The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of sales of potatoes?
Findings Of Fact In order to finance his 1991 crops, petitioner Daniel Methvin of Hastings, had to borrow money at the end of the year before. To do that, he was told, he needed to execute contracts for the sale of the potatoes he intended to grow. He had been glad to have future contracts for the 1990 season, when a glut of potatoes pushed the price below three dollars a hundredweight (cwt). Respondent J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. (or the company of which it is a subsidiary) had honored those contracts and paid considerably more than the market price for potatoes then. On November 24, 1990, Mr. Methvin executed a contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 10,000 cwt of "REPACK REDS", Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 ("92% US #1 INCH AND 1/2 MIN. AT LEAST 95% SKIN, Id.) to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $6.50 per cwt. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Consolidating smaller, earlier agreements, Mr. Methvin executed another contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 45,000 cwt of Atlantics ("85% U.S. #1") to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $5.75 per cwt, guaranteeing the potatoes would be suitable for chips. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. With these contracts (or, as to the chipping potatoes, their predecessors) as collateral, Mr. Methvin raised the funds necessary to plant. Both contracts between Mr. Methvin and J.P. Mach, Inc. had "act of god clauses" excusing Mr. Methvin's nondelivery of potatoes he failed to harvest on account of, among other things, tornadoes or hail. As it happened, tornadoes and hail prevented Mr. Methvin's reaping all he had sown. Petitioner only harvested 6,300 cwt of red potatoes and approximately 43,000 cwt of Atlantic potatoes. Another result of the bad weather was extremely high market prices, at some times exceeding $20 per cwt. On April 27, 1991, J.P. Mach visited Mr. Methvin's farm and the two men discussed incentives to keep Mr. Methvin from "jumping his contract," i.e., selling his potatoes to others at the market price. In the course of their conversation, Mr. Methvin said he needed to realize $450,000 from that year's potatoes; and Mr. Mach replied, "I will help you out", and "I will keep you in business." There was general talk of incentives and bonuses. Eventually, Mr. Mach said he would pay a premium over the contract price if Mr. Methvin fulfilled the original contracts to the fullest extent possible, by delivering all the potatoes he had; and Mr. Mach began remitting premium prices, as promised. On June 1, 1991, however, Mr. Methvin advised Mr. Mach of his intention to sell what remained of his harvest, some 1100 cwt of Atlantics, on the open market. When he carried through on this, Mr. Methvin realized approximately $200,000. Even at that, he lost $40,000 that season. Meanwhile Mr. Mach and his companies were sued for $550,000 for failure to deliver potatoes; and were not paid another $172,000 for potatoes they shipped to chip plants and others to whom they had promised still more potatoes. (Mr. Methvin was not the only grower who defaulted on contracts to ship potatoes to J.P. Mach, Inc.) As of June 1, 1991, Mr. Mach, his companies or his agents had paid Mr. Methvin "about $200,000," which was more than the contract price of the potatoes Mr. Methvin had loaded. Neither Mr. Mach nor his companies paid Mr. Methvin anything after June 1, 1991. At hearing, Mr. Methvin calculated the value of the loads as to which nothing had been remitted as of June 1, 1991, as "a few hundred more than $36,000," assuming the contract price plus the premium. But Mr. Mach and his companies or employees recalculated the price of the loads he had paid for by eliminating the premium, since Mr. Methvin had not, as promised on his side, delivered all his potatoes. J.P. Mach, Inc. was duly licensed during the 1990 season. After its license lapsed, a new license was issued to J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. on April 24, 1991. A $50,000 certificate of deposit was filed with First Performance Bank as a condition of licensure.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's complaint be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Methvin Route 1, Box 92 Palatka, Florida 32131 Jeffrey P. Mach, President J. P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. P.O. Box 7 Plover, Wisconsin 54467 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agricutlure 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, the Respondent Liz Caldwell was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0122036, and Liz Caldwell was the owner, president and qualifying broker for the Respondent Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., a corporation registered as a real estate broker, holding license number 0181836. Waldorff Properties of Fort Walton, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. In 1983 and 1984 the principal officers included among others, Lloyd H. Waldorff, as president, and Marlin B. Waldorff, as vice president. In 1983, Waldorff Properties was the developer of a townhome project in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, known as La Mar West Townhomes. Phase One, which had already been completed prior to the time period relevant to this proceeding, consisted of six units in one building. Phase Two originally was to consist of two to three more buildings of five units each. Phase Two was expanded to include the entire balance of the project consisting of 25 units in five buildings, a pool, tennis court, clubhouse, and a boat dock. On or about June 13, 1983, an Exclusive Right of Sale Agreement was entered into between Waldorff Properties and the Respondents, wherein the Respondents would market and sell the townhome units at La Mar West Townhomes on behalf of Waldorff Properties. Thereafter, the Respondents presented to Lloyd H. Waldorff, president of Waldorff Properties, 18 Purchase Agreements, purportedly executed by 17 separate purchasers, which reflected receipt by the Respondents of 18 deposits of $1,000 each for a total of $18,000, to be held in the Respondents' escrow account. On behalf of Waldorff Properties, Lloyd H. Waldorff accepted and executed these contracts. On the strength of the 18 purchase agreements presented to Waldorff Properties by the Respondents, Lloyd H. Waldorff applied to Security Federal Savings and Loan in Panama City, Florida, for a construction loan. On November 2, 1983, Security Federal granted to Waldorff Properties a loan in the amount of $1,100,000 at 13.25 per cent interest for the construction of the La Mar West Townhome project. The 18 purchase agreements were instrumental in the approval of this loan. The project was completed in August or early September, 1984. As completion of the project approached, Lloyd H. Waldorff notified Respondent Caldwell that she needed to line up the purchasers and get ready to close on the purchase agreements. However, the purchase transactions failed to close. In October or November, 1984, Respondent Caldwell met with Lloyd H. Waldorff and, in answer to the question by Mr. Waldorff: "Liz, are these contracts bogus?", Respondent Caldwell nodded in the affirmative. Respondent Caldwell testified at a deposition taken on January 8, 1986, in a civil case in Okaloosa Circuit Court, that Lloyd Waldorff needed a construction loan to proceed with the La Mar West Townhome project, and he felt that if he had contracts for sale of the units the bank would give him the loan. She testified that Lloyd Waldorff asked her to "get up some contracts," because they were needed for the construction loan. She further testified in response to a question "did he (Lloyd Waldorff) ask you to get fraudulent contracts for him?", that "he asked me to work with him". In response to the question "did he ask you to go get bogus contracts for him?", Respondent Caldwell responded, "yes". In response to a question "he asked you to get bogus contracts that he would fraudulently submit to a construction lender?", Respondent Caldwell stated, "that is correct". Respondent Caldwell testified that "those contracts (referring to the 18 purchase agreements) were made up for Mr. Waldorff" and "they (the purchase agreements) were prepared in a couple of hours for him." She also stated under oath, "he (Lloyd Waldorff) needed a construction loan and I helped him obtain it. He asked me if we could prepare some contracts that he could take to the bank. And he felt that way, the bank would give him the loan. And we discussed it, made up the contracts and he picked them up". Finally, in this deposition Respondent Liz Caldwell adopted counsel's statement that "Our position relative to these contracts are as follows: Number one, that the contracts were prepared within a span of about two hours after a request for those contracts and delivered the next morning in total solely for the purpose of ... a construction loan. And number two, the contracts, themselves, are not enforceable contracts." "The names that appear on them are names - - some are actual purchasers; some are fictitious names..." Kelly Wilson Hill worked as secretary and bookkeeper for the Respondents from December, 1982, until June of 1984. A signature purporting to be that of Kelly Hill appears on 17 of the 18 purchase agreements as a witness to either the buyer or the seller. The name of Kelly Hill signed to the purchase agreements was not her signature, and she did not sign as a witness. There was no other employee at the Respondent's company named Kelly Hill. One of the purchase agreements showed the purchaser to be Charles Waters with an address of Sandalwood Drive in Destin, Florida. This purchase agreement is dated July 10, 1983. Charles W. Waters lives at 661 Sandalwood Drive in Destin, Florida, and he lived there on July 10, 1983. Mr. Waters acquired the house on Sandalwood Drive in 1982 through the Respondent's agency. Mr. Waters bought two other homes and a business in 1981 through the Respondent. Although a signature which purports to be Charles Waters appears on the Charles Waters purchase agreement, Charles W. Waters did not sign this agreement, and did not agree to purchase a townhome unit at La Mar West Townhomes. He did not put down a $1,000 deposit, and he had never seen the purchase agreement until a couple of months prior to the hearing. Respondent Liz Caldwell also admitted to Marlin Waldorff that the purchase agreements were not good contracts. Richard Watson has worked as a broker/salesman with the Respondents for approximately 6 years. A signature purporting to be that of Richard Watson appears on 17 of the 18 purchase agreements as a witness to either the buyer, the seller, or both. Richard Watson did affix his signature to the purchase agreements as a witness, but he did not see the buyers and/or the sellers sign the agreements. Richard Watson was aware that the purchase agreements were false, bogus contracts. Despite the written representation of Respondent Liz Caldwell on the purchase agreements that a $1,000 deposit had been received on each of the 18 purchase agreements, for a total of $18,000, and that these deposits had been placed in the Respondent's escrow account, the deposits were not received and were not placed in escrow. On July 3, 1983, the Respondents caused an advertisement to appear in the Playground Daily News in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, wherein it was stated that the La Mar West Townhome project was 95 percent sold. On July 10, 1983, the Respondents caused an advertisement to appear in the Playground Daily News in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, in which it was stated that the La Mar West Townhome project was 100 percent sold. The assertions in these advertisements were false, in that the project was neither 95 percent sold nor 100 percent sold when the ads were published.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 0122036 held by the Respondent, Liz Caldwell, be revoked, and that license number 0181836 held by the Respondent, Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., be revoked. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 18th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1986.
The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of watermelon sales?
Findings Of Fact Last spring, her first working on behalf of respondent McKay & Associates, Inc., Pat Harper nee ' Maddox accompanied Randy Finch, the company president, to Florida to help buy and ship produce. Because petitioner Bubba Hurst had sold watermelons to Ms. Harper season before last, she sought him out again. On Tuesday night, May 28, 1991, Ms. Harper orally agreed on behalf of McKay & Associates, Inc. (after Ruth Neuman, the company's secretary-treasurer, had been consulted by telephone) to pay Mr. Hurst 12 cents a pound for two truckloads of watermelons "as is." (Earlier she had seen the watermelons piled in the smaller trucks in which petitioner's crew had brought them from the fields to the melon yard, after harvesting them that day.) With Wednesday morning came a truck and driver (engaged by Ms. Harper or Mr. Finch) to haul the watermelons from petitioner's melon yard to truck scales some ten miles away, then to a farm in Denton, Georgia, for crating and transshipment to their ultimate intended destinations in Maryland and Pennsylvania. After the first truck left at 4:58 that afternoon, loaded with watermelons aggregating 43,280 pounds, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, a second truck and driver arrived. Mr. Finch had agreed to pay Mr. Hurst cash for the watermelons, but a complication arose before they could settle that night: Only after the crew had gone home was it discovered that the second truck was overloaded by some 9,000 pounds; and the driver refused to risk the fines he might incur by hauling an overload. As a result, it was not clear exactly how many watermelons McKay & Associates, Inc. would owe petitioner for. After some discussion, Mr. Finch wrote and signed a check in petitioner's favor but left blank the amount; petitioner then endorsed and returned the check. The plan was, once the exact amount was known, for Mr. Finch to complete the check, cash it, and give Mr. Hurst the proceeds. Afterwards it occurred to Mr. Hurst that if the check were made out for more than what he was to be paid for the watermelons, he could have problems with the Internal Revenue Service. Apprehensive, he asked Mr. Finch to void the check, which he did, by writing "VOID" across it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Later somebody filled in an amount ($5,193.60, which corresponds to the first load, 43,280 pounds at 12 cents per) and wrote "melons no good," perhaps in anticipation of a formal administrative proceeding like the present one. The check was never negotiated. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, while watermelons were being unloaded from the second truck, two men with a brief case full of cash expressed an interest in the lightening truckload. When Ms. Harper told Mr. Hurst, he said the watermelons were hers to do with as she pleased. She then sold the load to the two men for 12 cents a pound cash, and handed the money over to petitioner. The excess watermelons on the second truck had been offloaded onto a third truck. Of like capacity as the first, the third truck was empty when it accompanied the overloaded truck to the melon yard on Thursday morning. With the departure of the second truck, Ms. Harper and Mr. Finch told Mr. Hurst to fill the third truck up and agreed to buy that truckload. For a while, Mr. Finch was actually "in the line" handing some watermelons along for loading in the third truck, and rejecting others. They weighed 20 pounds each on average. Meanwhile, when Ms. Neuman saw the first truckload, after its arrival in Denton, Georgia, on Thursday morning, she exclaimed, "My God! These are sun scald[ed]!" At hearing, she testified she was incredulous Florida would let such watermelons leave the state. Ms. Neuman telephoned Mr. Finch and told him she was sending the first load back, but that she would take the other load if it "meets federal." She also called the trucking company (then reportedly owned by the late Sam Walton), however, and told the trucker not to load any more watermelons. When Evelyn Hurst, Bubba's mother, answered the telephone at the melon yard lunchtime Thursday, she was asked to tell the driver of the third truck to call home because there was an emergency. The driver made a telephone call, after which he told Mrs. Hurst nothing was wrong at his home. Then he made a second telephone call. After that call, he ordered a stop to the loading then in progress. Bubba Hurst was eating when his mother called with word that no more watermelons were being loaded onto the third truck. He then telephoned the motel where Mr. Finch was staying, and inquired. Mr. Finch told him to finish loading the third truck; and later went to the melon yard and told the driver that loading should go forward. Loading resumed. Later Mr. Finch raised with the driver the possibility of taking the load to New York, but the driver declined the suggestion. Around four o'clock Thursday, the renewed efforts to fill the third truck with watermelons came to an abrupt end, about 250 melons shy of a full load, and the driver, who had ordered the halt, drove away. Mr. Hurst called the motel, and spoke to Ms. Harper, in hope of obtaining the cash he had been promised for his watermelons, but to no avail. The next day the first truck returned from Georgia with the watermelons whose presence on the other side of the state line had so surprised Ms. Neuman; and a federal agricultural inspector, a friend of Mr. Hurst's father, arrived at petitioner's melon yard to inspect them. Mr. Hurst told the inspector (who had been called by Ms. Neuman) that he was welcome to inspect but that the whole load had been sold "as is" and that he - Mr. Hurst - would not be paying for the inspection. Hearing this, the inspector left. Disinterested testimony established that inspections by USDA- certified inspectors are routinely called for by shippers when produce is refused by buyers claiming that produce spoiled before reaching them; but that, at least in the environs of Wildwood, Florida, it is not customary to call for a federal inspection at the point from which watermelons are shipped (unless the shipment is to the Government itself.) Of course, these particular watermelons had already been to Georgia and back. After the inspector left, the driver of the first truck asked that the watermelons be removed from his truck. When Mr. Hurst told him he was trespassing and asked him to leave the melon yard, the driver (or Ms. Neuman by long distance telephone call) summoned a Sumter County deputy sheriff. But the deputy sheriff, informed upon his arrival that the melon yard was a good quarter mile on the Marion County side of the county line, left to perform other duties. Still loaded, the first truck eventually left the melon yard a second time.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DACS order McKay & Associates, Inc. to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order. That, in the event McKay & Associates, Inc. fails to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order, DACS order payment by State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section 604.21(8), Florida Statutes (1991), for disbursal to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, petitioner said the load may have been as many as 250 melons light. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the value of the second load established by the evidence is $4,591.60, representing 38,280 pounds at 12 cents a pound. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 3, Ms. Neuman's testimony that she directed her agents to procure federal inspection before the first truck left has not been credited, but she did try to arrange one later. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the second truck load was never rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is immaterial. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Finch agreed to buy the third truckload and ordered that loading go forward even after Ms. Neuman registered her dissatisfaction with the first load. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Julian E. Harrison, Esquire 324 West Dade Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513 John Sowa, Esquire Robert L. Rehberger, Esquire 5025 North Henry Boulevard Stockbridge, Georgia 30281
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearings the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). However, since the pallets were not an agricultural product produced by Petitioner and were not considered in the price of the bahia sod but were exchanged back and forth between Petitioner and his customer, including Respondent American, they are not considered to be an agricultural product in this case and are excluded from any consideration for payment under Section 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes. The amount charged Respondent American for these pallets was $1,188.00. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent American was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 3774 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SK-2 87 38. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Peerless was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). During the month of January, 1985 Respondent American purchased numerous pallets of bahia grass sod from Petitioner paying $16.00 per pallet but has refused to pay for 240 pallets at $16.00 per flat for a total amount of $3,840.00 picked up by Respondent American's employees and billed by Petitioner between January 16, 1985 and January 26, 1985. Respondent American did not contest having received 204 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice number. 6774- for 18 pallets on 1/16/85; 6783, 6785, and 6788 for 18 pallets each on 1/17/85; 6791, 6793, 6794, 6795, and 6800 for 16 pallets each on 1/18/85 and 6799 for 18 pallets on 1/18/85, 6831 for 18 pallets on 1/28/85; and 6834 for 16 pallets on 1/30/85 but contested invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 for 18 pallets each on 1/26/85. Gary L. Curtis stipulated at the hearing that Respondent American had received the 36 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 which left only the matter of Respondent American's contention that it was owed credit for 20 pallets of bahia sod received in December, 1984 that was of poor quality and fell apart and had to be replaced because it could not be used. The evidence was insufficient to prove that any of the sod purchased by Respondent American from Petitioner fell apart or was of poor quality and as a result could not he utilized by Respondent American.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent American be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,840.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent American fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered then Respondent Peerless be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary L. Curtis, President American Sod Company, Inc. Post Office Box 1370 Longwood, Florida 32750 Mid Florida Sod Company 4141 Canoe Creek Road St. Cloud, Florida 32769 Peerless Insurance Company 611 Aymore Road/Suite 202 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Raymond E. Cramer Esquire Post Office Box 607 St. Cloud, Florida 32769
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulations of facts as to the accounting figures received into evidence as respondents' Exhibit D, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner supplied cucumbers and cubanelle peppers to the respondents for the purpose of selling such produce for petitioner. Petitioner received a check in the amount of $1200.00 from the respondents. Frank Hause, who was involved in a joint venture with the petitioner, received another check from the respondents in the amount of $1500.00. Petitioner was not made aware of the Hause payment until a later date. With the exception of one shipment which does not appear on the accounting records involved in this proceeding, respondents received all their cucumbers from petitioner or Frank Hause. Due to the fact that the market for cucumbers was so depressed at the time, respondents neither needed nor received cucumbers from any other source. The accounting figures stipulated as being correct by both petitioner and respondents illustrate that respondents owed petitioner $905.39 for the sale of cucumbers and a figure of minus (-) $681.45 for the sale of peppers. The net amount due petitioner from the respondents for the sale of cucumbers and peppers was $223.94.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition and/or complaint filed by the petitioner against the respondents be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 29th day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Wilkinson Post Office Box 86 Webster, Florida 33597 Eric Ruff, Esquire Post Office Drawer TT Plant City, Florida 33566 Charles B. Lawton, Jerry Lawton and J. P. Sizemore d/b/a Dixie Growers Post Office Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33566 Robert A. Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. Post Office Box 730 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Mr. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Room 416 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent, Private Money Mortgage Company (PMMC), was a mortgage brokerage business in the State of Florida holding License Number HB592732699 that had been issued by Petitioner. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Frank Donahue was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida holding License Number HA267474770 that had been issued by Petitioner. The Department of Banking and Finance, the Petitioner in these proceedings, is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. In 1985, Mr. and Mrs. A. Charles Cinelli bought a house in Palm Beach County, Florida, and moved from upstate New York to Palm Beach County, Florida. Respondent, Frank Donahue, assisted Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli in obtaining financing for the home the Cinellis purchased in Palm Beach, County. In connection with this 1985 transaction, Mr. Donahue forwarded to the Cinellis an "Exclusive Broker Agreement", which they executed and returned to him. Because this 1985 transaction involved a purchase, Mr. Donahue ordered an appraisal for this property and charged its cost as a part of the Cinelli's closing costs. Subsequent to that transaction, Mr. Donahue and his wife, Brenda, saw Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli at occasional social events. Franklin T. Smith is a certified public accountant who performed professional services for Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli and for Mr. and Mrs. Donahue. Mr. Smith referred the Cinellis to Mr. Donahue in 1985 and advised the Cinellis during the transaction that is the subject of this proceeding. Prior to December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli contacted several mortgage brokers in the Palm Beach County area to discuss the possibility of obtaining a mortgage on certain real property located in upstate New York. Mr. Cinelli contacted Mr. Donahue by telephone and discussed with him his desire to raise capital to begin a business in Florida. Mr. Cinelli estimated that he would require approximately $1,000,000 to start this business. Mr. Cinelli told Mr. Donahue that he and Mrs. Cinelli owned certain commercial real property in upstate New York and that State Farm Insurance Company held an option to purchase this property for the sum of $1,450,000. Mr. Cinelli did not want to wait to learn whether State Farm intended to exercise this option to purchase and he discussed with Mr. Donahue the possibility of obtaining the desired capital by securing a mortgage on this property. Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Cinelli that he could expect to secure a mortgage for approximately $700,000 (which was approximately 50% of the amount of the option contract) and that he would need a current appraisal. Mr. Donahue also informed Mr. Cinelli that he would require the sum of $2,500 as a non-refundable deposit to begin seeking such a commitment. On or about December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli provided Mr. Donahue with a copy of the option agreement with State Farm and with a copy of the agreement dated September 21, 1988, which extended the time within which State Farm could exercise its option for an additional six months. Mr. Cinelli reiterated to Mr. Donahue that the option price was for $1,450,000 and that he wanted to mortgage the property for $1,000,000. Mr. Cinelli also provided Mr. Donahue with the name, address, and telephone number of Mr. Wayne Lupe, who was represented by Mr. Cinelli to be his MAI appraiser in Schenectady, New York. On December 15, 1988, Mr. Donahue sent to Mr. Cinelli a letter which attached an "Exclusive Broker Agreement" that had been executed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988. This was the same "Exclusive Broker Agreement" form that Mr. Donahue had used for the 1985 Cinelli transaction. The body of the letter provided as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of my exclusive brokers agreement detailing the probable terms of the loan which you are seeking. This agreement is the same agreement which you signed when you purchased your current resi- dence. The agreement calls for both you & Joan to sign and return along with a nonrefundable deposit in the amount of $2500.00 to Private Money Mortgage Corp. The above noted deposit shall be credited towards your closing costs at the time of closing, if a commitment is offered. I have spoken to several of my investors about your concerns and I am awaiting confirmation of their substantial interests prior to ordering the appraisal. I will contact you as soon as I have received the return of this agreement along with your deposit in order to fill you in on our efforts to secure you the most competitive loan on your desired terms. The Exclusive Broker Agreement reflected that the amount of the mortgage would be $700,000 and disclosed that the total estimated costs that would be incurred in securing the mortgage was $78,346, which included a broker's fee of $35,000 and an estimated appraisal fee of $3,500. The Exclusive Broker Agreement, signed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988, contained the following provision: DEPOSIT: In consideration of the sum of $2,500, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, Broker accepts this application and agrees to exert his/her best effort to obtain a commitment for loan in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein. This deposit shall be credited toward closing costs at the time of closing the permanent loan or commitment, less Broker's expenses. Among the "Standards" which were incorporated as terms and conditions of the Exclusive Broker Agreement was the following: Deposit. Client simultaneously with execution of this agreement has deposited with broker the amounts stated in this agreement in order to secure the obligations owed by client to broker in the event of default of client as provided in the agreement and to reimburse broker of any and all expenses, including telephone charges, lodging, and administrative fees for credit checks and processing appraisals and the like, including upon any cancellation by client, reimbursement for broker's time expended incurred by broker, whether or not a loan commitment is obtained by broker. Mr. Cinelli was concerned that he would be incurring substantial fees and costs if Mr. Donahue obtained a commitment and Mr. Cinelli decided not to accept it. Mr. Smith advised Mr. Cinelli that the estimated expenses were not abnormally high, but he suggested that his liability should be limited. In response to those concerns, Mr. Donahue prepared and delivered between December 15, 1988, and the end of the year an addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement that would have limited Mr. Cinelli's liability to the sum of $7,500. That addendum provided, in pertinent part, as follows: It is hereby understood and agreed by the parties that in the event a loan commitment is offered to the applicants & they decide to refuse this commitment, the applicants liability will be limited to the sum of Five Thousand Dollars plus the original deposit of $2,500.00 for a total amount of $7,500.00. It is further understood that said commitment must bear approximately the same terms and conditions as the attached agreement. Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli gave Mr. Smith the sum of $2,500 in cash to deliver to Mr. Donahue, but there is conflicting testimony as to when this money was delivered to Mr. Smith for delivery to Mr. Donahue. Mr. Cinelli testified that the money was delivered before the Exclusive Broker Agreement dated December 15, 1988, was prepared. Mr. Donahue testified that the money was delivered after both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto had been delivered to Mr. Cinelli. Mr. Donahue also testified that the statement contained in the Exclusive Broker Agreement that he signed on December 15, 1988, acknowledging his receipt of the $2,500 deposit was false. He did not explain why the addendum referred to the sum of $2,500 as "the original deposit". Mr. Smith did not recall when he delivered this money to Mr. Donahue, but he did recall having delivered the cash the same day he received it from the Cinellis. While his testimony is that he received the $2,500 during his initial meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli (which would be before Mr. Cinelli received the Exclusive Broker Agreement) this testimony lacks credibility because of Mr. Smith's lack of certainty as to dates. In addition, this testimony conflicts with the letter Mr. Smith wrote to Mr. Donahue at Mr. Donahue's request on August 28, 1989, which clearly indicates that the $2,500 was not paid until after the addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement had been prepared. This conflict is resolved by finding that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the sum of $2,500 was delivered by Mr. Smith to Mr. Donahue after Mr. Cinelli had received both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto. Mr. Donahue did not provide the Cinellis with any type of written agreement, other than his letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, and the addendum when he received the cash from Mr. Smith. There was no written receipt for these funds, nor was there any written memorandum of understanding between Mr. Donahue and the Cinellis as to whether payment for the appraisal that Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli had discussed would be made from the $2,500. Mr. Cinelli was of the belief that $2,000 of the $2,500 deposit would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Mr. Donahue was of the belief that the $2,500 was a non-refundable retainer and he treated that sum as an earned fee. There was no meeting of the minds between Mr. Cinelli and Mr. Donahue as to the nature of the $2,500 deposit, other than it was non-refundable. Specifically, there was no agreement as to what costs, if any, would be paid from that deposit. Mr. Donahue's normal business practice in transactions involving a refinance of property is different than his practice in transactions involving a purchase of property. In purchase transactions (such as the 1985 Cinelli transaction), Mr. Donahue arranges for the appraisals and treats the costs of the appraisal as an expense to be paid by the purchaser at closing. In refinance transactions (such as the 1988 Cinelli transaction), it is his practice to require his customer to deal directly with the appraiser in ordering and paying the costs of the appraisal. Respondents failed to establish that in the subject transaction, Mr. Donahue made it clear that Mr. Cinelli would be responsible for ordering and paying the cost of the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli believed that $2,000 of the $2,500 he later gave Mr. Donahue would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Neither Mr. Donahue's letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, nor the addendum clearly resolved the dispute. There was a dispute between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli as to who ordered the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his calls to his appraiser, Mr. Lupe, was only to advise him of Mr. Donahue's forthcoming call. Mr. Donahue denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his contacts with Mr. Lupe were after Mr. Cinelli had ordered the appraisal. Mr. Donahue contends that his contacts with the appraiser were merely to give the appraiser instructions as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. This dispute is resolved by finding that Mr. Cinelli ordered the appraisal through Mr. Lupe and that Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Lupe as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. It was determined from conversations between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Lupe that Mr. Lupe was not qualified to perform the appraisal and that Mr. Lupe would engage Albert L. Friedman, MAI and William J. McEvoy of Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company of Schenectady, New York, on Mr. Cinelli's behalf to perform the work. Messrs. Friedman and McEvoy prepared the appraisal and certified the same to Mr. Cinelli on March 13, 1989. The appraised value of the property was $2,100,000. As of the date of the formal hearing, the appraiser's bill of $2,000 had not been paid. Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had billed both Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli and an attorney representing Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had written Mr. Cinelli a demand letter. It was the dispute over the payment of the appraiser's fee that prompted the complaint the Cinellis filed against Respondents. The Cinellis did not execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum because they wanted to wait on the appraisal to see if the appraised value would permit them to borrow more than $700,000 and because they were not satisfied with the amount of the projected costs of consummating the transaction. Mr. Cinelli misled Mr. Donahue as to his intentions to execute these agreements. Mr. Donahue made several requests to the Cinellis that they execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and addendum and return them to him. Despite the absence of an executed brokerage agreement, Mr. Donahue exerted considerable effort to seek a commitment consistent with the Exclusive Broker's Agreement and succeeded in securing such a commitment in April 1989. No part of the $2,500 Mr. Donahue received from Mr. Smith on behalf of the Cinellis was placed in escrow by Mr. Donahue. Respondents have made no accounting of the $2,500 and have paid no part of the appraisal bill. Mr. Donahue claims the deposit as a non-refundable earned fee, despite the absence of a written agreement to that effect. The Cinellis sold the subject property to State Farm in June 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by Petitioner which finds: that Respondents violated the provisions of Rule 3D-40.006(5), Florida Administrative Code, by accepting the $2,500 deposit from the Cinellis without a written agreement as to the disposition of those funds; that Respondents violated the provisions of Section 494.055(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D-40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to place said deposit in escrow; and that Respondents violated the provisions of by Section 494.055(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by failing to account for said deposit. It is further recommended that an administrative fine be levied against Respondents in the total amount of $1,000.00 for said violations. It is further recommended that the final order place the licenses of Respondents on probation for a period of one year with three special conditions of probation. The first special condition of probation would require Respondents to pay Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company the sum of $2,000 within sixty days of the Final Order. The second special condition of probation would terminate Respondents' probation upon timely compliance with the first special condition of probation. The third special condition of probation would prohibit Respondents from conducting any business as mortgage brokers within the State of Florida for a period of six months should Respondents fail to timely comply with the first condition of probation. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4708 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3-10, and 13 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2 and 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being argument. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4-6, 14, and 17 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The characterization of the Cinellis having a "long standing relationship" with Mr. Donahue is rejected as being ambiguous and unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 9-11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent that they are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 13 are rejected as being recitation of testimony or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or as being contrary to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5293 Marie A. Mattox, Esquire Douglass, Cooper, Coppins & Powell Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1674 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. owes Petitioner, Florida Farm Management Inc. the sum of $4,846.00 for watermelons shipped by Petitioner and handled by Respondent as Petitioner's agent during the period from May 30, 1989 through July 5, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant fact are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state of Florida as that term is defined in Section 605.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 596 by the Department, and bonded by Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) for the sum of $47,000.00, bond number R2-27-13, with an effective date of November 13, 1988 and a termination date of November 13, 1989. At all times material to this proceeding, Debruyn was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. Around the last week of April, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent orally agreed, among other things, for Petitioner to produce certain quantities of Mickey Lee Watermelons and for Respondent to market those watermelons. This oral agreement was reduced to writing, executed by the Respondent and sent to Petitioner to execute. Petitioner, after making certain changes in the agreement and initialing those changes, executed the agreement and returned it to the Respondent. It is not clear if Respondent agreed to the change since they were not initialed by Respondent. However, the parties appeared to operate under this agreement as modified by Petitioner. Under the agreement, Respondent was to advance monies for harvesting and packing, furnish containers and labels for packing and agreed to pay certain chemical bills. Petitioner was to reimburse any monies advanced by the Respondent for (a) harvesting or packing; (b) containers and labels and; (c) chemicals, from the proceeds of the sale of watermelons. Any balance owed Petitioner for watermelons was to be paid within 30 days. Additionally, Respondent was to receive a commission of 8% of net FOB, except 30 cent maximum on sales of less than $6.25 per carton and 40 cents per carton for melons delivered on contract to National Grocers Co. The relationship of the parties was to be that of producer and sales agent. Before entering into the agreement with Respondent, Petitioner had agreed to furnish National Grocers Co. four shipments of melons totalling 8,000 cartons. Respondent agreed to service that agreement. Although Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows a credit of $6,007.13 for chemicals paid for by Respondent, the parties agreed that only $3,684.68 was expended by Respondent for chemicals and that Respondent should receive credit for that amount. The parties agree that Respondent advanced a total of $18,960.00 for harvesting and packing and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. The parties agree that Respondent paid to Petitioner the sum of $12,439.32 and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Cartons and pads for packing the melons were shipped on two occasions and the total sum paid by Respondent for those cartons and pads was $17,225.00. The cartons were printed with the logo of Respondent on one side and the logo of Petitioner on the other side. Petitioner agrees that the number of cartons and pads used by him came to $12,463.78 and the Respondent should be given credit for that amount. All cartons and pads in the sum of $17,255.00 were delivered to Petitioner's farm. The amount in dispute for the remainder of the carton is $4,762.22. The Respondent was responsible under the agreement to furnish cartons and pads (containers). Respondent ordered the cartons and pads after determining from Petitioner the number needed. There were two orders for cartons and pads placed and delivered. There was an over supply of cartons and pads delivered to Petitioner. This over supply was the result of a miscommunication between Petitioner and Respondent as to the amount of cartons and pads needed. Petitioner agrees that all of the cartons and pads were delivered to his farm but that he was unable to protect these cartons and pads from the weather. However, Petitioner advised Respondent that the remainder of the carton and pads could be picked up at his farm. Respondent contended that he was denied access to the farm and was unable to pick up the remainder of the cartons and pads and, therefore, they were ruined by exposure to the weather. While there may have been times when Respondent attempted to retrieve the carton and Petitioner was unavailable, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was intentionally denied access to Petitioner's farm to retrieve the cartons. Clearly, the ordering, purchasing and storing of the cartons and pads was a joint effort and both Petitioner and Respondent bear that responsibility. Therefore, the Petitioner is responsible for one-half of the difference between the total cost of the cartons ($17,225.00) and the amount used by Petitioner ($12,462.78) which is $2,381.11 and Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows that Petitioner shipped melons to Respondent in the amount of $54,715.63, after adjustments for complaints and commission. Respondent's accounts payable ledger shows receiving melons from Petitioner in the amount of $51,483.00, after adjustments for complaints and commission. The difference in the two ledgers in the amount of is accounted for as follows: Invoice No. 210066 - Customer paid $2.00 per carton less on 93 cartons, Petitioner agreed to the reduction. However, Petitioner's account is in error by 9 cents which reduces total amount to $54,715.54. Invoice No. 210067 - Respondent paid for more melons than Petitioner shows were shipped - $39.60. Invoice No. 210068 - difference in calculation of commission $13.32 Invoice No. 2100105 - difference due to Petitioner not agreeing to adjustment in price taken by customer. $2,886.00 Invoice No. 2100239 - difference of $108.04 due to Respondent allowing customer adjustment which Petitioner did not agree to. Invoice No. 2100267 - difference of $210.00 for same reason stated in (e) above. Petitioner should be allowed the difference due to miscalculation of commission in invoice Nos. 210068, 2100134 and 2100160 in the sum of $68.10 since Petitioner's calculation was in accordance with the agreement. There was no dispute as to the condition of melons being as contracted for upon receipt. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the melons shipped under invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 by Petitioner were not of the size and number contracted for by the customer. As to invoice Nos. 2100239 and 2100267, the adjustments were made after the fact without contacting Petitioner. As to invoice No. 2100105, the Petitioner shipped the melons to Russo Farms, Inc., Vineland, N.J., as per Respondent's order who then unloaded the melons and reloaded on Russo's truck and shipped to another buyer. It was this buyer's complaint that resulted in Russo demanding an adjustment. Respondent granted such adjustment without approval of the Petitioner. Although Respondent did contact Petitioner in regard to this complaint, Petitioner would not authorize a federal inspection, which he could have, but instead, requested that Respondent obtain an independent verification of the basis of the complaint. Instead of an independent verification of the complaint, Respondent had Russo evaluate the load as to size of melons and number of boxes. No complaint was made as to condition of the melons. Petitioner would not accept Russo's evaluation because based on the total weight of the melons shipped, as indicated by the freight invoice, Russo's evaluation could not have been correct. The only evidence presented by Respondent as to size and number of melon in regard to invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 was hearsay unsupported by any substantial competent evidence. Petitioner should be allowed the difference in invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 for a sum total of $3,204.00. No adjustment should be made for the differences in invoice No. 210067 other than the 9 cent error made by Petitioner because this amount is not used in Petitioner's calculation of the gross amount due for melons shipped. Therefore, the sum total of all melons sold and shipped is $54,715.63 - 0.09 = $54,715.54. The amount due Petitioner is calculated as follows: Sum total of melons shipped with proper adjustments $54,715.54 Subtract from that the following: Chemicals 3,684.68 Advances 18,960.00 Cost of Cartons $12,462.78 + 2,381.11 14,773.89 Payment 12,439.32 Subtotal of Deductions 49,857.89 Difference and amount owed $4,857.65
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. be ordered to pay the Petitioner Florida Farm Management, Inc. the sum of $4,857.65. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. fails to timely pay Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. as ordered, the Respondent, Peerless Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner. 1. Not a finding of fact but the issue in this case. 2.-3. Adopted in findings of fact 2 and 4. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 4. First sentence adopted in finding of fact 7. The balance is not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-14. Adopted but modified in findings of fact 21 and 22. 10(A), 10(C)(1), 10(E), and 10(F) adopted in finding of fact 24. 10(C)(2)(3), 10(d) rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See findings of fact 5, ,7, 9 - 15. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent. 1.-7. Adopted in findings of fact 2, 1, 4, 4, 4, 6, and 7 respectively as modified. Not material. This involved invoice Nos. 210066 and 210067 and adjustment were agreed to be Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger, Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Not material. This involved invoice No. 2100160 and adjustments were granted by Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 12.-13.Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Adopted in finding of fact 5, and 9-15 as clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-15. Adopted in finding of fact 13 as clarified. Adopted in finding of fact 23 as clarified but see findings of fact 9-22.
