding that, in both cases, the intention of Respondent in threatening to call or calling the authorities was not to correct an intolerable situation, but was to coerce the guardian to accede to Respondent's demands. While employed at Switlik, Respondent had numerous confrontations with numerous employees, including superiors. Two of the more prominent confrontations involved Respondent’s confrontation with a school bus driver, who occupied a managerial role at Switlik as to transportation, and two aids, who worked in a Head Start prekindergarten classroom at Switlik. These incidents occurred during the 2002-03 school year. The problem with the school bus driver began in 2002. Escorting one or more children to or from the school buses, as was her responsibility, Respondent entered a bus loaded with children and began directing them to sit down. When the bus driver, who was on the bus, told Respondent to leave the bus, Respondent angrily accused the bus driver of failing to discharge her duty to protect the safety of the children. After receiving complaints from the driver about Respondent and from Respondent about the driver and the students standing in the bus, the principal met with Respondent and told her not to interfere with the bus driver and her supervision of the students already on the bus. Despite the warning, Respondent later engaged in a nearly identical confrontation during the 2002-03 school year. When the principal sided again with the bus driver, Respondent demanded a meeting with the superintendent to discuss her problems with the bus driver and, now, the principal. Ignored by the superintendent, Respondent contacted a school board member and asked for a meeting. Obtaining no satisfaction from the school board member, Respondent contacted the United States Department of Education, Civil Rights Office, and Florida Department of Education with her complaints about the bus driver and the refusal of Petitioner's representatives to resolve the situation. The problem with the Head Start aids initially involved their choice of classroom attire. They wore shorts, which Respondent considered to be cut too short. Possibly arising out of Respondent's frustration at not being allowed to wear a head scarf at school, Respondent complained to the principal that the two women were allowed to wear shorts. A picture of the shorts revealed that they were not suggestive or inappropriate in length or style. To the contrary, shorts permitted the aids to perform the physical activity imposed upon them in working with young children. After Respondent complained about the aids' shorts, the aids began to lock the classroom door to prevent Respondent from taking a short-cut through the room when students were present. Respondent complained about this, but, again, the principal sided with the aids and directed Respondent to stop cutting through the occupied classroom--a directive that Respondent repeatedly ignored. Twice bested by the aids, Respondent pressed her complaints about them to higher authorities. Respondent informed the Monroe County director of Head Start of the problem. When the county director referred Respondent back to the principal, Respondent threatened to contact the Southeast Director of Head Start in Atlanta and government representatives in Washington. On October 8, 2003, the principal and other of Respondent's employees, including the Human Relations Director, participated in a meeting requested by Respondent to discuss her concerns about events that had taken place at Switlik over a period of time. At some point, the principal warned Respondent about her disruption of the school environment and her confrontational behavior. The principal warned that Respondent's unprofessional behavior would lead to termination. Respondent became belligerent and loudly denounced the Human Relations Director as a liar. Two days later, Respondent refused to sign a memorandum outlining what had taken place at the meeting. The above incidents are largely drawn from Respondent's testimony. However, there were numerous other confrontations, such as with an office manager who asked that Respondent wait a moment before the woman could get her paycheck or repeated abuse of school email to hector Petitioner's employees. There were also numerous other examples of insubordination, such as Respondent's refusal to sign a statement acknowledging Petitioner's anti-harassment policy and her refusal to sign her evaluation at the end of the 2002-03 school year, which warned that her noncompliance with Petitioner's policies was disrupting school operations. Dissatisfied with the resolution of all of these matters, Respondent also filed complaints with the Department of Health and Human Services and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission about at least some of them. Two principals over several years have tried patiently to counsel Respondent regarding her strident, uncooperative behavior. At meetings, Respondent routinely took the offensive, yelling and denouncing the participants by, among other things, claiming that the current principal was not doing her job. An endless pattern of complaints about problems perceived by no one but Respondent preceded complaints about never-commenced or incorrectly resolved investigations. The disruption upon the educational process was evident and substantial. Respondent has not been chastened by less severe job actions than termination. When Petitioner suspended Respondent for three days from April 30 to May 2, 2003, Respondent's response, upon her return to work, was to file a complaint about the principal and, after a month of inaction on her complaint, to email the superintendent and demand to know the status of his investigation of her complaint. Failing to obtain a satisfactory response from the superintendent, Respondent submitted complaints about the principal and superintendent to the Florida Department of Education. Finally, on August 14, 2003, Respondent emailed the School Board members and asked for a meeting about this problem. By undated letter in February or March 2004, Petitioner's superintendent advised Respondent that she was suspended with pay until the School Board meeting of April 1, 2004, at which he would recommend termination. The letter states that Respondent has violated Sections 1012.27(5) and 1012.33, Florida Statutes, The Code of Ethics for Education Professionals, and Petitioner's policies 6.37, 6.38, 2.70, 3.40, and 5.70. By letter dated March 22, 2004, Petitioner's superintendent advised that he would recommend at the April 1 School Board meeting that it convert Respondent's suspension with pay to a suspension without pay, pending final action on his recommendation to terminate Respondent's employment. Petitioner's policy 6.37 provides that Petitioner's superintendent may suspend an employee until the next meeting of the School Board. The policy provides a hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, to any employee who has a property interest in his or her job.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: John Padget, Superintendent Monroe County School Board Post Office Box 1788 Key West, Florida 33041-1788 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Scott E. Siverson Vernis & Bowling of the Florida Keys, P.A. 81990 Overseas Highway Islamorada, Florida 33036 Scott C. Black Vernis & Bowling of the Florida Keys, P.A. 81990 Overseas Highway Islamorada, Florida 33036 Diane Scott Post Office Box 501586 Marathon, Florida 33050
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent as a school bus driver in December, 1975. School bus drivers are part of the bargaining unit with the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, and at all times material hereto, the collective bargaining agreement between this union and the Respondent provided that employees who had not returned to work for one year following an on the job injury could be terminated without prejudice. During 1981, Petitioner was injured on the job when he twisted his back falling off a school bus, and thereafter he was determined to be disabled, and received worker's compensation benefits. Because he felt he would never be able to return to his job as a school bus driver due to his injury, Petitioner settled his claim against Respondent resulting from his 1981 injury for a lump sum payment of $15,000. In 1983, Petitioner was released by his treating physician, and applied for reinstatement with Respondent. When Respondent did not initially reinstate him, Petitioner filed a handicap discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ultimately, Respondent did rehire Petitioner during 1983 as a school bus driver, but his salary was set at the beginning level without credit for his prior experience. Petitioner continued to work as a school bus driver after he was rehired in 1983, receiving excellent performance evaluations, until April, 1985, when the bus he was driving was hit by a truck that ran a red light. In attempting to get the bus under control after it was hit, Petitioner twisted and reinjured his back. He was not at fault in this accident. Thereafter, Petitioner was again determined to be disabled, and received worker's compensation benefits. One month after his second accident, Petitioner was released by his treating physician, Dr. Patrick J. Logue, and was allowed to return to work with Respondent in May, 1985. However, after attempting to drive a school bus, and perform the other duties of a driver, Petitioner decided he could not continue working. He determined he was not physically able to do his job. Thereupon, he was referred by worker's compensation to two additional physicians, Drs. Charles D. Nach and H. G. Siek, orthopedic surgeons licensed to practice in this State. Dr. Nach prepared a medical absence report after examining Petitioner on July 5, 1985, and concluded that Petitioner would be able to return to work on that date, July 5, 1985. Petitioner did not return to work, however, and began seeing Dr. Siek in August, 1985, as well as Dr. J. Baird, a physician at the Martha Stetson Health Center, on referral by the Respondent. Respondent's Rule 6Gx52-7.05, Florida Administrative Code, authorizes the examination of injured employees at this Health Center. Dr. Baird filed a report dated October 22, 1985, indicating Petitioner could return to work, but could not lift, bend, stoop, squat, pull or push. Dr. Siek concluded that Petitioner could return to work on November 5, 1985, but with no heavy lifting. On November 14, 1985, Respondent's Assistant Transportation Director, Walter Allison, prepared a detailed description of duties a school bus driver must perform, and requested that Petitioner allow his treating physician to review this description, and provide written verification of the fact that he could, in fact, perform these duties. The parties took, and introduced in evidence, the deposition of Dr. Siek wherein Dr. Siek testified that he had reviewed Allison's letter with Petitioner on November 18, 1985, and determined that he "didn't find that these prerequisites are too strenuous if he (Petitioner) felt they were within his capabilities." There is no evidence in the record, however, that Dr. Siek's conclusion on November 18 was ever conveyed to Walter Allison or any other representative of Respondent. In late November, 1985, Petition was referred to a "work hardening" program administered by Physical Capacities, Inc. This program is used by Respondent and other employers to prepare employees who have been off the job for some time for the physical demands of their jobs, and to avoid aggravating their conditions while increasing mobility and strength. It consists of a physical assessment, training and work simulation exercises. However, after only two days in the work hardening program, Petitioner quit the program, and refused to return. He felt the exercises were aggravating his condition. Thereafter, Petitioner resumed seeing Dr. Siek, and in April, 1986, Dr. Siek concluded that Petitioner could return to work, with light duty. However, Petitioner never insured that Dr. Siek provide Respondent with a response to Walter Allison's letter of November 14, 1985, which had clearly stated that once written verifications were received from Dr. Siek and Dr. Baird that Petitioner could perform the duties of a school bus driver, he would be permitted to return to work. Petitioner completed and filed Statements of Continuing Disability from January through June, 1986, on which he indicated he was unable to return to work due to his back and hip condition. In August, 1986, Petitioner began employment with the Upper Pinellas Association for Retarded Citizens (UPARC) as a bus driver, and has been continuously employed with UPARC to the present. On December 5, 1986, Petitioner and Respondent executed a Stipulation and Joint Petition for Lump Sum Payment of his worker's compensation claim arising from the April, 1985 accident. Under the terms of this agreement, Respondent released a lien which it had against Petitioner's recovery against the driver of the truck which hit the school bus. The lien was in the amount of $21,845.71, resulting from worker's compensation benefits paid by Respondent to Petitioner, which Respondent could have collected against the $40,000 recovery Petitioner received from the tortfeasor. The parties also stipulated that maximum medical improvement was reached on April 14, 1986. The Stipulation and Agreement was approved by the Deputy Commissioner for worker's compensation. On January 16, 1987, Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination against Respondent alleging that since April, 1986, he had been denied reemployment by the Respondent due to retaliation for his filing of an earlier complaint of handicap discrimination in 1983. After investigation, the Executive Director of the Commission made a determination of "no cause" concerning Petitioner's complaint, and Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief, resulting in this hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5285 The Petitioner did not file a Proposed Recommended Order with Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 8-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 10-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 14-15. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 18-20. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 21. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony. 22-24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 25. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 26-27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 30-31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. 34-35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 38-49. Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 10, 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Moore, Esquire Gulf Coast Legal Services, Inc. 6 South Ft. Harrison Avenue Second Floor Clearwater, Florida 34616 Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Scott N. Rose, Ed.D. Superintendent Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed a discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner by virtue of Petitioner's race. (In deference to Petitioner’s preference, his race will be referred-to as "Black.")
Findings Of Fact Lenore Kimmons is an adult "White" female. She was initially hired in July 2004, in Milton, Santa Rosa County, Florida, by Laidlaw Education Services (Laidlaw) as a school bus driver. At that time, Laidlaw had the contract for driving and repairing Santa Rosa County school buses. (Stipulations 13, 14, and 15.) Effective April 1, 2005, Laidlaw and Amalgamated Transit Union (Local 1395/AFL-CIO), a mechanics’/maintenance union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement. (Stipulation 8.) This collective bargaining agreement (mechanics’ union contract) continued to be in effect when Petitioner was initially hired by Laidlaw, and by the use of executed “successor clauses,” continued in effect through the period of alleged discrimination. (Stipulation 8.) In the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, the undersigned takes the “effective date” of the mechanics’ union contract to constitute its “ratification” date, as well. Petitioner is an adult “Black” male. Laidlaw initially hired him in Milton, Florida, on September 18, 2006, as a "B Mechanic.” At that time, Laidlaw still had the contract for driving and repairing Santa Rosa County school buses. (Stipulations 1, 2, 3, and 7.) Petitioner was subject to the mechanics’ union contract, beginning with his September 18, 2006, date of hire and continuing past the alleged date of discrimination in 2008. Petitioner has had extensive heavy vehicle mechanical experience since 1989. He has worked for the United States Air Force and Department of Defense in Europe, and he supervised two vehicle maintenance shops prior to being hired by Laidlaw. He holds an Associate degree in automotive technology. Upon being hired in July 2004, Ms. Kimmons had begun work as a school bus driver (Stipulation 14) and shortly thereafter began to train as a mechanic. When she began training as a mechanic, she was reclassified into a “C Mechanic” position. As a “C Mechanic,” Ms. Kimmons ceased to be subject to the bus drivers’ union’s collective bargaining agreement and became subject to the mechanics’ union contract that eventually governed Petitioner. Sometime in 2006, Ms. Kimmons began to clerk in the office, but she continued to be classified as a “C Mechanic” and continued to be subject to the mechanics’ union contract. The mechanics’ union contract makes a distinction between employees hired before its ratification on April 1, 2005, such as Ms. Kimmons, and employees hired afterwards, such as Petitioner. It does not make a distinction based upon when one became a mechanic. The mechanics’ union contract provides, in pertinent part: MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT JOB DESCRIPTIONS/CLASSIFICATIONS ARTICLE 28 Section 1 only applies to current employees who are already employed prior to the ratification of this labor agreement. * * * “A” Mechanic – required to have a minimum of 2 years experience Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who hold a Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. Required to work with limited supervision. The employee should have good skills and who is capable of repairing bus and white fleet including brake inspections and repair. The employee is capable of assisting and instructing lower classification mechanics. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. “B” Mechanic – required to have a minimum of 3 years experience Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who assist higher classification mechanics. Work with supervision when required. Assists with inspection including all necessary repairs. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. “C” Mechanic – entry level employee(s) Is defined as maintenance employee(s) who shuttle, clean, fuel, and as otherwise directed by management. Also responsible for minor cosmetics around shop such as crush oil filters, sweep areas in need, empty trash, dip tanks, and assist mechanics if necessary with full supervision by other Management personnel. Must have and maintain a Florida CDL including “S” endorsement. * * * Section 5 As of the ratification of this AGREEMENT the job descriptions for all new hires will be as follows: * * * “A” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who holds a minimum of three (3) ASE School Bus Certifications to include at least a) Air Brake, b) Steering and Suspensions, c) Diesel Engines and a Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. The employee is required to have a minimum of 3 years of “medium/heavy duty” technician experience (“B” Mechanic level). The employee must have good skills, is capable of diagnosing and repairing school buses and white fleet including brake inspections and repair in a reasonable length of time, in a professional manner and be able to work with limited supervision. The employee is also capable of assisting and instructing lower classification mechanics. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. “B” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who holds a minimum of two (2) ASE School Bus Certifications to include at least a) Air Brake[1] and b) any of the other six (6) ASE School Bus Certifications. The employee is required to have a minimum of 2 years of “medium/heavy duty technician experience. The employee must also have good working skills, be able to assist with any inspection and all repairs as well as work with supervision when required. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. “C” Mechanic Is defined as a maintenance employee who is capable of shuttling, cleaning fueling and as otherwise directed by Management. The employee is responsible for minor cosmetics around the shop such as crush oil filters, sweep areas in need, empty trash, dip tanks and assist mechanics if necessary with supervision by other maintenance personnel. The employee must have and maintain a Florida Commercial Drivers License with an “S” Endorsement. (Emphasis supplied) At no time material has either Petitioner or Ms. Kimmons ever been a member of the mechanics’ union, but from its inception, the collective bargaining agreement between Laidlaw and the mechanics’ union applied to all mechanical employees, regardless of any employee’s union membership or lack of union membership. Petitioner has been outspoken in his refusal to join the mechanics’ union. Laidlaw was purchased by First Student, Inc., on October 1, 2007. (Stipulation 9.) Upon First Student, Inc.’s purchase of Laidlaw, Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons became employees of First Student, Inc. (Stipulation 10.) First Student, Inc., is the only Respondent in this cause. Upon First Student, Inc.’s purchase of Laidlaw, the mechanics’ union contract then in existence was carried over to bind First Student, Inc. At no time material has either Petitioner or Ms. Kimmons possessed an ASE School Bus Certification in Air Brake, an ASE School Bus Certification in Steering and Suspensions, or an ASE School Bus Certification in Diesel Engines. (Stipulations 4, 5, and 6.) Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons took the examination for the Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections in February 2008. (Stipulations 11 and 12.) Petitioner could not demonstrate that Ms. Kimmons did not have the prerequisite number of years of experience or other qualifications to sit for the examination. Petitioner’s testimony, that in February 2008, and up to the date of hearing herein, he was Respondent's only “Black” mechanic in Mechanic Classes A, B, and C, was not refuted. In February 2008, Petitioner and Ms. Kimmons both passed the Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections examination. At that time, both of them believed that successful completion of the examination would entitle them to be appointed as Class A mechanics, to a rise in pay grade, and to a $1.00/per hour raise in pay. (Stipulations 16, 17, and 18.) Lenore Kimmons requested an increase in pay and an increase in grade from “C Mechanic” to “B Mechanic” after she completed her Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. (Stipulation 16.) Petitioner requested an increase in pay and an increase in grade from “B Mechanic” to “A Mechanic,” after he completed his Florida State Certification for School Bus Inspections. (Stipulation 18.) In February 2008, Ron Kramer was the immediate supervisor of both Ms. Kimmons and Petitioner. He notified his superiors, up the line of command, that Ms. Kimmons and Petitioner had passed their February examination and that he, Mr. Kramer, believed that each of them was entitled to a rise in grade and to a commensurate raise in pay. (Stipulations 16, 17, and 18.) Approximately two months passed after the February 2008, examination, and Ms. Kimmons did not receive her requested rise in grade or raise in pay. Petitioner, likewise, did not receive any rise in grade or raise in pay. The union filed grievances on behalf of Petitioner and on behalf of Ms. Kimmons, resulting in an increase in pay and a rise to "B Mechanic" for Ms. Kimmons, but no raise and rise to “A Mechanic” for Petitioner. (Stipulations 17 and 20.) Pursuant to the union contract and Ms. Kimmons’ hire prior to its ratification, the raise/rise from Class C to Class B did not require any ASEs, but a raise/rise from Class B to Class A would have required Petitioner, who was hired after contract ratification, to have three specific ASEs that he did not possess. These ASEs were in Air Brake, Steering and Suspensions, and Diesel Engines. Ms. Kimmons had been hired in 2004, before the 2005, effective date of the collective bargaining contract for mechanics. Petitioner had been hired in 2006, after the 2005, effective date of the collective bargaining agreement for mechanics. Petitioner's rate of compensation was $12.99/hour, when his request for a raise in pay and rise in grade was denied. Had his grievance been successful, he would have received $1.00 more per each hour worked as an "A Mechanic." (Stipulation 19.) First Student, Inc., ceased all operations in Santa Rosa County, effective June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 21.) Petitioner has not been employed by First Student, Inc., since June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 22.) Most, if not all, of First Student, Inc.’s employees in Santa Rosa County, including Petitioner, were hired by Durham School Services in July 2008, at the same respective pay and grade at which they were employed by First Student, Inc., on June 30, 2008. (Stipulation 24.) Petitioner is currently employed by Durham School Services and has been so employed since July 1, 2008. (Stipulation 23.) Had Petitioner received his raise in pay and rise in grade in February 2008, under First Student, Inc., he would have continued to have received pay and all emoluments at that higher grade and rate after Durham School Services took over in July 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Seminole County School Board (Respondent) engaged in disparate treatment of Valeria Gaskin (Petitioner) such that the treatment of Petitioner constituted gender discrimination that resulted in a constructive discharge of Petitioner from her position with the school district.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who was hired by Respondent on November 25, 1991, as a school bus driver. At all times material to this case, Petitioner’s performance of her duties as a school bus driver relate to the ultimate issues of law and fact to be resolved. The employment relationship between Petitioner and Respondent was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement entitled “Agreement with the Seminole County Bus Drivers’ Association, Inc. and the School Board of Seminole County (union contract).” Respondent is the entity charged by law to operate the School District of Seminole County, Florida, and in that capacity entered into the union contract. Petitioner was charged with the responsibility of reading the union contract and complying with its terms. Petitioner acknowledged that she was directed to review the contract and familiarize herself with it not less than annually. The union contract required Petitioner to comply with school board policies related to her employment duties. Kenneth Lewis is Respondent’s Director of Transportation under whose leadership all school buses are operated and maintained. In the structure of the Transportation Department, Mr. Lewis is followed by Julie Murphy, Assistant Director of Transportation, who, in turn, supervises Area Managers who perform the daily supervision of bus drivers. At all times material to this matter, Kathy Dent was the Area Manager under whom Petitioner served. It is undisputed that Respondent’s policy prohibits the use of cell phones while driving a school bus. All school bus drivers are made aware of the policy and the policy is reiterated in the Transportation Handbook (handbook) and is discussed repeatedly throughout the school year during department meetings. Petitioner acknowledged that she was provided a handbook and knew that Respondent’s policy prohibited the use of cell phones by school bus drivers while on a school bus. On or about October 3, 2007, Ms. Dent met with the bus drivers under her charge (including Petitioner) to remind them of the policy against cell phone use while on school buses. On November 30, 2007, Ms. Dent met with Petitioner individually to advise her again that cell phone use was not permitted while driving a school bus. On January 17, 2008, Petitioner was involved in a vehicular accident and was talking on a cell phone at the time of the crash. Petitioner acknowledged that she was using a cell phone while driving on January 17, 2008, and that such use violated school board policy. In fact, because Petitioner’s school bus carried a digital video camera that recorded Petitioner’s actions on January 17, 2008, Petitioner knew that she could be terminated for cell phone use while driving a school bus. More specifically, at the time of the accident the video captured Petitioner exclaiming, "I’m going to lose my job because I’m on the cell phone." Subsequent to the accident Petitioner was on workers’ compensation/leave but returned to work to face a five-day suspension without pay for her violation of the cell phone policy. The letter advising Petitioner of the proposed punishment clearly indicated that the recommendation for a five- day suspension without pay from the Transportation Department would be forwarded to the school superintendent for review and action. The school superintendent accepted the recommendation and Petitioner was advised that she would serve the unpaid suspension on May 13, 14, 20, 21, and June 3, 2008. These were the first dates available after Petitioner returned to work. On May 7, 2008, a date that Petitioner was driving her bus on her designated route, a student complained that an ipod had been stolen. To attempt to solve the complaint, a law enforcement officer requested that the Transportation Department pull the video from Petitioner’s bus to see if it could reveal who might have taken the device. To that end, Assistant Director Murphy contacted Ms. Dent to ask her to retrieve the video and review it for the purpose requested. Ms. Dent pulled the video hard drive from Petitioner’s bus and viewed the footage for the purpose directed. Ms. Dent discovered conduct she had not expected. First, the video clearly showed that Petitioner continued to use her cell phone while on the school bus. Even in the face of her impending suspension, Petitioner disregarded the school board policy and the directives from her supervisor. Petitioner continued to talk on a cell phone while on the school bus. Second, the video clearly showed unbecoming conduct between Petitioner and another school bus driver, William Boone. During the video Mr. Boone can be seen approaching Petitioner while she is seated at the driver’s position, place his hand and arm under her skirt for an extended period of time, and then later giving her an unspecified amount of money before departing. This conduct occurred while Petitioner was in line awaiting the start of her bus duties. Students were not on the bus at the time. Given the unexpected discoveries on the video, both Petitioner and Mr. Boone were called to the transportation office to meet with Mr. Lewis. Beforehand, however, the video from Mr. Boone’s bus was retrieved to determine if any inappropriate conduct could be seen on it. The video did not disclose any such conduct. Mr. Boone was not observed using a cell phone while on his bus and no additional unbecoming conduct was depicted. On May 9, 2008, a meeting was conducted with Petitioner, Ms. Murphy, Ms. Dent, and Mr. Boone. Later Mr. Lewis joined the group. Petitioner and Mr. Boone were advised that their unbecoming conduct had been captured by the bus video. Additionally, Petitioner was advised that her continued use of a cell phone while on the school bus had also been shown on the video. The video spoke for itself. The video contained irrefutable evidence of the conduct described above. Petitioner and Mr. Boone were given the opportunity to see the video for themselves. Both employees displayed embarrassment and concern. Mr. Lewis advised Petitioner that her continued use of the cell phone was in violation of the school board policy and advised both employees that the unbecoming conduct that appeared to be of a sexual nature was also not acceptable. At some point Petitioner claimed that she and Mr. Boone had been involved in a romantic relationship for an extended period of time. Mr. Boone expressed concern that his wife would find out about the incident. Mr. Boone denied that he was engaged in sexual conduct but accepted that it appeared that way. Further, Mr. Boone who held a previously untarnished personnel record did not want to lose his job. Mr. Lewis advised both Mr. Boone and Petitioner that he would likely recommend termination for both of them. He did not ask for their resignations, did not attempt to intimidate them in any manner, but expressed concern at their lack of judgment. As to Petitioner, since the video depicted her continued use of the cell phone (an act not applicable to Mr. Boone), Mr. Lewis expressed serious issue with Petitioner’s behavior. Nevertheless, no one demanded that Petitioner resign her position with the school district. Later in the day, Petitioner and her union representative met with Mr. Lewis to review the allegations. Since Mr. Lewis did not change his position and the union did not seem supportive of her cause, Petitioner became upset. Ms. Murphy offered to speak to Mr. Lewis on Petitioner’s behalf to see if she would be eligible for another employment position within the school district. Petitioner was afforded additional opportunities to meet with her union representative and to determine what, if any, response she would make regarding the allegations. At that point in time, Petitioner knew or should have known that the conduct depicted on the bus video would lead to the recommendation from Mr. Lewis to the school superintendent that Petitioner’s employment as a bus driver be terminated. Petitioner knew or should have known based upon the previous disciplinary action against her that her supervisors could not take disciplinary action against her based upon their authority. Moreover, for Petitioner to be terminated, the school superintendent would have to make the recommendation to the school board for its action. In this case, that recommendation never happened. Instead, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to Ms. Murphy. Additionally, Petitioner stated to Ms. Murphy that she did not want Ms. Murphy to look for another employment opportunity within the school district for her. Petitioner’s letter of resignation selected May 30, 2008, as its effective date. It is undisputed that Petitioner continued to use a cell phone in violation of the school board policy despite being aware of the consequences for violation of the policy. Mr. Boone also faced disciplinary action for his part in the recorded conduct. As previously indicated, Mr. Boone had an unblemished record with the school district prior to the conduct described in this cause. He had worked for the school district almost 20 years without serious incident of any kind. Ultimately, Mr. Reichert, the Executive Director of Human Resources and Professional Standards for the Respondent, determined that there was insufficient evidence against Mr. Boone to recommend his termination to the school board. Instead, Mr. Boone was suspended without pay for five days. Mr. Boone did not challenge that decision and duly served his suspension. Mr. Boone did not admit that he had fondled Petitioner but did acknowledge that his conduct was unbecoming a school board employee. While more direct in admitting what occurred between Mr. Boone and herself, Petitioner also acknowledged that their behavior was inappropriate. Petitioner argues that both employees should have been treated similarly. Further, Petitioner maintains that Mr. Boone received better treatment, that is to say, less severe disciplinary measures, than she. Petitioner claims that her resignation was influenced by gender discrimination and ultimately a constructive discharge based upon the disparate treatment she received when compared to Mr. Boone. Petitioner did not file a complaint against the school board at the time of the incident claiming that her resignation was being coerced or was involuntarily tendered. At the time of resignation, Petitioner did not know what disciplinary action would be taken against Mr. Boone. Additionally, Petitioner knew or should have known that she could contest any disciplinary action brought against her and that she would be entitled to a hearing. Finally, Petitioner knew or should have known that her union could advise her and participate (as guided by their decision) in any disciplinary action against her based upon the terms of the union contract. Petitioner did not attempt to withdraw her letter of resignation prior to its effective date. Petitioner and Mr. Boone are no longer on friendly terms. Petitioner timely filed her claim with the FCHR seeking relief based upon gender-related disparate treatment. She maintains that conditions of her job environment constitute a constructive termination of her employment with Respondent. FCHR issued its determination of no cause and Petitioner timely pursued the instant administrative action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief as she was not treated in a disparate manner, did not experience a hostile work environment, and did not establish that she was qualified to continue her position as a bus driver for Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Serita D. Beamon, Esquire Seminole County School Board Legal Service Department 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Jerry Girley, Esquire The Girley Law Firm 125 East Marks Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Bill Vogel, Ed.D. Superintendent Education Support Center 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127
Findings Of Fact By Stipulation of Fact, the parties agreed, and it is found, that: Respondent, Janet Shrader, has been employed by the School Board of SARASOTA County for approximately seven years as a school bus aide. The job responsibilities of a school bus aide include assisting the bus driver in dealing with discipline problems and doing everything possible for the comfort of the students. School bus aides are required to have good working relationships with drivers, teachers and parents. The school bus aide is supervised by the route coordinator. Bus aides are only assigned to buses which transport students participating in the exceptional student education program. The Board provides training courses for bus drivers and bus aides by a behavior specialist. This program is designed to assist employees in acquiring skills for disciplining students in an appropriate manner. This program is titled ACT, (Aggression Control Techniques), and was developed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Janet Shrader attended the training programs for ACT conducted by behavior specialist, Linda Hall. On the morning of October 19, 1989, Janet Shrader lost her temper with Roy Sanders, a Board employee employed at the Student Center. In the course of the ensuing intercourse, she tweaked his nose with her hand, dislodging his eyeglasses, and yelled at him to, "Fuck Off, Asshole." On the afternoon of October 19, 1990, the bus on which she was riding as an aide had to return to the school. Respondent and Tony Sanders, a child classified as Severely Emotionally Disturbed, and the son of the Roy Sanders previously mentioned above, got off the bus. Ms. Shrader went with Tony to speak with Mr. Marks, the school psychologist. At this point, Ms. Cocanower, a teacher, and an aide, Ms. Rizzo, got on the bus to attempt to calm down the students who appeared to be somewhat upset. Shortly thereafter, Respondent returned with Tony and boarded the bus. She began yelling and when Ms. Cocanower heard this, she got on the bus and observed Respondent yelling at Tony who, by then, was even more upset. He was standing up saying, "I didn't do it." He was not trying to harm anyone. Ms. Cocanower attempted to take Tony's wrist but was unable to do so because Respondent grabbed the boy by the elbow from behind in a modified ACT grip and pushed him forward, at the same time yelling at Ms. Cocanower to get off the bus. At this point, Mr. Marks boarded the bus and Ms. Cocanower got off. In the opinion of Ms. Cocanower, Respondent's use of the ACT procedure was not consistent with the training received and was improper, especially when accompanied by the yelling Respondent was doing at the time. It is so found. Subsequent inquiry revealed that the incident came about when Tony was assaulted by `another child, Bobby Resnick and was responding to the attack on him. He `had not initiated the incident. Respondent did not see Resnik's kick but only Tony's response. As Respondent pushed Tony down the aisle toward the bus entrance, in the course of resisting her efforts to put him off the bus, he apparently kicked her. Whether this was by accident or on purpose is unknown. Respondent, in response, kicked back at him as he exited the bus. Her attempt to kick Tony did not connect. Had it done so, according to Detective Bank, the school resource officer who saw the incident, he would have arrested her. As it was, in his opinion, Ms. Shrader was completely out of control. She was yelling and screaming at the children and was verbally abusive. He does not recall her exact words, and refers more to the inappropriate tone of voice she was utilizing with emotionally disturbed children. There was, according to Ms. Tucker, another unusual incident relating to Respondent that same day, but earlier, in the morning. Ms. Tucker had written a referral slip on Tony Sanders to which Respondent wanted to place an addendum to the effect that Tony had been good that day, except for the referral incident. While on the bus, in front of the children, Respondent began yelling at Ms. Tucker about that situation and walked off the bus leaving Ms. Tucker alone with the children. That upset Tony. As a result of this incident, two meetings were held between Board officials and Ms. Shrader. The first was held on November 1, 1989. It was called by Vincent Laurini, Board Director of Transportation, and attended by the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources and the union representative, as well as Respondent. The second was held on November 2, 1989,after Respondent had been given an opportunity to review witness statements regarding the incident. Ms. Shrader admitted that the statements were "pretty accurate" and in a conversation with Ms. Tucker, on the bus on October l9, 1989, after the incident took place, she commented to the effect that at least if they "got" her, she wouldn't have to ride with the kids for a year. As a result of this incident, Mr. Laurini subsequently recommended Ms. S~rader be terminated for her conduct on October 19, 1989 and this action was subsequently recommended to the Superintendent. Ms. Shrader was thereafter initially suspended with by Dr. Fowler, but on November 21, 1989, the Board suspended her without pay pending termination. There is no contest by Respondent regarding the fact that the incident took place or that it happened as described. Whereas Ms. Tucker, Ms. Cocanower, Ms. Rizzo, and Detective Bang all opined that her conduct was a severe overreaction which was inconsistent with the best interests of not only Tony but all of the exceptional children dn the bus, it may have been an isolated incident. This was the first year Ms. Tucker had been riding with Respondent. A written statement from another driver who worked with Respondent for three years, and who retired from bus driving in 1988, indicates she was always very good with the children, had a good rapport with the parents and teachers, and contributed greatly to making his/her job easier. On the other hand, there is some evidence of aberrant behavior on the part of the Respondent in early March,1989 which resulted in her being evaluated by a psychiatrist at Mental Health Associates in Sarasota. The physician's report, rendered on April 4, 1989, indicated that Respondent had had psychiatric contact as early as 1966 when she was 19 and has been under continuing psychiatric care, intermittently, since that time. Her psychiatric history reflects a diagnosis of a bipolar illness, (manic-depressive), and a history of alcohol abuse. Based on this evaluation by Respondent's own psychiatrist, she was also referred to the Suncoast Mental Health Center for evaluation. In his report dated June 1, 1989, Dr. Fosser confirmed the prior diagnoses, indicating both conditions were in remission, and concluding she was ready to restart work. Dr. Fosser related he could not see, at that time, that her psychiatric symptoms would endanger the safety of the children under her custody. This opinion appears not to have been borne out by the ensuing circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing bindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the $chool Board of SARASOTA County enter a Final Order confirming its action suspending her without pay effective November 12, 1989, and dismissing her from employment with the Board. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria D. Korn, Esquire Kunkel & Miller 290 Cocoanut Avenue SARASOTA, Florida 34236 Herbert W. AbeIl, Esquire 3224 Markridge Rd. SARASOTA, Florida 34231 Janet Shrader 22 Goodrich Street SARASOTA, Florida 34236 Dr. Charles W. Fowler Superintendent of Schools Sarasota County 2418 Hatton Street Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on March 27, 2018.
Findings Of Fact On March 27, 2018, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR and alleged therein that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against him on the basis of race, national origin, and age. Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination states, in part, the following: During my time with LYNX, I satisfactorily performed the essential job duties of my position. Notwithstanding my performance, I was fired with only two weeks left on my training. I was subjected to discrimination based on my age, race and nationality as further described below. I believe I was fired because LYNX treated [me] disparately due to my Jamaican nationality and my age of 68 years. They manufactured classes of improper driving which could be disputed by all of the cameras that are on the training buses. They gave me only one week to improve my driving. Petitioner was born in 1949 and was 68 years old when he commenced his employment with Respondent. Petitioner was born and educated in Jamaica and lived in the country for a significant portion of his adult life. Respondent speaks with an unmistakable Caribbean accent. Petitioner’s ethnicity and race derive from the African diaspora, and for purposes of the instant proceeding his race is that of a Black person. On or about June 14, 2017, Respondent extended to Petitioner a conditional offer of employment to work as a full- time bus operator. The terms of Respondent’s conditional offer of employment to Petitioner provide, in part, as follows: All offers of employment are contingent upon the satisfactory completion of the following: acceptable criminal history background check and motor vehicle record, employment verification and Department of Transportation (DOT) physical examination (that is good for a minimum of one year) including a negative drug screen. All employees must complete a 120-day introductory period. Should the results be unsatisfactory, according to LYNX’ standards, your offer of conditional employment with LYNX will be reviewed and may be revoked. The job description for Petitioner’s position as a bus operator provides as follows: JOB SUMMARY: Bus Operators transport passengers by operating any type of motor coach on regularly scheduled links and chartered service, observing all state and municipal traffic laws, observing all safety rules and strictly adhering to time schedules. DUTIES: Performs DOT pre-trip inspections. Answers passenger questions courteously. Calls out stops. Issues slips for fare refunds. Issues and collects transfers. Observes all state and municipal traffic laws. Observes all safety rules. Strictly adheres to time schedules. Monitors fare and ticket collection. Verifies that appropriate passes are being used. Writes daily reports such as transfers collected, coach mileage, special fares and tickets collected, time cards for hours worked and completes memorandum cards. Completes trouble card for mechanical difficulties of bus assigned. Performs other duties of similar nature as may be required. Completes Bus Condition Reports. REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITIES: Skills in customer service. Ability to effectively communicate in English, both verbally and in writing. Ability to physically sit for extended periods of time. Ability to pass a drug screen. Must possess a valid Florida Commercial Driver License (CDL), Class A or B with a Passenger endorsement and airbrakes. Ability to communicate in English on the work site. Ability to maintain DOT physical for one year. MINIMUM EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE: Must be at least 21 years of age. High School diploma or GED required. Clean driving record. Full-time: Ability to work days, nights, weekends, holidays, split shifts, split days off and any hours assigned. Part-time: Ability to work mornings, afternoons and/or weekends. Not allowed to work over 30 hours per week. This description in no way states or implies that these are the only duties to be performed by the employee occupying this position. Employees will be required to follow any other job-related instructions and to perform any other job-related duties requested by their supervisor. Petitioner, as a condition of employment, was required by Respondent to complete an employment application. Petitioner noted on his employment application that he worked as a “Driver Guide” for Holland Alaska Princess for the period March 17, 2016, through May 24, 2016. According to Petitioner, his primary duties with Holland Alaska Princess were driving “tourists to scenic and historical locations in Alaska, USA, Yukon and British Columbia in Canada and informing guests on the highlights and history of each location toured.” Other than his employment at Holland Alaska Princess, Petitioner did not list on his LYNX employment application other jobs or experiences which required that he possess a CDL, Class A or B, with a passenger and airbrakes endorsement. According to the “experience questionnaire” completed by Petitioner during his LYNX new employee orientation, Petitioner noted that he had possessed his “CDL with passenger endorsement” for 16 months, and over the “course of [his] CDL career” had only driven an “MCI coach bus” for three months. Although Petitioner met the minimum qualification of possessing a valid CDL with appropriate endorsements, he, nevertheless, had limited practical experience in the operation of buses such as those operated by Respondent. On or about August 23, 2017, Petitioner, after completing the employment related background check and related matters, was hired by Respondent as a full-time bus operator. As a condition of employment, Respondent required Petitioner to attend “LYNX Training University (LTU).” Wilfredo Acosta, for more than seven years, has worked as a training instructor at LTU where he conducts “new operator” training sessions. According to Mr. Acosta, LTU is not a driving school where employees are taught how to drive a bus, but is, instead, an assessment opportunity where LYNX evaluates its new employees to ensure that they have “basic knowledge” regarding the proper way to operate buses utilized by the company. On September 15, 2017, less than a month after being hired, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment with the company due to “unsatisfactory job performance.” Maria Colon, who works as Respondent’s manager of organizational development and training, outlined in a memorandum to Petitioner the company’s reasons for the employment decision. The memorandum provides as follows: On September 8, 2017, you met with the manager and trainer concerning your unsafe driving practices. Your daily student operator evaluation forms were reviewed with you and the following dates were discussed: 8/28 Right turns too short, jumped a curb and drifted to the right side not maintaining the bus centered. 8/29 Right turns too short, jumped a curb and drifted to the right. 8/31 Right turns too short and jumped curb. 9/7 Right turns too short not using pivot point. 9/8 Unsatisfactory report was given for not slowing down for school zone when yellow light was flashing. Continued to make right turns too short with contact to the curb. Continued to drift to the right and did not maintain proper hand position on steering wheel or use of mirrors. At that time you stated that you were a driver for a long time and you knew how to drive. I informed you that LYNX’ priority is safety and my job was to ensure only those students that demonstrate consistent, safe driving practices would graduate from the LYNX Bus Operator Training Program. You felt the trainers were targeting you and [you believed that] with time you can improve. We agreed to give you until Friday, September 15th to improve your driving. If no improvement was noticed you would be terminated from the program. On September 15, 2017, you once again met with the manager and trainer to review your progress: 9/13 Unsatisfactory report for improper securing of the bus. Unsatisfactory report for obstructing traffic at an intersection. Continued to make right turns too short and jumped the curb. 9/15 Continued to drift to the right side not maintaining the bus centered. Failed to properly signal when approaching railroad crossing. Since you have continued to have unsafe driving practices with no signs of improvement, I have decided to terminate you from the LYNX Bus Operator Training Program. During the evaluation period referenced above, Petitioner’s driving deficiencies were personally observed by LYNX employees Karamchand Lowhar, Charles Rapier, Wilfredo Acosta, and Margaret McCoy. Each employee credibly testified during the final hearing regarding Petitioner’s driving deficiencies, and their testimony is credited. Petitioner contends that he is a bus driver of considerable experience, and the driving deficiencies cited by LYNX employees are exaggerated, fabricated, or both. Petitioner asserts that each of his bus training sessions was video- recorded, and that the most credible evidence of his driving performance lies therein. There is no indication that when Petitioner met to discuss his driving deficiencies with Respondent on or about September 8, 2017, he specifically requested either then, or thereafter, that the video recordings of his driving performance be evaluated and preserved. The evidence establishes Respondent’s vehicle video recording system preserves video for 30 days, and after such period, the video recordings are overwritten with new footage. Petitioner’s testimony that he has extensive commercial driving experience is undercut by the employment application and experience questionnaire that he completed as part of the pre- employment process. Petitioner admits in both documents that he has very limited experience with operating a bus. Petitioner, however, in prosecuting the instant action, and in his pre- termination meeting with Ms. Colon on September 15, 2017, represented that he is a bus driver of considerable experience. These inconsistencies are damaging to Petitioner’s credibility. Petitioner’s credibility also suffers from his factually inaccurate statement regarding when his employment was terminated in relation to the end-point of his 120-day probationary period. Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination states that he “was fired with only two weeks left on [his] training.” Petitioner attempts to bolster his claim of discrimination by inferring that for more than three months, he met, or even exceeded, Respondent’s performance expectations, and that Respondent’s discriminatory animus was only revealed when Respondent, without sufficient justification, terminated his employment as a bus operator. The evidence establishes, however, that Petitioner was hired on or about August 23, 2017, and his employment with LYNX ended approximately three weeks later because of his poor performance during bus operation training sessions. Petitioner’s suggestion that he was meeting, or even exceeding, Respondent’s performance expectations during his probationary period is not supported by the evidence. Other than Petitioner’s testimony, which is not credible, there is no proof, either circumstantial or direct, that Respondent’s asserted grounds for terminating Petitioner’s employment are merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, LYNX Transportation, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Leebert Lawrence, and denying Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Leebert Lawrence Apartment 211 7511 Solstice Circle Orlando, Florida 32821 (eServed) Cindy Ann Townsend, Esquire Bell & Roper, P.A. 2707 East Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32803 (eServed) Michael John Roper, Esquire Bell & Roper, P.A. 2707 East Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32803 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether the Lee County School Board may terminate Respondent's employment as a school bus driver based upon the conduct alleged in the Petition for Termination.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing and the matters officially recognized, the following findings are made: The School Board is the governing body of the local school district in and for Lee County, Florida. In January 2003, Respondent was employed by the School Board as a school bus driver. Respondent had been in that position since April 2000. Respondent's employment with the School Board is governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the Support Personnel Association of Lee County and the School Board (hereafter "SPALC Agreement"). On January 27, 2003, Respondent's supervisor, Joe Howard, received a note from Respondent which stated that Respondent was "going through a lot of problems (personal)" and that he "can't work today." The note was delivered to Mr. Howard's office by one of Respondent's relatives. The note did not expressly request leave and it stated that Respondent "will give [Mr. Howard] more details when [he] come[s] back to work." Respondent never contacted Mr. Howard to explain his absence, nor did Respondent report for work at any point after January 27, 2003. Mr. Howard subsequently learned that Respondent had not returned to work because he was in jail. Respondent never filled out the School Board's leave request form, nor did he get approval for his leave on January 27, 2003, or thereafter. School Board policy specifically requires requests for leave to be made and approved in advance of the period of leave. The policy has an exception for "sickness or other emergencies," but that exception is not implicated in this case. On January 29, 2003, Respondent was arrested by the Lee County Sheriff's office after he was involved in a confrontation with his girlfriend on the Mid Point bridge in Lee County. Respondent was charged with four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of false imprisonment. Each of those offenses is a third-degree felony. Respondent was taken to jail after his arrest. He remained in jail through March 5, 2003. All of the charges against Respondent except the false imprisonment and one count of aggravated assault were subsequently "dropped." Respondent is currently awaiting trial on the remaining charges. Upon learning of Respondent's arrest and the nature of the allegations against him, Mr. Howard had serious concerns regarding Respondent's ability to work as a bus driver. Mr. Howard was particularly concerned that parents would be uncomfortable with Respondent transporting their children in light of Respondent's alleged failure to follow the law. Mr. Howard considers compliance with the law to be a paramount duty of a bus driver. In accordance with School Board policy and the SPALC Agreement, the School Board investigated the circumstances surrounding Respondent's absence and arrest, as well as other unrelated allegations of misconduct by Respondent. The findings of the investigation were discussed at a duly-noticed pre-determination conference held on March 6, 2003. The purpose of the pre-determination conference is to give the employee an opportunity to respond to the allegations against him or her. Respondent attended the pre-determination conference and spoke on his own behalf. Respondent confirmed that he was arrested on January 29, 2003, and that he was in jail until March 5, 2003. Respondent also provided his version of the events surrounding his arrest. On March 24, 2003, the Superintendent informed Respondent that he was suspended from his position based upon the findings of the investigation and the pre-determination conference. The suspension was retroactive to March 6, 2003, which was the first day that Respondent could have reported to work after his release from jail. Also on March 24, 2003, the School Board's director of human resources informed Respondent that there was probable cause to discipline him for his conduct and that she was recommending that Respondent be terminated from his position. Thereafter, Respondent timely requested an administrative hearing. Respondent's employment contract with the School Board expired on May 29, 2003. His contract was not renewed for the 2003-04 school year as a result of a number of performance deficiencies cited in Respondent's annual assessment. Those performance deficiencies were not directly related to Respondent's arrest. Notice of this proceeding was provided to Respondent at the address he gave to the School Board at the pre- determination conference. Respondent received certified mail from the School Board at that address during the course of this proceeding. Respondent failed to appear at the final hearing despite having been given due notice of its date, time, and location.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Lee County School Board issue a final order that terminates Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may suspend Respondent for 30 calendar days without pay for driving a school bus while her driver license was suspended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a school bus driver for 14 years. In January, 2013, Respondent committed three toll violations. Initially, she could have paid $22.50 to have resolved these violations, but Respondent failed to do so. Unpaid, the violations matured into citations that required a court appearance. Respondent received a summons to appear in court on February 19, 2013, but Respondent failed to do so. Respondent then received a notice that her driver license would be suspended effective March 11, 2013. In late February, Respondent hired an attorney to clear up the matter. On February 28, the attorney appeared in court and obtained a disposition of the three citations. However, for some reason, the Clerk's office did not process the paperwork correctly, so the March 11 suspension was not lifted. On March 11, 2013, which was a Monday, Respondent reported to work and drove her bus. She did not conduct a driver license check prior to reporting to work, but she did so later that morning, at which time she learned that her license had been suspended. Respondent called her attorney and informed him that her license had been suspended. He said that it should not have been and, the next day, visited the Clerk's office and cleared up the confusion. After being suspended March 11-13, Respondent's driver license was reinstated without any costs effective March 14, 2013. In the meantime, knowing that her license had been suspended, Respondent drove her school bus on the afternoon of March 11. Due to the driver-license suspension, Respondent did not report to work on March 12, but she did on March 13 and, either knowing that her license was still suspended or in conscious disregard of the status of her license, drove the bus in the morning and afternoon. Petitioner's Handbook for School Bus Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff, dated July 2012 (Handbook), provides that drivers "must at all times maintain a valid Commercial Driver's License," and "[o]perating a bus with a suspended, expired, or revoked license shall be grounds for suspension or dismissal . . . ." Handbook, p. 10. School Board Policy 8600 incorporates by reference the Handbook. Also, the collective bargaining agreement covering Respondent acknowledges that noncompliance with any School Board policy, if not serious enough to warrant dismissal, may be a ground for suspension of the employee for up to 30 calendar days without pay.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order suspending Respondent for 30 calendar days without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Sara M. Marken, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Barbara A. Roberts 3120 Northwest 161st Street Miami Gardens, Florida 33054 Matthew Carson, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Pam Stewart, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Alberto M. Carvalho, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132-1308
