The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1, 1960, through January 1975.
Findings Of Fact Until January 1975, the Florida Retirement System and its predecessor, the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS), were contributory retirement plans, in which state employees contributed a portion of their wages toward their retirement benefits. In January 1975, FRS became a non-contributory retirement plan, in which the employer paid all contributions to the plan. On February 1, 1960, Petitioner, who was then known as Rebecca Jamis or James Lee, began her state employment at Florida State Hospital (FSH), located in Chattahoochee, Florida. During her employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the state’s retirement plan and contributed $2,188.01 to that plan. In 1980, Petitioner was convicted of a felony offense and was sentenced to prison. She began serving her sentence in state prison in June 1980. Due to her imprisonment, Petitioner’s employment at FSH terminated on July 29, 1980. At some unknown date, Respondent received form FRS-M81 requesting a refund of Petitioner's contributions to the state’s retirement plan. Pursuant to the state's document retention policy, the original form was destroyed many years ago with a microfilmed copy of the front of the form retained by DMS. The microfilmed copy of this form does not reflect the date the form was signed. Additionally, except for the agency number and various signatures, information contained in the refund request form was typed in. The date of termination of Petitioner’s employment was also typed on the form, indicating the form was completed after Petitioner was imprisoned. More importantly, the form was purportedly signed by Petitioner with the name she used at the time. However, the address on the request was not Petitioner’s residence but was the 1980 address of Florida State Hospital Credit Union. At the time, Petitioner had a loan at the credit union, although she denies having an account there. Petitioner also did not hear any more from the Credit Union about her loan and does not know what happened to it. The regularly kept records of the Division indicate that on November 4, 1980, pursuant to this request for refund, Respondent issued Warrant No. 264829 in the amount due Petitioner for a refund of her retirement contributions. The warrant was issued to Petitioner and mailed as instructed to the address of the credit union. Again due to the passage of time, a copy of this warrant is no longer available. Moreover, the credit union records are not available. However, Charlene Fansler performed a search of un- cashed state warrants for Warrant No. 264829. The warrant was not on the list of warrants that remained outstanding. Further, the warrant had not escheated to the State as abandoned property. As such, the evidence demonstrated that the warrant was paid by the State. In 1990, at the age of 60 and several years after her release from prison, Petitioner requested a refund of her retirement contributions. On May 24, 1990, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request based on the 1980 refund of those contributions. At the time, Respondent did not advise Petitioner of her chapter 120 hearing rights; and therefore, did not provide Petitioner with a clear point of entry for an administrative hearing. However, Petitioner was clearly aware that DMS claimed that she had been issued a refund of her contributions and was, therefore, not entitled to a further refund. Petitioner took no action in 1990 even though she did not personally receive the 1980 refund because and claimed to not have signed the refund request form. In 2012, 32 years after the 1980 warrant was issued and 22 years after the 1990 denial of her request for refund, Petitioner, at the age of 82, again requested a refund of her retirement contributions based on her claim that she did not sign the 1980 refund request form and the fact that she did not personally receive the refund warrant. Respondent submitted the microfilmed copy of the signed refund request form and known handwriting exemplars of Petitioner's signature to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) laboratory for analysis. Kesha White, a handwriting analyst with FDLE, analyzed the documents and concluded that they were more likely than not signed by the same person. Her finding was not conclusive due to the limits of analyzing signed documents preserved on microfilm. Indeed, the signatures on the refund form and the known handwriting samples of Petitioner's signature are very similar and appear to be by the same person. In this case, the better evidence demonstrates that Petitioner signed the 1980 refund request form and, due to the passage of time, has simply forgotten that she did so. By signing that form, Petitioner instructed Respondent to issue and mail the warrant to the address for the credit union listed on the form. Respondent complied with that request. Given these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to another refund of her retirement contributions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was issued a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1960, through January 1975, and dismissing Petitioner's request for hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Rebecca Thomas 1929 Hamilton Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, by pleading no contest to four counts of petit theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, despite steadfastly maintaining her innocence, must forfeit her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Division of Retirement is charged with the responsibility of managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on behalf of the Department of Management Services. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 1.) FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. As such, Respondent had deemed its action regarding the forfeiture of Petitioner's rights and benefits under FRS subject to administrative review. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 2.) Petitioner is a senior management service class member of FRS. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 3.) At all times material to the allegations of this case, Petitioner was employed by the Town of Callahan as a planning and zoning administrator. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 4.) On or about August 23, 2005, the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, through an assistant, filed a Third Amended Information charging Petitioner with (a) one (1) count of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (b) two (2) counts of grand theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes; (c) nineteen (19) counts of official misconduct, contrary to the provisions of Section 839.25(1), Florida Statutes; and (d) one (1) count of petit theft, contrary to the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 5.) The events that formed the basis for the Third Amended Information occurred during Petitioner's tenure as an employee of the Town of Callahan. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 6.) The Third Amended Information outlines the violations to which Petitioner pled no contest and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: COUNT 1: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between May 10, 2001 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or gasoline, the value of $300.00 or more but less than $20,000.00, the property of the TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefits therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 2: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with El Nino Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6M- 04-55-02-G16, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . COUNT 3: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 1999 and September 30, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency, the value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN received in accordance with Housing Rehabilitation Community Development Block Grant 00DB-6B-04-055-02-H09, with intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . * * * COUNT 23: BARBARA F. BOONE on or between October 1, 2000 and January 31, 2002, in the County of Nassau and the State of Florida, did knowingly obtain or use, or endeavor to obtain or use U.S. currency or cellular phone service, valued at One-Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or more but less than Three- Hundred Dollars ($300.00), the property of THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN, with intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive THE TOWN OF CALLAHAN of a right to the property or benefit therefrom, or with the intent to appropriate the property to her own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto . . . (Joint Stipulation of Fact 9.) Count 1 related to alleged misuse of a City gasoline credit card. Count 2 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the El Nino Block Grant. Count 3 related to alleged dual billing of hours for the HUD Block Grant. Count 23 related to alleged misuse of a City cell phone. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 10-12.) Petitioner had filed a civil action against the City concerning all these issues before she was charged with them as crimes. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea agreement with the State of Florida, wherein she acknowledged she would plead no contest (nolo contendere), while maintaining her innocence, to the "lesser included" offense of petit theft contained in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 23 of the Third Amended Information. The agreement provided, however, that Counts 1, 2, and 3 would be reduced to the lesser-included misdemeanor counts of petit theft, in violation of the provisions of Section 812.014(2)(e), Florida Statutes, and Counts 4 through 22 would be dismissed. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 7.) The first sentence of the plea agreement reads as follows: I hereby enter my plea of no contest for the reason it is in my best interest although I maintain my innocence. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 8.) On or about March 7, 2006, Petitioner pled no contest in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 10.) During the plea dialogue, which included inquiry by the circuit judge taking the plea to ascertain if the accused understood the charges and was entering the plea voluntarily, Petitioner articulated that she was innocent of all charges. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 5-13.) In accepting a nolo contendere plea and its concomitant plea agreement, a circuit judge is required to inquire and determine if there is a "factual basis" for the charges. To those types of questions at Petitioner’s plea dialogue Petitioner's counsel replied: . . . just for our purposes we do not agree that any of those facts are true, but we do agree, if they were true they would constitute a sufficient factual basis. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, pages 12-13.) The circuit judge then stated on the record: The Court finds that there is sufficient factual basis to support the pleas, and that the pleas have been entered into freely, willingly, and voluntarily. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Transcript, page 13.) Judge Robert Foster, Circuit Court Judge in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Nassau County, Florida, ordered that adjudication of guilt be withheld for good cause shown. Petitioner was ordered to pay $8,260 in restitution to the Town of Callahan and $386.00 in court costs. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 11.) The state attorney then entered a Code 30 nolle prosequi in accordance with the plea agreement. (Exhibit 4: Circuit Court Hearing Transcript, page 13.) On or about August 17, 2006, Respondent received from its legal counsel a report recommending that Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits be forfeited pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 12.) On August 21, 2006, Respondent approved the forfeiture of Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 13.) On August 28, 2006, Respondent notified Petitioner, by agency action letter, of the forfeiture of her FRS rights and benefits and afforded Petitioner a point of entry to challenge its decision and to request an administrative review of the issues. (Joint Stipulation of Fact 14.) The Agency conducted an informal proceeding on or about February 19, 2007. At that hearing, Petitioner maintained, under oath, her innocence with regard to all criminal charges that had been alleged against her, including those to which she had pled "no contest." She further testified that she was not guilty on all counts and had pled "no contest" to some of the criminal charges because the stress of the criminal process had been taking a toll on her and her family. The stress on Petitioner was exacerbated by a mastectomy and her subsequent treatment for breast cancer conducted during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the plea bargaining, and the plea itself. (Exhibit 9: Informal Hearing Transcript, pages 10-14.) After the informal proceeding, the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for proceedings consistent with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Herein, Respondent presented no evidence refuting Petitioner's testimony and no evidence of her guilt in relation to the charges to which she had pled nolo contendere.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order determining that Petitioner’s rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System have not been forfeited and reinstituting those benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Sally T. Sperling commenced teaching for the Leon County School Board in 1969 as an elementary teacher at Sabal Palm Elementary School. Following maternity leave and absences to continue her education, Mrs. Sperling returned to the Leon County School System in 1971 as a full-time teacher and subsequently gained continuing contract status before resigning in 1976. In 1978 Petitioner submitted an application (Exhibit 5) for part-time employment with the Leon County School System in which she indicated a desire to work "perhaps, three days per week. She was employed in the Adult Education Program at Lively Vocational-Technical School in Tallahassee teaching remedial reading. The form contract used by the Leon County School Board for Petitioner's employment is the same that is used for all instructional personnel. The contract purported to run for one year and Petitioner was paid on an hourly basis, with no minimum or maximum hours specified. Full-time teachers are hired on an annual basis. Some of the teachers in the Adult Education Program are full-time teachers and are on annual or continuing contracts. Most of the teachers in the Adult Education Programs are part-time teachers and are paid only for the hours they teach. Petitioner taught remedial reading classes and sufficient interest in this course has been maintained so the program has continued semester after semester for the four years Petitioner has taught adult education courses. Other Adult Education Programs in which sufficient interest has not developed have been dropped. Funding for Adult Education Programs depends upon the number of students attending the classes. If this number drops below the number required to keep the course self-sufficient, the course will be dropped. In such a case the teacher of the course will not remain on the Leon County payroll, as no hours will be devoted to teaching this course. Unless an actual course is taught, the part-time teacher is not paid. Teachers on annual contracts are paid for the full year regardless of the number of hours of classes taught. At the time Petitioner was hired she was given a packet of information (Exhibit 7) but was not specifically told that part-time teachers are not eligible for the Florida Retirement System. During the four years Petitioner has been employed as a part-time teacher she has had no social security deductions taken from her pay and has earned no annual or sick leave. Pursuant to an agreement between the state and federal governments all members of the Florida Retirement System are covered by social security and FICA deductions are taken from their pay. This deduction is indicated on the check stub given to the employee with each pay check. State employees not under the Florida Retirement System and not specifically made parts of the Social Security System are not covered by social security. Full-time teachers are considered salaried employees holding a regularly established position. They are paid from funds provided in the "100" account. Part-time employees are designated as Other Personal Services (OPS) and are paid from funds in the "700" account. These accounting codes are established by the Department of Education to provide uniformity in accounting in the various school systems. The accounting code designation from which fund the employee is paid gives a quick reference to the status of the employee. When the pay records show Petitioner is paid from "751" funds, there will be no state retirement or FICA contributions from the code that disburses those funds. When the Florida Retirement System replaced older state retirement systems, some confusion developed regarding the status of personnel hired temporarily and retained on the payroll for an extended period. This confusion carried over to part-time teachers in the Adult Education Programs throughout the state. Some of the counties placed these part-time teachers in the Florida Retirement System where they have been covered for nearly ten years. The Division of Retirement is in the process of removing those people from the retirement system. At the time Petitioner wads hired she did not believe she was eligible for the Florida Retirement System and no FICA deductions were ever taken from her pay. After a visiting friend advised her she might be eligible for the Florida Retirement System Petitioner initiated the inquiries that led to these proceedings.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Verna M. Johnson, terminated all employment with a Florida Retirement System employer, or employers, as defined in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes, when she concluded or terminated her "DROP" participation and therefore whether she actually, finally retired.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School Board in 1998 and 1999 and prior to that time. She was a regular class member of the FRS who begin participating in the DROP program on August 1, 1998. Thereafter, on July 9, 1999, the Petitioner terminated her employment with Alachua County Schools to begin receiving her DROP accumulation and her monthly FRS retirement benefits. The Petitioner and her husband had founded the Caring and Sharing Learning School (Charter School) back on January 28, 1998, while the Petitioner was employed by the Alachua County School District and had not yet retired or entered the DROP program. She was a full-time FRS employee with the Alachua County School system. The Charter School was not then an FRS employer, nor were retirement contributions made on the Petitioner's behalf by the Charter School. She worked most of the ensuing year after entering the DROP program, and on June 9, 1999, ended her employment relationship by exercising her resignation from the Alachua County School District employment, at which point she began receiving FRS benefits and her DROP accumulation. Thereafter, on July 16, 1999, the Director of State Retirement for the FRS, and the Charter School, entered into an agreement for admission of the Charter School to the FRS as an FRS employer. It had not been an FRS-enrolled employer before July 16, 1999, slightly over a month after the Petitioner had terminated her employment with the school district and began receiving her DROP accumulation and retirement benefits. That agreement provided that the effective date of admission of the Charter School into the status of an FRS employer (with attendant compulsory FRS membership by all employees) was related back with an effective date of August 24, 1998. The record does not reflect the reason for this earlier effective date. The Petitioner continued to work as an administrator with the Charter School even through the date of hearing in 2005. The Division performed an external audit of the Charter School during the week of March 15, 2004. In the process of that audit the Division received some sort of verification from the school's accountant to the effect that the Petitioner was employed as an administrator and had been so employed since August 24, 1998. Because of this information, the Division requested that the Charter School and the Petitioner complete "employment relationship questionnaires." The Petitioner completed and submitted these forms to the Division. On both questionnaires she indicated that the income she receives from the school was reported by an IRS form W-2 and thus that the employer and employee-required contributions for employees had been made. She further indicated that she was covered by the school's workers' compensation policy. On both forms the Petitioner stated that her pay was "more of a stipend than salary." On the second form she added, however, "when it started, at this time it is salary." She testified that she was paid a regular percentage of her total income from the Charter School before her DROP termination and the stipend after. She added that she just wrote what she "thought they wanted to hear" (meaning on the forms). The check registers provided to the Division by the Petitioner also indicate "salary" payments for "administrators" in September 1999. It is also true that the Petitioner from the inception of the Charter School in January 1998, and was on the board of directors of the Charter School corporation. According to the Division, the Petitioner was provided at least "three written alerts" by the Division that she was required to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers for at least one calendar month after resignation, or her retirement would be deemed null and not to have occurred, requiring refund of any retirement benefits received, including DROP accumulations. The Division maintains that based on the material provided it by the Petitioner, that the Petitioner was an employee of the Charter School from August 24, 1998 (the date the "related-back agreement" entered into on July 16, 1999, purportedly took effect) through at least May 12, 2005. It is necessary that a member of the FRS earning retirement service credits, or after retirement or resignation, receiving retirement benefits have been an "employee," as that is defined in the authority cited below, in order for the various provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and related rules to apply to that person's status. This status is determinative of such things as retirement service credit contributions and benefits, including DROP benefits, entitlement, and accumulations and the disposition made of them. In any event, the Division determined that the Petitioner had been an employee of the Charter School, as referenced above, and took its agency action determining that the Petitioner failed to terminate all employment relationships with all FRS employers (that is she kept working for the Charter School) before and during the month after resignation from the Alachua County School Board and continuing through May 12, 2005, as an employee in the Division's view of things. Therefore, because she was still employed by an FRS employer during the calendar month of July 1999 (only because of the agreement entered into between the Charter School and the division director on July 16, 1999,) her retirement (which had ended her employment with the Alachua County School System) was deemed null and void. The Division thus has demanded that she refund all retirement benefits and DROP accumulations earned or accrued between the date of entry into DROP which was August 1, 1998, through approximately May 12, 2005. This apparently totals approximately $169,000.00.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, determining that the Petitioner's retirement was effective and lawful, that she was entitled to the retirement benefits accrued and paid from June 9, 1999, forward, including the DROP accumulations that accrued up from August 1, 1998, until that date. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Verna M. Johnson 3432 Northwest 52nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32605 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner has forfeited her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Respondent is the Florida agency responsible for management and operation of the FRS. At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed as a teacher by the Brevard County School Board (BCSB). The BCSB is an FRS-participating employer. Because of her employment, the Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS. On or about June 25, 2008, the Petitioner was arrested and charged with the following offenses: Twenty counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 794.05(1), Florida Statutes; One count of lewd or lascivious conduct, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(6)(a)1., Florida Statutes; One count of lewd or lascivious exhibition, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(7)(a), Florida Statutes; One count of lewd or lascivious molestation, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(5)(c), Florida Statutes; One count of lewd or lascivious battery, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 800.04(4)(a), Florida Statutes; and One count of delivery of cannabis to a minor, a second degree felony, in violation of Section 893.13(4)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes. The victim of the alleged crimes was a male who had been temporarily incarcerated at the Brevard Regional Juvenile Detention Center (Center). As an employee of the BCSB, the Petitioner taught science, English, and health education to detainees incarcerated at the Center. The victim was a student in the Petitioner's classroom during his incarceration at the Center. The Petitioner engaged in sexual activity with the victim between May 16, 2008, and June 19, 2008, after the victim had been discharged from the Center. The evidence fails to establish the manner in which the Petitioner and the victim made initial contact after his discharge from the Center. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was coerced or required to engage in sexual activity with the victim. On at least one occasion, the sexual activity occurred in the Petitioner's home. On July 7, 2008, the BCSB commenced proceedings to terminate the Petitioner's employment as a teacher. On July 14, 2008, the Petitioner resigned from her employment with the BCSB. In February 2010, the Petitioner executed an agreement to plead guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a second degree felony, in violation of section 794.05(1), Florida Statutes, and one count of making a false report to law enforcement officers, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 837.05(1), Florida Statutes. On February 7, 2011, the Petitioner's plea agreement was filed in court, and the Petitioner was adjudicated guilty. The BCSB thereafter referred the matter to the Florida Department of Education, Office of Professional Practices. As a teacher, the Petitioner was subject to jurisdiction of the Education Practices Commission, pursuant to section 1012.795, Florida Statutes, and was required to comply with the Code of Ethics for the Education Profession in Florida (Code of Ethics) and with the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida (Principles of Professional Conduct). The Petitioner was an authority figure to her students at the Center. According to the Principles of Professional Conduct, she had an obligation to protect students from conditions harmful to learning and harmful to their health and safety and an obligation to refrain from exploiting a relationship with a student for personal gain or advantage. On May 11, 2011, the Florida commissioner of education filed an Administrative Complaint before the Education Practices Commission alleging that the Petitioner had violated provisions of the Code of Ethics and the Principles of Professional Conduct and seeking to impose a disciplinary penalty against the Petitioner's educator's certificate. On December 14, 2011, the Petitioner surrendered her educator's certificate for permanent revocation. On January 5, 2012, the Education Practices Commission issued a Final Order permanently revoking the Petitioner's educator's certificate. When the Petitioner was charged with the crimes referenced herein, the Respondent suspended the Petitioner's FRS rights and benefits and provided proper notice of the suspension to the Petitioner. After the Petitioner was adjudicated guilty, the Respondent notified Petitioner that her FRS rights and benefits had been forfeited as a result of the plea. The Petitioner timely requested an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension and forfeiture. The Petitioner has not retired from the FRS and is not receiving FRS retirement benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that the Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to section 112.3173 and directing the forfeiture of her FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Charles L. Handlin, Esquire Handlin and Hefferan, P.A. 12 North Summerlin Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is who is entitled to payment of remaining retirement benefits due to James E. Brandon, deceased.
Findings Of Fact James E. Brandon was employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department and was a participant in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Brandon had a long standing relationship with Dennis A. Barga. In February 1995, James E. Brandon applied for FRS disability benefits due to a medical condition. On the application for disability benefits, James E. Brandon designated Dennis A. Barga as his primary beneficiary. The application for disability benefits was approved in June 1995, with an effective retirement date of March 1, 1995. James E. Brandon elected to receive benefits under "Option 2" of the FRS, which provides for a lifetime benefit to the covered employee. Option 2 also provides that, if the covered employee does not survive for the ten years following retirement, payment is made to a designated beneficiary for the remainder of the ten year period. James E. Brandon died on August 28, 1995, of the condition which resulted in his disability. James E. Brandon did not personally receive any of his disability benefits. By letter dated September 29, 1995, the Division notified Mr. Barga that he was entitled to receive the remaining benefit payments for the ten year period. At the end of September, the Division sent two checks to the home of James E. Brandon. One check covered the initial benefits period from March 1995 through August 1995. The second check was for the September 1995 benefit. The checks were not returned to the Division and apparently were cashed or deposited. On October 10, 1995, the Division was notified by William Brandon that his brother, James E. Brandon, had completed a form amending his designation of beneficiary and that the form had been filed with the Division. The Division searched its files and located a form, FRS M-10, which was apparently filed on July 25, 1995, by James E. Brandon, and which amends his prior designation to identify sequential beneficiaries. The amended beneficiaries, in order, are William W. Brandon, III, Daniel A. Brandon, and Victoria Weaver Stevens. The Brandons are family members of the deceased. Ms. Stevens is a long-time family friend and was also employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. FRS Form M-10 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a non-retired FRS participant in designating a beneficiary. Form M-10 does not require execution before a notary public. FRS Form FST-12 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a retired participant in designating a beneficiary. Form FST-12 requires execution before a notary public. The amendment of the beneficiaries should have been executed on a Form FST-12. The Form M-10, which was filed on July 25, 1995, was provided to James E. Brandon by the human resources office of the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. The form was obtained by Victoria Weaver Stevens apparently at the request of the deceased. The filing of the improper form was through no fault of James E. Brandon. The Petitioner suggests that the signature on the Form M-10 is a forgery. There is no credible evidence to support the assertion. The evidence establishes that the deceased sometimes included his middle initial in his signature, and other times did not. The Petitioner suggests that during the last weeks of the deceased's life, he was overmedicated, was often unaware of his surroundings, and was likely manipulated into changing the designated beneficiaries. There is no credible evidence that James E. Brandon was mentally incapacitated and unable to understand the import of his decisions at the time the amendment was filed with the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition of Dennis A. Barga. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David T. Weisbrod, Esquire 601 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley N. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Thomas Frost, Esquire 7901 Fourth Street North Suite 315 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.
Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioners are entitled to Option 2 continuing retirement benefits following the death of Linda Prince, a Florida Retirement System member.
Findings Of Fact Linda J. Prince was employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (hereinafter "FDLE") and was a vested, regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter "FRS"). After she was diagnosed with a serious health condition, she was able to continue as a full-time employee by participating in the Department's sick leave pool. By November 2008 her family understood that she was terminally ill. About that time, she began alternating staying at the home of her son Brian Prince and at the home of her daughter and son-in- law Wendy and Harrison T. Rivers. During the first week of November 2008, her son, daughter, and son-in-law began discussing whether she should retire rather than remaining in full-pay status. Harrison T. Rivers asked his father Harrison W. Rivers for advice since his father was a retired member of FRS. His father told him that Linda Prince should retire right away under Option 2 since that would guarantee a 10-year payout. One of the persons that Harrison T. Rivers contacted for advice referred him to Annie Lamb, a Personnel Services Specialist at FDLE. He remembers asking her about Option 2 and understood her to tell him that Option 2 required having a spouse or other dependents. She does not recall the conversation. When Harrison T. Rivers conveyed his understanding to Brian Prince, Brian requested that a meeting be set up at FDLE's Personnel Office. The two men met with Samantha Andrews, a different FDLE Personnel Services Specialist, near the end of 2008. All three persons attending the meeting recall that they discussed the sick leave pool, and the two men were assured that there were enough donations to the sick leave pool to cover Linda Prince's continuing need. The attendees at the meeting have different recollections of the other matters discussed. The two men believe they discussed Option 2 and that Samantha Andrews called across the hall to Annie Lamb who confirmed that Option 2 required a spouse. Lamb recalls Andrews asking her a question but does not remember what the question was. Andrews does not recall asking Lamb a question and further does not recall discussing the retirement options at the meeting. At the final hearing, Andrews admitted that she did not understand the differences among the four retirement options until after Linda Prince's death and that before then she thought that one had to be a spouse or a dependent child to be a beneficiary. Andrews' impression of the meeting is that Linda Prince's children wanted to be sure she remained in full- pay status through the sick leave pool to increase her income and keep her benefits available and at a reasonable cost. After this meeting, Linda Prince remained on full-pay employment status. As a result, she received (1) her full salary rather than a reduced retirement amount, (2) health insurance at a cost of $25 bi-weekly, and (3) a $44,000 life insurance policy at the cost of $2 bi-weekly. If she had retired, she would have had to pay nearly $500 a month for the health insurance and would have lost her $44,000 life insurance policy. Instead, she would have had the option of purchasing either a $10,000 or $2,500 life insurance policy for $29.65 or $7.41 a pay period, respectively. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers was visiting at his son's home while Linda Prince was staying there. In a conversation with her, he was surprised to learn that she had not retired as he had strongly advised two months earlier. When he later questioned his son as to why she had not retired, his son told him because she did not have a spouse. Harrison W. Rivers told his son that that information was not correct. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers met with his own financial advisor David A. Wengert and relayed the information his son had given him. Wengert agreed with Rivers that the information about a spouse or dependent child was not correct but checked with a contact he had at the Department of Corrections. That person confirmed that the spouse or dependent child requirement did not apply to Option 2 and faxed the necessary forms for retiring under Option 2 to Wengert who gave them to Rivers. Harrison W. Rivers gave the folder from Wengert containing the correct information and required forms to his son and told his son to retire Linda Prince immediately. His son subsequently called Brian Prince, gave him the correct information, and told him that Linda Prince should retire. Brian Prince agreed but was out of town at the time. On February 11, 2009, Harrison T. Rivers drove Annie Lamb from FDLE to where Linda Prince was staying. The forms were completed and signed, and Lamb notarized Linda Prince's signature. The forms provided for Linda Prince to take early retirement under Option 2 with Brian Prince and Wendy Rivers as her equal beneficiaries. The forms were filed with Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, the same day. The forms she signed selected February 28, 2009, as Linda Prince's termination of employment date. A termination date of February 28, 2009, resulted in a March 1, 2009, retirement date. Linda Prince died on February 14, 2009. On that date, she was still in full-pay status since she had not terminated her employment and retired. Option 2 under the FRS system provides a reduced monthly benefit payable for the member's lifetime, but if the member dies within ten years after his or her retirement date, the designated beneficiary receives a monthly benefit in the same amount for the balance of the ten-year period, and then no further benefits are payable. Option 1 provides for monthly payments for the member's lifetime, and upon the member's death, no further monthly benefits are payable. It, therefore, pays no continuing benefits to a beneficiary. Options 3 and 4 provide for joint annuitants and reduced monthly benefits. Under Option 3, upon the member's death, the joint annuitant, who must be a spouse or a financial dependent, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount, but there are limitations on the amount and length of those payments for a joint annuitant under 25 who is not a spouse. Option 4 provides an adjusted monthly benefit while the member and the joint annuitant are living, a further reduced monthly benefit after the death of either the member or the joint annuitant, with adjustments if the joint annuitant is under the age of 25 and not a spouse. No benefits are payable after both the member and the joint annuitant are deceased. Thus, only Options 3 and 4 require a spouse or financial dependent in order for continuing benefits to be paid after the member's death. Upon learning of her death, the Division of Retirement researched whether any benefits were due to Linda Prince or her beneficiaries. Since she had paid nothing into the FRS, there were no contributions to refund. Further, since she had not retired, no retirement benefits were payable to her or her beneficiaries. The Division also looked at the dates of birth of her beneficiaries to determine if a beneficiary would qualify as a joint annuitant, but both of her beneficiaries were over the age of 25. The only time that Linda Prince contacted the Division of Retirement was in 2002 when she sent an e-mail asking that her benefits be calculated as to what she would receive if she retired at age 62. The Division performed the calculations and sent her the information as to what her benefits would be under Options 1 and 2. Her file contains her e-mail, the benefits estimates sent to her, and a copy of an informational retirement brochure. Information on the FRS, including descriptions of the Options, has been available on the Division's website, in employee handbooks available from the Division, and was available in written form in FDLE's Personnel Office on the day that Brian Prince and Harrison T. Rivers met with Samantha Andrews. During that meeting, neither Brian Prince nor Harrison T. Rivers requested a copy of the employee handbook or any written materials describing the Options for retirement. Because of Petitioners' estoppel argument, the chronology in this case must be closely reviewed. At least until early November 2008, Linda Prince had made her decision to stay on full-pay status to receive her full salary and benefits rather than take early retirement. In early November, her son, daughter, and son-in-law became involved in that decision. In early November, her son-in-law understood an FDLE employee to say that Linda Prince needed a spouse or financial dependent to qualify for continuing retirement benefits, but his father, who was a retired member of FRS, told him that information was wrong and that Option 2 would provide a ten-year continuing benefit for her beneficiaries. No contact was made on her behalf with the Division of Retirement to ascertain which information was correct. On January 10, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers, upon learning that Linda Prince was still not retired, again told his son that she should be retired under Option 2 and that his son's understanding that she needed a spouse or financial dependent was wrong. Again, no contact was made with the Division of Retirement. On January 20, 2009, Harrison W. Rivers obtained the written information and required forms. Within a few days he gave the information and forms to his son and told him again to see to it that Linda Prince was retired immediately. Yet, the forms were not executed and filed with the Division of Retirement until February 11, 2009. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf contacted the Division of Retirement to clarify which information was correct once they had conflicting information the first week of November 2008, she could have retired starting December 1. Had Linda Prince or anyone on her behalf submitted her application for retirement when Harrison W. Rivers provided the correct information and forms to use in January 2009, she could have retired then with a February 1 retirement date. Even though Petitioners offered evidence to show that they relied upon erroneous information conveyed by Harrison T. Rivers and even though they offered evidence that they received erroneous information from Samantha Andrews, it would have been clear to a reasonable person that such information conflicted with the information given by Harrison W. Rivers, who had gone through the process. Further, in January when Rivers gave them the correct written information and the forms to use, there was no basis for relying upon the erroneous information. If Petitioners had acted to clarify the previous conflicting information or had not delayed in having Linda Prince execute the forms when Rivers provided them, they would have retired her before her death and would have been entitled to continuing benefits. Whatever circumstances caused the further delay in the filing of Linda Prince's application for retirement and supporting documentation, the delay was not caused by the information, erroneous or not, provided by the FDLE employees. Accordingly, Linda Prince was still a full-time employee at the time of her death not as a result of erroneous information provided by FDLE employees as alleged by Petitioners, but as a result of delay in obtaining the easily- accessible correct information from the Division of Retirement and as a result of delay in acting on the correct information when it was provided to them. There are over 960 agencies, including state departments and local governments and school boards, which participate in the FRS. The employer and employee handbooks distributed to those agencies and their employees by the Division of Retirement clearly state that representatives of participating agencies are not the agents of the Division of Retirement but rather only act as a link between employees and the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Petitioners ineligible for an Option 2 benefit from the FRS retirement account of Linda Prince. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian Prince 1063 Walden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Harrison Rivers 4211 Camden Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
