The Issue Whether on or about November 28, 1993, Petitioner committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another and was sufficient grounds for denial of Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer and Class "G" Statewide Firearm Licenses, pursuant to Sections 493.6118(1)(j) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact By application dated February 10, 1994, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a Class "D" Security Officer license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license. The applications prepared by Petitioner were complete, and included the required photos and copy of a certificate evidencing successful completion of security officer training as required by statute. On November 28, 1993, the Petitioner met his estranged spouse in the Lakeland police station lobby to exchange custody of their baby daughter. This transfer of custody was videotaped, allegedly by the Petitioner's mother-in-law. As the transfer was ending, the Petitioner became agitated at the person holding the camera. Petitioner picked up the baby car seat and moved towards the camera. The Petitioner swung the baby car seat, while the baby was in it, in the direction of the camera. No competent evidence was produced which proved that the car seat, while being swung by Petitioner, struck another person or an object held by another person.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officers license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license as provided for in Section 493.6118, Florida Statutes (1993). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner is eligible for licensure under either stand Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Respondent proposed finding of fact: Accepted in substance: paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (in part). Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of competent (non-hearsay) evidence: paragraphs 6 (in part), 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Angel E. Figueroa 5331 David Street Lakeland, Florida 33813 Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. Respondent was issued certificate number 02-7330 on March 30, 1973. There was no evidence that Respondent's certification had been the subject of any other disciplinary proceeding. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a police officer by the City of Bal Harbour, which is a municipality located in Dade County, Florida. The following events occurred in Bal Harbour, Florida, on January 14, 1989, while Respondent was on duty as a police officer: A few minutes past 7:00 a.m., Respondent encountered a 1975 Plymouth that had broken down on Collins Avenue near its intersection with 102 Street. Respondent observed a young male (who he later learned was 17 year old Haroon Nabee) pushing this disabled car by himself trying to get the car off the street and into an adjacent parking lot. Mr. Nabee was pushing the car with one hand and steering it with his other. Respondent assisted Mr. Nabee by pushing the disabled car from the rear with his patrol car. After the disabled car and Respondent's patrol car were in the parking lot, Respondent asked Mr. Nabee his name and asked to see his registration and his drivers license. Mr. Nabee identified himself as Nevin Maharaj and showed Respondent a registration certificate that reflected that the car was registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Stein. Respondent later learned that Mrs. Stein was Mr. Nabee's sister. While Mr. Nabee looked through his wallet for his drivers license, Respondent observed two credit cards in the name of John J. Mendoza. When asked about the credit cards, Mr. Nabee reported that he had found them. Respondent became suspicious and requested a backup. In response to that request Officer Pamela Robinson Adlet (at the formal hearing, Officer Adlet had reverted to the use of Robinson as her last name) appeared on the scene at 7:20 a.m. After Officer Adlet arrived on the scene, Respondent placed Mr. Nabee under arrest, handcuffed his hands behind his back, searched him, and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's caged patrol car. Respondent then called for a tow truck and requested that Officer Adlet assist him in conducting an inventory of the automobile. The officers inventoried the interior of the automobile, but they could not gain access to the trunk. Because the rear seat was loose, Officer Adlet could observe objects in the trunk, but she was unable to inventory those objects because of her limited access. While waiting for the tow truck, Respondent returned to his patrol car, which was parked immediately behind the disabled vehicle, and began making out the arrest form using the false name Mr. Nabee had given him. Respondent had partially completed the arrest form when the tow truck arrived. Because his patrol car was blocking the tow truck's access to the disabled vehicle, Respondent drove the patrol car to a spot approximately thirty feet from the disabled vehicle. Respondent then walked from his patrol car towards the tow truck and he and Officer Adlet engaged in a brief conversation with the tow truck driver. Officer Adlet told the driver that she and Respondent wanted to get into the trunk of the disabled vehicle and asked if he had a screwdriver they could use for that purpose. 1/ Respondent decided to look into the glove box of the disabled vehicle for the second time because his earlier search of the vehicle had been interrupted by his efforts to help Officer Adlet gain access to the trunk. Respondent found in the glove box a passport which reflected Mr. Nabee's true name and which contained Mr. Nabee's photograph. Respondent showed the passport to Officer Adlet, who confirmed that the passport photograph appeared to be of Mr. Nabee. Respondent returned to his patrol car and began addressing Mr. Nabee in loud, profane language and accused Mr. Nabee of lying to him. Respondent opened the rear door of the patrol car on the driver's side and, while holding the passport in his clenched right hand, made three punching motions with his right hand in the direction of Mr. Nabee. With the first of these three blows the back of Respondent's right hand made contact with the right side of Mr. Nabee's face. (The right side of Mr. Nabee's face was struck because Mr. Nabee had turned towards Respondent when Respondent opened the door of the patrol car.) In reaction to that blow, Mr. Nabee stretched out on the back seat of the patrol car, and, consequently, the other two blows did not make contact with Mr. Nabee. Thereafter, Respondent transported Mr. Nabee to the Bal Harbour police station where Mr. Nabee complained to another officer about Respondent's acts. Mr. Nabee was not injured by Respondent. There was no evidence that he suffered any cut or bruise as a result of the contact with Respondent. Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee because he had lied about his name, which caused Respondent to have to redraft his arrest form. Respondent contends that the contact was accidental and was a result of his gesticulating in an angry fashion after learning that Mr. Nabee had lied to him. This contention is rejected. Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee and that Respondent intentionally struck Mr. Nabee in retaliation for Mr. Nabee's lying to him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent committed a battery upon the person of Haroon Nabee on January 14, 1989, which determines, pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, and which suspends his certification as a law enforcement for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of July, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' stipulations, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the holder of a Class "D" security guard license and a Class "G" statewide firearms license. He has held the former license since May of 1990 and the latter license since September of that year. He has never before been disciplined by the Department. From October of 1991, until June 23, 1993, Respondent was employed by Certified Security Services, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Certified"), a business which provides armed and unarmed security services. Among Certified's clients during the period of Respondent's employment was Winn-Dixie Store No. 343 (hereinafter referred to as "Store 343"), located at 14900 Northwest 6th Avenue in Miami, Florida. Respondent was assigned by Certified to work as a uniformed security guard at Store 343. He regularly drove a cashier at the store named Maria home from work in his car. On the afternoon of June 23, 1993, at around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m., Respondent was standing in the store parking lot conversing with a patron of the store, Sylvia Malgarejo, when he was approached by Maria, who was carrying a package containing a box of Pampers and a bottle of cooking oil. Respondent had no reason to, nor did he, believe that Maria had misappropriated these items from the store. Maria asked Respondent to put the package in his car. Respondent complied with Maria's request. He then continued his conversation with Malgarejo. The conversation did not last long. Olga Campos-Campbell, the store's general merchandise manager, had reported to the store manager that Respondent had shoplifted merchandise from the store. Campos-Campbell and Respondent had an ongoing feud concerning the scope of Respondent's job responsibilities. Campos-Campbell frequently asked Respondent to do things that he believed were outside the scope of his duties as a security guard, and an argument between the two invariably ensued. Based upon Campos-Campbell's erroneous report, the store manager had Respondent detained. Kent Jurney, who assisted the owner of Certified, his wife, in running the business, was contacted and advised of the situation. Jurney responded by going to the store with Certified's general manager, Bill Banco, and confronting Respondent. Respondent's native language is Spanish. Jurney, on the other hand, does not speak or understand Spanish. He communicates in English. Respondent's ability to communicate in English, however, is limited. Respondent tried to explain to Jurney in English how he had come into possession of the Pampers and cooking oil, but Jurney misunderstood him and mistakenly thought that Respondent was admitting that he had stolen the items from the store. Accordingly, he advised Respondent that Respondent's employment with Certified was being terminated effective immediately. The police were also contacted. The police officer who responded to the scene cited Respondent for shoplifting.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department enter a final order finding the evidence insufficient to establish that Respondent committed the violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, alleged in the instant Administrative Complaint and dismissing the instant Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of March, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-6941 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by Respondent in his post-hearing submittal: 1. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 2-5. Rejected as findings of fact because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony elicited at hearing than findings of fact based upon such testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 C. Ernest Rennella, Esquire 2524 Northwest 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of allegations set forth in a two-count Administrative Complaint in which the Respondent is charged with violations of Sections 493.6118(1)(j), 493.6106(1)(b), 493.6118(1)(t), and 493.6101(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed security officer holding a Class "D" Security Officer License and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm License.1 On May 25, 1996, the Respondent was driving himself and his wife, Tracee Kinlock, to the home of the latter's brother. During the course of that drive an argument began on the subject of whether the Respondent had been seeing another woman. During the course of the argument, Ms. Kinlock became angry about the Respondent's refusal to discuss the subject and began hitting him on the arm and side. The argument continued to escalate, and eventually Ms. Kinlock became so upset that she insisted that the Respondent stop the car and let her get out. The Respondent refused to do so. Eventually, Ms. Kinlock took matters in her own hands and grabbed the gear shift lever and pushed it into the neutral or park position.2 The Respondent told Ms. Kinlock to take her hands off of the gear shift lever and made several efforts to pull her hands off of the lever, but Ms. Kinlock refused to move her hands and refused to release the gear shift lever. The Respondent became so angry or frustrated that he leaned over and bit Ms. Kinlock on the hand. He bit her hard enough to make her cry and release the gear shift. The bite did not draw blood, but it was sufficiently severe to leave visible marks and to cause the hand to swell. After biting Ms. Kinlock, the Respondent was able to put the car in gear and resume driving. When they arrived at the home of Ms. Kinlock's brother, Ms. Kinlock threw her wedding rings at the Respondent, got out of the car, and began walking rapidly towards her brother's home in an effort to get away from the Respondent. The Respondent chased after her, grabbed her from behind, and then swung his foot in a sweeping motion in such a way as to intentionally trip Ms. Kinlock and cause her to fall down. Ms. Kinlock fell to the ground, and the Respondent fell on top of her. Ms. Kinlock's brother immediately pulled the Respondent away from Ms. Kinlock and then restrained the Respondent while Ms. Kinlock went into the house. The police were called and shortly thereafter the Respondent was arrested and charged with the battery of Ms. Kinlock. The Respondent ultimately entered a plea of "no contest" to the charge of battery. Adjudication was withheld on the charge of battery.
Recommendation Pursuant to Rule 1C-3.113(2)(n), Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and Class "G" Statewide Firearm License be revoked pursuant to Section 493.6118(2)(e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, an employee of Vanguard Security and the holder of a Class "D" security guard license and a Class "G" statewide firearms license. Vanguard Security (hereinafter referred to as "Vanguard") is an agency which provides armed and unarmed security services to its clients. Vanguard has a written policy prohibiting the display and use of firearms by its security officers except where such conduct is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm. Vanguard also has a written policy forbidding its security officers from leaving their assigned posts while they are on duty. These written policies are set forth in an employee handbook that all employees of the agency are given. On the evening of October 25, 1993, Respondent was assigned to provide armed security services in a warehouse area in Dade County, Florida. At approximately 10:00 p.m. that evening Andrea Ramsey was walking her friend's unleashed dog, a Doberman pinscher named "Chewy," in the vicinity of the warehouse area Respondent was responsible for guarding (hereinafter referred to as Respondent's "post" or "posted area"). Chewy's owner, Eileen Escardo, was working late in her photography studio which was located across the street from Respondent's post. Respondent saw Ramsey from afar. His suspicions aroused, he walked toward her to investigate. Respondent left his posted area and started to cross the street that separated the posted area from the warehouse in which Escardo's photography studio was located. When he was approximately 20 feet from Ramsey, he asked her if Chewy, who was by a tree to her left, was her dog. Ramsey responded in the affirmative. Chewy then, in a leisurely manner, headed toward Ramsey and Respondent. Although Chewy was moving in Respondent's direction, he did so in a manner that did not reasonably suggest that he was going to attack Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent panicked. Contrary to his employer's written policies regarding the display and discharge of firearms, he drew his revolver and, when Chewy was approximately three or four feet away from him, fired the weapon, but without any intention of shooting the dog or Ramsey. The bullet hit and shattered the glass door of the business next to Escardo's photography studio. Fortunately, no one was hurt or injured. Ramsey screamed when Respondent fired his revolver. Escardo heard her friend's scream, as well as the shot that preceded it. She rushed out of her studio to see what had happened. Escardo saw Ramsey standing in the middle of the street, with Respondent nearby holding a revolver. After instructing Ramsey to call the police, Escardo walked toward Respondent. Pointing his revolver at Escardo, Respondent warned her to stay away from him. Despite the warning, Escardo, who was unarmed, continued to approach Respondent until she was close enough to push him and the revolver aside. She then turned around and walked toward her studio to wait for the police.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to establish that Respondent committed the violations of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, in alleged Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and (2) disciplining him for having committed these violations by revoking his Class "G" statewide firearms license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of July, 1994. _ STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint. If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the holder of a Class "D" security guard license (license number D94-13786). He has been licensed since November 16, 1994. From April 3, 1996, through and including November 24, 1996, Respondent was employed as security guard by Delta Force Security (Delta), a business which provides security services. Ermelindo Onativia is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, the owner and manager of Delta. Among Delta's clients during the period of Respondent's employment was Motor World, an automobile dealership in Plantation, Florida. On the weekend of November 23 and 24, 1996, Respondent's assignment was to provide security services at Motor World. His shift was to begin at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 23, 1996, and end at 5:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1996. Onativia met Respondent at Motor World at the beginning of Respondent's shift on November 23, 1996, and reminded Respondent to "punch the time clock" when he made his rounds at the dealership. After conversing with Respondent, Onativia left the dealership. Onativia returned to Motor World at 2:00 a.m. on November 24, 1996, to check on Respondent. Respondent, however, was not there. He had left his assigned post without obtaining Onativia's permission to do so. Onativia remained at the dealership until 5:00 a.m. At no time during the period that he was at the dealership did he see or hear from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by fining him in the amount of $1,000.00 and placing him on probation for a period of one year, subject to such conditions as the Department may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1998.
