The Issue Whether Stanley Fried is guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Stanley Fried is a registered real estate salesman. Stanley Fried was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Stanley Fried as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire and Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Ronald L. Fried, Esquire 2699 South Bayshore Drive Suite 400C Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue Should Respondent have his Florida Real Estate Broker's License disciplined by Petitioner for violating provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to discipline its licensees for violations of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and associated rules. Those actions are brought through administrative complaints. Petitioner regulates Respondent's real estate practice in Florida. Respondent practices in accordance with a Florida Real Estate Broker's license, No. 0605307. At times relevant to this inquiry Respondent has not acted as an independent broker. Rather, Respondent has conducted real estate business as a broker-salesperson with McAfee Enterprise, Inc. t/a Re-Max On Park Avenue, located at 2233 Park Avenue, Suite 500, Orange Park, Florida, 32702-5567. Within the relevant time period Respondent's supervising broker at the Re- Max firm was Ann McIvey. On February 28, 1995, Respondent, as listing agent for Re-Max On Park Avenue, entered into an exclusive right of sale listing agreement with Marguerite A. Barr to sell Ms. Barr's real estate located at 6720 S. Long Meadow Circle in Jacksonville, Florida. By the terms of the listing agreement Ms. Barr agreed to pay Re-Max on Park Avenue: . . . 5 ½% of the total purchase price whether a buyer is secured by the REALTOR, the SELLER, or by any other person, or if the Property is afterwards sold within 6 months from the termination of this agreement or any extension thereof, to any person to whom the Property has been shown during the term of this Agreement. The listing agreement entered into between Respondent in behalf of Re-Max On Park Avenue and Ms. Barr also stated that: . . . in the event this Agreement is cancelled by SELLER before its expiration, or SELLER otherwise prevents performance hereunder, the SELLER agrees to pay REALTOR on demand, as liquidated damages, the brokerage fee due REALTOR as though Property had been sold, or the amount of broker's expenses, the same being bonafide, fair and reasonable as a result of an arm's length negotiation. Separate and apart from the terms set forth in the listing agreement, Ms. Barr requested, before she signed the contract, that Respondent inform her concerning her opportunity to cancel the contract at any time. Respondent answered that the contract could be cancelled by Ms. Barr before the home was sold, in which case Ms. Barr would be responsible for paying the advertising cost by Re-Max on Park Avenue. Ms. Barr was amenable to that arrangement. On May 8, 1995, Ms. Barr called to inform Respondent that she was terminating the contract to sell her home. This was followed by correspondence dated May 9, 1995, addressed to Re-Max On Park Avenue, attention to Respondent, notifying Re-Max On Park Avenue that the contract to sell the home was being cancelled. In response to the cancellation Respondent wrote the following letter to Ms. Barr: Mrs. Marguerite A. Barr 1364 Lamboll Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205-7140 Dear Meg: As you requested I have withdrawn your property located at 6720 Longmeadow Circle South from active listing for sale in the MLS and in my files. I hope you will be happy with your new arrangement and I wish you and your daughter the best. According to our contract, you agreed to reimburse me for expenses I incurred in marketing your property the event you decided to cancel prior to the expiration of said contract. A list of expenses follows: Two insertions in Homes & Land Magazine $249.21 500 Flyers to Realtors (250 twice) @ $.06 each 30.00 Total $279.21 Please forward a check in that amount to me at my office. Please remember that in the terms of our contract if anyone who has seen the property during my active term of the contract purchases the property you will still be obligated to pay the agreed upon commission to my firm. Regards, W. Wane Wier Broker-Salesman Per the request in the correspondence from Respondent to Ms. Barr, Ms. Barr contacted the Respondent and arranged to pay $50.00 a month to reimburse the costs described by the Respondent. Ms. Barr wrote three checks to the Respondent in his name, Wane Wier, without reference to Re-Max On Park Avenue. Respondent put those checks in his personal checking account. Respondent had originally taken money from his personal account to advertise the Barr property. On or about August 31, 1995, Ms. Barr sold her home on S. Long Meadow Circle to Jane Richardson. Respondent learned of the sale. Believing that the sale was a transaction that entitled Re-Max On Park Avenue to collect the 5 ½% real estate fee in accordance with the listing agreement, Respondent spoke to his supervising broker, Ms. McIvey, to ascertain the proper course for collecting the commission. Ms. McIvey advised Respondent that he should contact his attorney to see if the commission that was allegedly due Ms. McIvey and Respondent could be obtained by Respondent's counsel. Respondent took the advice of his supervising broker and contacted Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire, who was practicing at 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5, Orange Park, Florida 32073. In conversation Respondent explained to Mr. Santoro, that he believed that Ms. Barr owned the real estate commission. Respondent asked Mr. Santoro to write a letter to Ms. Barr to solicit the commission. Respondent feels confident that he told Mr. Santoro that Mr. Santoro should advise Ms. Barr to pay the commission to Re-Max On Park Avenue, given that was the normal course of events in seeking payment for commissions. To assist Mr. Santoro, Respondent left a written memorandum which among other things stated: . . . I feel that Ms. Barr has violated our listing agreement and should pay me and my company the full commission due under the terms of that agreement. Please take any steps necessary to have Ms. Barr honor our agreement, and advise me what I should do. On January 12, 1996, Mr. Santoro wrote Ms. Barr requesting payment of the commissions in the amount $3,397.50 related to the claimed balance due, after crediting Ms. Barr with $150.00 paid for advertising costs. This correspondence stated: Please be advised that you must forward a cashier's check in the amount of $3,397.50 made payable to W. Wane Wier, Re-Max On Park Avenue, within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter, which I have forwarded by certified mail as well as regular U.S. Mail. I have been instructed to proceed with appropriate action should you fail to make the payment as stated above Please Govern Yourself Accordingly. Respondent did not see the January 12, 1996, letter before it was sent to Ms. Barr. He did receive a copy of the correspondence. Respondent has no recollection of noticing that the correspondence said that the $3,397.50 should be made payable to W. Wane Weir, Re-Max On Park Avenue. In any event, Respondent did not take any action to correct the letter to reflect that the payment should be made to Re-Max On Park Avenue only. Prior to the charges set forth in the present Administrative Complaint Respondent has not been the subject of accusations about his conduct as a realtor.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, dismissing the complaint for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine consistent with Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-24.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5 Orange Park, FL 32072 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Linda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional; Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Defendant, Ray Sans, is currently registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding Certificate No. 0077190. On April 2, 1973, Defendant submitted a Requests for Registration Certificate as a registered real estate salesman in the employ of Southeast Land Corporation. The Defendant's application was also signed by Darien Kendall, a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida, who also served as Vice President of Southeast Land Corporation. The application form recites that the applicant was to be "exclusively connected" with Southeast Land Corporation, which indicated its willingness to carefully supervise the applicant in his activities as a registered real estate salesman. On April 3, 1973, Defendant, Ray Sans, and Darien Kendall, as apprenticing broker, signed a Declaration of Employment for Apprenticeship Purposes, pursuant to Rule 21V-2.24, Florida Administrative Code, which was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on April 9, 1973. On May 21, 1973, Defendant, Ray Sans, submitted a second Request for Registration Certificate as a registered real estate salesman in the employ of Store Realty Corporation. This request was also signed by Robert Pepper, President of Store Realty Corporation, and a registered Florida real estate broker. The application form indicates that Defendant, Ray Sans, was to be "exclusively connected" as a real estate salesman with Store Realty Corporation. On May 21, 1973, Defendant, Ray Sans, and Robert Pepper, as apprenticing broker, signed a Declaration of Employment for Apprenticeship Purposes, indicating that Defendant, Ray Sans, was to be employed as a real estate salesman with Store Realty Corporation, pursuant to the provisions of 21V-2.24, Florida Administrative Code. This declaration was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on May 24, 1973. On July 27, 1973, a Notice of Termination of Salesman's Employment was signed by a representative of Store Realty Corporation, indicating that Defendant, Ray Sans, had resigned from the employ of Store Realty Corporation, indicating that Defendant, Ray Sans, had resigned from the employ of Store Realty Corporation, effective July 27, 1973, and that his services while in the employ of that company had been satisfactory. Defendant, Ray Sans, returned to the employ of Southeast Land Corporation in September of 1973, and remained in the employ of that company as a real estate salesman until February, 1975. Defendant testified that he completed a Declaration of Employment for Apprenticeship Purposes after his return to Southeast Land Corporation in September of 1973, but that he did not know whether his employer, or his supervising broker, Sam Stier, ever mailed the declaration to the Commission for filing. Thereafter, Defendant filed an application for registration as a real estate broker with the Commission on January 16, 1975, and, after passing the required examination, received his license as a registered real estate broker on March 17, 1975. The application submitted by Defendant to the Commission contained the following question in Paragraph 16(a): "Have you served an apprenticeship as a real estate salesman with a registered real estate broker in the state of Florida for the 12 consecutive months within 5 years next prior to the date of this application?" Defendant answered this question in the affirmative, and in addition, gave the name and address of Darien Kendall, a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida, and Vice President of Southeast Land Corporation, as the broker with whom he had served his apprenticeship. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Commission ever contacted Ms. Kendall to verify whether Defendant had, in fact, served such apprenticeship. Shortly after receiving his real estate broker's license on March 17, 1975, Defendant left the employ of Southeast Land Corporation. Both Southeast Land Corporation and Store Realty Corporation have since gone out of business.
The Issue Whether recording a claim of lien by a registered real estate broker for the purpose of collecting a commission pursuant to an exclusive listing contract violated the provision of Section 475.42(1)(j)?
Findings Of Fact Robert F. Tully is a registered real estate broker holding Certificate #0090289 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Robert F. Tully, on April 24, 1975, entered into a 30 day exclusive listing contract with James and Joyce Deede to find a purchaser for their residence located at 4150 Rector Road, Cocoa Beach, Florida. This contract was to continue in effect after the end of the 30 day period but could then be terminated on 10 day written notice. The Deedes were unable to produce any evidence of having given 10 day written notice and the Respondent and his agents denied having received written notice of cancellation of the contract. On August 21, 1975, Mr. DeVaughn Bird, a registered real estate broker, personally contacted the Deedes to inquire about selling their house for them. At that time the property had a Tully "FOR SALE" located on it, but Bird did not contact Tully or his associate sales personnel. The Deedes advised Bird that the exclusive sales contract with Tully was no longer valid and gave Bird an open listing. On August 23 and 24, 1975, Bird showed the subject property to Richard and Diane McClure at which time the Tully sign was still located on the property. A contract for sale and purchase was negotiated by Bird between the Deedes and McClures, and a closing date set. Because of difficulties, the closing was delayed and a new contract executed on October 15, 1975 for a November 7, 1975 closing. Following the execution of the initial contract, Bird put his own "SOLD" on the property. Tully became aware of the sale by Bird, and contacted Bird advising him of the existence of his exclusive listing contract, and his expectation to participate in the commission. Bird informed Tully that he would not share a commission and that Tully would have to look to the Deedes for any commission due him. The Deedes refused to acknowledge Tully's claim for any commission or share thereof. At this point, Tully sought the advice of his attorney. Tully's attorney advised him that Tully's contract was in full force and on the basis of the attorney's opinion law applicable to the situation, Tully was entitled to file an equitable lien against the property. Tully, based on his attorney's advice, authorized his attorney to negotiate a settlement if possible; and, if that failed, to file an equitable lien on the property. Negotiations were unsuccessful and on October 30, 1975, just prior to closing, Tully's attorney filed a claim of lien for real estate commission in the amount of $3,314.50 with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brevard County, Florida, and this was recorded in OR Book 1570 at Page 349 of the official records of that county. Copies of, the claim of lien were also served on the closing agent for the sale of the property. The Deedes, as a result of the claim of lien, directed the closing agent to pay Tully one half the amount claimed, or $1,175.00, when Bird agreed to drop his commission from 7 percent to 5 percent of the selling price of $47,000. Having received payment of $1,175.00, Tully had the claim of lien immediately satisfied, which satisfaction may be found in OR Book 1572 at Page 115 of the Public Records of Brevard County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission direct Robert F. Tully to repay the $1,175.00 to the Deedes within 30 days, said period to be extended if the Deedes cannot be located, or face immediate suspension for 30 days; further, said repayment shall not act as a bar to any action by Robert F. Tully against the Deedes based on his contract with them. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward L. Stahley, Esquire Goshorn, Stahley & Miller Post Office Box 1446 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a yacht and ship broker's license.
Findings Of Fact Applicants for yacht and ship salesman licenses and for broker's licenses are furnished with copies of Chapter 326 F.S. and applicable agency rules with the application forms. Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted he had left Mr. Stanzel's firm on October 19, 1992 to pursue a construction job due to the vigorous insurgence of the construction industry following Hurricane Andrew. He took the original of his salesman's license with him and left only copies with Mr. Stanzel in Stanzel's Miami office. Petitioner asserted, however, that since "all it takes to sell yachts is a computer and a telephone," he continuously attempted to sell yachts from his own home after October 19, 1992. After October 19, 1992, Petitioner worked at least 40 hours a week in construction, did not sell any yachts or ships, and had no contact with Mr. Stanzel as his employing broker. Mr. Stanzel did not supervise Petitioner's sales activities after October 19, 1992. Petitioner never returned to Mr. Stanzel's Miami office after that date. Petitioner has never been in Mr. Stanzel's new office in Ft. Lauderdale. Mr. Stanzel paid Petitioner a commission in December 1992 for prior sales work on a yacht sale to Petitioner's father, which sale ultimately closed in December 1992, but since October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel has not considered Petitioner his employee. Petitioner received no IRS 1099 form (commission salesman's equivalent of employee's W-2 form) from Mr. Stanzel after 1992. After October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel did not display Petitioner's license, as required by agency rules for salesmen in a broker's employ. Nothing precludes a licensed salesman from selling yachts and ships out of his home if he is overseen by an employing broker. Petitioner had done so while employed by Mr. Stanzel prior to October 19, 1992. However, by law, all yacht and ship sale closings must be done through the employing broker's trust account. Petitioner has closed no sales on his own through Mr. Stanzel's trust account since October 19, 1992. The two have never discussed a return to work by Petitioner. They did not communicate on any subject between October 19, 1992 and April 15, 1994. Even if Mr. Stanzel had not written his March 1, 1993 letter, Petitioner still would not have been able to show that he has attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license, effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language became the focus of the concurrent Section 120.535 F.S. proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. The deficiency notice also specified that if Petitioner paid another dollar for a fingerprinting fee and provided an explanation of his 1992 yacht sales, the agency would issue a new salesman's license. There was no way Petitioner could alter the past lapse of the broker's license. Petitioner did not pursue relicensure as a salesman. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Even if Mr. Stanzel's broker's license had been reinstated without lapse, thereby by implication reinstating Petitioner's salesman's license without lapse, it would not retroactively change the fact that Petitioner has not attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. Petitioner claimed that he was "cancelled by ambush," because the agency did not timely notify him of Mr. Stanzel's lapsed broker's license, and further asserted that the agency's failure to timely notify him constituted a violation of Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. At the present time, the agency writes a letter to salesmen advising them when their employing broker's license is cancelled. However, such a letter would not have been written to Petitioner, even if it were being used by the agency on March 22, 1993 when Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expired, because Petitioner's license had already been effectively cancelled by his own removal of his license from Mr. Stanzel's office, by his assuming other full time employment in construction, and by his removing his yacht-selling activities, if any, from Mr. Stanzel's immediate oversight. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statute and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner asserted that he had been treated differently than others similarly situated because other salesmen were notified by the agency when their employing broker's license lapsed and because the agency cancelled their salesman's licenses for other reasons but did not cancel their salesman's licenses because of their broker's license's lapse. The facts adduced did not closely parallel his own situation so as to demonstrate disparate treatment. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the agency affirmatively set out to notify any other salesman that his salesman's license was cancelled due to a lapse of his employing broker's license. Rather, the agency was tipped off by a complaint that Bryan Long's salesman's license had expired February 27, 1993. The agency investigated and determined that the license of Mr. Long's broker had expired on February 14, 1993, before Long's own salesman's license had expired. The broker's name was Herbert Postma. Upon discovering that Long and Postma were selling yachts without licenses, the agency investigated the broker's transactions and commissions paid. As a result of its investigation, the agency discovered that two more salesmen, Villalon and Grzeszczak, held salesman's licenses which, like Long's license, had expired during the time Postma's license was lapsed. As with Petitioner, the agency did not attempt to notify any of the salesmen when their broker's license lapsed. The disciplinary investigation of Long's sales and of Postma's transactions and commissions peripherally notified the other salesmen of their lapsed salesman's licenses and of the broker's lapsed license. Petitioner is correct that none of the four licensees were listed as "cancelled" in the agency's records, and Brian Long entered into a Consent Order with the agency which did not mention he was "cancelled" because of the broker's license's lapse. However, the duration dates of each type of license were shown in the agency records. Like the current situation, the new licenses were not issued retroactive to the date of each salesman's prior license's expiration or retroactive to the date of the broker's prior license expiration. Also like Petitioner's reinstatement, none of these licenses showed a reinstatement without a lapse. The agency printout for yet another salesman, Preston, showed that like Petitioner, he was "cancelled" when he had no broker and was reinstated 21 days later. The printout also shows that like Petitioner, Preston was not reinstated retroactively. None of the named salesmen were shown to have been granted a broker's license as having been employed by a broker for two consecutive years.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship broker. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6033 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted except that legal argumentation pejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as not credible. Covered in substance in FOF 5, 6, and 8. Accepted that this is what the letter stated. However, not dispositive due to the facts as presented. See FOF 11. Rejected as mere legal argument. 9-10 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 11 Rejected as mere legal argument. 12-19 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 20 Rejected as mere legal argument. 21-25 Rejected in FOF 32-37 upon the greater weight of the evidence as a whole and in part as mere legal argument. 26-42 These proposals are mixed legal argument and some fact proposals, largely without any citation to the record. The legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts. The facts not accepted are either rejected as covered specifically within the recommended order or are rejected as not dispositive. Ms. Forrester's testimony is mischaracterized in proposed fact 24, and it is rejected for that reason. The legal arguments are addressed in the conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: 1-19 The proposed facts have been accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. The interspersed legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts, but has been addressed in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire GUSTAFSON & TILTON, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Robert Hartnett was at all times pertinent to this complaint a registered real estate broker. Bill Dew and Dave Allman sought to lease a specific piece of real property for business purposes. In this regard they contacted William Hartnett, who had previously leased a piece of real property which included the specific piece of property Messrs. Dew and Allman desired to lease. Messrs. Allman and Dew entered into an agreement to sublease a portion of the Hartnett leasehold. A contract was prepared by William Hartnett and delivered by Robert Hartnett to Dew and Allman, who executed the contract. Although there is conflicting testimony, the testimony of Robert Hartnett is accepted as the more accurate explanation of his role in the transaction. Robert Hartnett had no interest in William Hartnett's business venture or in the leasehold, and did not appear or function as a real estate broker in this transaction. The owner of the property, Mr. Grossinger, testified he agreed to lease the property to William Hartnett. Hartnett was permitted to occupy the premises and paid rent. William Hartnett prepared a written lease which was not signed by the owner, Mr. Grossinger. Grossinger terminated the agreement when Hartnett subleased the premises to Allman and Dew without notifying him and instituted legal action to evict William Hartnett. Under the circumstances, there was an oral lease between Hartnett and Grossinger. Messrs. Dew and Allman made arrangements with contractors to make modifications to the subleased premises, and the modifications were begun. These modifications were in part the cause for the owner terminating the lease with William Hartnett. Messrs. Dew and Allman or their agents did have occupancy of the premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against Respondent Robert Hartnett. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Louis M. Jepeway, Esquire 619 Dade Federal Building 101 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact The Respondent has been a registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission from February 17, 1967, until the present. The Respondent was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida and charged with devising and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud certain named persons and entities by use of the mails and further charged with the commission of an overt act in furtherance of said scheme. U.S. v. Hawk, Case No. 68-47-ORL CR, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. On October 11, 1968, the Respondent pled guilty to the offense of devising a scheme to defraud others and executing said scheme by use of the United States Mail and by telephone in violation of Title 18, Section 1341, U.S.C. The Respondent was sentenced to four years' imprisonment upon his plea of guilty. He served 17 months of his sentence before being paroled, which parole ended in October, 1972. The charge to which the Respondent pled guilty and was found guilty did not, in any manner, involve the sale of real property. Since his conviction and release from prison, the Respondent has worked as a real estate salesman. The Florida Real Estate Commission has shown no complaint lodged against Mr. Hawk regarding his registration as a real estate salesman from February 17, 1967, until the present, other than the complaint and allegations presently being considered. There has been no showing that Nelson F. Hawk engaged in any conduct warranting suspension of his registration as a real estate salesman other than that conviction heretofore referred to in 1968. Nelson F. Hawk is guilty of a crime against the laws of the United States involving fraudulent dealing as evidenced by the certificate of Wesley R. Thies, Clerk, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's real estate broker license should be disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Sections 475.25(1)(b),(c),(d)1. and (e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Bernard L. Covington is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0178235 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license was issued as a broker at 4383 U.S. Hwy. 1, Edgewater, Florida 34141. On September 6, 1990, Terra Mar Village's prospectus to sell proprietary leases in mobile home lots was approved by the Florida Department of Business Regulation. Included in said prospectus is a form Contract for Purchase and Installation of a Cooperative Unit and Manufactured Home at Terra Mar Village for use when lot was to be sold in said Village. On July 25, 1992, Respondent, through the actions of his agent, Alvin D. Booten, solicited and obtained a purchase agreement between sellers, Terra Mar Village Association, and buyers, Jack W. Miller and Jacqueline Miller for Lot 132 in Terra Mar Village. Respondent's agent represent that the buyers were purchasing a mobile home lot in fee simple at the Village. In actuality, they were only purchasing a proprietary lease in the lot. Al Booten, an unlicensed agent, was employed by Terra Mar Village, LTD. as a sales representative. In the course of his employment, he promised the Millers a deed to the property. They relied on his representations, and they put down their deposit on the lot. Booten never advised the Millers they were buying into a cooperative association. Respondent failed to use the approved Contract for Purchase agreement form contained in the prospectus approved in September 1990 by the Department in its dealings with the Millers. The Respondent failed to disclose prior to the closing that the buyers were purchasing only a proprietary lease in the lot. On January 14, 1993, the transaction closed with Respondent acting on behalf of Terra Mar Village, LTD. and Terra Mar Village Association, Inc. After closing, the buyers received the Prospectus and title policy. Upon examining their title insurance policy, they learned that they had purchased a proprietary lease, not a fee simple interest in the lot as has been represented to them by Booten. The mobile home park has gone into foreclosure and the ownership interest of the Millers, among others, in their lots have been put in jeopardy. The Millers had relied on the representations of the Respondent as a licensed broker in their decision to purchase a lot in Terra Mar Village. Respondent committed a breach of trust by failing to disclose that the lot being sold was by proprietary lease. On April 1 and May 10, 1993, buyer Reginald B. Randolph gave Respondent's unlicensed agent, Al Booten, two checks totalling $45,000 for the purchase of a mobile home and lot at Terra Mar Village. On May 10, 1993, Respondent closed the transaction without the knowledge or consent of the buyer. However, Respondent failed to have the title to the property recorded. Randolph was misled by the Respondent's agent Booten, who told Randolph and his wife that they could buy a lot on a canal in the Village. When the Randolphs discovered they had been deceived and demanded their money back, the Respondent refused to refund it. They also discovered the money was not being held in escrow. The Randolphs believed Al Booten was a licensed real estate salesperson because he claimed he was selling the lot. There were many problems associated with the park. The source of potable water at the park was not approved and a moratorium was placed on it by Volusia County. Later, Terra Mar Village, LTD. filed for bankruptcy, but it was denied. The Respondent seeks to blame the "recession" and the water problems for the difficulties he encountered with the Millers and Randolphs. However, Respondent collected their downpayments and misappropriated the funds after allowing them to be misled by his agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: The Florida Real Estate Commission issue and file a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1 and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. The Final Order should further direct that all of Respondent's real estate licenses, registrations, certificates and permits, be suspended for a period of two (2) years and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-14 Respondent's proposals. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bernard L. Covington, pro se 1034 Old South Lane Apopka, Florida 32702 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Northwood Centre 1940 N Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner committed violations of Chapters 468 and 455, Florida Statutes, sufficient for Respondent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a Florida auctioneer.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Michael (Mike) Bickers, lived in Naples, Florida, where he was issued Florida auctioneer License No. AU 0000177 on February 18, 1988. In 1989, Bickers was arrested on criminal charges arising from alleged violations of the Florida Auctioneer Practice Act, Chapter 468, Part VI, Florida Statutes (1989). He was incarcerated for sometime between seven and nine days, finally bonding out of jail for the alleged offenses. Bickers left the State of Florida in June of 1989, without filing a change of address with the Board of Auctioneers. His address of record remained Naples, Florida. In contrast, the application of Bickers, which is the subject of this proceeding, contains an Illinois address. Florida auctioneer licenses are effective for a biennium and may be reactivated for a period of four years thereafter. The biennium for Bickers' license ended on October 31, 1989. Bickers did not renew or reactivate his license at the conclusion of the biennium or during the four years transpiring after that time. On February 25, 1992, Respondent's personnel filed an Administrative Complaint against Bickers. That Complaint, later amended on April 13, 1992, was served on Bickers on July 19, 1993. At a hearing conducted by the Florida Board of Auctioneers on January 26, 1994, Bicker's Florida auctioneer's license was revoked. A final order of revocation was issued by Respondent and filed on April 29, 1994. On February 2, 2001, Bickers' application for licensure by endorsement was received by Respondent's personnel. Bickers has a auctioneer license issued by the State of Georgia. On his license application for licensure by reciprocity, Bickers answered a question about whether or not he had ever had an auctioneer license revoked or suspended in the negative. Upon consideration of Bickers' application, Respondent's Board of Auctioneers issued a Notice of Intent to Deny. The proposed denial was based on Bicker's material false statement on the application that he had never had an auctioneer's license suspended or revoked, a violation of Section 468.389, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the denial letter noted that such an offense, pursuant to Section 468.389, constituted a disciplinary offense and precluded the granting of licensure to Bickers. Further, Bickers was accused of fraudulently attempting to gain licensure, a violation of Section 455.227(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Bickers' action of knowingly responding falsely on the application was deemed by Respondent's Board of Auctioneers to constitute a felony since such behavior is proscribed by Section 455.2275, Florida Statutes, and is punishable as a felony. Additionally, the denial letter noted Bickers' previous revocation in 1994 for multiple violations of the Florida Auctioneer Practice Act as a further ground for not granting licensure and that the previous revocation, pursuant to Section 455.227(5), Florida Statutes, was statutorily deemed to be permanent. The Board of Auctioneer's letter specifically expressed that guidelines for reapplication in these situations had not been promulgated and were not contemplated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by Respondent's Board of Auctioneers denying certification of Bickers' application for licensure for the reasons enumerated in the Notice of Intent to Deny. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Bickers 537 Deer Run Trail Charleston, Illinois 61920 Barbara R. Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Julie Baker, Executive Director Board of Auctioneers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
