Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute licensees under Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent holds Florida real estate license 0315624. Until May 25, 1993, Respondent was licensed as a salesperson with Richard J. Moncello, Monard Realty and Investments, 4241 John Young Parkway, Orlando, Florida 32804. The fee arrangement between Respondent and Mr. Moncello provided that Respondent received 90 percent of the commission on her transactions and Mr. Moncello received 10 percent. Respondent and Mr. Moncello had been friends since 1982. On April 21, 1993, Respondent negotiated a contract between Mr. and Mr. Jerrod Zlatkiss, sellers, and Ms. Julie B. Maienzi, buyer, for the purchase of real property for $42,000. Mr. Moncello had no knowledge of the transaction. Respondent was in the employ of Mr. Moncello at the time. The transaction closed on April 27, 1993. The total commission due from the sellers was $1,567.57. Of that amount, Mr. Moncello was entitled to $156.75 under the fee arrangement between Respondent and Mr. Moncello. At the closing, the closing agent issued check number 8422 for $567.57 to Respondent in part payment of the commission due from the sellers. The buyer executed a promissory note for $1,000 in favor of Respondent. Respondent delivered the check for $567.57 to Respondent's mother. Respondent's mother deposited the check to her account and subsequently issued a check to Mr. Moncello for $57.00. Respondent did not have a checking account. Her mother took care of Respondent's affairs. Respondent had been injured in an automobile accident and was taking prescription drugs for pain. She was incapable of operating a motor vehicle and had to be driven to and from the closing. Respondent has little or no recollection of the events surrounding the transaction in question, including the day of closing. Mr. Moncello subsequently discovered the transaction and terminated Respondent. The amount due and owing Mr. Moncello is $100. Respondent has caused the buyers to execute a new mortgage note in favor of Monard Investors Services, Inc., in the amount of $1,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(b), be reprimanded and placed on probation for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 83-6802 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-15 Accepted in substance Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Mary K. Conner, pro se 522 Orange Drive, #16 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Florid Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section-Suite N308 400 W. Robinson Street, North Tower Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Florida Parole and Probation Commission, adopted revised rules of practice and procedure which became effective on September 10, 1981. Among these is Rule 23-21.09, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes "matrix time ranges" that are used in determining presumptive parole release dates for persons who are serving prison terms. In determining presumptive parole release dates, the Respondent's rules require that a "salient factor score" be determined based upon such factors as the number of prior criminal convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, total time served in prisons, the inmate's age at the time of the offense which led to the first incarceration, the number of probation or parole revocations, the number of prior escape convictions, and whether burglary or breaking and entering is the present offense of conviction. The degree or severity of the present offense of conviction is then determined. The Respondent's Rule 23-21.09 sets guidelines for time ranges for presumptive parole release dates depending upon the severity of the present offense of conviction and the salient factor score. The more severe the present offense of conviction, the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. Similarly, given the severity of the offense, the higher the salient factor score the longer will be the period before the presumptive parole release date. The rule replaced a rule which set different matrix time ranges. The new rule generally sets longer time ranges, but this is not uniformly true. The Petitioner, Seimore Keith, is an inmate presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution, Polk City, Florida. Polk Correctional Institution is a facility maintained by the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner Keith was convicted of grand theft in July, 1980, and was sentenced to serve five years in prison. The conviction was the result of a guilty plea which was entered in accordance with a plea bargain. During plea negotiations, Petitioner Keith was advised that his presumptive parole release date under Florida Parole and Probation Commission rules would require that he serve no more than 25 months in prison. At the time that Petitioner Keith's presumptive parole release date was set by the Respondent, the new Rule 23-21.09 had come into effect, and the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date was set to require that he serve 32 months in prison. The Petitioner, Ronnie McKane, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted of the offense of armed robbery in February, 1981. Under rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Petitioner McKane's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by Respondent in setting McKane's presumptive parole release date. The Petitioner, Daniel P. Hull, is presently incarcerated at Polk Correctional Institution. He was convicted in September, 1971, of the offense of robbery and sentenced to serve ten years in prison. He was paroled in 1974, but was reincarcerated as a result of a parole violation in 1976. In 1977 he escaped, and was recaptured in January, 1981. On June 1, 1961, Petitioner Hull was convicted of the offense of escape and sentenced to serve nine months. Under the rules in effect when he was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23-21.09, Hull's presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rules were applied by Respondent in setting Hull's presumptive parole release date, and it has been set subsequent to the expiration of his sentence. Hull will therefore be released when his sentence expires in March, 1982. The Petitioner, Douglas L. Adams, was convicted of the offenses of possession of marijuana and uttering a forged instrument, and sentenced in February, 1981, to two consecutive five-year sentences. Under the rules in effect when Adams was sentenced, which was prior to the adoption of Rule 23- 21.09, Adams' presumptive parole release date would, if the guidelines were followed, have been set sooner than under Rule 23-21.09. The new rule was applied by the Respondent in setting Adams' presumptive parole release date. During 1980, the Respondent directed its staff to begin considering proposed changes to its rules of practice and procedure. Various proposals were considered, and by September, 1980, a proposed rule package had been developed. The Respondent directed its staff to submit the proposed rule package to the Governor and members of the Cabinet, various pertinent legislators, county and circuit judges, prosecutors and public defenders, superintendents of each prison in the State, and to members of the Supreme Court and the district courts. The Commission opted to conduct various workshops throughout the State, and to invite all interested persons to share their input. Notices of the workshops were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The workshops were conducted, and the Commission commenced formal rule-making proceedings. Notice of rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and hearings were scheduled. Notice of the formal rulemaking proceedings was also published in the St. Petersburg Times, the Pensacola Journal, the Tallahassee Democrat, the Orlando Sentinel-Star, and the Florida Times-Union. Persons who had requested specific notification were provided it. In response to this notice, the Respondent received considerable written input, and oral presentations were made at hearings that were conducted. The final hearing in the rule-making proceeding was conducted on June 19, 1981, and the rules, including Rule 23- 21.09, were thereafter adopted effective September 10, 1981. Notice of the proposed rule changes and of the formal rulemaking proceeding was not specifically disseminated to inmates at Florida's prisons. The proposed rules were for- warded to the superintendent of each facility. At some of the institutions the proposed rules were apparently posted. All persons who requested copies of the proposed rules from the Florida Parole and Probation Commission were provided them. Numerous prisoners and organizations that represent prisoners made input during the various states of the rulemaking proceeding. None of the Petitioners in this matter were specifically noticed of the rulemaking proceeding. One of the Petitioners had heard that rules were being proposed, and requested copies of them from members of the Legislature or from Department of Corrections personnel. None of the Petitioners requested copies of the proposed rules from the Respondent or anyone connected with the Respondent.
The Issue Whether Judy Limekiller (Respondent) committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated August 30, 2012, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida created by section 20.165, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is charged with the responsibility of regulating the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. As such, Petitioner is fully authorized to prosecute disciplinary cases against real estate licensees. Respondent was at all times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate license, license number 3131887. At all times material to the allegations of this case Respondent was an active sales associate with Michael Saunders and Company. Respondent’s address of record is 1529 Pelican Point Drive, HA 205, Sarasota, Florida. In January 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Regina Zahofnik (Ms. Zahofnik). Ms. Zahofnik was the seller of property located at 4527 MacEachen Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida. Respondent admits she signed Ms. Zahofnik’s name to a Cancellation of Contract and Release. Respondent did not have written authorization to sign for Ms. Zahofnik. Instead, she maintains Ms. Zahofnik gave her verbal authority to sign the document. In February 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Lynda Kravitz. Ms. Kravitz was the seller of property located at 1526 Pelican Point Drive, BA 147, Sarasota, Florida. Respondent signed Ms. Kravitz’ name to a Seller’s Property Disclosure Statement. Ms. Kravitz did not authorize Respondent to sign the document. In February 2012, Respondent was a sales associate handling a transaction with Cherryne Kravitz. Ms. Kravitz was the seller of property located at 1526 Pelican Point Drive, BA 147, Sarasota, Florida. On or about February 10, 2012, Respondent signed Ms. Kravitz’ name to a Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase. Ms. Kravitz did not authorize Respondent to sign the document. In all situations, Respondent believed she was authorized to sign the documents. She claims either e-mail or text message gave her the go-ahead to sign documents so that they could be timely processed. In the case of Ms. Zahofnik, the “deal was dead” and could not close. Since the buyer elected to walk away from the purchase when the seller could not complete the transaction, Respondent maintains that no party was injured by the signing of the document and that by doing so the refund to the buyer was processed. In the case of the Kravitz sale, Respondent signed the property disclosure because she knew the property better than the sellers and an expedited completion of the paperwork was requested. Again, Respondent states Ms. Kravitz authorized the signature. And with regard to the signing of the contract, Respondent asserts that Ms. Kravitz was slow to return the contract and that she was getting pressure from the other Ms. Kravitz to get the paperwork completed. Eventually, both Kravitz daughters signed the contract. Respondent does not deny signing the contract. As a result of the allegations of this case, Michael Saunders and Company incurred expenses and lost commissions. Petitioner did not present evidence regarding the cost of investigating this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission finding Respondent in violation of the provision of law set forth in the Administrative Complaint as alleged by Petitioner, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500.00, and imposing a suspension of Respondent’s real estate license for a period of 30 days, with probation to follow for such period of time as the commission deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Leigh Matchett, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 42 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James P. Harwood, Esquire James Harwood, P.A. Suite 106 1277 North Semoran Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Juana Watkins, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Pontigo should be awarded $7,150 in attorneys' fees and $300 in costs under Section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, because the Department brought a proceeding against him which terminated in Mr. Pontigo's favor, the proceeding was not substantially justified when initiated and no special circumstances make an award of fees unjust.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulated facts and the chronology of events filed by the Department on October 31, 1990, the following are found: On December 21, 1982, George S. Pontigo was convicted of three felony offenses (a tax violation, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and using a telephone to distribute cocaine). These convictions constituted violations of Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1982), for at the time of his convictions, Mr. Pontigo held Class "P" license #P00-00679 (detection of deception examiner license). On September 1, 1983, the Department of State, Division of Licensing filed an Administrative Complaint (Case No. C 83-24) to revoke that license. An informal hearing was held on October 25, 1983, during which several character witnesses attested to the unique circumstances of Mr. Pontigo's arrest and conviction, his good moral character, his competence as a polygraph examiner, his honesty and his suitability for licensure. The Department of State entered a Final Order on November 15, 1983, which specifically found that a denial of licensure based solely on Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes, was unwarranted as too severe. A period of probation for one (1) year was imposed. The probationary period ended on November 30, 1984. No conduct during the probationary period provided a basis for non-renewal of the license. Mr. Pontigo's license was renewed and has been continuously renewed since that date. On June 7, 1988, the Department again filed an Administrative Complaint to revoke Mr. Pontigo's Detection of Deception Examiner License, this time based upon Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes, and the same criminal conviction of December 21, 1982, which had been the basis for the imposition of probation in the Department's Final Order of November 15, 1983. On June 28, 1989, the Department amended its Administrative Complaint. On August 18, 1989, Pontigo filed an answer and defenses, which argued that further disciplinary action was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that the statute could not be applied retroactively to Mr. Pontigo. An informal hearing was held on this second effort to revoke Mr. Pontigo's license on October 3, 1989. An Order entered that same day by Fred Speaker, the internal departmental hearing officer, recommended that "in the interest of fairness, I would recommend the Division [of Licensing] honor the decision reached as a result of the hearing of October 25, 1983." The internal departmental hearing officer felt compelled, however, to revoke Mr. Pontigo's license. On November 7, 1989, the Department of State, Division of Licensing entered its second Final Order based upon the 1982 criminal conviction, this time revoking Mr. Pontigo's license. By letter dated November 21, 1989, the Department confirmed that the Final Order was issued after considering Mr. Pontigo's October 19, 1989 Memorandum of Law and the Affidavit of Representative Alberto Gutman of the Florida House of Representatives dated January 5, 1989. The Department stated in the Final Order that it revoked Mr. Pontigo's license based upon Section 493.319(3), Florida Statutes. That statute mandates the revocation of a license or denial of an application "... when the person or licensee has been convicted of a felony, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended, unless and until civil rights have been restored and a period of ten years has expired." This disciplinary provision was first enacted in 1986 as part of Chapter 86-193, sec. 17 Laws of Florida, and codified as Section 493.319(1)(p), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Before that time, a licensee could be disciplined if found guilty of a crime directly related to the business for which the license had been issued. Section 493.319(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). Amendatory language was added regarding convictions based upon a plea of nolo contendere in 1987 and the provision was renumbered. Chapters 87-135, sec. 3 and 87-274, sec. 10, Laws of Florida. By letter of May 9, 1988, the Secretary of State informed the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House, that the Department would be required to review all licensing files for possible revocation action based on the 1987 amendment. The 1988 Legislature authorized a transfer of funds within the Department for the purpose of reviewing existing Chapter 493, gun permits and Chapter 790, concealed weapons licenses for appropriate action. Chapter 88-557, sec. 30, Laws of Florida; Chapter 87-247, sec. 58, Laws of Florida. The permit at issue here was neither a gun permit nor a concealed weapons permit, so the authorization for a fund transfer is irrelevant. George Pontigo appealed the Final Order of the Department revoking his Detection of Deception License to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, by Notice of Appeal dated December 1, 1989. The Department did not oppose a motion filed in the appellate court to stay the effect of the revocation order, and a judicial stay of the revocation was granted on January 9, 1990. Mr. Pontigo filed his brief on March 19, 1990. On April 13, 1990, the Department entered an Amended Final Order dismissing with prejudice its Administrative Complaint. While the second round of administrative litigation with Mr. Pontigo had been pending, Congressional action placed the continued licensure of polygraph examiners in doubt, because the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Public Law 100-347, effective December 27, 1988 would reduce the number of examiners throughout the country because the uses of polygraphy were restricted. Chapter 493 went through Sunset Review during the 1990 session of the Florida Legislature. By March 1990, the Department believed that the state licensure program for polygraph examiners would cease. Chapter 493 was revised by Chapter 90-364, Laws of Florida, so that as of October 1, 1990, Part II of Chapter 493, which had regulated polygraphers was repealed. Id., Sec. 10. After the Department determined that the polygraph licensure program would be phased out, it dismissed the Pontigo revocation action then pending in the Court of Appeal. The attorneys for George Pontigo filed a Petition for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Florida Statute 57.111. For services rendered through November 8, 1990, the attorneys for Petitioner request $7,150.00 in legal fees and $300.00 in costs for a total of $7,450.00 The Department does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount claimed. The sole issue in this proceeding is whether attorneys fees and costs should be awarded to Mr. Pontigo under Section 571.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, as a prevailing small business party because the actions of the agency were not substantially justified and no special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Second Amended Petition to Intervene in Licensing and Administrative Proceeding and for Formal Administrative Hearing filed in each of these cases by LEAF and Suzi Ruhl. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Ludder, Esquire Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. 1115 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cynthia K. Christen, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez and Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Virginia B. Wetherall, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact 12. The factual allegations contained in the Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 1, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 18, 2010, the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on September 28, 2010, and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on December 28, 2010, attached as “Exhibit A”, “Exhibit B”, “Exhibit D“, and “Exhibit F”, respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc., the Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 1, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”), issued an Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-360-D3-OPA to Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $26,455.55 against Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. for its failure to secure workers’ compensation for its employees as required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On February 4, 2010, the Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. by certified mail. A copy of the Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On March 18, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $12,368.81 against Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty- one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On March 24, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. by certified mail. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On April 14, 2010, Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. filed a request for an administrative hearing (“Petition”) with the Department, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 10-6375. A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C”. 6. On September 28, 2010, the Department issued a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,169.99 against Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. 7. On September 29, 2010, the Department filed a Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment with the attached 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment with the Division of Administrative Hearings in DOAH Case No. 10-6375. On December 23, 2010, Administrative Law Judge B. J. Staros entered an Order granting the Department’s Motion to Amend. A copy of the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On December 28, 2010, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,037.97 against Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. 9. On December 28, 2010, after receiving written notification from Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. that it did not wish to proceed to an administrative hearing in this matter, the Department filed a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction in DOAH Case No. 10-6375. As a result, Administrative Law Judge B. J. Staros entered an Order Closing File, relinquishing Jurisdiction of this matter to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit E”, 10. OnJanuary 13, 2011, the Department and Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. entered into a Settlement Agreement wherein Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. agreed to pay the Department the penalty assessed in the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $10,037.97. 11. On January 27, 2011, the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Wine Warehouse of St. Petersburg, Inc. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. A copy of the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue Petitioner challenges the validity of Rule 3SF-2.13, Florida Administrative Code. 1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the entire record compiled herein, including the parties' factual stipulation, the following relevant facts are found. MISSION Insurance Co. (MISSION) is a corporation duly authorized to issue insurance policies, including workers' compensation insurance policies in the State of Florida. MISSION conducts its adjusting operations at North Regency One, Suite 400, 985 Regency Square Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. In the regular course of its business, MISSION adjusted the worker's compensation claim of Katrine Graham, who was injured on April 30, 1984 in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Smiley's Mobey Dick Restaurant. MISSION received notice of the accident on May 21, 1984. On September 1, 1984, MISSION filed with the DIVISION its initial Injury Progress report (LES From BCL-13), in connection with the claim. On February 11, 1985, MISSION received from the DIVISION's Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier practices a letter dated February 4, 1985, notifying MISSION that the Bureau had assessed against MISSION the penalty of $100.00 for filing the form 11 days after the time prescribed by Rule 38F-3.16, F.A.C. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "A." Since at least 1979, the DEPARTMENT has had a policy of imposing a fine of $100.00 on any insurance carrier who files its initial Injury Progress Report (LES From BCL-13) more than 105 days after it receives notice of the accident. The DEPARTMENT applies this policy, through its Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier Practices, to all insurance carriers and self-insured employers who come within the jurisdiction of the DEPARTMENT. The DEPARTMENT imposes penalties for the untimely filing of forms other than the BCL-13 form. The penalties to be imposed for the untimely filing of the BCL-13 form, as well as other forms, are stated in a "Penalty Assessment Chart," a copy of which is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "B." At the time the subject penalty was imposed on MISSION, this chart was used by the DEPARTMENT's workers' compensation examiners in determining whether a penalty should be imposed and, if so, the amount of the penalty. The DEPARTMENT did not implement or use Chapter 120 rulemaking procedures to adopt the Penalty Assessment Chart, or the policy it represents, as a rule. PETITIONER'S POSITION Petitioner contends that the Penalty Assessment Chart amounts to an unpublished rule which has the effect of exacting a penalty for "late" filing in excess of Respondent's legislative authority inasmuch as Respondent is only authorized to impose a penalty based on a carriers failure or refusal to file forms, reports, or notices pursuant to Section 445.185(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner avers that in the absence of specific statutory authorization for Respondent to impose a penalty or assessment for an untimely filing, there is no basis upon which Respondent can impose the penalty involved herein, that the rule should be declared invalid and the $100.00 penalty imposed based thereon, should be rescinded. RESPONDENT'S POSITION Respondent avers that timely filings are inextricably tied to the Division's reporting requirements and that to conclude that a carrier could file reports, notices, etc. at will, without any directive, would lead to an absurd result in contravention of Respondent's long-standing reporting policy which has been effective since approximately 1979. Finally, Respondent urges that the legislature has authorized it to exact penalties for late filings based on the authority granted in Sections 440.185(5) and (9), Florida Statutes.
