The Issue The issue is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for signing an affidavit allegedly adverse to Respondent and for testifying on behalf of another employee in a proceeding filed under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as defined in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent employed Petitioner at Respondent's place of business located in Tallahassee, Florida. On March 29, 1990, Petitioner and Respondent's representative signed an Employment Agreement in which Petitioner agreed, inter alia, that during his employment, he would refrain from: (1) performing services for any person, during business hours, or at any other time, when said services were not authorized by Respondent; (2) soliciting work for or accepting any business from any customer of the company on behalf himself or for any others. On March 30, 1990, Petitioner and Respondent's representative signed a Sales Employee Compensation Plan in which Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner a starting salary of $1,200 per month as a guarantee against commission on sales for the first three months. Thereafter, Respondent's salary of $1,200 per month was to be a draw against commission on sales. Petitioner had to sell a minimum of $8,000 per month to earn his draw. Pursuant to the Sales Employee Compensation Plan, Petitioner earned a percent of sales, ranging from 10 percent to 20 percent, depending on the type of service Petitioner sold. He received commissions after the work was completed and the customer paid for the service. For example, Petitioner earned 15 percent of the annualized value of all pest control work, termite work, or special onetime service that he sold. He earned 20 percent of the initial month's service charge on all annual pest control service that he sold provided that he performed the start-up. Respondent paid Petitioner 20 percent of the total value of all real estate inspections (certification or clearance letter) that Petitioner performed. Under the Sales Employee Compensation Plan, Petitioner elected to receive 2.5 percent of monthly net commissionable sales, or $150, whichever was greater, as a gasoline allowance and to furnish his own transportation. However, Respondent's former branch manager gave Petitioner a gasoline credit card and told Petitioner to put the gasoline allowance in his pocket. The record indicates that the former branch manager acted beyond the scope of his authority in this regard. Upon employment, Respondent's former branch manager gave Petitioner a key to the office. Petitioner also received a pest control kit with which to perform the initial pest control treatment after selling a service contract. Respondent gave Petitioner a voice-pager so that he could stay in touch with the office and respond quickly to "office" leads. No other employee had the benefit of a voice-pager. In May of 1990, Petitioner successfully completed a training course in pest control. That September, he completed a course in termite control. On or about January 14, 1991, Petitioner became qualified to prepare wood infestation reports. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was allowed to sell Respondent's services in north Florida and south Georgia. There were two kinds of sales leads. Petitioner could develop his own "creative" leads and sell anywhere within the sales territory of the Tallahassee branch office. Respondent's office manager logged all incoming "phone" or "office" leads and distributed them to the salesmen based on a geographic division of the sales territory. Petitioner lived in south Georgia; therefore, the office manager gave him all "office" leads originating in Georgia and on the east side of Tallahassee. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, neither the office manager nor any other supervisor ever discriminated against Petitioner by withholding leads from him or by taking the best leads for themselves or another salesman. On or about September 16, 1991, Petitioner sold a customer a termite protection contract instead of a termite service contract on a very expensive home without Respondent's approval. This incident resulted in the preparation of a written Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) which states that Petitioner would be terminated if he could not follow Respondent's policy governing sales of termite protection and service contracts. Respondent's testimony that he signed this DAR under the threat of violence not credible. On February 26, 1992, Petitioner signed an affidavit relating to the employment relationship between Norm Arrington and Respondent. Mr. Arrington had been a salesman for Respondent and Petitioner's coworker. On March 9, 1992, Petitioner performed a wood-destroying organism inspection on residential property in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner issued a Form 1145 (October '89) Wood Destroying Organisms Inspection Report without identifying visible and accessible evidence of and damage caused by subterranean termites on the exterior of the structure. The Florida Department of Agriculture fined Petitioner $300 dollars for failing to report evidence of termite damage. Respondent paid this fine on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner failed to report to work on September 12, 1992, for a sales meeting. He claimed he had an emergency but did not call in to explain his absence. Respondent wrote a DAR dated September 14, 1992, warning Petitioner that he would be suspended without pay for three days or terminated if he repeated this type of conduct. Petitioner presented contradictory record evidence concerning his reason for missing the sales meeting: (a) family medical emergency; and (b) mechanical problem with vehicle. Until October of 1992, Petitioner was successful in meeting or exceeding his minimum quota of $8,000 in sales revenue on an averaged monthly basis. One month he earned an award for being Respondent's top salesman statewide. However, in November of 1992, Petitioner's monthly sales revenues dropped below an acceptable level for an experienced salesman. Thereafter, Petitioner was in overdraw status, averaging between $3,000 and $4,000 per month in sales. Except for the month of February, 1993, Petitioner never again met his monthly minimum quota. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner's father owned a construction company. Respondent occasionally hired Petitioner's father to perform termite repair work. Respondent always hired outside contractors to do repair work for customers because of the liability involved and to prevent giving the impression that Terminix, Inc. was in the construction business. Petitioner was also trained as a carpenter. Petitioner admits that, during the months of his highest sales, he solicited and received "building" leads from Respondent's customers. As a result of these leads, Petitioner performed carpentry work, such as building cabinets or repairing damaged woodwork, for Respondent's customers. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent authorized this outside employment is not persuasive. In February of 1993, Tim Carey was Respondent's sales manager. He attended an out-of-town divisional sales meeting and returned to Tallahassee with motivational material to share with his staff. In the material was a poster which stated, "If you don't know where you going . . . you'll probably end up someplace else." Mr. Carey gave a copy of the poster to all salesmen including Petitioner sometime before Petitioner gave testimony adverse to Respondent. Petitioner's testimony that Mr. Carey gave the poster to Petitioner alone as a means of retaliation is not persuasive. On March 22, 1993, Petitioner testified by deposition on behalf of Norm Arrington in an unrelated age discrimination case. Around the end of March or the first of April, 1993, Tim Carey became Respondent's sales manager-in-charge. Respondent's Tallahassee branch did not have a branch manager at that time. Mr. Carey was responsible for all operations under the direct supervision of Ralph Potter, Respondent's regional manager. Mr. Carey officially became branch manager before Respondent terminated Petitioner on June 30, 1993. One of Mr. Carey's first acts as sales manager-in-charge was to change the locks to the office and the pesticide storage room. Petitioner signed a statement that he received a key to the office on March 31, 1993. However, Mr. Carey did not reissue an office key to Petitioner or any other sales representatives because they, unlike route technicians, did not work after normal business hours. Petitioner's testimony that his key was taken away as a discriminatory act is not persuasive. The undersigned also rejects Petitioner's testimony that the office was locked during office hours so that he was unable to use the phone. Mr. Carey also took Petitioner's company gasoline credit card because Petitioner was not entitled to use the card and receive a gasoline allowance too. This action was to enforce company policy, and not to retaliate against Petitioner. Soon after Mr. Carey became sales manager-in-charge, he and the office manager began receiving calls from customers wanting to know when Petitioner was going to finish their carpentry work. Sales meetings were interrupted at times by calls on Petitioner's voice-pager with inquiries about unfinished jobs. On one occasion, Petitioner came to the office at noon with paint on his hands which had been clean earlier that morning. On another occasion Mr. Carey could hear saws operating in the background when Petitioner called the office during business hours. Mr. Carey gave Petitioner repeated verbal warnings not to solicit outside employment or perform outside work for Respondent's customers. After each verbal reprimand, Petitioner would promise that he would stop and that it would not happen again. Mr. Carey eventually took Petitioner's voice-pager away and replaced it with a tone beeper like the ones used by other employees. The purpose of this action was to reduce overhead expenses and alleviate problems with Petitioner abusing the privilege of having a voice-pager. Petitioner could no longer receive direct messages relating to his construction business. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent discriminated against him by taking his voice-pager is contrary to more persuasive testimony. In April or May of 1993, Petitioner performed unauthorized work for one of Respondent's customers who sent one check to pay for a termite inspection and for Petitioner's carpentry work. In order to balance the office books, Respondent deposited the customer's check and wrote a separate company check made payable to Petitioner. Respondent again warned Petitioner not to perform unauthorized work for the company's customers. On May 17, 1993, Respondent prepared another DAR reprimanding Petitioner for two incidents. The first involved Petitioner's issuance of a clearance letter for Ms. Fortune's residence even though Petitioner had identified wood rot on the premises. Petitioner claimed he knew Ms. Fortune and issued the clearance letter based on her promise that she would repair the damage. A subsequent inspection revealed that the customer had not made the repairs. The second incident covered by the May 17, 1993, DAR involved one of Respondent's national relocation customers, Prudential Relocation. Petitioner prepared a wood destroying organism report for the customer without inspecting the inside of the structure. Respondent was responsible for repairing wood rot damage on the house. Petitioner violated Respondent's policy regardless of whether he wrote "exterior only" on the report. Neither party signed the May 17, 1993, DAR. However, Mr. Carey discussed both incidents with Petitioner and warned him that he would be suspended or discharged if: (a) Petitioner gave a clearance letter without inspecting the interior of the structure; and (b) Petitioner issued a clearance letter on a structure with water damage. On another occasion, Petitioner informed Mr. Carey that someone had stollen his pest control kit out of the back of his truck. Petitioner filed a police report on the missing pesticide kit. Several days later, a lady, who was not Respondent's customer, reported that Petitioner left the service equipment at her home after using it to treat her residence. Respondent recovered the missing equipment and did not return it to Petitioner. From that time on, a service technician performed Petitioner's initial pesticide treatments. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent took his pest control kit as a retaliatory act is rejected. Petitioner was not allowed to use the service equipment again because: (a) He left registered material in an unsupervised location; (b) He used the equipment to service a non-customer's property; and (c) He could schedule the start-ups for his new customers through the office. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent took the pest control equipment away and deliberately delayed the start-up service or failed to service on Petitioner's new accounts is not persuasive. On June 8, 1993, Ralph Potter and Tim Carey had a conference with Petitioner. The result of the meeting was a DAR signed by Mr. Potter and Mr. Carey. During the conference, the parties discussed: (a) Petitioner's poor performance for the first week of June, 1993, in which he created only $90 in revenues; (b) Petitioner's poor attitude; and (c) Petitioner's work ethic. Mr. Potter advised Petitioner that he would thereafter be expected to produce $2,500 per week in sales. Petitioner was counseled not to make negative comments, not to perform outside jobs on company time, and not to solicit from or do any work for Respondent's customers. The DAR listed suspension without pay or termination as future corrective action, if required. Petitioner refused to sign the June 8, 1993, DAR. Petitioner's attitude created problems as follows: (1) Mr. Carey had to ask Petitioner to leave a sales meeting because of his negative comments; (2) Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Carey over the proper way to complete required daily written sales reports; (3) Mr. Carey had to ask Petitioner to leave the office by 9:00 a.m. for his first appointment of the day; and (4) Petitioner resented not being allowed to answer the office phone even though company policy dictated that only the office manager, sales manager, or branch manager could answer the phone. Petitioner's testimony that Respondent offered him a job which would have reduced his income significantly is rejected as contrary to more persuasive evidence. Likewise, the undersigned rejects Petitioner's testimony that Ralph Potter physically attacked Petitioner in the men's room during an out-of-town meeting. Respondent discharged Petitioner on June 30, 1993. Petitioner's termination was the result of his unsatisfactory job performance and his failure to follow his supervisors' instructions. There is no persuasive competent substantial evidence to indicate that Respondent retaliated against Petitioner because he participated in a discrimination suit on behalf of a co-worker. To the contrary, Petitioner's employment record presents a history of problems with his supervisors. When Tim Carey became sales manager-in-charge, he and Ralph Potter warned Petitioner repeatedly that, regardless of his past working conditions, Petitioner would be expected to follow company policies. Petitioner's refusal to heed their advice and to increase his productivity resulted in job separation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of August, 1995. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3 Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 1-6. 4-5 Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 9 & 14. Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 11 & 18. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10, 13, 25, & 30. Accepted in Findings of Fact 12 except the administrative case involved only one incident. Accepted as modified in Findings of Fact 25-27. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 9 regarding leads. However, Petitioner never received a new key from Mr. Carey. Accepted in Findings of Fact 28 & 29. 13-14 Accepted but unnecessary to resolution of case. Accepted. See Findings of Fact 11, 33, & 34. Not a finding of fact. More of a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 14922 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4922 James M. Nicholas, Esquire Post Office Box 814 Melbourne, Florida 32902 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Revenue’s (Department) January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner B Century 21, Inc. (B Century 21) is incorrect.
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida’s sales and use tax laws, pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. B Century 21 is a Florida S-Corporation that operates two liquor stores (Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor), as well as a bar (Overtime Sports Bar), in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Altheeb is the sole owner of B Century 21 and testified that he is solely responsible for the operation of it, including the two liquor stores and bar. With respect to the operation of B Century 21, Mr. Altheeb testified, “I do all the paperwork, all the books, all the taxes. I do all the orders.” Matters Deemed Admitted and Conclusively Established2 B Century 21 received correspondence from the Department, dated August 20, 2019. That correspondence, from Ms. Pitre, stated, in part, “I will be conducting an examination of your books and records as authorized under Section 213.34, Florida Statutes.” B Century 21 received the Department’s form DR840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, dated August 20, 2019, including the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist. The form DR-840 indicated that the Department intended to audit B Century 21 for a tax compliance audit for the period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019. The Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist listed a number of categories of documents the Department intended to review as part of this audit. B Century 21 (through its accountant, power of attorney, and qualified representative, Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s October 30, 2019, correspondence, which referenced the “Audit Scope and Audit Commencement,” and an attached Records Request list. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated October 30, 2019, from Ms. Pitre. That email references an attached Audit Commencement Letter. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated November 12, 2019, from Ms. Pitre, which inquired of “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, dated December 16, 2019. The form DR-1215 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through December 16, 2019, of $25,461.86, for a total deficiency of $238,253.04. The form DR-1215 also reflects that if B Century 2 See Order Granting Motion Declaring Matters Admitted and Setting Discovery Deadline. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b). 21 did not agree with these audit changes, or only agreed with a portion, that it had until January 15, 2020, to request a conference or submit a written request for an extension. Further, the form DR-1215 attached a Notice of Taxpayer Rights, which included additional detail on the options available to B Century 21. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received correspondence from Ms. Pitre, dated December 16, 2019, which stated that as of the date of the correspondence, the Department had not received the information previously requested on October 13, 2019, which it needed to complete the audit. The correspondence stated that B Century 21 had 30 days to review the audit changes, provided contact information to B Century 21 if it wished to discuss the findings in the form DR-1215, and noted that if the Department did not hear from B Century 21 within 30 days, it would send the audit file to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Proposed Assessment, form DR-831, dated January 27, 2020. The form DR- 831 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through January 27, 2020, of $27,224.82, for a total deficiency of $240,016.00. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide the Department with: (a) any sales records; (b) any purchase records; or (c) any federal tax returns. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide any records to the Department for examination in conducting the audit. Additional Facts In 2011, for the purpose of enforcing the collection of sales tax on retail sales, the Florida Legislature enacted section 212.133, Florida Statutes, which requires every wholesale seller (wholesaler) of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products (ABT) to annually file information reports of its product sales to any retailer in Florida. See § 212.133(1)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. Once a year, ABT wholesalers report to the State of Florida their name, beverage license or tobacco permit number, along with each Florida retailer with which they do business, the Florida retailer’s name, retailer’s beverage license or tobacco permit number, retailer’s address, the general items sold, and sales per month. See § 212.133(3), Fla. Stat. The information collected captures the 12-month period between July 1 and June 30, and is due annually, on July 1, for the preceding 12-month period. Id. ABT wholesalers file these reports electronically through the Department’s efiling website and secure file transfer protocol established through the Department’s efiling provider. § 212.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Baker explained this statutory process further: [W]e annually, every year in the month of May, my unit reaches out to the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulations. We compel them to give us a list of all of the active wholesalers who were licensed to sell to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Once we receive that list, we then mail a notification to all those wholesalers and state the statute and the requirements and give them a user name and a password that will allow them to then log into that portal and submit their retail—their wholesale—or their wholesale sales to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Those reports are due on July 1st of each year, but they are not considered late until September 30th of that year. So that gives the wholesaler population a couple of months to compile all of their sales for the prior year, fill out their reports and submit them to the Florida Department of Revenue by the end of September. Additionally, each month, and for each retail location, B Century 21 reports gross monthly sales to the Department, and remits sales tax, utilizing the Department’s form DR-15. Ms. Baker further described the process the Department utilizes in identifying an “audit lead,” utilizing the data that ABT wholesales provide: Specifically for ABT, we have a very, actually, kind of simple comparison that we do. . . . [A]s a taxpayer, as a retailer in the state of Florida, you may purchase from multiple wholesalers. So, part of our job is we compile all of the purchases that each beverage license or tobacco license has purchased, and once we compile all the purchases for the fiscal year, then to say, you know, what were the purchases for the fiscal year versus what were the reported sales for the fiscal year. And, again, a pretty simple comparison we really look to see, did you purchase, or . . . did you report enough sales to cover the amount of purchases that we know you made as a – as a retailer. And if the sales amount does not exceed the purchase amount, then we’ll create a lead on it. The Department’s efiling provider exports the ABT wholesalers’ information to SunVisn, the Department’s database. The Department’s analysts review the ABT wholesalers’ reported data, and taxpayer information, to identify audit leads. The Department then assigns these audit leads to its service centers to conduct an audit. A tax audit period is 36 months. In conducting ABT audits, the Department has 24 months of reported data (i.e., the first 24 months of the audit period) for review. This is because the timing of section 212.133(3) requires ABT wholesalers to report annually on July 1, for the preceding 12- month period of July 1 through June 30. For the ABT reporting data examination period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2018 (a period of 24 months), B Century 21’s gross sales for its two liquor stores was as follows: Liquor Store Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,051,128.56 Arlington Liquor $902,195.49 For the same 24-month time period of July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, B Century 21’s wholesalers reported the following ABT inventory purchases to the State, as required under section 212.133: Liquor Store ABT Inventory Purchases Al’s Liquor $1,250,055.79 Arlington Liquor $1,174,877.98 As the ABT wholesalers’ reported ABT inventory purchases by B Century 21’s retail outlets were higher than B Century 21’s reported sales, the Department issued an audit lead, which led to the audit that is at issue in this proceeding. The Audit For the 36-month audit period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019 (audit period), B Century 21’s reported gross sales for each of its locations was: Location Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,557,569.74 Arlington Liquor $1,434,551.65 Overtime Sports Bar $968,476.08 On August 20, 2019, Ms. Pitre mailed to B Century 21 (and received by Mr. Altheeb), a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the audit period. Included with the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records was correspondence informing B Century 21 of the audit and requesting records. On August 26, 2019, Ms. Pitre received a telephone call from Mr. Altheeb. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this call state: Received a call from Baligh Altheeb and he said he will be hiring Brett Isaac as his POA [power of attorney]. I informed him to complete the POA form and to give it to Mr. Isaac for signature and send to me. He knows about ABT Data assessments and asked that I note on the case activity that he contacted me regarding the audit. He was worried that his liquor license will be suspended if he does not respond right away. I informed him that once I receive the POA, I will contact Mr. Isaac and discuss the audit. On October 18, 2019, the Department received B Century 21’s executed power of attorney (POA) form naming Mr. Isaac as its POA for the audit. The executed POA form reflects that the Department’s notices and written communications should be sent solely to Mr. Isaac, and not B Century 21. The executed POA form further reflects that “[r]eceipt by either the representative or the taxpayer will be considered receipt by both.” On October 29, 2019, Ms. Pitre met with Mr. Altheeb and Mr. Isaac at Mr. Isaac’s office, for a pre-audit interview. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this meeting state: Met with the taxpayer contact person, POA Brett Isaac and owner Baligh Thaleeb [sic], at the POA’s location to conduct the pre-audit interview. Discussed the scope of the audit, records needed to conduct the audit, availability of electronic records, business organization, nature of the business, internal controls, and the time line of the audit. Discussed sampling for purchases and POA signed sampling agreement. Made appointment to review records on November 12, 2019. Toured one of the location [sic] to observe business operations, Overtime Sports Bar. On October 30, 2019, Ms. Pitre emailed Mr. Isaac a copy of the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, which included a “Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist,” which requested specific taxpayer records. After receiving no response from Mr. Isaac, Ms. Pitre, on November 12, 2019, emailed Mr. Isaac concerning “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” Section 212.12(5)(b) provides that when a taxpayer fails to provide records “so that no audit or examination has been made of the books and records of” the taxpayer: [I]t shall be the duty of the department to make an assessment from an estimate based upon the best information then available to it for the taxable period of retail sales of such dealer … or of the sales or cost price of all services the sale or use of which is taxable under this chapter, together with interest, plus penalty, if such have accrued, as the case may be. Then the department shall proceed to collect such taxes, interest, and penalty on the basis of such assessment which shall be considered prima facie correct, and the burden to show the contrary shall rest upon the [taxpayer]. Section 212.12(6)(b) further provides: [I]f a dealer does not have adequate records of his or her retail sales or purchases, the department may, upon the basis of a test or sampling of the dealer’s available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by such dealer for a representative period, determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales or the proportion that taxable purchases bear to total purchases. Mr. Collier testified that, in the absence of adequate records, the Department “estimates using best available information, and for this industry … ABT sales are a higher percentage of their taxable sales.” Because B Century 21 did not provide adequate records to Ms. Pitre, she estimated the total taxable sales for the audit period. For each liquor store that B Century 21 operated, she multiplied its total ABT purchases by average markups to calculate total ABT sales. To derive these average markups, Mr. Collier explained that the Department receives data from wholesalers, and then: [W]e take that purchase information, apply average markup to the different ABT product categories, which include cigarettes, other tobacco, beer, wine, and liquor; and then that gets us to total ABT sales number. And then we derive what we call a percentage of ABT sales, percentage of that number represents. And in this particular model, 95.66 percent represents what we believe in a liquor store industry, that this type of business, that 95.66 percent of their sales are ABT products. We derive the markups, and the percentage of ABT sales from a number of liquor store audits that the Department had performed on liquor stores that provided records. The Department utilized markup data from other ABT audits. The Department applied the following markups to these ABT categories: 6.5 percent for cigarettes; 47.5 percent for other tobacco products; 17.33 percent for beer; 29.84 percent for wine; and 24.5 percent for liquor. Applying the Department’s markup for liquor stores to the wholesalers’ reported ABT data and percentage of taxable sales, Ms. Pitre estimated taxable sales for the ABT reporting data examination period and calculated the under-reported sales error ratio as follows: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Error Ratio Al’s Liquor $1,597.544.01 1.519837 Arlington Liquor $1,516,259.34 1.680633 The Department then divided B Century 21’s estimated taxable sales for the examination period, for each liquor store, by its self-reported tax sales in its DR-15s to arrive at the under-reported rate. The Department then multiplied the under-reported rate by the reported taxable monthly sales in the DR-15s to arrive at the estimated taxable sales for the 36-month audit period. The result of this calculation was: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Al’s Liquor $2,367,252.11 Arlington Liquor $2,410,954.82 The Department then multiplied the estimated taxable sales by an effective estimated tax rate which, after giving credit for B Century 21’s remitted sales tax, resulted in tax due for the Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor for the audit period, as follows: Location Sales Tax Owed Al’s Liquor $58,367.01 Arlington Liquor $70,068.44 For Overtime Sports Bar, the Department could not use ABT wholesalers’ data to estimate an assessment because the Department does not have audit data averages for bars and lounges. The Department used the “Tax Due Method” in estimating under-reported taxes and calculating under- reported taxable sales. Mr. Collier explained: The Department does not have average markup and percentage of sales for a bar. Though, you know, obviously, we all know that a bar, their main product that they sell and in most cases is ABT products. So, therefore, typically, an auditor would need to get information about that specific location. Bars can vary so much in their type of business that they do, they can be like nightclubs, or they can be like bar and grill that serves a lot of food. So there’s a lot of variances there for that particular type of industry, so we haven’t really come up with average markups, average percentage of sales for bars, per se. It’s a case-by- case situation, and in this case, the auditor decided that the fair, reasonable way to estimate the bar location would be to just average the error ratios that were derived from the Al’s Liquor and the other liquor store location and apply it to the taxable sales reported for the bar. And I think that’s a very fair and reasonable estimate based on what we all know in a bar situation; their markups are significantly higher. And of course, there can be plenty of other non-ABT taxable sales occurring in a bar setting, such as prepared food, you know, just your regular cokes and drinks. So it’s certainly a fair way to estimate in this particular audit and I believe only benefits the taxpayer. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology for estimating an assessment for Overtime Sports Bar. Further, Mr. Altheeb testified that Overtime Sports Bar operates as both a sports bar and a liquor/package store, and stated: Most of it—it’s a liquor store. I don’t know if you know the area, it’s a liquor store on the Westside. So most of it—the sport bar doesn’t really do too much business in the Westside, mostly the liquor stores. People coming in and buy package, you know, buy bottles and leave. So, most of the business is the drive-through window. The Department’s decision to average the error ratios for the other two liquor stores to derive the additional tax due average for Overtime Sports Bar is reasonable, particularly in light of Mr. Altheeb’s testimony that Overtime Sports Bar operates primarily as a liquor (package) store. The Department calculated the additional tax due average error ratio for Overtime Sports Bar by averaging the error ratios of Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor, and then multiplied it by B Century 21’s reported gross sales to arrive at the additional tax due for Overtime Sports Bar of $41,797.49. Ms. Pitre testified that she determined that, for the audit period, B Century 21 owed additional sales tax of $170,232.93. In addition, the Department imposed a penalty and accrued interest. On December 16, 2019, Ms. Pitre sent correspondence, the preliminary assessment, and a copy of the audit work papers to B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac), informing B Century 21 that it had 30 days to contact the Department’s tax audit supervisor to request an audit conference or submit a written request for an extension. After receiving no response from B Century 21, Ms. Pitre forwarded the audit workpapers to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida, to process the Notice of Proposed Assessment. B Century 21’s Position As mentioned previously, and after initially meeting with the Department, B Century 21 failed to provide requested financial records or respond to any of the numerous letters and notices received from the Department, despite being given adequate opportunity to do so. And, after filing its Amended Petition, it failed to timely respond to discovery requests from the Department which, inter alia, resulted in numerous matters being conclusively established. Mr. Isaac served as the POA for B Century 21 during the audit, and also appeared in this proceeding as a qualified representative. However, Mr. Isaac did not appear at the final hearing, did not testify as a witness at the final hearing, and does not appear to have done anything for B Century 21 in this proceeding, other than filing the Petition and Amended Petition. After Mr. Heekin appeared in this matter, and well after the time to respond to discovery, B Century 21 provided 127 pages of documents to the Department. These documents consist of: 18 pages of summaries of daily sales that Mr. Altheeb prepared for the hearing; 41 pages of sales and use tax returns from B Century 21 locations, covering 25 months (DR-15s); 2 pages of Harbortouch’s 2016 1099K, reporting credit card sales; 43 pages of unsigned federal tax returns from 2016, 2017, and 2018, prepared by Mr. Isaac; and 17 pages of B Century 21’s untimely responses to the Department’s discovery requests. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-3.0012(3) defines “adequate records” to include: (3) “Adequate records” means books, accounts, and other records sufficient to permit a reliable determination of a tax deficiency or overpayment. Incomplete records can be determined to be inadequate. To be sufficient to make a reliable determination, adequate records, including supporting documentation, must be: Accurate, that is, the records must be free from material error; Inclusive, that is, the records must capture transactions that are needed to determine a tax deficiency or overpayment; Authentic, that is, the records must be worthy of acceptance as based on fact; and Systematic, that is, the records must organize transactions in an orderly manner. The nature of the taxpayer’s business, the nature of the industry, materiality, third-party confirmations and other corroborating evidence such as related supporting documentation, and the audit methods that are suitable for use in the audit, will be used to establish that the taxpayer has adequate records. The undersigned finds that the summaries of daily sales are not adequate records because Mr. Altheeb prepared them for use at the final hearing, rather than in the regular course of business. The undersigned finds that the DR-15s provided by Mr. Altheeb, covering 25 months, are not adequate records because they are incomplete and are not inclusive. The audit period encompassed 36 months, for B Century 21’s three retail locations; however, Mr. Altheeb only provided 25 months of DR-15s. The 2016, 2017, and 2018 federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided are not adequate records because they are not authentic. Mr. Altheeb was unable to verify if these tax returns were correct, and they were unsigned. B Century 21 did not provide any evidence that it had filed any of these federal tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service. Ms. Pitre reviewed the 127 pages of documents that B Century 21 provided and testified that the summaries of daily sales did not provide the “source documents” for verification. The unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a cost-of-goods-sold (COGS) of $518,606.00 for 2016; $1,246,839.00 for 2017; and $796,968.00 for 2018. Additionally, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a beginning inventory (BI) for 2016 of $95,847.00, and a year-end inventory (EI) for 2016 of $200,556.00, EI for 2017 of $280,235.00, and EI for 2018 of $295,628.00. When comparing the unsigned federal tax returns with the ABT wholesalers’ data, the federal tax returns reflect, for 2016, total inventory purchases of $623,315.00 (which is derived from $518,606.00 (COGS) + $200,556.00 (EI) - $95,847.00 (BI)). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,174,997.34 – a discrepancy of more than $500,000.00. For 2017, the federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $1,326,518.00 (which is derived from $1,246,839.00 (COGS) + $280,235.00 (EI) for 2017 - $200,556.00 (EI) for 2016). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,422,854.79 – a discrepancy of over $96,000.00. And for 2018, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $812,361.00 (which is derived from $796,968.00 (COGS) + $295,628.00 (EI) for 2018 - $280,235.00 (BI) for 2017). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2018 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,335,814.00 – a discrepancy of over $500,000.00. Mr. Altheeb testified that Arlington Liquor and Overtime Sports Bar opened in 2016 – after B Century 21 began ownership and operation of Al’s Liquor. He stated that he did not purchase inventory for the openings of the newer locations, but instead transferred excess inventory from Al’s Liquor, which resulted in lower total inventory purchases for 2016. Mr. Altheeb also testified that B Century 21’s three locations experienced spoiled inventory. However, B Century 21 should include spoiled inventory in COGS reported in its federal tax returns, and further, B Century 21 provided no additional evidence of the cost of spoilage for the audit period. The undersigned finds that the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 through 2018 reflects similar amounts for inventory purchases between 2016 through 2018. The undersigned credits the Department’s reliance on the ABT wholesalers’ data, which reflect fairly consistent purchases for each year. The undersigned does not find the unsigned federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided to be persuasive evidence that the Department’s assessment was incorrect. Mr. Altheeb testified that he believed Mr. Isaac, who B Century 21 designated as POA for the audit, and who appears as a qualified representative in this proceeding, was actively handling the audit. Mr. Altheeb stated that the audit, and the final hearing, “kind of came out of nowhere” and that once he learned of it, he retained Mr. Heekin and provided “everything” to him. However, it is conclusively established that the Department provided correspondence and notice to B Century 21 through its designated POA, and that B Century 21 failed to respond to record requests in a timely manner. Mr. Isaac neither testified nor appeared at the final hearing to corroborate Mr. Altheeb’s claims that Mr. Isaac did not keep Mr. Altheeb or B Century 21 apprised of the status of the audit, including the failure to provide requested records or to communicate with the Department. B Century 21 also attempted to challenge the Department’s use of markup data from other ABT audits, in an attempt to argue that the markups were inflated and not representative of B Century 21’s markups. However, and as previously found, B Century 21’s failure to timely provide records—or respond in any meaningful way to the audit—undermines this attempt. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology in using the best information available to it for the audit period in calculating the assessment. Although it became apparent during the final hearing that Mr. Altheeb did not treat the audit of B Century 21 with appropriate seriousness, and deflected blame to Mr. Isaac, and that his approach resulted in a legally appropriate and sustainable audit and assessment based on the Department’s best information available, the undersigned does not find that B Century 21, Mr. Isaac, or Mr. Heekin knew that the allegations of the Amended Petition were not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense, or would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts. The undersigned finds that the Department made its assessment based on the best information then available, and is thus prima facie correct, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b). The undersigned further finds that B Century 21 did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Department’s assessment is incorrect, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b).
Conclusions For Petitioner: Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 For Respondent: Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Department enter a final order sustaining the January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to B Century 21, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brett J. Isaac 2151 University Boulevard South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 James A Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's business activities include the sale of tangible personal property such as caskets and burial vaults. The written sales contract utilized by Petitioner sets forth the amount of sales tax and includes that sum in the total amount which the customer agrees to pay. The contracts are in the form of a note, containing a promise to pay, and were sold at discount by the Petitioner at certain times during the audit period. The contracts require a down payment and installment payments thereafter. The contracts further contain a clause allowing the customer three days in which to cancel the contract, under which circumstances the customer is reimbursed all moneys paid by him to Petitioner. Under Petitioner's retained- title, conditional-sale contract, if the customer cancels the contract or stops making payments at any time subsequent to the initial three-day period, Petitioner retains all sums which have been paid to it by the customer. Petitioner's business practice is to pay its salesmen commission from the down payment on a contract. Petitioner operates on the accrual method of accounting, and its sales tax liability is entered on its books at the time of the sale. Petitioner pays the total sales tax due at the time that it enters into the contract. When a contract is cancelled (after the initial three-day cancellation period), Petitioner claims a credit against its current liability for the full amount of sales tax charged on the transaction when it files its sales tax report for the month, even though at least the down payment, and frequently additional payments, has been collected from the customer. On audit, Respondent allowed full credit for the amount of sales tax when a contract had been cancelled within the three-day cancellation period, but disallowed that portion of the credits claimed which related to the down payments and installments which the Petitioner retained when a contract was cancelled after the three-day period. Respondent did allow, however, a credit for taxes attributable to the unpaid balance under each cancelled contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Department of Revenue enter its final order disallowing to Petitioner a credit for taxes attributable to amounts retained by it upon the cancellation of its installment sales contracts. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of May, 1980. LINDA M .RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Cynthia Savage Comptroller Restlawn, Inc. 2600 Ribualt Scenic Dr Post Office Box 9306 Jacksonville, FL 32208 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and another podiatrist were engaged in a partnership, practicing podiatry with offices in two locations, one on Broward Boulevard (hereinafter "the Broward office"), and one in Tamarac (hereinafter "the Tamarac office") On February 2, 1977, Respondent initiated negotiations for the acquisition of Parcel No. 154, the property leased by Petitioner or his partnership for the location of the partnership's Broward office. On February 7, 1977, Respondent delivered to the Broward office its ninety-day letter of assured occupancy. Since Respondent and the owner of Parcel No. 154 were unable to agree, Respondent was required to litigate the acquisition of that parcel, and Respondent obtained an order of taking in August, 1978. The contract for constructing the segment on Broward Boulevard where the Broward office was located was let on December 31, 1978. Petitioner closed his Broward office and vacated the premises in March, 1978. No notice to vacate the premises was ever issued to Petitioner, since he had vacated the premises approximately five and one-half months prior to Respondent obtaining possession of the property pursuant to the order of taking. Petitioner's partnership kept only one set of records for both the Tamarac and Broward offices. All of the income, the expenses, and the other allowable deductions were consolidated for both offices, and it is not possible to determine from those records any specific expenses attributable to the Broward office only. In determining the amount of gross income for patients seen at the Broward office, Petitioner, through his accountant, reviewed all patient cards of Broward office patients and added together those charges for services rendered. Those patient cards, however, do not indicate whether those patients were seen by Petitioner or by Petitioner's partner and, accordingly, reflect the income generated by both members of the partnership. In order to then determine expenses generated by the Broward office in order to compute net income, Petitioner, through his accountant, selected a percentage and, using that percentage, divided all expenses between the Broward office and the Tamarac office. No evidence was presented to explain or justify the basis upon which the percentage figures were chosen. Petitioner sold both offices to his partner on April 18, 1977. Petitioner's accountant certified the following figures in support of the amount of fixed payment claimed by the Petitioner: Fee Income per Patient Cards Year Broward Office Profit Percentage per Income Tax Returns Indicated Annual Profit Broward Office 1975 $ 30,371.00 25.09 percent $ 7,620.00 1976 8,093.00 18.04 percent 1,460.00 1977 491.00 44.09 percent 216.00 The figures for expenses used in determining Petitioner's net income were taken from Petitioner's income tax returns, and those returns were also used to verify income and in computing the percentage of business attributable to the Broward office. Petitioner's tax returns, however, were computed on the accrual basis rather than on the cash basis. Books maintained using the accrual method include billed fees not actually received in that year and total expense obligations incurred that year although those expenses may not have been paid. In billing patients who were medicaid or medicare recipients, Petitioner charged the amount of fee he considered proper. If the full amount of Petitioner's bill was not paid by medicare or medicaid, he reduced his fee to the amount actually paid under those programs. Fees not collected would be written off during the following tax year. A review of the records and of the return for the year in which the fee was declared would not reveal the fact that it was subsequently written off, whether partially or fully, such as in the case of an uncollectable fee. The figures set forth in Paragraph numbered 7 above are based upon Petitioner's books and tax returns on the accrual basis and have not been adjusted to reflect income actually received rather than billed or to reflect expenses actually paid rather than incurred. Only sixteen residents were displaced as a result of the entire road- widening project along Broward Boulevard.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered finding Petitioner, Mark H. Feldman, entitled to receive an additional $1,400 in relocation benefits, which represents the minimum fixed payment minus the amounts previously paid to him by the Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Mark H. Feldman 7160 N.W. 45th Court Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Paul N. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this cause, Robert W. Pope has been the holder of license no. 62-600, series 4-COP, SRX, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as The Wedgewood Inn, located at 1701, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for December, 1975 through August, 1976 was not made, and a lien was filed to aid collection of the tax. In mid 1976, the Respondent, contacted the State of Florida, Department of Revenue to discuss term payments of the sales tax remittance. The Respondent in October, 1976 tried to effect a partial release of the tax claim by paying $2,900. In keeping with their policy the Department of Revenue rejected these efforts. Subsequently, in February, 1977, the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250.00 or have the license no. 62-600, series 4- COP, SRX, suspended for a period of 10 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
The Issue Whether sales tax and local government infrastructure surtax is due on the lingerie modeling session fees received by Petitioner, and, if so, whether the Department of Revenue should compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty assessed against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner was established as a Florida corporation in November 1992. At the time of its incorporation, Petitioner's name was Ultimate Fantasy of Pinellas, Inc. Subsequently, the name was changed to U.F., Inc. Petitioner is an "S Corporation," having filed the required election pursuant to Section 1362 of the Internal Revenue Code in June 1994. Steve Smith was the sole shareholder and president of Petitioner during the audit period. Mr. Smith sold his interest in Petitioner in January 2002. Starting on October 1, 1994, Petitioner leased space for its business in a small shopping center at 8248 Ulmerton Road, in unincorporated Pinellas County. Petitioner's store was less than 1,000 square feet in size. Petitioner's lease included the following schedule of lease payments due from Petitioner to the lessor:1 Period Rent Sales Tax (7%) Total 10/1/94 - $585.00 $40.95 $625.95 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $605.00 $42.35 $647.35 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $630.00 $44.10 $674.10 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $670.00 $46.90 $716.90 3/31/02 The record does not include receipts showing that Petitioner actually made those lease payments. However, Mr. Smith testified that Petitioner made those payments, and the weight of the evidence clearly supports the inference that the payments were made. Specifically, Petitioner claimed a deduction for rent expenses on its federal income tax returns in amounts comparable to that set forth above, and Petitioner was actually operating its business at the location specified in the lease during the audit period. Petitioner made payments of $2,288.65 in sales tax to the lessor during the course of the audit period, computed as follows: Period Sales Tax Amount Months Total 5/1/95 - $40.95 17 $ 695.15 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $42.35 24 $1,016.40 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $44.10 12 $ 529.20 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $46.90 1 $ 46.90 4/30/00 8. Petitioner's lease stated that Petitioner would use the premises "as a retail store and for no other uses whatsoever." That limitation was apparently waived by the landlord because the lingerie modeling conducted in Petitioner's store required an adult entertainment permit from Pinellas County and the landlord's consent was required for Petitioner to obtain a permit. Petitioner's business includes the retail sale of lingerie as well as charging patrons a fee to watch lingerie modeling sessions which occur in Petitioner's store. Patrons are not charged to come into Petitioner's store. They are free to come in, look at merchandise, purchase merchandise, and/or leave. However, a patron who comes into Petitioner's store and wants to see a piece of lingerie modeled pays a fee to Petitioner. The fee is $30.00 per session, with a session lasting no more than a half hour. With a discount coupon, the fee was $20.00 per session. No sales tax was collected or remitted on those amounts. After the patron pays the fee to Petitioner, he then identifies the lingerie to be modeled and a model does so. The patron compensates the model for the session through tips. Neither Petitioner, nor any of its employees are involved in that transaction. The patron is not required to purchase the lingerie that is modeled and, as evidenced by the small amount of sales on which Petitioner paid tax during the audit period, such purchases rarely occurred. If the lingerie is purchased, Petitioner collects sales tax from the purchaser and remits it to the Department. If the lingerie is not purchased, it goes back into Petitioner's inventory. Almost all of Petitioner's income over the course of the audit period was derived from the lingerie modeling sessions. On the quarterly sales tax reports filed with the Department, Petitioner reported gross sales of $556,733.83 between May 1995 and December 1999. Of that amount, $554,829.88, or 99.65 percent, was from the fees for the lingerie modeling sessions and was reported as exempt sales. Only $1,978.57, or 0.35 percent, was reported as taxable lingerie sales. The women who model the lingerie are not employees of Petitioner. They are not paid anything by Petitioner, nor do they pay Petitioner anything. Petitioner did provide security for the models. The modeling sessions occurred in "segregated areas" of the store. They did not occur behind closed doors, behind a curtain, or in separate rooms, as that is prohibited by the Pinellas County Code.2 The "segregated areas" accounted for approximately 85 percent of the store's floor space. Thus, it is possible that a session could be observed from a distance by persons other than the patron who paid a fee to Petitioner. However, only the patron who pays the fee can view the modeling session in the "segregated areas" where the model performs. Before Petitioner opened for business, Mr. Smith contacted an accountant, Peter Ristorcelli, to provide accounting and tax services to Petitioner. Those services included compliance with Florida's sales tax laws. Mr. Ristorcelli had never worked for a client whose business was similar to that of Petitioner. Accordingly, Mr. Ristorcelli advised Petitioner to obtain guidance from the Department when he registered as a dealer and obtained a sales tax number. Mr. Smith went to the Department's Clearwater office pursuant to Mr. Ristorcelli's advice. While there, he explained the type and operation of Petitioner's business and asked whether sales tax was due on the receipts from the modeling sessions. Mr. Smith was told by an unknown Department employee that the receipts from the modeling sessions were not subject to the sales tax, but that they should be reported as exempt sales. Mr. Smith was also told that receipts from the sale of lingerie should be reported as taxable sales, and that sales tax should be collected on those sales. Mr. Smith conveyed this information to Mr. Ristorcelli who then confirmed it with Bonnie Steffes, an employee in the Department's sales tax collection division in the Clearwater office with whom Mr. Ristorcelli had prior dealings. In their conversations with the Department employees, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli fully explained the nature and manner of operation of Petitioner's business. Those explanations were not made in writing, nor were the Department's responses. Ms. Steffes is no longer employed by the Department, and she was not called as a witness at the hearing because she could not be located. Thus, the record does not contain any corroboration of the self-serving testimony of Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli on these events. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds their testimony to be credible. Petitioner followed the advice Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli received from the Department. Petitioner reported the receipts from the modeling sessions as exempt sales and did not collect or remit sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported $554,829.88 in receipts from the modeling sessions for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Petitioner reported the receipts from the sales of lingerie as taxable sales and collected and remitted sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported taxable sales of $1,978.57, and it collected and remitted sales tax in the amount of $138.58 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Had Mr. Smith been told that the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, he would have collected sales tax from the patron and remitted it to the Department. The Department's Audit On June 1, 2000, the Department gave Petitioner notice of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit on Petitioner's books and records for the audit period of May 1, 1995, to April 30, 2000. The audit was conducted by Jose Bautista, a tax auditor in the Department's Clearwater office. Mr. Bautista reviewed Petitioner's books and records and spoke with Mr. Ristorcelli and Mr. Smith on several occasions. In conducting the audit, Mr. Buatista utilized standard methods of assessment and followed the Department's rules and practices. He relied on the facts presented to him by Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli regarding the operation of Petitioner's business and, more specifically, the form and nature of the lingerie modeling transactions. The audit did not identify any underreporting of taxable lingerie sales, nor did it find any underreporting of the receipts from the modeling sessions. In this regard, the proposed assessment (discussed below) was simply based upon the Department's determination that the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, not exempt from taxation. The audit working papers indicate receipts of $573,642.89 upon which sales tax was not paid over the course of the audit period. That amount is solely attributable to the receipts from the modeling sessions over the audit period, as identified in the Department's audit. That amount does not correspond with the receipts for the modeling sessions reported to the Department by Petitioner on its periodic sales tax returns. As stated above, Petitioner reported exempt sales from the modeling sessions in the amount of $554,829.88 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. For that same period, the audit working papers show receipts from the modeling sessions as being only $540,460.32, calculated as follows: Grand Total for Audit Period (5/95 - 4/00) Less: April 2000 ($7,177.49) $ 573,642.89 March 2000 ( 8,208.15) February 2000 ( 8,872.59) January 2000 ( 8,924.34) Total for Period ( 33,182.57) Of 5/95 - 12/99 $ 540,460.32 This discrepancy works in Petitioner's favor. Had the Department simply based its assessment on the amount reported by Petitioner as exempt sales between May 1995 and December 1999 ($554,829.88), and then added the receipts for the period of January 2000 through April 2000 ($33,182.57), the amount upon which Petitioner would have owed sales tax would have been $588,012.45 rather than $573,642.89 as found in the Department's audit. Based upon the audit conducted by Mr. Bautista, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Notice of Intent) on August 16, 2000. The Notice of Intent assessed a total tax deficiency of $40,155.29, which included a sales tax deficiency of $34,418.81 and a local government infrastructure surtax deficiency of $5,736.78. Those amounts were calculated in accordance with the standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the tax deficiency. The Notice of Intent also assessed interest and penalty. The interest and penalty were calculated on the amount of the tax deficiency pursuant to standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the interest or penalty. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought administrative review of the Notice of Intent. That review is conducted at the district office level, which in this case was Clearwater. George Watson supervised the review. No changes were made based upon the review, and on October 26, 2000, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment which formally assessed the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty described above against Petitioner. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, protested the Notice of Proposed Assessment, and on July 5, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Decision rejecting the protest. The review which resulted in the Notice of Decision was conducted in Tallahassee by Charles Wallace. The Notice of Decision upheld the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty in full. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought reconsideration of the Notice of Decision. On December 17, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration which again upheld the proposed assessment in full and refused to compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty. The legal basis for the assessments asserted by the Department in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment was that the fee paid to Petitioner by a patron to view a lingerie modeling session was an admission charge. Based upon additional facts and clarifying information presented to the Department by Petitioner through the protest process, the Department concluded that the fee charged by Petitioner was more akin to a license to use real property and therefore taxable as such. That is the legal position asserted by the Department in its Notice of Decision and its Notice of Reconsideration. That legal position was also argued by the Department at the hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order.3 Despite the change in the legal basis of the assessment, the amount of the assessment set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration is the same as the amount set forth in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment. It was still based upon the full amount of the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions (as determined by the audit) which had been reported as exempt sales.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order that assesses tax, interest, and penalties, against Petitioner in the amounts set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration dated December 17, 2001; and, if the tax assessed in the final order is based upon Section 212.031 (license to use) rather than Section 212.04 (admissions), the Department should grant Petitioner a credit in the amount of $1,945.35, for the sales tax paid by Petitioner to its landlord on that portion of Petitioner's store where the lingerie modeling sessions occurred. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner, Classie Sales, Inc. (Classie), is entitled to be compensated for produce sold and delivered to Respondent, Tolar Farms (Tolar), and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact On June 30, 1990, Roger Harloff, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, and John A. Tipton, Secretary of Classie Sales, Incorporated, a sales agent founded by Harloff, entered into a written agreement whereby Classie would serve as sales agent for all sales of produce grown by or on Roger Harloff Farms. Between October 17, 1995 and December 9, 1995, Classie, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, sold watermelons with a total net sales price of $170,839.27 and tomatoes with a total net value of $1,720.00 to Tolar Farms. These sales were not direct sales to Tolar but transactions wherein Tolar was to sell the produce to whomever would buy it at an agreed price and would withhold its 3/4 per pound commission from the sales price, remitting the balance to Classie. Trucks arranged for by Tolar picked the produce up at the growing field and at the time of pickup, Classie issued to Tolar a packet jacket for each load sold. As the loads were sold Tolar would issue a ticket for that load which bore the shipping date, the lot number, the farmer, the transporting trailer's tag, the truck broker, the truck driver, and the weight of the product. Sometime later, when the produce was sold, Tolar issued an invoice bearing Classie Sales' logo, reflecting Tolar as the buyer and showing the lot number which corresponded to the load ticket, the shipping date, a description of the produce, the quantity, the unit price for that load, and the extended price from which was deducted Tolar's commission and an unspecified assessment. These documents were then forwarded to Classie. The terms of the sale between Tolar and Classie, on behalf of Harloff, were loose. The invoice documents reflected a net due 21 days after invoice date. The first delivery in issue here was made on October 17, 1995, and 21 days after that is November 7, 1995. The amount reflected by the deliveries made after that date is $27,509.72. Respondent, Preferred, claims that since Classie continued to make deliveries to Tolar's drivers after it was not paid within 21 days after the first shipment, it failed to mitigate its damages and should not be paid for any deliveries made after November 7, 1995. Classie was not paid for any of the instant invoices by Tolar, but Classie did not become concerned about Tolar's failure to make timely payment until January 1996. Tolar's payment and pricing practices were no different during this time than in years past. Typically, Tolar would start out quickly notifying Classie of the sales. As the number of shipments grew, however, the time for notification grew longer. It must be noted that less than two months transpired from the date of the first shipment in issue to the last.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a Final Order in this matter directing Tony and Robert Tolar, d/b/a Tolar Farms, to pay Classie Sales, Inc., the sum of $172,559.27. In the event this sum is not paid by Tolar, the Department should apply the bond posted by Preferred National Insurance Company in the amount of $75,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-1776A To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein as the testimony of the witness. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the issues. Accepted and incorporated herein. Respondent Preferred's Proposed Findings of Fact. Preferred accepted all of Classie's Proposed Findings of Fact but suggested an amendment to Number 14. The suggested amendment was made a part of the Findings of Fact made by the Hearing Officer. Respondent Tolar's Proposed Findings of Fact: Tolar consented and agreed to all Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact except for Number 9. The substance of Tolar's objection to Classie's Number 9, relating to a provision for a commission, has been made a part of the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: Hywel Leonard, Esquire Carlton Fields Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601-3239 Scott R. Teach, Esquire Meuers and Associates, P.A. 2590 Golden Gate Parkway, Suite 109 Naples, Florida 34106 David A. Higley, Esquire Higley and Barfield, P.A. The Maitland Forum 2600 Lake Lucien Drive, Suite 237 Maitland, Florida 32751-7234 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 56-year-old female. Petitioner has over 26 years of retail sales experience. Petitioner had both outside sales and store management experience, but most of her experience was as a retail floor salesperson. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at GM Appliance, a retail appliance business currently owned and operated by Respondent. She had worked for GM Appliance for over 21 years. Petitioner was a good and capable salesperson. She had never been formally reprimanded in her 21 years with GM Appliance. According to Respondent's owner and manager Todd Williams, there were no problems at all with Petitioner's performance. She was qualified as a salesperson. In 2004, Williams Corporation, a single shareholder entity owned by Mr. Williams, purchased GM Appliance from its previous owner, Curtis Murphy. Mr. Murphy was retiring after owning GM Appliance for many years. Mr. Williams had worked with Mr. Murphy as a wholesaler and was relocating to the Panama City area from Atlanta. At the time of the GM Appliance purchase, Mr. Williams was approximately 40 years old. As would be expected when taking over a business, Mr. Williams made some changes at GM Appliance. He created a new outside sales position. He created and hired a new sales manager. He opened two offices outside of Panama City. Mr. Williams made all the business decisions at GM Appliance. As he was the sole shareholder and owner, Mr. Williams had the sole authority to hire and fire employees. Under Mr. Williams, GM Appliance did not have any formal written employment policies. Respondent has no sexual harassment or anti-discrimination policies and no process on how to handle employment complaints related to age or sex. GM Appliance has no written employee evaluations or job descriptions. If someone had a complaint, he or she needed to "take it to the EEOC," according to Mr. Williams. As a result of Mr. Williams' hiring and firing decisions, the GM Appliance workforce became decidedly younger in Panama City, especially in the sales positions. Since purchasing GM Appliance through 2010, Mr. Williams hired Matt Davis (born 1970) as a sales manager; Ashley Williams (born 1976) in an outside sales position; Kris Westgate (born 1979) as inside sales and delivery; and Amy Farris (born 1982) as inside sales and administrative. In 2010, two sales persons also remained on the staff of GM Appliance from the former owner: Bobby Tew (aged 63) and Petitioner (aged 54). Both primarily worked inside sales. Mr. Williams' hiring decisions made the culture at GM Appliance more "youth" oriented. There was much more juvenile and sexual talk. Mr. Williams was overheard saying that Petitioner wore old women clothes. Some members of GM Appliance's younger workforce often called Petitioner "Mama" or "Old Mama" to her face and behind her back. As a result of the worldwide economic slowdown, the business environment deteriorated for GM Appliance in 2008. To save money, GM Appliance began to cut back on its operations and expenses. In late 2010, unable to stem the tide of losses, Mr. Williams decided he needed to cut additional staff from the sales department in Panama City. Of the six salespeople working in Panama City, he laid off the two oldest: Mr. Tew and Petitioner. The four younger sales persons kept their jobs, but one, Kris Westgate, was reassigned to the warehouse instead of laid off. Also, the two highest paid salespersons, Ashley Williams, Todd Williams' brother, and Matt Davis, remained employed with GM Appliance. Ashley Williams and Davis annually made $45,000 and $80,000, respectfully. Petitioner, at the final hearing, identified the three younger employees retained following her termination as evidence of discriminatory intent: Margaret Walden, Amy Farris, and Matt Davis. Matt Davis, aged 46, was the sales manager and Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Petitioner reported directly to Matt Davis. Amy Farris, aged 30, was originally hired as a secretary to the outside salesman. Although she would sometimes come on the sales floor, her job was to provide support for outside sales. During the course of her employment, her duties expanded to include purchasing agent and SPIFF (manufacturer's incentive program) administrator. Respondent employed outside salespersons and other salespersons (retail sales associates) such as Petitioner, who worked the showroom floor. Outside salespersons reported directly to Respondent's president, Mr. Williams. Margaret Walden, aged 45, was an outside salesperson in Respondent's office in Destin, Florida, and was responsible for developing and maintaining relationships outside the office with client contractors in Destin and South Walton County. A showroom was not maintained at the Destin office. All three identified co-workers held positions with different duties and responsibilities from the position held by Petitioner. Petitioner was not replaced, and no younger (or older) sales associate was retained in a similar position. In July 2011, Respondent hired 51-year-old Steve Williams as a sales associate. This hire was made after the Charge of Discrimination was filed by Petitioner. Steve Williams, a former Sears appliance salesman and manager, solicited a job with Respondent as Respondent had not advertised an available position. After being told repeatedly that Respondent was not hiring sales associates, he offered to accept compensation on a commissioned sales basis. Prior to terminating Petitioner, Respondent terminated six employees, ages 25 (outside sales), 27 (purchasing agent), 52 (warehouse/delivery), 41 (warehouse manager), 59 (accounting manager), and 45 (outside sales) from a period beginning on May 8, 2008, through July 31, 2009. Prior to discharge, Petitioner and the only other associate salesperson on the retail showroom floor, Mr. Tew, had their hours reduced to four days a week. In addition and during Petitioner's tenure, Respondent made changes in the corporation's 401-K plan, health insurance, paid leave, and overtime compensation all changes designed to save money. Mr. Tew was terminated on the same day as Petitioner, September 7, 2010. Janice Heinze (aged 66), Jeff Reeder (aged 54), and Angus Thomas (aged 70), all employees at the Panama City location and all older than Petitioner, were retained by the company. Respondent hired his father (a 1099 contractor), aged 68, to assume outside sales duties at the location in Foley, Alabama, and Cindy Powell, aged 54, was hired to answer the telephone there. Kelly Hill, aged 45, was hired to replace Ms. Walden upon her subsequent resignation and relocation. Petitioner and Mr. Tew were laid off with the intent to rehire. There were no performance or other identified issues with their employment. Mr. Williams stated that he wanted to bring them back to work. Petitioner had better objective sales qualifications than the younger salespeople that were retained. According to the latest records that GM Appliance had, Petitioner was the highest profit margin generating salesperson in Panama City. Mr. Tew had the second highest profit margin. Petitioner and Mr. Tew also had more sales experience and seniority than any of the younger retained workers. Petitioner earned approximately $40,000 in total over the past three years of her employment and has been unemployed since she was laid off in 2010.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel Harmon, Esquire Daniel Harmon, P.A. 23 East 8th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 Robert Christopher Jackson, Esquire Harrison Sale McCloy 304 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402-1579 Lawrence F. Kranert, Jr., General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue herein is whether the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against West Broward Chamber of Commerce as a result of the purchase of promotional books by the Chamber from Creative Public Relations and Marketing, Inc., is valid.
Findings Of Fact The West Broward Chamber of Commerce (Petitioner) entered into an oral contract with Mr. Randy Avon, a representative of Creative Public Relations, to purchase a promotional booklet pertaining to the West Broward area for distribution to the public. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1). Creative Public Relations in turn contracted with International Graphics to print the booklet. Mr. Bernard Fox, the Department of Revenue's (Respondent Area Manager in the Fort Lauderdale office and Mr. James W. Darrow, who worked with International Graphics during the time the transaction in question took place, testified and established that Mr. Randy Avon secured a sales tax number for the purchase of the promotional books in issue and presented the sales tax number to International Graphics. International Graphics sold the books to Mr. Avon for resale, without tax. The Department of Revenue issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales tax, penalty and interest due on the purchase of the books in question by Petitioner in the total amount of $1,307.56. Evidence reveals that said assessment was due as of December 20, 1978, and that since that time interest is accruing at a daily rate of $.31. This assessment was based on a total purchase price of $24,214.10, which, according to Mr. Fox and the statements contained in Respondent's Exhibit #1, was the price that Mrs. Gail Duffy, Petitioner's Executive Director informed the Respondent that the Chamber paid for the promotional booklets. Petitioner's treasurer, Helen Kerns, also testified that the total purchase price paid by Petitioner for the books was $22,104 and that part of the purchase price was paid directly to Creative Public Relations due to a dispute with an officer of the contracting entity, International Graphics. Mrs. Kerns testified that commissions were, however, paid by the Petitioner to Creative Public Relations, which commissions were not included in the purchase price as testified to by Mrs. Kerns. James W. Darrow, a witness who was allegedly privy to the agreement and understanding between the Petitioner and the seller, Creative Public Relations, testified that the oral contract price specifically included sales taxes on the transaction. Additionally, Mrs. Duffy testified that in her opinion, the sales taxes due on the purchase by Petitioner had been paid because she under stood that the total purchase price paid to Creative Public Relations by Petitioner included the sales tax. No sales invoices, receipt, or other tangible evidence of sales were offered into evidence at the hearing herein. Petitioner contends that the sales tax in question was included in the total purchase price. Based thereon, Petitioner contends that Creative Public Relations is now liable for the tax. Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that the taxes from the sales transaction can be imposed on either the seller or the purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against Petitioner be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Moore, Esquire 1265 Northwest 40th Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. White, Esquire 5460 North State Road #7, Suite 220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33319
The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondents Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. (Wilson), and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety, are indebted to Petitioner for certain Florida-grown agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of several vegetable crops in Hardee County. Wilson is a dealer in agricultural products. More specifically, Wilson operates an agricultural broker business in Plant City. Wilson’s surety is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Although Wilson has written contracts with some producers, Wilson does not have written contracts with all producers. In the absence of a contract, the terms of Wilson’s broker services are almost always the same; that is, Wilson gets a commission of 10 percent on the sale of the produce and $.35 per box for palletizing and pre-cooling the produce, in return for which Wilson makes a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Wilson in January 2007, about bringing flat beans to Wilson to sell. Wilson expressed interest and informed Petitioner about Wilson’s standards terms as described above. These terms were agreeable to Petitioner and he brought the beans to Wilson later that month. Although Petitioner and Wilson had no written contract, the parties’ mutual understanding of the terms of their agreement created an enforceable oral contract. Wilson sold Petitioner’s beans and no dispute arose from this first transaction. The parties’ subsequent transactions for other produce were undertaken pursuant to the same oral contract terms. Because Wilson works on a commission basis, it is generally in Wilson’s self-interest to sell growers’ produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Robert Wilson, Wilson’s owner, by telephone in February 2007, and informed Wilson of his plans to grow wax beans and “hard squash.” It was not stated in the record whether all three varieties of hard squash later grown by Petitioner, butternut squash, acorn squash, and spaghetti squash, were discussed by Petitioner and Robert Wilson during their February 2007 telephone conversation. A major dispute in the case was whether the parties’ February discussion about hard squash created some obligation on the part of Wilson beyond the oral contract terms described above. Petitioner claims that Wilson encouraged him to plant the squash and that Petitioner would not have planted the squash otherwise. Petitioner never made clear, however, what additional obligation was created by Robert Wilson’s encouragement beyond the obligation to accept delivery of and make good faith efforts to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price. Petitioner did not use the word “guarantee,” but his claim seems to be that Wilson became obligated to guarantee that the squash would be sold for a price close to the price published in the Columbia (South Carolina) Market Report, a periodic publication of produce prices. Such an obligation on the part of a broker is contrary to the general practice in the trade. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove more than that Robert Wilson thought he could sell Petitioner’s squash and had a genuine interest in acting as broker for Petitioner’s squash. The evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a contractual guarantee that Wilson would obtain a certain price for Petitioner’s hard squash or do more than was promised with regard to the beans that Wilson had sold for Petitioner; that is, to try to sell the produce for the best price. When Petitioner’s wax beans were picked in late April, he brought them to Wilson to sell. No dispute arose regarding the sale of the wax beans. Petitioner brought squash to Wilson in five deliveries between May 12 and May 29, 2007. Petitioner said that on one of these deliveries, he had to leave the boxed squash in the parking lot of Wilson’s facility because there was so much cantaloupe that had been delivered ahead of him. Petitioner says he was told by a Wilson employee that the squash would not be put in the cooler. Petitioner thinks Wilson was more interested in moving the cantaloupe than the hard squash. Petitioner thinks his squash was not put in the cooler or was put in too late. Wilson denies that Petitioner’s squash was not put into the cooler or was put in late. Robert Wilson claims that he made many calls in an effort to sell Petitioner’s squash, but he could not find interested buyers for all of the squash because (1) the demand for hard squash dried up, (2) some of Petitioner’s squash was of low quality, and (3) the squash began to spoil. Petitioner denied these allegations. Petitioner received invoices and other paperwork from Wilson showing that Wilson sold Petitioner’s first delivery of 490 boxes of acorn squash for $10.18 per box. It sold Petitioner’s second delivery of 519 boxes of acorn squash for $2.08 per box. For Petitioner’s third delivery of 110 boxes of acorn squash and 240 boxes of spaghetti squash, Wilson “dumped” the acorn squash by giving it to away for free to the Society of St. Andrews food bank, and sold the spaghetti squash for $5.15 per box. Wilson sold petitioner’s fourth delivery of 279 boxes of butternut squash for $.55 per box.1 Competent substantial evidence in the record established that it is a regular occurrence for agricultural products awaiting sale to decay and become unsellable, and for the broker to dump the products in a landfill or give the products to a charitable organization and then provide the grower a receipt for tax deduction purposes. It was undisputed that Wilson did not notify Petitioner before disposing of his squash. Petitioner claims he should have been notified by Wilson if the squash was beginning to spoil. However, Petitioner did not prove that prior notification was a term of their oral contract. Petitioner claims further that the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act required Wilson to notify Petitioner before dumping the squash and to have the squash inspected to determine whether, in fact, it was spoiled. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, this federal law is not applicable. Competent substantial evidence in the record established that the market for agricultural products fluctuates and, at times, can fluctuate rapidly. For hard squash, which is normally prepared in an oven, the market demand can drop dramatically due to the onset of warm weather simply because people tend not to cook hard squash dishes in warm weather. Petitioner’s squash was being marketed in May, which means the beginning of warm weather for most areas of the United States. This fact supports Wilson’s claim that the demand for hard squash had been good, but fell rapidly just at the time Wilson was trying to sell Petitioner’s squash. The problem with the claims made by Petitioner in this case is simply one of insufficient proof. It is not enough for Petitioner to offer theories about what he thinks happened or to raise questions which are not fully answered. Petitioner had no proof that his squash was not put in Wilson’s cooler, that his squash did not begin to decay, that the demand for hard squash did not fall rapidly, that Wilson did not make reasonable efforts to sell the squash, that Wilson had willing buyers for Petitioner’s squash at a better price, or that Wilson sold squash from other growers at a better price. Petitioner’s evidence for his claims consisted primarily of market price reports that he contends show the approximate price Wilson should have gotten for the hard squash. Market price reports have some relevance to the issues in this case, but competent evidence was presented that the prices quoted in the publications are not always reliable to indicate the price a grower can expect to get on any given day, because there are factors that cause the published market price to be an inflated price (and applicable to the highest grade of produce) and because the market price can change rapidly with a change in demand for the product. The oral contract between Petitioner and Wilson required Wilson to try to get the best price for Petitioner’s squash, not some particular price appearing in a particular market price report. Petitioner did not show that Wilson got a better price for hard squash of equal quality, or that other brokers in the area got a better price for hard squash of equal quality at the times relevant to this case. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Wilson did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.
