The Issue The issue in the case is whether Carter-Pritchett Advertising, Inc.’s (Petitioner), applications for the outdoor advertising sign permits referenced herein and filed by the Petitioner should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has filed two applications for permits to locate a two-sided outdoor adverting sign on State Road 82 (Immokalee Road), approximately 3,500 feet east of Colonial Boulevard in Fort Myers, Florida. The applications were assigned numbers 57413 and 57414 by the Respondent. The Respondent is the state agency charged with regulation of outdoor advertising signs within controlled portions of federal-aid primary highways, which include the site of the proposed signs at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent denied the applications on the grounds that the proposed location of the sign could not be permitted under the land use designation relevant to the site and did not qualify for permitting as an unzoned commercial/industrial area. The Petitioner has conceded that the parcel upon which the signs would be located does not meet the statutory definition of an unzoned commercial/industrial area. The issue in this case is whether the permit can be issued on the basis of the land use designation applicable to the parcel. The City of Fort Myers Future Land Use Map classifies the relevant parcel as being within a "Mixed Use" land development category. Property that is categorized as Mixed Use may be developed to include low and medium density single-family residential uses, medium and high density multi-family residential uses, as well as commercial and professional offices, industrial uses, and recreation and open space. The City of Fort Myers Comprehensive Plan (Policy 2.16) requires that development of parcels that are designated as Mixed Use must be approved through a "Planned Unit Development" process. In this case, development of the relevant parcel was approved by adoption of a Planned Unit Development Ordinance (PUD Ordinance No. 3356) by the City Council for the City of Fort Myers on November 20, 2006. The Ordinance allows for construction of a 106,722 square foot mini-storage facility on the parcel. The signage at issue in this proceeding would be located on the parcel with the mini-storage facility. The effective date of the Ordinance was the date of adoption, and the Ordinance requires that all construction be completed within a five-year period, which expires November 20, 2011. Section 6 of the Ordinance provides as follows: Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the planned unit development will result in cancellation of the development approval and the planned unit development approval shall become void and the underlying land use designation of Mixed use (MU) shall be restored. The language of the Ordinance clearly indicates that the planned unit development designation is provisional and based on compliance by the developer with a number of conditions. Among the conditions are requirements that the developer: enter into a development agreement with the city to address transportation impacts of the project; contribute $58,500 to the City Art Fund prior to the issuance of building permits or certificates of occupancy; complete construction within a five-year period; install new vegetation if required after removal of exotics to meet code minimums; and obtain a certificate of occupancy before outdoor storage may be utilized. At the time of the hearing, none of the conditions had been met. There was no evidence offered to suggest that any of the conditions would be met by the November 20, 2011, deadline. The designation can be extended by the Fort Myers City Council; however, at the time of the hearing, no request for an extension had been approved. Absent compliance with the conditions prior to the November 20, 2011, deadline, the provisional land use designation will become "void" and the underlying land use designation will revert to Mixed Use as specifically stated in the PUD Ordinance. The signs at issue in this proceeding would not permittable under a Mixed Use designation by the City of Fort Myers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the Petitioner's applications for the sign permits referenced herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Clark Menchion, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 E. Bruce Strayhorn, Esquire Strayhorn & Strayhorn 2125 First Street, Suite 201 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Deanna Hurt, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie C. Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact On or about June 10, 1986 Petitioners submitted a conditional use application to Respondent for the package sale of beer and wine at 601 Bayway Boulevard, Bayside Subdivision No. 5, Lot 1, Black B, in Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property in question is zoned SC (beach commercial), and the alcoholic beverage designation being sought is 2 APS. Respondent has identified this conditional use application as C.U. 86-49. The Planning and Zoning Board denied Petitioners' application on August 5, 1986 by a vote of 4 to 2, and Petitioners timely filed this appeal. The subject property is the site of a convenience store which is surrounded by motels and commercial establishments such as a bank, restaurant and lounge, car rental agency and a miniature golf course. Another convenience store which sells alcoholic beverages for off-premises consumption is located within three blocks of the property in question. Robert E. Davis operated the convenience store on the subject property from 1977 to July, 1986 at which time Petitioners acquired their interest in the property and the convenience store. While Davis was operating the convenience store the package sale of beer and wine was allowed under a previously approved conditional use. However in accordance with Section 136.024(b), City of Clearwater Land Development Code, Petitioners were required to reapply for conditional use approval upon the change of business ownership of the subject property. Under Davis' management, the convenience store regularly closed at 11:00 P.M., but beginning approximately one month prior to Petitioners acquiring their interest in the store and the property, Davis began to keep the convenience store open twenty four hours a day. Petitioners have operated the store twenty four hours a day since it has been under their management. Public testimony was offered in opposition to Petitioners' application due to concerns about increases in noise, lights, traffic, loitering, trash and debris, and consumption of alcohol on the premises since Petitioners have acquired their interest. Petitioners concede that there was a problem with rowdyism and trash when they initially took over the convenience store, but state that these problems have been corrected. By letter dated August 5, 1986, Chief of Police Sid Klein confirmed a problem with young people gathering on the premises and stated that he did not feel approval of this conditional use would be compatible with the need of the neighborhood. However, little weight can be given to this exhibit since it is clearly hearsay, and relates solely to conditions existing several months ago when Petitioners had just acquired their interest in the subject property and convenience store. Petitioners are seeking to continue the package sale of beer and wine on the subject premises during authorized hours, as had been allowed for previous owners. This activity will clearly be compatible with other commercial businesses in the neighborhood, and with prior business conducted at this specific location. Although there were problems with trash and rowdyism on the premises in July and August, 1986, Petitioners have taken corrective action, and have committed to continued management improvements. The use in question is compatible with surrounding uses and complies with Respondent's land use plan. Acceptable ingress and egress is provided, and noise from the site will not diminish the use, enjoyment or value of the surrounding property. Petitioners are taking steps to reduce the glare to surrounding properties from motor vehicle lights. Sufficient parking area is provided on site, and the evidence does not establish that the sale of beer and wine at this location increases traffic in the area. This is an existing use which was allowed when Petitioners acquired their interest in the subject property. There was no evidence that Petitioners have sold, or will sell, beer and wine at the store beyond the legal hours for such sale, or that they have or will sell to minors.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Bertin C. Tash, held land surveyor license number LS0002292 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Land Surveyors. Respondent currently resides at 1127 Broadway, Riviera Beach, Florida. Tash has held a license with the state since July 2, 1970, and has been in the surveying profession for some twenty-eight years. On or about November 11, 1983, respondent was contacted by a local mortgage broker and requested to perform a survey on a residence located at 2814 Saginaw Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida. A survey was needed since the owner of the residence intended to refinance his property. Tash performed the survey, turned the same over to the broker, and was paid $125 for his services. The drawing was signed and sealed by Tash, and contained the following notation above the certification: "No Corner's Set-All Rights Reserved." There was no mention as to whether the minimum technical standards had been met. On at least three places on the document, Tash referred to the drawing as a "survey." On June 7, 1984, Craig L. Wallace, a land surveyor in Lake Park, Florida, sent a copy of Tash's drawing to the Board's Executive Director and asked if the notation above the certification was permissible, and whether Tash's failure to refer to minimum technical standards was correct. This inquiry prompted the instant proceeding and resulted in the issuance of an administrative complaint. It is undisputed that the document prepared by respondent is a survey and subject to the minimum technical standards set forth in Chapter 21HH-6, Florida Administrative Code. Expert testimony by witness George M. Cole, Jr. Established that the drawing did not conform with the minimum technical standards in various respects. It did not contain a certification that the minimum technical standards had been met or a description of the type of survey being depicted. It did not reflect the measured distance to the nearest intersection of a street or right-of-way nor did it depict the entire lot being surveyed. Additionally, only one angle was shown on the drawing although agency rules require that all angles and bearings be shown. Finally, there was no boundary monument set as required by the standards. These are required unless monuments already exist at such corners. Although Tash pointed out that fence posts embedded in concrete were already on the corners of the property, agency rules still require that alternative monumentation be set. All of the foregoing deficiencies are violations of the minimum technical standards required for surveys. However, none were intentionally violated. Respondent readily acknowledged that he performed the survey in question. However, he considered the survey to be "minor" since two had previously been performed on the same lot, and his was only for the purpose of refinancing the property. He attributed any deficiencies to poor judgment rather than an intentional violation of the law. Tash has been a professional land surveyor for some twenty-eight years, and there is no evidence that he has been subjected to disciplinary action on any prior occasion. The complaint herein was initiated by another licensed surveyor and not by the consumer who used the survey. The survey was apparently satisfactory as far as the mortgage broker was concerned, and no problems arose at closing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the conclusions of law portion of this order. The remaining charges be DISMISSED. Respondent's license should be placed on probation for ninety days and he should be required to pay a $500 administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 1985.
The Issue Whether Interstate-Tallahassee West has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Purchase of the Property. In the Spring and Summer of 1985, Thomas W. Anthony began an inquiry relative to the purchase and development of 21.5 acres (original tract) located at the intersection of Capital Circle West and I-10. (R-2, pp. 11-15.) On December 11, 1985, a Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase was executed between Rehold, Inc. and C. Gary Skartvedt, Thomas W. Anthony, and Mary J. Price, d/b/a Denver West Joint Venture (Denver, Colorado) for the purchase of the original tract. (Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase.) On March 14, 1986, the Interstate-Tallahassee West Partnership Agreement was executed and Interstate purchased the original tract from Rehold, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 1.) At the time of the closing on the initial purchase of the original tract, the property was zoned C-2, with the exception of a small portion in the northwest corner of the tract which was zoned A-2. (R-2, pp. 34-35, Preliminary Plat approved on January 18, 1990.) Development Chronology. During 1987 and 1988 the original tract was held to realize growth potential in terms of Interstate's economic investment. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) In 1989, Interstate began negotiations for the sale of a portion of the original tract to Kent C. Deeb (Deeb). (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On June 26, 1989, Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. prepared a drawing of easement location and depiction of a 25 year flood line relative to the portion of the original tract which was the subject of the negotiations between Interstate and Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2, R-2 p. 20.) On September 12, 1989, Tilden Lobnitz and Cooper, Inc., (Consulting Engineers) recommended a reconfiguration of the original tract relative to the location of high voltage power lines. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On October 11,1989, final descriptions of the lakes on the original tract were prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events p. 2.) On November 13, 1989, a sketch depicting a revised legal description of a proposal to subdivide the subject property was prepared for Interstate by Broward Davis and Associates, Inc. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 7, 1989, an Environmental Assessment of the site was prepared for Interstate by Jim Stidham and Associates. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 2.) On December 14, 1989, Deeb executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement which contemplated the conditional purchase of 6.98 acres of the original tract from Interstate. Interstate signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate contends the execution of this Purchase and Sale Agreement resulted in it incurring substantial contractual obligations and argues that these obligations (along with other items and events) are elements in support of "common law vesting" of its development rights. This agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. The services that Interstate obtained during 1989 (as described in paragraphs 6-11 above) were related to the eventual consummation of the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. (R-2, pp. 20-21 and 27, Chronological listing of Events, p. 2.) On January 18, 1990, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat of the subject property. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) On April 4, 1990, the Tallahassee City Commission approved Interstate's previously filed application to rezone a portion of the subject property from A-2 to C-2. (Chronological Listing of Events, p. 3.) Interstate entered into a written Utility Agreement with the City on or about July 10,1990. (Letter of agreement dated June 25, 1990 from Henry L. Holshouser, Director of Growth Management, to Interstate Tallahassee West.) The Utility Agreement is the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. On August 20, 1990 a Vested Rights Application covering 6.98 acres of the original tract, which is the subject of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Interstate and Deeb, was approved. (Letter dated August 21,1990 to Kent Deeb from Mark L. Gumula, Director of Planning, Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, containing CERTIFICATION OF VESTED STATUS.) The Vested Rights Application for the approximately 15.6 acres remaining of the original tract was disapproved by the Staff Committee and that portion of the property is the subject of this appeal. (R-1, p. 17.) Interstate has not prepared a specific building or development design for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 97, R-1, p. 5.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had no specific building plans for the property which is the subject of this appeal. (R-2, p. 38.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not chosen a specific land use for the property. (R-2, pp. 38-39.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not made application for environmental permits for the property. (R-2, pp. 49 and 98.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, the only infrastructure that had been constructed on the original tract are two storm water ponds which were built in the 1970's, and prior to Interstate's purchase of the property. (R-2, pp. 86, 87.) Interstate was never assured by the City that the property could be used for any specific use such as a motel, apartments or offices. Interstate and the City made no commitments as to any specific uses of the property. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) The City advised Interstate by letter dated August 13, 1990, that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan requires Planned Unit Development zoning for an office park (which is by definition an office building or buildings of more than 40,000 square feet). (Letter from Martin P. Black, City's Chief of Land Use Administration, to Interstate Tallahassee West, dated August 13, 1990.) The City did not advise Interstate that it could not build such an office building on its property. (R-2, pp. 45, 46, and 100.) As of the date of the hearing in this case, Interstate had not requested a determination from the City as to whether the 2010 Comprehensive Plan would prohibit development of the property as the market might dictate. (R-2, p. 40.) At the hearing in this case, Interstate presented the testimony of Mr. Deeb regarding the existence of a master environmental permit for the original tract which was in place before Interstate purchased the property. (R-2, p. 67.) However, Interstate offered no evidence that such permit contemplated any specific use or density regarding development of the property. Costs Associated with Interstate's Property. Interstate purchased the original tract in 1986 at a cost of $748,000. (R-2, p. 17; Development Expenditures.) The cost to purchase the property was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $325,063.82 in interest on acquisition loans, pursuant to the property purchase. (Development Expenditures.) The interest cost on acquisition loans was not incurred in reliance on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $46,824.95 in Ad Valorem taxes on the property. (Development Expenditures) These costs were not incurred based on any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $28,839.75 on engineering and survey work on the property. (Development Expenditures) The costs of the engineering and survey work during 1989 were substantially incurred by Interstate in conjunction with the negotiations of the potential sale of the 6.98 acre parcel of its property to Deeb. (Chronological Listing of Events, pp. 2-3; R-2, p. 27.) These costs were not incurred based upon any representation of the City. Interstate has expended $8,500.00 in legal and miscellaneous fees associated with development of the original tract and the potential sale of the 6.98 acres to Deeb. (Chronological Listing, Development Expenditures) Interstate has failed to prove that these costs were incurred based on any representation of the City. The Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb. Negotiations between Interstate and Deeb regarding The Purchase and Sale Agreement began in the Spring of 1989. (R-2, p. 20.) Deeb executed the agreement on December 14, 1989, and the Interstate partners signed the agreement on December 27, 1989. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, p. 8.) Interstate does not assert that the City was privy to this agreement and has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City in entering into this agreement or in incurring any costs or future obligations pursuant to the agreement. Interstate was aware that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was being developed when the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission approved Interstate's Preliminary Plat on January 18, 1990. (R-2, p. 50.) Interstate knew that the Comprehensive Plan "was coming" at the time Mr. Anthony (partner in Interstate) understood that the original tract was to be subdivided in order to "cut out" a site for Deeb so as to "key on him" as to the development of the property. (R-2, p. 46.) The Preliminary Subdivision Plat drawing, subsequently presented to the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is dated November 29, 1990. (Preliminary Subdivision Plat as approved on January 18, 1990.) The testimony of Thomas W. Anthony that Interstate would not have entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Deeb if it knew that it would not be able to move forward with C-2 development of the remaining lots is accepted. (R-2, p. 36.) However, Interstate has failed to prove that it relied on any representation of the City that it could so proceed upon adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Utility Agreement. The Utility Agreement (previously described in paragraph 16) was executed by the City on June 25, 1990. The agreement was signed by on behalf of Interstate on June 29, 1990, by C. W. Harbin and Tommy Faircloth, and on July 10, 1990, by Mr. Anthony. This agreement outlines what Interstate and the City have each agreed to do in terms of Interstate's proposed development. The agreement describes Interstate's proposed development activity in general terms as "commercial development". In this agreement, the City makes no representation or commitments relative to any specific land use or specific density concerning Interstate's property. Interstate has failed to prove that the City, in executing the Utility Agreement, made any representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The Preliminary Plat Approval. The Preliminary Plat Approval of January 18, 1990, does not contemplate any specific uses, intensities or designations. (R-2, pp. 47-48.) Interstate has failed to prove that the approval of the Preliminary Plat constitutes an act or representation upon which Interstate relied in incurring any costs or future obligations. The A-2 Rezoning Approval. Interstate has failed to prove that it relied upon the act of the City, in approving Interstate's request to rezone a portion of the original tract from A-2 to C-2 in incurring any costs or future obligations. Interstate's Application for Vested Rights. On or about July 25, 1990, Interstate filed an application for vested rights determination (Application), with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0008T.) The Following information concerning the development of the subject property is contained on the Application: "Kent C. Deeb" is listed as the "owner/agent". Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Interstates Tallahassee West." The project is described as a "Four Lot Subdivision." The project location is described as "lots 1 and 2 Block A Commonwealth Center." The total project costs are estimated at $2.5 Million." Progress towards completion of the project is listed as: A. Planning: "Plans; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat Approval; Utility Agreement for Extension with the City"; B. Permitting: "Existing with the original Commonwealth Center Development; C. Site Preparation: "Zoning, Platting, and Plans"; D. Construction: "Original Holding Ponds". Total expenditures to date attributed to the progress towards completion of the project are listed as $1.325 Million. The form of government approval allowing the project to proceed is listed as "Original Plat; Rezoning; Subdivision Plat." On August 20, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the application before the City's three member Staff Committee. Kent C. Deeb appeared and testified for Interstate. By letter dated August 21, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon Planning Department, informed Interstate that the Application had been denied. During the hearing before the undersigned, Interstate stipulated that it sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not upon "statutory vesting," as those terms are defined in City of Tallahassee Ordinance 90-0-0043AA.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 3, 1976, the Board served its Administrative Complaint upon the Licensee. On May 18, 1976 the Licensee filed its Answer to the Administrative Complaint. The final hearing in this case was scheduled by Notice dated April 13, 1976, and was rescheduled by Notice dated May 27, 1976. John C. Ledbetter holds Certified General Contractor's License No. CG C5281 issued by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. The Licensee Ledbetter has been a certified contractor at all times relevant to this proceeding. The Licensee was the co-developer of a condominium project known as Ocean Palm Villas South or Ocean Palms Riverfront Condominium. Gerald M. Hadley, Sr., a certified contractor was initially listed as the general contractor for the project. Later Neil Wayne Smith was designated the general contractor. Smith was discharged as the general contractor, and by letter dated June 11, 1973 the Licensee notified the North Peninsular Zoning Commission that he would be substituted as the general contractor. Shortly thereafter Gerald M. Hadley was again designated the general contractor, and the change was acknowledged by the forth Peninsular Zoning Commission by letter dated August 28, 1973. Construction on Ocean Palm Villas South did not commence until after August 28, 1973. No construction was undertaken during the time that Ledbetter was designated as the general contractor. The general contractor was responsible for installation of the walls in Ocean Palm Villas South. A subcontractor was utilized to install the dry wall, but the wall construction was supervised by the general contractor. The original plans called for use of 5/8" thick gypsum wallboard. The wall units were to be installed in the manner depicted in Board Exhibit 5. The gypsum was to be nailed on either side of 4" studs, with insulating material laid between the studs. 5/8" gypsum was not available to the general contractor. 1/2" gypsum wallboard was utilized. A new wall assembly was planned. With this assembly gypsum wallboard was nailed to studs, but the wallboard on the other side of the wall was nailed to alternately interspaced studs. Insulating material was woven between the interspaced studs. (See: Board Exhibit 3). The decision to use this assembly was made by Gerald A. Hadley, a labor foreman. Hadley's father was the general contractor, and was consulted in making the decision. A Mr. Rasmussen, the building inspector, was consulted about the wall assembly, and he gave his approval. At the time that construction was under way on the Ocean Palm Villas South project, the 1965 Edition with Revisions of the Southern Standard Building Code was in effect in the North Peninsular Zoning District of Volusia County. The Ocean Palm Villas South project lied within that district. The wall assembly utilized by the general contractor does not precisely follow any of the assemblies set out as appropriate in the code. The wall assembly utilized does, however, meet the one hour fire resistance standard required by the code. There was no evidence presented at the hearing from which it could be concluded that the Licensee Ledbetter had any knowledge of the wall assembly utilized in this project other than what was set out in the original plans. Ledbetter was not the contractor for the project when the assembly was constructed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the comprehensive plan amendment adopted by the City of St. Augustine Beach on April 3, 1995, through enactment of Ordinance Number 95-5 is in compliance pursuant to Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 3, 1995, the City adopted the amendment by Ordinance Number 95-5, and submitted it to the Department for review pursuant to Section 163.3184(7), Florida Statutes. On July 15, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the amendment in compliance. By August 7, 1995, all Petitioners had timely filed their challenges to the amendment's adoption by the City. On October 3, 1995, Intervenor was granted leave to intervene and its motion to expedite these proceedings was granted. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with responsibility for review of comprehensive plans pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Petitioners reside in the City of St. Augustine Beach, St. Johns County, Florida. All Petitioners own property adjacent to or within close proximity to the parcel which is the subject of the amendment. The parties stipulate that each Petitioner is an "affected person" as defined by Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and that each Petitioner presented oral and written objections and comments at the public hearings held on the amendment. The City is a local government required to adopt a comprehensive plan pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The amendment to the City's Future Land Use Map (FLUM) which is the subject of this proceeding involves a parcel of land approximately .11 of an acre in size. Located on the north side of "A" Street which runs between Highway AIA (Beach Boulevard) and the Atlantic Ocean, the parcel adjoins the western boundary of an existing parking lot for a restaurant called the Beachcomber. In the short distance between Highway AIA and the the restaurant are duplexes and apartments, inclusive of a parking lot. There is a residence on the subject parcel at present. The Beachcomber was built before the comprehensive plan's adoption by the City and was designated on the FLUM as commercial in 1993. The amendment would change the designation of the parcel on which the residence is located from Medium Density Residential to Commercial Use, subject to conditions. The purpose for the designation change is to permit Intervenor, owner of the Beachcomber and purchaser of the parcel, to demolish the residence and use the parcel for an additional eight spaces of restaurant parking. The amendment is a small scale amendment pursuant to Section 163.3187, Florida Statutes. It is the position of Petitioners that the amendment is inconsistent with a policy on buffers contained at L.1.3.3, page AB-4 of the City's Comprehensive Plan (Plan). The policy states the following: For future development the City shall include in the land development regulations the require- ment for a 15 foot vegetative buffer between noncompatible uses such as between commercial and residential land uses. The amendment is silent with regard to buffers. The intervenor is required by the amendment to comply with all applicable land development regulations. A proposed site plan of Intervenor reveals buffers of 10 instead of 15 feet, but the Intervenor has not yet sought site plan approval. Petitioners also maintain that the amendment's change in designation of the parcel from medium density residential to commercial property subject to restrictions constitutes an inconsistency with the Plan. Policy L.1.3.5., states "[c]ommercial development shall not be allowed in areas designated as residential on the Future Land Use Map." As established by testimony of the Department's planning expert, Carol Collins, the amendment is a small expansion of "the existing commercial use." The expansion was viewed by Collins as intended to replace a parking area in front of the Beachcomber that was lost through erosion. She opined that "you can make a reasonable case for finding this amendment in compliance." While the amendment may be considered inconsistent with one policy (Policy L.1.3.5.) of the Plan, in the opinion of Collins, the amendment is in compliance with the Plan as a whole. Craig Thompson, certified planner and architect with an established expertise in comprehensive planning, opined at the final hearing that certain aspects of the Plan are furthered by the amendment. Specifically, the amendment supports the goal of encouraging tourism and addressing commercial needs beneficial to residents and tourists alike by providing parking for automobiles of Beachcomber patrons otherwise parked on the street. Further, although the Beachcomber is a grandfathered commercial use in a residential area, the enhanced parking will not be so great as to enlarge the commercial activity at the restaurant. The Plan sets forth a growth management strategy on page L15 which recognizes the potential for future rezoning of parcels from residential to commercial and notes that such rezonings "should be restricted, consolidating areas where possible." As noted by Thompson's testimony, the use of property immediately behind the Beachcomber site for parking is consistent with the Plan's intent that commercial rezonings should be consolidated. The amendment specifically states that the use of the parcel is restricted solely to parking of vehicles "or, if approved by Conditional Use Permit, residential purposes." Although designated as commercial by the amendment, expanded commercial development on the parcel, i.e., an expansion of the restaurant itself, is not authorized or contemplated. Petitioners provided no independent testimony that fears of property devaluation of their nearby residences will be realized as a result of parking activity on the parcel. Other Petitioner concerns of after hours activity in the parking lot should be alleviated by the plans of Intervenor to strictly police the parking area and enforce its use for patron parking only, including closure of the lot when the Beachcomber is not open. Petitioners' claim that the necessity for redesignation of the parcel is mooted in view of the future renourishment of the beach, as contemplated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and documented by a letter dated after adoption of the amendment. However, the contemplation of such future beach renourishment fails to establish that Beachcomber Restaurant parking would be permitted on the renourished beachfront. The Plan, as amended, is in compliance with the regional plan and the state comprehensive plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining the amendment to be in compliance. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 14th day of December, 1995. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-3885GM, 95-3886GM & 95-4027GM. In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioners' Proposed Findings (Petitioners' proposed findings were numbered 13-69.) 13.-14. Accepted. Rejected, unnecessary. Incorporated by reference. Accepted with the addition of "subject to conditions" following the word "commercial" at the end of the 2nd sentence. 18.-21. Rejected as redundant, cumulative and subordinate to HO findings. 22.-23. Incorporated by reference. 24.-29. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 30.-33. Incorporated by reference. Rejected, conclusionary, subject to reasonable debate. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, unnecessary. Incorporated by reference. 38.-39. Rejected, out of context quotation, argumentative, subordinate to HO findings. 40.-42. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 43. Adopted. 44.-46. Rejected, not materially dispositive. Rejected, materially, occurred after amendment adoption. Rejected, speculative. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Incorporated by reference. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, credibility. 54.-55. Rejected, relevancy. 56. Incorporated by reference. 57.-58. Rejected, relevancy, subordinate to HO findings. 59. Rejected, conclusion of law. 60.-63. Rejected, relevancy, subordinate to HO findings. 64.-65. Adopted, not verbatim. 66.-67. Rejected, unnecessary. 68.-69. Rejected, argument, subordinate to HO findings. Respondent Department's Proposed Findings (Respondent Department's proposed findings were numbered 5-21.) 5.-12. Adopted, not verbatim. 13.-14. Rejected, relevancy, legal conclusion. 15.-18. Adopted, not verbatim. 19. Rejected, argument, no record citation. 20.-21. Incorporated by reference. Intervenor's Proposed Findings 1.-4. Adopted, not verbatim. 5.-15. Incorporated by reference. Rejected, conclusion. Adopted, not verbatim. Rejected, conclusion. Adopted, not verbatim. Incorporated by reference. 21.-23. Rejected, argument. 24. Adopted, not verbatim. 25.-26. Incorporated by reference. 27.-29. Incorporated by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell K. Arline, Esquire Dept. of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Geoffrey B. Dobson, Esquire 66 Cuna Street, Suite B St. Augustine Beach, FL 32084 Mr. and Mrs. Joseph F. Peacock 6 "A" Street St. Augustine Beach, FL 32084 Mr. and Mrs. Matthew Braly Three First Lane St. Augustine Beach, FL 32084 Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Morris One First Lane St. Augustine Beach, FL 32084 George M. McClure, Esquire O. Box 3504 St. Augustine, FL 32085-3504 James F. Murley, Secretary Dept. of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Dept. of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
