Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: For approximately the past 35 years, Petitioner has owned property on Held Court 6/ in the Vista Salerno subdivision in unincorporated Martin County, Florida. On the west, the property extends to Dixie Ross Road, an unpaved, private street in the Vista Salerno subdivision. Dixie Ross Road runs parallel to U.S. 1, a north-south roadway that is part of the State Highway System. On the east, the property approaches, but does not directly abut, U.S. 1. Petitioner's residence is located on the property. Petitioner also operates his commercial plumbing business, R.C. Lindsey Plumbing, Inc., from a structure (approximately 200 feet from his residence) located on the property. Large trucks make daily deliveries to Petitioner's business. There are no other commercial establishments located on Held Court or elsewhere in the Vista Salerno subdivision. Petitioner owns other lots in the Vista Salerno subdivision. None of these other lots directly abuts U.S. 1. The Vista Salerno subdivision lies west of U.S. 1. It was created in 1954. There are approximately 100 homes in the subdivision. The subdivision has three paved roads: Held Court; Parkwood Drive; and Lillian Court. Each runs east-west and connects with U.S. 1. Parkwood Drive is 898 feet south of Held Court. Lillian Court is 993 feet north of Held Court. Held Court is a Martin County-maintained roadway. Unlike U.S. 1, Held Court is not part of the State Highway System. Approximately 600 feet west of U.S. 1, Held Court turns into Robert Loop Road, an unpaved, private roadway. Since approximately 1970, there has been a full median opening (with a left hand storage lane) on U.S. 1 at Held Court. As a result, northbound, as well as southbound, motorists on U.S. 1 are able to turn directly from U.S. 1 onto Held Court. Likewise, motorists exiting the Vista Salerno subdivision via Held Court are able to turn right and head south on U.S. 1 or turn left and go north on U.S. 1. The Department proposes to close the median opening that now exists on U.S. 1 at Held Court as part of a proposed road improvement/widening project (State Project No. 89010-1500/1501, hereinafter referred to as the "proposed project.") The proposed project involves the widening of U.S. 1 (from an existing four-lane divided roadway to a six-lane divided roadway) in unincorporated Martin County (south of the City of Stuart city limits) from south of County Road 708 to north of Salerno Road. (Held Court is between County Road 708 and Salerno Road). This segment of U.S. 1 has been classified as a Class 3 roadway under the Department's access management classification system. It has an existing traffic volume of 27,000 vehicles a day. In 20 years it is projected to have a traffic volume of 45,000 vehicles a day. The proposed project will enable this roadway segment to handle the projected increase in traffic volume at a design speed of 55 miles an hour. The plans for the proposed project are in the preliminary design phase and are approximately 30 percent complete. Traffic studies (of U.S. 1 and the major intersecting roadways feeding traffic onto U.S. 1 in the area of the proposed project) have been done. Held Court is not one of these major intersecting roadways and therefore has not been the subject of any traffic study done in conjunction with the proposed project. The Department's District 4 Access Management Engineer has made recommendations regarding the location of median openings which have been incorporated in the plans that have been developed for the proposed project. Martin County (which has jurisdiction over side streets that intersect with U.S. 1 in the area of the proposed project) was asked to provide its input regarding the location of median openings. All but one of its recommendations (that relating to Parkwood Drive) have been adopted in the plans for the proposed project. These plans, which were formulated in accordance with generally accepted principles of traffic engineering and safety design, provide for the following median openings on U.S. 1 in the vicinity of Held Court: a full median opening (with a left turn storage lane) at Lillian Court, 993 feet north of Held Court; a full median opening (with a left turn storage lane) at Morningside Drive, south of Held Court; a directional median opening (with a left turn storage lane for southbound traffic) at Village Road,7 between Morningside Drive and Held Court, approximately 350 to 400 feet south of the latter; and a directional median opening (with a left turn storage lane for northbound traffic) at Parkwood Drive, between Village Road and Morningside Drive, 898 feet south of Held Court. 8/ The Department does not propose to entirely eliminate direct access between U.S. 1 and Held Court. Motorists will still have direct access to the southbound lanes of U.S. 1 from Held Court. Likewise, southbound motorists on U.S. 1 will still be able to turn directly onto Held Court. Access between U.S. 1 and Held Court, however, will be more limited than it is presently. Northbound motorists on U.S. 1 will no longer be able to turn left and directly access Held Court from U.S. 1, nor will motorists on Held Court any longer be able to turn left onto U.S. 1 and head north. Reasonable and safe, although somewhat more inconvenient, alternatives will remain for these motorists, however. Northbound motorists on U.S. 1 will be able to access Held Court by making a U-turn 993 feet north of Held Court at the full median opening at Lillian Court 9/ and then going south on U.S. 1 and turning right onto Held Court. Alternatively, they will be able to turn left at either the directional median opening at Parkwood Drive (before Held Court) or at the full median opening at Lillian Court (after Held Court), travel west one block, turn onto Dixie Ross Road and then take Dixie Ross Road (north if coming from Parkwood Drive or south if coming from Lillian Court) to Held Court. Motorists on Held Court desiring to travel north on U.S. 1 will be able to turn right on U.S. 1 and travel south until the directional median opening at Village Road, where they will be able make a U-turn onto the northbound lanes of U.S. 1. 10/ Another option they will have will be to take Dixie Ross Road to Lillian Court, travel east one block, and then turn left (north) onto U.S. 1. Although some of the travelling public (including Petitioner, his neighbors, his employees and those making deliveries to his business) may be slightly inconvenienced as a result of the closure of the median opening on U.S. 1 at Held Court, it is prudent, from a traffic engineering and safety perspective, to close this median opening as part of the proposed project. In order to meet generally accepted roadway and traffic design standards, the storage lane for southbound traffic on U.S. 1 turning left onto Village Road will need to extend north beyond Held Court. Motorists using a median opening at Held Court would have to cut across this storage lane. Traffic safety therefore would be seriously compromised if, in addition to a directional median opening at Village Road (with a left turn storage lane that extended past Held Court), there was also a median opening at Held Court (only 350 to 400 feet to the north of Village Road). The elimination of the median opening at Held Court is, on balance, a feature of the proposed project that will promote, rather than, as Petitioner argues, jeopardize, the safety of motorists. 11/ Several years ago, (it is unclear precisely how many), the Department completed another road improvement/widening project on U.S. 1. This previous project involved a roadway segment between Stuart and Port St. Lucie (north of the roadway segment which is the subject of the proposed project in the instant case). No median openings were closed as a part of this previous project and a full median opening was provided for a Florida Power and Light transformer vault.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order rejecting Respondent's challenge to the Department's proposed closure of the median opening on U.S. 1 at Held Court. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of January, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1996.
The Issue Whether Relocation Assistance Appeal of Petitioner should be granted. Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel or other representative at the hearing. After an explanation of her rights in administrative hearings conducted under the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, Petitioner stated that she wished to proceed in her own behalf.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner moved into an apartment located at 1013 West Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida on June 9, 1977. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) On August 3, 1977, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a letter from Respondent which notified her that Respondent was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for a state road project located where she lived and that negotiations for the purchase of the property had begun on June 23, 1977. The letter enclosed an informational brochure entitled "YOUR RELOCATION" and expressed the desire of Respondent to assist in Petitioner's relocation necessitated by the property acquisition. (Exhibit 1) In late November or early December, 1977, Petitioner vacated her apartment upon the request of the landlord for non-payment of the rent. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) Respondent purchased the property where Petitioner had resided from the West Broward Land Corporation on February 8, 1978. The purchase was accomplished pursuant to the Federal Highway Aid Program (PL 91-646) and involved the widening of Broward Boulevard (SR 842). Guidelines under the federally funded program are implemented by the Federal Aid Highway Program Manual and by Chapter 14-14.05, F.A.C., which incorporates by reference Respondent's Right-of-way Bureau Operating Procedures. These procedures include eligibility criteria for receipt of monetary payments by individuals who have been displaced from real property as a result of its acquisition by the state. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibit 3) On February 15, 1978, Petitioner was present at the residence of another tenant of the apartment building at the time Respondent's right-of-way agent was explaining relocation benefits to that individual. Petitioner asked the agent if she could return to her former apartment and resume occupancy, but he explained that he had no authority to grant such permission. Thereafter, Petitioner moved back into the apartment. She testified at the hearing that one of Respondent's employees named Bill Barnette had told her she could occupy the premises. This alleged authorization however, took place at the time Petitioner was given a check for $320 for moving expenses by Barnette sometime in March, 1978. (Testimony of Way, Petitioner, Crawford, Johnson, supplemented by Exhibits 2, 5) Thereafter, Petitioner made application with Respondent for rent supplement payments, but by letter of October 2, 1978, Respondent denied any such payment on the ground that Petitioner was not living on Broward Boulevard when the state obtained legal possession of the property. (Testimony of Moon, Case File)
Recommendation That Petitioner's appeal be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Sallie Mae Ray 429 1/2 North West 7th Terrace Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Also mailed to Ms. Ray at: Apartment 14 North West 10th Avenue and 7th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation ("Respondent"), has demonstrated that Petitioner, Frank C. Kunnen, Jr., d/b/a U.S. 19 Commerce Center's ("Petitioner"), right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 will present a safety and operational problem following Respondent's reconstruction of Highway 19. Whether Petitioner's access to the state highway system will be reasonable if Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is closed. Whether Respondent is legally entitled to administratively close Petitioner's driveway, pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, and applicable Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property located within the city limits of Clearwater, in Pinellas County, Florida, which property abuts U.S. Highway 19 (State Road 55). It has a right-in and right-out driveway connection to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner's current right-in, right-out driveway does not create a safety or operational problem with the existing configuration of U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Chapter 20, Florida Statutes. Respondent regulates access to the state highway system. Respondent initially cited Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, in the Notice as authority for the intended agency action. This Rule pertains to closure or modification of permitted driveways. At hearing on March 20, it was discovered that Respondent had intended to cite Rule 14-96.012, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to closure or modification of unpermitted driveways that had been in existence since before July 1, 1988, the effective date of the State Highway System Access Management Act. The Rule refers to these driveways as "grandfathered." As of March 20, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway might have been permitted. In order to provide Petitioner all due process to which he was entitled, Respondent requested that the hearing be continued. After reviewing its files, Respondent indicated to Petitioner on June 28, 2001, that Respondent would be requesting an additional continuance to conduct an engineering study pursuant to Rule 14- 96.011, Florida Administrative Code.¹ Petitioner agreed to both continuances. The study was dated August 20, 2001, and was delivered to Petitioner's counsel just after that date. This study was presented as Respondent's Exhibit 5 at the resumption of the hearing on September 20, 2001. The Study sets out the essential safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case and was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. Prior to the reconvened hearing, Petitioner did not seek to depose the author of the engineering study nor did he request documents utilized in creating the study. Petitioner decided to wait until the hearing and make a series of objections to the study's admissibility. Prior to and after the study was admitted into evidence, Petitioner's counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the engineer who signed and sealed the study, Vibert Griffith, P.E., and his assistant in the creation of the study, Julian Parsons. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice resulting from the timing of the creation of the study. Any prejudice which may be presumed was cured by Respondent's requesting a continuance specifically to search its records for evidence of a permit; Respondent's requesting another continuance to create that study; Petitioner's agreeing to both continuances; and Respondent's producing the study approximately one month prior to hearing. This gave Petitioner time to conduct discovery regarding the study, not to mention sufficient time to prepare for the hearing itself. The Notice did not state whether mediation was available in this case. However, the lack of mention of mediation in the Notice was of no prejudice to Petitioner in light of the fact that that Petitioner proposed several alternative driveway designs to Respondent, and that these alternatives had been closely studied and considered. Petitioner did not present any evidence that he had asked whether mediation was available or was denied an opportunity to mediate this case. Accordingly, any error in the lack of information regarding mediation in the Notice was harmless, and any prejudice was cured. Petitioner elicited testimony with respect to a third procedural point in this case. Rule 14-96.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, states that if Respondent seeks to close a driveway, Respondent will offer to meet with the property owner or his representative on-site. As Petitioner's counsel stated during his opening remarks, however, there is a long history of litigation between Petitioner and Respondent, including two pervious mediations. Again, the unrebutted testimony at hearing was that over the last several years Respondent evaluated three alternative designs submitted by Petitioner for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice in not being able to meet on-site with Respondent in this case. Any error in relation to this issue was harmless. U.S. Highway 19 runs north-south through Pinellas County, Florida and is a part of the Florida Intrastate Highway System. In the vicinity of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 has three lanes of traffic each for northbound and southbound traffic (total of six lanes). As part of the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, Respondent has plans to create "grade separated intersections" or "urban interchanges" at the cross street to the south and north of Petitioner's property. The cross street to the south is Drew Street, and the cross street to the north is Coachman Road. Also, just to the north of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 is elevated over railroad tracks, and will continue to be so elevated after reconstruction. In its reconstructed state, vehicles will reach mainline U.S. Highway 19 by a series of frontage roads and on and off ramps. Vehicles that stay on mainline U.S. Highway 19 will not have to stop for signals at intersections with cross streets because the mainline will travel over the cross streets. The effect of U.S. Highway reconstruction will be to create a more efficient transportation facility by improving safety and capacity. The overall improvements to U.S. Highway 19 are necessary. Although Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to mainline U.S. Highway 19, Respondent is not acquiring any property from Petitioner. Accordingly, Respondent provided Petitioner with notice of the intended agency action and right to an administrative hearing (the "Notice"). Respondent's Proposal Respondent proposes, as part of its planned improvements to U.S. Highway 19, to provide Petitioner a right- in only entrance from a frontage road running adjacent to and parallel to U.S. Highway 19. Respondent also proposes to build a new two-way road, referred to as Access Road A, which runs north-south, parallel to U.S. Highway 19, intersects Drew Street, and from that point provides vehicles the option of traveling either north or south on mainline U.S. Highway 19, or east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's northerly neighbor, a maintenance yard owned by Pinellas County, would also send all of its traffic, including large trucks and emergency vehicles, out Access Road A to Drew Street. Other properties, including several car dealerships, to the south of Petitioner's property would also have access to Access Road A. No other property owner, including Pinellas County, objected to Respondent's proposed access system. It is undisputed that Respondent has all of the right-of-way necessary to construct Access Road A to Petitioner's property line. During construction, the City of Clearwater will install a temporary traffic signal at the intersection of Access Road A and Drew Street. Based on a traffic study conducted by the Pinellas County MPO and endorsed by the City of Clearwater and Pinellas County, the traffic light will become permanent when construction is completed. Even if the temporary light is removed after construction, Access Road A will function properly for right turns onto Drew Street which will provide access to the northbound and southbound mainline lanes of U.S. Highway 19. This is true, even assuming that all of Petitioner's neighbors send all of their traffic out Access Road A. In addition, Petitioner's neighbors to the south have several alternate means of access to travel west on Drew Street and either north or south on U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 because, post-construction, the driveway would be located on an on-ramp. The frontage road and on-ramp, as currently designed by Respondent, would prevent placement of a right-out driveway in such a location. It is Petitioner's position that Respondent could have designed the frontage road and on-ramp in front of Petitioner's property in such a way as to allow the safe operation of a right-out driveway in the approximate location of Petitioner's current right-out driveway. Petitioner's Proposal In support of his contention that Respondent could have designed a right-out driveway, Petitioner offered an aerial map and overlay (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), which purported to show that Respondent could have designed an on-ramp from Drew Street and an off-ramp to Coachman Road to the north in such a way as to allow Petitioner a right-out driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a concept based upon what was referred to as the "Lochner Study" at hearing. The "Lochner Study" was a study performed by the engineering firm H. W. Lochner, and showed a right-in, right-out driveway from Petitioner's property onto a frontage road/on-ramp in approximately the same location as Petitioner's current driveway. In the past Petitioner had proposed other alternatives for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner withdrew from consideration at this hearing all other alternative designs for a right-out driveway for Petitioner. The Lochner Study was undertaken with the specific purpose of determining whether needed improvements to U.S. Highway 19 could be safely constructed within right-of-way already owned by Respondent. The Lochner Study concluded that placing a driveway for Petitioner in the location shown in the study would provide "substandard operation and is very undesirable from a safety stand point." The primary reason for this conclusion was that the physical separation of northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road ended south of the driveway's location. This lack of physical separation would allow vehicles on northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 to cross over the frontage road and enter Petitioner's property, creating unsafe traffic movements. Petitioner's witnesses agreed that this lack of separation would be a safety problem. Petitioner's Exhibit 3, prepared and testified about by Reginald Mesimer, attempted to alleviate this admittedly unsafe aspect of the Lochner plan by extending the physical separator between northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road/on-ramp to a point just beyond the location of where Petitioner's driveway would be. The area of physical separation is the "gore" area. In effect, this extension also would shift the beginning of the on-ramp to the point of Petitioner's driveway. Thus, the issue raised was whether the location of the on-ramp could be safely designed to co-exist with the location of the off-ramp for the next interchange at Coachman Road. The standards for determining whether this design is safe are set by the American Association for State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO"), who publish these standards in the "Green Book," known as the "Bible" of transportation engineers. In examining Petitioner's Exhibit 3, as well as the requirements of AASHTO submitted in this case, it is clear that the requirements for an on-ramp followed by an off-ramp are: (1) an acceleration area for the on-ramp; (2) a weaving area for vehicles going from the on-ramp to mainline, and for vehicles going from mainline to the off-ramp; (3) a deceleration area for the off-ramp, and (4) a queue area for vehicles at the terminus of the off-ramp. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows the start of the acceleration area for the on-ramp at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway, which indicates that the on- ramp for vehicles leaving Petitioner's property would begin at his driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows a 2,000-foot weave area, also beginning at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Placing the start of the acceleration area and the weave area at the same point on an on-ramp is contrary to AASHTO design standards. The beginning of the weave area should be near the end of the acceleration area, which, on Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is supposed to be where vehicles on the on-ramp are traveling at the design speed of the highway they are attempting to enter. AASHTO places the beginning of the weaving area where the outside lane of the mainline and the inside lane of the on- ramp are separated by two feet. The weave area extends to a point where there is a twelve-foot separation of the mainline and off-ramp lanes at the next interchange. The design speed of U.S. Highway 19 is 55 miles per hour. It is uncontested that vehicles leaving Petitioner's property will be in a stopped condition prior to entering the on-ramp. Thus, looking at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the beginning of the weave area should be placed approximately 965 feet to the north of the current location shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In turn, this forces the deceleration area for the off-ramp to Coachman Road shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3 to be shifted 965 feet to the north. Petitioner's expert testified that the off- ramp deceleration area at Coachman Road could be shifted between 300 and 400 feet to the north. Assuming this to be correct, this places the start of the off-ramp deceleration area approximately 965 feet to the north of its current location, which is 565 to 665 feet beyond the farthest point Petitioner's expert testified it could be moved. Respondent's experts also examined Petitioner's Exhibit 3 under the dictates of AASHTO. Unlike Petitioner, Respondent assumed a design speed of 50 miles per hour, and assumed that shorter distances for acceleration, weaving, and deceleration could be applied in this situation under AASHTO. Respondent's findings demonstrate that under the "Petitioner's best case scenario" the off-ramp at Coachman Road would still have to be moved approximately 600 feet to the north, which is at least 200 feet past the farthest possible shift testified to by Petitioner's expert. Moving the off-ramp would obviously require redesign and delay of the Coachman Road project to the north, already designed and funded for construction. Further, Petitioner's Exhibit 3 also did not take into account any need for increased acceleration distance on the on- ramp due to the grade of the road. For certain portions of the acceleration area of the on-ramp in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 the grade is steeper that 3 percent, and averages over 2 percent. AASHTO does not require an increase in acceleration distance where the grade is "less that two percent." AASHTO requires an increase when the grade is more than 3 percent. This is, according to Petitioner's witness, a "gray area" in AASHTO. In this situation, while AASHTO may not require a multiplier be applied to the entire acceleration distance, it would be safer for the traveling public to apply the multiplier at least to the portions above 3 percent and perhaps to the entire acceleration distance, and to acknowledge that the grade of the road militates against application of strict minimum AASHTO standard distances. Adjusting at all for grade would result in a longer on-ramp and require pushing the off-ramp at Coachman even further north, which makes Petitioner's Exhibit 3 alternative even less viable. Another factor that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 did not take into account was that a significant amount of traffic leaving the proposed right-out driveway would be fully-loaded heavy trucks both from Petitioner's property and the Pinellas County maintenance yard. The AASHTO acceleration distance of 965 feet shown in that Exhibit is for automobiles. Knowing that heavy, fully loaded trucks would be utilizing this driveway on a regular basis, the acceleration distance for such trucks reaching 55 or even 50 miles per hour would be longer than for a normal passenger vehicle. Petitioner's alternative proposal was fatally flawed in its misplacement of the weave area, and was defective in other respects such as not considering the slower heavy truck traffic or the grade of the road. Thus, it is apparent that under any interpretation of the AASHTO standards, Respondent could not safely design an on-ramp from the Drew Street area and an off-ramp to the Coachman Road interchange and provide Petitioner a right-out driveway in the approximate location of his existing right-out driveway. Based upon all the evidence presented at hearing, Respondent demonstrated that AASHTO standards preclude moving the on-ramp to the location proposed by Petitioner. Therefore, closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to reconstructed U.S. Highway 19 is mandated for safety and operational reasons. Access-Reasonableness Issues Following the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, the access proposed by Respondent for Petitioner's property is reasonable. An objective comparison of the alternative proposed by Petitioner and Respondent's proposal reveals that Respondent's design results in safer and more efficient access to the state highway system for Petitioner and direct access to east and west travel on Drew Street. One measurable point of comparison is the relative distance a vehicle would have to travel to reach the state highway system under Respondent's proposal versus Petitioner's. Prior to Petitioner's withdrawing from consideration all alternatives other than what was represented in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent presented testimony regarding two of Petitioner's earlier alternative concepts. These previous alternatives were referred to as Proposal One and Proposal Two. Proposal One was basically a right-out driveway in the form of an on-ramp that would have tied in to mainline U.S. Highway 19 prior to the railroad tracks. Proposal Two was a right-out driveway/on-ramp that tied into the off-ramp for Coachman Road. As far as comparing relative travel distances, both Proposals One and Two are similar to the alternative in Petitioner's Exhibit 3. For vehicles to travel north from Petitioner's property on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design, vehicles travel south on Access Road A, west on Drew Street, and then south on the frontage road/on-ramp. This is a distance of .44 miles. To reach the same point using the access provided in Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3, a vehicle must travel north to the Coachman interchange, and double back south, a distance of approximately 1.45 miles. Thus, when added together, the distances for vehicles to travel north and south on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design total 1.12 miles, or .33 miles less than the 1.45 miles to reach the same points using any of Petitioner's alternative driveway proposals. In addition, for vehicles that wish to travel east or west on Drew Street from Petitioner's property, Respondent's alternative is much shorter. It is .32 miles to reach Drew Street along Access Road A, and 1.6 miles to reach Drew Street from Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Another measurable point of comparison are conflict points, places such as intersections and merge areas where vehicles can be expected to change lanes. In Respondent's design, there are four or five conflict points to travel north on U.S. Highway 19, three or four to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and one to travel east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows two conflict points to travel north (right-out turn to on-ramp and merge to mainline), six or seven to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and seven or eight to travel east or west on Drew Street (same as south on U.S. Highway 19 plus turn from off-ramp). For vehicles traveling north and south on U.S. Highway 19 from Petitioner's property, the number of conflict points in either Respondent's design or Petitioner's alternative are essentially even, but when travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison Respondent's design is clearly safer. A third point of comparison is that Petitioner's alternative provides one way in and one way out. Respondent's design provides two ways in and one way out. Respondent's design provides reasonable access to Petitioner's property. In comparison to Petitioner's alternative, Respondent's design provides for shorter combined travel distances. In regard to conflict points, Respondent's design is as safe as Petitioner's alternative, and safer if travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison. Finally, Respondent's design provides an additional point of ingress. Both witnesses called by Petitioner opined that the access proposed by Respondent was not reasonable, primarily because the access is not "direct." The basis of that opinion was limited to their belief that a "better" access plan, the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, was viable. Neither of Petitioner's witnesses knew the relative travel distances, nor did either witness testify about actual conflict points or any other possible objective points of comparison. Petitioner's witnesses' view are flawed because the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is not viable. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 reflected a safe design, and assuming that this access is reasonable, it would be contrary to logic to conclude that Respondent's design results in unreasonable access. The only "advantage" in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 versus Respondent's proposal is a right-out "direct" connection to U.S. Highway 19 via the on-ramp. However, comparing travel distances, conflict points, and points of ingress, Respondent's design is comparable if not superior, and thus, reasonable. Petitioner stressed that all other property owners along the U.S. Highway 19 corridor have right-in and right-out driveways on frontage roads, and that Petitioner is the only property owner required to use a facility like Access Road A for egress. Even if true, this circumstance does not in and of itself change Respondent's designed access for Petitioner's property into unreasonable access. Based upon objective criteria, Respondent's design is comparable or superior to Petitioner's alternative, and Respondent's design is comparable or superior to the access enjoyed by all other property owners in this vicinity. Engineering Study Pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent conducted an engineering study to examine the closure of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Normally, an engineering study is prepared prior to Respondent serving its Notice of Intent to close or alter a permitted driveway connection. The engineering study documents that there is a safety or operational problem with a particular driveway connection, and ensures that Respondent has an engineering basis to seek closure or alteration of the driveway. However, at the time this case came to hearing on March 20, 2001, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway may have been permitted. That is the reason the study was conducted during a continuance of this case and delivered to Petitioner on or around August 17, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the continuance for Respondent to conduct the study, and Petitioner had adequate time to conduct any further discovery in this case after receipt of the study. Thus, any procedural error in the timing of the study was waived by Petitioner and/or cured by Respondent. The Study does provide safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case. The study summarizes the history of the U.S. Highway 19 improvement project, discusses the current conditions, explains the proposed improvements, and reviews the safety and operational issues specific to Petitioner's right-out driveway in the post construction condition. The study also explains why two alternative right-out driveway configurations were not acceptable to Respondent. The study contains exhibits showing traffic patterns in the existing and possible future post construction conditions. The study was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. The study did not discuss the Petitioner's alternative advocated at hearing. The reason the study did not address this concept was that at the time of its creation, Respondent did not have Petitioner's Exhibit 3. One other item not addressed was traffic accident data. Since the improvements of U.S. Highway 19 have not been constructed, there is no accident data for the right-out driveway in the post construction condition. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is safe, so any accident data relating to current conditions is not relevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order approving the closure of Petitioner's right- out driveway as part of the future constructed improvements to Highway 19 and the construction of Access Road A. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
Findings Of Fact On July 20, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed a sign owned by Respondent along U.S. 19 near the intersection of Evans Road in Pinellas County which appeared to be on the DOT right-of-way along U.S. 19. The right-of-way along U.S. 19 at this location extends 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19 and 50 feet from the edge of the pavement of U.S. 19. The measured distance from the edge of pavement to the sign was 39 feet, thus placing the sign 11 feet inside the right of way. Generally the line of power poles along U.S. 19 marks the DOT right-of- way; however, this is not necessarily true, particularly when additional right- of-way is acquired. One photograph of the sign (Exhibit 2), taken a short distance from the sign by the DOT sign inspector, would indicate part of the sign is inside the line of power poles. Another photograh (Exhibit 4), taken by Respondent from a greater distance from the signs, would indicate the sign is outside the line of power poles. The check list (Exhibit 3), prepared by the DOT sign inspector at the time the sign was cited, does not reveal the location of the sign with respect to the right-of-way, yet the inspector testified to the measurements in finding no. 2 above.
The Issue Case No. 87-1735T: Whether respondent's sign located .14 miles east of Old San Ann Road on State Road 52 violates the spacing rule and was erected without a required permit. Case No. 87-1736T: Whether respondent's sign located .07 miles west of Ann Road, on State Road 52 was erected without the required permit.
Findings Of Fact Case No. 87-1735T: Respondent owns an outdoor advertising sign adjacent to State Road 52 and .14 miles east of Old San Ann Road. The sign advertises Dick Jarrett Ford, Dade City. The sign site is located within the corporate limits of Dade City, Florida. At the site of the sign, State Road 52 is a federal-aid primary highway. The sign is located approximately 100 feet from the edge of the highway pavement, and the edge of the highway pavement is 12 feet from the center line of the road. There is a 50-foot right-of-way on the eastbound side of the road, which places the sign approximately 62 feet from the right-of-way. The sign is visible to traffic on State Road 52. When the sign was observed by Linda K. Brown, an Outdoor Advertising Inspector for the Department of Transportation, the sign had no permit tag attached to it. Further, the sign was located 460 feet from a permitted sign on the same side of the highway. A review of Department of Transportation records revealed that no permit had been issued for the sign in question. The inspection and review by Ms. Brown resulted in the issuance of the Notice of Violation dated March 12, 1987. Case No. 87-1736T: Respondent owns a sign located on the eastbound side of State Road 52, .07 miles west of Ann Road, in Pasco County, Florida. At that location, State Road 52 is a federal-aid primary highway. The sign is located approximately 50 feet from the edge of the road pavement, which is 12 feet from the center line of the road. There is 50-foot right-of-way on the eastbound side of the road. Thus, the sign is approximately 12 feet from the road right-of-way. The sign is visible to traffic on State Road 52. The sign is owned by Joe Bryant, the respondent, and is located on property where Mr. Bryant has his residence. The sign is located approximately 50 feet from his front door. When Ms. Brown initially observed the sign, on March 11, 1987, the sign contained an advertisement for General Home Development and the model center located on the 98 Bypass. The model center is approximately 2 miles from Mr. Bryant's property. Mr. Bryant does not work as a sales representative for General Home Development and General Home Development has no offices or sales representatives on his property. Respondent's intent is to receive revenue for the subject sign. On March 11, 1987, the subject sign had no permit tag attached to it, and a subsequent review of the records of the Department of Transportation showed that no permit had been issued for the sign. Based on the inspection and review by Ms. Brown, the Notice of Violation was issued. Subsequently, the face of the sign was removed by Mr. Bryant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the signs involved in Case No. 87-1735T and 87-1736T were erected without the permits required by statute, directing that respondent remove both signs, including the structures, within thirty (30) days from the day of the Final Order, and providing that should respondent fail to comply with the order, the petitioner shall remove the signs and charge the respondent for the cost of removal. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1735T & 87-1736T Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in paragraph 1 Accepted in paragraphs 1 & 2 Accepted in paragraph 3 Accepted in paragraphs 4 & 5 COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 3299-0458 Joe Bryant Post Office Box 805 Dade City, Florida 33525 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
Findings Of Fact A DOT sign inspector observed a portable type sign in front of Respondent's automobile dealership on what appeared to be the right-of-way along the east side of U.S. 19. The arrow on the sign pointed to Respondent's business and electrical lines to the sign emanated from Respondent's property. The right-of-way along U.S. 19 at this location extends 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19. The easterly edge of the right-of-way at this location is 50 feet from the easterly edge of the north bound traffic lane. Measurements made by the inspector revealed the sign to be located 38 feet from the easternmost edge of the northbound lane of U.S. 19, thereby locating the sign 12 feet inside DOT's eastern right-of-way line.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Facts set forth in paragraphs 1.-13., below, are agreed to by the parties. The Petitioner in this matter, Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., owns a parcel of land in Hernando County, on the southwest corner of State Road 50 and Windmere Extension. The parcel is located east of the Interstate 75/State Road 50 interchange. Petitioner has constructed a service station and convenience store at that location. State Road 50 has been classified as a Class 3 Road east of Interstate 75, with a posted speed limit of 45MPH. Interstate 75 is a limited access facility and the Interstate 75/State Road 50 interchange is a limited access interchange. To the west of Petitioner's parcel, and closer to the Interstate 75 interchange, is a Texaco service station which abuts State Road 50 and has two driveways to State Road 50. The Texaco service station does not abut any other road or connection to State Road 50. Abutting the east property line of Petitioner's parcel is a parcel that also abuts State Road 50 and on which a McDonald's restaurant is located. Along the common property line between the two parcels is a joint ingress and egress easement. This joint ingress and egress easement remains in effect as of this date. At this time, there is a four-lane paved facility on the easement which is east of Petitioner's parcel and on McDonald's parcel. That facility currently provides the only vehicular route to and from State Road 50 for Petitioner's parcel, the McDonald's parcel and the parcel to the south. The four-lane facility between Petitioner and McDonalds was originally constructed by McDonalds as a three-lane facility to serve its parcel, Petitioner's parcel and the parcel to the south. On December 16, 1992, during the construction of its service station and convenience store, Petitioner applied to Respondent DOT for a permit to modify the existing facility. The December 16, 1992, permit application proposed to "modify existing driveway per the request of Hernando County (Increase existing radius from 25' + to 50)." DOT approved Permit No. A-08-92-0023 on February 19, 1993. Petitioner completed construction of a service station and convenience store on the parcel and modified the facility in accordance with DOT's Permit. On June 15, 1993, Petitioner filed an application with DOT for an access connection permit to construct and operate a 28-foot wide right-in/right- out access connection to State Road 50, 185 feet west of the original driveway. The application was assigned Application No. A-08-93-0034P by DOT. On July 12, 1993, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the application. The Notice of Intent to Deny stated that the application was being denied for the following four reasons: Proposal fails to provide 440' Minimum Clearance Spacing per 14-97.003 Proposal falls to provide 440' minimum clearance from end of the acceleration lane taper from a Limited Access facility (Inter- state 75) per Rule Chapter l4-97.003(l)(j)l. Reasonable access to the State Highway System is provided to the site via an existing "joint use" access located 185' east of the proposed access connection. Proposed access connection may create safety and operational problems within the operational sphere of the Limited Access Interchange. The Notice of Intent to Deny also stated that Petitioner could appeal the intent to deny or submit a revised application within 30 days of receipt of the Notice. On September 13, 1993, Petitioner submitted plans for a right-in only connection to State Road 50. Accompanying the plans was a supporting traffic study and a transmittal letter. On October 7, 1993, DOT issued a letter which acknowledged receipt of the September 13, 1993, submittal and presented the following reasons why DOT's Notice of Intent to Deny would remain in effect: Proposal fails to provide 440' Minimum Clearance Spacing per 14-97.003 Proposal fails to provide 440' minimum clearance from end of the acceleration lane taper from a Limited Access facility (Inter- state 75) per Rule Chapter l4-97.003(l)(j)l. Reasonable access to the State Highway System is provided to the site via an existing easement located 185' east of the proposed access connection. None of the original reasons for denial were addressed. The Highway Capacity Software weave analysis in the Supplemental Traffic Report shows no benefit to the State Highway System. The traffic count and turning movement data indicate that the 4 lane facility is operating within capacity, thus showing that existing access is adequate. There is a significant difference in the rate of deceleration for vehicle entering the proposed driveway (5.81 mph/s) and the existing driveway from the ramp end (4.36 mph/s). The deceleration rate for vehicles entering the proposed driveway exceeds 5.5 mph/s. This rate is described in the ITE Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook as reasonably comfortable for car passengers. The proposed "Right In" geometry cannot reasonably accommodate WB-50 or WB-40 Vehicles. The Radius of Return at the Windmere Road entrance is 50'. The radius was improved from 40' and can now accommodate WB-50 vehicles. 1O. The site entrance is located some 200' from SR 50. There is ample space for truck movements given the existing access. The October 7, 1993, letter stated that DOT's Notice of Intent to Deny would remain in effect and that DOT would accept a response within eleven days of the receipt of the letter. The letter further stated that, if there was no response within eleven days, any future requests for connection would require a new application along with the applicable fee. On October 21, 1993, Petitioner filed the first petition for a formal hearing, which was assigned DOAH Case No. 93-6932. On December 15, 1994, Petitioner filed the second petition for a formal hearing, which was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-0248. Other Facts Petitioner's first interaction with DOT regarding access to State Road 50 resulted from meetings in late 1991 with DOT District 7 representatives. Access at the front of Petitioner's property, via a right-in/right-out driveway, was discussed during two or three meetings between representatives of the two parties. Petitioner was advised at that time of DOT's position that the proposed connection with State Road 50 could not be approved due to safety concerns about the impact of the connection on the operation of the interchange ramp coming off the interstate and the auxiliary lane on State Road 50. Petitioner was advised that the only access would be that afforded by the Windmere Extension, the four-lane facility located on the property easement between Petitioner's parcel and McDonalds. Windmere Extension is properly classified as a joint access connection to State Road 50. The pavement on the joint access easement terminates at the property lines of Petitioner and McDonalds with a barrier erected at the end of the drive. On December 5, 1992, DOT issued a Notice of Conceptual Review Findings, stating the following reasons for the denial: The proposed connection on State Road 50 encroaches into the merge lane from Inter- state 75; The proposed connection does not meet the requirements to be located a minimum of 1320 feet from the terminus point of the taper from the interstate; The frontage road immediately adjacent to the parcel on the east is designed to provide access to the site. Following receipt of the Notice of Conceptual Review Findings, Petitioner's representative applied again for a conceptual review in order to obtain direct affirmation that access would be afforded only via the Windmere Extension. DOT responded with a second denial specifically stating that access must be accomplished via Windmere Extension, the frontage road east of the property. Thereafter, Petitioner closed on the purchase of the property, apparently satisfied that Windmere Extension afforded adequate vehicular access for a convenience store and gasoline station. Petitioner normally attempts to ascertain property access prior to purchase. Petitioner's property is not properly classified as an isolated corner property under DOT's rules. Rather, Windmere Extension functions as a common access drive, as opposed to a road. It is the existence of Windmere Extension as an established access point for Petitioner that prevents the catagorization of Petitioner's property as an isolated corner property. In 1992, during the development of Petitioner's parcel, Petitioner applied for and received a permit from DOT to perform modifications on the Windmere Extension. Petitioner's representative confirmed his understanding with DOT's District 7 representative that this permit would be the only driveway requested by Petitioner. At the time of Petitioner's request for a permit to accomplish modifications to the Windmere Extension, McDonalds held an access permit for the Windmere Extension but was not made a party to the modification permit and has remained silent regarding the matter. In spite of the previous confirmation of Petitioner's representative of access via Windmere Extension, Petitioner applied in June, 1993, following completion of construction of their facility, for direct access to State Road 50 via a right-in, right-out connection. After denial of the requested right-in, right-out connection and prior to any request for formal administrative proceedings pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, Petitioner requested the right-in connection on September 13, 1993. The request was filed subsequent to a conference between representatives of Petitioner and DOT which had been held to determine whether any basis existed upon which to mitigate denial of the requested right-in, right-out connection. Immediately upon exiting from Interstate 75 on to State Road 50, the first business entity on the right hand side is a Texaco service station. The Texaco station is an older facility and continues to utilize its only access to State Road 50, both right-in and right-out exits. Petitioner's proposed right-in only connection is less than 440 feet from Texaco's nearest driveway and is less than 440 feet from Windmere Extension. The proposed right-in only connection is less than 440 feet from the end of the taper of the eastbound exit ramp from Interstate 75 on the south side of State Road 50. The ramp extends into an auxiliary lane that continues eastward on State Road 50 and ends just past Windmere Extension. The purpose of the rule-required interval of 440 feet from the end of the taper of the exit ramp to the provision of an access point reflects a concern for safety. The spacing interval provides drivers exiting, in this case Interstate 75, with an opportunity to look rearward and pick a gap in through traffic and merge into the through lanes without the complication of also having to look forward to identify upcoming connections. The end of the taper of the exit ramp must be ascertained in order to determine where the 440 feet interval begins. An appropriate way to make this determination is to observe vehicles using the auxiliary lane to merge into the through lanes of State Road 50. The majority of the traffic exiting Interstate 75 via the eastbound State Road 50 ramp merges to the through lanes in front of the Texaco station and establishes the "functional end of the taper" as just east of Texaco's easternmost driveway. At this point, most vehicles exiting Interstate 75 have completed their merging movements to the through lanes of State Road 50. This location is consistent with the standard taper rate used by DOT to design ramps. The presence of a stoplight and a yield sign at the ramp for Interstate 75 and State Road 50 does not limit the influence of the interchange to the area west of the Texaco station. As established by observations made of vehicles entering the auxiliary lane from Interstate 75, most vehicles did not come to a stop at the yield sign before turning to the right and heading to the east. The area of influence of the interchange extends a considerable distance to the east. The Texaco station is closer to the Interstate than Petitioner's property, but it has little observed traffic. No evidence was presented probative of any significant safety or operational problem for the interchange ramp or State Road 50 which is occasioned by the placement of the Texaco Station. Constructed in the early 1970's, the station predates DOT access management spacing standards. Connections constructed prior to the adoption of those access management standards are "grandfathered." The Windmere Extension provides reasonably safe and efficient access to Petitioner's property on State Road 50. Observations support findings that petroleum product laden tankers are able to enter and exit the property, that passenger vehicles enter and exit without problems with their movements, and larger vehicles also enter and exit the property without backing traffic up onto the state highway. The joint access connection at Windmere Extension provides sufficient access to reasonably serve needs of Petitioner's property. Traffic flows effectively between Petitioner's property and State Road 50 via the joint access connection. The Petitioner's gasoline station appears to be reasonably busy. As documented by video tapes admitted in evidence, traffic is observed to be regularly entering and leaving the property. The station has been observed with all fueling stations occupied. Those occasional problems encountered with large vehicles on Petitioner's property appear to be susceptible to alleviation by on- site changes. The layout for the State Road 50 location is pretty much a standard site plan for Petitioner's properties. Petitioner's store and gasoline pumps are generally located toward the front of the parcel, facing State Road 50. At this time, the only function of the access connection at Windmere Extension is to provide vehicular access to the Petitioner and McDonald's parcels. As previously noted, a barrier marks the conclusion of Windmere Extension at the southern property boundary of the Petitioner and McDonalds parcels. No evidence was presented that development of the parcel to the south of these two businesses was impending. Absent development to the south, there is no reason to expect growth in traffic on Windmere Extension except due to growth of business for the Petitioner and McDonald's properties. Until development occurs, Windmere Extension will continue to provide reasonably safe and efficient access to Petitioner's property. The right-in only access connection proposed by Petitioner would create an unsafe condition on State Road 50. Petitioner proposes to locate the connection in an auxiliary lane extending from an Interstate 75 exit ramp. Most motorists exiting the Interstate and heading east use that portion of the auxiliary lane to merge with eastbound traffic lanes while other motorists merge into the auxiliary lane in anticipation of turning right at Windmere Extension. Most of the traffic merging into through lanes complete that maneuver in front of the Texaco station, while motorists merging to turn right at Windmere Extension complete that maneuver at the proposed connection location. The addition of the proposed right-in connection would cause some portion of the traffic currently turning right at Windmere to turn at the proposed connection, increasing conflicts between vehicles exiting Interstate 75 and accelerating into through lanes with those automobiles decelerating from State Road 50 in preparation for a right turn at Windmere Extension or the new proposed connection. Drivers from State Road 50, intending to enter the new connection, would merge into the ramp/auxiliary lane in front of the Texaco station, right where the majority of drivers currently accelerate and merge out into State Road 50. The simultaneous acceleration and deceleration of vehicles merging into and out of the auxiliary lane in front of the Texaco station would create a substantial safety problem for State Road 50. Distance would be shortened within which drivers must observe other traffic, pick their gap and merge into the other lane. Eastbound drivers exiting Interstate 75 to State Road 50 will be looking to the rear to pick their gaps as opposed to looking to those vehicles ahead in the auxiliary lane. In addition, the proposed connection would create a safety problem for the substantial number of eastbound drivers that would not enter the new connection but would continue down the auxiliary lane to turn right at Windmere Extension to patronize McDonalds. Drivers exiting Interstate 75 that turn right at Windmere tend to remain in the auxiliary lane the entire time. These drivers will be behind slowing vehicles that are turning into the new connection. To escape the slowing vehicles, eastbound auxiliary lane drivers will tend to encroach into the through lane as they pass around the turning vehicles. Similarly, eastbound State Road 50 drivers who normally merge into the auxiliary lane in front of the proposed connection will remain in the through lanes longer and either begin decelerating in the through lane, creating a speed differential in that lane, or will have to decelerate at an uncomfortable rate over a shorter distance in the auxiliary lane. The short length or "throat" of the proposed connection, coupled with the need of turning vehicles to avoid other vehicles on the Petitioner site, pose additional safety problems. Larger vehicles, such as semi-trailers with a 50-foot wheelbase, recreational vehicles, and trucks towing trailers will have difficulty entering the site if other vehicles are moving in front of the pump islands or larger vehicles are parked at the pumps. Some semi-trailers entering the proposed driveway would have to pass under the edge of the canopy that overhangs the gasoline pumps in order to make a turn. Similar difficulties can be expected when vehicles are maneuvering in the area between the pumps and State Road 50. Larger vehicles entering the proposed connection will have to slow or stop to avoid moving vehicles already on the property, creating an operational and safety hazard on State Road 50 as traffic queues in the connection. There is a greater likelihood that vehicles caught in a queue will back out onto State Road 50 at the proposed location than if they enter at Windmere. Alternatively, the diversion of right-turning vehicles into the new connection would not significantly improve the safety of the intersection of State Road 50 and Windmere Extension. There are presently no significant conflicts between westbound vehicles turning left into Windmere Extension and right-turning vehicles. The westbound left-turning vehicles that are delayed by traffic are normally blocked by eastbound through traffic, rather than right- turning vehicles. As set forth in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit 16 entitled Guidelines for Driveway Location and Design placement of connections within the functional area of an intersection is not advised. The location of the proposed connection is at about the end of the functional area of the Interstate 75 interchange, but the functional area of the State Road 50/Windmere intersection can be said to extend west of the proposed connection. The current access arrangement is safer than the situation that arises after construction of the proposed connection. Petitioner's September 13, 1993, submittal to DOT of a proposed right- in only connection was not a revised application under Rule l4-96.007(2)(b) but rather an informal proposal submitted as a result of a meeting between DOT and Petitioner's representatives. Subsequent to DOT's denial of Petitioner's request for a right-in, right-out connection, Richard Peoples, Petitioner's vice-president in charge of site design, authorized the submission of the September 13, 1993 right-in only proposal and intended that both the original right-in/right-out proposal and the revised right-in proposal be "on the table." People's testimony at the final hearing to the effect that the second submission was meant to be a revised application is in conflict with his earlier deposition testimony that all offers were on the table. His final hearing testimony on this point is, accordingly, not credited. People's deposition testimony substantiates DOT's position that the second submission by Petitioner did not constitute the submission of a revised or amended application. DOT's October 7, 1993, letter conveyed rejection of both the originally proposed right-in/right-out connection and the right-in only proposal. The letter acknowledges receipt of the drawings and the supporting traffic study associated with the second submittal. Several of the enumerated comments in the letter expressly reject or comment negatively on the contents of the September 13, 1993, submittal. Subsequent to the issuance of the October 7, 1993, letter, Richard Baier, an employee of DOT charged with consideration of the connection application, had a telephone conversation with Petitioner's representative Lawrence Hagen and verbally advised him that DOT had rejected Petitioner's proposed right-in only connection. Hagen understood that the proposed right-in only connection had been rejected. Petitioner's October 21, 1993, petition for formal hearing was filed 38 days after DOT received the September 13, 1993, submittal from Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's applications. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-3. Accepted. 4.-7. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted. Rejected, hearsay. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected, absence of direct evidence. 13.-17. Rejected, not dispositive of material issues presented. Accepted, not verbatim. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 20.-21. Rejected, not materially dispositive. 22. Accepted. 23.-25. Rejected, not dispositive of material issues. 26. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. 27.-28. Rejected, relevance. 29.-30. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 31. Accepted. 32.-33. Rejected, subordinate, relevance. 34. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 35.-36. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted, but not verbatim. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Accepted, not verbatim. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Rejected, legal argument. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 45.-48. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 49. Accepted. 50.-51. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 52.-56. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 57.-59. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 60. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-14. Accepted. Rejected, redundant. Accepted. 17.-20. Rejected, unnecessary. 21.-57. Accepted in substance, but not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 John H. Beck J. Victor Barrios Ellen Chadwell Attorneys at Law Beck Spalla et al. 1026 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Diedre Grubbs Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. #58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact On or about August 11, 1987, Respondent owned a sign advertising the business which was located on the DOT right-of-way along U.S. 41 in Pasco County. When Respondent moved into its present location it placed some of its castings on display on the right-of-way alongside its business. The co-owner was told by the Deputy Sheriff that the castings had to be removed from the right-of-way but it was all right to leave the sign on the DOT right-of-way. Accordingly, until the sign was cited for the violation, Respondent thought its sign was legally erected.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed at least 15 persons for each working day in each of at least 20 calendar weeks during the years in question. Petitioner, whose country of origin is Iran, holds a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering from the University of Central Florida. In early 1987. Petitioner submitted to Orange County an application for employment. The application was accidentally lost, resulting in the passage of several months during which Petitioner was not considered for employment. After expressing his frustration with the personnel department, Petitioner submitted another application in the fall of 1987. Relations between Petitioner and the personnel department were strained as Petitioner repeatedly followed up on his application and demanded an internal investigation into the matter. Although warning him that he was over-qualified for the position, the personnel department arranged for Petitioner to interview for an opening as an Engineering Technician III with the Orange County Highway Construction and Maintenance Department. On February 11, 1968, William Baxter, manager of the Orange County Highway Construction and Maintenance Department, interviewed Petitioner for the above-described position. During the course of the interview, Mr. Baxter decided that Petitioner was over-qualified for the Engineering Technician III position. However, aware that a person serving as an Engineer I had quit a few days earlier, Mr. Baxter summoned William E. Whyte, assistant manager of the same department, to join in the interview. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Baxter and Mr. Whyte told Petitioner that he would not have to submit to another interview for the Engineer I position. They did not, however, promise the position to Petitioner, although the interview had generally gone well for him. Mr. Baxter and Mr. Whyte mentioned that the position first had to be made available for then- existing qualified employees, but they were unaware of any who had applied. The job opening had been advertised publicly at about the same time that it had been posted internally. Pursuant to the requirements of the Orange County Commission Personnel Policy Manual, Section 2.11, the Highway Construction and Maintenance Department posted the Engineer I vacancy notice for existing employees on February 12, 1988. The notice stated that the position was delinquent in minorities: black. On February 17, 1989, Mr. Rolando L. Raymundo, a Filipino then employed by the department as an Engineer Technician IV, applied for the Engineer I position for which Petitioner was being considered. Mr. Raymundo also held a college degree in civil engineering and was more experienced than Petitioner in the work involved. Due to other responsibilities, neither Mr. Baxter or Mr. Whyte pursued the Engineer I opening for a couple of months. On April 27, 1988, Mr. Whyte interviewed Mr. Raymundo, whom he recommended on that date for promotion to Engineer I, effective May 15, 1988. In the meantime, no one with Orange County informed Petitioner of the status of his application or the fact that Mr. Raymundo eventually had been hired to fill the position. This treatment was not unique to Petitioner, however. Due to the number of applications received and personnel available to process applications, the personnel department does not routinely inform unsuccessful applicants that they have not been chosen for a particular position.
