The Issue Whether Respondent's action to reject all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-205, relating to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Countryside High School, is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, as alleged in the Amended Petition.
Findings Of Fact On March 4, 2013, the ITB was issued by Respondent for work related to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Countryside High School in Clearwater, Florida. According to the Special Conditions portions of the ITB, the "scope" of the project is to "[p]rovide labor and materials to remove and replace the auditorium sound system as per plans and specifications by Keane Acoustics, Inc." The ITB was assigned bid number 13-803-205 by Respondent. Bids for the contract were to be submitted to Respondent by 3:00 p.m., April 11, 2013. Bids for the project were timely received from two companies. The first company, Becker Communications, Inc., d/b/a BCI Integrated Solutions (BCI), submitted a bid in the amount of $118,143.27. Petitioner submitted a bid in the amount of $108,000.00. There is a section of the ITB titled "special conditions." The special conditions provide in part that "[t]his is an ALL or NONE bid [and] [t]he entire contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder meeting the specifications." On April 22, 2013, Respondent posted a notice advising of its intent to award the contract to BCI. Although Petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive because the bid failed to include "proof of 5 years [of] experience with this type of work" as required by the special conditions of the ITB. Petitioner interpreted this provision as requiring five years of experience as a certain type of general contractor, which Petitioner had, whereas Respondent intended for the ITB to convey that five years of experience related to the removal and installation of audio equipment was the desired type of experience. Petitioner's failure to respond to the ITB in the manner contemplated by Respondent was a technical, nonmaterial irregularity.1/ Numbered paragraph six of the General Terms & Conditions of the ITB provides in part that Respondent "expressly reserves the right to reject any bid proposal if it determines that the . . . experience of the bidder, compared to work proposed, justifies such rejection." On April 24, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent a notice advising of its intent to protest the award of the contract to BCI. On May 3, 2013, Petitioner filed its formal protest challenging Respondent's intended action of awarding the contract to BCI. Petitioner's formal protest enumerated several grounds. Of particular concern to Respondent were Petitioner's assertions that the ITB was "inconsistent with Florida law since bidders [were] not required to submit a List of Subcontractors by the time of opening bid"2/ and that provisions of the ITB were ambiguous with respect to the type of experience required to qualify for bidding.3/ Prior to receiving Petitioner's protest, Respondent was unaware of the fact that its bid specifications governing the disclosure of subcontractors did not comply with Florida law. Upon consideration of Petitioner's grounds for protest, Respondent determined that the ITB, as alleged by Petitioner, failed to comply with section 255.0515, Florida Statutes (2012),4/ and that there was ambiguity in the language regarding the experience requirements for bidders.5/ Respondent refers to the problems with the ITB as "procedural errors." These procedural errors will be referred to herein as "irregularities" as this term is more in keeping with the nomenclature of this area of jurisprudence. Given the ITB's irregularities, Respondent decided to reject all bids. In explaining Respondent's rationale for rejecting all bids, Michael Hewett, Respondent's Director of Maintenance,6/ testified that "the [irregularities] were such that [they] potentially could give an unfair advantage to one bidder over another." As for the issue related to the requirements of section 255.0515, Mr. Hewett explained that neither of the two bidders submitted a listing of subcontractors. It would have been competitively disadvantageous to BCI if Petitioner were able to successfully argue that BCI should be disqualified for failing to provide a listing of subcontractors when Petitioner also failed to provide such listing. During the same approximate time that the ITB in the present case was issued, Respondent issued an ITB for nearly identical work to be performed at one of its other facilities (Palm Harbor). In all material respects, the Palm Harbor ITB was identical to the one at issue herein. Unlike the present case, BCI was the sole bidder for the Palm Harbor project and this distinguishing fact reasonably explains why Respondent did not reject BCI's bid for the Palm Harbor Project even though the ITB therein was plagued with the same irregularities found in the present case.7/
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Pinellas County School Board enter a final order finding that the rejection of all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-205 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing Tamco Electric, Inc.'s instant protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2013.
Findings Of Fact In August, 1975, the Department of General Services invited competitive bids for the purchase of supervisory and control equipment and revenue metering equipment for expansion of primary electric utilities in the Capitol Center, a project known as State Project No. DGS-6026/6424, AEP File No. 74288-003. Plans and specifications for the project were developed by the department's consulting architect/engineers Reynolds, Smith and Hills. The Department of General Services (hereinafter Department) and Reynolds, Smith and Hills (hereinafter Reynolds) conducted formal bid opening on September 25, 1975. Bid proposals were received from petitioner, Weston Instruments, Inc. (hereinafter Weston), and from Respondents, Harris Corporation (hereinafter Harris) and Hathaway Instruments, Inc. (hereinafter Hathaway). The amount of the bids were as follows: CONTRACTOR BASE BID ALTERNATE NO. 1-ADD TOTAL Harris 332,000.00 28,649.00 360,649.00 Weston 338,991.00 20,965.00 359,996.00 Hathaway 343,429.00 33,224.00 376,653.00 Hathaway's bid as submitted was responsive to the specifications and other requirements of the bid invitation. Weston's bid was responsive to the specifications and requirements of the bid invitation with the following exception. Specification B-2, in its second paragraph, states: "In order to facilitate the execution of the Agreement, the Bidder shall submit with his proposal a list of and brief description of similar work satisfactorily completed, with location, date of contracts, together with names and addresses of Owners." Weston did not submit that information with its bid but did submit that information on October 9, 1975. The Harris bid as submitted was not responsive to the specifications and requirements of the bid invitation. The material deviations from the specifications found in the Harris bid are as follows: Paragraph 16755-13(c) of the specifications states that data logger equipment by Teletype, Lear Siegler or General Electric will be considered. The Harris bid proposed a data logger manufactured by Practical Automation, Inc. and noted that if Harris was required to conform to the specifications by furnishing a data logger manufactured by one of the three specified manufacturers, its base bid would have to be increased by $635.00. Paragraph 16755-18 of the specifications requires a specific number of supervisory functions at each of the nineteen locations. The Harris bid met the requirements of the specifications at only one of the nineteen locations. At each of the other eighteen locations the Harris bid was from one to three supervisory points deficient. According to the evidence presented it would cost between $250 to $300 per location to furnish the supervisory points left out of Harris' bid. Paragraph 16755-13(d) of the specifications requires that the data logger shall log an uninitiated (alarm) change of status in red lettering. Harris' bid states that the equipment they have chosen is not available with red ribbon printout and that they therefore propose that all changes normally logged in red would instead have an asterisk in the first column. This specification requiring logging in red of an alarm change of status was included by the specifications writer of the architect/engineers as a safety feature. Paragraph 16755-13(e) of the specifications requires that the log shall contain time in a 24 hour format to a tenth of a minute. The Harris bid proposes that the log shall be in seconds rather than tenths of a minute. The specifications require equipment delivery to the job site and substantial completion within 180 calendar days after receipt of Notice To Proceed. The specifications further provide for liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day the contractor fails to meet the above completion date. The Harris bid requested that the liquidated damages clause and the required time for completion be modified to provice that the 180 day period would not commence until all drawings had been approved by the architect/engineers. The architect/engineers, Reynolds, Smith and Hills, calculated that the required drawing time was approximately 60 days. Therefore, the Harris bid proposes that Harris would have 240 days instead of 180 days in which to deliver the equipment to the site and substantially complete the contract. The Harris bid proposed a deviation from the warranty provision of the specifications. The specifications in paragraph E-17 placed the final determination of the need for repairs or changes under the guarantee clause of the specifications with the architect/engineers and the owner. Harris proposes to alter those specifications and place the right of final determination as to the existence and cause of any claim defect with Harris. Harris' bid contained information setting forth their experience with the Micro II System, which is the system they proposed in their bid. That information shows that the Micro II System had been in use no more than two and one-half years at the time of the bid letting. In its evaluation of the bidders' proposals, based upon the data contained in the original bid packages, Reynolds calculated that the deviation from the specifications by Harris gave Harris at least a $10,135 advantage in its bidding (See Petitioner's Exhibit 8). That evaluation did not include a dollar value for the deviation from the specification concerning the warranty. In that evaluation Reynolds noted the failure of Harris to meet the supervisory point requirements. They calculated that this would add $3,900 to Harris' bid based on twelve locations at $300 per location. In fact, Harris failed to meet the requirements at eighteen locations, which at $300 per location, would add $5,400 to Harris' bid. Thus, using the evaluation figures of Reynolds, it appears that Harris' deviations from the specifications gave them at least an $11,635 advantage in the bidding. On October 9, 1975, Reynolds held a conference with each of the three bidders. At that conference Weston provided a list of three names, with addresses of customers for whom Weston had completed work similar to that proposed in its bid. Reynolds did not receive any material information from these references until after October 31, 1975. At least two of the references commented favorably on Weston's performance in letters to Reynolds dated January 13, 1976 and January 20, 1976, respectively. By letter dated October 31, 1975, Reynolds' project manager for this project conveyed the architect/engineers' recommendation for award to the Department. That recommendation was that the contract be awarded to Hathaway Instruments, Inc., for the base bid item only. The recommendation noted that the alternate should be rejected because the bids for the alternate were excessively high. As stated in the letter of recommendation, Reynolds rejected Harris' bid because "there were several major exceptions taken to the specification (sic), the most serious of which was their not being able to meet the delivery schedule." Also, as stated in the letter of recommendation, Weston's bid was apparently rejected because they "could not meet the experience qualifications as specified." Harris, at the time of the bid letting, had five years experience with its Micro I equipment but had only two and one-half years experience with its Micro II equipment. The two lines of equipment constitute two generations of equipment. Neither Harris nor Weston had five years experience with the specific equipment proposed in their bids. Both, however, have had five years experience with the general type system and equipment proposed with Harris being the more experienced of the two. Based upon the evidence presented Weston and Harris are both responsible bidders. In November, 1975, the Department directed Reynolds to contact Harris and determine whether Harris would conform their bid to the specifications. The project manager for Reynolds so contacted Harris and by letter dated November 17, 1975 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4), notified the Department that Harris stated they would deliver the equipment within the time required by the specifications. That letter reiterated Reynolds' recommendation of Hathaway as contained in their letter of October 31, 1975. Reynolds did not retreat from their recommendation of Hathaway and at the final hearing again stated that recommendation. Thereafter, the Department proposed to award the contract to Harris and set the matter for final decision on December 2, 1975. Harris' bid was a responsible offer but was not in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions. The bids of Weston and Hathaway were responsible offers and were in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions except as noted in paragraphs 4, 7 and 19 herein. Paragraph B-18 of the Specifications and Contract Documents (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) states that "No bid modification will be accepted after the close of bidding has been announced." Section A of the same document states that bids would be received until 2:00 p.m. EDST, on September 25, 1975. No evidence was presented which would show that the time for receiving bids was extended beyond that set forth above. Therefore, the close of bidding appears to have been at 2:00 p.m., EDST, September 25, 1975. The agreement by Harris to conform their bid to the specifications and conditions constituted a material modification of their bid. This modification occurred in November, 1975, after the close of bidding, and was therefore not allowable under the terms of the Specifications and Contract Documents set forth above. The lowest base bid and alternate bid of those responsible offers received in full compliance with the bid specifications and conditions was that of Weston. No evidence was presented which would show that the Department submitted its complete File on this matter to the Division of Purchasing along with its reasons for recommending a bid other than the low bid meeting specifications, as required by Section 13A-1.02(a), F.A.C.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Close Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), (Close) was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder in the Request For Bid (RFB) Number 6000000262, whether the subject contract should be awarded to the Petitioner, and, concomitantly, whether the Respondent agency's decision to award the contract to the Intervener, Worth Contracting, Inc. (Worth) was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District is a public corporation authorized under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. It issued a request for bids for the refurbishment and automation of certain facilities in Broward County, Florida. Close is a construction company duly authorized to do business in the state of Florida. It was one of the bidders on the procurement represented by the subject request for bids and is the Petitioner in this case. This dispute had its beginnings on June 5, 2009, when the Respondent issued RFB number 6000000262. The RFB solicited construction services for the refurbishment and automation of two facilities in Broward County. The procurement would involve the installation of new direct-drive electric pumps at the Respondent's G-123 Pump Station in Broward County, along with the construction of an equipment shelter and the replacement of a retaining wall with a poured concrete retaining wall, as well as refurbishment of "pump flap gates." The RFB also requested construction services for the replacement of gates at the Respondent's S-34 water-control structure in Broward County. Both facilities would thus be automated so that they can be remotely operated from the Respondent's headquarters in West Palm Beach. After issuance of the RFB, two addenda were supplied to vendors and were posted. The first addendum was posted on or about June 19, 2009, concerning a change in specifications for flap gates and is not the subject of this dispute. Addendum No. Two was electronically posted on or about June 30, 2009. It amended the technical specifications of the RFB by deleting Section 11212 regarding measurement of payment of electric motors/belt-driven axial flow pumps. That addendum also added a new measure and payment to Subpart 1.01 of the technical specifications to provide for an owner-directed allowance of $40,000.00 to provide for the potential need for certain electrical utility work to be done by FPL in order to complete the project. Addendum No. Two added an additional term to the RFB in providing that the $40,000.00 allowance price "Shall be added to the other costs to complete the bid." The second Addendum also stated, "The allowance price shall be used at the discretion of the District and, if not used, will be deducted from the final Contract Price." That addendum also directed bidders to replace the original Bid Form 00320-2, which had been enclosed with the RFB, with a new Bid Form, 00320R1-2. The new Bid Form is identical to the original form except that the schedule of bid prices contained in paragraph four, on page 003201-2, was altered to itemize the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance. The original form had contained a single line for the bidder's lump sum bid price, whereas the revised form provided for a lump sum bid amount to be itemized and a base bid amount, which required the bidder to enter on the form the amount of its bid, then add the discretionary cost amount and write the sum of those two numbers on a third line. In paragraph four of the new bid form there is re- printed language concerning the use of the discretionary allowance which appeared on the face of Addendum No. Two. Other than the change to paragraph four and the alteration of the page numbers to include an "R" in the page number, the revised bid form is identical to the original bid form. The other bid documents were not altered in any manner by Addendum No. Two. The deadline for bid submissions was Thursday, July 9, 2009, at 2:30 p.m. The Petitioner timely submitted its bid to the District. In submitting its bid however, the Petitioner used the original bid form which had been enclosed with the RFB. The bid form submitted was an exact copy of the bid form furnished by the District which Close had printed from the electronic copy of the RFB received from the District. The Petitioner did not substitute the revised bid form, attached to Addendum No. Two, for the original form in submitting its bid. The Petitioner's bid was deemed non-responsive by the District and was rejected on the basis that Close had failed to submit the bid on the revised form required by Addendum No. Two. Thereafter, the District, at its August 13, 2009, meeting, approved award of the bid to Worth. The intent to award was posted electronically on or about August 14, 2009. The persuasive evidence establishes that Close received both addenda to the bid documents. It was aware of the Addendum No. Two, and it accounted for all of the changes to the technical specifications made in both addenda in the preparation of its bid. The evidence shows that Close was aware of the $40,000.00, owner-directed cost allowance and that it incorporated it in the formulation of its total bid price. Thus, Close's final bid amount was $3,751,795.00. That number included the $40,000.00 cost allowance at issue, added to the bid documents by Addendum No. Two. The internal bid work sheets, prepared by personnel of Close, identified and itemized the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance as a component of the final bid price. The persuasive evidence thus establishes that Close's final bid amount did include the $40,000.00 cost allowance. Moreover, the written notes of witness Christopher Rossi, the estimator for Close, show the $40,000.00 amount as an "FPL Allowance." Both Mr. Rossi and Mr. Boromei, the Vice President for Close, who prepared the bid, explained that the $40,000.00 was understood by Close to be a cost allowance, that it would only be charged to the District to the extent that it was actually used, at the District's discretion. If it were not used, it was to be deducted from the overall contract price. Addendum Two specifically provides that the discretionary cost allowance was to be used only at the discretion of the District and that the unused portion would be deducted from the contract amount. When Close submitted its bid it mistakenly submitted it on the original bid form and failed to exchange the bid forms as directed in Item Two of Addendum No. 2. In paragraph one of both bid forms, however, the bidder is required to specifically fill out, acknowledge and identify all addenda. By doing so the bidder expressly agrees to build the project in conformance with all contract documents, including all addenda, for the price quoted in the bid. Close completed this paragraph, specifically identified both Addendum One and Addendum Two, and specifically agreed to strictly conform, in performance of the work to the plans, specifications and other contract documents, including Addendum Nos. One and Two. Paragraph one was not changed by the addition of Addendum No. Two and it is identical in both the original and the revised forms at issue. Paragraph one of the original and the revised bid forms constitutes an agreement by the bidder to perform and construct a project "in strict conformity with the plans, specifications and other Contract Documents. . . ." The addenda are part of the contract documents and are expressly referenced as such in this agreement. Both bid forms, the original and the revised, include paragraph eight, which clearly states that the bidder will post a bid bond to secure and guaranty that it will enter into a contract with the District, if its bid is selected. Paragraph eight was unchanged by Addendum No. Two and its terms are identical in both Bid forms at issue, including the form that Close signed and submitted as its bid. The persuasive evidence shows that in submitting its bid, whether on either form, Close committed itself to the identical terms as set forth in the identical contract documents agreed to by Worth and the other bidders. The evidence established that Close intended to bind itself to the terms of the RFB, and all terms of Addendum No. Two, including the discretionary cost allowance term. Close considered itself bound to enter into a contract for the price of its bid if selected by the District. It likewise considered that the price of its bid, would only include the cost allowance if the discretionary allowance was implemented by the District. Upon the opening of the bids, the firm of Cone and Graham, Inc., was identified as the lowest bidder. Cone and Graham's bid was in the amount of $2,690,000.00. Close was the second lowest bidder, with a bid of $3,751,795.00. The third lowest bidder was Worth Contracting, Inc., with a bid of $3,898,410.00. Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information and to even meet with some District staff following the opening of its bid. The additional information it was allowed to provide concerned technical specifications of the pumps proposed in its bid. Through this verification process conducted with the Agency, Cone and Graham ultimately convinced the District to permit them to withdraw its bid without forfeiting their bid bond. This left the Petitioner, Close, the lowest bidder, at $146,615.00 less than the bid submitted by Worth, the initially-awarded bidder. Close's bid, upon review, was rejected as non- responsive due to its failure to exchange the original Bid form with the revised Bid form, as indicated above, in spite of the fact that Close had also agreed to adhere to the entirety of Addendum No. Two on the face of the Bid form. Thus the recommended award to Worth for the above-referenced additional amount of bid price was adopted by the District, engendering this protest. James Reynolds, the Contracts Specialist for the District, conceded that it was apparent on the face of Close's bid that a mistake had been made in the use of the original form, rather than the revised form. He conceded there was an inconsistency between Close's clear acknowledgement of and agreement to the terms of the contract documents, which expressly included Addendum No. Two and Close's apparent mistaken use of the original Bid form. Under the express terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB, "The Bid shall be construed as though the addendum(a) have been received and acknowledged by the bidder." Mr. Reynolds admitted, however, that he did not apply the terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB in his review of Close's bid and did not construe the bid in the manner provided in the RFB to resolve the apparent inconsistency. He reasoned that Close had used the wrong bid form and looked no further. The District's Procurement Manual provides a procedure whereby a bidder may correct inadvertent mistakes in its bid. Under the terms of Chapter 5-5 of that manual, where the District knows or has reason to conclude, after unsealing of bids, that a mistake may have been made by a bidder, the District "shall request written verification of the bid." In such a circumstance the bidder "shall be permitted the opportunity to furnish information in support of the bid verification as long as it does not affect responsiveness, i.e., the bid substantially conforms to the requirements of the RFB as it relates to pricing, surety, insurance, specifications and any other matter unequivocally stated in the RFB as determinant of responsiveness." See Joint Exhibit 7,6 pages 61 and 62, in evidence. Mr. Reynolds admitted in his testimony that he did not follow the procedure set forth in the manual for verifying a bid because, in his view, that would be allowing an impermissible supplementation of Close's bid. Ms. Lavery, in her testimony, in essence agreed. The Procurement Manual expressly required the District, upon recognizing the mistake and an inconsistency apparent on the face of Close's bid, to verify that bid and to provide Close with the opportunity to furnish information in support of bid verification. Thus, by the express terms of the manual, a bidder must be given an opportunity to clarify mistakes. The Procurement Manual expressly permits a bidder under these circumstances to correct any "inadvertent, non- judgmental mistake" in its bid. Chapter 5 of the Manual provides that "a non-judgmental mistake" is a mistake not attributable to an error in judgment, such as mistakes in personal judgment or wrongful assumptions of contract obligations. Inadvertent technical errors, such as errors of form rather than substance, are considered non-judgmental errors." See Joint Exhibit 7, page 62, in evidence. It is patently apparent that Close's use of the original bid form, inadvertently, while also unequivocally acknowledging and agreeing to the entirety of Addendum No. Two, represented a non-judgmental mistake. Both of the District witnesses, however, testified that the policy regarding mistakes was not followed and Close was not given an opportunity under the District's policy to provide additional information to support verification of the bid. Although Close failed to substitute the revised Bid form for the original Bid form, as called for by Addendum No. Two, its bid was substantively responsive to the technical specifications and requirements of the RFB, and the irregularity is technical in nature. The parties stipulated that the use of the original form, rather than the revised bid form, was the sole basis for Close being determined to be non-responsive by the Agency. In accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.301, in Chapter 5 of the District's Procurement Manual, the District reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in a bid. A material irregularity is defined by the District's policy as one which is not minor in that it: (a) affects the price, quality, time or manner of performance of the service such that it would deprive the District of an assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to the specified requirements; (b) provides an advantage or benefit to a bidder which is not enjoyed by other bidders; or (c) undermines the necessary common standards of competition. See Joint Exhibit 7, page 58, in evidence. The preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that the irregularity in Close's bid did not affect the price of the bid or truly deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be entered into and performed according to all the terms of the RFB, including addenda. The evidence established that Close actually included the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance in its final bid price. It merely did not show it as a separate itemization, because it did not use the revised form providing that itemization line. The fact that the discretionary allowance was itemized in the revised bid form, as part of the bid amount, does not equate to an effect on the contract price as a result of Close's using the original Bid form. Close's error, by mistakenly submitting its bid on the original bid form, did not alter the price of its bid. The evidence clearly established that the bid price for Close's bid would be the same regardless of which form it used. Moreover, the preponderant, persuasive evidence establishes that the use of the original Bid form by Close did not deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance with the all bid documents. Close's bid, secured by its bid bond, clearly acknowledged and agreed to the express terms of Addendum No. Two in their entirety, which included the terms under which the discretionary cost allowance could be applied. Close considered itself bound to the terms of the RFB and assured the Agency that it was so bound by the written acknowledgement and agreement it submitted to the Agency as part of its bid, concerning the elements of Addendum No. Two. The evidence demonstrated that Close understood that the $40,000.00 amount was a discretionary cost allowance and that Close would not be entitled to it unless the District decided to use it. Despite the opinion of Agency witnesses to the contrary, the error in Close's bid was a technical one and non- material because it did not confer a competitive advantage upon Close. Close's use of the wrong form did not alter the price of its bid. Its mistake in the use of the original bid form could only change the relative, competitive positions of Close and Worth if the amount of the discretionary cost allowance was greater or equal to the difference between those two bids, i.e., the $146,650.00 amount by which Worth's bid exceeded the bid of Close. 1/ The bid of Worth exceeds Close's bid by an amount far greater than the amount at issue in the discretionary cost allowance identified in Addendum No. Two and expressly itemized in the revised Bid form, i.e. $40,000.00. The District contends that Close gained some competitive economic advantage over other bidders by having the means by which it could optionally withdraw its bid, based upon alleged non-responsiveness, in not substituting the revised Bid form which would contain the itemization of the $40,000.00 cost allowance. It is difficult to see how it could gain a competitive advantage versus other bidders through some perceived ability to deem itself non-responsive, at its option, and withdraw its bid, thus denying itself the contract. The competitive bidding laws are designed to prevent a firm from gaining a competitive advantage in obtaining a contract versus the efforts of other bidders, not in depriving itself of the opportunity to get the work. Moreover, concerning the argument by the District that this may confer the advantage to Close of allowing it to withdraw its bid at its option and still obtain a refund of its bid bond; even if that occurred, it would not confer a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other bidders. It would merely involve a potential pecuniary advantage to Close's interest, versus that of the Agency itself, which obviously is not a bidder. Moreover, it should again be pointed out that Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information concerning its bid elements, and even to meet with the District staff, following the opening of the bids. It was then allowed to withdraw its bid without forfeiting its bid bond. If the District had inquired, by way of verification of Close's bid, as to whether the discretionary cost amount was included in it's bid, that inquiry does not equate to allowing Close to unlawfully supplement its bid. Indeed, if in response to such an inquiry, Close announced that the discretionary allowance was not included in its bid, its bid at that point would be materially non-responsive to the specifications. If Close was then allowed to supplement its bid by changing its price to add the allowance, such would indeed be an unfair competitive advantage and a violation of law on the part of Close and the Agency. The evidence does not show that such happened or was proposed by any party. If a verification inquiry had been made and Close announced that, indeed, its bid price did include the subject discretionary cost allowance, without further response to the specifications being added, then no competitive advantage would be afforded Close and no legal violation would occur. In fact, however, as pointed out above, the verification request, pursuant to the District's policy manual, was never made. This was despite the fact that the District's witness, Mr. Reynolds, acknowledged that the use of the original bid form was an apparent mistake on the face of the bid, when considered in conjunction with Close's express agreement to construct the project in strict conformance with all contract documents, and particularly with regard to Addenda Numbers One and Two. The non-judgmental mistake, involving use of the original bid form in lieu of the revised bid form, could have been easily clarified by a verification inquiry. That policy was not followed, based solely on the fact that the wrong bid form was used, even though the preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that in all material and substantive respects the bid was a conforming, responsive bid and included in its price the discretionary cost allowance. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the mistaken use of the original Bid form was a non- material irregularity under the District's policies and the terms of the RFB. The District's actions in failing to uniformly apply its own bid verification policy when, in fact, it had allowed verification to one of the other bidders, and when, according to its own witness, it perceived an apparent mistake, was clearly erroneous. It is true that Close may not supplement its bid by changing material terms, but it is permitted to verify whether, in light of the mistaken use of the original Bid form, its bid price, as submitted, included the $40,000.00 discretionary allowance or not. Providing such "yes or no" type of additional information in order to clarify, and only clarify, information already submitted in the bid, in response to an inquiry by the District does not constitute "supplementation" of the bid for purposes of Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). NCS Pearson, Inc. v. Dept of Education, 2005 WL 31776, at page 18 (DOAH, Feb. 8, 2005). Even without verification of the bid, the bid on its face agrees to compliance with all terms and specifications, including Addendum No. Two. It is thus determined that there is no material irregularity. The bid submitted by Close does not afford it any competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other bidders and it is responsive.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the South Florida Water Management District, awarding the subject contract for RFB 6000000262 to the Petitioner herein, Close Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2010.
Findings Of Fact On five dates in June and July, 1988, Respondent advertised in The Orlando Sentinel newspaper its Invitation to Bid for the project known as High School "BB." The advertisement announced that bids would be received at 2:00 p.m. on August 4, 1988, at which time all bids would be publicly opened. The advertisement stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive irregularities. The Invitation to Bid stated that bids received after the deadline "will be returned unopened" and bids "received on time" will be opened publicly. The Invitation to Bid also stated: "The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality or irregularity in any bid received when such a waiver is in the best interest of the Owner. The contract would be awarded, according to the Invitation to Bid, within 45 days after the opening of bids. The location designated for the opening of the bids was the Facilities Services building located at 6200 Chancellor Drive, Orlando, Florida. The bids were opened in a conference room within the building. Robert Gallardo, who is Respondent's Director of School Planning and Construction, was in charge of the bidding process. Mr. Gallardo has been in this position for six years. During this time, he has been responsible for the majority of school construction bids for Respondent. He estimates that he has supervised ten such bids. On August 4, 1988, Mr. Gallardo worked in his office in the Facilities Services building until 1:55 p.m. At that time, he asked his secretary if the bid tabulation forms had been prepared, and, with the forms, he left his office for the conference room where the bids were to be opened. Mr. Gallardo entered the conference room, which was occupied by a number of bidders' representatives, at 1:58 p.m., according to the clock on the wall. At a few seconds before 2:00 p.m., he first spoke, asking that all bids be handed in. He then asked his secretary to call the front desk to see if any bids had been turned in there and needed to be brought down the hall into the conference room. This was a normal procedure. In past bids, some bidders left their bids with the receptionist at the front desk. Prior to obtaining any response from his secretary who was talking on a phone in the conference room, Mr. Gallardo announced his name and position and announced that he was going to open bids. He then picked up a sealed bid from the pile of sealed bids in front of him. As he was about to open the envelope, at or about 30 seconds past 2:00 p.m., a man entered the conference room and said that he had a bid to deliver. The man disclosed the bidder which he represented, but Mr. Gallardo did not clearly hear the name and did not know whose bid was being offered to him. Mr. Gallardo accepted the bid and placed it at the bottom of the pile. The late bid was from Intervenor. A few seconds after it was accepted Mr. Gallardo opened the first bid. A few seconds after that, another man entered the conference room and attempted to deliver a bid. Mr. Gallardo refused to accept the bid because, as he explained, the first bid had already been opened. Mr. Gallardo's practice has consistently been to accept late bids, provided they are delivered prior to the opening of the first bid. Mr. Gallardo had not previously known of Intervenor, which had never previously even submitted a bid on a school job being let for bid by Respondent. Mr. Gallardo's only prior contact with Intervenor's representative who delivered the bid was seeing the man in the building, along with other bidders' representatives, prior to the opening of the bids; however, Mr. Gallardo did not know who the man represented. There was no fraud or collusion in the acceptance of the late bid. There was no evidence that, under the facts of this case, Respondent abused its discretion in accepting Intervenor's late bid. Petitioner's bid was lowest among the bids delivered prior to 2:00 p.m. However, Intervenor's bid was over $500,000 lower than Petitioner's bid on a project costing in excess of $25 million. Respondent has confirmed Mr. Gallardo's decision not to reject Intervenor's bid as late. On August 16, 1988, Respondent published the agenda for the next school board meeting, which was scheduled for August 23, 1988. One of the items to be taken up was the award of the contract for High School "BB." By letter dated August 18, 1988, Petitioner declined Respondent's invitation to participate in what the parties referred to as an informal hearing at the August 23 school board meeting. Threatening unspecified sanctions under state and federal law if Respondent awarded the contract at the August 23 meeting, Petitioner demanded a formal hearing and asserted that the bidding process should be stayed until resolution of the protest, under Section 120.5361 [sic -- apparently referring to Section 120.53(5)(c)]. By memorandum dated August 23, 1988, Respondent's attorney opined that Rule 6A-2.016(7) did not require Respondent to utilize the Section 120.53(5) bid protest procedures, but, out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of expediting resolution of the dispute, recommended the referral of Petitioner's protest to the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated August 23, 1988, Respondent referred the protest to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the bid protest of Petitioner. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4078BID Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted except to the extent that "timely" implies that Intervenor's bid was improperly accepted. Such an implication is rejected as legal argument. 2 and 4. Adopted in substance. 3. Rejected as irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected as not findings of fact except that the inference of Intervenor's efficient utilization of time following the deadline is rejected as unsupported by the evidence and irrelevant. 8-9. Adopted to the extent relevant. 10-11. Rejected as irrelevant. 12-15. Rejected as subordinate to the procedures set forth in the Invitation to Bid and advertisement, especially concerning the waiver of irregularities. First sentence adopted. Second sentence rejected as recitation of testimony through semicolon and irrelevant as to remainder except that the basis for Mr. Gallardo's decision is adopted and modified to add that he accepted the late bid in accordance win his past practice. Petitioner proved all of the facts in this proposed finding except that it could have used effectively any additional time. In any event, all of the facts in this paragraph are irrelevant and are rejected for this reason. The theory of Petitioner's case, as well as the evidence that it offered, was that in this and every other major bid, the last minutes before the deadline are critical due to the unwillingness or inability of subcontractors to supply critical numbers substantially before the deadline. This theory proves too much because, if true, the Hewitt court would have been constrained to consider such a universal fact and thereby would have prevented the agency in that case from accepting the late bid. The Hewitt case stands for the proposition that, in general, an agency may accept late bids before the first bid is opened. It is incumbent upon a frustrated bidder to show that the agency abused its discretion, under the circumstances of the individual case. Petitioner has in essence suggested that the burden is upon the agency to show that it did not abuse its discretion, at least once the frustrated bidder shows that it spent a lot of time and money in preparing its bid and could have used more time. To the contrary, Hewitt tells the frustrated bidder that it must find evidence of impropriety, such as fraud or collusion, in the agency's acceptance of the late bid. This mandate is especially clear in light of the recent Groves-Watkins decision. 18-19 and 22. Rejected as irrelevant. See Paragraph 17. Adopted. 20A-20F. Rejected as legal argument. First sentence rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. Second sentence rejected as speculative. Rejected as speculative and unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and unsupported by the evidence. 24A-27. Rejected as legal argument. Adopted in substance. Rejected as not finding of fact. Treatment Accorded Respondent/Intervenor's Joint Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Adopted. 3-4. Rejected as not finding of fact. 5-6. Adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. 8. Adopted in substance. 9-12. Adopted in substance except that Mr. Gallardo did not arrive in the conference room "several minutes" before 2:00 p.m. and Intervenor's representative arrived about 30 seconds after 2:00 p.m. 13. Rejected as irrelevant. 14-15. Adopted in substance. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted. Rejected as irrelevant. See Paragraph 17 in Petitioner's proposed findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph G. Thresher, Esquire Dykema Gossett Ashley Tower Suite 1400 100 South Ashley Drive Post Office Box 1050 Tampa, Florida 33601-1050 William M. Rowland, Jr., Esquire Rowland, Thomas & Jacobs, P.A. 1786 North Mills Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Scott H. Johnson, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A. Two South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 James L. Schott Superintendent Orange County Public Schools Post Office Box 271 434 North Tampa Avenue Orlando, Florida 32802 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent's action to reject all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206, relating to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School, is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, as alleged in the Amended Petition.
Findings Of Fact On March 4, 2013, ITB was issued by Respondent for work related to the removal and replacement of the public address system at Pinellas Park High School in Largo, Florida. According to the Special Conditions portions of the ITB, the "scope" of the project is to "[p]rovide labor and materials to remove and replace the auditorium sound system as per plans and specifications by Keane Acoustics, Inc." The ITB was assigned bid number 13-803-206 by Respondent. Bids for the contract were to be submitted to Respondent by 3:00 p.m., April 11, 2013. Bids for the project were timely received from two companies. The first company, Becker Communications, Inc., d/b/a BCI Integrated Solutions (BCI), submitted a bid in the amount of $130,756.66. Petitioner submitted a bid in the amount of $116,000.00. There is a section of the ITB titled "special conditions." The special conditions provide in part that "[t]his is an ALL or NONE bid [and] [t]he entire contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder meeting the specifications." On April 22, 2013, Respondent posted a notice advising of its intent to award the contract to BCI. Although Petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive because the bid failed to include "proof of 5 years [of] experience with this type of work" as required by the special conditions of the ITB. Petitioner interpreted this provision as requiring five years of experience as a certain type of general contractor, which Petitioner had, whereas Respondent intended for the ITB to convey that five years of experience related to the removal and installation of audio equipment was the desired type of experience. Petitioner's failure to respond to the ITB in the manner contemplated by Respondent was a technical, nonmaterial irregularity.1/ Numbered paragraph six of the General Terms & Conditions of the ITB provides in part that Respondent "expressly reserves the right to reject any bid proposal if it determines that the . . . experience of the bidder, compared to work proposed, justifies such rejection." On April 24, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent a notice advising of its intent to protest the award of the contract to BCI. On May 3, 2013, Petitioner filed its formal protest challenging Respondent's intended action of awarding the contract to BCI. Petitioner's formal protest enumerated several grounds. Of particular concern to Respondent were Petitioner's assertions that the ITB was "inconsistent with Florida law since bidders [were] not required to submit a List of Subcontractors by the time of opening bid"2/ and that provisions of the ITB were ambiguous with respect to the type of experience required to qualify for bidding.3/ Prior to receiving Petitioner's protest, Respondent was unaware of the fact that its bid specifications governing the disclosure of subcontractors did not comply with Florida law. Upon consideration of Petitioner's grounds for protest, Respondent determined that the ITB, as alleged by Petitioner, failed to comply with section 255.0515, Florida Statutes (2012),4/ and that there was ambiguity in the language regarding the experience requirements for bidders.5/ Respondent refers to the problems with the ITB as "procedural errors." These procedural errors will be referred to herein as "irregularities" as this term is more in keeping with the nomenclature of this area of jurisprudence. Given the ITB's irregularities, Respondent decided to reject all bids. In explaining Respondent's rationale for rejecting all bids, Michael Hewett, Respondent's Director of Maintenance,6/ testified that "the [irregularities] were such that [they] potentially could give an unfair advantage to one bidder over another." As for the issue related to the requirements of section 255.0515, Mr. Hewett explained that neither of the two bidders submitted a listing of subcontractors. It would have been competitively disadvantageous to BCI if Petitioner were able to successfully argue that BCI should be disqualified for failing to provide a listing of subcontractors when Petitioner also failed to provide such listing. During the same approximate time that the ITB in the present case was issued, Respondent issued an ITB for nearly identical work to be performed at one of its other facilities (Palm Harbor). In all material respects, the Palm Harbor ITB was identical to the one at issue herein. Unlike the present case, BCI was the sole bidder for the Palm Harbor project and this distinguishing fact reasonably explains why Respondent did not reject BCI's bid for the Palm Harbor Project even though the ITB therein was plagued with the same irregularities found in the present case.7/
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Pinellas County School Board enter a final order finding that the rejection of all bids submitted in response to ITB 13-803-206 was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent, and dismissing Tamco Electric, Inc.'s instant protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2013.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner or Intervenor submitted the lowest and best bid.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1989, the District Board of Trustees, Okaloosa-Walton Community College, issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for Phase I Construction of the OWCC-WUF Joint Use Campus. The total project was estimated to cost about $5,000,000.00. The funds for the project would come in large part from the Public Education Capital Outlay Funds appropriated by the legislature and passed into law in the State's budget and to a limited extent from the college's renovation fund. Up to the time of hearing, the legislature had appropriated $3,000,000.00 for the project. The college's renovation fund contained approximately $70,000.00. The board hopes that the additional funding needed for the project (approximately $2,000,000.00) will be appropriated by the legislature this summer. However, until the additional funds are appropriated, the Board, by statute, is prohibited from contracting for projects in excess of the amount of money which has been appropriated for such projects. See Section 235.42, Florida Statutes. Michael Richardson, of Bullock-Tice Associates Architects, Inc., was the architectural project manager. Each bidder was asked to provide a base bid and a separate bid on each of ten alternatives. Eight bids were submitted in response to the original solicitation. All eight bids were rejected. The bids were rejected because all eight bids for the base bid without the addition of any alternates exceeded the funds available for the project. The Board decided to rebid the project. The second ITB was issued on March 26, 1990. The second ITB was restructured in an effort to obtain a base bid within the amount of money which had been appropriated for the project. Alternates could then be added to the base bid until the funds ran out. Specifically, the project was revised to provide for a base bid and separate bids on six alternates. The base bid essentially provided for construction of a classroom (Building No. 3) and a utility plant. Alternates 1 and 2 provided for outside civil, electrical, and landscaping work related principally to the buildings covered by the base bid. Alternates 3 and 4 related principally to the construction of two additional buildings and landscaping related to those buildings. Alternates 1-4 added work to the project. Alternates 5 and 6 deleted certain work from the project. Paragraph 1A of the Instructions to Bidders required that: To receive full consideration, all bids must be executed and submitted in strict accordance with the "INSTRUCTIONS TO BIDDERS. Paragraphs 7C and 7D of the Instructions to Bidders required that: Unit Prices: Each bidder shall state in the schedule provided on the Form of Proposal the amount he proposes for each applicable Unit Price requested. Unit price amounts shall include all costs of material, labor, equipment, insurance, bonds, taxes, overhead and profit and shall be used for determining amounts to be paid for all additional work on the project. Credits for any work omitted shall be determined by Unit Price at the amount scheduled. The Owner reserves the right to reject any Unit Price if considered excessive or unreasonable, or to accept any and all such Unit Prices which may be considered fair and reasonable. Alternates: In order that the Owner may discern an alternative use or type of material, or an increase or decrease in the scope of the Project, such items will be defined as Alternates and will be specifically described by the Drawings and/or Specifications. Alternates will be listed in the Form of Proposal in such a manner that the bidder will be able to clearly indicate the sums that will be added to or deducted from the Base Bid. Alternates shall include all costs of materials, taxes, bonds, handling, overhead, and profits and the acceptance of any alternate shall be in strict accordance with applicable Specification Sections. At some point after the initial bid instructions were sent out, and prior to the bid opening, the project architect drafted and sent to bidders a document entitled "Clarification to All Bidders." This document stated: It is the intention of the Owner to award all add Alternates upon receipt of additional funding this Summer. Due to this circumstance, the determination of Low Bidder will most likely be based upon the Base Bid plus Alternate 1 through 4 and 5 & 6 if so desired. This procedure is in accordance with rules of the Florida State Board of Education for Educational Facilities. (emphasis supplied) No bidder challenged the clarification's inclusion in the specifications for the project. Bidders generally interpreted this "Clarification" to mean that the Board of Trustees intended to award a contract for the total project, and thus would make its determination of low bid based on the total sum of the bids for base bid and alternates 1-4. However, bidders were not uniform in their application of that language to developing their specific bids and were not uniform in their interpretation of whether the Board's method of award of the bid as set out in the clarification was guaranteed by the clarification's language. In other words, some bidders realized that the use of the words "most likely" in the clarification meant exactly what it said and was not a guarantee that the project would be awarded according to the method established in the clarification. Petitioner, on the other hand, at its peril ignored the words "most likely" and altered its normal method of calculating its bid. In any event, no bidder received any advantage over another bidder due to the clarification's issuance and no bidder was favored or discriminated against because of the clarification. All bidders received the clarification and reacted to it in the normal course of their businesses and prepared their bids according to those dictates. Six bids were received on the second ITB, including Jack Moore & Company, Inc. and Sharpe, Inc. The bids on the base bid and the various alternates were as follows: CONTRACTOR BASE BID TOTAL SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT 1 Under the method of determining low bidder set out in the clarification, Jack Moore & Company was the low bidder. However, the Petitioner's bid, as well as all other bidders' bids, exceeded the amount of money that the Board had on hand for construction of the project. Therefore, the Board of Trustees felt that it could not award the contract according to the method set out in the clarification and examined the bids to determine the amount of construction which could be accomplished for the amount of money it had on hand ($3,000,000.00 from the legislature and $70,000.00 from the renovation fund). By using only the $3,000,000.00 from the legislature, Opus South would have been the low bidder on the base bid. However, by adding approximately $25,000.00 from the renovation fund, the college had enough money to award the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2. Money for alternates 3 and 4 was not available. The Board decided to award the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2. Sharpe, Inc. was the low bidder on the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2. The Board awarded the contract to Sharpe. Petitioner was approximately $100,000 over the amount bid by Sharpe on the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2. The Board's reasoning was not arbitrary or capricious in the award of the bid to Sharpe. Since the language of the clarification was not binding on the Board, the method used by the Board was within the specifications. Finally, there was no substantial evidence of fraud or collusion on the part of the Board in its award of the bid to Sharpe and no evidence was submitted that Sharpe was not responsive to the ITB. In fact, all the bidders responded to the exact same specifications, thereby affording the Board an exact comparison between the various bids submitted to it for the project. The only difference in the bids was in how each individual bidder calculated its bid to arrive at it's price. Such differences occur in all bid situations and do not serve to lessen the exact comparison of the bids on the specifications. Therefore, Sharpe, having presented the lowest and best bid, should be awarded the contract on the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding Sharpe, Inc., submitted the lowest and best bid and awarding the bid on the base bid plus alternates 1 and 2 to Sharpe, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1990 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1990.
Findings Of Fact On May 19, 1983, Respondent mailed official Invitations to Bid (IFB) forms to 18 different firms, including Petitioner, soliciting bids for Class VI printing in accordance with the specifications and conditions attached to the letter, signed by R. E. Read, Jr. This letter contained the comment, "As the best interests of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularities in bids received." This letter also advised prospective bidders who had questions regarding the IFB to call Larry Amison, the individual who had drafted the accompanying specifications. The notice of IFB, published in the Tallahassee Democrat on Thursday, May 19, 1983, also contained a notice of reservation of the right to reject all bids. Only five IFB forms were returned. Three of the five were returned without bids for various reasons, such as "Not Competitive," "Unable to meet specified delivery date" and "Cannot schedule job of this proportion at this time." This type of explanation, in government procurement circles, need not be taken at face value, but is often used to signal the recipient's thanks for the invitation to bid and a desire to be invited to bid again at some time in the future. The other two forms received were bids: one from Zenith Communications Group, and one from Petitioner. This procurement was somewhat unusual in that the IFB stipulated the amount of money the agency had to spend and requested a hid as to the most product it could get for that money. There were two publications involved: "A" and "B." An alternative was given on delivery date options: one within 30 working days of receipt of approved proofs, and one within 45. Zenith offered to provide 7,180 copies of Book "A" and 7,155 copies of Book "B" (14,335 total books) for a total price of $53,400 1/ within 30 working days. Petitioner offered to provide 9,473 copies of Book "A" and 4,950 copies of Book "B" (15,423 total books) for a total price of $53,344.64 within 45 days. The bids were opened on June 1, 1983, and published from June 1 through June 10, 1983. They were brought to the Director for consideration upon opening. It is his responsibility to evaluate the bids and make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Agriculture on the successful low bidder. Since there was only one bid on each delivery date, the Director felt there were not two comparative bids. As a result, he forwarded the bid package to Ms. Grace Harrison, a purchasing agent with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and an individual very familiar with the procurement of printing services. After a review of the entire bid package, Ms. Harrison's studied opinion was that there were two valid bids and Douglas was the low bidder, and it is so found. Ms. Harrison also felt it was unusual not to receive any more responses than were received on a procurement of this magnitude. This same opinion is held by Mr. Amison, who drafted the specifications. Others have differing opinions, however. Whether it was unusual or not, however, is immaterial. There were two valid bids, and only two are required for an award. However, even in the case of two bids, the agency reserved the right to reject any and all bids. As a result, on or about June 6, 1983, the Director decided, based on his understanding of state policy on the matter and in light of the size of the procurement, to seek more bids through rebidding. In this case, the Director felt more bids were available because of the responses of the nonbidders which referred to the response times being so short. Therefore, he directed a rebid, and this information was communicated to all bidders, including Petitioner. On June 7, 1983, Petitioner wrote to the Director, disagreeing with his decision and notifying him of its protest. On the following day, the Director notified Petitioner the rebidding was being delayed, giving Petitioner 10 days to file a formal notice of protest. This was done in a timely manner. The phrase regarding the agency's right to reject bids is contained in every State IFB. Its purpose is to permit state agencies to reject bids where it becomes apparent there is a valid and legitimate benefit to be gained by the agency in doing so. One such situation is when, in the bona fide opinion of the agency, there are insufficient bids. While there is a difference of opinion as to whether only two bids are unusual in a procurement of this nature, there is no dispute that it would have been beneficial to the agency to have received more than two, since more bids would increase competition. To rebid the contract at this juncture would undoubtedly increase competition to the potential benefit of the Respondent. However, Petitioner claims it would also work to its detriment because other potential bidders would have access to the details of the two present bids and would thereby gain an advantage. This may be the result of rebidding.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner, Douglas Printing Company, Inc., be awarded Contract DOF- ADM-79. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On October 11, 1991, DOT's District Four office let out for bid district contracts E4551 and E4554. Contract E4551 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Broward County. Contract E4554 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors is a four page document which is specific to each contract. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district contracts. Both the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications to the bidders required bidders to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price. Bidders could satisfy this requirement by submitting a bid guarantee of 5% of the bid, submitting a notarized letter of intent from a bonding company or by providing a Certificate of Qualification issued by Respondent. The Notice to Contractors for both Contracts provided as follows: Failure to provide the following with each bid proposal will result in rejection of the contractor's bid.... District contracts of $150,000 or less require the following as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond: A notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: (1) a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or (2) a copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department. (No emphasis added) Similarly, the first Standard Specification provides: 1.1 Bidders (contractors) A contractor shall be eligible to bid on this contract if:... (2) Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the District Contract Administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project.... The requirement to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond has been imposed on the Districts by DOT Directive 375-00-001-a (hereinafter the "Directive".) This Directive was in place at all times material to this proceeding. Section 3.2.2 of the Directive provides: A contractor shall be eligible to bid if: ...Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the minicontract administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of the bid, should the firm be awarded the project. A bid guaranty as specified above may substitute as proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. This applies to bids amount over or under $150,000. A copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department may be substituted in lieu of a notarized letter for those contracts not requiring a bid bond. The bids for the Contracts were opened on October 11, 1991 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received from four bidders: CPM, SCA, Florida Sweeping, Inc. and P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. In its bid proposals, SCA included executed bid bonds in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of each bid proposal. Each bid bond cost $55.00. CPM did not submit executed bid bonds with its proposals. Instead, CPM submitted letters from Mark A. Latini dated September 25, 1991. Those letters were provided on the stationery of Bonina-McCutchen-Bradshaw, Insurance and indicate that Mr. Latini is the "bond manager." The letters provide as follows: Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above-referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should Certified Property Maintenance, Inc., be low and awarded the referenced contract. All bonds are subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request.... The letters submitted by CPM with its bid proposals were not notarized and were not binding obligations to issue bonds since they were conditioned upon meeting certain unspecified underwriting requirements at the time of the bond requests. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Four Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by CPM were the lowest for each contract. Its bid for Contract No. E4551 was $109,343.97. Its bid for Contract No. E4554 was $30,312.63. SCA's bids for the Contracts were $139,442.14 and $44,100.00, respectively. During the initial review of the bid proposals, the Contractual Services Office rejected CPM's bids for failure to have its bonding company "letters of intent" notarized. In addition, the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping, Inc. were rejected for failure to note a required addendum and the bids submitted by P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. were rejected because the "proposal bond was not of proper character". On October 18, 1991, DOT posted its Notice of Intent to Award the Contracts to SCA, the only bidder for the Contracts whose proposals had not been rejected. CPM timely filed protests of the proposed awards to SCA on October 22, 1991. The protests filed by CPM argued that its bids should not have been invalidated simply because the bonding company's letters did not include notary seals. At this point, the sole basis for the disqualification of CPM's bids was the failure to have the bonding company letters notarized. Respondent contends that, except for the absence of the notary seal, the letters submitted by CPM met the requirements of the Notice to Contractor and the Standard Specifications cited above. However, those letters are equivocal and do not evidence a binding commitment to issue a bond upon award of the contract. The DOT officials admit that they do not know what "normal underwriting requirements" would or could be required by CPM's bonding company. This conditional language makes it uncertain whether CPM could obtain the necessary bond. Therefore, it is concluded that those letters do not meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors, the Standard Specifications or the Directive. A hearing on CPM's protest was not held. CPM's president, Raymond Hanousek, who prepared CPM's bid and attended the pre-bid meeting, called DOT's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. Mr. Hanousek spoke with Joseph Yesbeck, the District's Director of Planning and Programs. After their conversation, Mr. Yesbeck reviewed the file and met with Teresa Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts, and other members of the contracting staff. Ms. Martin explained why CPM's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Yesbeck determined that the failure to submit notarized letters should be considered a non-material deviation and the bids submitted by CPM should be accepted and considered the low responsive bids. Mr. Yesbeck concluded that the absence of the notary seal did not give any competitive advantage to CPM and that defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. Therefore, he reversed the contract administrator's decision to disqualify CPM on both Contracts. The District secretary concurred in the decision reached by Mr. Yesbeck to repost the award of the Contracts. Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed CPM's disqualification and declared CPM to be the low bidder for both Contracts. At the time Mr. Yesbeck made his decision, he had not reviewed the Directive from the Assistant Secretary's office stating that there must be a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Mr. Yesbeck did not review the Directive until his deposition was taken one week prior to the hearing in this case. According to Ms. Martin, the option to provide a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the posting of a 5% bid guarantee or obtaining prequalification was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants. While DOT was apparently trying to make it easier and cheaper for companies to bid by not requiring a bond to be posted, the DOT Directive and the bid documents still clearly required unconditional proof that a bid bond would be issued if the contract was awarded to the bidder. CPM was not prequalified nor did it post a bond. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications, CPM's only option was to submit a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. DOT was never provided with any proof that CPM had been prequalified by the bonding company for a bond and/or that a bond would unconditionally be issued if CPM was awarded the Contracts. Because the letters stated they were "subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request", there was some possibility CPM would not be able to obtain a bond. Such a condition was not permissible under the bid doucments. The decision to accept CPM's bid was contrary to the DOT Directive, the Notice to Contractors and the bid specifications which require that a bidder demonstrate proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Consequently, it is concluded that DOT's decision to accept the conditional, unnotarized letters submitted by CPM was arbitrary and capricious. There is some indication that other DOT Districts have, on occasion, waived the notarization requirement for the bond letter. However, it is not clear whether the language in the bid documents was the same or similar in those cases and/or whether the bond letters were conditional. In the past, whenever District Four has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter, the bid was rejected. Apparently, there has never been a protest based on such a denial in District Four. Under Section 337.18, DOT does not need to require notarized, unconditional bond letters on contracts under $150,000. Indeed, there was a suggestion that some DOT Districts have dropped the requirement for certain contracts under $150,000. However, the bid documents in this case clearly required some proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the Contracts. It was incumbent for all bidders to meet this requirement. It was arbitrary to delete this requirement after the bids were submitted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding the bids submitted by CPM to be non-responsive and rejecting those bids. Petitioner should enter into negotiations with SCA regarding the award of the contract. In the absence of a favorable negotiation, Petitioner should enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and opening the Contracts up for new bids. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact By Joint Prehearing Stipulation filed at the time of hearing, the parties agree that bids for contract No. E-4450, the contract in issue here, were opened by the Respondent in Fort Lauderdale on October 11, 1991. Bids were received from five bidders including the Petitioner, Power, and the low bidder, Certified. Based on its evaluation of the bids submitted, on October 18, 1991, Respondent posted an intent to award the contract to Power Sweeping Services, Inc., Petitioner herein. However, thereafter, on October 22, 1991, the Department received a formal protest from the low bidder, Certified, challenging the intent to award. After review of the substance of Certified's protest, Respondent notified all bidders that it would be reposting its intent to award on November 5, 1991, and on that date, did repost, indicating an intent to award the contract in question to Certified, the low bidder. Thereafter, on November 14, 1991, Petitioner timely filed its formal protest, having filed its initial intent to protest on November 6, 1991. The bid blank, which was issued to all prospective bidders at the pre- bid conference held in this matter for a contract to involve mechanical sweeping on Interstate Highway 595 from its eastern terminus to Southwest 136th Avenue, including interchange ramps at I-95, I-595, and State Road 84, contained as a part thereof a notice to contractors which, at page 1 of 4, (page 1 of the 36 page bid package), contained a notation that for contracts of $150,000.00 or less, the bidder would be required to submit, as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payments bond: a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or a copy of the contractor's certificate of qualification issued by the Department. This note specifically states that "failure to provide the following required evidence of bonding", as indicated above, with the bid proposal would result in rejection of the contractor's bid. Petitioner submitted a notarized "letter of commitment to issue bond" dated October 8, 1991, by Burton Harris, attorney in fact and resident agent for American Bonding Company. Certified submitted with its bid an un-notarized letter from Mark A. Latini, bond manager with Bonina - McCutchen - Bradshaw Insurance to the effect that "Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should CPM be low and awarded the referenced contract." Five bidders submitted bids. Certified was the low bidder with a bid price of $61,474.85. Florida Sweeping, Incorporated was second low bidder with a bid of $67,388.16, but that bid was rejected because an addendum was not noted. Petitioner was third lowest bidder with a bid of $72,290.65. Because Certified's bid as initially submitted did not contain the required notarized letter from the bonding company, its bid was initially rejected. Thereafter, however, Certified's president, Mr. Hanousek, who prepared Certified's bid, and who attended the pre-bid meeting, called the Department's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. As a result, he submitted a notice of protest and a subsequent protest to the denial of Certified's bid. A hearing on Certified's protest was not held. When Joseph Yesbeck, the District's director of planning and programs, who was at the time serving as acting district secretary in the absence of the appointed secretary, was contacted by Mr. Hanousek. He reviewed the file and met with Ms. Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts and the contracting staff to see what was happening. At that point Ms. Martin explained why Certified's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. When the District secretary came back, Mr. Yesbeck briefed him and recommended that based on the information he had received from the District and Department attorneys, the failure to submit the notarized letter should be considered a non-material deviation and the Certified bid be determined the low responsive bidder. The reasons for this were that the absence of the notary did not really give any competitive advantage to Certified and that ordinarily defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. When the District secretary, on the basis of the information provided by Mr. Yesbeck, decided to repost the contract, Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed Certified's disqualification and left it as the low bidder. None of the other rejected bidders, including Florida Sweeping and bidder Number 5, which was rejected because its bond proposal was not of a proper character, were advised that they could come in and correct the defects with their bond letters. According to Ms. Martin, the notice to contractors requiring a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the requirement to post a 5% bid guarantee was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants, so that the bidder does not actually have to post the bond in question. The notarization requirement was put in by the Department but neither Ms. Martin nor any other witness testifying on behalf of the Department was able to indicate why the bond certification had to be notarized. Historically, when the Department has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter it has been rejected, and in Ms. Martin's experience, she has never known of a protest based on such a denial since she began working with contracts in July, 1988. When she reviews the bids, she reviews the bonding letter for its content as well as seeing whether it is notarized. Here, her reason for initially rejecting certified's bid was solely that the bond commitment letter was not notarized. The decision to reject was not hers alone, however, since she also checked with the District General Counsel who initially advised her that Certified's bond commitment letter was no good. Apparently, counsel changed his position upon discussion of the matter with Mr. Yesbeck and the Department's General Counsel since, according to Mr. Yesbeck, both counsel recommended subsequently that the absence of the notarization not be a disqualification. Further, according to Ms. Martin the requirement for the notarization has been utilized by District 4 since 1987 with all bids requiring it notwithstanding Mr. Hanousek's testimony that he has never seen the requirement before in any of the 6 successful contract's he has had with the Department before. In that regard, however, he admits this is the only contract he has had with District 4. Ms. Martin does not know if the notarization requirement is used in other Districts and no evidence as presented by any party to clarify that issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered setting aside the determination that Certified Property Maintenance's bid on Contract No. E4450, Job No. 869069108 was the low responsive bid. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 28th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-7592BID The following constitute my ruling on all Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes submitted by the parties hereto. FOR THE PETITIONER: None submitted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the finding that Certified's bid complied in every respect except the notarization. The assurance by the bonding company was not unqualified but conditioned upon Certified being awarded the contract. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for last sentence regarding which see 3., supra. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE INTERVENOR: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce M. Cease, Esquire 2720 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33135 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ray Hanousek President Certified Property Maintenance 3203 Robbins Road Pompano Beach, Florida 33062 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation can reject all bids on State Project No. 37906-9007?
Findings Of Fact In response to an invitation to bid, petitioner C & S Chemical Company (C&S) submitted a bid, No. 9059-86, offering to undertake complete maintenance operations to ensure Rest Area facilities located on State Road 93 (1-75) in Suwannee and Hamilton Counties are maintained in a safe, attractive, clean and sanitary manner." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Invitations to bid were mailed in October of last year, (T.9), and bids were to have been opened on December 2, 1987. C&S's bid price was $14,860.76 monthly or $178,329.12 for the year. By letter dated December 9, 1986, however, the Department of Transportation (DOT) advised C&S that all bids had been rejected, stating that the "Department reserved the right to reject any/or all bids when it is determined to be in the best interest of the Department. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. C&S mailed notice of protest the same day it received the Department's advice that all bids had been rejected. C&S's formal written protest took the form of a letter, dated December 18, 1986, in which C&S inquired: [H]ow can the Department of Transportation offend and deprive legitimate contractors of this work by negotiating a Contract with a non-profit organization after the bid prices have been made public knowledge? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. In this letter, C&S took the position that DOT should not reject all bids: We feel that if the non-profit organizations are going to get Department of Transportation contracts, they should either bid compet[i]tively with private enterprises, or that certain contracts should be set aside for them well advance of the bidding process. At hearing, Mr. Sperring narrowed or clarified the grounds of the protest when he stated, "I have no objection to the concept of the nonprofit organizations as long as they are set aside," (T.12) before bids are invited. The parties agree that, after bids were solicited, DOT decided to award the contract for Project No. 37906-9007 to intervenor Florida Association of Rehabilitative Facilities, Inc. (FARF), even though FARF never bid on the project. By agreement dated August 21, 1985, the Commission for Purchase for the Blind and other Severely Handicapped designated FARF "the central nonprofit agency of the Commission . . . [and its] sole agent." Intervenor's Exhibit No. 2. The day before, DOT Secretary Thomas E. Drawdy had signed a policy statement proclaiming DOT's intention "to procure commodities or services from qualified nonprofit agencies for the blind or other severely handicapped when feasible unless otherwise restricted by budgetary constraints." Intervenor's Exhibit No. 1.
