Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407
Findings Of Fact At about 4:00 o'clock on the afternoon of May 8, 1979, petitioner's officers David William Shomers and Muriel Snipes Waldmann, entered respondent's place of business. At that time, Sherry Ann Armetto was behind the bar. When Officers Shomers and Waldmann asked Ms. Armetto for a meal she told them that the cook had not yet arrived. Officer Shomers and Officer Waldmann then each ordered a Scotch and soda, and both were served. At about 5:00 o'clock, the cook was still nowhere to he found. Officer Shomers counted the places available for people to sit down and eat, including seats in the bar, and determined that there were only 161 such places. Even though Ms. Armetto had worked for respondent as a bar tender for five or six months before the inspection on May 8, 1979, she had never been advised to refrain from selling alcoholic beverages when the kitchen was closed. She was so advised, however, after the events of May 8, 1979. Ricardo John Gutierrez had worked for the business four or four and one half years as of May of 1979. He was never told not to sell alcoholic beverages while meals were not sold. Petitioner initiated the present proceedings on or about July 3, 1979. In May of 1979, respondent Pete Rose Corporation held license number 16-790 SRX, an "ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LICENSE FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1970, THRU SEPTEMBER 30, 1979." Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. Respondent has not renewed the license since. As a condition of this beverage license, respondent was required to maintain at least 4,000 square feet, sufficient tables, chairs, china, other equipment and personnel to serve food to 200 persons, Officer Shomers testified.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause, thereby terminating these proceedings and allowing respondent's license to expire; and then cancel respondent's license. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Pete Rose Corporation d/b/a Fat Cats 2590 S. State Road 7 Miramar, Florida
The Issue Whether the Respondent failed to have the seating capacity required of a licensee in its category as alleged by the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent, EDM of Key West, Inc., d/b/a/ Portside, was the holder of a special restaurant license issued by Petitioner, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation. This license, Series 6-COP, Number 54-00999SRX, authorizes Respondent to sell alcoholic beverages, subject to regulation by Petitioner and other authorities, in conjunction with its restaurant business. On November 16, 1988, Petitioner's law enforcement investigator, David Myers, inspected Respondent's premises to determine whether Respondent was in compliance with the regulations applicable to licensees such as Respondent. Two violations were discovered. The first was that the establishment failed to have sufficient seating for patrons under the covered portion of the premises. The second was that the establishment failed to keep adequate records of its sales of food and of its sales of alcohol as required by regulation. Official Notices were issued by Petitioner to Respondent for both violations. Investigator Myers told Respondent's dining room manager on November 16, 1988, that the establishment was required to have seating sufficient for at least 150 dining patrons under a permanent roof and that the seats located outside the roofed area could not be counted toward that requirement. This advice is consistent with Petitioner's interpretation of Rule 7A-3.014, Florida Administrative Code. Prior to December 12, 1988, Investigator Myers advised the management of Respondent that he intended to make a follow-up inspection on December 12, 1988. On December 12, 1988, there were 132 seats for dining patrons within the roofed area. Other seats for dining patrons were located in an uncovered area. Petitioner filed a Notice to Show Cause subsequent to its inspection of December 12, 1988, against Respondent alleging, in pertinent part, the following: On December 12, 1988, you, EDM OF KEY WEST INC., failed to have accommodations for service of 150 patrons at tables on your licensed premises . . . . The Notice to Show Cause did not cite Respondent for failure to keep adequate records of sales. On May 22, 1989, an inspection revealed that there was seating for only 118 dining patrons under the roofed area. On June 5, 1989, Respondent was found to be in compliance with the seating requirement. Respondent filed a timely request for hearing and therein denied the factual allegations of the charge brought against it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of having failed to have accommodations for the seating of 150 dining patrons as required by Section 561.20(2)(a)4, Florida Statutes, and by Rule 7A-3.014 and Rule 7A-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, and which imposes an administrative fine of $500.00 against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 2. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5-6. Addressed in paragraphs 4-5. Rejected in part as being unnecessary or subordinate to the findings made. 7-8. Addressed in paragraph 7. Rejected as being unnecessary to the result reached. Addressed in paragraph 3. 11-16. Rejected as being recitation of testimony or subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 2. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5-6. Addressed in paragraphs 4-5. Rejected in part as being unnecessary or subordinate to the findings made. 7-8. Addressed in paragraph 7. Rejected as being unnecessary to the result reached. Addressed in paragraph 3. 11-16. Rejected as being recitation of testimony or subordinate to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry Hooper, Esquire Deputy General Counsel 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 James T. Hendrick, Esquire MORGAN & HENDRICK, P.A. Post Office Box 1117 Key West, Florida 33041 Leonard Ivey, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Golfweek, Inc., was incorporated in March of 1975. During the year 1975 it began to publish "Florida Golfweek" which is a weekly publication concerning the golf industry in Florida. The Petitioner has published "Florida Golfweek" continuously since 1975, and it now has approximately 10,000 paid subscribers from every state and some foreign countries. Eighty-five to ninety percent of these subscribers are Florida residents. The Petitioner started a golf tournament called "Florida Women's Open" in 1978. This tournament was held at Errol Estate at Apopka in 1978, and in 1979, at Rolling Hills at Fort Lauderdale in 1980, at Plantation Inn in Crystal River in 1981 and 1982, and at Grenelefe Resort in Haines City in 1983. The Petitioner sets the dates for this tournament each year, and engages the golf courses. The event is publicized in its publication "Florida Golfweek," and in daily newspapers throughout the state, as well as on radio stations. Posters are printed and are circulated for display at golf courses. Entry blanks for the tournament are published in "Florida Golfweek" and these are sent to all Florida golf courses, about 60 of them. The entry blanks show the entry fee and where it should be mailed, normally to the Petitioner's address in Winter Haven, Florida. Both professionals and amateurs from the State of Florida play in this tournament, which has been established for Florida women golfers. A total of 260 played in the 1983 event. There has never been a fee charged for spectators, and the tournament has never been named anything but "Florida Women's Open." The Petitioner pays the prize money to the tournament winners, checks to the professionals and merchandise to the amateurs. It arranges for cocktail parties, and bears all of the expenses of the tournament including the golf course, carts, and green fees since 1978. The Petitioner makes a profit from this tournament, and as the field of players grows the profit potential will increase. There is a projection that a total of 400 golfers will participate in this tournament eventually. The Petitioner does not intend to abandon either the tournament or its name "Florida Women's Open." The Petitioner moves the tournament around Florida so as to return some business to golf courses and organizations which advertise in "Florida Golfweek," and also in deference to the participants, to get the event into their area. In March of 1983 the Petitioner learned that Plantation Inn at Crystal River intended to put on a similar tournament which had been named "Florida Women's Open," and that a corporation had been formed with the name Florida Women's Open, Inc. This tournament was put on by the Respondent at Plantation Inn at Crystal River in October of 1983. The Petitioner's president received a brochure about the Respondent's tournament, and he saw this brochure at a number of golf courses in Florida. He received telephone calls at the office of "Florida Golfweek" about the two opens, inquiring which is which. He also saw articles in the St. Petersburg Times publicizing the Respondent's tournament. These are the facts which have been found as a result of the Petitioner's proof. From the pleading presented by the Department of State's Division of Corporations, it is also found that the Respondent was issued Charter No. G11537 permitting the use of the corporate name Florida Women's Open, Inc., on December 3, 1982, and that on April 19, 1983, Mark Registration No. 929223 was issued to the Petitioner, Florida Golfweek, Inc., permitting the use of the trademark "Florida Women's Open" by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter its Final Order finding that on the evidence presented the Respondent is entitled to use the corporate name Florida Women's Open, Inc., and that the Petition of Florida Golfweek, Inc., be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 26th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Randall G. Blankenship, Esquire Post Office Box 917 Winter Haven, Florida 33882 W. T. Green, Esquire Route One, Box 403 Crystal River, Florida 32629 Carole J. Barice, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner, Atlantic Social Club, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida on July 27, 1972. Its Articles of Incorporation, filed with the Secretary of State, reflect it is a corporation not for profit and its purpose is to be concerned with: . . . the needy and underprivileged and to promote and be charitable to those in distress . . . . Petitioner registered with the Florida Department of Revenue on May 31, 1983, and on June 1, 1983, filed an application with DABT for an 11-C alcoholic beverage license which may be issued to, inter alia, social clubs, nonprofit corporations, or clubs devoted to promoting community development, without limitation on the number of licenses issued in this category. Organizations, to qualify, must meet certain standards set out by rule and statute. At the time of filing the application, Petitioner submitted several personal questionnaires executed under oath by the then corporate officers. The questionnaires signed by two officers, Elzie Lee Jackson and David Daniel Riles, indicated that they had never been arrested, charged, or convicted of any offense. However, on April 12, 1977, Mr. Riles had been charged by the State Attorney in Miami, with, on February 12, 1977, carrying a concealed firearm (felony); possession of a firearm by an intoxicated person; and trespass after warning. Documentation submitted also reveals that on October 16, 1982, Mr. Jackson had been arrested at the Atlantic Social Club by state beverage officers for the sale of alcoholic beverages without a license. Neither individual is currently an officer, director, or member of the club. Upon receipt of Petitioner's application, on June 29, 1983, Respondent, in writing, requested that Petitioner submit certain specified additional information necessary for investigation of the application. The information was to be submitted by July 23, 1983. The requested information consisted of a list of club members and a copy of its bylaws. In the interim, Investigator Oliva attempted, by telephone, to contact Mr. Riles to set up an appointment for an interview but could not reach him. When the deadline for submitting the requested information had passed without compliance, Oliva met with Petitioner's representative, Mathew Bothwell, at Respondent's Miami office on July 25, 1983. At this time Bothwell provided the requested membership lists and bylaws as well as records of meetings. At the meeting, Bothwell stated that Petitioner donated money to various charitable organizations, churches, and needy individuals. When asked for records of these donations, Bothwell indicated they did not normally exist but that he would try to provide them. The documentation submitted by Petitioner for consider- ation of the Hearing Officer indicates charitable contributions on: December 30, 1977 - Variety Children's Hospital $200.00 March 28, 1980 - Variety Children's Hospital $100.00 January 16, 1981 - Variety Children's Hospital $100.00 January 7, 1982 - Variety Children's Hospital $100.00 February 28, 1982 - New Jerusalem PBC $200.00 Mr. Bothwell, by affidavit, also contends that the Club has continued to help the needy and unemployed by providing meals and foodstuffs but there is no evidence confirming this from even one recipient of this assistance. Petitioner did produce other club records which included a copy of the bylaws dated July, 1983, the minutes of one meeting held on January 18, 1983, and a list of six members dated July 19, 1983. The bylaws are extremely limited and provide very little guidance for club operation. Certain provisions ordinarily required by rule, such as the method by which members are elected, are missing. Mr. Bothwell explained that the records of meetings, other than that submitted for January 18, 1983, were kept by the Club's secretary and were not available even though they had been requested by Respondent several weeks earlier. At the close of the July 25, 1983 meeting between Oliva and Bothwell, Bothwell was informed that in order for the processing of the Club's application to progress, it would be necessary for Respondent to be furnished: written minutes of all meetings; accounting records, receipts, and other documentary proof of the Club's charitable activities; and affidavits from Riles and Jackson indicating why they had failed to include their arrests on the personal questionnaires they submitted with the application. These requested documents were not furnished to Respondent, but, on October 16, 1980, pursuant to the Order dated October 4, 1984, counsel for Petitioner submitted the membership records, documentary evidence of the $700.00 in contributions referenced above, and affidavits from Bothwell and Singletary to the effect that neither Riles, nor Jackson has any current affiliation with the organization. The membership records provided, kept in a spiral notebook, which go no further than July 12, 1983, reflect 13 members. They also reflect that the 9 older members paid dues of $10.00 per week and in addition, paid money in for savings and dances. The earliest records on membership submitted were dated in January, 1981, and reflected activity from that time up to July 12, 1983. The Club's bank book, which, as of the last entry on May 31, 1983 showed a balance of $94.56, reflected a balance in October, 1982 of almost $6,400.00. No explanation was given for how this sum was disposed of. When, on August 28, 1983, as a part of the ongoing investigation of the license application, Agents Oliva and Delmonte went to Petitioner's indicated address to get the information requested of Bothwell on July 25, they found both front and rear doors locked. Repeated knocking on all doors failed to get a response and it appeared as if the building was unoccupied. As of the present date, Petitioner has failed to provide Respondent with its federal employer's identification number though it promised to do so in the past. On November 28, 1983, Respondent denied Petitioner's application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the application of the Petitioner, Atlantic Social Club, Inc., for an 11-C alcoholic beverage license be DENIED. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of November, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George J. Tallianoff, Esquire Suite 600C, Office in the Grove 2699 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 Captain John J. Harris Department of Business Regulation 1350 Northwest 12th Avenue, Room 552 Miami, Florida 33136 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard M. Rassmussen, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, John's Island Club, Inc. (petitioner or the club), is a not-for-profit corporation which owns and operates a private country club facility in the John's Island residential development in Indian River County, Florida. It provides a variety of recreational facilities to its members. Among the amenities are three golf courses, nineteen tennis courts, a tennis building, a beach club, a club house, a swimming pool, and dining facilities. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is a statutorily created agency charged with the administration of the state revenue laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated thereunder. As a result of an amendment made in 1991 to Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, DOR is authorized by law to impose an admissions tax on "dues and fees" paid to private membership clubs providing recreational facilities. As a private membership club, petitioner is subject to this tax. Beginning on July 1, 1994, petitioner made an assessment on each member to raise capital for the purpose of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. During the six month period ending December 31, 1994, $10,441,897 was collected from the members and made available to the club. Rule 12A- 1.005(d)1.b., Florida Administrative Code, which was adopted by DOR in December 1991 to implement the admissions tax on dues and fees, imposes a tax on "(a)ny periodic assessment (additional paid-in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non-equity club for capital improvements." Under the authority of that rule, DOR required that petitioner pay the applicable sales tax on the assessment collected through December 31, 1994, or $730,932.79, and that it continue to pay the tax as other similar assessments are made in the future. Claiming that the rule exceeds DOR's grant of rulemaking authority, and it modifies, enlarges, and contravenes the law implemented, petitioner filed a petition for administrative determination of invalidity of existing rule. DOR denies all allegations and asks that the validity of its rule be upheld. The Club and the Assessment The composition of the club The club began operation in 1969 but was purchased by its members in 1986. It is an equity private membership club but issues no stock. The club has two types of memberships: golf and sports social. Currently, the cost of a golf equity membership is $85,000 while the cost of a sports social membership is $30,000. After payment of these fees, the member receives a membership certificate, which represents his or her equity ownership interest in the club. At the present time, there are 1125 golf memberships and 257 sports social memberships. Of the 1125 golf memberships, the original developer still owns 67. In addition to having to purchase a membership, members must also pay annual dues. A golf member pays $4,875 in annual dues while a sports social member pays $2,760 in annual dues. A sales tax is also collected on these dues. The dues are used to cover operating expenses such as insurance, administrative costs, staff salaries, and maintenance costs. In addition, members pay fees for additional services such as golf cart use, golf bag storage, locker room use, and golf and tennis lessons. When a member decides to resign or retire from the club, he or she may resell the membership to the club (but not a third party) and receive the greater of (a) the initial amount paid by the retiring member, or (b) 80 percent of the current membership cost (with the remaining 20 percent retained by the club in a separate capital improvement account). The assessment In 1992, the club began studying the feasibility of repairing and replacing many of its physical facilities. The total cost of the proposed work was set at $16,372,000. By majority vote taken in the spring of 1994, the members decided to raise capital for the work by imposing a capital assessment on each current member. It was agreed that the capital contribution would be $12,000 from each golf member and $11,150 from each sports social member. However, the payment of the capital contribution was not intended to, and did not result in any, decrease in the dues which members were required to pay for the use of the club's facilities. A failure to pay the assessment would result in suspension from the club. Three different options were made available to the members for the manner of payment of the capital contribution. The options included (a) a single payment, (b) payment over a three-year period, or (c) payment of interest only until such time as the member either sold the membership or left the club. After making payment in full, the member would be issued a certificate of capital contribution. It is noted that the developer was required to pay the capital contribution for his 67 golf memberships. Further, any person joining the club after the imposition of the assessment would likewise be required to pay the assessment. Beginning in July 1994, the club began collecting the capital contribution from its members. From July through December 1994, some $10,441,897 was collected. A total sales tax of $730,932.79 has been paid on those collections. Shortly thereafter, petitioner opted to file this rule challenge. The Rule and its Origin Rule 12A-1.005(5)(d)1.b. provides as follows: (d)1. Effective July 1, 1991, the following fees paid to private clubs or membership clubs as a condition precedent to, in conjunction with, or for the use of the club's recreational or physical fitness facilities are subject to tax. * * * b. Any periodic assessments (additional paid in capital) required to be paid by members of an equity or non equity club for capital improvements or other operating costs, unless the periodic assessment meets the criteria of a refundable deposit as provided in sub-subparagraph 2.e. below. * * * Under the terms of the rule, the capital contri- bution assessed by the club does not qualify as a refundable deposit. This is because any difference between the amount collected by the club upon the sale of a membership to a new member, and the amount which was paid to the retiring member, is retained by the club. Because Rule 12A-1.005, Florida Administrative Code, covers a wide array of items subject to taxation, the DOR cites Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority for adopting the rule, and Sections 212.02(1), 212.031, 212.04, 212.08(6) and (7), 240.533(4)(c), and 616.260, Florida Statutes, as the law implemented. There is no dispute between the parties, however, that in adopting sub-subparagraph 1.b., which contains the challenged language, the agency was relying principally on Subsection 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, as the law being implemented. That subsection defines the term "admissions" for sales tax purposes. Although the parties did not specifically say so, DOR relies on Section 212.17(6), Florida Statutes, as its source of authority for adopting the rule. That subsection authorizes DOR to "make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter . . . for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder." For the purpose of assisting DOR in administering the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, which imposes a sales and use tax on various transactions, Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, provides definitions of various terms used in the chapter, including the term "admissions." Prior to the 1991 legislative session, subsection 212.02(1) read in pertinent part as follows: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, exercise, and fitness facilities. During the 1991 legislative session, the definition of the term "admissions" was expanded by the addition of the following underscored language: The term "admissions" means and includes . . . all dues and fees . . . paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities, including, but not limited to, golf, tennis, swimming, yachting, boating, athletic, excercise, and fitness facilities. Thus, the legislature added the term "fees" to the term "dues" for those amounts "paid to any private clubs and membership clubs" which would be subject to the admissions tax. Prior to the above change in substantive law, rule 12A-1.005(5), as it then existed, provided that dues paid to athletic clubs which provided recreational facilities were taxable. However, subparagraph (5)(c) of the rule also provided that (c) Capital contributions or assessments to an organization by its members are not taxable as charges for admissions when they are in the nature of payments made by the member of his or her share of capital costs, not charges for admission to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment, and when they are clearly shown as capital contributions on the organization's records. Contributions and assessments will be considered taxable when their payment results in a decrease in periodic dues or user fees required of the payor to use the organization's recreational or physical fitness facilities or equipment. Therefore, capital contributions were not taxable unless they resulted in decreased dues. That is to say, if a club levied an assessment on members and concurrently lowered its monthly dues, the assessment would be deemed to be taxable and in contravention of the rule. Thus, the effect of the rule was to prevent a club from renaming "dues" as "capital contributions" or "assessments" in order to avoid paying a tax on the dues. After the change in substantive law, the DOR staff began preparing numerous drafts of an amendment to its rule to comply with the new statutory language. At one stage of the drafting process, a DOR staffer recommended that, because the legislature had not provided a definition of the term "fee," the DOR should adopt a rule which provided that capital contributions be "not taxable if assessed under an equitable membership." Relying on what it says is the legislative intent, the DOR eventually proposed, and later adopted, the rule in its present form. In doing so, the DOR relied upon the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees" which are found in certain legislative history documents pertaining to the new legislation. Legislative History of the Law Implemented Although a number of bills related to the subject of a sales tax on admissions, the bill enacted into law was identified as Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523 (CS/HB 2523). The legislative history of the various bills relating to this subject has been received in evidence and considered by the undersigned. In early 1991, the House and Senate considered bills which addressed amendments to the sales tax on admissions. The first time the issue was addressed was at a meeting on February 21, 1991, of the Subcommittee on Sales Tax of the House Committee on Finance and Taxation. The discussion at the meeting indicated that the intent of the bill was to close a loophole that allowed physical fitness facilities to change their pricing structure to charge a higher initiation fee, which was not taxable, and thereby reduce their monthly dues, which were taxable, so as to reduce the revenue below that originally anticipated by this tax on admissions. This is corroborated by the bill analysis of the proposed committee bill that was offered, PCB FT 91-3A, which summarized the problem and solution as follows: Section 212.02(1), F. S. was amended during the 1990 Legislative Session to include in the definition of admissions those "dues" of "membership clubs" providing "physical fitness" facilities. Some clubs have attempted to avoid the tax (on dues) by shifting a substantial portion of the members' payments from "dues" to "initiation fees." Section 212.02(1), F. S., is amended to include "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions. It is unclear, but likely, that PCB FT 91-3A became House Bill 2417 (HB 2417). The bill analysis and economic impact statement on HB 2417, which was prepared by the House Committee on Appropriations, contained identical language to that in the bill analysis on PCB FT 91-3A. At the same time, the Senate was considering Senate Bill 1128, which later became Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1128 (CS/SB 1128). On March 14, 1991, a staff analysis and economic impact statement on CS/SB 1128 was prepared by the Senate Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. It provided that: Section 212.02(1), Florida Statutes, defines "admissions" for sales and use tax purposes. Monthly fees of clubs with major facilities such as tennis courts, a swimming pool or a golf course have always been subject to the sales tax. During the 1990 Legislative Session this statute was amended to include dues on membership clubs providing physical fitness facilities, and not having these other major facilities. According to the DOR, such clubs have attempted to avoid payment of this tax by shifting a substantial portion of the members payments from dues to initiation fees which are not taxed. Accordingly, the purpose of the proposed statutory amendment was "to include initiation fees as well as dues in the definition of admissions." HB 2417 was passed by the House on April 17, 1991, and was sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Claims. HB 2417 died in that Committee. CS/SB 1128 was passed by the Senate on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the House, where it died in messages. A separate bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 2523, which addressed similar issues to those addressed in HB 2417 and CS/SB 1128, was passed by the House on April 4, 1991, and was sent to the Senate where it was passed with amendments. The Bill was then returned to the House where further amendments were adopted. The Bill was again sent to the Senate with a request for the Senate to concur with the House amendments. The Senate refused to concur and the Bill was sent to a conference committee. The conference committee on finance and taxation met on April 19, 1991. The entirety of the discussion of the committee on this issue is as follows: Senator Jenne: The - - going down to number 21, admissions, initiation fees. The House includes capitalization fees. Representative Abrams: Which is this? Mr. Weiss: The Senate bill just states initiation fees are additionally included. The House bill, I believe, says that it's just all fees, which would include whether they called them initiation fees or capital facility fees or whatever. Representative Abrams: Because we are using something other than initiation - - Mr. Weiss: It's a fee that is going to be included. Representative Abrams: Yes, they were using - - they were breaking down categories of fees to avoid the tax, I think is what the deal was there. That gets us how much? Senator Jenne: Okay, well, it doesn't matter, because you can do it. Representative Abrams: Okay, good. Although the terms "capital facility fees" and "capitalization fees" were used during the discussion, contrary to DOR's assertion, it is far from clear that the intent of the amendment was to make taxable all capital contributions and assessments paid by members of private clubs providing recreational facilities. When placed in context with the prior debate before the committees and their staff analyses, it is much more likely that the intent was to close a loophole then used by physical fitness clubs who were renaming dues as fees in order to avoid taxes. The report of the conference committee was received by both houses on April 30, and CS/HB 2523 was passed by both houses the same day. The conference committee report for the bill contains only the following language describing the sales tax on admissions/initiation fees: Includes all recreational or physical fitness facility fees in the definition as admissions. The official conference committee report contains no reference to the terms "capitalization fees" or "capital facility fees." Neither does it make reference to the terms "assessment" or "paid in capital," which are the terms used by DOR in its rule. In the final bill analysis and economic impact statement prepared by the House Committee on Finance and Taxation for CS/HB 2523 on June 12, 1991, or 43 days after the bill was passed, the analysis states that subsection 212.02(1) was amended to include: "fees" as well as "dues" in the definition of admissions. All fees, including initiation fees and capitalization fees, paid to private clubs and membership clubs providing recreational or physical fitness facilities would be subject to the sales tax on admissions . . . This amendment should also limit further attempts to avoid taxation by renaming the fees collected from members. The staff analysis was obviously not available to members of the House or Senate when they voted on the bill on April 30, 1991. Although the final bill analysis used the term "capitalization fees," no where in any of the legislative history is there evidence of any legislative consideration of what was actually meant by that term. This is also true of the term "capital facility fees" which surfaced on one occasion prior to the passage of the bill. Capitalization Fees and Their Significance The sole basis for the DOR including the tax on assessments for capital improvements was the appearance in the legislative history of the terms "capitalization fees" and "capital facility fees." Neither term has any meaning to tax accountants. However, the accounting witnesses for both parties agreed that, from an accounting perspective, the phrase "capital facilities" would be understood to be assets having a life longer than one year. A capital contribution is typically a one time payment for the purchase of assets. It does not entitle the member to use the club. It is an equity transaction, not an income transaction, and it represents an intent to make an investment to improve the value of the membership assets separate and apart from the payment of annual expenses for the receipt of some service. "Dues" are a member's contribution to the operating costs of a club. They are assessed over an annual period and they are recurring. They also represent the payment that a member pays for admission to the organization. A capital contribution paid by a member of an equity membership club is not "dues." "Fees" as applied to a club are user charges. They are voluntary so that a member can decide whether or not to incur the charge based on whether the member uses the particular service to which it relates. A capital contribution is not a "fee."
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent’s alcoholic beverage license Number 39-01036, Series 4-COP, for the premises located in the 900 block of Franklin Street in Tampa, Florida, should be disciplined in some manner because of the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause entered herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Petitioner, DABT, was the state agency responsible for the issue of alcoholic beverages licenses in Florida and the regulation of the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in this state. Respondent, Bay Entertainment, Inc., now known as Freedom Rings Entertainment, Inc., operated a night club, Solar, in the 900 block of Franklin Street in Tampa. There is some disagreement as to whether the facility was located at 911 Franklin Street or at 913 Franklin Street. The confusion is irrelevant to the issues for consideration since there is no indication a different club was operating at the second location, and there is no question regarding the identity or the licensure of the facility where the indicated misconduct was alleged to have taken place. The operation was licensed by the Petitioner under alcoholic beverage license number 39-01036, 4-COP. DABT S/A Elaine Paven first went to Solar on December 13, 1996 at approximately 11:55 p.m.. At the time, she was accompanied by S/A Murray and a confidential source. After paying the cover charge to the doorman, the party was directed to the second floor of the facility where the bar was located. From that location, they could look down to the first floor where another bar and the dance area were located. When Paven and her party went to the bar, she observed Tiffany Middlesexx, a transvestite and known narcotics user, sitting on the bar against the wall. Several male dancers, either wearing only a G-string or nude with a towel over their privates were performing. Paven and Murray went up to Middlesexx and asked to buy cocaine. Middlesexx asked them how much they wanted, and Paven gave the confidential source twenty dollars to buy some. The source gave the money to Middlesexx who, in return, gave the source a white powder which, in turn, was delivered by the source to Paven. All during this transaction, employees of the facility were routinely working in the immediate area. Other patrons appeared to be buying from Middlesexx as well, though Paven drew this conclusion only from her observation of individuals who approached Middlesexx as her source did. Paven has no direct knowledge of whether cocaine or any other proscribed drug was transferred from Middlesexx to the other patrons or whether money was transferred. In addition, however, as Paven and her party were leaving the club that night, she observed another known cocaine dealer, not further identified, enter the club. Paven next went to Solar on December 21, 1996. Tiffany Middlesexx was again sitting on the bar as before. Paven approached Middlesexx and asked for cocaine. In response, Middlesexx asked how much Paven wanted, and Paven transferred twenty dollars to Middlesexx. With that, Middlesexx took a packet of white powder out of the purse he/she was carrying and gave it to Paven. Paven saw several other similar transactions by Middlesexx that evening, during which Solar employees were present and could have observed them, and at no time did any club employee attempt to interfere with or prevent the purchases. That same evening, up on the second floor of the bar, Paven overheard a conversation between two other patrons who were discussing obtaining Ecstasy, also a proscribed narcotic. In addition, she observed patrons exiting the rest rooms snuffing and rubbing their noses which, to her, based on her training and experience, was indicative of drug use. Paven next went to the club on the evening of January 10, 1997, arriving just before 10:00 p.m. and staying until after midnight. During that period, however, she left for a short while and returned. Sometime that evening, during a conversation with Dennis, a bartender on the second floor, he told her that the club took a liberal and permissive approach toward drugs, and that the owner usually stayed on the first floor. Paven also went to the first floor that evening and, while in the restroom, notwithstanding signs posted prohibiting more than one person in a stall at a time, observed patrons go into the stalls in groups, and heard snuffing sounds coming from them which to her, under the circumstances, indicated the use of narcotics, usually cocaine. She did not observe and use however, nor did she confiscate for testing any of the substances involved. On her return to the second floor that evening, Ms. Paven met with another patron, identified as Darren, who spoke in general of the use of narcotics in clubs. She recalls no specific reference to the use of narcotics at Solar, however. Before she left the club that night, in another conversation with Dennis, the bartender, she mentioned she was going to get “party favors,” and he used the word, “stuff.” Both, in the vernacular of the drug milieu, relate to narcotics. That same night, though early in the morning of January 11, 1997, Paven additionally saw Tempo, also a transvestite male and a known cocaine dealer, on the second floor of the club. Another transvestite male, Gilda, was also there, at the bar, with Tony, who identified himself as an off-duty employee there, at the time, as a patron. Paven approached Tempo and offered him/her $20.00 for which, in return, she received a plastic bag of a substance later identified as cocaine. Dennis, the bartender, was standing behind the bar right there and, in Paven’s opinion, could not have failed to observe the transaction occur. Tony was, in fact, not an employee. He had been employed at the club as a bar back before the club opened for business but was injured within the first few minutes on the job and never returned to work. Agent Paven again went to the club at 10:45 p.m. on January 17, 1997, but left shortly after arriving and did not return until early on the morning of January 18, 1997. At that time Dennis was on duty as bartender and a group of individuals, known to Paven as drug dealers, including Tempo, Tony, and Brittany, were also present. At approximately 1:15 a.m. that morning, while up on the second floor, Paven was approached by Tony who told her he was leaving and offered to get her “something” before he left. Paven gave Tony $20.00, after which he went over to a group at the end of the bar and immediately came back with a bag of a powdered substance which he gave to her. He then asked her to save him a “bump,” which, in the drug culture, means a hit of cocaine. That same evening, Paven observed three male dancers performing down on the first floor. Two of these were nude. As she watched, she saw patrons approach the dancers and give them tips to be allowed to fondle their private parts. Dennis came downstairs while this was going on, jumped on the bar, and removed his shirt, and lowered his pants to reveal his buttocks and, presumably, his genitals, to the patrons. Dennis admits to climbing on the bar, removing his shirt, and displaying his buttocks, but denies revealing his genitals. Paven also observed some of the dancers leave the stage and approach patrons who would then touch the dancers’ genitals. Galiano, a known cocaine user, was there that night, going back and forth from Tempo to Brittany, and into a back room reserved for employees. Paven observed her at the time, snuffing and rubbing her nose, though she did not observe any direct use of any substance. Later that evening, in a discussion with Paven at the bar on the second floor, Galiano denied having any cocaine to sell but offered Paven a line of cocaine if she would come downstairs to the restroom. When Paven went downstairs with Galiano, she was given the line of substance, thereafter pretending to use it but in reality not doing so. While on the first floor, Paven asked Tempo if she had any coke. In response, Tampo said she was out, but had an order for more in and was waiting for delivery. On January 25, 1997, Paven was in Solar looking for Tiffany Middlesexx. Tony approached her and asked if she wanted any cocaine. Paven said she did and gave Tony $20.00. Approximately five minutes later, Tony came back and gave her a bag with a substance in it which was purported to be cocaine. He then suggested he and Paven go somewhere for a “bump.” Taking Paven upstairs, Tony then poured some of the substance out onto the back of her hand for her to snort it. He did the same for himself and actually ingested it, while Paven dumped hers out. That same night Tony told Paven not to go to a second bar mentioned because a raid was planned. Also the same night, Tiffany Middlesexx and Tempo were present at the club, as was the club’s chief of security, Tim, who was known to Paven as a drug dealer. Paven also observed nudity by the dancers, and sexual fondling of the male dancers for tips by some patrons, and she heard discussions between patrons about getting cocaine from elsewhere, but she did not observe any transfers take place. Agent Paven returned to the club on January 28, 1997, a slow night for business. She observed one of the male dancers dancing on top of the first floor bar and witnessed several instances where the dancer squatted in front of a patron who, it seemed to Paven, committed fallatio on him in front of other patrons. This was repeated with several patrons while Paven, as well as Agent Murray, who was also present, watched. Paven brought this to the bartender’s attention, but the bartender denied seeing anything untoward. On February 1, 1997, at approximately 1:34 a.m., Paven again entered Solar and proceeded to the first floor bar area. Tiffany Middlesexx was again sitting in his/her regular spot on top of the bar, and Paven asked if he/she had any cocaine for sale. In response, Tiffany Middlesexx offered Paven three bags for $50.00 or single bags for $20.00 each. When Paven handed over $50.00, Middlesexx opened up his/her purse and took out three bags of cocaine which was transferred to Paven. All this time, another patron was waiting and made a purchase when Paven was through. Paven also observed several other identical transactions take place with other patrons that same evening though she cannot say with certainty what substance was passed. Since the procedure was the same, it is likely the substance transferred to the other patrons was also cocaine, and it is so found. Middlesexx subsequently left the premises while Paven was still there. On February 8, 1997, Paven went back to Solar, arriving at 12:45 a.m. She went to the first floor and again observed Tiffany Middlesexx sitting in the regular spot on the bar. Paven approached Middlesexx and asked for cocaine and subsequently gave Middlesexx two $20.00 bills, in return for which she received two bags of cocaine. At this time, other employees of the Respondent were present behind the bar, and in Paven’s opinion heard and observed the transaction. Paven also watched a white male buy four bags of apparent cocaine from Middlesexx from no more than five feet from where the transaction took place. After making his purchase, that same white male showed the bags he had purchased to his friends and the group departed. Later that evening, on the second floor of the club, Paven purchased one zip-lock bag of what appeared to be cocaine from Tempo because Tempo did not want to deal on the first floor. Paven paid Tempo $20.00 for it. At no time during any of the above mentioned visits did any of the Respondent’s employees or management try to stop the purchases. The only warnings Paven heard were to watch out for the police. Paven claims she didn’t see any signs prohibiting drug activity in the club, nor did she observe club employees prohibit sales to other patrons. On any given night she was there, Paven would observe six or seven individuals on the premises who were known to her, from prior buys or sales, some of which took place within Solar, to be drug dealers. The parties stipulated that the substances purchased by Paven from individuals inside the club was cocaine. While Paven denied seeing any signs prohibiting the use or sale of drugs in the club other than in the restroom, she admits there were some signs at the entry, but even then, she cannot be sure of what the signs there said. Another sign in the bathroom prohibited more than one person in a stall at the same time. There is no doubt that the noise level in the club when the music was playing and the club was full was considerable. Club employees contend that it would have been impossible for them to hear any of the conversations between Paven and any of the individuals from whom she bought drugs because of it, because they even had to bend over the bar to hear patrons’ orders for drinks. However, Paven and Murray both insist they were able to hear and contend the bartenders, while possibly not able to hear the exact conversations taking place during the buys, could not have failed to observe what was going on. The noise certainly did not dissuade anyone from buying or selling. In addition, Paven observed security personnel hired by management passing through the club from time to time. These individuals would stop and talk to patrons and would attempt to prevent patrons from jointly occupying the restroom stalls. This served to halt drug sales while the security officer was present, but the activity resumed when the officers left. Most of the drug transactions which took place between Agent Paven and Middlesexx or Tempo were witnessed from three to four feet away by Agent Murray as well. Murray notes that whenever Paven tried to make a buy from Middlesexx, there was always someone in line before them, and Murray also observed what appeared to be drug purchases by other patrons from Middlesexx. Usually a bartender was in the immediate area of the purchase transaction. Murray cites, by way of exception, the incident on January 25, 1997, when Tony took Agent Paven to another area of the bar. Though Murray observed anywhere from six to seven drug dealers on the premises, known to her as such from prior investigations, at no time did she ever see an employee of the club, or a member of management, try to interfere with a transaction, nor did anyone ever state that such activity was illegal. It seemed as though the only concern expressed by anyone employed by the club related to the potential for the use of undercover police. Murray also observed male dancers at the club engaged in conduct which, it appeared to her, was salacious and obscene. It appeared to her than some patrons committed actual acts of fellatio on the dancers who would squat on the bar or dance floor in front of them. On at least one occasion, Murray changed her location at the bar so as to be able better to see what was going on. In her opinion, there was no doubt as to the nature of the activity. Notwithstanding the allegations of both Paven and Murray regarding the obscene activity, Diane M. Smith, the owner of the dance group which performs at Solar, categorically denies that any such activity took place involving her employees. Normally, she claims, she was present whenever her dancers performed. At any given time, she had three dancers active. One was on the center podium, one on one of the bars, and one was on break. Her dancers would wear jeans for the first set and shorts, or possibly a T-back, for the second set. She adamantly asserts there was no nude dancing or lewd or lascivious conduct permitted. She would not permit it, and management knew that. Her dancers performed from approximately 11:30 p.m., until 2:00 a.m., and at all times, there were two chaperones present. She was also often present before and after the show, and she never saw any conduct as described by Paven or Murray. This relates to drug activity as well as activity regarding the dancers. In fact, she claims, management made it very clear that drug activity was not permitted in the club. Jeffery Winemiller, who has a college degree and who attended medical school for two years before personal commitments brought him back to the Tampa area from California, was working at Solar as a bartender the night the Emergency Order of Suspension was entered. Mr. Winemiller has attended Responsible Vender training several times and is aware of how to check among patrons for drug use and abuse. He usually worked on the first floor at the rectangular bar on Friday and Saturday nights, and occasionally on other nights as well. Mr. Winemiller contends that while he worked at Solar, he never witnessed any drug activities or any oral sex being conducted on the premises. He claims there were signs at the front door and in the rest rooms warning against the use of drugs in addition to signs prohibiting entrance to persons under age and prohibiting more than one person in a restroom stall at any one time. Neither the men’s nor the women’s restroom had entry doors. Only the women’s restroom had doors on the stalls. Tiffany Middlesexx is a known drag queen - a performer in his/her 50’s, who is very well known in the transvestite community. Whenever he/she comes into Solar, he/she would have an entourage of from three to six people with him/her. Middlesexx would usually position himself/herself on the L-shaped bar on the first floor across from the dance podium on a space which was cleared for him/her. According to Winemiller, normally a bartender would not be working in that immediate location. As Winemiller recalls, Friday nights are rather quiet until after midnight, when up to seven hundred people might be in the club. During the period from midnight to club closing, a bartender might serve several hundred drinks and would be too busy to note what any particular patron was doing. In addition, as he described it, the noise level was high, and he would not be able to overhear any patron conversations. Specifically, Winemiller contends, he did not see Middlesexx or any of the other dealers described by Paven and Murray sell drugs in the bar, nor did anyone ever tell him anyone was selling drugs. As told to him, ownership policy on drugs was no tolerance. Any drug activity was to be reported to management or to security. By the same token, no lewd sexual activity was permitted either. Mr. Winemille claims he does not know Tiffany Middlesexx, Tony, or Tempo to be drug dealers. He claims not to use drugs himself and professes not to know who does. As a result of this raid and the closing of the club, he is now out of a job. In addition, his loan of $35,000 to Mr. Engerer to start up the operation is in jeopardy, though Winemiller contends he is not concerned about this. Donald Bentz, an employee of the Tampa AIDS Network has been in Solar on several occasions as a part of his work. He knows Mr. Engerer well and was a regular customer from May 1996, when the club opened, until it closed. During that period, he went there at least once a week and claims he never saw drug activity or lewd acts being carried on there. Mr. Bentz goes to several gay-oriented clubs as a part of his job and has put on fund raising functions with some of them. Because of his organization’s non-profit status and the thrust of its activities, it is careful with whom it operates and carefully checks out any operation before becoming involved with it. Mr. Bentz knows Tiffany Middlesexx as a transgendered performer who is popular in the gay/transgender community. On several of the occasions when he has been at Solar, Mr. Bents has seen signs permitting only one person at a time in the rest rooms and recalls seeing a sign stipulating no drugs allowed at the entrance. In addition, he has seen security personnel routinely checking for drugs. Though Bentz has heard rumors that Middlesexx deals drugs, he claims never to have seen it at Solar nor did he ever see anyone do or talk about illicit drugs on the premises. In his opinion, both Mr. Engerer and Mr. Winemiller considered drugs to be out of bounds at Solar. They wanted a long-term, drug-free relationship with the gay community. In Bentz’ opinion, if either member of management heard of drugs or lewdness going on at Solar, it would have been stopped. Dennis Fleming worked part time as a bartender at Solar between August 1996 and February 1997, usually on Friday and Saturday nights, and on a couple of evenings during the week. He, too, took Responsible Vendor training. As he recalls it, the noise level in Solar when it is crowded is very high, which makes it impossible to overhear patrons’ conversations. He knows Tiffany Middlesexx, who usually sat not far from where he worked the bar. During all the time Fleming worked at Solar, he claims, he never saw Middlesexx sell drugs to anyone inside or near the club. Though he knows Tony from that individual’s brief employment at the club and his subsequent patronage, he doesn’t know if Tony deals drugs The same is true for Tim. Fleming claims not to know Tempo. His periodic conversations with management reinforced the explicit no-drug policy which is expressed to the public by the signs posted about the building. Though he admits to having danced at the club, removed his shirt, and unbuttoned his pants, he denies having ever removed his pants or lowered or removed his underpants. Steven Stamberger was employed at night as a security officer at Solar from July 1996 to its closing. His post was at the entrance door where he checked identification for age and searched back packs of patrons to look for contraband. According to Mr. Stamberger, while doing this he never discovered any drugs being carried by any patrons. Mr. Stamberger also contends there were signs posted at the front entrance which indicated that drugs were not allowed on the premises. There were also signs in the bathrooms to that effect. From time to time each night he would walk through the club on the way to the bathrooms, and he claims never to have seen any drug activity during any of those walk-throughs. He also admits to knowing Tiffany Middlesexx and Tempo but denied knowing whether either sold drugs. He claims no one discussed it with him, but he knows that drugs are not tolerated on the premises. Mr. Stamberger recalls having seen an act of oral sex being committed in the VIP room one time. When he saw it, he went over to the parties, interrupted the activity, and put them out of the club for the evening. To his knowledge, they were not barred from the club for this. He denies, however, having ever seen any of the dancers disrobe or allow patrons to touch their genitals for tips in the club. In 1996, Mr. Engerer, the owner and sole officer of the corporation which operates Solar, invested $50,000 the company. This money came from his 401(k) plan and his stock investments. At the time, he claims, he had very little experience in nightclub operation, and when he took over, he hired a firm to provide Responsible Vendor training to him and his staff before he opened. Mr. Engerer worked every Friday and Saturday nights and, in addition, occasionally also went in during the week. On the weekends, he would open the club, set up the bar, and work at bar three as a bartender. Bar three is where Tiffany Middlesexx generally sat. It has two cash registers -- one at the “L,” and one at the far end. He worked at the far end. Engerer knew Tiffany Middlesexx from his/her performances at other clubs, but asserts he had no knowledge of that individual’s dealing in narcotics, either before or after he bought the club. He claims he never saw any drug deals take place in the club. Engerer claims not to have known Tempo or anything about him/her before or after he bought the club, especially about drug activity. Mr. Engerer admits to knowing Tony, who was recommended to work at Solar because of his prior experience at other clubs. However, Tony was injured the first night on the job and never actually worked there. Engerer claims he had no idea Tony dealt drugs, nor did he ever see Tony deal at Solar. Club policy, according to Mr. Engerer, which he claims he expressed to all employees, is that there is a zero tolerance for drugs, and patrons and employees are to be evicted or fired for possession of unlawful drugs on the club premises. With the large crowds they get on the weekends, he claims it was very hard to hear, especially for the bartenders who worked at least three feet from the patrons. Mr. Engerer claims that signs given to him by the Responsible Vendor trainers were posted throughout the club: at the front door, at the top of the stairs to the second floor, downstairs in the bar, and in each restroom. He had several security people on the floor on the weekends to ensure there was no drug activity in either the bar areas or the restrooms. According to Mr. Engerer, he had no prior indication from the Division or other police agencies that they had any suspicion of ongoing drug activity, nor had he heard of any prior complaints about his establishment. Club policy also prohibited lewd activities, and Engerer claims he had no knowledge of such conduct going on there. He did not ignore it nor would he condone it, he claims. Mr. Engerer also claims he was never told by anyone that Tiffany Middlesexx, Tempo, or anyone else, for that matter, was selling drugs in Solar. The first he knew of any of it, he asserts, was when the Emergency Order of Suspension was served. Had he known Tim was selling elsewhere, Tim would have immediately been fired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order revoking Respondent’s 4-COP alcoholic beverage license number 39-01036, for the premises located at 911-913 Franklin Street in Tampa, and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Joseph L. Diaz, Esquire 2522 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Richard Boyd, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Linda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
