The Issue Whether the petitions for formal administrative hearing filed by Petitioner in these consolidated cases should be dismissed as contended by Respondent? If not, whether Petitioner should be granted the relief sought in these petitions?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence and the factual stipulations entered into by the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Florida Medicaid provider. Its provider number is 027856400. Paragraph 8 of the provider agreement that it entered into with the Department provides that it and "the Department agree to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations." The Department is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program. The Department's Medicaid Program Integrity Unit audits and investigates claims for reimbursement submitted by Florida Medicaid providers. John M. Whiddon is Chief of the Unit. Ellen Williams is one of his subordinates. In November, 1991, Whiddon received a letter from the Director of the Auditor General's Fraud Control Unit. The body of the letter read as follows: The Florida Medicaid Fraud Control Unit is currently in the process of conducting a criminal investigation of [Petitioner]. Our investigation has established that there is a basis for criminal prosecution for the billing of services not rendered and for providing treatment that was not prescribed (there were no treatment plans). As of today's date the provider's YTD earnings are in excess of $444,000. I believe that a review of the claims submitted the last 90-120 days will indicate a high volume of the claims being false and that you may want to proceed administratively to stop the improper claims. Shortly after receiving this letter, Whiddon ordered that each of Petitioner's claims be subjected to prepayment review. On February 17, 1992, Petitioner filed with the Department his petition requesting an award of "damages in excess of $10,000.00." The petition contains four counts. Count I of the petition alleges that "[i]n refusing to reimburse [Petitioner] for services rendered, [the Department] has violated Section 409.266, et seq., Fla. Stat." Count II of the petition alleges that "[i]n refusing to reimburse [Petitioner] for services rendered and failing to notify [Petitioner] of [the Department's] intent to withhold any payment due [Petitioner], [the Department] has violated Rule 10C-7.060, et seq., Fla. [Admin. Code]." Count III of the petition alleges that "[b]y withholding monies due and owing to [Petitioner] for services rendered without prior notice to [Petitioner], in violation of its own rules and regulations, and failing to provide for any procedure for a post-deprivation hearing, [the Department] violated [Petitioner's] due process rights." Count IV of the petition alleges that "[the Department] has breached its agreement to reimburse [Petitioner] for services rendered." Each of the foregoing counts contained the following prayer for relief: WHEREFORE, Our Lady requests this Court enter judgment against HRS for compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, costs and interest and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. On March 7, 1992, Petitioner received a letter from Whiddon, dated January 28, 1992. The body of the letter read in part as follows: In accordance with 42 CFR 455.23, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is withholding payments for Medicaid claims submitted by Our Lady Health Care Services. Based on our review of a sample of your home health records for the period February 1, 1991-November 30, 1991, we find evidence of willful misrepresentation on your part. Your home health records revealed that: You billed for services for which there was not a valid treatment plan, and You billed for nursing and aide services that were not documented as having been provided. As stated in 42 CFR 455.23, this action is temporary and will not continue after: the department determines that there is insufficient evidence of willful misrepresentation by the provider; or legal proceedings related to the provider's alleged willful misrepresentation are completed. In accordance with 42 CFR 455.23, you have the right to submit written evidence for consideration by the department. If you have such evidence, please send it to Ms. Ellen D. Williams, 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, Suite B-10, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. Pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (F.S.) and Rule Section 10- 2.056, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) you may request either a formal or informal hearing on the department's action. Your request for such hearing must be received by the department within 30 days of the date you received this letter. A request for informal hearing must be in writing and a request for formal hearing must be in the form of a petition in compliance with Rule Section 28-5.201, F.A.C. Either request must be substantive and state clearly the specific actions to which you object and why you object to them. . . . The purpose of either a formal or informal hearing is to determine whether the action taken in this letter is within the authority of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and in accordance with the department's applicable rules and policies. . . . If a hearing request is not received within 30 days from the date of receipt of this letter, the right to such hearing is waived. On March 19, 1992, Petitioner filed a petition with the Department requesting a formal hearing on the matter. On June 4, 1992, Whiddon sent Petitioner a letter. The body of the letter read as follows: Please be advised that this office has concluded its investigation of Our Lady Health Services, pursuant to 42 CFR 455.23. Based upon this investigation, your claims are now pended for medical review pursuant to Section 409.913(2), Florida Statutes. Please forward copies of all supporting documentation for those claims which are now in pend status. Attached hereto are the claims which are the subject of this review. The supporting documentation must be received by this office within 30 days of receipt of this letter. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Ellen Williams at (904) 488- 3588. As of June 8, 1992, the date of the final hearing in these cases, the Department had not made any official determination regarding overpayments made to Petitioner, nor had it decided to pay or deny the pended claims. These matters were still under review and investigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the petitions filed by Petitioner in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4 day of August, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4 day August, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was overpaid for Medicaid prescriptions. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA, Agency or Respondent) asserts the Petitioner, Compscript, Inc., d/b/a Compscript (Petitioner or Compscript) failed to maintain proper records to support and document the Medicaid prescription claims paid by the Agency for the audit period. According to the Agency, the audit findings must be extrapolated to the universe of all claims for the audit period. If so, the Agency maintains the Petitioner should reimburse AHCA for a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $216,974.07 (this is the “recoupment” amount). The Petitioner denies it was overpaid any amount, asserts it kept records in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing pharmacy records, and maintains that the Agency may not apply the extrapolation accounting procedure in this case.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was a licensed pharmacy authorized to do business in the State of Florida; its pharmacy license number is PH0016271. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner’s Medicaid provider number is 106629300. The terms of the provider agreement govern the contractual relationship between this provider and the Agency. The parties do not dispute that the provider agreement together with the pertinent laws or regulations controls the relationship between the provider and the Agency. The provider agreement pertinent to this case is a voluntary agreement between AHCA and the Petitioner. Pursuant to the provider agreement, the Petitioner was to “keep, maintain, and make available in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid-related records as AHCA requires for a period of at least five (5) years.” In addition to the foregoing, a Medicaid provider must maintain a patient record for each recipient for whom new or refill prescriptions are dispensed. Any Medicaid providers not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. A Medicaid provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional, and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. The records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. However, in order to qualify for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensive. Specific to the issues of this case, a Medicaid provider must also retain prescription records for five years. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility and authority to administer the Medicaid program in Florida. Pursuant to this authority AHCA conducts audits to assure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and provider agreements. These “integrity” audits are routinely performed and Medicaid providers are aware that they may be audited. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Medicaid program in Florida was governed by a “pay and chase” procedure. Under this procedure, the Agency paid Medicaid claims submitted by Medicaid providers and then, after-the-fact, audited such providers for accuracy and quality control. These “integrity” audits are to assure that the provider maintains records to support the paid claims. In this case, the audit period is May 28, 1999 through July 18, 2000. The pertinent audit has been designated AHCA audit no. 01-0514-000-3/H/KNH and was initiated on October 23, 2000. The Petitioner does not dispute the Agency’s authority to perform audits such as the one at issue. The Petitioner maintains its records are sufficient to support the paid claims and that the Agency has unreasonably imposed its interpretation of the requirements. The Medicaid provider agreement that governs this case required that the Petitioner comply with all Medicaid handbooks in effect during the audit period. Essentially, this standard dictates the records that must be kept for quality control so that the after-the-fact audit can verify the integrity of the Medicaid claims that were paid by the Agency. During the audit period the Petitioner sold or dispensed drugs to Medicaid recipients. Equally undisputed is the fact that Medicaid claims were paid by the Agency during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this cause was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the Petitioner’s provider agreement and the pertinent regulations. The Agency required that each and every claim submitted by the Petitioner during the audit period under the Medicaid program be filed electronically. Each claim submitted was filed electronically. Nevertheless, the Agency also required the Petitioner to retain records supporting the claim. Additionally, the Petitioner was to make such supporting records available to the Agency upon request. The Agency asked the Petitioner to present its records to support the claims for the audit period. The disclosure of the records proved difficult for this Medicaid provider because it does not operate in a conventional pharmacy setting. More specifically, it operates solely to serve a nursing home population. All of the patients whose prescriptions were filled were nursing home residents. Compscript maintains its manner of doing business is slightly different from the conventional pharmacy. Rather than the walk-in patient who presents a written prescription to be filled, this Petitioner receives its pharmacy orders by telephone or facsimile transmission from nursing homes. Typically, the staff at Compscript takes the call, writes down the pertinent information, enters the data into the pharmacy’s computer system, and the item is dispensed and routed to the nursing home via the delivery driver. All drugs are dispensed in sealed containers and are delivered with a manifest listing all the medications by name and patient. Given the volume of prescriptions being prepared and delivered, for the audit period at issue in this case, the Petitioner made 2-3 trips to the nursing home per day. Once the information for the prescription was entered into the Petitioner’s computer system, Compscript had little interest in maintaining the written telephone message or the facsimile sheet that generated the request. In some instances the Compscript employee did not make a written record of the prescription request. In those instances the employee entered the request directly into the Petitioner’s computer system and bypassed the written step altogether. The Compscript computer system tracks the initials of the pharmacist who entered the prescription information and cannot be altered without such alteration being tracked and noted. Since the pharmacy fills “over the counter” items, as well as controlled and non-controlled pharmacy products, the computer record denotes that information along with the patient information. When the Respondent’s audit agents went into the Compscript facility to audit the Medicaid claims, the Petitioner could not readily produce the written documentation to support the dispensed drugs. In fact, many of the records that verified the prescriptions dispensed were found on the nursing home records. The nursing home patient’s physician order sheet specified the item or items requested for the patient. This “physician order sheet” (POS) should theoretically always support the dispensing of the product from the Petitioner. In this case there were instances when the POS did not corroborate the claim. When the auditors from the Agency presented at Compscript, the Petitioner did not have the POS records to produce. Obviously, those records were maintained within the nursing home. Additionally, Compscript did not have the telephone notes or the facsimile transmission sheets to support items dispensed during the audit period. When the hearing in this cause proceeded it was also discovered that records that were generated daily by the Petitioner’s computer system that would have corroborated the claims (and which were allegedly maintained in storage) were not produced or available to support Medicaid claims submitted during the audit period. During the audit the Agency’s auditors requested records from a random sample of the claims submitted during the audit period. The results from that sample where then applied to the universe of claims for the audit period. When this mathematical calculation was performed the audit produced a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $1,341,466.27. Afterwards, when the Petitioner was able to locate additional records to correspond to and support the prescriptions dispensed, the amount of overpayment was reduced to $217,715.28 (the amount set forth in the parties’ Pre-hearing Stipulation). At hearing, the Agency maintained that the amount of overpayment was $216,974.07 for which the Petitioner could produce no adequate documentation. At hearing, the Petitioner continued to dispute the procedure of applying the audit sample overpayment to the population of claims to mathematically compute the overpayment for the audit period. This “extrapolation” process was admitted into evidence and has been fully considered in the findings reached in this case. The Petitioner was required to maintain Medicaid- related records for a period of 5 years. Thus, for the audit period in this case, any record supporting the claims should have been maintained and made available for the Agency. Such records would have been within the five-year period. The Agency designates Medicaid compliance to its office of Medicaid Program Integrity. In turn, that office contracted with Heritage Information Systems, Inc. (Heritage) to perform and report pharmacy audits of the numerous pharmacy providers within the state. Auditors from Heritage were assigned the Compscript audit. At the time of the audit the Heritage auditors were not privy to any of the POS documents later produced in the case. Ken Yon is the Agency’s administrator who was responsible for managing the instant case and who worked with the Heritage auditors to assure the policies and practices of the Agency were met. In this case, the Heritage auditors presented at Compscript unannounced on October 23, 2000, and sought 250 randomly selected claims for review. By limiting the number of claims, the auditors were not required to sift through the records of 46,000+ claims (the approximate number of claims that the Petitioner submitted during the audit period). For the universe of 46,000+ claims, 250 randomly selected claims is a reasonable sample to audit. The adequacy of the sample number as well as the manner in which it was generated is supported by the weight of credible evidence presented in this matter. Also, the results of a sample of 250 from the universe of 46,000+ would be statistically valid if randomly chosen as they were in this case. In this regard the testimony of Dr. Mark Johnson, an expert in statistical sampling and analysis, has been deemed credible and persuasive as to the issues of the appropriateness of the sample (as to size and how it was generated), the use of the sample overpayment to calculate an overall payment, and the statistical trustworthiness of the amounts claimed in this cause. If anything, as Dr. Johnson asserted, the actual overpayment would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. The Agency has used a statistical extrapolation method to compute overpayments for years. The statistical concept and process of applying a sample to a universe to mathematically compute an overpayment is not novel to this case. After the auditors completed their review of the records at the Compscript pharmacy, Kathryn Holland, a licensed pharmacist (who is also a consulting pharmacist) prepared the Respondent’s Final Agency Audit Report. Prior to completing the report, Ms. Holland received and reviewed the information provided by the Petitioner through the auditors. As a result of the review, a number of “can’t find” conclusions were reached. By “can’t find” the auditors and Ms. Holland meant that the original prescription or refill documentation could not be located for the paid Medicaid claim. These “can’t find” claims were reported to the Petitioner, who was given additional time to locate and produce documents to support the claims. In fact, the Agency continued to accept documentation for claims up through the time of hearing. Consequently, the amount sought for overpayment has been substantially reduced. Whether the Agency had the authority to accept documents outside the prescription records maintained by the pharmacy is not an issue. In fact, the Agency did reduce the overpayment amount when subsequent supporting documents were located. A second error in the documentation for the Petitioner’s prescriptions was noted as “no doctor’s address on the prescription.” That expression meant that pursuant to state and federal law the physician’s address is required for a controlled substance and when it was not provided the auditor deemed the documentation incomplete. Although the Petitioner maintained doctor addresses in its computer system, the records did not correspond to the specific prescriptions that were filled for the audited claims. In order to stand as a sufficient prescription form, a writing must be created contemporaneous to the order (phone requests that are transcribed are acceptable), must contain specific information (type of drug, strength, dose, patient, doctor, DEA number, refill, etc.), and it must be kept for the requisite time. It would be acceptable for the prescription to be computer generated so long as it was written contemporaneous to the order and preserved as required by law. In this case, at the conclusion of the audit, the Agency identified 194 discrepant claims within the random sample of 250. The vast majority of those discrepancies were noted as “can’t find.” Had the Agency not accepted other documentation to support the dispensing of the drugs, the calculated overpayment would have been $1,575,707.44. Applying a lower confidence limit of 95 percent to that amount generated the calculated overpayment of $1,341,466.27. The audit findings set forth in the Agency’s Final Agency Audit Report (dated April 6, 2001) is supported by the weight of credible evidence in this case. Nevertheless, the Agency did allow the provider here to supplement the documentation disclosed during the audit. And, to that end, the calculated overpayment was reduced to $216,974.07 (this amount is 95% of the calculated overpayment). In reality, the amount owed by this Petitioner for failure to maintain proper documentation for this audit would be greater than the recoupment amount sought by the Agency. Had the Agency held the Petitioner to a standard of “no prescription, no payment” standard arguably 194 of the 250 audited claims could have been disallowed. That is not the standard applied by the Agency. A “patient record” may include information regarding the patient’s prescription history. The terms “patient record” and “prescription” are not synonymous. For example, while a prescription would contain information such as patient's name, doctor, DEA number, doctor's address, dosage, drug, and whether it may be refilled, it would be expected that the “patient record” would contain additional information not typically found on a prescription. For instance, a “patient record” might contain a historical track of past medications or known patient allergies. In this case, the computer records or “patient records” maintained by the Petitioner did not retain the prescriptions in the format dictated by rule. An electronic imaging recording system may be used when the system captures, stores, and can reproduce the exact image of the prescription, including the reverse side of the prescription if necessary. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. An electronic system must be able to produce a daily hard-copy printout of all original prescriptions dispensed and refilled. If the Petitioner’s system could do that, it did not. An acceptable electronic system must generate the prescription contemporaneous to the dispensing order. The Petitioner’s system did not do that. The Agency has not alleged, and there is no evidence to suggest, fraud in the Petitioner’s failure to maintain its records. The Agency’s interpretation of the requirement that a prescription be reduced to writing is consistent with the rules and regulations in effect at the time of this audit. The last category of discrepant items was “UR” which stood for “unauthorized refills.” These were claims for refills on drugs for which the original prescription could not be located or documentation from the nursing home could not be found. Again, the Petitioner the maintained that within the nursing home setting a physician’s reorder for medications for the patient could be found on the POS. These refill requests were handled orally among the physician, the nursing home staff, and the pharmacy. Nevertheless, because they were not documented in writing the Agency disallowed this claims and included them among the discrepant list. If the Petitioner was able to produce a physician order to support the UR claims, it was removed from the recoupment list. In most instances, the Petitioner did not have the requisite paperwork to support the refill. Instead, the Petitioner relied on its computer records (again not kept in accordance with the applicable standards) to support the UR claims. The Agency has not claimed that the refills were not dispensed, merely that the paperwork to support the claim cannot be produced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order that accepts an amended Final Agency Action Report to support an overpayment and recoupment against the Petitioner in the amount of $216,974.07. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 L. William Porter, II, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center III 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kenneth W. Sukhia, Esquire Fowler, White, Boggs, Banker, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1090 Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ralph E. Breitfeller, Esquire McGrath & Breitfeller, LLP 140 East Town Street, Suite 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215
Findings Of Fact Billings for home health care services once made CCI the recipient of substantial Medicaid moneys. By resort to, among other things, "a variety of different types of statistical investigations," (T.82) the Office of Program Integrity within HRS' Medicaid Office is "continuously asking the question, do we get what we pay for?" Id. A separate, legislative agency, a unit of the Office of the Auditor General, investigates allegations of Medicaid fraud. Investigation In February of 1990, Ellen Williams, a medical health care program analyst in HRS' Office of Program Integrity, noticed that CCI was "suddenly showing up as either number one or number two in the State, and . . . was intrigued why a home health agency in Palatka would be [b]illing to the extent it appeared that they were." T.36. She "requested a printout of their billings" (T.37) and opened a file. Not long afterwards, Ms. Williams learned that the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) in the Auditor General's Office "had basically a new review of the same agency." T.37. MFCU investigators copied "a number of boxes" (T.116) of CCI's records, including "pieces of files" for ten of the 49 patients whose files HRS subsequently attempted to obtain from CCI. T.53. As far as the evidence showed, MFCU did not obtain "the entire files on any of these people." Id. In early May of 1990, Ms. Williams received an unsigned investigative report the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit had prepared. On the strength of this report, at her supervisor's direction, she prepared a letter which was sent to CCI by certified mail on May 20, 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. She did not attempt at that time to verify the allegations in the MFCU report. Prosecution The letter dated May 20, 1991, initiated a recoupment and termination proceeding, Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 91-4020, intended to end CCI's "participation in the Florida Medicaid program for [alleged] violation of federal and state laws and regulations respecting the Medicaid program," stating: Information has been received from the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Office of the Auditor General (MFCU) to the effect that you have billed and been paid $591,082.00 for services that are not covered by Medicaid. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. HRS also sought to recover the alleged overpayment, and impose an administrative fine. The letter did not allege times. (HRS later concluded that the overbillings alleged in the letter occurred between December of 1989 and November of 1990, but HRS never sought leave to amend to allege this, and took no other step to limit the allegations in the recoupment and termination proceeding.) In response to CCI's request for formal administrative proceedings, HRS referred Case No. 91-4020 to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Discovery and Further Investigation On September 23, 1991, while Case No. 91-4020 was pending at the Division of Administrative Hearings, HRS' Ellen D. Williams wrote CCI's Inez Browning, as follows: In order to complete the Medicaid review of services billed by Conval-Care, Inc. to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, it will be necessary to obtain completed home health records on a selected statistical sample of recipients. I plan to arrive at your Palatka office on Tuesday, October 8, 1991, for the purpose of copying the records for the individuals on the attached list. Please have them available at that office. If you have any problems or questions, please call me at (904) 488-3588. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Although not identified as such, the list of names was purportedly a random sample of Medicaid beneficiaries to whom CCI had provided services between December of 1989 and May of 1991, a period during which CCI's alleged overbillings were even higher. In response to Ms. Williams' letter of September 23, 1991, counsel for CCI wrote Ms. Williams, on September 30, 1991, as follows: Please recall that your office, due in large part to your actions, is involved in litigation with Conval-Care, Inc. As a result, any request for documents must be pursued through appropriate discovery channels pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. No records will be provided as a result of your letter of September 23rd. If you appear at the door, you will be refused entry. You referred to a "statistical sample" of recipients, yet requested information concerning both recipients whose records have already been provided and the remaining recipients whose records were not provided during the initial investigation. This hardly reflects any statistical sampling. Further, your letter contradicts your sworn testimony in which you indicated there was no pending investigation of Conval-Care, Inc. by DHRS. In any event, Conval-Care, Inc. is a represented party in active litigation with your agency and neither you or any other representative from DHRS may contact Conval- Care, Inc. or any of its employees without my consent. You and others at the agency may have realized the weakness of your claims against Conval-Care, Inc., since the credibility of several of your key witnesses has been seriously undermined, but we will not permit you to go on a fishing expedition to try to develop new allegations against our client. You made your case Ms. Williams, now live with it. If DHRS must seek other documents related to the matters at issue, its attorneys should know how to do that. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. HRS did not file any request for production in Case No. 91-4020 under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b), 1.350 or 1.351, which are applicable to administrative proceedings by virtue of Rule 60Q-2.019, Florida Administrative Code. Instead, attaching the same list of 49 names that Ms. Williams had attached to her letter of September 23, 1991, counsel for HRS wrote CCI's counsel, on October 17, 1991, as follows: Pursuant to Chapter 400.484 and 409.913 Florida Statutes, representatives of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services intend to copy certain records in the possession of Conval-Care, Inc. It is their intention to go to your clients place of business on Tuesday, October 22, 1991 and obtain these copies. I have attached a list of those records which are of interest. Please advise the undersigned if this date is inconvenient. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Some, but not all, of the listed records concerned patients for whom reimbursement between December of 1989 and November of 1990 was at issue in Case No. 91-4020. On October 21, 1991, in response to Mr. Scott's letter dated four days earlier, Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, Julie Gallagher wrote, on behalf of CCI: Section 400.487, F.S., grants HRS the authority to make "such inspections and investigations as are necessary in order to determine the state of compliance with the provisions of this act and of rules or standards in force pursuant thereto." It is our position that HRS has already made such "inspections and investigations" and has determined that Conval-Care, Inc. is not in compliance with various provisions of the statute and rules and, hence, HRS has initiated termination proceedings to exclude Conval-Care, Inc. from the Medicaid Program. Further "inspections and investigations" are not necessary as required by the statute and will, therefore, not be permitted. The other statute you cited, Section 409.903 [sic], F.S., has nothing to do with the inspection of documents. Should you desire documents from Conval-Care, Inc., which are pertinent to the issue in the pending litigation, please submit a discovery request and we will respond appropriately. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. Insisting it had the right to inspect the records in question, HRS sent Ms. Williams to Palatka where, as CCI's counsel had forewarned, nobody from CCI was on hand to receive her. Main Case Abandoned "In the month or so preceding" (T.52) September 23, 1991, Ms. Williams came to believe "that what MFCU referred to . . . as their sample was not in fact a [random] sample . . . [and] did not encompass the entire billing period." Id. At hearing, she testified that she wanted "to determine an overpayment amount, irrespective of the termination proceeding." T.60. But at the time this desire arose HRS was seeking to recover the "overpayment amount" in Case No. 91-4020, the recoupment and termination proceeding in which final hearing was then set for October 14, 1991. HRS' counsel in the recoupment and termination proceeding relied on the attempt to obtain records Ms. Williams initiated on September 23, 1991, as his sole means of securing records that HRS listed as exhibits it intended to offer in the recoupment and termination proceeding, Case No. 91-4020. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7.; T. 134-5. After the attempt to gather evidence in this fashion proved unavailing, and after several continuances, HRS dropped the recoupment and termination proceeding it had initiated against CCI.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That HRS dismiss the sanctions letter which initiated these proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993.
Findings Of Fact On February 4, 1980, the Office of Medicaid Quality Control advised Respondent that a review of his Medicaid claims revealed that he billed the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services and further advised him that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program for such services. The letter further requested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a copy of his Board certification. (Although the letter admitted in evidence bears the date of February 4, 1979, it is obvious that the date contains a typographical error, since the letter pertains to services previously rendered in April of 1979, and refers to a rule which became effective January 1, 1980.) By letter dated February 8, 1980, Respondent replied, by advising Petitioner that he was neither Board-certified nor Board-eligible. Respondent included in his letter a recitation of his extensive experience and qualifications as a psychiatrist. In spite of Petitioner's failure to reply to his letter or to authorize him to do so, Respondent continued to bill Petitioner for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. During the summer of 1981, Petitioner determined that ineligible psychiatrists were billing the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services rendered to Medicaid recipients. In order to ascertain those qualified to bill the Program, form letters were sent to all providers of psychiatric services requesting documentation of Board eligibility or Board certification and further advising that only Board-certified or Board-eligible psychiatrists were entitled to bill the Program. On August 5, 1981, that form letter was sent to Respondent. On August 11, 1981, Respondent replied to the August 5 form letter by again advising Petitioner that he was not Board-certified or Board-eligible and his extensive background and qualifications as a psychiatrist. Although no reply was made to his August 1981 letter to Petitioner, Respondent continued to bill the Medicaid Program for psychiatric services, and Petitioner continued to pay Respondent's claims. Respondent is not presently, and has never been, a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification. During the period from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982, Respondent billed for and was paid $38,252.75 by the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner never advised Respondent that he was entitled to bill the Medicaid Program for providing psychiatric services to Medicaid recipients notwithstanding the fact that he was not a Board-certified psychiatrist or a candidate for Board certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered directing Respondent to reimburse to Petitioner the sum of $38,252.75 for payments received by him for psychiatric services rendered from January 1, 1980, through February, 1982. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Medicaid Program Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 233 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bruce M. Boiko, Esquire 1000 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 212 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether an administrative fine should be imposed on the respondent for the violations alleged in Final Agency Audit Report number 94-0367-000-G, and, if so, the appropriate amount of the fine.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in Florida. Ch. 93-129, 58, Laws of Fla. (1993). The Agency oversees the activities of Medicaid providers and is authorized in section 409.913(9), Florida Statutes, to impose sanctions for violations of the Medicaid rules and regulations. The division of the Agency responsible for monitoring payments to Medicaid providers is referred to as Medicaid Program Integrity, which is part of the Agency's Office of the Inspector General. Medicaid payments are monitored to ensure that such payments are made in accordance with federal and state rules and regulations. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the respondent was licensed to practice medicine in Florida and was an approved Medicaid treating provider assigned Treating Provider number 065767102. The respondent entered into a Noninstitutional Professional and Technical Medicaid Provider Agreement on October 14, 1981, in which he agreed to "abide by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Rules, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations," as provided in paragraph 7 of the agreement. The Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook provides in the introduction to section 11.1 that "[t]he services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness for an eligible Medicaid recipient." The provider agreement also requires in paragraph 2 that the provider "keep such records as are necessary to fully disclose the extent of services provided to individuals receiving assistance under the State Plan." The Agency audited a random sample of medical records of Medicaid recipients for whom payments were made to Dade Health Services for medical services provided from August 3, 1992 through October 31, 1993. The respondent's name appeared frequently in these records as a treating provider. As a result, the Agency extended its investigation to the respondent. The respondent provided medical services at Dade Health Services from the beginning of the audit period until February 9, 1993, when he terminated his association with the clinic. The medical records of seven Medicaid recipients treated by the respondent were among the Dade Health Services's medical records audited by the Agency. In order to ensure that the Agency had all the medical records relevant to these patients, a letter was sent to the respondent requesting any additional medical records he might have in his possession. The respondent notified the Agency through his attorney that he did not have any medical records relating to the seven patients. The medical records of the seven Medicaid recipients treated by the respondent were reviewed by Dr. John Sullenberger, Chief Medical Consultant for the State of Florida Medicaid Group, to determine if the services provided and billed to Medicaid were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger evaluated the medical records in accordance with generally-accepted practices and using generally-accepted tools such as the Current Physician Terminology Handbook. He concluded that certain of the tests and treatments ordered by the respondent were not medically necessary Patient Q.M. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on September 16, 1992. The patient's main complaint was shortness of breath. The respondent ordered spirometry, a test which measures lung function. Shortness of breath can have many causes, among them heart problems. There is no indication in the medical records that a chest x-ray was taken, and nothing in the records supports the medical necessity for a test measuring lung function for shortness of breath alone. Patient J.U. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on January 30, 1993. The patient complained of a dry cough and shortness of breath. The respondent noted that the patient wheezed when he blew air out of his lungs, and he ordered spirometry. Spirometry is contraindicated for wheezing, and there is nothing in the records to support the medical necessity for the test for shortness of breath alone. Patient M.V. was treated on November 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, and 29, 1992, and on December 2 and 7, 1992, with aerosol treatments ordered by the respondent. An aerosol treatment consists of the patient's breathing in a vaporized mist to moisten the nose and the bronchial tubes, and it provides relief for approximately three hours. Aerosol treatments are properly administered every four to six hours, usually to patients who are hospitalized. There is nothing in M.V.'s medical records to support the medical necessity for aerosol treatments, and there is no medical justification for administering these tests every two to three days. Patient D.S. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on January 23, 1993. The medical record of this visit is largely illegible, but it appears that the patient's main complaint was a cough. The respondent ordered spirometry, an electrocardiogram, and radiologic testing. There is nothing in the medical records to support the medical necessity for spirometry, especially since the respondent noted in the records that an examination of the lungs showed that they were within normal limits. There was no legible entry in the medical records to support the medical necessity for an electrocardiogram, which measures, among other things, the rhythm of the heart beat, the rate of the beat, and any blockage of blood passing through the heart. The radiologic testing consisted of a chest x-ray, but there is nothing in the medical records to support the medical necessity for this test. Patient E.R. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on November 2, 1992. The entry in the medical records of this visit for the patient's chief complaint is illegible. The respondent ordered two non-invasive tests, one to measure the blood flow through the arteries of the patient's legs and one to measure the blood flow through the veins of the legs. The respondent also ordered echography to test the patient's peripheral vascular system. Echography uses sound waves to construct a picture or photographic plate of the area being tested. There is no indication in the medical records that the respondent observed any abnormality of the patient's legs or feet or that he took the pulse in the feet to determine if the tests were necessary. The two non- invasive tests and the echography were not justified as medically necessary by the information contained in the medical record of E.R.'s November 2 office visit. Patient E.R. was also seen by the respondent in an office visit on December 19, 1992. The respondent ordered a duplex scan, which is a sonogram of the arteries in the neck that go to the brain. It is unusual to perform such a test on a 45-year-old woman, and there is nothing in the medical records to support the medical necessity for this test. Based on his examination of patient E.R. on December 19, the respondent also ordered aerosol treatments, which were administered on December 21, 23, 26, 28, and 30, 1992, and on January 4, 1993. There is nothing in the medical records to support the medical necessity for aerosol treatments, and there is no medical justification for administering the treatments every two to five days. Patient W.L. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on November 23, 1992. The patient's chief complaint was pain in the legs. There is nothing in the medical records indicating that the respondent examined the patient's legs or took the pulses in the feet, behind the knees, or in the groin. Nevertheless, the respondent diagnosed the patient as having peripheral vascular disease and ordered two non-invasive tests and echography of the peripheral vascular system. There is nothing in the medical record to support a diagnosis of peripheral vascular disease or the medical necessity for the three tests. Patient A.A. was seen by the respondent in an office visit on October 19, 1992. The patient's chief complaint was hemorrhoids, and the respondent noted in the medical records that the patient's lungs were clear. Nevertheless, he ordered aerosol treatments, which were administered October 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, and 30, 1992, and November 2, 4, 6, and 9, 1992. There is nothing in the medical records to support the medical necessity for these treatments, and there is no medical justification for administering the treatments on the prescribed schedule. The evidence is clear and convincing that the respondent administered or ordered administered forty-seven tests and treatments for these seven Medicaid recipients, that Medicaid claims were submitted for these tests and treatments, and that no medical necessity was shown in their respective medical records for these tests and treatments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order finding that, from August 3, 1992, until February 9, 1993, Jaime Vergel, M.D., committed forty-seven violations of Medicaid rules and regulations and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $25,000. DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of November 1995. PATRICIA HART MALONO, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November 1995.
