The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a public lodging establishment, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner, who is African-American, by refusing to provide her accommodations or service based upon race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Phyllis Phyl ("Phyl") is an African-American woman who resides in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent G6 Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Studio 6 ("Studio 6"), is the owner and operator of the Studio 6 Extended Stay Hotel located in Pompano Beach, Florida (the "Hotel"). Phyl arrived at the Hotel at around 1:30 p.m. on February 22, 2014. Previously, she had made a reservation for a two-night stay, booking a nonsmoking room with a queen bed. Phyl was aware that check-in time at the Hotel was 3:00 p.m., but she decided to take a chance that a room would be available for earlier occupancy. When Phyl attempted to register, however, the clerk informed Phyl that no rooms were available for early check in. Phyl elected to wait in her car, which was parked in the Hotel's parking lot. From there, she watched a black man enter the Hotel and walk out a few minutes later. Phyl assumed that he, too, had been told that his room was not ready. She did not, however, witness his attempt to check in (if that is what occurred), and therefore Phyl lacks personal knowledge of this man's transaction with the Hotel, if any.2/ Unhappy, Phyl walked around the Hotel grounds and peered through the window of an apparently vacant room, which she determined, based on her observation, was clean and ready for occupancy. Phyl might have been mistaken, for she could not see, e.g., the bathroom, but even if her assumption were correct, the fact is not probative of discriminatory intent. This is because a room is not "available" for guest occupancy at this Hotel until after a manager has inspected the room, deemed it "clean," and caused such information to be entered into the Hotel's computer system, at which point the front-desk clerk is on notice that the room is ready. Thus, there is a delay between the time the housekeeping staff finishes cleaning a room and the time the front-desk clerk is able to let the room to a guest. After peeking in the seemingly empty room, Phyl returned to her car, and soon she noticed a white couple enter the Hotel, from which they exited several minutes later. Phyl did not witness the couple's activities inside the Hotel. The man and woman got into their car and drove around the Hotel premises. Phyl followed. She watched the couple park, leave their car, and enter a room. She observed the man retrieve some luggage and bring his bags to the room. Phyl assumed that this couple had just checked in. Phyl returned to the Hotel lobby and inquired again about the availability of a room. This time the clerk told her a room was ready. Phyl checked in at 2:09 p.m. Phyl stayed two nights, as planned, and paid the rate quoted in her reservation. When she checked out on February 24, 2014, the clerk refunded the $25 security deposit Phyl had given the Hotel at check in, which was required because she wanted to pay cash for the room (and did). Phyl claims that the clerk was rude to her, and so she left without taking a receipt. Hotel business records show that on February 22, 2014, no guest checked in between Phyl's arrival at 1:30 p.m. and 2:09 p.m., when she herself checked in. The white man who (together with a female companion) seemed to have checked in while Phyl was waiting actually had checked in earlier that day, at 11:14 a.m. The undersigned rejects as unfounded Phyl's contention that the Hotel's records are unreliable and possibly fraudulent and instead accepts them as persuasive evidence. Ultimate Factual Determinations At the material time, the Hotel was a "public lodging establishment" within the reach of section 509.092, Florida Statutes, and a "public accommodation" as that term is defined in section 760.02(11). Thus, the Hotel is accountable to Phyl for unlawful discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act if such occurred. The greater weight of the evidence, however, fails to establish that the Hotel refused accommodations or service to Phyl, or otherwise unlawfully discriminated against her. Rather, the Hotel provided Phyl the type of room she had reserved, at the quoted rate, for the length of stay she requested. Indeed, despite arriving 90 minutes before the Hotel's published check-in time, Phyl was able to get a room early, after waiting little more than half an hour. The Hotel's conduct, in this instance, cannot be faulted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Phyl's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2015.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407
The Issue Whether Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., denied Petitioners full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered at its place of public accommodation, in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Parties and Jurisdiction Petitioners are African Americans who reside in the State of Ohio, who visited Orlando, Florida, in June 2011 and stayed at Lake Eve Resort beginning on June 21, 2011. Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., was the owner of Lake Eve Resort, located at 12388 International Drive, Orlando, Florida, at all times relevant hereto. Each Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission as follows: Jessica Austin – July 20, 2012 Denise Austin – July 21, 2012 Tracie Austin – January 18, 2013 (Amended Complaint)2/ Bonlydia Jones – July 11, 2012 James Austin – July 31, 2012 Dionne Harrington – August 1, 2012 Esther Hall – January 28, 2013 (Amended Complaint)3/ Boniris McNeal – March 27, 2013 Summer McNeal – March 27, 2013 Derek McNeal – March 27, 2013 In each Complaint, the Petitioner alleges that the most recent date of discrimination is June 22, 2011. On June 21, 2012, Petitioners Esther Hall, Summer McNeal, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, and Dionne Harrington, each filed a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) with the Commission. Each TAQ is signed by the named Petitioner, is stamped received by the Commission on June 21, 2012, and contains the specific facts alleged to be an act of discrimination in the provision of public accommodation by Respondent. Allegations of Discrimination On or about May 23, 2011, Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, entered into a Standard Group Contract with Lake Eve Resort (the Resort) to reserve 15 Resort rooms for five nights at a discounted group rate beginning June 21, 2011.4/ The rooms were to accommodate approximately 55 members of her extended family on the occasion of the Boss/Williams/Harris family reunion. Petitioners traveled from Ohio to Orlando via charter bus, arriving at the Resort on the evening of June 21, 2011. Erika Bell, a relative of Petitioners, drove a rental car from Ohio to Orlando. She did not arrive in Orlando until June 22, 2011. Petitioners checked in to the Resort without incident. However, one family member, John Harris, was informed that the three-bedroom suite he had reserved for his family was not available due to a mistake in reservations. He was offered two two-bedroom suites to accommodate his family. Petitioner, Boniris McNeal, dined off-property on the evening of June 21, 2011, to celebrate her wedding anniversary. Petitioner, Bonlydia Jones, left the Resort property shortly after check-in to shop for groceries. Petitioners, Dionne Harrington and Esther Hall, were very tired after the long bus trip and went to bed early on June 21, 2011. Petitioner, Denise Austin, arrived in Orlando with the family on June 21, 2011. On the morning of June 22, 2011, Ms. Jones received a call from Mr. Harris, informing her that the Resort management wanted to speak with them about his room. That morning, Ms. Jones and Mr. Harris met with two members of Resort management, Amanda Simon and Marie Silbe. Mr. Harris was informed that he needed to change rooms to a three-bedroom suite, the accommodation he had reserved, which had become available. Mr. Harris disputed that he had to change rooms and argued that he was told at check-in the prior evening he would not have to move from the two two-bedroom suites he was offered when his preferred three-bedroom suite was not available. After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Harris would move his family to an available three-bedroom suite. The Resort provided an employee to assist with the move. Following the meeting with management, Ms. Jones went to the pool, along with Ms. Harrington and other members of the family. After a period of time which was not established at hearing, Mary Hall, one of Ms. Harrington’s relatives, came to the pool and informed Ms. Harrington that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Harrington left the pool and entered the lobby, where she observed police officers and members of Resort management. She approached a member of management and was informed that she and her family were being evicted from the Resort and must be off the property within an hour. Ms. Harrington left the lobby and returned to her room, where her mother, Ms. Hall was sleeping. Ms. Harrington informed Ms. Hall that the family was being evicted from the Resort and instructed Ms. Hall to pack her belongings. Ms. Jones’ cousin, Denise Strickland, came to the pool and informed her that the family was being evicted from the Resort. Ms. Jones entered the lobby where she was approached by a member of management, who introduced herself as the general manager and informed her that the family was being evicted. Ms. Jones requested a reason, but was informed by a police officer that the owners did not have to give a reason. In the lobby, Ms. Jones observed that an African- American male was stopped by police and asked whether he was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion. He was not a family member. Ms. Jones observed that no Caucasian guests were approached in the lobby by management or the police. Ms. Austin was on a trolley to lunch off-property on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from her cousin, Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland informed Ms. Austin that the family was being evicted from the Resort and she needed to return to pack her things. Ms. Austin returned to the property, where she was escorted to her room by a security guard and asked to pack her belongings. Ms. McNeal was en route to rent a car and buy groceries on June 22, 2011, when she received a call from Ms. Strickland informing her that the family was being evicted and that she needed to return to the Resort to pack her belongings. Upon her arrival at the Resort, Ms. McNeal entered the lobby. There, she was approached by Resort staff, asked whether she was with the Boss/Williams/Harris reunion, and informed that the Resort could not honor the reservations and the family was being evicted. Ms. McNeal observed that Caucasian guests entering the lobby were not approached by either the police or Resort management. Ms. McNeal was escorted to her room by both a police officer and a member of management and instructed to be out of the room within 30 minutes. Ms. McNeal inquired why they were being evicted, but was told by a police officer that the Resort was not required to give a reason. Erika Bell received a call from her mother, Ms. Austin, while en route to the Resort on June 22, 2011. Ms. Austin informed Ms. Bell that the family was being evicted from the Resort and asked her to call the Resort and cancel her reservation. Respondent gave no reason for evicting Petitioners from the property. Respondent refunded Petitioners’ money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: Finding that Respondent, Eve Management, Inc./KA and KM Development, Inc., committed an act of public accommodation discrimination in violation of sections 509.092 and 760.08, Florida Statutes (2011), against Petitioners Jessica Austin, Denise Austin, Tracie Austin, James Austin, Bonlydia Jones, Esther Hall, Boniris McNeal, Derek McNeal, Summer McNeal, and Dionne Harrington; and Prohibiting any future acts of discrimination by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race, sex or religion.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates the Valu-Lodge Motel located at 4810 West Highway 98, Panama City Beach, Florida. The motel offers rooms for rent to the public and is a "transient public lodging establishment" within the meaning of Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white male. His national origin is American. Although Petitioner’s complaint and petition indicate that Petitioner espouses to be a member of the Church of Christ, there was no evidence presented at the hearing regarding Petitioner’s religion. On September 9, 2004, Petitioner rented a motel room from Respondent at its Panama City Beach motel. The rental term was week to week. At some point, Respondent felt Petitioner had become disruptive to the operation of the hotel and to its guests. On November 25, 2005, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would no longer rent a room to Petitioner and hand-delivered a Notice of Termination of Lease to Petitioner. The Notice stated that Petitioner must vacate the premises by December 1, 2005. Petitioner refused to vacate the motel premises. On December 9, 2005, Respondent hand-delivered a Fifteen Day Notice for Possession of Premises to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that no further rent would be accepted. Petitioner again refused to vacate the premises. Petitioner also did not pay any further rent to Respondent. Respondent filed an eviction proceeding against Petitioner. The first and second eviction proceedings appear to have been dismissed for procedural reasons. However, the third eviction proceeding was successful. During that proceeding, Petitioner had the opportunity to defend against eviction based on the claims of discrimination raised in this matter. However, on June 22, 2007, after hearing, Respondent received a final judgment, awarding the Intown Companies, Inc., $19,213.18 in unpaid rent, plus interest. Respondent also received a Final Judgment of Eviction awarding the Company possession of the premises and court costs. A Writ of Possession was issued on June 25, 2007, and Petitioner vacated the premises on June 27, 2008. There was no evidence presented by Petitioner that demonstrated Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in any manner. There was absolutely no evidence of any racial, nationalistic or religious bias on the part of Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner believes that he is entitled to rent a room from Respondent simply because he is a member of the public and desires to rent a room from Respondent. Neither the facts, nor the law supports Petitioner’s misinformed view of the view of the law. Given the utter lack of evidence presented by Petitioner, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Alan Johnson 20417 Panama City Beach Parkway No. 8 Panama City Beach, Florida 32413 Melton Harrell, Authorized Agent The Intown Companies, Inc. d/b/a Valu Lodge American Motel Management, Inc. 2200 Northlake Parkway S-277 Tucker, Georgia 30084-4023
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race, national origin, or disability at Respondent’s place of public accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a McDonald’s franchisee operating six McDonald’s restaurants in the Orlando area. At issue in this case is the restaurant referred to as the “Lockhart” store. The Lockhart McDonald’s is located on Orange Blossom Trail in Orlando, in a high-crime, low-income area. This McDonald’s has a history of problems with persons using the restaurant for purposes other than purchasing food and drink there to consume onsite. There has been a wide range of “other purposes” in the Lockhart McDonald’s history: sitting at the dining tables without ordering any food or drink; panhandling (asking customers if they have a spare dollar); bringing in drinks purchased elsewhere, topped off with refills stolen from the McDonald’s drink station; soliciting restaurant customers for prostitution; and using the bathrooms to ingest or inject illegal drugs, leaving behind used hypodermic needles and other paraphernalia. On two separate occasions, people overdosed on heroin in the bathrooms. To combat these problems, which hurt business, Mr. Vidler enlisted the help of his brother, an Orange County Deputy Sheriff, who conducted drug and prostitution stings to help clean up the restaurant. In addition, the Lockhart McDonald’s adopted a no-loitering policy, a no-solicitation policy, and a policy requiring that only food and drink purchased there may be consumed there. Notices of these policies are prominently displayed on signs at the restaurant. Respondent’s witnesses testified, credibly and consistently, that these policies are enforced uniformly and strictly, with the goal being to avoid the problems they have had with persons improperly using the restaurant’s facilities. As part of the enforcement procedure, if someone is observed seated at a table without any apparent McDonald’s food or drink items, after a few minutes a manager or other staff member will approach that person and politely inquire whether the person intends to make a purchase. Petitioner is a black woman who has been a customer at the Lockhart McDonald’s. She and her boyfriend, who is not black,2/ have gone there on occasion, made purchases, and enjoyed their meals, without incident. On the day in question, December 28, 2015, Petitioner and her boyfriend went to the Lockhart McDonald’s for breakfast. The restaurant was not very busy or crowded when they arrived, with perhaps one other customer in line and another customer seated at a table in the separate dining area. Petitioner went to the dining area, while her boyfriend went to the counter to place their order. The restaurant is fairly large, with physical and visual separation of the area where customers wait in line to place orders, pick up food, and get drinks at the drink station from the area where customers can go to sit at tables to consume their purchases. Behind the ordering counter on the employee side, there is a door used by employees to enter the dining area. Through a small window at the top of the door, a customer waiting in line at the counter might be able to glimpse a small portion of the dining area, but otherwise would not be able to see or hear what is going on in the dining area. Petitioner took a seat at a table by an outside window. She propped both of her feet up on the Corian window ledge and sat there gazing out the window. Eric Vidler, the operations manager of Respondent’s six restaurants, was in the Lockhart McDonald’s that morning. After Petitioner had taken her place by the window, Mr. Vidler and the Lockhart restaurant manager, Adam Allegroe, entered the dining area together to conduct a cleanliness walk-through. They saw Petitioner, taking note of her unusual positioning, with feet propped up on the windowsill,3/ staring out the window. They also noted that there was no sign of any McDonald’s food or drink purchases on the table or in her hands. After a few minutes, consistent with the restaurant’s policies and procedures, Mr. Vidler approached Petitioner and politely inquired whether she intended to make a purchase. She did not answer him.4/ Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe testified that usually, when they make such an inquiry, the person will respond, but sometimes they do not respond. Since their goal is not to make a scene, offend, or embarrass anyone, under these circumstances they will usually walk away for a short period of time. If the person had no legitimate business there, then the person often will disappear at that point. Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe retreated to the men’s and women’s bathrooms, where they spent three to five minutes conducting their cleanliness inspection. When Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe returned to the dining area, Petitioner was still seated, positioned the same way, with her feet still propped up on the windowsill. She was still staring out the window, and still had no McDonald’s purchases on the table or in her hands. Mr. Vidler went back up to Petitioner, and following up on his prior statement to her, this time he told her, “Ma’am, if you are not going to be making a purchase today, then you are loitering and I need to ask you to leave.” Mr. Vidler testified credibly that this is how he always handles the second approach when the person does not answer his first inquiry. The message, though direct, was delivered in a calm tone. Mr. Vidler did not yell at Petitioner. He did not threaten to call the police or have her arrested. This time, Petitioner responded. She got up, flung a chair in Mr. Vidler’s direction with sufficient force so that the chair traveled some distance with all four chair legs four to six inches off the ground, until it fell against and partially on a half-wall that set off that portion of the dining area.5/ Petitioner also responded verbally, using an elevated voice to express her anger. Mr. Vidler said that she cursed, using a four-letter word. Although more than one year later he did not recall exactly which curse word or words she uttered, he did recall that her words were not nice. Mr. Allegroe corroborated Mr. Vidler’s recollection, testifying that Petitioner stood up, “slung” the chair in their direction, and “started speaking profanity.” (Tr. 83). She then left the restaurant. The testimony of Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe describing their two encounters with Petitioner was corroborated by Shahanna Owensby, a guest services department manager for the Lockhart McDonald’s. Ms. Owensby was seated at a table in the dining area, working on pricing and tagging merchandise, when she noticed Petitioner. She observed Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe conducting their cleanliness walk-through. She observed Mr. Vidler’s initial approach to Petitioner. She heard Mr. Vidler ask Petitioner if she was going to be making a purchase, and confirmed that Petitioner did not respond. She saw Mr. Vidler and Mr. Allegroe keep walking after that, back in the direction of the bathrooms. She observed Mr. Vidler approach Petitioner a second time, estimated at four to eight minutes later. She heard him tell Petitioner that if she was not making a purchase, he needed to ask her to leave. She saw Petitioner stand up, pick up a chair, and fling, throw, or toss it: “It was up in the air and it was off the ground, by her hand.” (Tr. 98). By the time of Petitioner’s stormy exit from the restaurant, a family--a woman with some younger children--had entered the dining area and was seated near Ms. Owensby. After Petitioner left, Ms. Owensby apologized to the family, who had witnessed the scene and had been exposed to the profanity used by Petitioner within their hearing range. After Petitioner left the restaurant, her boyfriend walked into the dining area with the food he had purchased. The boyfriend described what happened next: Jennifer, my wife, was not sitting at the table. I thought she was at the--in the bathroom. I put my tray on the opposite side of the table. I was sitting to the left, I guess, or the right. I was sitting on the other side. And that’s when I saw Mr. Vidler with a surprised face, you know, like wow-- Q. [Mr. Millan]. Uh-huh. A. --what happened here. So he approached me and he said that he didn’t know--that he didn’t know. And I asked him that he didn’t know what. He said that he didn’t know that she was my wife, that she was there with me. (Tr. 108). At that point, Petitioner (whom Robert Millan clarified is his girlfriend, not his wife) knocked on the restaurant window, signaling for him to come outside. He went out to her and asked what happened. She told him that that person [Mr. Vidler] offended her. When asked how he offended her, Robert Milan said that Petitioner responded as follows: She said he told her that what was she doing there, if she was going to buy food or if she was just going to sit there. And those were the same words that he told me that he told her.[6/] And then when I came back inside the store, I went and I asked him, you know, to explain to me what was going on. And he said that. You know, that--he said that he didn’t know that she was there with me. And he apologized to me. He asked me if he -- if he could go apologize to my wife, Jennifer. And I really told him that I think that was beyond apology because she was like, you know, angry. So he said, well here, I give you my card and you can call the office and see what, you know, we can do about it. (Tr. 109-110). For some unexplained reason (perhaps a mistake filling the order or perhaps a request for customized food), Petitioner’s boyfriend waited ten minutes at the ordering counter, where he was not able to see or hear the encounters in the separate dining area. He was not even aware that Petitioner had stormed out in anger, although he confirmed that she was, indeed, angry when he went outside. Robert Millan did call Respondent’s office, as suggested by Mr. Vidler, and spoke with the owner of the franchise. The owner also offered to apologize to Petitioner, but Robert Millan did not think she wanted to speak to anyone. The owner then offered a $50 gift card. The boyfriend said that he would ask Petitioner, but she refused the gesture. No evidence was presented of any racial statements made directly or indirectly to Petitioner, or of any racial overtones to any of the statements made directly or indirectly to Petitioner. The circumstantial evidence presented does not support an inference that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner based on her race. Instead, all of the circumstantial evidence supports an inference that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Respondent has a no-discrimination, no-harassment policy that is enforced as to its employees, customers and potential customers. The Lockhart McDonald’s has a very diverse staff. A comparison of the number of restaurant employees who are members of the classes of white, black, or Hispanic, the largest category represented by the restaurant’s employees is black; the next- largest category is Hispanic; white employees are in the minority. As to gender, female employees outnumber male employees. Manager positions are spread among white and black males, and white, black, and Hispanic females. The operations manager in charge of Respondent’s six restaurants, Mr. Vidler, is a white male as is the restaurant’s manager, Mr. Allegroe. The other employee testifying at hearing, Ms. Owensby, is the restaurant’s guest services manager and she is a black female. The diversity of the restaurant’s staff is circumstantial evidence, though not particularly weighty evidence, suggesting a general absence of intent to discriminate on the basis of race.7/ More compelling circumstantial evidence was provided by Mr. Vidler, who is the individual accused of discriminating against Petitioner because she is black. Mr. Vidler testified with great sincerity that Petitioner’s accusation is not only unfounded, but it hits a particular sore spot with him. Although he is a white male, his daughter is half-black. He has experienced the pain of discrimination based on race, with unkind questions, or worse, directed to him or to his daughter, because their races do not match. This personal fact shared by Mr. Vidler is compelling circumstantial evidence giving rise to a inference that he would not intentionally discriminate against Petitioner based on her race. The evidence strongly supports a finding, and it is so found, that Mr. Vidler’s December 28, 2015, encounters with Petitioner were the reasonable implementation of Respondent’s reasonable policies for its Lockhart restaurant to ensure that persons using the restaurant’s facilities are there for the purpose of purchasing and consuming food and drink. The credible, consistent testimony of Mr. Vidler and Respondent’s other employees who testified is that the no-loitering policy is applied uniformly to all persons, regardless of race, nationality, gender, disability, or any other classification, who are not apparently customers in that they have no McDonald’s food or drink purchases. These persons are asked whether they intend to make a purchase, and if they do not respond in some fashion that they are indeed there to purchase food and/or drink, they are told that if they are not there to make a purchase, they are loitering and will have to be asked to leave.8/ Petitioner has only herself to blame for not making clear to Mr. Vidler that she was there with her boyfriend, who was in line at the counter ordering their breakfast. That would have ended the matter. That Mr. Vidler only took the action he did because he did not know Petitioner was there with her boyfriend was perhaps most convincingly established by Robert Millan’s testimony describing the utter surprise on Mr. Vidler’s face when he realized that Petitioner had, in fact, been waiting for someone who had been purchasing food. The undersigned finds as a matter of ultimate fact that Respondent did not intentionally discriminate against Petitioner based on her race (the only protected class proven at hearing) or any other classification that might have applied to Petitioner but was not proven at hearing.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner Jennifer M. Foster-Garvey. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Motel 6, discriminated against Petitioner, Emanuel Sessions, a/k/a Emanuel Glenn, by refusing to rent him a room at the Motel 6, Number 0791 (Motel), based on his race, African-American.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. The Motel is part of a national public lodging establishment chain, which is in the business of renting rooms to consumers. The Motel is located in Orange County, Florida, where the alleged act of discrimination arose. On October 25, 2010, and for six consecutive nights, Petitioner was a guest at the Motel, registered under the name of Emanuel Glenn.1/ There were no allegations of discrimination reported between October 25, 2010, and October 31, 2010.2/ The only allegation of discrimination occurred on November 1, 2010, when Petitioner was denied a room at the Motel. On October 31, 2010, Petitioner secured room 124 at the Motel. This room was on the ground floor, facing the parking lot. During his testimony, Petitioner failed to recollect that he had stayed at the Motel for the five nights prior to October 31, 2010. Petitioner could not recall when he stayed at the Motel, claiming it was over a year ago, and he did not know; yet, he was adamant that, on November 1, 2010, the Motel would not rent him a room. The evidence was overwhelming that Petitioner had stayed at the Motel for six consecutive nights, beginning on October 25, 2010. On October 31, 2010, the Motel's manager-on-duty was Emile Saleeb (Mr. Saleeb).3/ Late on October 31, 2010, Petitioner went to the Motel lobby and complained to Mr. Saleeb about a security guard questioning Petitioner as he sat in his car in the Motel's parking lot. Petitioner acted in an aggressive and offensive manner and used profanity towards Mr. Saleeb while at least one and up to three other Motel guests were present in the lobby. Mr. Saleeb felt Petitioner caused a disturbance in the Motel's lobby, which could be categorized as aggravated misconduct on the part of a Motel guest. Mr. Saleeb had concerns for the safety and welfare of the Motel's guests as well as its employees. The Motel has a policy that anyone causing a disturbance or engaged in aggravated misconduct on the property will be placed on the do not rent (DNR) list.4/ Mr. Saleeb has the authority to place someone on the DNR list for the Motel. Based on his encounter with Petitioner on October 31, 2010, Mr. Saleeb put Petitioner's name on the Motel's DNR list. Mr. Saleeb's testimony was credible. The following evening, on November 1, 2010, Petitioner attempted to rent another room at the Motel. At that time, Petitioner was told he would not be able to rent a room as he had been placed on the Motel's DNR list. No testimony, credible or otherwise, was offered that Petitioner was told that the refusal to rent a room to him was based on his race. Petitioner jumped to the conclusion that he had been discriminated against because of his race. He believed he had been denied a room at the Motel because he is African-American. He filed a complaint with the Commission about the incident. In his complaint, Petitioner said that he "was told that I couldn't rent a room at Motel 6 on November 1, 2010 because of my skin color, and I have proof wich [sic] is my witness that was there with me." However, this complaint information conflicts with the information that Petitioner provided to the Motel's guest relations department on November 2, 2010. In the guest relations contact report, it was recorded that: GST states last night, he tried to c/i to prop & was told by GSR that he cannot rent there. GST sd he asked why & was told it is based on past experience. GST asked GSR to elaborate & GSR said he had no further information. GST sd the last time he was at prop he had a room with his partner. GST sd he went to sit in his car right outside the rm to made a call to get a better signal. While he was sitting in the car, a police officer came up to the car & opened the door & asked him why he was sitting in his car & did he have a room there. GST sd he told the officer that he did have the room right in front of the car & was making a call from the car because there was a better signal. The officer told GST he had to go back inside his room. GST sd other people were outside their rooms. GST sd when he C/O he told GSR about the officer being rude & opening his car door. GST sd he does not understand any of this. GST said there is no reason for him to not be able to rent at property. GST said he was told he cannot rent there last night about 11 p.m. & the man at the F/D was named Nabeel. Petitioner did not present any witnesses to testify despite repeated opportunities to do so. According to Robert Wade (Mr. Wade), the general manager of the Motel, his primary concern is for the safety and welfare of all the guests on his property, as well as for the safety and welfare of his employees. Mr. Wade confirmed that he is in the business of renting rooms in order to make money; the more money the business brings in, the more his bonus (and the bonuses of his employees) will be. Thus, he wants to rent rooms to customers; however, he must be able to maintain the property in a manner that customers will want to stay at the property. Mr. Wade receives a security report every day from the security officer who was on duty the previous night. Based on this security report, Mr. Wade knows if there are broken lights on the property that need to be fixed, parking lot issues to be addressed or other maintenance issues that should be resolved to ensure the property is well maintained. Additionally, he reviews the security report to review any incidents involving Motel guests or other activities. Upon receipt of the security officer's report of October 31, 2010, Mr. Wade became aware of an incident in the parking lot involving Petitioner. Mr. Wade interviewed Mr. Saleeb and the security officer, Willie Wilson, in order to understand the circumstances. A day later, Mr. Wade was contacted by the Motel's guest relations office regarding a complaint that Petitioner had lodged on November 2, 2011. Based on his own investigation into the facts and circumstances regarding Petitioner being placed on the Motel's DNR list, Mr. Wade determined that it was in the best interest of the Motel that Petitioner be on the Motel's DNR list. Mr. Wade's testimony is credible. There are other Motel guests who are on the DNR list for similar and other reasons. Those guests who are put on the Motel's DNR list based on an infraction of a Motel policy are banned from the property for one year. However, guests whose names are provided by law enforcement for the Motel's DNR list are banned for up to three years. Neither of Petitioner's names is currently on the Motel's DNR list. During the hearing as the facts were presented, Petitioner did not appear to grasp the concept that his placement on the DNR list was a result of his encounter with the security officer in the parking lot which resulted in his loud, aggressive, and disruptive behavior in the Motel lobby in front of Mr. Saleeb and other Motel guests. Petitioner had stayed at the Motel for six consecutive nights. Unfortunately on the sixth night, Petitioner engaged in behavior that caused a disturbance, and he was placed on the DNR list. Petitioner contacted the Motel's guest relations department on November 2, 2010, to complain about his inability to rent a room at the Motel on November 1, 2010. During that November 2, 2010, telephone conversation, Petitioner specifically recalled his issue with the Motel security officer. Yet during the hearing, Petitioner evaded questions about any contact with the security officer, claiming he "might have come across a security guard." Petitioner did not answer questions in a concise manner and evaded answering some questions all together. Thus, his testimony is not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Emanuel Sessions in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has committed a discriminatory act with respect to public accommodations in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be provided.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a fleet of cruise ships. The Triumph is one of the ships in its fleet. It sails from Miami, Florida. Among the cruises that Respondent offers on the Triumph is a seven-day cruise to the Western Caribbean, which stops in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, and Cozumel, Mexico. Ms. Raphael, a Black female, contracted to and took a seven-day Western Caribbean cruise on the Triumph from March 18- 25, 2006. It was Ms. Raphael's first cruise and she traveled by herself. The make up of the passengers and crew on the ship included all races: Asians, Caucasians, Indians, Hispanics, African Americans, etc. The Triumph left the Port of Miami on March 18th and was at sea in international waters until it returned to the Port of Miami on the 25th. On the 20th, the ship docked at Cozumel. On the 22nd, the ship was at Grand Cayman and on the 23rd it docked in Ocho Rios. The Triumph sailed under a foreign flag and is registered in Panama. When Ms. Raphael boarded the Triumph on March 18, 2006, her picture was taken with the rest of the passengers. Paris Dining Room: Upon boarding, Petitioner was given a card that assigned her to the Paris dining room, lower level, table 334, for 5:45 p.m. dining. During the first two days of the cruise, Petitioner did not go to her assigned table in the Paris dining room because she really didn't pay attention to where she was to go. On the third day of the cruise, Ms. Raphael received another dining room reservation card for the Triumph's Paris dining room, table 334 at 5:45 p.m. Petitioner's allegations in her petition relating to the incident in the Paris dining room were not substantiated by the evidence at hearing. Ms. Raphael presented inconsistent testimony and failed to prove any of the allegations. Pizza Incident: While in international waters, Petitioner went to the pizzeria on the Lido deck to get pizza because she was hungry. She stood in line with other passengers to get a slice of pizza. Ms. Raphael took the last piece of pizza. The slice was burnt. After Ms. Raphael got the last slice of pizza, the server left to go get another pizza pie. Ms. Raphael didn't wait for him to return but, instead just threw the burnt pizza away. She neither asked for a new slice of pizza nor addressed or complained about the burnt slice to anybody. Housekeeping Incident: Ms. Raphael could not get her television in her cabin to work properly. She complained to the purser's office two times to get it fixed. On March 20, 2006, staff reported to the purser's office that Petitioner was using the television incorrectly and it was fine. Petitioner reported to a Triumph employee that her room had not been cleaned for the first few days of the cruise. Housekeeping cleaned her room after she made her report. Petitioner talked to a staff member assigned to clean her room about his national origin and found out that the crew member was from India. So, she informed him that she was from Haiti. After the conversation, Ms. Raphael left her cabin. When she returned to her room it was clean and a towel in the shape of two little pigs and a sign that spelled out the word "Haiti" was left on her bed.2 Carnival's policy requires that stewards leave towel animals on all passengers' beds in their cabins nightly. The stateroom stewards are trained to make various towel animals for passenger cabins, including pigs. Carnival sells a book, Towel Creations with Freddy, which contains instructions for assembling animals. Over 800,000 copies of the book have been sold. Petitioner's Cruise Account Incident: Ms. Raphael went to the ship's casino to play Bingo. When she went to withdraw money to play, the employee she approached didn't provide her money because she did not have identification. So, Petitioner went back to her room to get her identification. After Petitioner returned to the casino, showed her identification, and requested $10.00, she was told there was no money in her account. This incident occurred on or about the fourth day of the cruise. Ms. Raphael witnessed passengers of other races in line getting money in the casino. After Petitioner was denied any withdrawal of money, she went to another Carnival Cruise Line cashier to withdraw money and was told that there was about 40 something dollars in her account. Petitioner did not go back to the casino to play bingo.3 Petitioner also got her account straight by having the cashier remove the service gratuity for meals off her account since she had not eaten in the dining room. At the end of the cruise, Carnival Cruise gave the Petitioner a check for $58.44. Although she complained at hearing that she made a $200.00 deposit and she was given credit for a $100.00 deposit, she accepted it without further complaint. Jewelry Store Incident: Petitioner went to the jewelry store on the cruise ship with fellow passenger Ms. Clayton and received what she considered was bad service. The retail jewelry store is operated by Starboard Cruise Services Limited (Starboard), an independent contractor of Carnival Cruise Line. The employees of the retail jewelry shop are hired, trained, supervised, and employed by Starboard. A male employee was assisting Petitioner and Ms. Clayton, answering their questions and showing them jewelry items, when three other people came up. The salesperson walked away from Petitioner to help the other customers before he finished assisting Ms. Raphael and Ms. Clayton. Petitioner addressed this treatment with another cashier, an employee of Starboard, who apologized to her and said that he would report the matter to the head office. Ms. Raphael never made any additional complaints about the salesperson's rudeness after informing the cashier. The jewelry store is only open while in international waters. Petitioner's visit to the jewelry store was made when the ship was at sea and in international waters. Cabin Search Incident: On March 24, 2006, Homeland Security Officer Mayer sent an e-mail to Triumph Chief Security Officer Paul requesting Ms. Raphael's "A-pass/on/off activity." After the request, Officer Paul provided Petitioner's A-pass activity to United States Customs and Boarder Protection (CBP), a part of the United States Department of Homeland Security. CBP requested an escort to search Petitioner's room when the Triumph docked. Respondent neither initiated the search, requested the search, nor participated in the search of Petitioner's cabin, other than to have a security officer escort CBP Officers Mayer and Maize to Ms. Raphael's cabin. Respondent has no knowledge as to why CBP chose Ms. Raphael's cabin to search. When the Triumph docked at the port in Miami on March 25, 2006, Homeland Security went to search Ms. Raphael's cabin. After they knocked on her cabin door, at 6:49 a.m. Petitioner took approximately three minutes to open the door. Emanuel Moise, a Carnival crew member, was found in the bathroom when CBP came to search Petitioner's room. Petitioner waited in the hall with a female security officer while CBP performed the search of her cabin with a K-9 detector dog.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that dismisses Petitioner's Public Accommodations Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2008.
