The Issue The issue is whether just cause exists to terminate the employment of Respondent with the Escambia County School Board (School District or School Board).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent was employed as a leaderman mechanic assigned to the Transportation Department. In this position, he was responsible for ensuring that mechanics properly completed their work and their records. Respondent's direct supervisor was Terry Orso. The Transportation Department is responsible for maintaining and operating the School District's fleet of school buses, as well as the support vehicles which are generally known as the "white fleet." The Transportation Department, including the garage for the maintenance of Petitioner's vehicles, is within the same building as the Parts Department. The Parts Department, however, is separated from the garage by a wall to ensure the security of the stocks of parts until these parts are turned over for installation in and the maintenance of Petitioner's vehicles. As a leaderman mechanic, Respondent initiated "Repair Orders," which were also known as "Work Orders," and completed part of a "Request for Materials," also known as a "chit" so that parts could be ordered from outside vendors and installed in Petitioner's vehicles requiring repair. The School District form known as a "Repair Order" requires information, including the vehicle number assigned by Petitioner, mileage of the vehicle, and the vehicle make and year. The form includes a section to identify the repairs to be made. The practice within the School District is to complete the top portion of the Repair Order when the vehicle is brought in for repairs with the identifying information. Each Repair Order has an identification number. The person completing the Repair Order is usually, but not always, a leaderman mechanic. Once the vehicle is repaired, the leaderman mechanic initials the form to confirm the correct repairs have been made and that the vehicle has been inspected. The initials of the leaderman mechanic are also written next to the identification number when all repairs are completed. When a vehicle has been brought to the Transportation Department for repairs, the Parts Department issues a chit. Once the chit is issued, an employee from the Parts Department, which is usually a leaderman mechanic, completes the upper left portion of the chit. This section identifies the vehicle, the date the request for materials is submitted, the initials of the mechanic submitting the request, the work order number, and the year and make of the vehicle brought in for repair. A Parts Department employee completes the upper right hand portion of the chit with information identifying the date the request for materials is received, the vendor that is contacted, the name of the person from whom the part is ordered at the vendor, and time of the estimated delivery of the parts. In 2007, Petitioner received information from one of its employees, John Bodie, that parts had been ordered from a vendor at the School District's expense for installation in a private vehicle. Mr. Bodie delivered a letter to the superintendent with copies of Transportation Department records attached. Petitioner initiated an investigation based upon the allegations of Mr. Bodie and the records he provided. Mr. Bodie alleged that he had been approached by Garage Manager Terry Orso to repair a vehicle owned by another employee, Ms. Diana Archer. Mr. Bodie claimed that, at Mr. Orso's request, he took Ms. Archer's vehicle, which was a 1988 Chevrolet Blazer, to his home to assess the needed repairs. He made a list of the parts that were needed to repair the Blazer's front end. Mr. Bodie alleged that, after he agreed to make the repairs, Mr. Orso told him the parts were on Lanny's (Respondent's nickname) desk. Mr. Bodie needed two additional brake calipers and alleged he was told by Mr. Orso that the parts would be ordered. Mr. Bodie received the additional parts and completed the repairs on Ms. Archer's Blazer. Ms. Archer paid Mr. Bodie for his services. Ms. Archer's statement was admitted into evidence without objection. She stated that Mr. Bodie repaired her Blazer and that she paid him for the work. She alleged that Mr. Orso told her "not to worry about the parts" and that the cost of the repairs would be $300.00-$350.00. Since Mr. Bodie admitted to being untruthful in an earlier investigation, Petitioner took extra care when attempting to corroborate his allegations. The investigation revealed that through Repair Order #22721 for School District vehicle #8667, a Chevrolet C-10 pick-up truck, parts were ordered for that vehicle, including parts for "front end repair." A chit was then completed for vehicle #8667 with a request for materials received June 2, 2005. The chit ordered "front end parts." The parts were ordered from a vendor First Call and received at Petitioner's Parts Department the same day. The parts ordered through Repair Order #22721 for vehicle #8667, the C-10 pickup, would not fit that vehicle. Those parts did fit a 1988 Blazer owned by Ms. Archer and repaired by Mr. Bodie. Repair Order #22721 bears the initials of Respondent as confirmed by Ms. Karen Nobles, a forensic document examiner. She noted that Respondent has a distinctive style of handwriting and that there was no question that he had initialed the Repair Order in question. To further corroborate Mr. Bodie's testimony, the School Board Auditor David Bryant was directed to check Petitioner's records to verify whether Mr. Bodie ordered the two calipers after initially receiving the parts to complete the repairs to Ms. Archer's vehicle. Mr. Bryant first checked the service records on vehicle #8667. Finding no calipers ordered in June 2005 for that vehicle, he checked a similar vehicle, #8691, another Chevrolet C-10 pick-up truck. Mr. Bryant located Repair Order #24674 dated June 7, 2005, indicating that brake repairs were needed, specifically "R and R both front brake calipers--flex lines." Respondent's initials were found on Repair Order #24674 indicating that the work was requested, inspected, and completed. The Repair Order corresponds with a chit for vehicle #8691, and the work order corresponds with the purchase order for the parts. Ms. Nobles, through forensic examination of these initials, verified that they too belonged to Respondent. The chit, however, was not completed in the normal manner. It was completed by a Parts Department employee identifying "Lanny" as the person requesting materials and that the "parts were ordered by White Fleet direct." The parts that were ordered were two calipers. As was the case with vehicle #8667, the parts that were ordered would not fit vehicle #8691, a Chevrolet C-10 pick-up truck, but would fit Ms. Archer's Blazer. Dr. Alan Scott, Assistant Superintendent, received a call from a mechanic telling him that Respondent and another mechanic, Robert Hutto, were planning to bring the C-10 pick-up truck into the garage to make it look as though repairs had been done to the front end of the truck. Dr. Scott and Mr. Bryant moved the truck into an area covered by surveillance cameras and then called the Sheriff's Department. The truck was secured by the Sheriff's Department and removed to its impound yard to be inspected by Sheriff's Department mechanics. Sheriff's Department employee, Louie Kemp, inspected Petitioner's C-10 pick-up truck and found that no new parts had been installed on its front end. Mr. Bryant's investigation concerning vehicle #8691 demonstrated not only that the brake parts ordered would not fit the C-10 pick-up truck, but that the same brake repairs had been reported as completed on the same C-10 pick-up truck three times in 2005: on February 16, June 7, and October 20. The State Attorney's Office reviewed the same evidence and determined not to further prosecute the case against Respondent, entering a Nolle Prosequi in the matter of State of Florida v. Andrew L. Mardesich, Circuit Court Case No. 1707CF005289B, for the reason that insufficient evidence existed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent does not know nor does he have any relationship with Ms. Archer. Respondent never spoke with Ms. Archer or anyone else about parts or repairs for her Blazer. Mr. Bodie acknowledged that he never spoke with Respondent about parts he needed to perform the work on Ms. Archer's Blazer; nor did Mr. Bodie obtain any parts from Respondent; nor was Respondent present when Mr. Bodie allegedly got the parts from Respondent's desk to repair Ms. Archer's vehicle. Mr. Bodie testified via deposition that he never personally observed Respondent involved with the purchase and installation of parts in Ms. Archer's car in any way. Mr. Bodie was not aware of any benefit Respondent may have received as a result of the work being performed on Ms. Archer's Blazer. Mr. Bodie's only involvement with the parts was through Mr. Orso, Respondent's supervisor, who told him about the job to be performed on Ms. Archer's vehicle and where to find the parts on Respondent's desk. Petitioner relied upon Mr. Bodie's statement to take action against Respondent and Mr. Orso for the ordering and installation of parts in Ms. Archer's vehicle. Respondent denies that he ordered or was ever asked to order parts that were installed in Ms. Archer's vehicle or any other non-School District owned vehicles. He denies ever ordering parts at the School District's expense and approving or installing them on vehicles not owned by the School District. Based upon Respondent's long work history with Petitioner, as well as his demeanor and candor in responding to questions at the hearing, the undersigned finds Respondent's testimony to be credible. Petitioner's records establish that parts were ordered using one vehicle number and installed in other vehicles owned by the School District. Petitioner's investigation documents establish that parts were not always ordered using the correct vehicle numbers. Respondent acknowledged that the ordering of parts using one vehicle number and installed in another vehicle owned by the School District was done when budget constraints forced a department to reimburse at a later date for services needed right away. Mr. Bryant, as well as other School District employees who looked into Transportation Department practices, expressed concern about this practice. Respondent acknowledged that as a leaderman mechanic, due to the busy work schedule in the garage, sometimes he took other mechanics at their word that the repairs had been performed and he would initial the work orders without a thorough, or even any, inspection of the work performed. Respondent never completed any work documents using the name "Lanny" or ordering any parts directly. Parts were ordered by the Parts Department. Respondent's usual way of initialing repair orders was with "A.M." The preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that a scheme existed to order parts and perform work on non-District owned vehicles, in this case, a 1988 Chevrolet Blazer owned by one of Petitioner's employees, Ms. Archer. Mr. Bodie performed the repairs on Ms. Archer's vehicle using the parts ordered under the School District's account. Respondent did not knowingly sign repair orders or order parts for repairs on non-District owned vehicles, such as the Blazer owned by Ms. Archer. Prior to the investigation and notice of termination, Respondent had voluntarily entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). Once he received notice from Petitioner that his employment would be terminated effective October 17, 2007, Respondent advanced his DROP exit and regular retirement to be effective October 17, 2007.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Escambia County School Board, rescind Respondent's termination and compensate him for his lost salary and benefits, including accrued retirement benefits, since the date of his termination on October 17, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons, Longoria & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Tom Wazlavek Union of Escambia ESP 6551 North Palafox Pensacola, Florida 32503 Emily Moore, Esquire Florida Education Association 300 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1700 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jim Paul, Superintendent Escambia County School Board 215 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32502-5782
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent T.A.S. Auto Sales held independent motor vehicle license #6VI-2652, with a licensed place of business at 117 1/2 Central Avenue in Brandon, Florida. The owner of T.A.S. Auto Sales is Donald Hunt. On May 1, 1985, the Division of Motor Vehicles issued license number 5VI-003620A to T.A.S. Auto Sales for a supplemental location at 312 East Brandon Boulevard in Brandon, Florida. The expiration date on this license was April 30, 1986. Donald Hunt leased the property at 312 East Brand on Boulevard and operated a retail car sales business there until approximately mid-June of 1985. He then decided to sell the business to Clarence W. Jenkins, and entered into an Assignment of Lease on July 1, 1985. According to Mr. Hunt, it was his intent to allow Mr. Jenkins to operate under the supplemental license of T.A.S. Auto Sales while Mr. Jenkins, doing business as Brandon Auto Brokers, obtained his own Florida Dealers License. However, according to Mr. Hunt, said arrangement was to terminate no later than July 28, 1985. A letter setting forth this agreement was received into evidence as respondent's Exhibit 4. From July 1, 1985, through July 28, 1985, Donald Hunt did supervise all title work performed through Brandon Auto Brokers and/or Mr. Jenkins. During July and early August, 1985, Brandon Auto Brokers secured a County occupational license, a Department of Revenue Certificate of Registration to collect sales and use taxes, a reassignment of telephone numbers, an insurance binder, a surety bond and membership in the Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association. Signage indicating either Brandon Auto Brokers or "under new management" was also placed on the premises, but the date upon which such signage was erected was not established. Lois Jarvis, an inspector with the Division of Motor Vehicles, testified that she spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Jenkins on August 9, 1985, and thereafter mailed to Mr. Jenkins an application form for a dealer's license. It was Inspector Jarvis' understanding that Mr. Hunt was allowing Jenkins to operate under Mr. Hunt's supplemental license until such time as Jenkins obtained his own license. On September 4, 1985, she visited the supplemental lot to check on Mr. Jenkins' incomplete application. Her next visit with either Mr. Hunt or Mr. Jenkins occurred on September 23, 1985. At that time, while at Mr. Hunt's lot on Central Avenue, Mr. Hunt informed her that he had nothing more to do with the supplemental lot on Brand on Boulevard, and gave Ms. Jarvis his license for that location. Inspector Jarvis then went over to the supplemental lot and issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Jenkins/Brandon Auto Brokers for offering, displaying for sale and selling motor vehicles without a license. On September 24, 1985, Ms. Jarvis requested the Department to cancel dealer license 5VI-3620A on the ground that "dealer closed lot and surrendered license." Mrs. Jarvis testified that she did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot in July or August of 1985. Her work records for July and August do not reflect a visit to either location. Mr. Hunt, and several witnesses testifying in respondent's behalf, testified that he told Inspector Jarvis in early July that he would have nothing more to do with the supplemental lot beyond July 28, 1985. It was their testimony that Mrs. Jarvis' response was that "there was no way Mr. Jenkins could be issued a license by July 28th, to which Mr. Hunt responded, "that's not my problem." Mr. Hunt admits that he did not specifically request Mrs. Jarvis to cancel his license for the supplemental lot as of July 28th, and that he did not deliver that license to Mrs. Jarvis until September 23, 1985. Based upon the demeanor and possible motives of the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence received into evidence, it is concluded that Inspector Jarvis did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot for which T.A.S. held licenses in June, July or August of 1985. It is further found that Inspector Jarvis did not become aware that Mr. Hunt intended to cease all relationships with the supplemental lot until he delivered the license for those premises to her on September 23, 1985. By statute, an independent motor vehicle license period is from May 1 to April 30 of the following year. Licenses expire annually, "unless revoked or suspended prior to that date." Section 320.27(4), Florida Statutes. The Department has no rule, regulation, policy or established procedure for a licensee to surrender or cancel a license prior to the expiration date. On July 30, 1985, Bruce Reich purchased a 1980 Chevrolet Camero from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. His checks were made payable to Brandon Auto Brokers. He did not think he was buying a car from T.A.S. or from Don Hunt. On or about September 30, 1985, Mr. Reich filed a Complaint Affidavit against Brandon Auto Brokers regarding this transaction. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Reich had still not received title to the vehicle he purchased. On August 26, 1985, William S. Ryder purchased a 1981 Van from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. On or about October 2, 1985, Mr. Ryder filed a Complaint Affidavit against T.A.S. Auto Sales on the ground that he had not received a clear title or plates for this vehicle. He had previously attempted to locate Mr. Jenkins, but was unable to find him.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0471 The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been fully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 8. Rejected; the evidence demonstrates that respondent intended that its responsibilities with regard to the supplemental lot would terminate on July 28, 1985. Respondent 1 - 3. Rejected in part as improper findings of fact. 4 - 9A. Rejected; not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 9H. Accepted, except that the evidence demonstrates that the Ryder complaint named T.A.S. Auto Sales as the dealer. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire 419 West Platt Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue for determination at formal hearing was whether Rule 5J- 12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Theron C. Phinney is the sole owner and operator of Mobile Auto Repair Shop, located in Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Florida. He is engaged in the repairing of motor vehicles and has been in the auto repair business for over 35 years. Mr. Phinney's auto repair business is mobile. All of his equipment and tools for repairing vehicles are located in his truck. Mr. Phinney repairs vehicles wherever they are located, i.e., he goes to where the vehicles are located. No repairs are performed at Mr. Phinney's residence. Mr. Phinney has no employees. Mr. Phinney has been issued an occupational license by Palm Beach County at a cost of $25.00. The license identifies his residence as the location for his business. Even though Mr. Phinney does not perform any vehicle repairs at his residence, the County required him to provide his residential address as the location of his business. The County renews his license yearly with the residential address. 1/ Repairs by mobile motor vehicle repair shops are performed wherever the vehicle needing repair is located. Equipment and tools used to perform the repairs are located in the vehicle owned by the mobile motor vehicle repair shop. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) is charged with administering the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes. The Act requires motor vehicle repair shops to register with the Department and pay a fee and provides certain exemptions. Section 559.904, Florida Statutes. Section 559.904(9), Florida Statutes, provides: (9) No annual registration application or fee is required for an individual with no employees and no established place of business. Section 559.903(8), Florida Statutes, defines "place of business" and provides: (8) "Place of business" means a physical place where the business of motor vehicle repair is conducted. The Department's Rule 5J-12.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (2) "Established place of business" means that physical location noted on the occupational license issued to the motor vehicle repair shop pursuant to Chapter 205, Florida Statutes. If the county or municipality has adopted no local occupational license requirement pursuant to Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, the term means that physical location where motor vehicle repairs are performed, or records, equipment, or tools used for the conduct of the business of motor vehicle repair are housed or stored. The term includes any vehicle constituting a mobile repair shop. The Rule was adopted on January 18, 1995. Rule 5J-12.001(2) implements Section 559.904(9). The Rule also implements Section 559.903(5) and (7), Florida Statutes, which define "minor repair service" and "motor vehicle repair shop," respectively. There is no dispute that mobile motor vehicle repair shops are included in the definition of motor vehicle repair shops. The Department developed the challenged Rule over a period of several months. Numerous public meetings were conducted, particularly with the motor vehicle repair industry, throughout the State of Florida. From the public meetings conducted by the Department, it was evident, among other things, that there was no clear understanding of the meaning of the term "established place of business" in Section 559.904(9). Consequently, the Department was convinced that clarification of the term was needed. The Motor Vehicle Advisory Council (MVAC) reviewed and advised the Department on the challenged Rule and gave the Rule its (MVAC) approval. The MVAC is a statutorily created advisory council, composed of members from the motor vehicle repair industry. The challenged Rule includes all mobile motor vehicle repair shops within the class of businesses required to be registered with the Department pursuant to Chapter 559, Florida Statutes. The Department contends that this inclusion is necessary because, since the purpose of Chapter 559 is to regulate the auto repair business, the mobile motor vehicle repair shops are conducting the business sought to be regulated in that the mobile repair shops are licensed by county and municipal authorities and are performing significant repairs for compensation. There are approximately 560 mobile motor vehicle repair shops registered with the Department. Standing is not at issue in this proceeding.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be denied on the ground that the request was not timely filed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department")?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the factual stipulations into which the parties have entered, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner purchased the motor vehicle that is the subject of the instant controversy, a 1991 Mitsubishi Eclipse, on May 23, 1991, from King Mitsubishi, a Mitsubishi dealership located in Lighthouse Point, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealership"). Various problems developed with the vehicle which Petitioner reported to the Dealership, but the Dealership was unable to rectify within 18 months of the date of purchase. During this 18-month time frame Petitioner drove the vehicle less than 24,000 miles. Several of the problems that Petitioner reported during the first 18 months of her ownership of the vehicle still persist today. In June or July of 1993, Petitioner began considering the possibility of seeking arbitration under the State of Florida's "Lemon Law." To find out more about her rights, she obtained from a friend, and reviewed, a Florida state government publication on the "Lemon Law." In September of 1993, Petitioner sent a completed Motor Vehicle Defect Notification form to the Dealership requesting that it "make a final attempt to correct the . . . reported . . defects." On November 12, 1993, Petitioner brought the vehicle to the Dealership for such repairs to be made. When she picked up the vehicle five days later, she discovered that the defects she had reported had not been remedied. Dissatisfied with these results, Petitioner telephoned the Department and asked to be sent a Request for Arbitration form. She received the form on November 29, 1993. Petitioner then proceeded to gather the documentation that she needed to fill out the form. After gathering this documentation, Petitioner telephoned the Department a second time because she had some questions regarding certain items on the form. Her questions having been answered by the Department representative to whom she spoke, Petitioner completed the form and, on December 2, 1993, mailed the completed form to the Department. The Department received the completed form on December 6, 1993. At no time did Petitioner, a layperson acting without the benefit of legal counsel, ever intend to forfeit her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. She was not under the impression, nor did the Department representatives to whom she spoke give her reason to believe, that if she failed to file her request for arbitration on or before November 23, 1993, her inaction would be deemed a waiver of her right to request arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Petitioner's request for arbitration to have been timely filed and therefore not subject to dismissal on the ground of untimely filing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of May, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-0755 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the parties in their post-hearing submittals: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order.. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 4-5. Rejected as findings of fact because they are more in the nature of conclusions of law. 6-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of evidence adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such evidence. First sentence: Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. The Department's Proposed Findings 1-4. Accepted and incorporated in substance COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Feldman, Esquire Berman & Feldman 2424 Northeast 22nd Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33062-3099 Barbara Edwards, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner for registration as an electronic repair dealer should be denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Jack Resnick d/b/a Smart Service petitioned for an administrative hearing upon receipt from the Respondent of a Notice of Intent to Deny License or Registration. The hearing was scheduled for November 27, 1978 at 2:00 p.m. in Tallahassee, Florida. Prior to the hearing the parties requested that the Hearing Officer write a Recommended Order upon submission of "Stipulation of Facts and Questions of Law" filed jointly by the parties, copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The instruments filed in this case reflect that in February, 1978 Petitioner Jack Resnick applied to the Respondent, Division of General Regulation, for an electronic repair dealer registration under the provisions of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. In April, 1978 the Respondent notified Petitioner of its intent to deny said application for registration for the reason that applicant Jack Resnick intended to employ one Arthur Resnick as a repair work person In the business. Previously, in 1976 Arthur Resnick had been denied a registration certificate as an electronic service dealer by the Respondent, having been determined to be unfit and ineligible to be registered as an electronic repair service dealer. The Recommended Order entered in that cause, which was adopted as Respondent's final order, made the following; findings of fact: Arthur Resnick caused to be advertised in local (Florida)newspaper advertisements which would the public believe Arthur Resnick Television Repair Service was registered with the Bureau of Electronic Repair when, in fact, it was not. Arthur Resnick had been asked to disclose on his application for registration whether he had been convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or any infraction other than traffic viola- tions to which Arthur Resnick answered "no" when, in fact, Arthur Resnick had been convicted of three counts of theft by deception involving the repair of television sets by the Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The Hearing Officer concluded that: The acts and conduct of the Petitioner in operating without a registration; advertising in a leading and deceptive manner; making false statements as an inducement to the public to authorize repair, and his failure to answer truthfully to certain questions on his sworn application for registration is good and sufficient cause for the director of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of General Regulations to deny the Petitioner a registration certificate as an electronic service dealer. The order of the Respondent adopted the Recommended Order noting that it had received no exceptions to the Recommended Order from either party and thereupon denied the application for registration as an electronic service dealer filed by Arthur Resnick. The application of Petitioner Jack Resnick indicates that he is to be the sole proprietor of the business Smart Service. It indicates that Arthur Resnick, who has the same address as the Petitioner, is to do repair work with a possible employee named Jerry Cohen. Respondent gave no other reason for the denial of Petitioner's application except for the indicated employment of Arthur Resnick.
Recommendation Retract the Notice of Intent to Deny License or Registration which was based on the fact that Arthur Resnick was the prospective employee of the Petitioner. Grant Petitioner's application for registration as an electronic repair dealer providing he presently meets the requirements of the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Hudson, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Depariment of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alexander M. Siegel, Esquire 1303 North State Road 7 Margate, Florida 33062 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION JACK RESNICK and SMART SERVICE, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1687 DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
