The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified for certification of qualification for licensure as a professional engineer by endorsement, pursuant to section 471.015(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In 1982, Petitioner earned a bachelor's degree in construction engineering from Florida International University. Petitioner does not have a doctorate in engineering. On June 24, 2009, the state of North Carolina issued Petitioner a license as a professional engineer. This is his only professional engineer license. Because Petitioner had over 20 years' progressive experience on engineering projects acceptable to the North Carolina State Board of Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors, he was eligible for a professional engineer license by, among other things, passing Part II of the National Council for Examiners of Engineering and Surveying (NCEES), which is also known as the Principals and Practices Examination. Due to his experience, North Carolina did not require Petitioner to pass Part I of the NCEES, which is also known as the Fundamentals Examination. By application dated August 27, 2009, Petitioner applied for Florida licensure by endorsement as a professional engineer. Ultimately, Respondent declined to certify to the Florida Engineers Management Corporation the application for licensure by endorsement because Petitioner had not passed Part I of the NCEES. Except for not having passed Part I of the NCEES examination (or, if applicable, not having met one of the other two alternatives set forth in section 471.015(5)(a), as discussed in the Conclusions of Law), Petitioner otherwise meets the education and experience requirements set forth in section 471.013(1), Florida Statutes, for certification for licensure by endorsement.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for certification of qualification for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Todd Flury, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kristine M. Johnson, Esquire 10620 Griffin Road, Suite 106-B Cooper City, Florida 33328 Carrie A. Flynn, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267 John Rimes, Esquire Chief prosecuting Attorney Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267 Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2007)1/, by terminating Petitioner's employment in retaliation for her filing a formal grievance asserting that a co-worker made a racially discriminatory comment to her at a staff meeting.
Findings Of Fact The District Board of Trustees of LCCC is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by the College and began work on January 29, 2007. She worked in the cosmetology department as a Teaching Assistant II until the College terminated her employment on June 28, 2007. In addition to Petitioner, the College's cosmetology department consisted of two instructors, Carol McLean and Vicki Glenn. Ms. McLean was also the department coordinator, meaning that she supervised Petitioner and Ms. Glenn. The instructors performed classroom instruction and supervised students "on the floor" in the department's laboratory, where the students practiced their skills on clients who made appointments with the department to have their hair styled. Petitioner's duties included answering the telephone, making client appointments, ordering and stocking cosmetology supplies, and recording the hours and services performed by the students. Petitioner was a licensed cosmetologist and was expected to assist on the floor of the lab, but only when an instructor determined that her presence was necessary. Petitioner was not authorized to perform classroom instruction. Petitioner was at all times employed on a probationary basis under LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:8-04, which provides that all newly hired career service employees must serve a probationary period of six calendar months. This Policy and Procedure also requires that conferences be held with the employee at the end of two and four months of employment. The conferences are to include written performance appraisals and should be directed at employee development, areas of weakness or strength, and any additional training required to improve performance. Petitioner acknowledged that she attended orientation sessions for new employees during which this Policy and Procedure was discussed.4/ The evidence at hearing established that the orientation sessions covered, among other subjects, an explanation of the probationary period, the College's discipline and grievance procedures, and how to find the College's Policies and Procedures on the internet. The employee orientation process also required Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Carol McLean, to explain 14 additional items, including Petitioner's job description and the College's parking policies. The evidence established that Ms. McLean covered these items with Petitioner. Petitioner's first written evaluation covered the period from January 29, 2007 through March 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on April 13, 2007, and approved by the Dean of Occupational Programs, Tracy Hickman, on April 30, 2007. The College's "Support Staff Job Performance Evaluation" form provides numerical grades in the categories of work knowledge, work quality, work quantity and meeting deadlines, dependability, co-operation, judgment in carrying out assignments, public relations, and overall performance. A score of 1 or 2 in any category is deemed "unsatisfactory." A score of 3 or 4 is "below norm." A score of 5 or 6 is "expected norm." A score of 7 or 8 is "above norm." A score of 9 or 10 is rated "exceptional." Petitioner's scores in each area were either 5 or 6, within the "expected norm." Ms. McLean graded Petitioner's overall performance as a 6. The evaluation form also provides questions that allow the supervisor to evaluate the employee's performance in a narrative format. In response to a question regarding Petitioner's strengths, Ms. McLean wrote that Petitioner "has demonstrated she is very capable handling conflicts/situations concerning clients. She is also good working with the students when needed. Her computer skills/knowledge has been an asset." In response to a question regarding Petitioner's weaknesses, Ms. McLean wrote, "Kay5/ needs to be a little more organized. I feel confident with the move to the new building, she will be able to set her office up to be more efficient for herself." Petitioner testified that she has excellent organizational skills and that she is, in fact, a "neat freak." Her problem was the utter disorganization of the cosmetology department at the time she started her job. She could not see her desk for the pile of papers and other materials on it. Boxes were piled in the middle of the floor. There were more than 100 unanswered messages in the recorded message queue. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn could tell her how to proceed on any of these matters, and that she was therefore required to obtain advice via telephone calls to either Wendy Saunders, the previous teaching assistant, or Jeanette West, secretary to the Dean of Occupational Programs. Neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn recalled the complete departmental disorganization attested to by Petitioner at the outset of her employment. In fact, Ms. McLean recalled having to work 80-hour weeks to restore order to the department's workspace after Petitioner was discharged. No other witness testified as to disorganization prior to Petitioner's hiring. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Petitioner dramatically overstated the poor condition of the cosmetology department's offices at the time she started work, and also greatly overstated any contribution she made to improve its organization. Petitioner's second and final evaluation covered the period from March 29, 2007, through May 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on May 22, 2007, and approved by Dean Hickman on May 23, 2007. Petitioner's numerical scores in each of the categories, including overall performance, was 4, meaning that her performance was "below norm." In a typewritten attachment, Ms. McLean wrote: Employee Improvement: Strengths: Kay is very good with the students and has strong desires to help them. Weaknesses: A concern is Kay's words and actions have shown that she would rather teach than be in the office. There is still a lack of organization in the office. We have had a couple incidents where we have to search for invoices, etc. I am still receiving complaints about the phone not being answered. Other comments: Too often Kay's actions have made it difficult for the department to operate effectively. Since Kay's arrival, it have discussed [sic] that each person must respect the protocol of communicating within the chain of command. On numerous occasions Kay ignored those instructions, In spite of my direct instructions to notify/discuss an incident report to Dean Hickman before doing anything else with it, Kay distributed it to others.6/ The College terminated Petitioner's employment on June 28, 2007, roughly five months after she began work and well within the six-month probationary period. Petitioner's dismissal was due to inadequate job performance and to several episodes displaying poor judgment and disregard of the College's rules and regulations. As to day-to-day job performance, the evidence established that Petitioner often had to be asked several times to do things that she conceded were within the scope of her duties. One of Petitioner's duties was to track the department's inventory, order supplies as needed, check the supplies against the invoices as they arrived, and unpack the supplies and restock the department's shelves. If the supplies were not removed from their shipping containers and stocked on the shelves, it was difficult for the instructors and students to find items or know when the department was running low on a given supply. Student cosmetologists at the College were frequently required to use caustic chemicals, and it was critical that the supplies be correctly inventoried and shelved to avoid mistakes in application of these chemicals. Ms. McLean had to tell Petitioner repeatedly to unpack the supplies. Petitioner would tell Ms. McLean that she would take care of it, but later Ms. McLean would notice that the supplies were still in their boxes.7/ Ms. McLean testified that there were multiple occasions when paperwork could not be located due to Petitioner's lack of a filing system. Ms. McLean and Petitioner would have to rummage through stacks of paper to find the item they needed because Petitioner failed to file the department's paperwork in a coherent manner. Another of Petitioner's duties was to set up "product knowledge" classes conducted by vendors of hair care products used in the cosmetology program. In February 2007, Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner to set up a class with Shirley Detrieville, the Redken representative for the College. Over the next month, Ms. Glenn repeatedly asked Petitioner about her progress in setting up the class, and Petitioner consistently responded that Ms. Detrieville had not returned her calls. Finally, in March, Ms. Glenn happened to see Ms. Detrieville on the campus. Ms. Detrieville informed Ms. Glenn that all the paperwork for the class had been completed long ago, and she was just waiting for Petitioner to call and let her know when to come. Ms. Glenn's class never received the Redken training. The evidence established that Petitioner consistently failed to return phone calls made to the department. There was a core group of women, mostly retirees that constituted an important segment of the regular patrons at the department's lab. Keeping track of their appointments was important because the students needed practical experience in order to meet the requirements for licensure. It was also important to keep track of the training needs of each student, because a student working on hair coloring, for instance, needed to be matched with a customer requesting that service. Among Petitioner's duties was to make the appointments for the patrons, and to coordinate the appointments with the students. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn testified that they consistently received complaints that Petitioner did not return phone calls from patrons attempting to make appointments. Ms. McLean recalled an elderly woman named Ms. Grammith, who was a weekly customer at the lab. Ms. Grammith phoned Ms. McLean at home because she was unable to get Petitioner to return her calls for an appointment.8/ Ms. Glenn recounted an occasion when she received a phone call from Ms. Grammith, complaining that Petitioner was not returning her calls. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and asked her to return Ms. Grammith's call and make her appointment. Petitioner assured Ms. Glenn that she would. Ms. Glenn then went to teach a class. When she returned to her office, Ms. Glenn had another message from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner about the situation, and Petitioner admitted that she had not yet returned the call. Still later on the same afternoon, Ms. Glenn received a third call from Ms. Grammith. Again, Ms. Glenn inquired of Petitioner, who again admitted that she had not phoned Ms. Grammith. The next morning was a Friday, and Ms. Glenn received another call from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and told her to call Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn knew Petitioner never made the call because Ms. Grammith called Ms. Glenn yet again on the following Monday. Another elderly regular customer, Ms. Caldwell, stopped Ms. Glenn in the hallway one day to ask "what in the world was going on here." Ms. Caldwell complained that Petitioner never got her appointment right, and always told her that she had come in on the wrong day or at the wrong time. On this day, Ms. Caldwell was left sitting in the hallway outside the lab for three and one-half hours because Petitioner failed to schedule her appointment correctly. On another occasion, Shirley Rehberg, an LCCC employee, emailed Ms. Glenn to inquire about making an appointment for a pedicure. Ms. Glenn responded that Petitioner handled appointments, and provided Ms. Rehberg with information as to Petitioner's office hours. On three different occasions, Ms. Rehberg informed Ms. Glenn that she had attempted to make appointments with Petitioner but had received no response. Ms. Glenn also recalled going to the College registrar's office on unrelated business and being asked by Debbie Osborne, an employee in that office, whether the cosmetology department had stopped taking appointments. Ms. Glenn told her that all she had to do was call Petitioner. Ms. Osborne replied that she had emailed Petitioner several times and never received a response. Ms. McLean concluded that Petitioner was much more interested in the occasional teaching aspect of her position than she was in the quotidian matters of filing, ordering and answering the phone that constituted the bulk of her job. Ms. McLean believed that Petitioner's eagerness to teach, even when her presence on the floor was not requested or needed, sometimes caused Petitioner to neglect her other duties. Petitioner admitted that she preferred teaching, but also testified that she was forced to teach students at least two days per week because Ms. McLean simply skipped work every Wednesday and Thursday. Petitioner stated that when she was on the floor of the lab, she could not hear the phone ringing back in the office. She believed that this might have accounted for some of the missed phone calls. Ms. McLean credibly denied Petitioner's unsupported allegation that she skipped work twice per week. Ms. McLean was in the classroom and lab with her students four days per week, as required by her schedule. Ms. McLean reasonably observed that she would not remain long in the College's employ if she were to skip work every Wednesday and Thursday. When classes were not in session, faculty members such as Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn were not required to come into the office, whereas the teaching assistant was required to come in and work a full day from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On these faculty off-days, it was especially important for Petitioner to be on the job because she constituted the sole point of contact between students and the cosmetology department. New classes in cosmetology start twice a year, and prospective students may drop by the campus at any time. If no one is present during normal working hours to answer questions or assist the student in applying, the College could lose a prospective student as well as suffer a diminished public image. The evidence established that Petitioner would take advantage of the lack of supervision on faculty off-days to go missing from her position, without submitting leave forms for approval by an administrator as required by College policy. May 4, 2007, was the College's graduation day. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn arrived at the cosmetology building at 3:00 p.m. to prepare for the cap and gown ceremony and noted that Petitioner was not there, though it was a regular work day for her. Petitioner was still absent at 4:30 p.m. when the two instructors left the building to go to the graduation ceremony. On May 15, 2007, a faculty off-day, Ms. Glenn came in at 11:00 a.m. to prepare for her class the next day. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn to handle a student registration matter while Petitioner went out. Ms. Glenn agreed to do so. The students had yet to arrive by 2:00 p.m. when Ms. Glenn was ready to leave. Petitioner had still not returned to the office, forcing Ms. Glenn to ask Ms. West to register the students if they arrived. Ms. Glenn had no idea when or if Petitioner ever returned to work that day. Marcia Brinson was the custodian who cleaned the cosmetology building. During summer session at the College, Ms. Brinson worked from 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. She would often come into the cosmetology building and find that Petitioner was not there. This was the case on May 15, 2007, when Ms. Brinson entered the building at 2:00 p.m. At around 2:30, an administrator named Glenn Rice came to the cosmetology building with two students whom he was attempting to enroll.9/ Ms. Brinson phoned Ms. McLean at home to inform her of the situation. Ms. McLean phoned the cosmetology office. Petitioner did not answer. At about 2:50 p.m., Ms. McLean called Petitioner at her cell phone number. Petitioner answered and told Ms. McLean that she was at her mother's house, but was about to return to the College. Ms. McLean could not say whether Petitioner ever actually returned to the College that day. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that the only time she left the cosmetology department on May 15, 2007, was to go to the library at 2:15 p.m. and obtain materials for a class she was going to teach on May 17. This testimony cannot be credited, given that it conflicts with the credible testimony of Ms. McLean, Ms. Glenn and Ms. Brinson. Further belying Petitioner's claim is the fact that she later submitted a leave form claiming "personal leave" for two hours on May 15, 2007. She claimed the hours from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Aside from its inconsistency with Petitioner's testimony, this claim was inaccurate on two other counts. First, the evidence established that Petitioner was away from the office from at least 11:00 a.m. until some time after 3:00 p.m. Second, Petitioner's regular work day ended at 5:00 p.m., thus giving her no cause to claim leave for the half-hour between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. The College has a "wellness" program in which employees are allowed to take 30 minutes of leave, three days per week, in order to engage in some form of exercise. Petitioner considered wellness time to be the equivalent of personal leave, and would leave her job at the College early in order to keep an appointment at a hair-styling salon at which she worked part-time. Finally, Petitioner was unwilling or unable to comply with the College's parking decal system. At the time she was hired, Petitioner was issued a staff parking pass that entitled her to park her car in any unreserved space on he campus. As noted above, many of the cosmetology customers were elderly women. For their convenience, the College had five spaces reserved for customers directly in front of the cosmetology building. Customers were issued a 5 x 8 "Cosmetology Customer" card that they would leave on their dashboards. If all five of the reserved spaces were taken, the card allowed the customer to park in any space on the campus. On May 30, 2007, the College's supervisor of safety and security, Tony LaJoie, was patrolling the campus on his golf cart. Petitioner flagged him down, asking for help with a dead battery in her car. Mr. LaJoie stopped to help her, but also noticed that Petitioner's car was parked in a space reserved for customers and that Petitioner had a "Cosmetology Customer" card on her dashboard. When he asked her about it, Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she had lost her staff parking pass and therefore needed to use the customer pass. Mr. LaJoie told Petitioner that she could go to the maintenance building and get a new staff pass, or get a visitor's pass to use until she found the first pass. Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she could not afford the $10 replacement fee for the pass. Mr. LaJoie told her that the $10 replacement fee was cheaper than the $25 to $50 fines she would have to pay for illegally parking on campus. Petitioner promised Mr. LaJoie that she would go to maintenance and take care of the situation. On June 5, 2007, Mr. LaJoie found Petitioner's car again parked in a customer reserved space and with a customer card on the dashboard. Mr. LaJoie wrote Petitioner a parking ticket. Petitioner was well aware that the customer spaces were reserved at least in part because many of the department's customers were elderly and unable to walk more than a short distance. Petitioner nonetheless ignored College policy and parked her car in the reserved spaces. Petitioner never obtained a replacement parking pass.10/ Dean Hickman was the administrator who made the decision to recommend Petitioner's termination to the College's Vice-President, Charles Carroll, who in turn presented the recommended decision to LCCC President Charles W. Hall, who made the final decision on termination. She based her recommendation on the facts as set forth in Findings of Fact 19 through 48, supra. Petitioner's termination was due to her performance deficiencies. Dean Hickman considered Petitioner's pattern of conduct, including her repeated violation of parking policies and her practice of leaving her post without permission, to constitute insubordination. Ms. McLean, who provided input to Dean Hickman as to Petitioner's performance issues, testified that Petitioner's slack performance worked to the great detriment of a department with only two instructors attempting to deal with 20 or more students at different stages of their training. Petitioner's position was not filled for a year after her dismissal. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn worked extra hours and were able to perform Petitioner's duties, with the help of a student to answer the phones. The fact that the instructors were able to perform their own jobs and cover Petitioner's duties negates Petitioner's excuse that she was required to do more than one full-time employee could handle. Furthermore, Ms. McLean testified that, despite the added work load, Petitioner's departure improved the working atmosphere by eliminating the tension caused by Petitioner. Because Petitioner was still a probationary employee, the College was not required to show cause or provide specific reasons for her dismissal. Nevertheless, the evidence established that there were entirely adequate, performance-based reasons that fully justified the College's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The evidence further established that Petitioner's dismissal was not related to the formal grievance Petitioner filed on June 5, 2007. However, because Petitioner has alleged that her termination was retaliatory, the facts surrounding her grievance are explored below. The grievance stemmed from an incident that occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Glenn on May 16, 2007, the first day of the summer term. A student named Russia Sebree approached Ms. Glenn with a problem. Ms. Sebree was not on Ms. Glenn's summer class roster because she had not completed the Tests of Adult Basic Education ("TABE"), a test of basic reading, math and language skills. Students were required to pass the TABE in their first semester before they would be allowed to register for their second semester. Ms. Glenn told Ms. Sebree that, because the initial registration period had passed, they would have to walk over to the Dean's office and have Dean Hickman register Ms. Sebree for the class. Ms. Glenn phoned Dean Hickman's secretary, Ms. West, to make an appointment. Ms. West told Ms. Glenn that Dean Hickman was out of the office, and that she would make a return call to Ms. Glenn as soon as the dean returned. While waiting for Ms. West's call, Ms. Sebree apparently drifted into Petitioner's office. She mentioned to Petitioner that she hadn't passed the TABE test, and Petitioner told her she could take care of the matter by making an appointment for Ms. Sebree to take the test. Ms. Glenn overheard the conversation and walked in to stop Petitioner from making the call. She told Petitioner that she had a call in to Dean Hickman, and that she and Ms. Sebree would have to meet with the dean to determine whether Ms. Sebree could register for Ms. Glenn's summer class or whether she would be required to complete the TABE and wait until the next semester. Ms. Glenn was angered by Petitioner's interference in this matter. Petitioner's actions were beyond the scope of a teaching assistant's duties, unless requested by an instructor.11/ She jumped into the situation without inquiring whether Ms. Sebree had talked to her instructor about her problem and without understanding the steps that Ms. Glenn had already taken on Ms. Sebree's behalf. Eventually, Ms. West returned the call and Ms. Glenn and Ms. Sebree met with Dean Hickman. After the meeting, Ms. Glenn requested a private meeting with Dean Hickman. She told the dean that she was very upset that Petitioner had taken it upon herself to take over the situation with Ms. Sebree, when Ms. Glenn was taking care of the matter and Petitioner had no reason to step in. Dean Hickman told Ms. Glenn that she would not tolerate a staff person going over an instructor's head in a matter involving a student. Dean Hickman asked Ms. Glenn to send Petitioner over to her office. Dean Hickman testified that she met with Petitioner for about 30 minutes, and that Petitioner left her office requesting a meeting with Ms. Glenn. Dean Hickman did not testify as to the details of her meeting with Petitioner. The dean knew that Petitioner was angry and cautioned her to conduct herself in a professional manner when speaking with Ms. Glenn. Petitioner testified that Dean Hickman "yelled" at her, "I will not have you undermine my instructor's authority." Petitioner professed not to know what Dean Hickman was talking about. The dean repeated what Ms. Glenn had said to her about the incident with Ms. Sebree. According to Petitioner, Ms. Glenn had told the dean "some lie," an "outlandish" tale in which "I went in telling Russia that she didn't have to do what Vicki said, or something like that." Petitioner told Dean Hickman her version of the incident, which was essentially that nothing happened. She was showing Ms. Sebree "some basic algebraic equations and stuff and there was no conflict or anything in the office." Petitioner asked for a meeting "so I can see what's going on." Petitioner returned to the cosmetology department. She was visibly upset. She asked for a departmental meeting with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn that afternoon. Ms. McLean agreed to move up the weekly departmental meeting in order to take care of this matter. The meeting convened with Ms. McLean going over the usual day-to-day matters involving the program. Once the regular business was completed, Ms. McLean stated that she wanted Petitioner and Ms. Glenn to air out their problems. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn why she wanted to tell lies about her. Ms. Glenn said, "What?" and Petitioner stated, "You're a liar." Ms. Glenn denied the accusation. Petitioner repeated, "You're nothing but a liar." In anger and frustration, Ms. Glenn stated, "Look here, sister, I am not a liar." Petitioner responded, "First, you're not my sister and, secondly, my name is Stephanie K. Taylor, address me with that, please."12/ Ms. McLean testified that both women were "pretty heated" and "pretty frustrated" with each other. She concluded the meeting shortly after this exchange. After the meeting, Petitioner and Ms. McLean spoke about Ms. Glenn's use of the word "sister," which Petitioner believed had racial connotations. Ms. McLean told Petitioner that she did not believe anything racial was intended.13/ Ms. Glenn had never been called a liar, and in her frustration she blurted out "sister" in the same way another angry person might say, "Look here, lady." Petitioner seemed satisfied and the matter was dropped for the remainder of the day. Dean Hickman testified that Petitioner brought some paperwork to her office that afternoon after the departmental meeting. Petitioner told her that she felt better about the situation, that they had aired their differences and everything now seemed fine. The dean considered the matter resolved. By the next morning, May 17, 2007, Petitioner had changed her mind about the comment. She sent an email to each member of the College's board of trustees, President Hall, Dean Hickman, and various other College employees that stated as follows: Hello. I am Stephanie K. Taylor, Teaching Assistant for Cosmetology. I am writing because of an incident that took place on yesterday, May 16, 2007. Nancy Carol McLean (Coordinator/Instructor), Vicki Glenn (Instructor) and I met for a meeting to discuss concerns in our department approximately 11:35 am. During our discussion, Vicki Glenn made a racial comment to me. I disagreed with her concerning a statement she made. Her reply to me was: "No, 'Sister', I did not!" I was very offended by her remark and I replied, "My name is Stephanie Kay Taylor." Following the meeting, I spoke with Ms. McLean and I decided to write this incident statement. If I allow an instructor to call me something other than my name, these incidents will continue. Ms. McLean had repeatedly cautioned Petitioner to respect the College's chain of command. As Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. McLean was supposed to be Petitioner's first resort insofar as work-related complaints. Petitioner was in the habit of going straight to Dean Hickman with complaints before discussing them with Ms. McLean. However, in this instance, Petitioner did show Ms. McLean the text of her statement before she distributed it. Ms. McLean advised Petitioner to take the matter straight to Dean Hickman and discuss it with her before distributing the statement. Petitioner did not take Ms. McLean's advice. Though Petitioner emailed the statement to Dean Hickman, the dean did not actually see the statement until it had been distributed to several other people. No evidence was presented that Petitioner suffered any adverse consequences from distributing her written statement outside the College's chain of command. To the contrary, Petitioner testified that Ms. McLean advised her that if she felt strongly about the matter, she should file a formal grievance pursuant to the LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:6- 10.14/ Ms. McLean provided Petitioner with the forms she needed to file a written grievance. Petitioner also sought and received the advice of a human relations specialist at the College as to how to file a formal grievance. Both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn convincingly testified that they had no ill feeling toward Petitioner for filing a grievance. Ms. McLean stated that the grievance had no impact on her at all. Ms. Glenn was not disturbed by the grievance because she had done nothing wrong and believed the process would vindicate her. Petitioner filed her formal written grievance on June 5, 2007. Vice president Marilyn Hamm began the investigation in the absence of Human Resources Director Gary Boettcher, who picked up the investigation upon his return to the campus. Dean Hickman also participated in the investigation of Petitioner's grievance. They interviewed the witnesses to the incident. They also interviewed 11 cosmetology students and asked them whether they had ever heard Ms. Glenn make any "derogatory or racial slurs or comments" relative to Petitioner. None of the students had heard Ms. Glenn make any remarks fitting the description in the query.15/ One student told the investigators that he had heard Petitioner speak disparagingly of Ms. Glenn, but not vice versa. On June 19, 2007, Mr. Boettcher issued a memorandum to Petitioner that stated as follows: You filed a grievance alleging that Ms. Vickie Glenn made a racial comment to you by calling you "sister." You further stated that you want the same respect that you have given to others and that you be referred to by your name, Stephanie K. Taylor. I was not available when you filed the grievance therefore it was referred to Vice President Hamm who began the investigation and upon my return it was referred to me. Ms. Hamm interviewed yourself, and Carol McLean. Ms. Hamm and I then interviewed Ms. Glenn. Subsequently, Ms. Hickman, the Dean of your department, and I interviewed a random sampling of students in the cosmetology program. The incident you described, when you were referred to as "sister" was discussed with both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn, who were in the meeting when the comment was made. They both acknowledged that you were in fact referred to as sister. Neither of them viewed it as a racial comment but a term that was used in the heat of the discussion in which you and Ms. Glenn were very much at odds on a subject. The students were interviewed and asked if you had discussed or made mention of an evaluation that you received and also whether that had ever heard Ms. Glenn talk derogatorily or made any racial comments relative to you. Some of the students heard of talk of your evaluation but none of them heard it first hand from you. None of the students ever heard Ms. Glenn refer to you in any racial or disparaging way. In view of the investigation it is concluded that you were called "sister" but not in a negative or racial inference and that Ms. Glenn has not referred to you in a derogatory or racial manner. This has been discussed with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn in that they were asked to refer to you strictly by your name and in a professional manner. I trust this will be satisfactory to you and if you have any questions please feel free to contact me. Petitioner's employment with the College was terminated on June 28, 2007, nine days after Mr. Boettcher's memorandum. No evidence was presented to establish a causal connection between these two events, aside from their temporal proximity. As noted extensively above, the College had more than ample justification to terminate Petitioner's employment before the conclusion of her six-month probationary period. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was terminated from her position with the College due to poor job performance and conduct amounting to insubordination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College did not retaliate against Petitioner for the filing of a grievance alleging that Ms. Glenn had made a racially discriminatory remark towards Petitioner. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence established that College personnel assisted Petitioner in filing her grievance and that the College conscientiously investigated the grievance. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College has not discriminated against Petitioner based on her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Lake City Community College did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for the Principles and Practice Examination has met the requirements set forth in Subsection 471.013(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-20.002(1)(b).
Findings Of Fact On or about April 27, 2006, Petitioner filed an application (Application) with the Board seeking to take the Principles and Practice Examination for professional engineers. Petitioner is not licensed in any other state as a professional engineer. Petitioner is a resident of Florida, who is of good moral character, and completed his bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from Ohio State University in December 1999. On August 5, 2006, Petitioner was awarded the degree of Master's of Science in Electrical Engineering from UCF. Petitioner is seeking to take the Florida Professional Engineering Examination in the area of electrical engineering. Section 7 of the Application for the Licensure by Examination directs the Applicant to do the following: List, in order, all employment experience. A minimum of four years experience must be evidenced at time of submitting your application. All engineering experience after graduation or prior to graduation shall be verified by professional or practicing engineers. Non- engineering experience or periods of unemployment shall be listed, but is not required to be verified. List employment beginning with earliest experience. Refer to attached copy of Rule 61G15-20.002. Column # 1 of Section 7 directs the Applicant to identify the Experience Number. Column # 2 of Section 7 directs the Applicant to list Dates of Employment, Month, Day, and Year. Column # 3 of Section 7 directs the Applicant to list Title of Position, Names and complete address of the firm and immediate supervisor. Column # 4 of Section 7 directs the Applicant to list Total Time in # of Months in Professional (Engineering Related) and Non-Professional (Non-Engineering Related) work. Column # 5 of Section 7 directs the Applicant to provide the following: Details pertaining to nature of work. Distinguish clearly between professional and non- professional duties and responsibilities. For each employment, describe explicitly, but concisely, the work you did and one engineering decision you were required to make. Attach exhibits as necessary. Refer to definitions in Section 471.005, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G15, Florida Administrative Code, when defining work, see attached copy of rule. All experience, whether or not engineering, shall be accounted for on this application. (Emphasis in Original) Petitioner listed four separate professional experiences under Section 7. From August 1, 1995, to March 1, 2000, Petitioner served as a research assistant in the Electroscience Laboratory at the Ohio State University, while studying for his degree in electrical engineering. Petitioner assisted Ph.D. researchers to investigate electrical phenomena built electrical research devices, in a laboratory setting. From March 1, 2000, to March 1, 2001, Petitioner was employed as an electrical engineer for Weldon Technologies in Columbus, Ohio, where he worked on design, construction and manufacture of electrical systems for integration onto mobile devices. Petitioner worked on designs for digital systems, multiplying systems, vehicle systems, mobile vehicle response systems, emergency vehicles, and airplane/aerospace powered supply designs. From March 1, 2001, to December 1, 2001, Petitioner was employed as an electrical engineer for National Technical Systems in Foxborough, Massachusetts, where he worked to design, construct and perform electrical testing for domestic and international certification requirements and compliance verification. From December 1, 2001, to the present, Petitioner has been employed as an electrical engineer for the Harris Corporation in Palm Bay, Florida, where he works to design and analyze electrical systems for performance and qualification verification on aircraft, mobile vehicles, and space communication systems. Although staff had recommended that Petitioner's application be approved, Petitioner understood that the Board had to hear and approve the application. Petitioner completed the application form himself and felt that he had fulfilled all of the requirements set forth in the Application, including those contained in Column 5 of Section 7. Although Petitioner testified as to the details of the nature of the work he did at each of his employments after graduation, Petitioner failed to describe explicitly the work he did as required in Section 7, Column 5. Petitioner was required to describe explicitly, but concisely, one engineering decision he was required to make during the course of his employment. Petitioner failed to do so on his application or at the formal hearing. Petitioner has failed to show that he has met the requirements, set for in the Florida Statutes and in the Florida Administrative Code Rules, that he is entitled to sit for the Principles and Practice Examination for Professional Engineers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order denying the application of Petitioner, Larry Freeman, for application for the Principles and Practice Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Respondent used a title that tended to indicate he was an active registered engineer in the State of Florida when he did not hold such registration; (2) whether Respondent violated an order previously issued by the Department; (3) and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Frank V. Burianek, earned a Master of Science Degree in Civil and Structural Engineering from the University of Bratislava. In 1967, when Respondent earned this degree, the University of Bratislava was located in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. However, since that time, the country of Czechoslovakia was dissolved and divided to form two new countries. The country in which the City of Bratislava is now located is the Slovian Republic. Respondent has worked in the construction business for about 30 years. During this time, Respondent worked as an engineer in Africa and Europe. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent resided in Pinellas County, Florida. After moving to the area, Respondent made inquiries concerning how he could become a licensed or registered engineer in the State of Florida. After considering the matter, however, Respondent decided that he would not pursue applying for and obtaining a license to practice engineering in the State of Florida. Instead, Respondent chose to become a home inspector. In Florida, there is no requirement that individuals who work as home inspectors be licensed. Moreover, neither the home inspection business, nor its employees, are regulated by the State of Florida. According to a flyer distributed by Respondent, he began conducting home inspections in the Pinellas County area in 1992. The flyer stated in relevant part the following: Hi, my name is Frank Burianek. I am a Civil and Structural Engineer. I have thirty years experience in the construction industry. I have been successfully completing Home Inspections in this area since 1992. You might have used me before, seen my marketing, or heard how I saved your colleague's deal. I want to offer you and your colleagues the best service, but I need your professional opinion . . . your advice. And here is where I need your help. You have obviously used a number of inspectors in the past and you can help me be the best one. Don't worry. I have never killed a deal. On the contrary. As there are few inspectors eagerly killing some deals, I have been called on a number of occasions for Engineer's re-inspection. On October 27, 1998, a letter of complaint, which included a copy of Respondent's flyer, was filed with the Department. The letter of complaint, which appeared to be from the president of a company located in Spring Hill, Florida, that provided construction inspections consultation, indicated that Respondent did not list his license number on the flyer. The Department assigned the complaint described in paragraph 6 above as DBPR Case No. 98-21925. In a letter from the Department, Respondent was advised that a complaint had been filed alleging that Respondent "acted in the capacity of an ENGINEER without being duly licensed, a business that requires licensure in the State of Florida." The letter further stated that "this unlicensed practice is a criminal offense for which [Respondent] may be criminally prosecuted." The Department's investigation of DBPR Case No. 98-21925 included reviewing Department records and Respondent's flyer and written response to the Department, interviewing Respondent, and conferring with Department staff. During the course of the investigation, Respondent's flyer was reviewed by the contract administrator for the engineering board. After the contract administrator completed her review of the flyer, she wrote an e-mail to the Department's investigator regarding recommended changes that could be made to Respondent's flyer to correct the problem raised in the complaint. The e-mail, dated January 8, 1999, stated in part the following: I've read the flyer. Suggest to Mr. Burianek that he change the second sentence to the following: "I hold a Master Degree in Civil & Structural Engineering from University." If it is a foreign university, listing the city, state and or country might be helpful too! The way it is currently written implies or "tends to indicate" that he holds an active registration as a licensed engineer when he does not. The e-mail described in paragraph 10 was referred to in the Department's Investigative Report of DBPR Case No. 98-21925. According to the Investigative Report, the engineering board's contract administrator recommended that Respondent "change the second sentence on the flyer and add credentials." During the investigation of DBPR Case No. 98-21925, Respondent indicated that he was a civil and structural engineer because he had a master's degree in that field from the University of Bratislava. Respondent also indicated to the investigator that he was working as a home inspector and never intended that the flyer indicate he was licensed or registered as a professional engineer by the State of Florida. Based on the custom and practice in Europe, as a result of Respondent's obtaining a graduate degree in civil and structural engineering, his title was engineer. On January 13, 1999, the Department issued a Notice to Cease and Desist in DBPR Case No. 98-21925. The Notice to Cease and Desist, which ordered Respondent to "Cease and Desist from the unlicensed and illegal practice of Engineering," provided in relevant part the following: You are hereby notified that the following specifically described conduct constitutes the unlicensed practice of contracting by yourself: * * * Advertising in the capacity of an Engineer without being duly licensed. Company advertisement indicates that SUBJECT is holding himself as a Civil and Structural Engineer without being licensed. Subject is in violation of F.S. 471.031(1)(a). You are hereby advised that under Chapter 471.031 of the Florida Statutes, only persons or firms licensed by the Florida Engineering Board may hold himself or advertise as an Engineer. * * * You are hereby ORDERED to immediately CEASE AND DESIST from the unlicensed practice of Engineering in the State of Florida. You are further notified that under Section 455.228, Florida Statutes, a fine of up to $5000 may be imposed on any person engaging in the unlicensed practice of Engineering. On or about January 13, 1999, Respondent met with Department staff regarding his flyer. At that meeting, Department staff advised Respondent that although he had a master's degree in civil and structural engineering, because he was not licensed or registered as a professional engineer in the State of Florida, he could not simply refer to himself as an engineer. Rather, he also had to indicate that he had a degree in civil and structural engineering and the name and location of the university where he obtained the degree. The flyer, which was the basis for the complaint in DBPR Case No. 98-21925, had stated only that Respondent was a civil and structural engineer, but made no mention of his educational credentials. However, based on the information the Department gave to Respondent, he modified his initial flyer to include the fact that he had a master's degree with distinction from the University of Bratislava in Europe. Additionally, in the modified version of the flyer, Respondent deleted the reference to his being called to conduct an "Engineer's re-inspection." Rather, the revised flyer stated that Respondent had been called on a number of occasions for a "re-inspection." In the revised flyer, Respondent made the following two changes: I am a Civil and Structural Engineer (Master's Degree with distinction from University of Bratislava - Europe). * * * As there are few inspectors eagerly killing some deals, I have been called on number of occasions for a re-inspection. On or about January 13, 1999, Respondent provided the Department with an affidavit and a copy of the revised flyer. In the affidavit, Respondent stated that he did not intend to deceive the public and had changed the flyer pursuant to the Department's instructions and recommendations. The revised flyer was reviewed and approved by the Department. On January 24, 1999, after the Department reviewed Respondent's affidavit and revised flyer, it issued a Closing Order. The Closing Order found that probable cause existed to believe that Respondent violated Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, and noted that the Department had issued a Notice to Cease and Desist to him. Finally, the Closing Order stated that because "the unlicensed activity" had ceased, the case would be closed without further prosecution. On or about June 8, 2000, the Florida Engineers Management Corporation received a complaint against Respondent. Included with the letter of complaint was a letter dated October 23, 1996, that appeared to be from Respondent to someone for whom he had performed an inspection. This complaint was written on stationery with the letterhead of Advanced Building Inspections, Inc., St. Petersburg, Florida. The complaint referred to in paragraph 21 stated that the October 23, 1996, letter attached thereto was documentation of a "past structural inspection." The complaint further alleged that Respondent, whose name appeared on the letterhead of the October 23, 1996, letter and who appeared to have signed the letter, was not in the Department's computer. The implication was that Respondent was not a registered or professional engineer in the State of Florida. The Department took no action against Respondent as a result of the allegations in the June 8, 2000, complaint. However, during the course of the Department's investigation of that complaint, the Department requested that Respondent provide a copy of his current business stationery and business card. On or about October 25, 2000, Respondent provided to the Department the documents it had requested as a part of its investigation of the June 2000 complaint filed against Respondent. In addition to sending the requested documents to the Department, Respondent also sent a letter which stated that the Department had advised him some time ago to "include the city/place of my university with my qualification." In referring to his letterhead and business card, Respondent wrote, "As you can see, I have complied with this request, whenever, I refer to my engineering degree." Finally, Respondent stated that his business cards were printed about eight years ago and that because he does not use them often, "instead of wasting the old ones and printing new ones," he had added the requested information by hand. The address, telephone and fax numbers, and e-mail address were inscribed on the letterhead of the stationery provided to the Department by Respondent. Also, inscribed on the letterhead just above this information was the following: Frank V. Burianek, MSC, MBA Civil and Structural Engineer (Bratislava) As requested, Respondent also provided the Department with one of his business cards. In the center of the business card, in all capital letters and in bold print was "HOME INSPECTION." In the lower left corner of the business card was the following: Frank Burianek MSC, MBA Civil and Structural Engineer (Bratislava) Respondent's name, educational degrees earned, and "Civil and Structural Engineer," were inscribed on Respondent's business card. "(Bratislava)" was hand-written just below the words, "Civil and Structural Engineer." Bratislava is the name of the university where Respondent earned his Master of Science Degree and the name of the city where the university is located. Because the name and location of the university were the same, rather than writing, "Bratislava, Bratislava," Respondent wrote only "Bratislava." Respondent had seen business cards of other individuals that had only included the name of the university where they had earned their degrees. Based on this and the Department's prior instructions, Respondent believed that the addition of "Bratislava" to his letterhead and business cards was acceptable, particularly in view of the fact that the name of the university and the city where it is located are identical. In the lower right-hand corner of the business card, Respondent's telephone number, including the area code of "813", was inscribed. On the business card, Respondent had crossed out the "813" area code and had written above it the new area code of "727." In the January 13, 1999, meeting with Department staff, Respondent was specifically advised how his flyer should be modified so as to avoid the perception that he was a professional engineer, licensed by the State of Florida. Based on Respondent's understanding of the Department's instructions given at that meeting and its approval of his revised flyer, Respondent reasonably believed that he could use the title, "Civil and Structural Engineer" because he had earned a degree in that area, if he included his educational credentials. In light of the Department's instructions and recommendations, Respondent revised the flyer. In that revised version, Respondent stated, "I am a Civil and Structural Engineer (Master's Degree with distinction, from University of Bratislava - Europe)." The Department approved this revised version of the flyer. The instructions and suggestions that the Department staff gave to Respondent in January 1999 specifically addressed the flyer that was the subject of the complaint filed in DBPR Case No. 98-21925. However, Respondent reasonably assumed that the substance of those instructions and/or recommendations should apply to his other business documents and advertisements. The language on Respondent's letterhead and business card complies with the instructions and recommendations given to him by the Department on or about January 13, 1999, and do not tend to indicate that Respondent is a registered engineer in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order that dismisses Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank V. Burianek Post Office Box 4563 Seminole, Florida 33775 David K. Minacci, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Natalie A. Lowe, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Doug Sunshine, Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes (2013), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) and (e), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 1011542, covering the areas of Elementary Education and Social Science. Her certificate is valid through June 30, 2018. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent taught sixth-grade social studies at Bob Graham Education Center (Bob Graham) in the Miami-Dade County School District (the School District). Respondent was employed by the School District for approximately eight years. This case involves events that happened while a substitute teacher was in charge of Respondent's class, and Respondent's reaction to those events upon her return to school. Respondent was absent from school on Tuesday, November 26, 2013, and left lesson plans for the substitute teacher handling her classes. The substitute teacher assigned to her classroom was a young male teacher. The substitute teacher gave the students an assignment to complete, and told them that once all of the students in the class completed their work, they could have free time. During the free time, students engaged in a variety of activities typical of sixth graders. Some played games on the computers in the room, some watched prank videos played by the substitute, some danced, some sat or stood on desks, some wrote on the smart board, and some played with the cheerleading pom poms stored in the room. At least one student used her phone to take pictures and gave her phone to another student to take a picture of girls standing on the desks. Apparently one of the girls, who did not testify, posted one or more of the pictures on social media. The social media posts were seen by Respondent. The students who testified recognized that their behavior that day was not in keeping with the strict behavioral standards maintained at Bob Graham. One student described the prank videos as not appropriate for school, and another acknowledged that use of cell phones during the day was prohibited. No one maintained that it would be appropriate to stand on a desk. As affirmed by one student, the substitute lost control of the classroom. When Respondent returned to school the following day, she became aware of what had happened in her classroom that Tuesday. The more credible evidence supports the conclusion that she saw the pictures posted on social media. While Respondent claimed that her room was in disarray when she returned, each of the students who testified denied that they left the room in that condition. Only three students testified, C.C., S.G., and N.C., and these students were all students in Respondent's second period class. It is possible that the room was in disarray based on the behavior of students in other class periods. Respondent was unhappy with the condition of her room and with the reported behavior of her students during her absence. N.C. testified that on Wednesday morning, before the second period class, word had circulated around school that Ms. Rosa knew what they had done in class the day before, so the students believed that they were going to get in trouble. When class began, Ms. Rosa told the students that she was upset with their behavior from the day before. Descriptions from the students varied, one describing her as acting like she was happy they were all going to get in trouble, and threatening them all with detentions or in-school suspensions, while another student described her as yelling at the class as a whole, but not yelling at individual students. Whether she actually raised her voice at them or whether the students were reacting to the message she was delivering is not clear. In any event, the more persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent called each child's name and asked what they had done the day before. After hearing from each student, she had some of the students line up and go to the principal's office. How many students actually went to the office is also unclear: the description ranged from all but three to only a few. At the office, the students met with Assistant Principal Jesus Mesa, who apparently issued in-school suspensions to some and detentions to others.1/ These were students who had never been in significant trouble before. Getting an in-school suspension meant that they would not be permitted to participate in clubs or remain in the National Junior Honor Society. It appeared that this consequence of the punishment they received is what upset the students the most. There were reports that Ms. Rosa used the words "stupid," and "ratched," as well as "shit" while she was talking to the students. N.C. testified that she told the class as a whole that they were stupid for thinking she would not find out what happened. There was no testimony that she described any one student as stupid. All three students testified that she used the term "ratched," although one of them acknowledged that his written statement to that effect was based upon what others told him, as opposed to hearing the term himself. None of the students knew what the term meant, other than it had a negative connotation, and none identified the context in which the word was used. The principal, Yecenia Martinez-Lopez, described the term as meaning someone was "low class" or trash. Urbandictionary.com, referred to by Ms. Rosa in Respondent's Exhibit 1, defines the word as being slang for "wretched." With respect to the use of the word "shit," C.C. did not testify that the word was used. S.G. stated that he had heard Respondent use the term, but did not testify that she used it on the day in question, and said it had never been directed toward him. He did not identify when or to whom the word was used. Similarly, N.C. testified that Respondent had used the term, but also did not give any context for its use and her written statements did not reference the term. N.C. claimed that she just remembered the use of the term while reading her statements during the hearing. Given that the incident occurred more than four years before her testimony, this claim is not plausible or persuasive. No student testified that they were embarrassed or humiliated by Respondent's behavior that day. One student described Respondent's behavior as "rude and unacceptable," and another indicated that she was scared about explaining to her parents the possibility that she would not be able to participate in clubs. The more persuasive testimony was that students felt the punishment they received (ironically, from Mr. Mesa as opposed to Respondent) was out of proportion for what happened, and were concerned with the effect an in-school suspension would have on their ability to participate in extracurricular activities. Several students went home and complained to their parents about what happened that day. Whether they were complaining about Ms. Rosa's treatment of them, about the punishment they received, or about being reported to the front office is not clear. Likewise, the reaction of the various parents is also somewhat unclear. N.C. testified that she knew the parents were talking amongst themselves, and that the parents thought that there should be consequences for the students' behavior, but that an in-school suspension was a whole other step. From N.C.'s view, the parents' concern went from concern about the level of punishment to a complaint about Ms. Rosa. What any of the parents actually thought or said remains a mystery, because no parent testified at hearing. However, on Monday, December 2, 2013, following the Thanksgiving weekend, approximately 20 parents of students in Respondent's class went to the school and met with the principal, Ms. Martinez-Lopez, demanding that their students be removed from Ms. Rosa's class. As a result of their complaints, which are identified only by hearsay in this proceeding, the punishment for some, if not all, of the students affected was downgraded to a detention. Ms. Martinez-Lopez contacted the School District's north region office to report the incident. Ms. Martinez-Lopez was directed that the matter should be handled as an administrative review, meaning she should investigate it as opposed to having it investigated by the School District, and forward her findings to the School District. Ms. Martinez-Lopez collected statements from the students in Respondent's class and prepared a report of her findings. As a result of her investigation, Respondent was issued a reprimand, and moved from teaching sixth grade to teaching second grade. No other discipline was imposed. There are two sets of statements related to this incident: one set collected by Ms. Martinez-Lopez from December 4, 2013, through December 11, 2013, and a second set collected by the Department of Education on October 10, 2014. There was no evidence presented regarding the method Ms. Martinez-Lopez used to collect the first set of statements. With respect to the second set of statements, S.G. testified that multiple students were in the same room filling out the statement at the same time. N.C. testified that she, C.C., and S.G. were called out of their English class and went to the office together, but were not in the room together when they made the statements, and did not talk to each other about what was happening. S.G.'s description of the events was the more credible of the two. Respondent is no longer teaching in the School District. She took a leave of absence after the 2013-2014 school year, and then left the School District to take a position with United Teachers of Dade. She denies that she used profanity toward the students in her class, and contends that the events as described by the students did not happen. She does acknowledge asking each student what they had done the day before and having many of the students go to the principal's office.2/ Respondent was clearly upset by the events that took place in her classroom and expressed her displeasure to her students. There is persuasive evidence that she told them in no uncertain terms that there would be punishment imposed for their behavior. There is not clear convincing evidence that Respondent embarrassed, mocked, and disparaged students, or directed profanity toward them. Likewise, it was not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's conduct reduced her effectiveness as a teacher.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2018.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and considering the matters in mitigation, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Lula Mae Kemp Tharpe be reissued in April, 1980. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1107 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert L. McKinney, Esquire 3071 SW 27th Avenue Grove 27, Suite 7 Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue Whether respondent FGCIA should reinstate petitioner as its director or acting director and give her back pay from August 31, 1978, because FGCIA terminated her employment as of that date on account of her race?
Findings Of Fact Jan Marie Tuveson, became the third person to go to work for the FGCIA, although she is not an Indian herself. In February of 1974, she began doing secretarial work and generally assisting Osley Saunooke and John L. Chaves, at the time the FGCIA's director and assistant director, respectively. With Mr. Saunooke's resignation later the same year and Mr. Chaves' resignation in May of 1975, all of the Council's staff work fell to Ms. Tuveson and a secretary whom she hired after consulting the cochairmen of FGCIA's Board of Directors. CODIRECTOR About four months after Mr. Chaves' departure, Ms. Tuveson assumed one of two newly created program coordinator positions. She was seen as "representing" the Miccosukee Tribe, while the other program coordinator, originally Steve Bowers, was seen as representing the Seminole Tribe. Together the program coordinators were to act as codirectors of the FGCIA. In September or October of 1975, Joe Billie succeeded Steve Bowers as codirector. An extremely likeable person, Joe Billie, a Seminole Indian for whom English is a second language, did not spend much time at FGCIA's Tallahassee headquarters. As a result, Ms. Tuveson had almost full responsibility for the staff work of the FGCIA, after Joe Billie became codirector. During this period, she worked on behalf of and dealt with not only Buffalo Tiger and the Miccosukee Tribe, but also the Seminole Tribe, Mike Tiger, Joe Dan Osceola and other Seminole Indians. According to uncontroverted testimony, she treated the tribes "equally." CETA PROGRAM DIRECTOR Shortly after becoming program coordinator, Ms. Tuveson proposed to FGCIA's Board of Directors that FGCIA apply for funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). With Howard Tommie, chairman of the Seminole Tribe and cochairman of the FGCIA, dissenting, the Board approved the suggestion, Ms. Tuveson went forward with preparation of a grant application, and a CETA grant was awarded. Ms. Tuveson established and, as CETA program director, oversaw the program funded by the grant. Mr. Tommie's objection to the proposal was that money which, at least in his view, might otherwise have been routed to the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes exclusively was not being administered by the tribes and was being made available to other American Indians, as well. Later Mike Tiger came to share this view as did Joe Billie, who had originally said a CETA grant would be a good idea. Mr. Tommie also felt that administration of a CETA grant would be "a hectic responsibility," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, p. 42, for FGCIA. JOE BILLIE RESIGNS At a special meeting of the Board of Directors on November 21, 1977, Joe Billie resigned his position with the FGCIA effective November 25, 1977. Expense account irregularities occasioned the resignation, but Howard Tommie resented Mr. Billie's leaving. According to the minutes of the special meeting: The meeting was then directed to the discussion of the appointment of a new Codirector. Howard Tommie ... felt there should not be a designated Codirector for the Miccosukees or the Seminoles. Bob Travis agreed that each Codirector should be obligated to work for both Tribes. Howard Tommie stated the struc- ture should be changed to suit a state agency because of the fact that the Council now works with all Indians in the State of Florida, not just the Tribes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Other board members expressed other views, but the position Joe Billie left vacant was not filled, and a board member "directed the staff to prepare alternative organization structures and job descriptions." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. REORGANIZATION At its December 6, 1977, meeting, the FGCIA Board decided on organizing staff into an executive director, a deputy director, two program coordinators and a "Secretary III/Bookkeeper," Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5, but the positions were not filled at that time. Although "on the same level as the Deputy Director," the program coordinators were to report to the deputy director, as well as "to the tribes and [were to] be located at the Tribal headquarters most of the time." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On the subject of job descriptions, Joe Wilson, who "was present at the [November 25, 1977] meeting for the Department of Community Affairs as a representative of Mr. Robert Guttman instructed the staff . . . to add the Indian preference in order not to discriminate." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Among the policy changes effected at the December 6, 1977, meeting, was addition of a personnel policy in these words: Preferential consideration will be given to federally recognized Native American appli- cants and/or those with experience in Native American programs. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The Board did not adopt specific job descriptions for the positions decided upon at the December 6, 1977 meeting. ACTING DIRECTOR When the FGCIA Board met on June 23, 1978, it was generally acknowledged that Ms. Tuveson had been FGCIA's acting director for some time. Board member Robert Mitchell, for example, remarked, "Up to the present time you could say that Jan is the real Director, or Executive Director . . . ," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, and another board member thought it might be official: "I think we may have given Jan the title of Director. I don't remember." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. But, after further deliberations by the board, member Robert Travis' motion to "unhire" Jan as Director and place the [executive director's] position vacant and then Jan would apply for the position along with everybody else," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, carried. Later in the same meeting, according to the minutes, Joe Dan Osceola directed the meeting to clarifying whether or not Jan Tuveson would remain as Acting Director for the Council until someone is hired permanently. Ms. Tuveson stated that she would. Joe Dan Osceola made a motion to make Jan Tuveson Acting Director. Cochairman Tiger seconded the motion and it carried unanimously. Although she had acted as FGCIA's director for almost two years and was officially named acting director when the board met on June 23, 1978, it was at this same meeting that Ms. Tuveson first began to fear for her continued employment. Several members of the board expressed the view that FGCIA should hire staff, including CETA program staff, who were of American Indian extraction. Ms. Tuveson herself remarked, during the meeting, "I think that is the intention of the personnel committee that any position that is vacated should be filled with a Native American . . ." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Board member Joe Dan Osceola explained his position: So I say with the Indian programs any Indian program which is designed for the Indians in the law states that it should be run as such, meaning Indians should be in that position. The non Indians, no matter what color it is, there is going to be a time when you all are going to have to switch over to another job. . . . So I believe in Indian movement, I mean if we don't who is going to do it. It has to be the Indians who do it. So, I wish Jan was an Indian, really. Because she has done a good job. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Board member Jo Ann Jones stated, "Any program now in our area should be all Indians." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. NATIVE AMERICAN DIRECTOR At its next meeting the FGCIA Board of Directors chose Joe Allen Quetone as executive director of the FGCIA, and voted him a starting salary of $20,000 per year. Mr. Quetone, who is a Native American and a member of the Kiowa tribe of Oklahoma, began as executive director on September 1, 1978, a week after his selection. He has held the position since, and nothing in the evidence suggests that he has done anything other than an exemplary job as executive director. Beginning March 17, 1977, he had worked at FGCIA's headquarters in a CETA position for which Ms. Tuveson had recruited him. A 1973 graduate of Florida State University in philosophy, he began, but did not finish, some graduate public administration courses, before starting at FGCIA. He served as a noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Army, was a paid assistant to a student body president while in college, worked at a car wash and a pizza parlor, tended bar, worked at the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board as a mail clerk; and, for the year and a half or two year period next preceding the move to FGCIA, worked for the Florida Human Relations Commission. INDIAN PREFERENCE The board went forward with the selection on August 25, 1978, despite the suggestions of Cochairman Mike Tiger and board member Robert Travis that the decision be put off. Cochairman Tiger reported Bob Mitchell's request for deferment, and Jim Hutchinson's request for a postponement, which was stated in a letter and related to the board in his absence, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 91, also proved unavailing. A three-member personnel committee had recommended Jan Tuveson, Joe Quetone and Henry A. Williams, Jr., as "highly qualified" to serve as Executive Director. Robert Travis reported on the personnel committee's work to the eight board members present, on August 25, 1978, and described the committee's criteria or "formula" as basically the same thing we've always been talking about; one dealing with the educa- tional background of the person, experience factors, and an Indian preference. Those are the three, or at least the three major things that the committee considered..... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 94. The board first voted to eliminate Mr. Williams from consideration, them voted to promote Joe Quetone to Executive Director. The FGCIA board chose Mr. Quetone over Ms. Tuveson on the basis of their respective racial origins. Other factors may have entered in, as well. Published reports of the possibility of a lawsuit on race discrimination grounds did not endear Ms. Tuveson to certain board members, see, e.g., Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 108-111; and Howard Tommie, among others, seemed still to harbor resentment over the establishment of the CETA program. At least one board member feared a schism between the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes. Mr. Travis remarked: I think Jan kept the Council together. My preference is I would prefer to vote for her; but, if that vote will cause a split between the S[e]minoles and Miccosukees, and the organizations, the staff she is supposed to help, then my overall concern is for the Indian people. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 144. Mr. Travis was one of six board members who voted for Mr. Quetone. Two members abstained. Joe Dan Osceola explained his position: I'm not against white people, believe me; black, or anybody, even other Indians.... There's Indian programs--there's such a law as Indian Preference Law. There used to be a policy; but it's a law as of 1967.... I know a lot of you don't share my opinion. ... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 122. Mr. Osceola may have been referring to an informal legal opinion which John Chaves, himself raised as an American Indian, had given as legal counsel to the FGCIA's CETA program, to the effect that the FGCIA could not lawfully implement an Indian preference. FGCIA had nevertheless adopted such a policy, although, over objection of the Seminole and some other board members, the phrase "and/or those with experience in Native American programs" had been added. (During the federal trial, Mr. Tommie testified that he did not think Ms. Tuveson had such experience. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, p. 52) At least one other board member adhered to the FGCIA's preference policy in the course of the selection process on August 25, 1978. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 135. Ms. Tuveson testified that jokes about her race that various Seminole members of the FGCIA's board had made from time to time seemed much less amusing in retrospect, after the August 25, 1978 vote. NO OFFER After it was decided that Mr. Quetone would begin work on September 1, the Board began to turn to other matters, when an "Unidentified Female Voice" inquired: Mr. Chairman? Before we start discussing the future business, do you think it's possible we could get some clarification as to Jan's termination date? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 176. The cochairmen responded and Joe Dan Osceola expressed his views: COCHAIRMAN TIGER: All right. They need that, too; otherwise, we'd have to do something, because--I mean, she's still on the payroll. COCHAIRMAN TOMMIE: I think one takes care of the other. Do you want to go on record as terminating Jan Tuve- son as our director? ... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 176. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: ... You have a certain day that when somebody has come in that you are supposed to move out of their office ... You clean out your table and desk and everything else because another guy is taking your place. I really can't see all this question on this. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 177. After a confusing colloquy, Joe Dan Osceola raised the question whether Ms. Tuveson was "quitting the Council": JO ANN JONES: I know what you're saying. She's going to get the pay for those two weeks. COCHAIRMAN TOMMIE: Yes, if she wants to stay on the payroll for an extra two weeks, then we've just got to make the provisions... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 180. COCHAIRMAN TIGER: I think we understand where we stand. ... JAN TUVESON: Effective September 1st, I am on two weeks' notice; right? CO-CHAIRMAN TIGER: No. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 181. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: Is she quitting the Council? That's one part I'm not familiar with, if she's quitting. That's one thing I haven't heard from Jan, that she's not going to be (inaudible) for Miccosukee or (inaudible). That's one thing I don't know. JAN TUVESON: (Inaudible) I'm not (inaudible) coordinator right now, Joe, and I'm acting director. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: Yes, that's what I know. JAN TUVESON: And I haven't been offered the position of coordinator, which would be ludicrous in my opinion, anyway, since it would be a backward step for me. But, the point is, I think, on September 1st, am I to be given two weeks' paid notice? Or am I not to be given any notice at all? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 183. Neither the Board of Directors as a whole nor any individual board member offered Ms. Tuveson employment in any capacity beyond August 31, 1978. EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT A 1972 graduate of the University of Texas, with a major in English, Ms. Tuveson also attended Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. as an undergraduate. After graduation, she worked as assistant manager and advertising director for "Hook'm Horns Night Club" in Austin, Texas. In Tallahassee, she worked as public relations assistant to the Sesquicentennial Committee and then for a department store, also in public relations; at Gayfer's, she had supervisory responsibilities, worked on a budget, and wrote copy for radio, television and newspapers, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8, at a salary of $8,000 to $10,000 a year. She began taking graduate courses at Florida State University after she went to work for FGCIA, first in mass communications then in public administration, but did not earn a degree in either field. After she left the employ of the FGCIA, Ms. Tuveson sent out 25 to 30 applications for jobs and had several interviews. In every interview the matter of her losing her job at the FGCIA arose. Receiving no job offers, she applied to law school in October of 1978, and began in January of 1979. She graduated from law school at Western State University in June of 1981, finishing an accelerated program which left little time for gainful employment. She did not work the whole of the year 1982 partly because she was ill and partly because she took time off to study for a bar examination, which she has never succeeded in passing. She was employed in 1983 in the legal department of the Alamo Savings & Loan Association in San Antonio, Texas. In May of 1984 she moved back to Tallahassee and found work at Electronic Communications. During 1977, the last full year Ms. Tuveson worked for FGCIA, she was paid $18,736.23. The following year FGCIA paid her $15,948.70 for the work she did from January 1, 1978 through August 31, 1978, representing an annual rate of $21,264.93. Her 1979 income totalled $1,818.97. In 1980, Ms. Tuveson's income fell almost to nothing. She earned approximately $2,500 in 1981, and about the same in 1982. Her 1983 income was $10,832.38 and she made $11,526.87 in 1984. At the time of the hearing she was still working for Electronic Communications. Petitioner's proposed recommended order and respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order were filed on August 12 and 13 1985, respectively. Proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, to the extent they are supported by the weight of the evidence, except where they are cumulative, subordinate or immaterial.
