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ALAN MOLLICK vs UNITECH, 09-000093 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jan. 08, 2009 Number: 09-000093 Latest Update: Aug. 04, 2009

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.

USC (2) 29 U.S.C 62342 U.S.C 2000 CFR (1) 29 CFR 1601.70 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.10760.1195.051
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D. PAUL SONDEL vs FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 93-006243 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 02, 1993 Number: 93-006243 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1995

The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief. AUTHORITY Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, D. Paul Sondel, was born August 13, 1928, and was, at the time of final hearing, 65 years of age. On April 11, 1993, Petitioner saw a newspaper advertisement for the position of Analyst I with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (FBOBE). On April 12, 1993, Petitioner went to the office of the employment agency which the FBOBE was using to locate and screen applicants. Petitioner was told that he would not be allowed to apply or take the pre- employment test for the position because he had a graduate degree and only persons who have a Bachelor's degree but no graduate degree(s) were allowed to apply. On June 1, 1993, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which he alleged that the FBOBE requirement that no one would be considered for the position of Analyst I who had a higher level degree than the minimum required Bachelor's degree, served the "intended purpose" of eliminating older applicants, especially those over Petitioner further alleged that the existence and implementation of such FBOBE policy was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Respondent hired two persons to fill the April 1993 advertised position of Analyst I. One of the persons hired was 24 and the other was 23 years of age. The FBOBE is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida and charged by the court with the responsibility of evaluating the character, fitness and competence of each applicant for admission to the Florida Bar. Petitioner has established that he is a person in a protected group; that adverse employment action was taken against him; that the persons hired for the position in question were outside the protected group; and that, but for his graduate degree, he was qualified for the position in question. The FBOBE has a current staff of 29 full time employees. As of March 30, 1994, of those employees, three were 40 years or older at the time of employment. Nine of these employees are currently 40 or older. The employment application used by the FBOBE does not request any information regarding an applicant's age. The FBOBE have hired individuals in the past who were 40 years of age or older. The FBOBE uses the American Employment Agency, Inc. to advertise vacancies and to conduct preliminary screening. Kathryn E. Ressel has been employed by the Respondent for over 22 years and is currently the Deputy Executive Director of the FBOBE. Ms. Ressel is responsible for the instructions given to the employment agency concerning the qualifications for the position of Analyst I. Ms. Ressel testified that the reason for the FBOBE policy of excluding applicants with post graduate college or university degrees is not intended to restrict employment opportunities to younger persons and is not related to the age of any applicant. Ms. Ressel's testimony is that past experience in hiring persons with graduate degrees has indicated that such persons tend to stay in the Analyst positions for short periods of time and leave when an employment opportunity presents itself in the field for which the person is educated. Ms. Ressel testified that the Analyst I position is an entry level position and that the Analyst receives extensive on-the-job training to enable the newly hired employee to perform assigned duties and meet job related responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. Therefore, according to Ms. Ressel, when Analyst I's leave the employment of the FBOBE after a short time on the job, the Respondent is unable to recoup the time, energy and expense involved in training such individuals. Ms. Ressel's testimony articulates a reasonable nondiscriminatory basis for the employment practice at issue. Ms. Ressel's testimony indicates that the employment policy at issue is age neutral in that it is applied to all individuals who apply for the position of Analyst I, regardless of age. Ms. Ressel's testimony in this regard is unrefuted. Official notice is taken that a given individual is generally older at the time such person receives a graduate degree than when the same individual receives a Bachelor's degree. It does not follow, however, and Petitioner has failed to prove (statistically or otherwise), that in any specific job applicant pool available to the Respondent to fill Analyst I positions, potential applicants with graduate degrees are older than potential applicants who possess only Bachelor's degrees. Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the employment policy at issue has a disparate impact on persons 40 years of age or older. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the FBOBE as the basis for rejecting Petitioner's application is in fact a pretext and/or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed in this case be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1994.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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ROBERT JOHNSON vs TREE OF LIFE, INC., 04-002659 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Jul. 28, 2004 Number: 04-002659 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2005

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his age.

Findings Of Fact Currently, Petitioner is a retired, 68-year-old male. He retired from Respondent at the age of 66. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a truck driver. The position of truck driver, involves many long hours of driving (sometimes over 56 hours) various interstate and intrastate truck routes, along with some lifting and exposure to diesel fumes. Petitioner attributed a variety of illnesses and health problems to his work as a truck driver. Some of the illnesses and health problems are hypertension and heart blockage and failure, which resulted in the implantation of a pacemaker, carpal tunnel syndrome, polyneuropathy, muscular and autonomic system problems and pathological hyper-insomnia. Petitioner offered no evidence that any of these conditions resulted from his employment with Respondent. Prior to September 9 or 10, 2000, at the age of 64, Petitioner was hospitalized for heart problems. Around September 9 or 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the hospital. Upon his return to work, he gave his employer a physician’s note indicating that his work duties be limited to 40 hours a week. Petitioner met with Respondent’s transportation manager regarding whether less lengthy routes were available or whether his schedule or work duties could be adjusted. The employer did not have the ability to adjust the length of the routes, but added a second driver to ride and help with the driving on any route that Petitioner drove. Petitioner inquired about office work and was told that if he was interested in such work he needed to apply at the main office to see what was available. In part, because Petitioner liked driving and in part because the lesser number of hours involved in office work would cause Petitioner to earn less, Petitioner elected not to pursue and did not apply for such office work. No adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner, and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. At some point during this meeting, Petitioner alleges that the transportation manager said, “Why don’t you just retire.” Petitioner offered no specific context for this statement other than it was a general conversation about his health and closeness to retirement age relative to the adjustments that could be made to his driving duties. One isolated statement such as the one above does not demonstrate any intent to discriminate on Respondent’s part based on Petitioner’s age, especially since no adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. Around January 1, 2001, for medical reasons, Respondent approved a Leave of Absence with pay for Petitioner. In June or July, 2002, Petitioner filed his first workers compensation claim with Respondent. Petitioner’s claim was turned over to Respondent’s workers' compensation insurer, Kemper Insurance Company. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Kemper was under the direction or control of Respondent in any decisions Kemper made regarding paying or litigating Petitioner’s claim. In any event, Petitioner’s claim was contested. The main reason the claim was contested was that Kemper alleged that Petitioner’s “injuries” were not work-related. Over the years, Petitioner has amended his claim to include, among other health claims, the health problems listed above. Kemper has maintained its defense. During a mediation session on December 11, 2002, at which the employer was not present and in response to an inquiry regarding Kemper’s defense, Kemper’s representative stated that except for the carpal tunnel claim, all of Petitioner’s medical conditions were due to the natural aging process. Petitioner claims this statement demonstrates an intent on his employer’s part to discriminate against him based on his age. Such an isolated statement does not demonstrate such an intent especially since such conditions can be age related, there was no expert medical evidence demonstrating the cause of Petitioner’s health problems, the statement did not come from the employer, and there was no evidence that the insurer was under the direction or control of the employer regarding decisions to litigate or the factual basis for the defenses that the insurer would raise. The workers' compensation litigation continues to date. In the interim, Petitioner remained on a leave of absence with pay until January 1, 2003. He retired thereafter. There was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or that Petitioner suffered any adverse employment action based on his age. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Glynda Copeland Qualified Representative Tree of Life, Inc. Post Office Box 410 St. Augustine, Florida 32095-0410 Robert C. Johnson 560 Florida Club Boulevard, Suite 112 St. Augustine, Florida 32084

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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RHUEBEN GOLPHIN vs WAL-MART STORES, INC., 03-003146 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 03, 2003 Number: 03-003146 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004
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CATHY M. THURSTON vs FLORIDA A & M UNIVERSITY, 05-003286 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 12, 2005 Number: 05-003286 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 2006

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to unlawful employment practices by discriminating against her based on her age, sex, and/or disability contrary to Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and by retaliating against her contrary to Section 760.07, Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact On or about February 17, 1992, Petitioner began working for Respondent in the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences as an Other Personnel Services (OPS) Secretary. On or about January 11, 1993, Petitioner became a Program Assistant in the University and Support Personnel System. In late 1999 or early 2000, Petitioner began working as an Administrative Assistant for Dr. Folakemi Odedina, a Professor and Director of the Economic, Social, and Administrative Pharmacy Division (ESAP). Initially, Petitioner enjoyed working for Dr. Odedina in an office located in the Frederick S. Humphries Science and Research Center (Science and Research Center). However, in time Petitioner's professional relationship with Dr. Odedina began to deteriorate, along with the expanding responsibilities of the job.1 In January 2001, Petitioner fell while she was carrying some documents from one of Respondent's buildings to another. The fall injured Petitioner's ankle, hip, and lower back. Petitioner was pregnant at the time of her fall in January 2001. She filed a workers' compensation claim as a result of the accident and subsequently returned to work with medical limitations as to activities involving lifting and walking. In a memorandum dated May 16, 2001, Petitioner advised Dr. Odedina and the ESAP faculty that she soon would be going on three to four months of parental leave. She also advised them that she had removed her personal belongings and other items belonging to other departments that had been on loan to her. In June 2001, Petitioner fell again while she was at work. She was in her ninth month of pregnancy at the time of the second accident. She decided not to return to work until after the birth of her baby. In a memorandum dated June 14, 2001, Dr. Odedina acknowledged that Petitioner would be out on sick leave, followed by parental leave until October 2001. Dr. Odedina wanted Petitioner to turn in her office keys and provide information about the office voicemail password so that the office would continue to function efficiently during Petitioner's absence. Apparently, Petitioner had not removed her personal belongings from her office as stated in her May 16, 2001, memorandum. On June 14, 2001, Petitioner and Melvin Jones, an investigator for Respondent's Police Department went to the office after 5:00 p.m. to remove Petitioner's personal belongings. During the moving process, Mr. Jones took a typewriter and a chair, both of which were university property on loan to Petitioner from another university office, to the library on the fourth floor of the Science Research Center. Petitioner intended to leave the chair and the typewriter there until someone could return them to the office in the department to which they were officially assigned. Additionally, in packing her personal items, Petitioner or Mr. Jones inadvertently packed and removed a black office telephone from the premises. On June 15, 2001, Dr. Odedina noticed that the typewriter and telephone were missing from Petitioner's office. After making an unsuccessful effort to contact Petitioner, Dr. Odedina reported to Respondent's Police Department that the typewriter and telephone were missing from Petitioner's office. Respondent's Police Department immediately initiated an investigation of unauthorized removal of state property with Petitioner as the suspect. On June 15, 2001, Petitioner realized that she had mistakenly packed the black telephone with her personal belongings. She returned it to Respondent that same day. Thereafter, Respondent's Police Department closed its investigation after verifying that Petitioner never removed the typewriter from the Science Research Center and that she returned the telephone on June 15, 2001. On June 25, 2001, Petitioner delivered her baby. Subsequently, Petitioner received medical treatment for physical problems that were the result of her on-the-job falls. Between parental leave and workers' compensation leave, Petitioner was out of work for approximately eighteen months. During Petitioner's absence from work, Dr. Odedina hired an OPS employee to temporarily fill Petitioner's position. At some point in time, Petitioner contacted FCHR to make an inquiry concerning discrimination. In a letter dated August 28, 2002, relative to FCHR Case No. 2202827, FCHR advised Petitioner as follows: "Based on the information you provided, we are unable to pursue this matter further." FCHR then cited Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for the proposition that a complaint must be filed within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory act. From 1994 to 2004, and at all times relevant here, Dr. Henry Lewis was the Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. From January 2002 through July 2002, Dr. Lewis also served as Respondent's interim president. Since 2004, Dr. Robert Thomas has served as Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. At all times relevant here, Dr. Thomas served as Associate Dean of the College of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences. In a letter dated October 9, 2002, Dr. Lewis advised Petitioner that he had received documentation from Ruth Beck, Petitioner's Rehabilitation Consultant, regarding accommodations for Petitioner's return to work with medical restrictions. Dr. Lewis requested that Petitioner meet with Respondent's Equal Opportunity Programs Office to determine what accommodation are to be provided upon Petitioner's return to work. The recommended accommodations included an ergonomic chair and a desk equipped with a keyboard tray and mouse extension. It was also suggested that Respondent provide Petitioner with a flat screen monitor and a utility cart because Petitioner's permanent office in the Science and Research Center was small and too cramped to accommodate Petitioner's physical limitations. Petitioner needed a more spacious work area, with adequate storage space in close proximity, than was available in her office at the Science and Research Center. Even with the new furniture and equipment, Petitioner's needs could not be met in her old office. Accordingly, it was mutually agreed that, upon her return to work, Respondent would assign Petitioner to work temporarily in the Division of Pharmacy Practice, under the supervision of Dr. Otis Kirksey. Dr. Kirksey's office was located off-campus at 565 East Tennessee Street, Tallahassee, Florida, in a building with a ramp and without stairs that Petitioner would have to climb. Petitioner's assignment to work in Dr. Kirksey's office was temporary. Dr. Odedina and the ESAP faculty and staff planned to move to the new Dyson Pharmacy Building as soon as it was completed. The new facility would have sufficient space, furniture, and equipment to accommodate Petitioner's needs in her position as Administrative Assistant to Dr. Odedina. In November 2002, Petitioner learned that her doctor would not sign a form stating that Petitioner had a permanent disability. Instead, he agreed that she needed a disabled parking permit for a temporary period, for three months through February 5, 2003. On December 2, 2002, Petitioner began to work for Dr. Kirksey as an Administrative Assistant/Receptionist. She agreed to begin working in that capacity even though all the accommodations she needed were not immediately available. Petitioner was eager to return to work. By February 18, 2003, Respondent had provided Petitioner with all necessary accommodations. She had the ergonomic chair and a desk equipped with a keyboard tray and mouse extension. Given her more specious work area, a flat screen monitor and/or utility cart was not required to accommodate her physical limitations. Petitioner did not want to return to work for Dr. Odedina under any circumstances. She was aware that Dr. Kirksey was going to hire a new employee for a Program Assistant position. However, Petitioner never applied for the new Program Assistant position because she believed that Dr. Kirksey had already made up his mind to hire another person for the job. There is no evidence that Dr. Kirksey ever intended to deprive Petitioner of the opportunity to apply for the Program Assistant position or that he would not have considered her application if she had filed one. On October 6, 2003, Petitioner had a meeting with Dr. Lewis about her work assignment. During the meeting, Petitioner and Dr. Lewis discussed another position that was available. The position involved keeping track of student volunteer hours. After the meeting, Petitioner mistakenly believed that Dr. Lewis had offered her the new position, which would not have been under Dr. Odedina's supervision. During the October 6, 2003, meeting, Dr. Lewis asked Petitioner how things were going in her private life, i.e. whether she had anyone special in her life. Petitioner replied that she did not have such a relationship and that with all the drama she was experiencing in her personal life, she did not need to be involved with anyone. There is no indication that Petitioner was offended by Dr. Lewis's personal expressions of concern for Petitioner's well being. On October 8, 2003, Petitioner met with Drs. Lewis and Thomas. During the meeting, Petitioner adamantly refused to return to work for Dr. Odedina. Petitioner made the following statement: "I do not want to see FAMU facing a wrongful death lawsuit for an employee killing a supervisor." Drs. Lewis and Thomas were concerned about the statement, which they understood to be a threat against Dr. Odedina. However, they believed they would be able to handle any problem that might arise when Dr. Odedina joined the prescheduled meeting. Petitioner was agitated during the meeting with Dr. Lewis and Dr. Thomas. She became more agitated when Dr. Odedina joined the meeting. Dr. Odedina went to the meeting expecting to discuss Petitioner's office space and accommodations when she moved into the Dyson Pharmacy Building with the rest of the ESAP faculty and staff. She was not aware that Petitioner had made a threatening comment. Initially, Dr. Odedina was obviously pleased that Petitioner would be returning to work for her. However, as the October 8, 2003, meeting proceeded, Dr. Odedina felt that Petitioner's demeanor was hostile. Dr. Odedina got the impression that Petitioner was resisting the idea of returning to work for Dr. Odedina. At that point, Dr. Odedina insisted that Petitioner return to work for ESAP or, if Petitioner continued to work for Dr. Kirksey, his office should be responsible for paying Petitioner's salary. At one point during the October 8, 2003, meeting Petitioner complained that she suffered from migraine headaches and depression. She showed Drs. Lewis, Thomas, and Odedina prescriptions for Imatrex and Prozac. Before Petitioner left the meeting on October 8 2003, Dr. Lewis told Petitioner that she should write a letter stating that she refused to return to work in the ESAP office under Dr. Odedina's supervision. Petitioner subsequently wrote a letter, describing it as a "notice of transfer," but clearly indicating that she chose not to return to work for Dr. Odedina. After Petitioner and Dr. Odedina left the October 8, 2003, meeting, Drs. Lewis and Thomas discussed Petitioner's threatening statement against Dr. Odedina. They decided to report it as a serious threat of bodily harm to Respondent's Director of Personnel, Vice President for Academic Affairs, and Provost, first by telephone, and later in writing. Dr. Lewis also contacted Dr. Odedina by telephone, advising her of the threat and directing her not to report to work on October 9, 2003. Finally, Dr. Lewis informed Respondent's Police Department about the threatening statement. Respondent's Provost, Larry Robinson, drafted a letter dated October 9, 2003. According to the letter, Petitioner was on administrative leave with pay, effective upon receipt of the notice. The letter advised Petitioner of a pending investigation of an employment matter and directed her to return all university-owned property. The letter advised Petitioner to refrain from reporting to work or visiting the campus, until further notice. The only exception was that Petitioner could continue to transport one of her sons to Respondent's Developmental Research School. On October 10, 2003, Respondent's Police Department initiated a formal investigation about Petitioner's threatening statement based on the written statements of Drs. Lewis and Thomas. On that date, Respondent's investigator, James Rose, filled out an incident report, indicating that he had interviewed Dr. Odedina and that Respondent's Director of Personnel had requested him to deliver the October 9, 2003, letter to Petitioner. Officer Rose was not able to deliver the October 9, 2003, letter to Petitioner until October 11, 2003. After Officer Rose gave Petitioner the letter placing her on administrative leave with pay, Petitioner stated that she only made the comment about Dr. Odedina because the department was about to transfer her back to Dr. Odedina's office. Petitioner told Officer Rose that she never intended to harm Dr. Odedina. On October 13, 2003, Petitioner returned her office key to Respondent. She left the key at Respondent's Police Department's communications office. On October 14, 2003, Petitioner filed her first Employment Charge of Discrimination with FCHR. In that initial complaint, identified hereinafter as DOAH Case No. 04-2003, Petitioner alleged as follows: (a) Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her disability by failing to accommodate her back impairment; (b) Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her age because Respondent did not give Petitioner an opportunity to apply for a position ultimately given to a younger, less senior employee; and (c) Respondent placed Petitioner on administrative leave with pay. In a letter dated October 31, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent intended to terminate her employment for threatening and/or abusive language and conduct unbecoming to a public employee. In an undated letter, Petitioner requested a conference in order to make an oral or written statement to refute or explain the charges against her. On or about November 3, 2003, Petitioner requested information about the return of her personal property located in Dr. Kirksey's office. Officer Rose approved Petitioner's request to retrieve her property. Sometime after November 3, 2003, Officer Rose concluded that Petitioner had made a threatening statement. However, Officer Rose found no indication that Petitioner intended to carry out the threat against Dr. Odedina. Accordingly, Respondent's Police Department suspended its investigation. In a letter dated November 17, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had scheduled a predetermination conference on November 24, 2003. By letter dated December 8, 2003, Petitioner informed Respondent that she received the November 17, 2003, letter on December 5, 2003. She asserted that she did not receive timely notice of the predetermination conference. In a letter dated December 11, 2003, Respondent advised Petitioner that it was proceeding with the employment action. According to the letter, Petitioner's dismissal from employment would be effective on December 19, 2003. However, Petitioner had an opportunity to request arbitration. On December 19, 2003, Petitioner reminded Respondent that she did not receive timely notification of the predetermination conference. She requested Respondent to schedule another conference. In a letter dated January 9, 2004, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had scheduled a predetermination conference for January 13, 2004. However, a subsequent letter dated January 13, 2004, rescheduled the conference for February 18, 2004. In a letter dated March 3, 2004, Respondent advised Petitioner that her dismissal from employment was effective March 11, 2004. On February 2, 2005, Petitioner filed a Consented Motion for Abatement or Alternatively, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. On February 8, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Diane Cleavinger entered an Order Closing File in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. Judge Cleavinger's order is silent as to any prejudice that might have resulted from closure of the file in DOAH Case No. 04-2003. However, the parties agreed during the hearing in the instant case that FCHR never entered a final order in the prior case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2005.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569760.01760.07760.10760.11
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DEMETRICE WORTHY vs PRINCIPAL SENIOR LIVING GROUP, D/B/A BENTON VILLAGE, 07-004751 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Oct. 16, 2007 Number: 07-004751 Latest Update: Jul. 10, 2008

The Issue : The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioner has a disability, whether she was discriminated against based upon the disability, whether there was a reasonably requested accommodation which was refused by the Respondent employer, and whether it maintained a hostile working environment.

Findings Of Fact This cause arose upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination and ultimately a Petition for Relief by the above-named Petitioner against the Respondent, Principal Senior Living Group, d/b/a Benton Village (Benton Village or Respondent). The Petitioner was an employee at the Respondent's assisted living and memory care facility, located in Panama City, Florida. That facility employs approximately 28 to 30 employees and had 53 residents as of the time of hearing. The Respondent has an equal employment opportunity policy in place which precludes discrimination on the basis of any protected status including handicap or disability as to any employees, customers, vendors, or applicants for jobs. The Petitioner signed a document indicating that she had received a copy of that policy when she began employment on or about January 29, 2007. The Respondent, enforces the policy against discrimination and harassment and encourages employees to bring any such discrimination or harassment issues to the Respondent's attention so that it can take necessary steps to correct the situation. The Petitioner received a handbook at the beginning of her employment period that outlined the Respondent's benefits, practices, and policies. The Equal Opportunity Policy is restated in that handbook. On page 18 of the handbook under the title "Discourtesy or Disrespect," the Respondent stated a rule as follows: We expect all employees to be courteous, polite and friendly to our residents, vendors, and to their fellow employees. No one should use profanity or show disrespect to a resident or co-worker, or engage in any activity that could harm the company's reputation. The Petitioner began working for the Respondent in early February 2007 as a personal care assistant (PCA). Her general job description included assisting residents with personal care and activities of daily living and performing daily housekeeping tasks. Mr. Alan Williams is the Respondent's executive director. His duties involve resident care staffing including evaluation for promotion and administering discipline and managing the facility's budget. Mr. Williams was responsible for evaluating the Petitioner's job duties and performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Tiffany Sims who was the Resident Services Director while the Petitioner was employed at the Respondent's facility. The Petitioner is hearing-impaired and wears a hearing aid that allows her to hear within a normal range and follow normal conversations. She does have difficulty hearing when people speak in a low voice and at times has to request them to speak louder. The Petitioner acknowledged that her hearing aid allowed her to perform her job without any special treatment. Moreover, she was able to attend training course, which involved listening to a lecturer in a classroom, and did not request or need any special accommodation to understand the lecturer. When the Petitioner was hired by the Respondent, she did not tell anyone she had a disability that prevented her from performing the job duties in her job description. She received the same training as the other employees and did not request or receive accommodations for her alleged hearing impairment during the training process. She acknowledged that she did not request special treatment because she did not need special treatment. During her testimony at hearing she admitted that she had never requested an accommodation of her employer. During less that three months of employment she was disciplined once by Ms. Sims and on two separate occasions by Mr. Williams. The Petitioner admits receiving corrective action admonishments from Ms. Sims on or about February 8, 2007. The corrective action document informed the Petitioner that there had been several resident complaints regarding the Petitioner's resident care and the care with meal assistance. The corrective action also embodied an instruction to the Petitioner that within 30 days she should show significant improvement with care of residents, with no resident complaints or she could be subject to termination. Mr. Williams disciplined the Petitioner on February 26, 2007. He was notified on that occasion by Supervisor Sandy Simon and his Assistant Director Renee Rhodes, that the Petitioner had been observed watching television by herself in the Alzheimer's ward. Mr. Williams went to an office where he could view a security monitor and personally observed the Petitioner watching television by herself. Mr. Williams accordingly executed a corrective action form or memorandum to the Petitioner, which the Petitioner admits receiving. Mr. Williams administered discipline to the Petitioner on a second occasion on Tuesday, April 3, 2007. Mr. Williams had learned that the Petitioner had been involved in an altercation with a resident that involved raising her voice, yelling and engaging in disruptive behavior. Mr. Williams informed the Petitioner that this was unacceptable behavior and reflected badly on the Respondent. The Petitioner admitted the occurrence to Mr. Williams when he questioned her. There is a dispute over whether the Petitioner quit or was terminated as a result of this discussion. Mr. Williams established that, under the duly-adopted policy, arguing with a resident can be a terminable offense. Mr. Williams' testimony is deemed credible and is accepted. It was thus established that the Petitioner became angry and informed Mr. Williams that she was quitting her employment during the course of this discussion. One other incident occurred with Mr. Williams when he terminated an employee because the employee had yelled or cursed at a coworker. The employee who was terminated did not have any sort of disability of which Mr. Williams was aware. Mr. Williams' undisputed testimony shows that the Petitioner's hearing impairment did not play any role in the decision to discipline for the television incident, nor in the decision to speak to her about the altercation with the resident or with any other employment decision he made with regard to the Petitioner. The Petitioner admitted that Mr. Williams never made any negative comments to her about her hearing or hearing impairment. The Petitioner contended that some co-workers made fun of her hearing impairment during the course of her employment. The Petitioner acknowledged, however, that she never complained of this to the Human Resources manager or to Mr. Williams, even though she had received a copy of the company's policies against harassment and discrimination.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Demetrice Worthy Post Office Box 121 Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott E. Wood, Esquire 990 Hammond Drive, Suite 910 Atlanta, Georgia 30328 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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LINDA CATTANACH vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS, 14-006130 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 29, 2014 Number: 14-006130 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 2016

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, based on her sex or in retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013).2/

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was at all times relevant hereto an employee of the Florida Department of Elder Affairs. Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Respondent or Department), is the state agency responsible for administering human services programs for the elderly and for developing policy recommendations for long-term care. See § 430.03, Fla. Stat. (2015). Respondent operates a Comprehensive Assessment and Review for Long-Term Care (CARES) program to assess individuals for Medicaid long-term care services, whether in a nursing facility, in a private home, or in another community setting. The CARES program operates 19 offices statewide and one central office in Tallahassee. Medical assessments are conducted by CARES Assessors (CAs), and Senior CAs. CAs and Senior CAs are supervised by a Program Operations Administrator (POA) in each office, who reports to a Regional Program Supervisor (RPS). The RPS reports to the Deputy Bureau Chief in Tallahassee, who reports to the Bureau Chief; who, in turn, reports to the Division Director for Statewide and Community- Based Services. In January 2013, Petitioner began employment as a CA in Respondent’s Gainesville office. Petitioner began in a one-year probationary employment status. The record did not clearly establish how many individuals were employed in the Gainesville office with Petitioner. There was an office assistant, Rose Gonzalez; at least four other CAs, including Justin Keels; a registered nurse; and their supervisor, POA Sam Rutledge. Freadda Zeigler was the RPS for the region, which included the Gainesville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Daytona Beach offices. Ms. Zeigler commuted from her home in Broward County. In Tallahassee, Jay Hudson was the Deputy Bureau Chief, Paula James was the Bureau Chief, Carol Carr was the Deputy Division Director, and Marcy Hajdukiewicz was the Division Director. The Gainesville territory covered from Marion County north to the Florida/Georgia line, west to the Leon County line, and east to the Duval County line. CAs were assigned to particular locations within the office’s jurisdiction. CAs traveled to both health care facilities (e.g., nursing homes, assisted living facilities) and private homes to meet with and personally evaluate the needs of the client. Petitioner was primarily assigned to cover facilities in Jasper, Live Oak, Dowling Park, Mayo, and Lake City. Petitioner was in the field conducting evaluations two to three times per week. Her assignments required some long commutes, up to one and one-half hours to Jasper (just south of the Georgia line) and over an hour to Dowling Park and Live Oak. In February 2013, a senior CA position became open in Gainesville. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied and were interviewed for the position. Mr. Keels was selected for the position in March. As senior CA, Mr. Keels did not supervise other CAs in the Gainesville office, but was “put in charge” when Mr. Rutledge was out of the office. When Petitioner began her employment in Gainesville, she was told that a desk was being ordered for her. She was given a folding table to use in her workspace. Petitioner’s workspace was in an open area of the office. Other employees would pass through and occasionally gather in her workspace on breaks or on their way to lunch. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rutledge often came into the open area to interact with other employees around lunchtime to see if anyone wanted to “get food.” Sexual Harassment Claim4/ One day in late March 2013, Mr. Rutledge and Mr. Keels were in Petitioner’s workspace and began discussing a restaurant with the word “cooter” in its name. During this conversation, the two men stood on opposite sides of Petitioner’s worktable, where Petitioner was seated. One of the men asked Petitioner if she knew what the word “cooter” meant, and she responded that she did not. One of the men stated that it meant “vagina.” Petitioner testified that she was embarrassed, uncomfortable, and felt trapped at her worktable where the men stood on either side of her. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone at first. Petitioner testified that she was afraid that if she said anything, she would be fired. Petitioner’s ambivalence was due in no small part to the fact that Mr. Rutledge was her supervisor. Petitioner described another incident that occurred shortly before the “cooter” incident. Mr. Rutledge called Petitioner into his office and asked her to look at a picture on his computer screen. The picture was of a woman in a bikini. Mr. Rutledge said something to the effect of “that is what my ex-wife used to look like.” Petitioner was embarrassed and left Mr. Rutledge’s office. Respondent maintains a sexual harassment policy of which Petitioner was aware. The policy provides, in part, that “[a]ny employee who believes that he or she is the victim of sexual harassment . . . may make an oral or written complaint to the General Counsel or Director of Internal & External Affairs within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory action.” In April 2013, approximately a week after the “cooter” incident, Respondent’s Inspector General Taroub King began an investigation of Mr. Rutledge, prompted by an anonymous complaint. Among the allegations investigated were that Mr. Rutledge borrowed money from employees, encouraged employees to participate in an investment scheme (or schemes), and utilized employees to witness signatures and notarize documents of a personal nature. The complaint described Mr. Rutledge as maintaining no management structure, lacking basic documentation, and essentially performing no work of any kind. Petitioner was interviewed in connection with the investigation by Ms. King and another investigator from the Inspector General’s office on April 4, 2013. Petitioner was placed under oath and her interview was audio-recorded. Petitioner was questioned about the allegations in the complaint against Mr. Rutledge, and she fully cooperated with the investigators. At the end of the interview, Ms. King asked Petitioner if she had any other information to relay. At that point, Petitioner reported that inappropriate comments and banter of a sexual nature occurred in the office. Petitioner did not report any other details. Ms. King asked Petitioner for particular examples. In response, Petitioner shared the “cooter” incident and the “bikini” incident. All of the employees in the Gainesville office were interviewed by Ms. King. Mr. Keels was interviewed after Petitioner and was questioned about the “cooter” incident and office banter of a sexual nature. At the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that there was both frequent sexual banter and inappropriate conversations in the Gainesville office. She testified that the staff nurse once referred to a patient as having “balls the size of a bull.” She also reported that Mr. Rutledge made hand gestures indicating that Ms. Gonzalez was large-breasted. Petitioner did not share these details with Ms. King during her interview. As with the “bikini” incident, Petitioner was able to walk away from, or otherwise ignore, the comments and gestures of a sexual nature in the workplace. Upon her return to Tallahassee, Ms. King reported her investigative findings to members of Respondent’s Human Resources Department, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director of Internal and External Affairs. Petitioner testified that she sent Ms. King an email sometime after her interview asking whether more information was needed from Petitioner regarding her complaints of inappropriate sexual comments in the workplace. Ms. King denied that Petitioner sent any follow-up email of that nature. Ms. King did recall an email from Petitioner requesting public records. Respondent terminated Mr. Rutledge on April 8, 2013, four days after Petitioner was interviewed by Ms. King. The decision to terminate Mr. Rutledge was made by management in the Tallahassee office. Both Mr. Hudson, the Deputy Bureau Chief, and Ms. James, the Bureau Chief, traveled from Tallahassee to Gainesville to terminate Mr. Rutledge. Ms. Zeigler was likewise present at the Gainesville office for the termination of Mr. Rutledge. However, Ms. Zeigler claimed not to have been informed ahead of time about the termination. She said the appearance of Mr. Hudson and Ms. James at the Gainesville office on April 8, 2013, was a surprise to her. In early May 2013, a significant remodel of the Gainesville office was initiated. The remodel created confusion in the Gainesville office, with furniture being moved around, office files and equipment being boxed up, and the general mess associated with construction in the workplace. At some point, Petitioner lost track of an entire box of her files and later found them on the floor under a pile of chairs she assumed the painters had moved.5/ Alleged Acts of Retaliation Respondent named Mr. Keels as Acting POA, effective April 8, 2013. Ms. James testified, credibly, that Mr. Keels was named Acting POA because he was the senior CA in the office. Mr. Keels was questioned about the “cooter” incident during his interview by the Inspector General. Thus, there is sufficient evidence from which the undersigned can infer that Mr. Keels was aware Petitioner had reported the “cooter” incident to the Inspector General during the investigation of Mr. Rutledge. Petitioner complained that she was ostracized by other employees in Gainesville after Mr. Rutledge was terminated. Petitioner also complained that Mr. Keels treated her unfairly in his capacity as acting POA. First, Petitioner maintained that Mr. Keels increased her caseload, from about 27 to about 44 cases, which made her job very difficult given the lengthy commutes to her assigned facilities. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than her testimony, that her caseload substantially increased after Mr. Keels became acting POA. Petitioner complained to the Inspector General on April 4, 2013, that her caseload under Mr. Rutledge’s supervision was inordinately heavy. Petitioner also shared with the Inspector General that Mr. Keels, in his capacity as senior CA, was unfair in case distribution. Further, Petitioner testified that although her caseload was heavy in early May, it later declined. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Keels assigned Petitioner an inordinately heavy caseload following her complaints to the Inspector General and Mr. Keels’ temporary promotion to acting POA. Sometime after Mr. Keels became acting POA, he took away Petitioner’s worktable. According to Petitioner, Mr. Keels said he took the table for use in the conference room for “staffings,” a term that was not explained by any witness. Petitioner testified there were other tables available in the meeting room which could have been used for that purpose. For the next two months, Petitioner completed her in- office work at a window ledge. She placed her laptop and files on the ledge and utilized extra chairs for additional workspace. In June 2013, Petitioner was presented with a new desk. Petitioner’s Termination During Mr. Rutledge’s tenure as POA, the Bureau had rolled out significant changes to the CARES program. Those changes had not been implemented by Mr. Rutledge, much less communicated to the Gainesville staff. After Mr. Rutledge’s termination, CARES management began monitoring the Gainesville office very closely. During the next few months, Ms. Zeigler was more frequently present in the Gainesville office and was in almost constant contact with Mr. Hudson regarding the activities of the Gainesville office. However, Ms. Zeigler was unaware of any discussions Mr. Hudson may have had with the Bureau Chief or the Division Director. Shortly after Mr. Rutledge’s departure, Ms. Zeigler met with the Gainesville staff to explain new procedures. Among the procedures was a requirement to include on employees’ GroupWise calendars, an entry of every planned field visit. The CAs’ GroupWise calendars were accessible not only to their immediate supervising POA, but also to the RPS and higher-level managers. The calendar was an important management tool used by Respondent both to perform quality assurance checks and to monitor employee performance. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent the following email to the CAs in Gainesville: Good afternoon all, As mentioned in the past meeting in your office, it was requested that I be given access to your GroupWise calendars to help monitor accountability for field visits with Specialization. I would like to thank each of you for adhering to the request, and would like to ask each of you to add the following information to your calendars: First and Last name of client visiting Facility name where client will be visited Home address if visiting client in the home Purpose of visit Time of visit (include estimated travel time) * * * This information is needed for accountability purposes, and also used to check that assessments are being entered in CIRTS, per the attached CARES policy #PPH Update No2011_2, that is still currently in place. Effective immediately, I would like for each worker to add this information to their calendars prior to making a visit. You should also add any approved leave time that you will be taking as well. If your visit schedule changes, it needs to be noted on the calendar with the appropriate change. Please revisit this memo for a thorough understanding. On May 14, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent an email to Petitioner informing Petitioner that information on her calendar was incorrect. On May 31, 2013, Ms. Zeigler issued a formal counseling memorandum to Petitioner for failure to list her client visits on her GroupWise calendar as directed. The following excerpt is especially relevant: You were instructed to submit your plans for field visits [sic] travel at least one day in advance of the actual travel. A review of your calendar clearly showed that you either did not put any information on your calendar as required and/or you entered incorrect data, for the following dates: April 16, 2013, May 6, 2013, May 7, 2013, May 9, 2013, May 10, 2013, and again on May 14, 2013. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not deny that she failed to enter required information on her calendar. Instead, Petitioner offered a series of excuses, including system connectivity issues, her travel schedule, and confusion regarding a transition from GroupWise to the Outlook calendar system. With regard to connectivity, Petitioner explained that there were problems connecting to the Department’s computer system from remote locations and, occasionally, in the Gainesville office. Petitioner likewise testified that she would not return home until 6:00 p.m. or later on days she traveled to Jasper and other remote field locations. Petitioner complained that connectivity issues prevented her access to GroupWise from home, and thus, was unable to enter the visits scheduled for the following day. Petitioner testified that she complained to the information technology department in Tallahassee about connectivity issues and diligently tried to address these concerns. Petitioner introduced in evidence an email exchange between herself and Ms. Zeigler in which she complained about, and Ms. Zeigler resolved, an issue with Petitioner’s access to CIRTS – the Department’s online case input system. The email string is dated July 17, 2013, well after the date of Petitioner’s documented missing calendar entries. Further, the email relates to access to the case input system and is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim of issues with connectivity to the computer system in general. Finally, Petitioner explained that the Department changed from GroupWise to the Outlook system, and she was confused about whether to continue adding entries on her GroupWise calendar during that transition. In the May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum, Ms. Zeigler referred to the program’s transition from the GroupWise to the Outlook calendaring system, as follows: The Microsoft Outlook Email and Calendar program was installed on all computers in DOEA, migrating existing GroupWise information to the new Outlook program on May 28, 2013. Instruction videos and online documentation were made available to all DOEA employees to learn how to utilize the new program. You were instructed to give proxy access to the RPS via email from the acting Supervisor. It is evident that you were successful in accessing the Outlook Calendar, as you sent the RPS a request to share your calendar on May 30, 2013. On the same date, you left the office to go to the field at 12:55 p.m., and failed to update/place any information on your calendar before departing. The sign in sheet indicated that you were going to a nursing facility. This repeated failure to comply with procedures is unacceptable. As a result of this failure, your supervisor was unaware of what facility and/or client you were seeing and how long it would take time wise for the field visit. You effectively prohibited your supervisor from knowing your whereabouts and/or the client(s) to be seen. In light of the facts, Petitioner’s alleged confusion about whether to continue adding information to her GroupWise calendar is not credible. Petitioner did not send an Outlook calendar-sharing invite to Ms. Zeigler until May 30, 2013, well after her missing GroupWise calendar entries of April 16 and May 6, 7, 9, 10, and 14, 2013. Further, Petitioner failed to calendar her appointments the same day she sent Ms. Zeigler the calendar- sharing invitation, thus belying any excuse that she had connectivity issues, at least on that particular date. In an effort to minimize the significance of her failure to document her field visits on her calendar, Petitioner testified that she noted her field visits on a daily sign-in log physically maintained in the Gainesville office. Petitioner introduced a composite exhibit purporting to be copies of the daily sign-in logs from April, May, June, and July 2013. Even if the exhibit was reliable evidence of Petitioner’s whereabouts, the logs are irrelevant to the issue of whether Petitioner complied with the electronic calendaring requirement. No evidence was introduced to support a finding that the daily sign-in log was an acceptable alternative to Ms. Zeigler’s specific, clear, and repeated direction to all Gainesville employees to use their GroupWise, and later Outlook, calendars to note their planned field visits with required details. The evidence conflicted as to whether Ms. Zeigler’s May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum constituted discipline. Petitioner testified that the memorandum was a training tool. Ms. Zeigler testified alternately, and with hesitancy, that the memorandum was “almost like a verbal warning type of thing,” and “unofficially formal.” On cross-examination, Ms. Zeigler testified, “I don’t think that that would be a reason to fire somebody after one counseling memo. I mean that would be absurd.” Ms. James testified that the memorandum constituted a first-step disciplinary action. Ms. James explained that a counseling memorandum is preceded by a verbal warning from the supervisor. The Department’s disciplinary policy was not introduced in evidence. In light of Petitioner’s probationary employment status, the issue of whether the counseling memorandum constituted discipline is largely irrelevant. The counseling memorandum is evidence of poor job performance during Petitioner’s probationary employment period. At some point after Mr. Rutledge’s termination, the Department advertised for the open POA position. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied for the position. Mr. Hudson and Ms. Zeigler conducted interviews for the position. Petitioner was not responsive to Ms. Zeigler’s efforts to schedule Petitioner’s interview for the position. Eventually, Ms. Zeigler did interview Petitioner for the position. Ms. Zeigler also interviewed Mr. Keels. In June 2013, Ms. Zeigler prepared performance evaluations of the Gainesville staff. Ms. Zeigler had little knowledge of staff performance prior to Mr. Rutledge’s termination, as Ms. Zeigler was new to the region. Ms. Zeigler gave all the Gainesville employees ratings of “3,” satisfactory performance, across the board. In late July 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. Hajdukiewicz from the Tallahassee office came to the Gainesville office and personally terminated Mr. Keels. Ms. James did not directly make the decision to terminate Mr. Keels, but she agreed with the decision. Ms. James stated that Mr. Keels was terminated based on his actions after he became acting POA in Gainesville. Ms. James did not elaborate and neither counsel asked any follow-up question. On July 31, 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. James came to the Gainesville office from Tallahassee, met with Petitioner, and offered her a choice of resignation or termination. Petitioner chose termination. That same day, after leaving the office, Petitioner called the Department of Human Resources and requested to change her termination to resignation. The request was granted. Petitioner did not ask why she was being terminated or asked to resign. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. Carr nor Ms. James gave her a reason. Ms. Zeigler resigned from the Department in October 2013. The circumstances of Ms. Zeigler’s resignation were not introduced in evidence. In that regard, Ms. Zeigler testified as follows: I had a lot of questions with the State that probably should not come up here, but there are a lot of questionable things that were going on with the State at the time which led to my resignation. So I did not question it. I did not question [Petitioner’s] termination based off of my ability to run the office, because I almost felt like it was being run above me.[6/] Ms. Zeigler’s testimony was introduced in support of Petitioner’s claims. However, Ms. Zeigler had difficulty recalling events, including the timing of relevant events. Of note, Ms. Zeigler testified that she was the RPS for Gainesville about a year, meaning she would have begun in the position in October 2012. Later, she testified that Mr. Rutledge was terminated “not long after I was there [as RPS].” Her testimony was hesitant, hedging, and sometimes conflicting. Ms. Zeigler testified that she was in daily contact with Mr. Hudson about issues in the Gainesville office after Mr. Rutledge was terminated, but claimed to have had no advance notice of either Mr. Keels’ or Petitioner’s termination. As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Zeigler’s testimony to be both unreliable and unpersuasive. Ms. Zeigler’s counseling memorandum to Petitioner regarding calendaring is credible evidence of Petitioner’s job performance which cannot be discounted by Ms. Zeigler’s after-the-fact, and apparently biased, testimony.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, did commit an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, and prohibiting the practice. However, under the specific facts of the case, the undersigned recommends no affirmative relief from the effects of the practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2015.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 110.1091120.569120.57430.03760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-5.006
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LEONA SANDERS vs. G & B PRODUCTS/BATES FILE COMPANY, 79-002265 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002265 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, Leona Sanders, a black female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by unlawfully failing to consider her for employment based on her race. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record complied herein, I make the following:

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action. Petitioner timely filed her complaint and Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Chapter 9D-9.08, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Leona Sanders, is a black female who filed an application for employment with the Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, for a factory worker's job on July 13, 1978. 1/ The Respondent, having employed fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks during times material herein, is an employer within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Petitioner satisfied Respondent's listed requirements for the position of factory worker and sought factory employment based on the advice of her doctor. Petitioner was unable to obtain a personal interview from Respondent when her application was originally filed inasmuch as Respondent's Personnel Director and Executive Secretary, Dorothy Russell (Director), was then on vacation. Petitioner was informed by a Personnel employee that she would be scheduled for an interview when the Director returned from vacation on July 17. Petitioner, after having waited until Wednesday, July 19, without receiving a call from Respondent, called the Director, since in her opinion the Director would not be granting her request for an interview without some prodding on her (Petitioner's) part. Petitioner was unable to schedule an interview with the Director on the following day, Thursday, July 20, at which time she was told by the Director that a full complement of employees had been hired. The Director assured Petitioner that she would be called during the following week should any vacancies occur. Petitioner was assured that in any event she would be notified if she would be hired by July 25. During the interview, Petitioner expressed a desire in being considered for work on the first and second shift inasmuch as she had four children who ranged in ages from ten to sixteen. However, she advised the Director that she would accept a position on any shift. From the date of the interview, July 20, through August 7, Petitioner was not called or otherwise notified of any vacancies for factory workers by Respondent. While reading the employment section of the classified ads in the local newspaper on August 7, Petitioner noted an advertisement by Respondent's Personnel Office for factory workers. Upon reading the ad for the factory workers, Petitioner immediately visited Respondent's factory and reported to the Personnel Office in hopes of being employed. Petitioner was again told by Respondent's Personnel Director that a full complement of workers had been hired but that she would be notified should any vacancies occur. Respondent hired sixteen non-black females as factory workers during the period July 15 through August 23. All of the sixteen newly hired employees made application for employment after Petitioner, i.e., July 15. Respondent, in completing the final phase of its heavy seasonal hirings, hired its first black factory worker on approximately August 28, 1978. Petitioner has suffered from hypertension in the past. As stated, she was encouraged to seek factory work by her physician. Petitioner has an automobile to commute from her home to Respondent's factory if offered a position. Petitioner passed a test designed to measure dexterity and aptitude. Results of the tests were provided to the Personnel Director. Petitioner has sought, and continues to seek, employment from neighboring employers. The list of employers she has applied to for employment includes St. Joseph Medical Center, The News Press, R. L. Polk & Company, and all local nursing homes. Petitioner's interim earnings during times material amount to $968.16. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Respondent's Personnel Director testified that the number of applicants greatly outnumbered the available factory worker positions. Director Russell considered Petitioner better suited for employment at a hospital, nursing home or for clerical work and suggested that she seek employment in those areas. According to Director Russell, Petitioner displayed a poor attitude during the interview since she attempted to dictate the hours that she was willing to work and she concluded that Petitioner would not work out satisfactorily in the factory based on her expressions as to the hours and positions for which she wanted to be considered for employment.

Conclusions The Florida Commission on Human Relations, a Section 706 deferral agency for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, administers the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. The intent of the Human Rights Act of 1977 (Act) is to eradicate employment discrimination based on certain protective classifications, including race. Chapter 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). Respondent is an employer subject to the guides of the Act. Respondent, as an employer, has an established affirmative action policy and employee selection plan which guides it in its search of employees on an equal opportunity basis. Respondent also has a policy of attempting to hire those employees with children to work on the first shift. (Testimony of Director Russell.) During the months of July and August, Respondent repeatedly placed ads for employees in the local newspaper. Petitioner, during this period, repeatedly sought employment at Respondent's factory, as well as with other employers. As reflected by all the available criteria required by Respondent for its selection of employees. Despite Petitioner's continuing efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent, she was repeatedly told that a full complement of employees had been selected. On the other hand, Respondent continued to advertise for factory employees. Given the above factors which reveal that Petitioner satisfied the eligibility criteria for employment selection as required by Respondent; Petitioner's continued efforts to be selected for employment with Respondent; Respondent's continued search for employees by the placing of ads in the local newspaper and the rejection to Petitioner based on the claim that the full employee complement had been selected, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent in violation of Section 23.167(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979). I shall so recommend. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in order to effectuate the purposes of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order requiring Respondent, G & B Products/Bates File Company, to: Cease and desist from discriminatorily denying or limiting Petitioner's employment opportunities. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended: Make Petitioner whole by: Reimbursing Petitioner for the difference in wages between what Petitioner would have earned as a factory worker and what she earned in other employment from July 13, 1978, plus interest until Petitioner is offered employment by Respondent as a factory worker. Back pay is to be computed in accordance with Schedule "A" attached here. Offer to Petitioner the next available factory worker position on the first shift. Post, for a period of sixty (60) days, in Respondent's facilities in places where notices to employees are usually posted, copies furnished by the Commission to the effect that Respondent will not discriminate because of race in affording equal employment opportunities and terms and conditions of employment to all its applicants and employees. Report to the Commission, within thirty (30) days of the Commission's order, steps taken by it respecting the fulfillment of the above conditions. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August 1980.

Florida Laws (2) 120.5790.803
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PAULINE LOMBARDI vs DADE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 09-003225 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 17, 2009 Number: 09-003225 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 2010

The Issue The issue in the case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by terminating her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act.

Findings Of Fact Lombardi started her employment as a judicial assistant with Dade County in 1971. Judge Mattie Belle Davis was the first judge who hired Petitioner. Judicial Assistants serve at the pleasure of the appointing Judge.1 Judge Bruce Levy hired Lombardi as his judicial assistant after Judge Davis retired. In December 2004, Judge Levy lost his re-election bid and Petitioner no longer had a full-time position as a judicial assistant with a judge. Lombardi started working in the temporary pool of judicial assistants. The position allowed Petitioner to retain her benefits while seeking a permanent judicial assistant position. While serving in the pool, Petitioner worked for Judge Leon Firtel from February 14, 2005, through February 28, 2006, before he let her go. Petitioner then worked for Judge Rosa Rodriguez from April 1, 2006, through May 23, 2007, until she let her go. Petitioner last worked for Dade County when she served as retired Judge Roger Silver's ("Silver") judicial assistant from September 1, 2007, until January 7, 2008. Lombardi was terminated in Silver's chambers with a bailiff and Ms. Suarez from Human Resources present. Silver informed the Petitioner her services were no longer needed and he was letting her go. Petitioner questioned why she was being terminated; however, Silver did not provide an explanation. Silver terminated Petitioner because he was not happy with her work performance. Silver testified that Petitioner had the following problems regarding her work: taking lunch breaks beyond the one hour he had discussed with her; numerous complaints from attorneys; selling Avon at the work place; not answering the phones and allowing calls to go to voicemail; and repeatedly setting unnecessary hearings on the docket. Prior to terminating Lombardi, Silver inquired with Human Resources about a replacement and was informed that he could not be assured that he would be able to get a temporary assistant to replace Lombardi due to the unavailability of funding. He still choose to terminate Petitioner because, "[he] felt having no one was better than what [he] had under the circumstances." Petitioner was not able to go back in the "temporary pool" of judicial assistants as she had in the past after Silver terminated her. In 2008, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit had a hiring freeze whereby the temporary pool was no longer funded. Human Resources eventually sent Elizabeth Gonzalez, whose date of birth is May 26, 1965, to Silver as a temporary judicial assistant. Silver had never met Gonzalez prior to her coming to work for him. There was no discussion of age when Silver requested a judicial assistant or when Gonzalez was assigned to him. Gonzalez served as Silver's temporary judicial assistant for a number of weeks and, when personnel advised him he could hire someone, including Gonzalez, Silver hired Gonzalez on or about March 10, 2008, because he was pleased with her work. Gonzalez worked with him until his retirement in December 2008. At the time when Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner was unaware of the exact age of her replacement. Petitioner's date of birth is May 18, 1948.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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