Findings Of Fact L.B. Thanki received a degree in Civil Engineering at the University of Durham at Kings College, Newcastle Upon Tyne in the United Kingdom in 1956. Petitioner received a batchelor of law degree from Sardar Patel University (India) in 1967. This degree is the equivalent of two years study in law. The degree obtained from the University of Durham is not the equivalent of the degree received from an ABET approved university in the United States because it lacks 16 credit hours in Humanities and Social Sciences. Petitioner presented no evidence that his degree from the University of Durham or the curriculum he completed at any other university included the missing 16 hours in Humanities and Social Sciences. Petitioner presented a certificate (which was not offered into evidence) that he had completed a course in computer services meeting the board's evidentiary requirements of computer skills.
Recommendation Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure by examination as an engineering intern. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: B. Thanki 1106 East Hillsborough Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Carrie Flynn, Acting Executive Director Florida Board of Professional Engineers Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0755 Jack L. McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, David McQuay, Jr., committed the violations alleged in a four-count Amended Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy, on February 6, 2008, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the duty to regulate the practice of certified public accountants in Florida and to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165, and Chapters 120, 455, and 473, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to the allegations of the Complaint, Respondent David McQuay, Jr., has been licensed in Florida as a certified public accountant. Mr. McQuay's license number is R 1736, and his address of record is 110 North Lincoln Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33609-2908. Thomas Reilly, an expert in public accounting and auditing, reviewed an audit that Mr. McQuay performed for the Mid-Florida Center, a non-profit organization, for the financial year ending September 30, 2002. The audit was completed on July 18, 2003. Mr. Reilly prepared a report of his findings, dated September 5, 2005. He filed a subsequent report dated June 25, 2007, to include copies of various accounting standards and reference materials that were cited in the original report. In preparing his original report, Mr. Reilly met with Mr. McQuay and reviewed Mr. McQuay's complete set of working papers. Mr. Reilly testified that he billed the Department $3,444.00 for his services. No billing statements, invoices, or other documents were entered into evidence to support the amount of Mr. Reilly's fee. No expert testimony was offered to establish the reasonableness of the fee. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement above, Mr. Reilly identified four issues relating to the financial statements. First, Mr. Reilly found that the audit did not include certain statements that are required by government auditing standards. The "Yellow Book" contains the authoritative auditing standards issued by the federal Governmental Accountability Office ("GAO"). Amendment No. 2 to the auditing standards, adopted in July 1999, requires that certain language be included in the auditor's report on the financial statement. In particular, Section 5.16.1 of Amendment No. 2 provides: When auditors report separately (including separate reports bound in the same document) on compliance with laws and regulations and internal control over financial reporting, the report on the financial statements should also state that they are issuing those additional reports. The report on the financial statements should also state that the reports on compliance with laws and regulations and internal control over financial reporting are an integral part of a GAGAS [Generally Accepted Government Accounting Principles] audit, and, in considering the results of the audit, these reports should be read along with the auditor's report on the financial statements. Mr. McQuay's report on the financial statements did not contain a statement calling the reader's attention to the fact that a separate report on internal control and compliance is included elsewhere in the audit report. Mr. Reilly stated that the quoted language from the Yellow Book is mandatory, and that the GAO felt that the issue was important enough to call for the issuance of Amendment No. 2 to emphasize the revised mandate. In response, Mr. McQuay pointed to his reliance on a commercially produced practice guide that did not include the revised language of Amendment No. 2. While conceding the error, Mr. McQuay continued to contend that the practice guide's position was reasonable: that the statement is required only when the reports on compliance with laws and regulations and internal control over financial reporting are issued separately from the report on financial statements. In Mr. McQuay's case, the reports were issued under a single cover. Given that the express language of Amendment No. 2 references "separate reports bound in the same document," Mr. McQuay's response to the charge is insufficient. The Department has demonstrated that Mr. McQuay's audit report deviated from professional standards as to its failure to include the mandatory Yellow Book language. The deviation is ameliorated by the fact that all of the reports referenced in Amendment No. 2 were in fact contained in Mr. McQuay's audit report. There was no indication that Mr. McQuay's failure to include the mandatory statement was intended to mislead a reader of the audit report, or that his failure to comply with the strict language of Amendment No. 2 had any practical effect on the soundness of the audit report. The second allegation as to the financial statements is that necessary disclosures were missing in the notes to the financial statements. Mr. Reilly stated that the notes to the financial statements did not disclose the entity's capitalization policy for capital assets. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") Audit and Accounting Guide for Not-for-Profit Organizations requires disclosure of the entity's capitalization policy. Mr. Reilly testified that it is important for a reader of the audit to understand the dollar threshold at which the entity has decided to capitalize fixed assets, and that the professional standards require the disclosure in the audit report. In response, Mr. McQuay contended that the audit report did disclose the capitalization policy, citing to the following paragraph: Property donated to the Center is stated at its estimated fair market value. Depreciation expense is computed by use of the straight-line method of the estimated economic life of the respective assets. Maintenance and repairs are expensed as incurred. Extraordinary repairs that significantly extend the useful lives of the related assets are capitalized and depreciated over the assets' remaining economic useful life. This response is insufficient because the quoted language does not address the dollar threshold for capitalizing fixed assets, which is required under the standards for audits of nonprofit organizations. Mr. Reilly stated that the notes also failed to include a required statement as to lease commitments. Where the entity has operating leases that commit the entity for more than one year, professional standards require disclosure of the amount of the future commitments for each of the first five years subsequent to the date of the statement of financial position. Mr. McQuay's audit notes indicate that Mid-Florida Center had leases ranging as far as three years into the future, but do not disclose the amount of those lease commitments. Mr. McQuay responded that audit standards provide that immaterial items need not be disclosed, and that it was his professional judgment that the leases in question were not material. Mr. Reilly replied that the audit report gives the reader no basis for making an independent judgment as to the materiality of the leases. Mr. Reilly's view is more consistent with the specific standard regarding lease disclosure, though Mr. McQuay's exercise of independent professional judgment in this instance was not so unreasonable as to constitute a violation of professional standards. Mr. Reilly stated that the notes to the financial statements also omitted a statement of cash flows. However, Mr. McQuay's audit report properly identified this omission as a departure from generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), rendering irrelevant any further discussion of the definition of cash equivalents. In summary, as to the second allegation, the evidence proved that Mr. McQuay violated the standards by failing to address the dollar threshold for capitalizing fixed assets, but did not prove any other violations of the disclosure requirements. The third allegation as to the financial statements was that the Statement of Activities and Statement of Functional Expenses should not contain captions of "Memorandum Only" for their "total" columns. Mr. Reilly contended that the "Memorandum Only" caption was inaccurate and misleading. Historically, the term "memorandum only" was used frequently on local government financial statements, where the auditor must give an opinion on different types of columns. Some of the columns were on a modified accrual basis and others on an accrual basis. Because these are two different bases of accounting, the "total" column was irrelevant. Mr. Reilly pointed out that the only time an auditor would use the "memorandum only" terminology as to a nonprofit organization's audit would be in presenting comparative financial statements, or where the prior year's audit included a summary total that was not in accordance with GAAP. In those situations, an auditor would use the "memorandum only" caption, as well as other disclosures, in the notice of the financial statements and the auditor's report. However, the Mid-Florida Center audit involved a single year's financial statement. Mr. Reilly opined that the total column on these financial statements was extremely significant, and that the "memorandum only" caption was extremely misleading. Mr. McQuay responded that the decision was made to use the "memorandum only" caption because this was the initial audit for Mid-Florida Center, and that the caption does not materially change any substantive aspect of the financial statement and is therefore not misleading. Mr. Reilly's position that the inclusion of the "memorandum only" caption was misleading and a violation of the standards cited in his report was correct, and Mr. McQuay's response was insufficient. The fourth allegation as to the financial statements was that donations of long-lived depreciable assets should not be reported as "Permanently Restricted Net Assets." Mr. Reilly conceded that this was a very complicated issue for which Mr. McQuay had "quite a bit of support." Mid-Florida Center purchased land and some equipment from the Highlands County School Board. The fair value of the property exceeded the price paid by Mid-Florida Center. Under GAAP, the difference between the price paid and the value would be recorded as a donated asset. The dollar amount recorded in the financial statement was $330,000, but there was no documentation showing how that number was arrived at, and no documentation showing the breakout between the land and the equipment. Mr. Reilly testified that when he looked at the fixed assets, he found a $280,000 item for land but could not be certain whether the item was part of this land or another piece of property referenced elsewhere in the notes. However, $330,000 was shown in a column called "permanently restricted." Mr. Reilly did not take issue with placing the land in that column. However, he thought that the equipment, i.e., the depreciable portion of that asset, should not be placed in the "permanently restricted" column. Mr. Reilly testified that an item such as an endowment fund is the only thing that should be placed in a "permanently restricted" column. Once an asset is placed in service and begins depreciating, it must be placed in the "unrestricted" column. In his response, Mr. McQuay referenced a reversionary clause in the purchase agreement, whereby if Mid-Florida Center gave up its 501(c)(3) nonprofit status, the property would revert to the School Board. Mr. Reilly testified that this is a standard clause in government contracts, and is not a reason to classify the item as permanently or temporarily restricted. While his report took issue with the placement of depreciable assets in the "permanently restricted" column, Mr. Reilly conceded that the relevant Statement of Financial Accounting Standards is not crystal clear and that he used non- authoritative practice guides to arrive at his conclusion. Mr. Reilly believed that it was misleading to label equipment in operation as "permanently restricted," but also conceded that the notes to the financial statement fully disclosed the issue. Mr. McQuay insisted that his audit did distinguish between the land and equipment in the fixed assets and depreciation schedules. While his treatment of the item was subject to dispute, Mr. McQuay cannot be found to have violated professional standards as to this issue. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement above, Mr. Reilly identified six issues relating to the working papers. The first allegation is that there was no evidence of a reporting and disclosure checklist for not-for-profit organizations. Mr. Reilly opined that it is common practice to include such a checklist, and that Mr. McQuay should have used one on this audit because nonprofits have unique disclosure requirements and Mid-Florida Center was the only nonprofit organization that Mr. McQuay was auditing at the time. Mr. Reilly noted that failure to use a checklist does not violate a particular auditing standard, but could be held to violate the more general professional standard of due care. Mr. Reilly believed that due professional care mandates that a CPA use a checklist when auditing a nonprofit organization, and that a CPA "would be a fool" not to use one. A typical checklist is 70 pages long, and an accountant needs the list to jog his memory as to the many unique requirements of nonprofits. Mr. Reilly thought that Mr. McQuay might have avoided some of the cited deficiencies if he had used a checklist. Mr. McQuay responded that professional standards do not require the use of a checklist. Moreover, he asserted that his auditing software contains the functional equivalent of a disclosure checklist. While conceding that this was the only nonprofit he audited during the year in question, Mr. McQuay testified that he has been auditing nonprofit organizations for over 36 years and that his previous firm conducted 35 to 40 such audits annually. A checklist would be of no assistance out in the field, where the auditor is examining the client's working papers. Mr. McQuay stated that he does use a checklist when he is reviewing the work of a staff auditor, but that he did not need a checklist here because he was performing the audit himself. Even after hearing Mr. McQuay's response, Mr. Reilly continued to hold that it was foolish not to complete a disclosure checklist. The fact that Mr. McQuay was the only person working on the audit provided all the more reason for the use of a checklist. Accepting Mr. McQuay's testimony that his auditing software contained the equivalent of a checklist, it is found that his failure to use a paper checklist was not a violation of auditing standards or of due professional care. The second allegation relating to the working papers was a lack of audit evidence for fraud risk factors or planning materiality. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82 states that the auditor "should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and should consider that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed." The auditor should consider fraud risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting and from misappropriation of assets. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 provides that the auditor should consider audit risk and materiality in planning the audit and designing auditing procedures and in evaluating whether the financial statements "taken as a whole are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." Mr. Reilly found nothing in Mr. McQuay's working papers documenting that an assessment in conformance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82 was made, or that an audit risk and materiality assessment was made in accordance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47. Mr. McQuay responded that a separate section in his work papers dealt with fraud risk factors and materiality. He testified that his firm is careful in selecting clients and looks carefully at management capabilities and the risks involved in the representation. Mr. Reilly reviewed Mr. McQuay's response and concluded that it did not come close to meeting professional standards. As to this issue, it is found that Mr. McQuay did violate professional standards as to documentation, though he may well have performed the assessments in question. The third allegation relating to the working papers was that the management representation letter omitted the specific representations relative to the single audit and the referenced schedule of uncorrected misstatements in the management representation letter. The "single audit" is an Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") A-133 audit of an entity that has received $500,000 or more of Federal assistance for its operations. Mr. Reilly found the omissions in the management representation letter constituted a violation of professional standards. Mr. Reilly testified that the standards require that on every audit, the auditor obtain a management representation letter signed by the appropriate levels of management. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 85 contains the basic requirements for management representations. Mr. McQuay obtained a management representation letter from Mid-Florida Center in compliance with this basic requirement. However, because this was a single audit, additional representations were required in the management representation letter over and above those found in a generic audit. AICPA's Statement of Position 98-3, "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Not-for-Profit Organizations Receiving Federal Awards," paragraph 6.68 requires the auditor conducting an OMB A-133 audit to obtain written representations from management about matters related to federal awards. Paragraph 6.69 of the same document lists 22 items for which the auditor should consider obtaining written representations in a single audit. Mr. Reilly testified that most of these items were applicable in this case, but that none of them were included in the Mid-Florida Center's management representation letter. In response, Mr. McQuay pointed to his engagement letter with the client. The engagement letter states that this would be an OMB A-133 audit, and that Mr. McQuay has explained to the client and the client has understood that management is responsible for compliance with the OMB A-133 audit requirements. Mr. McQuay did not think he needed to include the detailed representations of paragraph 6.69 when he already had an extensive engagement letter that covered these areas of management responsibility. Mr. Reilly replied that the engagement letter and the management representation letter are two entirely different things. The engagement letter spells out the scope of representation to the client at the outset of the engagement; completely different standards require the auditor to obtain written representations from management regarding elements spelled out in the standards, at the conclusion of the engagement. The engagement letter is irrelevant for purposes of the single audit's requirement that representations be obtained from management about matters related to federal awards. None of the specific statements referenced by Mr. McQuay in his engagement letter dealt with the specifics of federal awards. As to this issue, it is found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards. The fourth allegation relating to the working papers was that no documentation was evident regarding a consideration of a going concern with the entity's financial position. Mr. Reilly testified that it was apparent from a glance at the financial statements that the entity had severe financial problems. It had an adverse current ratio, with assets of $33,000 and liabilities of $138,000, not considering the issue of liability for back pay owed to the executive director. Under Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59, an auditor has the responsibility to evaluate and document any causes for doubt about the continuing viability of the entity, and further to evaluate and document management's plans to turn around the entity. Mr. Reilly saw nothing that came close to meeting this standard. The only items of substance he found were a statement that the Mid-Florida Center was creating a new charter school and that fundraising activities were "ongoing." There were no specifics as to the charter school or the fundraising. Mr. Reilly found these statements "grossly inadequate" to comply with professional standards. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 includes specific items that an auditor should evaluate, such as management's specific plans to curb expenditures and increase revenue. Mr. McQuay supplied a document titled "Going Concern Evaluation," but the document provided no specifics as to the evaluation that was performed. Mr. McQuay responded that any startup organization such as the Mid-Florida Center will have poor current ratios. However, the entity had the management wherewithal to raise money and a committed, competent board of directors. The proposed charter school had already received funding for building renovation for the 2003-2004 school year. Mr. McQuay believed that his field work and evaluation of the management plans was sufficient to satisfy the standard. As to this issue, it is found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards, at least insofar as he failed adequately to document his consideration of a going concern with the entity's financial position in accordance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59. The fifth allegation relating to the working papers was that the management representation letter addressed the $158,429 liability owed to the executive director, which was reversed off the books, but failed to justify the removal of the liability from the financial statements by specifically finalizing the matter. Mr. Reilly explained that, as of the balance sheet date, Mid-Florida Center owed several years' salary to its executive director, Dr. Arthur Cox, a significant liability that would make Mid-Florida's poor current ratio even worse. Mid-Florida removed the liability for Dr. Cox' salary from its books. Mr. Reilly did not have a problem with removing the salary, in the amount of $158,429 from the books, provided Mid-Florida had secured a separate, standalone confirmation from Dr. Cox that he was totally relinquishing any rights to those funds. However, the relinquishment issue was addressed in a management representation letter by way of what Mr. Reilly termed "squirrely wording." Rather than completely extinguish any rights Mr. Cox had to the salary, the Mid-Florida Center's board voted to change the liability from deferred compensation to amounts owed for future salary increases. Essentially, the board took the liability off the books at the present time, but left open the possibility of reinstating it when Mid-Florida Center's finances permitted it to pay Dr. Cox the amount he was owed. Mr. McQuay responded that the Form 990 for the year in question had been completed by another CPA and filed prior to his retention. Form 990 is the tax return for organizations exempt from income tax. The working trial balance prepared by the other CPA indicated that the liability for the back pay had been removed, and the Form 990 had been filed with the Internal Revenue Service without including the liability. In reconciling the Form 990 with the working trial balance for purposes of his audit, Mr. McQuay obtained the management representation letter referenced by Mr. Reilly. Mr. McQuay testified that he viewed the letter as firming up the matter that the previous CPA had dropped in his lap. Selvin McGahee, a member of the Mid-Florida Center's board of directors, testified that Dr. Cox founded the Mid- Florida Center, writing the initial grants that got the entity started. Dr. Cox' focus on providing services led him to forego some of the salary that was budgeted for his position, in order to spend the funds on other positions. Mr. McGahee testified that this situation persisted for a couple of years, with Dr. Cox supplementing the organization's revenues by not paying himself. The board ultimately decided to remove the back pay from its books, but had the intention of paying Dr. Cox his back salary if and when the organization generated sufficient unrestricted revenue to do so. As to this issue, it is found that that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards and departed from generally accepted accounting principles. Removing the liability for back salary payments to the executive director should have been accompanied by an unequivocal renunciation of those funds by the executive director. As matters were allowed to stand by Mr. McQuay, Mid-Florida Center's balance sheet was significantly improved in a manner that did not finalize the issue of the possible reinstatement of the back pay liability in the future. The sixth allegation as to the working papers was that, relative to compliance testing, the working papers contained evidence of testing only one monthly invoice/progress report. Mr. Reilly testified that the problem here was a lack of documentation. Though the auditor's judgment is paramount as to compliance testing, there are stated requirements that the auditor must meet. Because this was a single audit, OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement was used. This Circular lists fourteen specific items of testing, each of which should be addressed by the auditor at least to the point of indicating that the auditor has determined the item to be inapplicable to the audit at hand. Mr. Reilly testified that one of the specific issues he was called to investigate involved the lack of documentation regarding a grant that the Mid-Florida Center had obtained from the City of Bartow. The grant required the submission of a monthly invoice/progress report. Mr. Reilly could find evidence that Mr. McQuay had tested only one such invoice. Mr. Reilly conceded that it was "tough to say" what professional judgment demanded in this situation because he was not there when the audit was conducted. Mr. Reilly stated that he would probably have tested more than one invoice, but he could not say how many. The usual practice is to expand the testing if a problem is found with the first invoice. Mr. McQuay found no problems with the one invoice and progress report that he tested, and made the judgment that his examination was adequate. Mr. Reilly believed that, based on the overall scope of problems with Mid- Florida Center's documentation, Mr. Reilly concluded that the entity's invoices and progress reports were "lightly tested." As to this issue, it is found that Mr. McQuay did not violate professional standards or generally accepted accounting principles. Mr. Reilly testified that he might have conducted the compliance testing more strenuously than did Mr. McQuay, but he could not state that Mr. McQuay's actions were outside the boundaries of his professional judgment. Petitioner offered the testimony of Allan Nast, an expert in accounting and auditing. Mr. Nast reviewed the audit performed by Mr. McQuay, and also reviewed the reports prepared by Mr. Reilly. Mr. Nast agreed with Mr. Reilly's opinions in every particular. Mr. Nast's opinion has been considered and is respected by the undersigned, but does not change the findings of fact made above. Mr. Nast testified that he billed Department $1,365.00 for his services. No billing statements, invoices, or other documents were entered into evidence to support the amount of Mr. Nast's fee. No expert testimony was offered to establish the reasonableness of the fee. Mr. McQuay testified that he believes he has been singled out for disciplinary action based on business reasons. Mr. McQuay pointed out that the initial complaint in this matter was filed by a competitor who was also the father of an accountant whose firm Mr. McQuay had rejected for work in his role as director of quality assurance for WorkNet Pinellas, Inc. Mr. McQuay, an African-American, also testified as to incidents of racism as he pursued his career in a profession dominated by white men. The undersigned has considered this testimony by Mr. McQuay, but cannot find that these matters had any bearing on the merits of the allegations lodged by the Department in the Complaint after its thorough investigation of the initial complaint. In summary, as to the four allegations regarding the financial statements recited in the Preliminary Statement above, it was found that the first allegation as to missing statements in the audit was proven, though ameliorated by the fact that all of the reports referenced by the missing statements were included in the audit report. As to the second allegation as to missing disclosures, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards as to only one of several of the alleged omissions. As to the third allegation regarding the "Memorandum Only" statement in the "total" columns, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated the relevant standards. As to the fourth allegation regarding the categorization of long-lived depreciable assets, it was found that Mr. McQuay did not violate professional standards. There were six allegations regarding the working papers recited in the Preliminary Statement above. As to the first allegation regarding the disclosure checklist, it was found that Mr. McQuay did not violate auditing standards or the duty of professional care. As to the second allegation regarding lack of evidence for fraud risk factors or planning materiality, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards as to documenting his work, though he may have performed the assessments in question. As to the third allegation regarding omissions in the management representation letter, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards. As to the fourth allegation regarding going concern considerations, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards. As to the fifth allegation regarding removal of liabilities owed to the executive director, it was found that Mr. McQuay violated professional standards. As to the sixth allegation regarding the sufficiency of compliance testing, it was found that Mr. McQuay did not violate professional standards.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that A final order be entered finding that David McQuay, Jr. committed the violations alleged in Counts One, Two, and Four of the Amended Administrative Complaint and requiring Mr. McQuay to take sixteen hours of Continuing Professional Education beyond the regular requirement, including eight hours related to nonprofit organizations, and placing Mr. McQuay on probation for a period of two years. During the first year of probation, all audits (including financial statements and working papers) will be reviewed by a consultant selected by the Board, at Mr. McQuay's expense. If any audit is deemed deficient upon review by the Board, review of all audits will continue through the second year of Mr. McQuay's probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric R. Hurst, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David McQuay, Jr. 110 North Lincoln Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609-2908 Veloria A. Kelly, Director Department of Business and Professional Regulations, Board of Accountancy 240 NW 76th Drive, Suite A Gainesville, Florida 32607 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulations Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0793
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B3-5.007 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2005).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Petitioner, Kanithahalli Satya-Prakash, is seeking licensure in Florida as a clinical laboratory director pursuant to Section 483.824, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B3-5.007. Petitioner is a cytogeneticist who has served as the Director of the Cancer Cytogenetics laboratory at the Medical College of Georgia since 1986. Petitioner holds an earned doctoral degree in chemical, physical, or biological science from a regionally accredited institution. Petitioner received his doctoral degree in India in 1976. Petitioner trained at the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas. The Florida Department of Health, Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel (the Board), has been delegated by the Florida Legislature to serve as the regulatory board for clinical laboratory directors in the state of Florida. After submitting his application for licensure as a clinical laboratory director, the Board instructed Petitioner that he lacked the requisite board certification requirement necessary for licensure under Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B3-5.007. Petitioner is not board certified and does not maintain certification by a board approved by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. On or about June 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Variance from or Waiver of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B3-5.007, with the Board. The Board informed Petitioner that he had to pass the specialty examination in clinical cytogenetics prepared by the American Board of Medical Genetics in order to become licensed in Florida as a clinical laboratory director. On August 18, 2005, the Board issued an Order Denying the Petition for Variance/Waiver. The Board ruled that Petitioner failed to meet "the board certification requirements set forth in Rule 64B3-5.007(4) for licensure as a laboratory director." Petitioner has over four years of clinical laboratory experience with two years of experience in the specialty to be directed.2/ The federal Health Care Financing Administration is now known as Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Petitioner is substantially affected by the challenged Rule and has standing to bring this action.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is not a graduate of at least a four-year accredited college or university course, and has not qualified for a degree with a major in accounting. The Petitioner has not completed such courses as would constitute a major in accounting. The Petitioner has not satisfied all of the legal requirements to take the Florida examination or to receive a Reciprocal Certificate from the Respondent. The Petitioner has practiced accountancy for more than fifty years, and he holds Certified Public Accountant Certificates from the state of New York and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Petitioner has also been admitted to practice before the United States Treasury Department and the United States Tax Court. The Petitioner has performed meritorious work as a Certified Public Accountant, and as also performed many important civic services.
Recommendation That the application of Philip M. Percus for a Reciprocal Certificate allowing him to practice as a Certified Public Accountant in Florida be denied. Recommended this 6th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Laurence J. Marchbanks, Esquire 301 W. Camino Gardens Boulevard Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Attorney for Petitioner James S. Quincey, Esquire P.O. Box 1090 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Attorney for Respondent Douglas N. Thompson, Jr. Executive Director Florida State Board of Accountancy Post Office Box 13475 Gainesville, Florida 32604
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Gary L. Wheeler, Respondent, is a graduate of Bob Jones University, having received a Bachelor of Science degree therefrom in accounting in 1974. On July 27, 1979, Respondent received his California certificate as a certified public accountant. Thereafter, Respondent filed an application to obtain a reciprocal C.P.A. certificate in Florida based on his certificate issued by the State of California (Certificate No. E-28234). His application was denied by the Petitioner on October 26, 1979, for the following reason: Applicant failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 7(3)(b), Chapter 79-202, Laws of Florida, inasmuch as the license issued to Gary L. Wheeler in California is not issued under criteria substantially equivalent to that in effect in Florida at the time the California license was issued. Bob Jones University was not recognized as an accredited university in Florida by the Board when Respondent received his California certificate inasmuch as it was not listed among the institutions of postsecondary education by the Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA). During September, 1976, Petitioner adopted the COPA list of schools as the schools from which it would accept graduates to sit for its examination. This was done for the avowed purpose of ensuring minimum competence and technical fitness among the ranks of Florida accountants. Douglas H. Thompson, Jr., the Petitioner's Executive Director since 1968, is the Board's chief operating officer and carries out its functions respecting applications for licensure. As such, Mr. Thompson was the person charged with examining Respondent's application pursuant to his California certificate to determine whether the Respondent's certificate was issued under criteria "substantially equivalent" to Florida's licensing criteria. Respondent's application was considered by the Board on two (2) occasions and rejected because Respondent's alma mater, Bob Jones University, is not listed among the accredited schools and universities by COPA. See Sections 473.306; 473.307 and 473.308, Florida Statutes, as amended; and Chapter 21A-28.06, Florida Administrative Code. As an aside, it was noted that the Board, in adopting its procedure for evaluating the criteria for applicants who were seeking to obtain certificates based on the reciprocal qualifications guidelines also adopted other equivalency procedures which provide Respondent an alternative method for which he may obtain a Florida certificate. In this regard, Respondent is only approximately six (6) quarter hours away from obtaining his certificate under the alternative equivalency procedures established by the Board. See Chapters 21A-9.01 through 9.04(4), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's appeal of the Board's action in denying his application for a reciprocal license to practice public accounting based on the issuance of his California certificate be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of March, 1980. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Did Respondent, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners (County), discriminate against Petitioner, Annette Whitner, on account of her age?
Findings Of Fact At the time of the alleged discrimination, Ms. Whitner was 71 years old. Ms. Whitner claims that the County discriminated against her by not interviewing her for its business services director position due to her age. Ms. Whitner claims that she was discriminated against because the position required an applicant to be a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). She argues that older people are less likely to hold a CPA certification. The weight of the credible evidence did not establish this claim. Ms. Whitner did not establish any connection between possessing a CPA certification and age. On November 10, 2014, the County posted the position online. It was a newly created position, established as part of a reorganization by the County. Because of previous audit errors and the departments the position would oversee, the County determined the minimum qualifications for the position should be: Bachelor’s degree with major course work in public administration, business administration, accounting, finance or related field and possession of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) professional certification or equivalent is required. Master degree in business administration, finance management, public administration, or related discipline is preferred. In determining the equivalent to a CPA, the County referred to the Guide for Certifications for Accounting, Finance and Operations Management (Guide). This was a reasonable non- discriminatory decision. Based on the Guide, the County determined a Certified Government Auditing Professional, Certified Governmental Financial Manager, and Certified Internal Auditor would constitute an equivalent to a CPA certification. The certifications were deemed equivalent because they required similar education, experience, and completion of an examination, similar to one taken for a CPA certification. The closing date for all applicants was December 15, 2014. Ms. Whitner submitted her application near midnight of December 15. Ms. Whitner is not a CPA. In addition, Ms. Whitner did not follow the instructions on the application. She scratched out the instructions on the application and wrote “first” above where it read “current or most recent employer.” Ms. Whitner’s application contained typed and handwritten information. Ms. Whitner’s application did not provide her complete work history as the application instructed. In one of the fields of employment, after 1992, Ms. Whitner wrote “various employers.” Ms. Whitner’s application left an unexplained gap in work history, from 1992 to the present. Ms. Whitner’s application included copies of her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree, Master of Public Affairs degree, certification as a Certified District Manager, Certificate of Recognition from the Indiana Executive Program, and a letter of reference from Al Grieshaber, General Manager at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring, dated February 8, 2010. Ms. Whitner’s application indicated she had a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant. Ms. Whitner asserts that a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant should be equivalent to a CPA certification. However, the Guide does not include a certification for a Certified Professional Government Accountant as a CPA equivalent, nor does the County consider it equivalent. Additionally, Ms. Whitner did not attach a copy of her certification or provide persuasive evidence of the certification criteria and their similarity to CPA criteria. The County could not determine if Ms. Whitner had worked since 1992. Ms. Whitner argues that her letter of reference from Al Grieshaber demonstrated her employment since 1992. However, the letter did not include the dates Ms. Whitner worked, the position held, or her duties and the type of work she performed at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring. Randal Vosburg, Assistant County Administrator, was involved in the hiring and selection process for the position. The primary criteria he was looking for when reviewing the applications was whether the applicant had a CPA. Mr. Vosburg did not have any contact with Ms. Whitner and did not know her age when reviewing her application. Mr. Vosburg did not consider Ms. Whitner’s age when reviewing her application. The County did not select Ms. Whitner for an interview because she was not a CPA and did not possess a certificate that is equivalent to a CPA certification. Additionally, Ms. Whitner presented an unprofessional application, did not provide a complete work history so that there appeared to be more than a twenty-year gap in employment, and did not follow the instructions on the employment application. These were all reasonable non-discriminatory bases for deciding not to interview Ms. Whitner. On January 5, 2015, Ms. Whitner submitted an addendum to her employment application. This was after the application deadline and after the County had selected candidates to interview. Ms. Whitner’s addendum did not provide documentation or certification that she possessed a CPA certification or the equivalent. The County selected Tanya Cannady and Stanoil Raley for interviews. Both possessed CPAs. Both were reasonably deemed to be more qualified than Ms. Whitner. A panel of three people interviewed Ms. Cannady and Mr. Raley. Randal Vosburg, June Fisher, County Administrator, and Mark Hill, then-Development Services Director, served on the panel. Ms. Cannady performed much better than Mr. Raley during the interview. Additionally, Ms. Cannady’s work experience was more relevant to the position than Mr. Raley’s work experience. The County selected Ms. Cannady for the position because she met the requirement of having a minimum of five-years of progressively responsible relevant experience, was a CPA, and was more qualified than Mr. Raley and the other applicants. The County offered the position to Ms. Cannady. She did not accept the offer and withdrew her application. On August 5, 2015, the County re-posted the position online. The county changed the CPA requirement from “required” to “preferred” because the County was having trouble finding CPA applicants. Ms. Whitner did not reapply for the position. The County conducted additional interviews and selected Tasha Morgan. Ms. Morgan was female and was a CPA. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence did not establish that the County discriminated against Ms. Whitner due to her age. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence established that the County had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not interviewing Ms. Whitner.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the FBM, Respondent herein, was the state agency responsible for the licensing of medical doctors in Florida and the regulation of the practice of medicine in this state. Petitioner is a medical doctor licensed by the Board to practice in Florida. The parties stipulated to the following facts, and it is so found: The Florida Board of Medicine employs no specific criteria for the recognition of practitioners as specialists for advertising purposes other than the rule. The Board of Medicine has not reviewed the activities of the ABMS as it relates to its criteria for the recognition of specialists. The FBM has never adopted written standards, policies or guidelines governing the actions of the ABMS or their separately incorporated, financially independent member boards. The ABMS has never petitioned or applied to the FBM to be considered as a recognizing agency pursuant to Rule 61F6-24.001(2)(f), formerly rule 21M-24.001(2)(f). There are no written standards relating to qualifications for "recognizing agencies" as the term is used in the above-mentioned rule. Pursuant to the rule, the FBM designated specialty boards of the ABMS, a private organization, to be recognizing agencies without establishing any written standards or guidelines for the recognition of a physician as a specialist. The ABMS does not, itself, establish specific criteria standards or requirements for the certification of particular physician specialists. The ABMS utilizes guidelines and requirements established by separately incorporated, financially independent bodies known as specialty boards. The FBM has established no written standards, policies or guidelines to which the ABMS must adhere relating to the recognition of individual practitioners as specialists. The FBM has adopted no rules relating to the regulation or recognizing agencies as defined by the rule. The FBM has not established criteria relating to the qualification of non-ABMS organizations as recognizing agencies under the rule. The FBM has no input into the standards employed by the separately incorporated boards. There are no FBM rules requiring ABMS compliance. The FBM has no mechanism for review of the actions of either the ABMS or its separately incorporated boards. Regardless of standards employed by groups which recognize physicians as specialists, if the groups are not member organizations of the ABMS, advertising specialty achievements of these groups is not permitted under Florida law. Petitioner has been licensed as a physician by the FBM since 1976. He has completed a residency program in orthopedics but has not been certified in this specialty by a member board of the ABMS. However, he identifies himself as a diplomate of the American Academy of Neurological and Orthopedic Surgeons on his letterhead on correspondence mailed from his office and on various correspondence sent to Associated Insurance Brokers Claims Management in regard to a patient. Though he claims he did not intend his letterhead identification as a board diplomate to be advertising, he acknowledged such designation enhanced his stature as an orthopedic surgeon and many insurance carriers approve higher patient charges for various specialists. Thereafter, the FBM initiated disciplinary action against Petitioner on the basis that his "advertising" was in violation of rule 61F6-24.001(2)(f), F.A.C. which prohibited false, deceptive or misleading advertising, and which implied those conditions if the advertising stated or implied the physician was formally recognized as a specialist in a medical specialization unless such recognition was by an agency recognized by the ABMS or another FBM approved agency. Petitioner subsequently filed this challenge to that rule. In the interim, a Division of Administrative Hearings Hearing Officer held a formal hearing on the disciplinary administrative Complaint and on December 20, 1993, entered a Recommended Order in which he found that Petitioner had disseminated the alleged letterhead and that constituted advertising. Since the specialty certification was by an agency not recognized by the ABMS or any other approved recognizing agency, Petitioner was in violation of the rule. The FBM was scheduled to act on the Recommended Order at its meeting to be held on February 4 - 6, 1994. Whether such action was taken, or the nature thereof are not known to the undersigned. Dr. Michael Rask, a medical doctor licensed to practice in Oregon, California, Nevada, and Arizona, and certified in orthopedic surgery by an ABMS recognized board, is Chairman of the Board of the American Academy of Neurological and Orthopedic Surgeons, (Academy). The Academy is an educational, nonprofit, eleemosynary society of physicians and surgeons across America located in Las Vegas, Nevada. It has some international members. It is accredited by the American Federation for Medical Accreditation, (Federation), of which Dr. Rask is also the Chairman. The Federation has close to 50 specialty and sub-specialty boards in its membership, 35 of which are also members of the Academy. Membership in the Academy is neither illegal nor inconsistent with the lawful practice of medicine in Florida. Petitioner, Dr. Feldman, has been a member of the Academy since 1980. The Academy has approximately 650 certified members. For certification in orthopedic surgery as a specialty, the Academy requires completion of a five year residency in that service, in addition to 3 years practice experience. Both a written and an oral examination are required. The tests are formulated by the Academy's national examination committee who are members of the Academy. Between 50 and 60 percent of the committee members are also certified by ABMS recognized specialty boards, but Dr. Rask was unable to identify the members without reference to the Academy's archives, which were not available. Failure rate on the examinations runs from 25 to 28 percent and Dr. Rask feels the tests are comparable to those administered by ABMS member boards. The Academy publishes periodic medical journals edited by Dr. Rask as a part of its educational program and certifies continuing medical education courses accepted by both Texas and California as well as, "maybe some others." The Academy specialty board criteria have been approved by the US Department of Labor which, by letter dated December 18, 1984, recognized the Academy as a "bona fide medical specialty board" and indicated its diplomates could be accorded status equivalent to that of ABMS diplomates in their respective fields. Educational organizations have also recognized the Academy including the International College of Surgeons, United States Section. Nonetheless, it has not been recognized by the ABMS nor has any other recognition board sought approval from the FBM during the period between 1980 through April 1993. Since that time, four requests, including one from the American Academy of Neurologic and Orthopedic Surgeons, have been received by the FBM but they have been held in abeyance pending FBM rulemaking activity to develop appropriate criteria for approval. 10. Rule 61F-24.001(2)(f), F.A.C., formerly 21M-24.01, F.A.C., which is challenged in this matter, was adopted by the FBM in 1980 and amended the same year. In 1988 it was again amended to require ABMS recognition of specialty boards which certified individual physicians. At the time of adoption of the rule and of the amendment thereto, the FBM members recognized the organization and purpose of the ABMS and intended it to be the recognition agency for specialty certification as it relates to physician advertising. Dr. J. Lee Dockery has been Executive Vice-president of ABMS since July, 1991. Before that time he was in the private practice of medicine in Florida and a member of the Florida Board of Medicine. The ABMS is a nonprofit private organization not governmentally regulated, incorporated in Illinois. It is made up of 24 separately incorporated and financially independent specialty boards. There are approximately 126 other self-designated boards for the purposes of certification. The ABMS maintains no files on the standards of certification of these self-designated boards. According to Dr. Dockery, these self-designating boards are not accepted by the medical profession. The independent specialty boards within the ABMS framework develop the criteria for admission to the certifying examinations they administer. They also develop the examinations, determine the examinations' validity, score them, and report the passing scores to the individual physicians, along with certificates of qualification. The ABMS, on the other hand, is the agency which approves the establishment of a specialty or sub-specialty and the independent board for that specialty establishes the criteria and requirements for certification in that specialty. The ABMS does not prepare or grade specialty examinations nor does it review the results of the tests. It also does not establish the requirements for admission to specialty examinations. This is done by the individual certifying board. There are uniform standards among the 24 member boards which relate to the completion of required educational programs under which that specialty was approved for authorization purposes. These standards may vary in terms of length of years of training required but not as to the accreditation of that training. All member specialty boards require initial specialty training for sub-specialties in addition to the training for initial certification in the specialty. Once a physician is certified based on the requirements in place at the time, he does not lose that certification if the requirements for certification are subsequently increased. None of the fee paid by physicians to specialty boards is paid to the ABMS. The ABMS does not lobby, though it has, in some cases, given testimony before state medical boards concerning proposed legislation which, it feels, would inappropriately diminish the qualifications for certification, in order to insure the health of the public is protected. There is an organization for osteopathic physicians similar to the ABMS. It is called the American Osteopathic Association. The American Academy of Neurological and Orthopedic Surgeons is not and never has been recognized by ABMS, nor has the American Federation for Medical Accreditation. Using the term "diplomate" of an organization not affiliated with the ABMS is not improper since that term signifies only the passage of an examination and not certification of expertise. Also, placement of a credential in a cirriculum vitae is different from placing it in a letterhead. The issue is how the placement is to be used. Whereas the former has limited application, the latter may be widely disseminated.
