The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Harry William Rinehart, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 20, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department has requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on September 29, 1981. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner did not testify but did offer a witness in his behalf, one Dr. Robert M. Berland, a staff psychologist in the forensic program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. The Petitioner submitted eighteen (18) exhibits. Respondent called as its witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at the Florida State Hospital; Michael Denny, Petitioner's attending clinical psychologist at Florida State Hospital and Michael Pomeroy, another attending clinical psychologist at Florida State Hospital who had worked with the Petitioner. Respondent submitted nine (9) exhibits. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the orders of court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities, his progress in the recognition of and ability to deal with the underlying condition which caused him to be placed in this program has reached its zenith. In the face of this circumstance, the Respondent has made preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. Thus, the Petitioner has requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Rinehart was committed to the custody of the Respondent on May 24, 1979, the Court having found him to be a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). He was received into the program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, on June 18, 1979, and has undergone treatment beginning on that date. The objectives of the treatment program were to deal with Rinehart's underlying condition until he no longer evidenced himself to be a menace to society in terms of sexual "acting out" or until it was concluded that he could no longer be treated. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its central focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs of recreational and occupational therapy and some individual therapy and relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4, admitted into evidence, are clinical summaries of the Petitioner's condition during the course of his treatment. As can be seen in the initial evaluation of November, 1979, the petitioner had made minimal progress in the program and had offered little participation. (He had come into the program in a circumstance where he was placed on suicidal precaution.) In these early phases of the treatment, the patient was distant and withdrawn and wrote notes in the group therapy sessions as opposed to communicating orally. His attitude was childish and immature and he was prone to "horseplay" and to breaking rules of the unit, for which violations he was placed in seclusion. It was difficult in the 1979 year for the therapist assigned to the Petitioner's case to establish goals for his improvement in the group setting and as a consequence an attempt was made to use individual therapy sessions to address the particular needs of the patient. By March, 1980, at the time of the next staffing of the patient to determine his progress, again minimal progress had been demonstrated; however, there had been some increase in participation in the group programs, two or three weeks prior to the staffing. The patient still had a maladaptive coping style and had problems controlling his anger and depression and still had a tendency to "act out," that is to say be involved in inappropriate behavior. At the conclusion of the March, 1980, staffing it was intended that another evaluation be made within ninety (90) days. By June, 1980, a decision had been reached to change the primary therapist for the Petitioner, from a female to a male therapist, due to the fact that the Petitioner utilized the sessions with the female therapist to seek her attention in an unacceptable way. In June, 1980, Michael Pomeroy became the therapist for the Petitioner. Pomeroy served until May, 1981. Pomeroy is a clinical psychologist. Pomeroy was replaced by Michael Denny, another clinical psychologist at the hospital and Denny worked with the patient from May, 1981, through July, 1981. Denny replaced Pomeroy when Pomeroy left the sex offender unit. In the overview, by April, 1981, when the staffing was held, Rinehart was no longer evidencing the same form of childish behavior that he had shown initially; however, the staff at the hospital was uncertain whether this change had been promoted by the aging process and maturity associated with that process or due to the therapy afforded. In the April staffing a discussion was made on the question of the twenty-five (25) year minimum sentence which the Petitioner was facing for the offense which had caused his placement in the program. By that time, i.e., April, 1981, the staff had more or less reconciled itself to the fact that Rinehart was going to make little progress in coming to some understanding of, and dealing with, the underlying sexual difficulty. Consequently, beyond April, 1981, for a period of up to one year, it was intended that an effort should be made to assist the Petitioner in coping with a prison environment. This plan of treatment came about as a result of a discussion between staff and the Petitioner's attorney. The emphasis of this coping mechanism was to assist the Petitioner in choosing friends in a prison environment; the types of behavior to avoid in prison; an effort to share experiences from people who had been in a prison environment and who were in the sex offender program and to give the Petitioner some vocational training skills which would avoid his confinement without any outlet. The April, 1981, plan was put into effect but it was interrupted in July, 1981, due to an indictment placed against the Petitioner for an alleged homicide involving a staff member at Florida State Hospital. This caused another staffing conference to be held on July 29, 1981, at which point a decision was reached which was to exhaust treatment on the Petitioner and have him returned to court. Subsequent to that date, the Petitioner has been in the maximum security building of the hospital for reasons of security and for reason that his attorney did not wish the hospital staff to talk to the Petitioner. Therefore, the Petitioner has not been involved in the sex offender program since late July, 1981. After the Florida State Hospital had decided to exhaust treatment on the Petitioner, a discussion was held between the directors of other programs in the State dealing with sex offender problems and it was the consensus of those other program directors that they could not assist in treating Rinehart's condition and a determination was reached at the Departmental level to exhaust treatment. The testimony of psychologist Pomeroy established that the Petitioner was angry when Pomeroy took over as the Petitioner's primary therapist from the former therapist Carol Ford. The Petitioner expressed his anger by wearing sunglasses at the group therapy sessions. After a time, the Petitioner began to show some maturity and to evidence a change in attitude. The Petitioner was receiving instruction from a special teacher during this period to assist him in coping with his educational deficit. He still continued to manipulate the female aides by pouting and acting inappropriately. Pomeroy responded to this by treating the Petitioner as he would other adults and the Petitioner seemed to respond to being treated as an adult as opposed to being treated as a child. The Petitioner participated in ward government in the sex offender program and became more social. Nevertheless, he continued to have problems choosing the right kind of friends and had a tendency to choose those persons who would not aid him in becoming a more responsible individual. Pomeroy was in accord with the decision in April, 1981, to assist the Petitioner in his need to cope with the prison environment and the value of such a pursuit; however, as early as April, 1981, Pomeoy correctly identified the fact that the psychosexual problems of the Petitioner would not be alleviated by further treatment in the sex offender program and to that extent that element of the treatment had been exhausted in the spring of 1981. Pomeroy's observations of the Petitioner while Pomeroy was the primary treating psychologist included the observation that the Petitioner would not talk in a group therapy session beyond expression interest in his problem as opposed to in-depth discussion of that problem. Pomeroy did find the Petitioner to be helpful to other members of the group. Once or twice the Petitioner entered into some discussion of the Petitioner's problem. At this time, Pomeroy is of the persuasion that to keep the Petitioner in the sex offender program would be counterproductive. Staff psychologist Denny, when he began treating the Petitioner as primary therapist instituted a regimen that would include individual therapy once a week for one hour a week and two times a week for one hour in each session as a group therapy treatment modality. Denny had reviewed the patient's records up to the point of his involvement as primary therapist and had discussed the case with therapist Pomeroy and other staff members. On May 20, 1981, an attempt was made by Denny to have the Petitioner share his life history with fellow patients in the patient's group and to try to assist the Petitioner in understanding his personality style. All these matters were in preparation to allow the Petitioner to adjust to incarceration in the penal system and learn to cope with that incarceration. In June, 1981, in the Denny group sessions, the Petitioner began to discuss his parents and the crime which had placed him in the sex offender program and began to express to me concern about why he committed the crime. This occurred in two sessions. After that, the Petitioner began to participate less and less in the sense of discussing his problems with other members of the group. On July 6, 1981, at the time of a staffing, the emphasis as established through Denny's testimony was to impress upon the Petitioner his need to share the history of his life and to question others on his assumptions and to work on relating himself to others either in positive or negative exchanges. These concerns, in terms of the treatment of the Petitioner, were efforts toward the goals of teaching the Petitioner to let others know how he felt about certain events in the past and to question others when he was unsure about his premise and to share similarities in his circumstance and the circumstance of others. The Petitioner's performance in July, 1981, prior to the time of the indictment, was minimal. He shared less and less of his life's experiences in that time sequence. In one of these July therapy sessions, the Petitioner was very unresponsive and in the course of that session smashed a ping-pong ball which was part of the sports equipment of the unit. The efforts which have been mentioned previously which dealt with teaching the Petitioner vocational skills were successful during the time of Denny's treatment of the patient, in that the patient attended small engine repair classes and profited from that experience. The Respondent has a so earned a graduate equivalency diploma. By late June and early July, according to Denny, whose observations are accepted as factual, the patient was no longer motivated to deal with his underlying sexual problem and the hospital had exhausted all appropriate treatment. The patient, at that time, was still a sexual menace and there was still a likelihood of the patient committing other sexual crimes. In summary, his progress in rehabilitation of the underlying sexual deviancy was minimal. There is some evidence of record indicating problems dating from 1973, and at various times thereafter, of seizure disorders on the part of the Petitioner. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 16.) The Florida State Hospital was aware of the history of those matters and although the patient has complained of numerous headaches and been treated for those headaches with aspirin substitute during his stay at the Florida State Hospital, the patient has not complained of seizure circumstances during this period nor has he appeared to have had any form of seizure during the hospitalization at the Florida State Hospital. (His last problem with seizures dates from late 1978.) Moreover, testimony revealed that any past problems the Petitioner has had with seizure type events did not hinder the treatment of the Petitioner at the Florida State Hospital. (See also Respondent's Exhibits 5 through 9.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Harry William Rinehart, and that said Harry William Rinehart be returned to the committing court for further disposition. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1981.
The Issue The issues in these cases for determination are whether Respondent Elham Kharabi, A.P., L.M.T, committed the violations alleged in two Administrative Complaints issued by the Department of Health on March 14, 2005, in DOAH Case No. 06- 4117PL, and on November 8, 2006, in DOAH Case No. 06-4491PL; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice acupuncture and his license to practice massage therapy in Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving the practice of acupuncture and massage therapy in Florida. § 20.43, and Chs. 456, 457 and 480, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Elham Kharabi (identified as Elham Kharabi- Moghaddam by the Board of Massage Therapy), A.P., L.M.T, is and was at all times material to this matter, licensed by the Board of Acupuncture as an acupuncturist, having been issued license number 1890 on November 7, 2003, and by the Board of Massage Therapy as a licensed massage therapist, having been issued license number 0013944 on January 29, 1993. Respondent's mailing address of record at all times relevant to this matter is Post Office Box 451342, Miami, Florida 33245. Respondent's clinic is located at 2808 Bird Avenue, Miami, Florida 33133. No evidence that Respondent has previously been the subject of a license disciplinary proceeding was offered. Respondent’s Treatment of Patient U.C. At the times material to this matter, Respondent operated as "Miami’s Clinical of Oriental Medicine" (hereinafter after referred to as the "Clinic"), located in Coconut Grove, Miami, Florida. U.C., a single, 34-year-old mother, visited the Clinic in June 2004 (hereinafter referred to as "Patient U.C."). Patient U.C. visited the Clinic because she was suffering from depression and fatigue and thought that acupuncture might help her. On her first visit Patient U.C. spoke briefly with Respondent and was given a pamphlet. After this first meeting, Patient U.C. called Respondent and made an appointment for treatment. Patient U.C.’s first formal appointment with Respondent was a free consultation which took place on June 29, 2004. During the consultation visit, Patient U.C. completed a Comprehensive Acupuncture Examination form, in which she described her "Major Complaints" as "depression, fatigue, inability to concentrate & focus, lethargy, moody, irritable, too sensitive & emotional." Respondent's Exhibit 3. Patient U.C. also indicated on the form that she had experienced the following "Nuerological" problems: "nervousness, depressed, easily angered, easily irritated, frequent crying, numbness/tingling in limbs, poor coordination, muscle weakness, and feel weak and shaky." She did not, however, mean that she was suffering from all of these problems at the time she competed the form. Rather, she simply listed every symptom she had ever experienced during her lifetime. After Patient U.C. had completed the Comprehensive Acupuncture Examination form, Respondent conducted a patient interview with her, which he memorialized in a Patient Interview form. Respondent’s Exhibit 4. Respondent determined a plan of treatment for Patient U.C., which he memorialized on the Patient Interview form. Respondent's plan of treatment consisted of: "Tui Na, LR3, LI4, SJ5, GB41, Yin Tang, R17." Based on Respondent’s testimony describing these treatments, none required touching of Patient U.C.'s anus or vagina. Respondent completely identified his plan of treatment and there was no testimony indicating that it was inadequate. After the patient interview, Respondent advised Patient U.C. that he could treat her "Major Complaints" with Chinese medicine. Respondent, with Patient U.C.'s agreement, performed a complete massage (while Patient U.C. and Respondent characterized the treatment differently, the procedure involved manipulation of Patient U.C.'s body and will be referred to throughout this Recommended Order as "massage" for ease of reference) and acupuncture on Patient U.C. after their initial discussions on June 29, 2004. Patient U.C. was unclothed, except for her underwear, during the massage. Having experienced a number of massages by male therapists in the past, Patient U.C. felt comfortable receiving the massage from Respondent. On June 30, 2004, Patient U.C. returned to the Clinic to pay for her first visit and future planned visits. On July 6, 2004, Patient U.C. presented to the Clinic for her second appointment. During this visit, she received the same treatment as she had during the first appointment. While at the Clinic, Respondent advised Patient U.C. that she needed treatment on a daily basis and encouraged her to come to the Clinic daily. Respondent told Patient U.C., who was concerned about cost, that she could come in any time and that he would not charge her for her sessions. Patient U.C. declined Respondent's offer and indicated that she would only come for her scheduled paid-for weekly appointments. On July 13, 2004, Patient U.C. went to the Clinic for her third visit, which had been paid for in advance. Patient U.C. complained to Respondent of pain in her jaw and the left side of her buttocks, radiating down her leg. After rubbing or manipulating Patient U.C.'s jaw, Patient U.C. removed her clothing, except for her underwear, while Respondent left the room. When Respondent returned, he began treatment of Patient U.C.’s left buttock. Respondent massaged Patient U.C.'s left buttock, moving his oiled hands rapidly on her buttock while applying heavy pressure. Patient U.C., concerned that her underwear was hampering Respondent's efforts, offered to remove them. Respondent agreed and Patient U.C. removed her underwear. Respondent recommenced his treatment, massaging Patient U.C.'s left buttock rapidly and forcefully. At some point, Patient U.C. felt Respondent remove his finger from her anus. Because Patient U.C. was lying on her stomach at the time and, therefore, was not able to see exactly what had happened, she was cautious in her testimony at hearing. The weight of her testimony, however, proved that, while Patient U.C. was unable to say that she felt Respondent's finger enter her anus, she was able to feel him removing his finger from her anus. After realizing that Respondent had inserted his finger into her anus and then removed it, Patient U.C. was confused and unsure of what to do. Patient U.C. described her feelings at hearing: Q. What did you do when you felt that? A. Nothing. I was shocked. It didn't make sense to me. How could I feel this thing coming out of my butt if I didn't feel it . . . being inserted? I was confused. It just didn't make sense and I though you know it is probably an accident, a mistake because there is oil and he did massage vigorously and it was fast, but I did not do anything. Transcript, Vol. I, Page 61, Lines 16-24. After Respondent completed massaging Patient U.C., he placed acupuncture needles in her buttocks and left the room. Respondent returned a few minutes later and removed the needles. After removing the needles, Respondent had Patient U.C. turn over on her back and he began massaging her right thigh. While massaging Patient U.C.’s thigh, he inserted his finger into her vagina and briefly moved it back and forth several times. Again, Patient U.C. did not respond to Respondent's inappropriate conduct, instead deciding to avoid having "to deal with it." Instead, she "just pretended that it wasn't going on, that it didn’t happen. I just pretended that it didn't happen." Transcript, Vol. I, Page 65. When Patient U.C. did not respond to this second unwanted touching, Respondent removed his finger and returned to appropriate treatment, inserting acupuncture needles in Patient U.C. Following this treatment, Respondent removed the acupuncture needles and left the room. Patient U.C. got up from the treatment table, dressed, and left the clinic without confronting Respondent about putting his finger in her anus and her vagina. Patient U.C. did not confront Respondent because she just wanted to leave the Clinic and pretend that Respondent had not violated her. Events Following Respondent’s July 13, 2004, Treatment of Patient U.C. Patient U.C. went home immediately after her July 13, 2004, visit to the Clinic and called William Parente, her boyfriend at the time. She was unable, however, to tell Mr. Parente what had happened because he was at lunch with other people. After talking briefly with Mr. Parente, Patient U.C. took a shower, ate, and went to work. Later that day, Patient U.C. spoke to Mr. Parente and described the events that had taken place at the Clinic that day. According to Mr. Parente, Patient U.C. was very distraught and, from the sound of her voice, had been crying. During the evening of July 13, 2004, Patient U.C. experienced pain in her anus. The pain had intensified by the next morning. Therefore, Patient U.C. went to the Health Clinic at the University of Miami, where she was a second-year law student. Personnel at the clinic advised patient U.C. to go to the Jackson Memorial Rape Treatment Center (Jackson). On July 14, 2004, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Patient U.C. presented to Jackson for treatment. Patient U.C.'s vagina and pelvic area were examined by a physician, who took a specimen. No lacerations or lesions were found. The specimen was forward to law enforcement. The physician also examined Patient U.C.'s anus. During this examination, Patient U.C. felt an uncomfortable burning pain in her anus. Because of the pain, she asked the physician to discontinue the examination. Although the examination of Patient U.C.’s anus was terminated, a specimen was also obtained from her anus and forwarded to the police. After completion of the examination at Jackson, Patient U.C. was referred to the police and to the Journey Institute for counseling services. Patient U.C. immediately went to the Miami-Dade Police Department to make a report. She also sought assistance from the Journey Institute. Two days after the incident, Patient U.C. also reported the incident to a friend, Luis Yllanes. When Mr. Yllanes spoke to her, Patient U.C. was visibly upset. She trembled when Patient U.C. told Mr. Yllanes the specifics of what occurred in Respondent’s office. On July 19, 2004, Patient U.C. called her psychiatrist, Manuel Rodriguez-Garcia, M.D. Patient U.C. called to request a prescription for medications because she was depressed following the incident. Dr. Garcia prescribed Wellbutrin, an anti-depressant. The Reliability of Patient U.C.’s Recollection. Patient U.C. had been sexually abused over approximately a two-year period by her uncle when she was 16 to 17 years of age. She was also raped by a neighbor in the neighbor's house when she was a teenager. When she reported her uncle's abuse, her family, rather than being supportive, made her feel as if it was her fault. In addition to the sexual abuse she suffered, Patient U.C. was physically and emotionally abused by her brother. Beginning in 1998, Patient U.C. sought the medical assistance of Dr. Garcia, a board-certified psychiatrist. Dr. Garcia treated Patient U.C. from 1998 through March 22, 2005. (Having asserted her psychiatrist-patient privilege in relation to psychiatric records which substantially predate the allegations made in these cases, Dr. Garcia was limited to relating his treatment of Patient U.C. beginning May 30, 2003.) As of May 30, 2003, Patient U.C. was diagnosed as suffering from attention deficit disorder (hereinafter referred to as "ADD") and depressive disorder with anxiety. Patient U.C. was not exhibiting any symptoms of psychosis. ADD is a congenital disorder that makes its sufferer distractible, with poor concentration. Dr. Garcia prescribed Ritalin to Patient U.C. to treat her ADD. He also prescribed Lexapro (an anti- depressant) and Ambien to help Patient U.C. sleep at night. As of September 29, 2003, Patient U.C. continued to suffer from ADD and depressive disorder with anxiety. Patient U.C. told Dr. Garcia during the September 29, 2003, visit that "something is wrong with my brain." She was concerned because she had driven into the parking lot of one store when she had intended to go to another one. Dr. Garcia was not concerned about this incident or her comment. He found that Patient U.C. was not suffering from any dementia, delirium, confusion, disassociative states, or organic deficits and that she was oriented on life's decisions. Finding that Patient U.C. did not have anything "wrong with her brain," Dr. Garcia concluded that she was simply having difficulty concentrating, a symptom of her ADD. Finally, Dr. Garcia found that Patient U.C. was not exhibiting any signs of psychosis as of September 29, 2003. Patient U.C. visited Dr. Garcia’s office again on May 7, 2004. At Patient U.C.’s request, Dr. Garcia wrote her a prescription for Adderall to replace her prescription for Ritalin. Patient U.C. failed to go to her next scheduled appointment with Dr. Garcia on June 29, 2004. Patient U.C. had begun to believe that she was not getting better, despite the medications prescribed by Dr. Garcia. Consequently she had stopped taking those medications (Adderall, Ritalin, and Ambien) two or three months before the July 13, 2004, incident. Patient U.C. did not inform Dr. Garcia of her actions. In addition to suffering from ADD and depressive disorder with anxiety, and the difficulty of raising a child as a single mother while attending law school, Patient U.C. was subjected to a serious of stressful events preceding the July 13, 2004, incident: her mother was diagnosed with a brain tumor, her father was seriously ill, her brother was indicted on criminal charges, and her sister had attempted suicide. Despite Patient U.C.'s medical problems, Patient U.C. was not suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (hereinafter referred to as "PTSD") on or before July 13, 2004. Nor did Patient U.C. misperceive the events of July 13, 2004. Those events, as found, supra, were accurately recalled and testified to by Patient U.C. The testimony of Merrysue Haber, Ph.D., suggesting that Patient U.C. suffered from PTSD, and that she may have suffered a PTSD event or "flashback" on July 13, 2004 was not convincing. Dr. Haber's suggestion that Patient U.C. could have misperceived what had actually taken place on July 13, 2004, because of the sexual abuse she had suffered as a teenager, the stress that Patient U.C. was experiencing at the time, and the intensification of her psychological problems when Patient U.C. stopped taking her prescription medications is rejected. Dr. Haber's testimony is rejected for a number of reasons. First, and most importantly, her testimony is rejected because her opinions were inconsistent with those of Dr. Garcia, who did not diagnose Patient U.C. as suffering from PTSD prior to July 13, 2004. During the period that Dr. Garcia treated Patient U.C., he never found her to be suffering from hallucinations or bipolar disorder, or to be exhibiting any signs of psychosis. At no time was there any interaction between Dr. Garcia and Patient U.C. that led him to “think that she could be psychotic, that she could have a delirium or a problem with perception.” Transcript, Vol. II, Page 202, Lines 12 through 16. Dr. Garcia had personally met with Patient U.C. and diagnosed her condition, while Dr. Haber has never spoken to Patient U.C. Having failed to find that Patient U.C. was suffering from PTSD prior to or on July 13, 2004, any suggestion by Dr. Haber that Patient U.C. suffered from PTSD on the critical date is not credited. In further support of these findings, it is noted that Dr. Haber relied, at least in part, on the medical records of Roger Rousseau, M.D., of the Journey Institute, the institution Patient U.C. had been referred to by Jackson personnel. Dr. Rousseau, while diagnosing Patient U.C. with "chronic" PTSD, did not see Patient U.C. until after the events of July 13, 2004. Dr. Haber's reliance on Dr. Rousseau's diagnosis is, therefore, misplaced. Dr. Haber's testimony concerning the possible impact of Patient U.C.'s discontinuation of her medicines prior to July 13, 2004, is also rejected as inconsistent with Dr. Garcia's testimony. Based upon Dr. Garcia's credited testimony, it is found that Patient U.C.'s discontinuance of here medications would not have altered Patient U.C.’s perception of reality. At most, she would merely have experienced a resurgence of the symptoms of her ADD and depression, not psychosis. While Patient U.C. could have experienced an increased difficulty concentrating and her depression may have worsened, she would not have experienced withdrawal symptoms associated with discontinuing her medications and would not have exhibited new symptoms like hallucinations. Finally, even it had been proved that Patient U.C. was suffering from PTSD on July 13, 2004, the evidence proved that it is highly unlikely that she would have continued to insist that events which she supposedly misperceived on July 13, 2004, actually occurred. PTSD is a condition or disorder where a person may experience a variety of signs and symptom, including vivid memories of a traumatic event, an inability to function, anxiety, depression, and hypersensitivity (ultra-sensitivity to stimuli that remind the person of the traumatic event). Persons suffering PTSD may suffer some or all of the foregoing symptoms. Although not common, a person suffering PTSD can relive the traumatic event; experience a "flashback." Even when a person experiences a flashback or relives the traumatic event, the feeling of reliving the event does not last and the person realizes that the event did not actually recur. Dr. Garica gave the example of a combat soldier's reaction to an automobile back-firing. The soldier may flinch, but will quickly realize there is no real danger. Patient U.C. never reported any flashback relating to her sexual abuse as a teenager to Dr. Garcia. Having given birth to a child, she has obviously had sexual relations; she has not had any difficulty being undressed while receiving a massage; and she was not concerned about suggesting to Respondent that she take off her underwear when she realized her underwear was hampering his treatment of her on July 13, 2004. Based upon the foregoing, while it is obvious that Patient U.C. is not without problems, the evidence failed to prove that she was in any way unable to accurately understand and subsequently relate the events of July 13, 2004, as found in this Recommended Order. Respondent's Acupuncture Medical Records. Having denied that he placed his finger in Patient U.C.'s anus or vagina, Respondent obviously did not record any medical justification in his medical record for Patient U.C. for doing so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Board of Acupuncture finding that Elham Kharabi, A.P., has violated Section 456.072(1)(u), Florida Statutes, by violating Section 456.063(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 457.109(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2004), as alleged in Counts One and Two of the Administrative Complaint; dismissing the allegations of Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; issuing a written reprimand; imposing a fine of $1,000.00; suspending Respondent's acupuncture license for six months; and placing Respondent's license on probation for two years with terms to be set by the Board of Acupuncture; and That a final order be entered by the Board of Massage Therapy finding that Elham Kharabi-Moghaddam, L.M.T., has violated Section 480.046(1)(o), Florida Statutes, by having violated Section 480.0485, Florida Statutes; issuing a written reprimand; imposing a fine of $1,000.00; suspending Respondent's massage therapy license for six months; and placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of two years, with terms to be set by the Board of Massage Therapy. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Allison M. Dudley Assistant General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 David M. Shenkman, Esquire David M. Shenkman, P.A. 2701 South Bayshore Drive, Suite 602 Miami, Florida 33133 Pamela King, Executive Director Board of Acupuncture and Board of Massage Therapy Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C06 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation filed in this cause, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Randall E. Pitone, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed (license number ME 0029098) by the State of Florida since 1976. Respondent is a diplomate in psychiatry having received certification from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was in the practice of psychiatry in the State of Florida. Respondent has been affiliated with or authorized to practice in a number of hospitals in the Pinellas County area. He enjoys a good reputation among the community of practicing psychiatrists and has covered for several of them during the course of his practice. The Respondent became Patient 1's treating psychiatrist in 1982 when the patient was almost 18 years of age. Patient 1 has a borderline personality disorder and other problems for which she required treatment. In order to more effectively provide treatment for borderline patients, Respondent attended at least two courses related to borderline personality disorder during the early 1980s. From September, 1982 through May, 1988, Respondent treated Patient 1 with individual psychotherapy. During this time, Patient 1 was hospitalized on several occasions and Respondent counseled with her within the hospital setting and at his office. Borderline patients are typically very needy, seductive, and manipulative in their approach to others. During her period of treatment Patient 1 frequently attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Respondent who diplomatically refused her advances. On each of these occasions, Respondent explained to Patient 1 that he could not have a romantic relationship and continue therapy. Also during this period, Respondent was married and devoted to his family. In May, 1988, Respondent and Patient 1 ended their formal physician- patient relationship. Patient 1 was not sincerely pursuing therapy. Additionally, she had a new boyfriend with whom she seemed happy. Respondent encouraged her to seek therapy but she mistakenly believed that she did not need it. Although she would periodically drop by to visit with Respondent, she did not make appointments for therapy. Nor did she obtain therapy from another psychiatrist despite Respondent's encouragement for her to do so. Respondent's wife left him sometime in 1988. Her departure was very difficult for Respondent. The couple divorced in June, 1988, and Respondent's former wife remarried shortly thereafter and moved to Georgia. Respondent's children resided with him until sometime in 1989 when they moved to their mother's home. Subsequently, Respondent allowed Patient 1 to move into his home. She resided with him from June, 1989 until April, 1990. Throughout this period of cohabitation, Respondent included Patient 1 in his family activities. She went to his brother's home with him for Christmas and went on a cruise to Jamaica with his relatives. Respondent did not hide their relationship from his family or friends. During this period Respondent and Patient 1 engaged in sexual intercourse. Patient 1 has been hospitalized on several occasions since 1982. During one such hospitalization, on or about October 30, 1988 (after formal therapy had ended), Dr. Helm consulted with the Respondent regarding Patient 1's suspected drug abuse. Patient 1 has a serious addiction to alcohol, cocaine, and crack cocaine. This addiction dates at least as far back as the summer of 1989, and perhaps earlier. Respondent knew of Patient 1's addiction to cocaine and of her abuse of other substances. Respondent prescribed medications for Patient 1 in a misguided effort to wean her from street drugs. Whenever Respondent refused to give Patient 1 prescriptions, she would become outraged and destructive. On one such occasion, Patient 1 exited the car in which the couple was travelling and bolted in front of an oncoming truck. As a result Patient 1 was hospitalized with a broken pelvis. Between May, 1988, and March, 1990, Respondent wrote or authorized the prescriptions listed in attachment A for Patient 1. These prescriptions were given to Patient 1 despite the fact that she was no longer formally receiving psychotherapy from Respondent. Moreover, many of the prescriptions issued are not of the type generally associated with the treatment of psychiatric patients since they are more commonly associated with pain relief. Amitriptyline is a legend drug. Dalmane is a brand name of flurazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Valium is a brand name of diazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Xanax is a brand name of alprazolam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Darvocet is a brand name of a compound containing propoxyphene, a legend drug and controlled substance. Tylenol #3 and Tylenol #2 are brand names of acetaminophen or apap with codeine, legend drugs and controlled substances. Percodan is a brand name of oxycodone with aspirin, a legend drug and controlled substance. Percocet is a brand name of oxycodone with acetaminophen or apap, a legend drug and controlled substance. Legend drugs are required by federal or state law to be dispensed only on a prescription. Respondent inappropriately prescribed legend drugs/controlled substances to Patient 1. Respondent prescribed drugs for Patient 1 after they were living together and engaging in sexual relations. The types and quantities of prescriptions written by Respondent for Patient 1 were not justified by examinations and records maintained by the Respondent, were not issued in the course of medical practice, and were clearly excessive. By prescribing the drugs listed in attachment A, Respondent failed to provide Patient 1 with that level of care, skill and treatment, which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as acceptable under the conditions and circumstances of this case. Respondent also failed to seek consultation in connection with his concerns over Patient 1. Instead, Respondent set himself up as her sole provider and savior. This action was medically inappropriate and further evidences Respondent's loss of objectivity in this instance. In effect, Respondent became a patient in need of treatment as a result of his erroneous and misguided efforts to assist Patient 1. On April 11, 1990, an order of emergency restriction of Respondent's license was issued by Larry Gonzalez, acting as Secretary of the Department. That order placed specific restrictions on the Respondent's license which include: -the prescription of controlled substances utilizing sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions; -the review of each prescription by a supervisory physician; -the prohibition of providing medical services to Patient 1; and -the submission of monthly reports by a monitoring physician which includes specific information regarding Respondent's practice, any problems, a review of prescriptions and patient records. To date, Respondent has complied with the restrictions placed on his license. Additionally, Respondent has sought and obtained psychiatric counseling in connection with his errors in thinking related to his relationship with Patient 1. Respondent developed a rescue fantasy in which he perceived that he alone could assist Patient 1 recover from her illnesses. This was not a medically sound approach to the dilemma within which Respondent became embroiled. As Respondent fell in love with Patient 1, he lost his professional perspective and undertook this ill-fated rescue of her. An examination of Respondent's medical records does not suggest that the activities which gave rise to the allegations of this case have occurred regarding other patients. From the circumstances of this case, it is unlikely another incident or series of incidents of this type will recur. Sexual activity between a psychiatrist and his patient has detrimental effects on the patient. In this instance, that conduct had detrimental effects on both the Respondent and Patient 1. Since Respondent fell prey to Patient 1's manipulative nature, his judgment became impaired and she was able to orchestrate an inappropriate response from Respondent. It cannot be found, however, that Respondent used their relationship to induce Patient 1 to engage in sexual activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and imposing the following penalties: suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year during which time the Respondent shall continue counseling, followed by a two year period of probation under the terms set forth in the emergency order issued April 11, 1990, together with an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3276 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 20 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 21 it is accepted that Respondent provided the prescriptions as described, however, he had formally ended psychotherapy of Patient 1 in May, 1988. It was inappropriate for him to issue the prescriptions. Paragraphs 22A. and 22C. are accepted. Paragraph 22D. is rejected to the extent that it finds Respondent did not maintain appropriate records, otherwise, rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Note: there is no paragraph 22B. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24A. is accepted. Paragraphs 24B. and 24C. are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 25 it is accepted that Respondent prescribed substances for Patient 1 inappropriately and excessively, otherwise the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 26, 27, 30 and 31 (because it allowed her to manipulate Respondent into prescribing inappropriately--he should have been the physician not a co-patient) are accepted. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings paragraphs 3 through 7, Respondent's paragraphs 4 through 9 are accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or a recitation of testimony. With the exception of the last sentence, paragraph 10 is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculative or conjecture--it is accepted that Respondent was in a stress-filled, emotional situation. Paragraphs 11 through 14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraphs 18 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 through 23 are rejected as recitation of testimony but see findings of fact paragraphs 27, 28, and 29. Paragraphs 24 through 28 are rejected as recitation of testimony. With regard to paragraph 29 it is accepted that the Respondent does not pose a threat to the public under his current circumstances. Otherwise, paragraph 29 is rejected as recitation of testimony or irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32 is accepted. Paragraph 33 is accepted. ATTACHMENT A Date Drug Prescribed 5/14/88 Dalmane 6/02/88 Valium 7/15/88 Percodan 7/20/88 Percodan 7/27/88 Xanax 7/27/88 Percodan 8/12/88 Percodan 9/06/88 Percodan 9/13/88 Zantac 9/23/88 Percodan 10/7/88 Darvocet N-100 10/29/88 Xanax 11/18/88 Percodan 01/6/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/10/89 Percodan 01/11/89 Xanax 01/16/89 Xanax 01/18/89 Xanax 01/21/89 Xanax 01/20/89 Tylenol 3 01/24/89 Tylenol 3 01/25/89 Tylenol 3 01/26/89 Xanax 01/31/89 Xanax 02/02/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/04/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/09/89 Percodan 02/10/89 Xanax 02/10/89 Percodan 03/03/89 Xanax 03/03/89 Percodan 03/13/89 Percodan 03/14/89 Xanax 1mg 03/17/89 Percodan 03/20/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Xanax 03/29/89 Percodan 03/31/89 Percodan 04/07/89 Xanax 1mg 04/10/89 Percocet 5mg 04/11/89 Percodan 04/21/89 Percodan 04/24/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Xanax 04/26/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Xanax 04/29/89 Percodan 05/01/89 Xanax 05/02/89 Percodan 05/04/89 Percodan 05/05/89 Percodan 05/09/89 Xanax 05/11/89 Xanax 05/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/18/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/20/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/06/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/08/89 Percodan 06/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/09/89 Percodan 06/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/14/89 Percodan 06/16/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/23/89 Xanax 1mg 06/24/89 Percodan 06/26/89 Percodan 07/01/89 Xanax 07/07/89 Xanax 1 mg 07/07/89 Percodan 07/10/89 Percodan 07/15/89 Percodan 07/17/89 Percodan 07/20/89 Percodan 07/21/89 Valium 10 mg 07/21/89 Percodan 07/28/89 Percodan 07/30/89 Valium 07/31/89 Percodan 08/02/89 Percodan 08/04/89 Percodan 08/05/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Percodan 08/09/89 Percodan 08/20/89 Valium 10 mg 09/01/89 Percodan 09/04/89 Valium 09/06/89 Percodan 09/19/89 Percodan 09/22/89 Valium 09/22/89 Percodan 09/28/89 Percodan 10/01/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Percodan 10/05/89 Xanax 1 mg 10/06/89 Percodan 10/13/89 Darvocet-N. 100 10/13/89 Valium 10/13/89 Tylenol #2 10/17/89 Tylenol #2 10/19/89 Valium 5 mg 10/20/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Valium 5 mg 10/25/89 Tylenol #3 10/26/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Tylenol #4 10/30/89 Valium 10 mg 11/03/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Percocet 11/27/89 Percocet 11/29/89 Percocet 01/02/90 Valium 10 mg 01/02/90 Percodan 01/12/90 Tylenol #3 01/12/90 Valium 10 mg 01/13/90 Xanax 1 mg 01/17/90 Tylenol #3 02/04/90 Xanax 1 mg 02/17/90 Percodan 02/20/90 Percodan 02/28/90 Percodan 03/10/90 Percodan 03/16/90 Percodan 03/17/90 Percodan COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb Chief Trial Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 730 Sterling Street, Ste. 201 Tampa, Florida 33609 Grover C. Freeman FREEMAN, LOPEZ & KELLY, P.A. 4600 West Cypress, Ste. 500 Tampa, Florida 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation (Charter) which proposes to construct and operate a freestanding, 60 bed, 24- hour-a-day, Intensive Residential Treatment Program for children between the ages of 6 and 18 in Palm Beach County within HRS District IX, pursuant to Rule 10-28.152(8), F.A.C. and Chapter 395, F.S. Although FRTC represents it will construct its proposed facility with or without CON licensure, which it is entitled to do, given the peculiarities of this type of health care entity, it is clear that a prime motivator in FRTC's CON application is that with CON licensure, FRTC potentially will have greater access to insurance reimbursement because it may then call itself a "hospital." FRTC will seek JCAH accreditation. HRS is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications, pursuant to Chapter 10-5.011, F.A.C. and Sections 381.701-381.715, F.S. (1987). HRS preliminarily approved FRTC's application, and supported it through formal hearing and post-hearing proposals. RTCPB is an existing 40 bed residential treatment center for adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18, located in Palm Beach County, on the campus of Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches. It provides services similar or identical to those services proposed to be offered by FRTC. It is JCAH accredited through an extension of Lake Hospital's accreditation and is close to JCAH accreditation in its own right. RTCPB is a subsidiary of Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. (PIA) . PIA operates two residential treatment centers in Florida. RTCPB is not CON licensed as an IRTP, under Chapters 381 and 395, F.S., but is licensed as a child care facility under Chapter 395, F.S., as a provider of services to HRS under Chapters 10M-9 and 10E-10, F.A.C. RTCPB accepts substance abusers in residency. RTCPB has also applied for CON licensure as an IRTP in a batching cycle subsequent to the present one. That application has been preliminarily denied by HRS and RTCPB is awaiting a Section 120.57(1), F.S., formal administrative hearing thereon. RTCPB now estimates its current patients' average length of stay (ALOS) as 106 days but projects a 315 day (10 1/2 months) ALOS in its subsequent CON application. RTCPB is charging $185 per day or HRS patients and $255 with $23-26 ancillaries [sic] per day for private pay patients. Like FRTC, it uses a "levels" system of behavior modification and patient control. Humana is a 250 bed JCAH accredited hospital located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Of Humana's 250 beds, 162 are traditional acute care beds and 88 are psychiatric beds. The 88 psychiatric beds are administratively divided into different units, one of which is a 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit; this unit opened January 20, 1987, and has an average length of stay of nine months. Humana's existing CONs are for short-term adult psychiatric beds and do not authorize an adolescent unit with an average length of stay of over 30 days. Ninety days is the demarcation, by rule, between short- and long-term psychiatric beds. Humana recently applied for a CON for more psychiatric beds and also applied for an IRTP CON in a subsequent batch to the present one. Humana's present 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit provides grossly similar services to those proposed to be offered by FRTC, but its emphasis is more medical-psychiatric than emotional-behavioral. Like FRTC, Humana does not accept in residency adolescents with a primary diagnosis of substance abuse. Like FRTC and RTCPB, Humana uses a "levels" system. Eighty percent of Humana's patient mix are commercial pay, and the unit is running at a 15 to 20 percent profit margin. Humana usually charges $325 per day on their adolescent unit plus ancillaries [sic] amounting to 10 percent of the patient's bill, but HRS contract patients pay only $225 per day. Humana has lost a number of adolescent unit referrals to RTCPB since RTCPB opened June 1, 1987, but the unit continues to be almost fully occupied. Humana's main referral asset, as well as the source of the confusion of referring entities, appears to be the reputation of its director, Dr. Kelly. Dr. Kelly previously directed a program at Lake Hospital which was identical to the program that he now directs at Humana. Lake Hospital currently has RTCPB operating under its auspices, but not Dr. Kelly. Nature of the FRTC Program FRTC's proposed program is designed to serve those persons in the designated age group who have psychiatric diagnoses of a severity requiring a long-term approach in a multidisciplinary structured living setting to facilitate recovery. It will not, however, treat adolescents with an active diagnosis of chemical dependency or substance abuse. It also only commits to 1.5 percent indigent care. The proposed FRTC program differs from an acute care setting in significant quantitative and qualitative ways, the most visible of which is that acute care psychiatric settings (either long- or short-term) are geared toward dealing with patients actively dangerous to property, themselves, or others, but patients whom it is reasonably assumed will respond primarily to physiologically-oriented physicians and registered nurses administering daily medication, treatment, and monitoring, as opposed to a long-term living arrangement emphasizing behaviorally-oriented group interaction as an alternative to parental care at home. FRTC will, however, accept patients with psychiatric diagnoses of effective disorders, depression, schizophrenia and impulse disorders and those who may be potentially harmful to themselves, others, or property for whom no other less intensive or less restrictive form of treatment would be predictably helpful. FRTC would fall on the continuum of care below an acute psychiatric facility such as Humana. Assessment of such a target group on a patient by patient basis is obviously subject to a wide variation of interpretation by qualified health care professionals, but FRTC anticipates both verifying referral diagnoses and assuring quality of care by insuring that each new patient is seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee. FRTC also plans to complete appropriate patient assessments and develop and update individual, integrated treatment programs. FRTC will provide, where appropriate, for continuity of care from previous acute care institutions through the FRTC program and out into more normal individual or family living arrangements. Parents will have to consent to their child's placement at FRTC. FRTC's program proposes an average length of stay of 365 days (one year) with a range of six months to two years. Based upon all the credible record evidence as a whole, including, but not limited to, the protestants' respective ALOS, this is a reasonable forecast despite contrary evidence as to Charter's experience at its "template" Virginia institution, Charter Colonial. FRTC's program components will include individual therapy, recreational therapy, occupational therapy, and general education. The general education component in FRTC's proposed program is more general and more open than that offered in acute care settings, such as Humana. FRTC's overall program will utilize a "levels" system of behavioral management based upon patients earning privileges, which levels system has a good patient rehabilitation and functional administrative track record in many different kinds of psychiatric health care facilities, including Humana and RTCPB. FRTC intends that each patient's program will be individualized according to age and program component directed to his/her diagnosis and each patient will receive individual, resident group, and family therapies. As to assessment, types of therapy, continuity of care, and general education provisions, FRTC's proposal is grossly consistent with that of its "template." To the extent there is evidence of inconsistencies between the two programs in the record, the FRTC proposal represents either improvements over, or refinements of, its template program which have been developed as Charter/FRTC has learned more about what actually "works" for the IRTP form of health care, or it represents changes to accommodate Florida's perception of what less restrictive but still intensive residential treatment should be, or it anticipates local community needs. Quality of Care The applicant's parent corporation is an experienced provider of many types of accredited psychiatric facilities. The type of quality assurance program proposed and the staff mix provide reasonable quality care assurances. Design, Construction, and Personnel Refinements to FRTC's original schematic take into consideration the influence that physical structure has on an Intensive Residential Treatment Program. Those refinements include modification of a multipurpose room into a half-court gymnasium, addition of a classroom, addition of a mechanical room, modification of the nursing station to decrease the amount of space, and the deletion of one seclusion room and addition of a four to six bed assessment unit. The modifications resulted in the addition of approximately 1,000 square feet to the original design. A minimum of four to six acres would be necessary to accommodate the modified design which totals approximately 32,000 square feet. Public areas, such as administration and support services, dining room, and housekeeping areas, are to the front; private areas, such as the nursing units, are to the back. The facility's middle area houses gym, classrooms, and occupational therapy areas. The location encourages residential community involvement. Each of three, 20-bed units is made up of a group of two consultation rooms, a galley, a laundry, a day room and core living space located directly across from the nursing station for maximum observation and efficiency. Each unit comprises a separate wing. Six handicapped accessible patient beds are contemplated; the building will be handicapped-accessible. The staffing projections have increased and the pattern has been minimally altered in the updates. The updated pro forma also modified the initial financial projections so as to increase salary expense and employee benefits based on this change in staffing. An increase in the total project cost impacted on depreciation, and interest expense changed with time. All these changes are reasonable and insubstantial. FRTC's design is adequate for providing a suitable environment for intensive residential treatment for children and adolescents even though it is not identical to Charter's "template" for residential treatment and even though Charter's extensive experience with acute care facilities has focused these changes in its residential treatment concepts. The parties stipulated to the adequacy of FRTC's proposed equipment list and costs. Total construction cost was demonstrated to be reasonably estimated at $2,078,000. The square footage costs of $64.86 per square foot represet an increase from the square footage costs contained in the original CON application. The original budget was updated based upon a three percent inflation factor and the addition of the approximately 1,000 square feet. The additional space is not a significant construction change. The total project costs of $4,728,000 are reasonable. The testimony of HRS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, who testified by deposition, (RTCPB's Exhibit 8, pp. 21-22) revealed no firm policy on what the agency, within its expertise, views as substantial and impermissible amendments to a CON application; HRS did not move at hearing to remand for further review; and the undersigned concludes that the changes in facility design, costs, and staffing do not represent significant changes which would be excludable as evidence and that they do represent permissible minor modifications and refinements of the original FRTC application. Site Availability No party contended that FRTC's application was a "site specific" application, that a residential treatment program is otherwise required to be "site specific," or that an IRTP CON is governed by a "site specific" rule or by "site specific" statutory criteria. Therefore, it was only necessary for FRTC in this noncomparative proceeding to establish that several suitable sites were available within the required geographic parameters at the financial amount allotted in FRTC's projections. FRTC did establish financially and geographically available and suitable sites through the testimony of Robert H. Ellzey, a qualified expert in commercial real estate values. The Non-Rule Need Policy There are no hospital licensed Intensive Residential Treatment Programs in Palm Beach County or in District IX. IRTPs are in a separate licensure category by law from psychiatric beds, acute care beds, and rehabilitation beds. There is a separate need methodology for long-term psychiatric beds and there are no CON licensed long-term psychiatric programs for children and adolescents in District IX, unless one considers Humana which is treating adolescents well beyond 30 or 90 days residency. HRS has no promulgated rule predicting need for IRTPs seeking specialty hospital licensure under Chapter 395, F.S. Subsequent to advice of its counsel that a CON must be obtained as a condition of IRTP licensure pursuant to Chapter 395, F.S., HRS elected to evaluate all IRTP CON applications in the context of the statutory criteria of Chapter 381, F.S., and in the context of HRS' non-rule policy establishing a rebuttable presumption of need for one "reasonably sized" IRTP in each HRS planning district. The May 5, 1988 Final Order in Florida Psychiatric Centers v. HRS, et al., DOAH Case No. 88- 0008R, held this non-rule policy invalid as a rule due to HRS' failure to promulgate it pursuant to Section 120.54, F.S., but that order also held the policy not to be invalid as contrary to Chapter 381, F.S. That Final Order intervened between the close of final hearing in the instant case and entry of the instant Recommended Order, however, it does not alter the need for the agency to explicate and demonstrate the reasonableness of its non-rule policy on a case by case basis. HRS was unable to do so in the formal hearing in the instant case. Notwithstanding the oral testimony of Robert May and Elizabeth Dudek, and the deposition testimony of John Griffin, it appears that the non- rule policy is not based upon generally recognized health planning considerations, but solely on the agency's statutory interpretation of recent amendments to Chapter 395 and some vague perception, after internal agency discussions, that the policy is consistent with certain promulgated need rules and with certain other non-rule policies for other types of health care entities, which other non-rule policies were never fully enunciated or proved up in this formal hearing. The HRS non-rule policy was also not affirmatively demonstrated to be rational because it does not take into account the reasonableness of a proposed facility's average length of stay, referral sources, geographic access, or other factors common to duly promulgated CON rules. Numerical Need and Conformity to Applicable Health Plans FRTC sought to support HRS' non-rule policy on numerical need for, and definition of, a "reasonably sized" IRTP through the testimony of Dr. Ronald Luke, who was qualified as an expert in health planning, development of need methodologies, health economies, survey research, and development of mental health programs. In the absence of a finding of a rational non-rule policy on numerical need, Dr. Luke's evidence forms the cornerstone of FRTC's demonstration of numerical need. Through the report and testimony of Dr. Luke, and despite contrary expert health planning testimony, FRTC established the numerical need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District IX with projected 60 percent occupancy in the first year and 50 percent in the second year of operation using two bed need methodologies. Dr. Luke ultimately relied on a utilization methodology based upon 1991 population projections. Dr. Luke used a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58. This is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, regardless of the fact that the types of residential treatment considered by the NIMH data base employed by Dr. Luke greatly vary in concept and despite HRS having not yet clearly defined the nature of the programs and services it expects to be offered by a Florida specialty hospital licensed IRTP. Therefrom, Dr. Luke derived an average daily census of 52 in 1991. That figure yields a bed sizing of between 58 and 61 beds, depending on whether an 85 percent or 90 percent occupancy factor is plugged in. Either 58 or 61 beds is within the range of ratios calculated by Dr. Luke's other methodology for currently licensed Florida IRTPs in other districts. Assuming a target occupancy rate of 85 percent and an ALOS of one year, Dr. Luke considered the gross District IX IRTP bed need to be 60. In the absence of any like program to assess occupancy for and in the presence of similar programs such as Humana operating at nearly full occupancy now and RTCPB forecasting its occupancy at 88 percent in 1990 if it were IRTP-licensed, it is found that 60 beds are justified. Since there are no IRTP beds licensed as specialty hospitals in the current district bed inventory, no adjustment of this figure must be made to account for existing licensed IRTP beds. Simply stated, this is a CON application for an IRTP, nothing more and nothing less, and the subtrahend to be subtracted from gross district bed need is zero when there is a zero specialty hospital licensed IRTP bed inventory. Luke's calculated gross need of 60 bed is also his net need and is accepted. Fifty beds is generally the minimum size HRS will approve to be feasible for any free standing facility to be eonomically efficient and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. This 50 bed concept is within the wide range of bed ratios that HRS implicitly has found reasonable in, previously- licensed IRTP CON approvals. Conformity With Applicable Health Plans Section 38l.705(1)(a), F.S., requires HRS to consider CON applications against criteria contained in the applicable State and District Health Plans. In this regard, neither the applicable State Health Plan nor the applicable District IX Local Health Plan make any reference to a need for intensive residential treatment facilities. The District IX Health Plan addresses the need for psychiatric and substance abuse services to be available to all individuals in District IX. FRTC's project addresses this goal only in part. The District Health Plan states that priority should be given to CON applicants who make a commitment to providing indigent care. FRTC proposes only 1.5 percent indigent care which works out to only 1/2 of the ALOS of one patient at the proposed facility and is hardly optimum, but in a noncomparative hearing, it stands alone as advancing the given accessibility goal within the plan. Objective 1.3 of the State Health Plan provides: Through 1987, additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy for all existing and approved long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the HRS District is at least 80 percent. FRTC's project is neutral as to this goal. The District Plan also contains a goal for a complete range of health care services for the population of the district. FRTC advances this goal. The State Health Plan further provides: Goal 10: DEVELOP A COMPLETE RANGE OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN EACH HRS DISTRICT OBJECTIVE 10.1: Develop a range of essential mental health services in each HRS district by 1989. OBJECTIVE 10.3: Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1990. RECOMMENDED ACTION: 1.03A: Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving ing treatment in out-of-state facilities by 1990. The FRTC project advances these goals in part. To the extent SED patients placed outside the state for residential treatment services are HRS patients whom FRTC as yet has not contracted to treat, the FRTC project does not advance this goal. However, increased insurance reimbursement will advance accessibility for those SED children and adolescents in need of this type of care whose families have insurance coverage. The State Plan also emphasizes a goal for a continuum of care. The FRTC plan advances this goal. Financial Feasibility William S. Love, Senior Director of Hospital Operations for Charter, was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Mr. Love prepared the pro forma financial statement contained in the original CON application and the update of the pro forma in response to HRS' completeness questions. Mr. Love also had input into the updated financial information which increased salary and benefit expense. (See FOF No. 11). The revised pro forma utilized an assumption of gross patient revenues of $300 per day and a 365 day ALOS, both of which are reasonable and both of which support the rest of FRTC's assumptions (See FOF No. 9). Routine revenues are based on the types of routine services patients normally receive on a daily basis. Ancillary revenues are support revenues such as pharmacy charges, X-rays, lab charges, and other charges not generally utilized on a routine basis. The only charges to patients at the proposed FRTC facility are the routine and ancillary charges. The assumptions with regard to contractual adjustments are that there will be no Medicare utilization since the facility is projected for children and adolescents and no Medicaid since freestanding facilities in Florida are not eligible for Medicaid. Two percent of gross patient revenues are estimated to be contractual adjustments which relate to HMOs and PPOs. FRTC addresses indigent care by 1.5 percent of gross revenues which will be dedicated to Charter Care which is free care. The assumptions with regard to bad debt are that 8 percent of gross revenue will be the allowance for bad debt. An assumption of 20 percent of salaries was used for employee benefits which include the FICA tax, health insurance, dental insurance, retirement plans, and other benefits. Supplies and expenses were calculated as a function of patient day with a $90 per day estimate. Included in supplies and expenses are supplies utilized in the delivery of health care services as well as medical professional fees such as the half-time medical director and purchased services such as laundry, linen, speech and hearing services, utilities, telephone, malpractice insurance, repairs and maintenance. The depreciation assumptions are that the building would be depreciated over 40 years, fixed equipment over 20 years and major movable equipment over 10 years. Pre-opening expenses for the first 45 days of operation have been capitalized over 60 months with low amortization costs over 15 years. There is no income tax assumed in the first year but the assumption in subsequent years is that the tax rate will be 38 percent. The failure to assume a hospital tax is inconsequential. The assumptions for the second fiscal year are basically the same. Although staffing remained the same, the FTEs per occupied bed increased, and a 7 percent inflation factor was added. The project will be financially feasible even though the facility is pessimistically projecting a loss of $102,000 for the first year because a facility can suffer a loss in its first year of operation and remain financially feasible. The facility projects a $286,000 profit in its second year of operation. With regard to utilization by class of pay, FRTC has assumed that the insurance category represents 65.5 percent of total revenues projected and includes such things as commercial insurance, Blue Cross and any third party carrier other than Medicare and Medicaid. Assumptions with regard to the private pay are that 25 percent of the total revenues will be generated by private pay patients and would include the self pay portions of an insurance payor's bill, such as deductible and co-insurance. Bad debt was assumed to be 8 percent, and Charter Care or free care, 1.5 percent. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable and is supported by the protestants' current experience with commercial insurance utilization and reimbursement and the predicted recoveries if RTCPB were IRTP-licensed. In the second year of operation, the assumptions with regard to utilization by class of pay demonstrated an increase in the insurance category from 65.5 to 66.5 percent with everything else remaining the same except for a decrease in bad debt to 7 percent. The assumption with regard to a decrease in bad debt is based upon the establishment of referral patterns from acute psychiatric facilities, outpatient programs, mental health therapists, and miscellaneous programs. The assumption is that 65 percent of the patients would be covered by insurance, not that 65 percent of each bill would be paid by insurance. Charter's experience has been that a good portion of the deductible and co-insurance payments are collectible. FRTC did not assume payment from any governmental contracts or HRS reimbursement. FRTC's projected self pay percentages assumption reasonably contemplates the percentage of households in the district which can afford its projections for self pay. For purposes of evaluating the financial feasibility of this proposal, a management fee was not included because in looking at the financial feasibility of a facility the expenses of a corporate home office are incurred whether or not the facility is built. It was not appropriate to allocate a management fee to the hospital because it showed a loss in its first year of operation and a profit in its second. When the facility becomes profitable, FRTC anticipates passing the profit through to the corporation to help reduce the corporate overhead. If a management fee had been allocated to this facility, allocations would have had to have been made to the other Charter facilities to show where their management expense had decreased and their profitability increased. It would have been inappropriate to take these fixed expenses and allocate a portion of them to the proposed FRTC facility. In addition to the fact that the failure to include a management fee in the pro forma should not affect the feasibility of the project, Charter has good cause not to apply a $44 per patient day management fee in its IRTP. FRTC's categories of payor class are generally reasonable based in part on the results of a survey performed in Florida. FRTC's assumptions and calculations are reasonable, based upon the testimony of William S. Love and Dr. Ronald Luke, notwithstanding the testimony of Dan Sullivan, Donald Wilson, and Christopher Knepper, also qualified as experts. Specifically, it is found that Dr. Luke's assessment that the designation of a facility as a licensed specialty hospital has a beneficial effect on its ability to obtain insurance reimbursement for services, that reimbursement impacts to increase ALOS, and that the breakdown of sources of payment that FRTC has used is reasonable, is a credible assessment, supported elsewhere in the record. It is also found that Mr. Knepper's assessment for bad debt is inadequately supported and inconsistent with other evidence, and therefore not credible. Mr. Sullivan's testimony is not persuasive. Staffing and Recruitment Dr. Brett, a Charter regional director for hospital operations, was accepted as an expert in staffing psychiatric facilities including residential treatment centers. His distinctions between the acute care and residential types of facilities are corroborated and explained by other witnesses and evidence. Mr. Joyner was accepted as Charter's expert recruiter. Although the depth of Mr. Joyner's hands-on involvement in active recruitment is not extensive, the Charter network of manpower referrals and "head hunting" will obviously support this project. Upon the combined testimony of Dr. Brett, Mr. Joyner, and Paul Bodner, Charter's senior director of physician relations, there is sufficient evidence that FRTC can recruit a suitable staffing pattern to ensure quality of care (see FOF Nos. 9 and 10) in its proposed program, even if it has to hire from out of state and pay somewhat higher salaries due to some qualified manpower shortages in certain categories in Palm Beach County. In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the testimony of Donald Wilson concerning certain institution-specific recruiting problems of his principal, RTCPB, and the "step down" status of residential treatment as testified by Mary Certo, of Humana. Impact on Costs and Competition The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to attract patients with insurance coverage who would otherwise go to existing facilities for care, however, in light of the relatively consistent occupancy rates at Humana and RTCPB despite both their geographical proximity and the unique confusion of referrals arising over the relocation of Dr. Kelly, this impact is not altogether clear. Dr. Kelly's reputation will not be impacted by granting of a CON to FRTC. It is also not possible upon the basis of the record created in this hearing to factor out reimbursement differences inherent in Humana's current CON classification and RTCPB's circumstance as an unlicensed intensive residential treatment center. In any case, the negative impact upon Humana must be measured against the health planning goals expressed by several witnesses that it is desirable to substitute more suitable, less restrictive facilities for institutionalization of the severely emotionally disturbed child and adolescent whenever possible and that it is also desirable to encourage residential treatment upon a continuum of care basis after acute psychiatric care. The FRTC project will obviously increase the accessibility to this type of treatment for young people who have the appropriate insurance coverage. These goals are in conformity with the applicable health plans. The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to initially increase some costs of health services throughout the district because it will inflate some salary costs due to competition, but the negative impact will probably be short term.
Recommendation Upon a balanced consideration of all relevant criteria it is RECOMMENDED that HRS enter a Final Order approving FRTC's CON application for an IRTP, as updated, for licensure as a specialty hospital. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2037 & 87-2050 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., with regard to the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) of FRTC: Covered in "issue" and FOF 1. Covered in FOF 1 and 2. 3-7. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 8. Accepted in FOF 12. 9-12. Except as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative, accepted in FOF 7-9. 13. Accepted in FOF 10. 14-17. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 7-11, 30. Although portions of the underlying data referred to in proposal 16 and by Mr. Joyner in his testimony was excluded from evidence, he was qualified as a recruitment expert and for the reasons set forth in FOF 30, his opinion is accepted. 18-19. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 23. Accepted in FOF 24. Accepted in FOF 25 and 29. Accepted in FOF 26 and 29. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, covered in FOF 27. Except as mere argument or statement of position, accepted in FOF 26-27, and 29. 27-29. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 26-29. 30-31. Accepted in FOF 28. 32-40. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 9, 11, 21, 26-29. 41-44. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 29-32. 45-47. Rejected, as recital or summation of testimony and as part of preliminary agency review not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 48. Covered in FOF 7, 18-20, 22, and 26. 49-52. dejected as set out in "organic law and legislative background," "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15. See also COL. 53. Accepted in FOF 16. 54-58. Rejected in part and accepted in part as set out in FOF 14-15. Rejected where not supported in full by the record as a whole, where subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found and where mere recital of testimony. 59. Accepted in principle and modified to conform to the record in FOF 18-20, 31. 60-61. Accepted in part and rejected in part as stated in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and in FOF 14-16 and the COL. Accepted in FOF 15 and COL. Accepted in FOF 18-20, 31. 64-68. Rejected as unnecessary to the facts as found in FOF 1, 7, 13-15 and 29, also in part as not supported by the record as a whole, and as primarily legal argument and recitation of testimony. Accepted in FOF 3-4 and 30. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 3-4, 7, 26, and 29. 71-74. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9 and 30-32. HRS' Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): 1-3. Accepted in "organic law and legislative background." 4. (Two paragraphs) Accepted FOF 3-4. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. Accepted, FOF 29-32. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted, FOF 1. 10-18 & 20. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5, 6, 15, 26, 31. 19. Rejected as irrelevant. 21-28. Accepted in part as modified to conform to the record as a whole in FOF 6-9, 30-31. The irrelevant, unnecessary or subordinate material has also been rejected. 29-31. Accepted in FOF 4, 9, 21, 26, 29-31. 32-35. Accepted in FOF 7-9. 36-41. Accepted in FOF 7-9 as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application, in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 42-45. Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 9-11, 21, 23, 30 and 32. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 22, 26. 49-52. Accepted in FOF 3, 4, 21-29. Assuming, based on the transcript reference, that this proposal refers to FRTC's pro forma, this proposal is accepted but unnecessary for the reasons set forth in rulings on HRS' PFOF 36-45. See FOF 11 and 21-29. Accepted in FOF 13-15. 55-58. Rejected as unnecessary. 59. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 13-15. 60-62. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-14, as mere recital of testimony and statements of position. 63. Accepted in FOF 29. 64-65. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Accepted in FOF 7-9. Accepted that HRS made this assumption but it fails to explicate the non-rule policy. See FOF 13-14. Accepted in FOF 16. Rejected as a statement of position or COL. Peripherally, see COL. Accepted in FOF 13-14 but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. Rejected in FOF 13-14. 72-74. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 75-76. Accepted in FOF 17-20. This is a subordinate definition and not a FOF. See FOF 30-31 and COL. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 17-20, 31. Accepted in FOF 10. Accepted in FOF 13-15. Accepted as stated in the "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15 and in the COL. 82-85. Covered in FOF 3-6, 13-15. 86. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 87-88. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary. 89. Accepted in FOF 29. 90-96. Accepted as modified to conform to the record evidence as a whole and FOF 15-16 and to reject subordinate and unnecessary material. Accepted without any connotations of the word "therefore" in FOF 4, 7-9, 21 and 29. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Accepted in "organic and legislative background" and FOF 13-15. Rejected as not established upon the record as a whole; unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of position only. Joint Proposed Findings of Fact of RTCPB and Humana 1-2 Accepted in FOF 1. 3-4. Accepted in FOF 2. 5-6. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. 7. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 5-6. 8-13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as set out under "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 3-6, 13-15, and the COL. 14-18. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 1, 7-9, 11, 21-29. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant preliminary action to this de novo proceeding. 28-36. Rejected in part and accepted in part upon the compelling competent, substantial evidence in the record as a whole as set forth in FOF 13-14. Also as to 33 see FOF 15. 37-52. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-16 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence of record as a whole. Irrelevant, unnecessary and subordinate material has been rejected, as has mere argument of counsel. Accepted in FOF 17. Rejected in FOF 20, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 20, 31. Excepting the mere rhetoric, accepted in FOF 18, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 7, 18-20, 26, 31. 58-59. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 17-20, 26, Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as recital of testimony and argument 62-63. Rejected as unnecessary. 64-67. Accepted in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The first sentence is rejected as cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. Rejected in FOF 4, 21. Accepted in FOF 4 and 21, 29. Rejected as unnecessary Accepted in FOF 26. Rejected in FOF 15-20, 31. Rejected as unnecessary in a noncomparitive hearing. 75-87. Except as irrelevant, unnecessary, or subordinate, accepted in FOF 5-9, 30, 31. Rejected in part as unnecessary and in part as not comporting with the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 7-10 and 30. Accepted in FOF 1, 5-9. 90-92. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Rejected in FOF 5-6. Rejected as subordinate. 95-98. Accepted in FOF 5-9. 99-102. Rejected as unnecessary. 103. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9. 104-118. Except as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, these proposals are covered in FOF 5-9, 30-31. Except as Subordinate, covered in FOF 6 and 31. Accepted in part in FOF 5-9, 21-29, otherwise rejected as misleading. Except as subordinate, accepted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 21-29. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 21-29. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary in part and not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in 21-29. 127-128. These proposals primarily recite testimony by Mr. Grono, an administrator of a psychiatric hospital for very severely disturbed persons (Grant Center). This evidence by itself is not persuasive in light of Dr. Luke's study and other admissions of the parties referenced in FOF 21-29. Upon the greater weight of contrary evidence, it is rejected. 129. Rejected as subordinate except partly accepted in FOF 29. 130-133. Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 9, 11 and 21-29. 134, 139. Rejected as legal argument without citation. 135-138. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 140-144. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence and as partly mere legal argument. See FOF 9, 21-29. 145. The first sentence is rejected upon the reference to PFOF 140-144 for the same reasons given above and the remainder is rejected as subordinate. 146. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 147. Rejected as mere legal argument without citation. 148-149. Rejected in FOF 21-29, particularly 27 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. The mere legal argument is also rejected. 150-157. Rejected as set out in FOF 28 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Uncited argument and statements of position have likewise bean rejected. 158, 160. Rejected as mere argument without citation. 159. Rejected as subordinate and not dispositive of any material issue at bar in FOF 23. 161. Rejected as mere argument. 162-167. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in FOF 30-32. Also 167 is rejected as mere argument without citation. 168. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 30-32. 169. Accepted but subordinate. 170. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 31. 171-180. Covered in FOF 30-32. 181-185. Rejected as contrary to the evidence in part and in part unnecessary and cumulative to the ruling in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 7, 10-11, 21, 23, 30-32. 186-188. Rejected in FOF 7, 10 and 30 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. 189. Rejected as unnecessary 190. Rejected in FOF 30. 191-392. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 30-32. 193. Rejected in FOF 30-32. 194-195. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, rejected in the several references to future establishment of referral networks. See FOF 21, 27. 196-197 & 199. Rejected as unnecessary 198. Rejected as irrelevant in part and immaterial in part upon the rulings in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 200. Rejected as unnecessary 201-202. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 26-27 and 31, but cumulative. 203. Covered in the COL. Rejected in FOF 21-22. 204. Rejected as mere argument without citation. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire BONNER & O'CONNEL 900 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 James C. Hauser, Esquire Joy Heath Thomas, Esquire MESSER, VICKERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN 215 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred W Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LaFACE & RICHARD 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 456.072(1)(gg), 456.072(1)(y), and 460.413(1)(q), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of chiropractic medicine pursuant to Chapters 20, 256 and 460, Florida Statutes. Dr. Guerriero is a licensed chiropractic physician with the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH 6373 on or about August 21, 1991. The Professional Resource Network (PRN) is the impaired practitioners program for the Board of Chiropractic Medicine pursuant to Section 456.076, Florida Statutes. PRN is an independent program that monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired healthcare professionals. PRN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers and the Department for the protection of the public. On or about October 26, 2005, Dr. Guerriero was admitted to the Center for Drug Free Living, Inc., for detoxification related to opiate and benzodiazepine use. On October 31, 2005, he self-reported to PRN that he was discontinuing the use of benzodiazepines and opiates prescribed by his doctor and that he had entered the Center for Drug Free Living, Inc., to be weaned from these prescription medications. PRN arranged for Dr. Guerriero to be evaluated by Chowallur Dev Chacko, M.D. (Dr. Chacko), who is a psychiatrist. The evaluation was made to determine whether Dr. Guerriero's addiction problems prevented him from practicing chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients. Dr. Chacko saw Dr. Guerriero on November 7, 2005. Dr. Guerriero admitted to continuing the use of prescription medications containing opioids and benzodiazepines after his recent detoxification. Dr. Chacko diagnosed Dr. Guerriero as having opioid and benzodiazepine dependence, as well as suffering from alcohol abuse. It was Dr. Chacko's opinion that Dr. Guerriero was not able to practice chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. He recommended that Dr. Guerriero receive inpatient substance abuse treatment. After PRN received the evaluation performed by Dr. Chacko, there were several unsuccessful attempts to contact Dr. Guerriero. However, Dr. Guerriero did talk with his case manager on December 16, 2005, to discuss options for treatment. Dr. Guerriero maintained that he could not afford the inpatient treatment. His case manager informed him that one option would be an intensive outpatient program with no less than nine hours a week of therapy. During the therapy, Dr. Guerriero would not be allowed to practice chiropractic medicine. After the treatment was completed, Dr. Guerriero would be required to be evaluated to determine if he could practice chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients. Dr. Guerriero did not provide PRN with any evidence that he had completed any treatment program. PRN received no further contact from Dr. Guerriero until May 2, 2006. Dr. Guerriero indicated that he wanted to get a second opinion. On July 31, 2006, Martha E. Brown, M.D. (Dr. Brown), who is board-certified in psychiatry and addiction psychiatry, saw Dr. Guerriero for an evaluation. During the evaluation, Dr. Guerriero indicated that he was taking Dalmante, which had been prescribed for him as a sleep-aid. He admitted to drinking from one-to-two glasses of wine three times a week. Dr. Guerriero was given a drug test during the evaluation, and he tested positive for alcohol, opioid, and benzodiazepine use. Dr. Brown's diagnosis of Dr. Guerriero was that he was alcohol dependent, opiate dependent, and sedative hypnotic dependent. It is Dr. Brown's opinion that Dr. Guerriero cannot practice chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. She recommended that he enter a detoxification program and then a residential long-term treatment program, that he see a pain management specialist to look at his pain issues, that he see a psychiatrist acceptable to PRN to help him with his sleep difficulties, that he abstain from all mood altering substances including alcohol, and that he be in PRN for long-term monitoring. Dr. Guerriero did not provide PRN with proof that he had completed an inpatient program. He did not execute a contract with PRN. PRN sent Dr. Guerriero contracts to sign, but the contracts were returned as unclaimed. The last contact that Dr. Guerriero had with PRN was on August 31, 2006. Jerome M. Gropper, D.D.S. (Dr. Gropper), is a clinical network coordinator at PRN. He is a practicing dentist and has a master's degree in counseling. Based on his review of the PRN file of Dr. Guerriero, he is of the opinion that Dr. Guerriero could not practice chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety and that Dr. Guerriero will need long-term residential treatment before he could safely return to practice. Based on the opinions of Drs. Chacko, Brown, and Gropper, Dr. Guerriero cannot practice chiropractic medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients due to his dependence on drugs and alcohol. In order to be able to return to practice chiropractic medicine, Dr. Guerriero will need long- term residential treatment and will need to enter into a monitoring contract with PRN.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Guerriero violated Subsections 456.072(1)(y), 456.072(1)(gg), and 460.413(1)(q), Florida Statutes; imposing a $1,000 administrative fine; and suspending his license until such time the following conditions are satisfied: Dr. Guerriero executes a PRN advocacy contract, Dr. Guerriero successfully completes a six-month period in which he complies with all of PRN's treatment recommendations, PRN appears before the Board and advocates for Dr. Guerriero's return to active practice during a Board meeting in which Dr. Guerriero is present, and (4) the Board determines that Dr. Guerriero is able to practice with reasonable skill and safety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007.
