The Issue The issue is whether proposed amendments to Rule 46-39.005 adopted by the Marine Fisheries Commission, setting maximum lengths for nets used for the commercial harvesting of mullet, establishing one week alternating closure periods for mullet harvests during the late fall/ early winter roe season, setting a 500 pound per vessel per day harvest limit during the pre-roe season and a one thousand pound limit if two licensed commercial fishermen fish together during the roe season, constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The Petitioners assert that the economic impact statement which accompanied the notice of rulemaking is inadequate.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Sigma International, Inc., owns and operates a mullet processing, wholesaling and exporting business in Florida. The restrictions embodied in the proposed rules will substantially affect its interests. Seafood Consumers and Producers Association is a non-profit association of businesses and consumers interested in fishery resources and fish harvesting in Florida and elsewhere. The rules would substantially affect interests of the association and the interests of individual members of the association. Bob Combs Fish Co. are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler doing business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. Everglades Fish Corporation are fishermen, are first receivers of fish caught by others, and fish wholesalers doing business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect their interests. Houston Brown is a fisherman who does business in the State of Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect his interests. Triad Seafood is a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. Horse Weeks Fish Co. is a first receiver of fish caught by others, and a fish wholesaler which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. A.P. Bell Fish Co. are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer, and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interests. SaltWater Enterprises, Inc., are fishermen, a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. The Fisherman's Market, Inc., is a first receiver of fish caught by others, a wholesaler, retailer and distributor of fish and fish products which does business in Florida. The proposed rules would substantially affect its interest. The Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) is legislatively created and assigned to the Department of Natural Resources. It has authority to adopt rules. Sections 370.025, 370.026 and 370.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991). It adopts fishery conservation and management measures which promote the continued health and abundance of marine fisheries resources in Florida. Section 370.025(2)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1991). The Fish Black or striped mullet is a popular food sought for the flesh of the fish and especially for its roe, which is available annually during the autumn spawning season beginning in October. Mullet roe is highly valued by the Japanese, and much of the roe is exported to Japan. Mullet is the most intensively harvested finfish in Florida; in 1989 mullet accounted for 19.3 percent of the state's total finfish catch. Florida is the source for 85 percent of the nation's black mullet catch. Since 1976 the demand for the export of black mullet roe has increased, which has increased fishing pressure on the species' egg bearing females. Roe-bearing fish caught during roe season are about four times as valuable as the fish would be if caught in the pre-roe season. Mullet has a shelf life as a fresh fish of no more than four days due to the oil in its flesh. Although it can be frozen, in the Florida retail market frozen mullet is not considered a desirable food. There is a California market for frozen mullet, however, where it is popular with Asians. Since the closures during the roe season proposed in the Commission's rules will be for periods of one week, there could be days when no fresh mullet would be available to Florida consumers. Earlier Regulation of the Black Mullet Fishery - 1989-1992 Black or striped mullet (mulgi cephalus) are regulated by the Commission as a restricted species. Section 370.01 (20), Florida Statutes (1991), and Rule 46-39.001(4), Florida Administrative Code. Size and bag limits are imposed on recreational takings of mullet. Commercial fishermen taking mullet must hold a saltwater products license with a restricted species endorsement. When they sell their catch they must provide a trip ticket to the purchaser of the fish which includes the fisherman's name and license number, the gear used in the catch, the place of the catch, the species caught and the number of pounds of fish caught. This information is then sent by the purchaser to the Department of Natural Resources, and is an important part of the Department's data base used in regulating the fishery. The Marine Fisheries Commission began a study of black mullet in 1987, and adopted rules restricting commercial black mullet fishing in 1989. Those rules established gear restrictions, amended certain qualifications for licensure to catch mullet in commercial quantities, and set roe season closure periods for mullet fishing. During 15 weekends of the year, the fishery was closed for 36-hour periods. The minimum net size for mesh was set at three inches. Amendments to the rules in 1990 closed new areas to fishing, set minimum net mesh size which could be used during the roe season at four inches, and prohibited commercial fishermen from using spotter aircraft to locate schools of fish. The weekend closures were extended from 36 to 54 hours, and two more weekends were closed for fishing. In drafting all its management measures, the Commission attempted to make it possible for fishermen to fish year round for mullet, and thus make fresh mullet available to consumers throughout most of the year; See the Purpose and Effect Statement of the rule published at 18 Florida Administrative Weekly at 4931, which reflects this Commission policy. In 1991 the Commission debated whether additional regulation was necessary for the mullet stock and proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules which were published in Volume 17, No. 32, of the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 9, 1991, at pages 3593 et seq. but, as noted above, the validity of these rules was challenged. In a final order that was issued on December 9, 1991, provisions of those rules were found to be invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority (DOAH Case Nos. 91-5408R and 91-5422R). The District Court of Appeal affirmed that determination in the opinion entered in Florida Marine Fisheries Commission v. Organized Fishermen of Florida, 610 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Those invalidated rules had their genesis in a decision made by the Commission in February 1991 which set a statewide spawning potential ratio (SPR) for black mullet. The SPR is a measurement tool used by the Commission and by other regulatory groups, such as the Federal Fishery Management Councils, in the regulation of fish stocks. It is a measure of the biomass (essentially the total weight) of those fish capable of reproducing, divided by an estimate of what would have been the total biomass of fish of reproductive age if there were no fishing at all in the fishery. The goal the Commission set of maintaining a 35 percent SPR for black mullet was chosen using the best information available. The goal is a reasonable tool for the Commission to use in assessing the effectiveness of any of its efforts to manage the black mullet population to produce maximum stock abundance. The 35 percent target is the minimum level which could be set to provide adequate management of the stock and avoid the risk of a dramatic reduction in the number of fish available. The Commission was disappointed that its August 1991 efforts to increase regulation (and in its view, protection) of the mullet population had been turned back through litigation. It credited data on mullet landings showing a continuing decline in the mullet population. This led the Commission to believe that the spawning potential ratio for mullet in the 1991-1992 fishing year had declined to 18-25 percent, well below the target of 35 percent. Review of nine management options and debate at its August 1992 meeting led the Commission to advertise proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules published in Volume 18, No. 35 of the Florida Administrative Weekly at pages 4931 et seq. on August 28, 1992. According to the Purpose and Effect Statement and Summary for these rules the changes proposed to the regulatory regime for black mullet would do six things: proposed rule 46-39.0036 would prohibit the recreational harvesting of mullet from October 1 through October 15, from November 1 through November 15, and from December 15 through January 15 each year; an exception to the closures would be recognized for possessing cut mullet to be used on boats as bait; an amendment was proposed to existing rule 46-39.005 to prohibit the use of gill or trammel nets or beach or haul seine nets longer than 600 yards; subsection (4) of existing rule 46-39.005 was deleted, it had closed the fishery to commercial operation during weekends in the roe season; a new subsection (5) was proposed to rule 46-39.005, which would close the fishery to commercial harvests for the same periods specified for recreational closures; a new subsection (6) was also proposed for rule 46-39.005, which set a limit on commercial harvesting of mullet to 500 pounds of mullet per vessel per day from July 1 through September 30, which is the pre-roe season. At its meeting of September 25-26, 1992, the Commission conducted a legislative-type hearing under Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes (1991), for the rules it had noticed for adoption. More than 60 people commented on the proposed new rules and amendments to existing rules. On September 26, 1992, the staff of the Commission made a presentation of options it believed were available to the Commission to achieve increased SPR for black mullet and the Commission deliberated using all the information placed before it. Based upon the rule making record compiled, the Commission voted to make changes to the text of the rules as they had been published for comment on August 28, 1992. The Commission decided that instead of two week alternating closures of the mullet fishery for 61 days during the roe season (from October 1-15, November 1-15 and December 15-January 15), it would close the fishery for 56 days using alternating one week periods (from the first through the seventh and fifteen through the twenty-first days of the months of October, November, December and January). The proposed 600-yard maximum net length and 500-pound per fisherman trip limit during the pre-roe season remained, but an increased limit of 1,000 pounds per vessel during the roe season was added if two licensed commercial fishermen used a single vessel. These changes were published in Volume 18, No. 42, of the Florida Administrative Weekly, pages 6221 et seq., on October 16, 1992, as a notice of changes to the Commission's proposed rules. DSPOPS Model for Estimating Spawning Potential Ratio Authorities which manage stocks of pelagic fishes commonly assess the condition of the stock with biological models. Models attempt to account for dynamics of a fishery represented by variables, in an effort to mimic the behavior of the population in its natural state. The models' results provide managers with as accurate an estimate of future fish populations as current science can provide. The choice of a particular model is significantly affected by the data available to be loaded into the model equation. How well any model mimics the natural population necessarily is affected by the accuracy of each of the values used in running the model. The federal National Marine Fisheries Service uses models to assess the condition of stocks of king mackerel, Spanish mackerel and dolphin. The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission has used similar a model known as GXPOPS 1/ to manage the red drum population, with good results, and another for management of Spanish mackerel, which has been brought back from the point of collapse (i.e., a dramatic change in population from an insufficient number of juveniles reaching adulthood). Commission staff chose the biological model known by the acronym DSPOPS 2/ to analyze the current spawning potential ratio of the black mullet fishery. The DSPOPS model is rather sophisticated and contains a significant number of input parameters or variables, such as growth rates, age at sexual maturity, observed harvest levels, recruitment and mortality. The value for some of these parameters are relatively well known through biological sampling, such as age, size, sex and maturity. Values for others, such as mortality of black mullet due to fishing, are subject to some debate. There is sufficient data available to use the DSPOPS model. The model can be run using the high and low estimates for input variables, which yields a range for the SPR, based on those runs. Data the Commission staff used to run the model came from the southwest Florida area. About 75 percent of all mullet landings are made there (especially in the Tampa area), and there is no reason to believe that the dynamics of the black mullet population operate differently there than in the panhandle area or in eastern Florida waters. Catch and effort data for all areas of the state are sufficiently similar to show the fishery is a single unit. Analysis of mullet show Gulf and Atlantic mullet are part of a single gene pool. Moreover, the statute encourages the Commission to manage species populations as a single biological unit. Section 370.025(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). The Commission used data only for female mullet, which is appropriate when calculating the spawning potential for a fish where eggs are a limiting factor for the number of fish in a population. Recruitment is a term that refers to those fish that survive the egg and larval stages and eventually mature into adults which can be harvested with fishing effort. There is a relationship between the number of fish able to spawn and the number of fish that are added or "recruited" into a fishery as the result of the spawning, which is known as the spawner recruit relationship. Unfortunately, the spawner recruit relationship cannot be estimated for mullet with enough precision to incorporate it into the model. To account for this, Commission staff ran the model assuming constant recruitment, that is, the assumption was made that there is no relationship between spawning stock and recruitment. This produces an estimate of spawning potential ratio that may be accurate or may be higher than it would be had a spawning recruitment relationship been determined (or assumed). Thus, use of a constant recruitment assumption tends to produce an optimistic assessment of the spawning potential ratio. The most basic variables used in a biological model designed to predict future fish stock are those for mortality rates. In fisheries science, total mortality is universally represented as the variable "Z." It is equal to the rate of fishing mortality, represented as "F," plus the rate of natural mortality "M." 3/ Thus, the equation is that Z = F + M. This is as basic to fishery science as the equation "debits = credits" is to accounting. It is also significant that under this equation, if any two of the three variables are known, the third can be calculated. Non-Parametric Statistics and Independent Review Many of the parameters used in the DSPOPS model have threshold values, they are not parameters which would be expected to have a normal or bell-curved type distribution (such as the average age of fish in a population). Threshold values are non-parametric statistics, and there are no confidence intervals or other measures of variation, such as coefficients of variation, associated with them. This does not mean that the expected SPR levels produced by the model lack utility, are unscientific, or are inherently untrustworthy. Other efforts are made to test the correctness of the parameters values used in the model, or in using the model's output. Using the model to estimate a range of SPR for various regulatory regimes is the best way to manage a fishery. It is for this reason that the Department convened an independent review panel to evaluate the values which its staff had loaded into runs of the DSPOPS model, to represent what would happen in the fishery if various management measures were imposed. This group of outside scientists met with the Commission staff on July 9-10, 1992, to review the data and reach a consensus on the appropriate values to be used for all parameters introduced into the model equation. They cross checked data, and evaluated its consistency with published studies. Although Petitioners complain that scientists who testified for them at the Section 120.54(4) final hearing on the 1991 rules were not invited to this meeting, the Commission's explanation for this is persuasive. The scientists invited were independent, had no association with the Commission, DNR or the Petitioners, and had no other prior associations or biases militating against reaching a consensus. The panel concluded that data available showed female SPR was in the range of from 15 percent to 26 percent, with the most likely value being 21 percent or less. F Value Determined by Tag/Recapture Data and Z Using Time Series of this Data Dr. Behzad Mahmoudi, of the Florida Marine Research Institute, performed a tag/recapture experiment on mullet in southwest Florida in an attempt to determine the F value (fishing mortality) to be used in the DSPOPS biological model. The determination of F can be a problem; for some fish species it is not available. In a few fisheries researchers are assigned to observe and record activity on commercial fishing vessels; there F (fishing mortality) may be calculated by analyzing catch per unit of fishing effort, i.e., the number of pounds of fish landed per hour or per day of fishing. Florida's data gathering through trip tickets does not permit this, since it provides no means to account for the common situation of a fishing trip which yielded no mullet catch. Dr. Mahmoudi's experiment for determining fishing mortality was a good one, which carefully accounted for the biases normally associated with studies designed to estimate F. In a tagging experiment mullet are handled, a smooth plastic filament streamer or tag inserted in a small slit, and then the fish is reintroduced into the waters of the Gulf. These streamers are thin enough to be pulled through the mesh of the crown of fishing caps, where they are sometimes worn by fishermen disinclined to return them to the Commission's researchers, although they are paid $5.00 per tag returned. These tags are then returned to the Florida Marine Research Institute by fishermen or fish processors when tagged fish are caught. When used in conjunction with data on landings of mullet, the proportion of tags returned from among those landed gives an indication of the fishing mortality for the species. The fish were tagged at the beginning of the '89-'90 and '90-'91 seasons, and captured over the following two seasons. Fish tagged in the first year may not be caught until the second year or later. Dr. Mahmoudi also performed ancillary experiments. He put a sample of tagged fish in pools, and evaluated mortality over time caused by the tagging process itself. He also evaluated tag rejection by monitoring tagged fish placed in pools to determine the proportion of spontaneous tag loss. Lastly, he and associates evaluated the non-return rate for tagged fish commercially caught by going to fish processors, and examining commercial catches made by licensed fishermen. After the fishermen and processors had finished with the fish, and returned all tags that were going to be returned, researchers examined those fish to see how many tags yet remained and had not been removed or returned to the Commission. This permitted calculation of the rate at which tags on fish caught are returned. Through these three ancillary experiments, Dr. Mahmoudi accounted for the major variability likely to be introduced into estimations of F (fishing mortality) based on tag recovery. He did not add a specific adjustment to his F value for any increased predation on tagged fish, for there was no reason to believe that it would be anything other than de minimis. Due to the nature of the tag and the placement of the tags on the fish, it is unlikely that tagged fish were ensnared in nets at any higher rate than untagged fish. It is also significant to remember that the recovery rate for tags is not affected by fishing effort. It is based on the percentage of tags which are returned from among fish caught, and is a proportion of fish caught. The more fishermen fish, the larger the absolute number of tags returned, but if the price of fish falls, and fishermen make fewer fishing trips, the proportion of tags returned does not change, although fewer tags may be returned. The range of values which Dr. Mahmoudi estimated for F based on his tag return data of .88 through 1.13 are quite accurate. Moreover, the numbers are consistent with published studies and confirmed by separate calculations discussed below which are consistent with these F values. By treating tagged fish as if they were the whole fish population, Dr. Mahmoudi was also able to determine how many tags were returned at different time intervals, and by using this time series data, was able to calculate a value for Z (total mortality) of 1.5. Since he then had values for both F and Z, he was able to calculate the value of M (natural mortality) as .3. Independent Calculation of Z Through Catch Curve Analysis A commercial catch of fish contains individual fish of different ages. When gear such as gill nets are used, small fish escape, but after the fish reach a certain size, all but the biggest fish are caught (big fish may bounce off or swim around gill nets). The range of ages of the fish caught in gill nets mirrors the age distribution in the fish population, after an adjustment for the smallest and largest fish which escape gill net capture. It is possible then to calculate the slope of a line by plotting the age of fish versus the percent of fish of that age in the catch, and by this method to derive a value for Z (total mortality). Dr. Mahmoudi did this. He then went through an additional verification step. He made a catch of fish using a purse seine net which, unlike a gill net, catches all fish regardless of size. He was able to superimpose the catch curve analysis from this purse seine catch over that generated by the catch curve for fish caught with gill nets, and they matched. This gave him two additional independent and consistent estimates of Z, which also were consistent with his Z estimate of 1.5 from the tag/recapture data. Corroboration of Z value by Otolith Size Mullet have bones in their ear which lay down layers of clear and opaque material creating rings. Counting the number of rings yields a determination of the fish's age. Dr. Mahmoudi counted otolith rings using a large sample of mullet, and he determined the average age of mullet in the fishery was 3.5 to 4 years. This is consistent with the estimates of Z as being 1.5, because use of 1.5 in the equation Z = F + M means that the average age of mullet in the fishery is 3.5 to 4 years old. Independent Calculations of M Natural mortality, or M, is a significant parameter in the DSPOPS biological model, and it is important to have a good estimate for it. Dr. Mahmoudi used three independent methods to calculate a value for M. The first he used, Pauly's method 4/, is one which can be done with little data, but provides a somewhat weak estimate. It was developed for use in estimating sardine populations, and is based on water temperature readings, and the rate of the growth of fish. It yields an estimate of mortality which is accurate within a range of from one half to two times the actual mortality rate for the fish. The independent review panel determined that it was likely that the estimate for mullet of .58 using Pauly's method would be on the high side, i.e., closer to the twice than to one-half of the actual mortality rate. Dr. Mahmoudi then calculated an M value with a different method, Alagaraja's method 5/, which provides a stronger estimate, but requires knowing the maximum age of the fish attained in an unfished environment. This is somewhat difficult because black mullet have been fished in Florida waters for more than 50 years. Other experiments in the scholarly literature showed mullet have been found that were at least ten old, so an age of at least ten years was appropriate and when used in Alagaraja's method yielded a value for M of .4. The consensus of scientists on the independent review panel was that the maximum age of mullet in an unfished population was probably closer to 15 years of age, and using that value, the Alagaraja's method yielded a M value of .3, which was consistent with the M value generated in the tag/recapture study, and reasonably close to the .4 value computed for M under Alagaraja's method using a maximum age of ten years for mullet. The third method was to calculate M based on the values of F and Z determined from the tag/recapture study. Summary of Biological Data For Z there were two independent estimates derived from catch curve analyses (one using gill nets and the other purse seine net catches) and the determination from otolith rings. There were two separate calculations of M using Pauly's and Alagaraja's methods. F was calculated from the tag/recapture study. Independent estimates for Z and M were derived from Dr. Mahmoudi's tag/recapture data, and all were consistent. There are number of reasons, therefore, to have great confidence in the values for the significant variables Z, F and M used by Dr. Mahmoudi in running the DSPOPS model. As with the values for other parameters loaded into the DSPOPS model, which have no statistical confidence intervals associated with them, it is not possible to say that the value of 1.5 for Z is correct within plus or minus X thousandths of a point, at the .05 level of confidence, as is commonly done with parametric statistics, such as reports of opinion polling data. For this reason, separate computer runs were done using high and low estimates of significant variables such as Z (total mortality), F (fishing mortality), and M (natural mortality), paying special attention to the estimates likely to produce the highest SPR value. Effects of Cold Fronts on Catchability and the Effect of Effort-shifting by Fishermen. The more cold fronts which occur during the closure season, the more likely it is that a higher proportion of fish will escape, and conversely if many cold fronts occurred during the open weeks, a larger proportion of fish ready to spawn would be caught. Dr. Mahmoudi ran simulations using data from 17 years on the occurrence of cold fronts, and using what is similar to a random number generator, performed a Monte Carlo simulation for likely occurrences of cold fronts based on the 17 years of data. This data was incorporated into the projections of likely SPRs for different regimes. Net Limitations The Petitioners attack the 600-yard net limitation found in the rule as arbitrary. At the time the rule was being considered, the average net length used in the fishery was about 1,000 yards. The reduction in the maximum net length would have an effect on the catch, but while catch may vary inversely with maximum net length, it does not vary directly with a reduction in net length. Consequently, Dr. Mahmoudi estimated that the 40 percent reduction in the maximum net length would result in an approximately 15 percent reduction in catchability. While this assessment of the effect of the reduction in gear is judgmental rather than statistical, it is reasonable, and not arbitrary, i.e., a judgment unsupported by fact or logic. Regulatory Options For the option proposed of two-week closures during the roe season of October through January of each year, coupled with the 600-yard net limitation and a 500-pound catch limit per vessel, the estimation of SPR mullet would achieve would be from 30 percent to 39 percent. This was the management option discussed at the Commission's August 1992 meeting which led it to the publication of the first iteration of the rule in the August 28, 1992 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly. After that publication and before the legislative-type public hearing on the rule which had been noticed for adoption, Dr. Mahmoudi ran the DSPOPS biological model to consider four more management options, three of which were suggested by commercial fishermen or their representatives. The option which suggested the highest SPR range was not necessarily the best option, however, because the Commission also had to consider what the escapement rate would be for roe-bearing mullet during the roe season for that option, and how enforceable that option was likely to be. The commercial fishermen made it clear at the pubic hearing that they would prefer a one week open/one week closed regime, as opposed to the published text of the rule which would have closed the fishery for alternating two week periods. In addition, the rule was amended to allow two licensed fishermen on a single vessel to catch 1,000 pounds of mullet per boat trip during roe season. Fishermen believed that by fishing together when fish were more valuable they could lower their expenses and thus achieve a higher profit margin during the open weeks. The Petitioners argue that had the Commission chosen option 1, a 72- hour-per-week closure during roe season, with one 10 day closure, the predicted SPR would be approximately 32.3 percent (with a range of 27.9 to 36.7 percent), while option 4, the proposal for week one/week off closures, would produce an average SPR of 34.2 percent (having a range of 29.8 to 34.2 percent). They see the options as essentially identical in the SPR but would find option 1 much easier to live with, since it would be easier for fish processors to maintain their labor forces with shorter closures. Option 1 would also make it less likely that there would be many periods when no mullet would be available to retail consumers of fresh mullet since with a four-day shelf life, week long closures could produce periods when fresh mullet could not be found and 72-hour closures do not. The longer the closure period, the more likely closures will coincide with cold fronts; it is closures during these frontal periods which permit the escapement of the most fish. The significant differences between option 1 and option 4 are that under option 1, approximately 20 percent more spawning females would survive the roe season, but under option 4 (which is essentially the option the Commission adopted), the increase in the number of spawning females surviving through the roe season would be 48 percent. Option 4 intuitively is a better management option if the goal is to reach spawning potential ratio of 35 percent, the minimum ratio to sustain stock abundance over time. The Commission did adjust the closure period to help the commercial fishermen by switching the closures periods from a two-week on/two-week off regime to a one-week on/one- week off regime. The Economic and Small Business Impact Statement As is often the case with legislation, the goals stated in Section 370.025(2), Florida Statutes (1991), can be harmonized, but only with some difficulty. Section 370.025(2)(b) requires the Commission to base its conservation and management measures upon "the best information available, including biological, sociological, economic and other information deemed relevant by the Commission." Section 370.025(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that those measures "shall permit reasonable means and quantities of annual harvest, consistent with maximum practicable sustainable stock abundance on a continuing basis." The Petitioners interpret this to require the Commission to achieve its biological goals with the least possible negative impacts on the economics or social conditions in the fishery. This is simply not what the statute says. No doubt those regulated would hope that the Legislature would require the least possible impact on them. But what was enacted was the mandate that the Commission's primary goal is to insure the continuing health and abundance of the species, and after doing so, then to permit reasonable quantities of annual harvest which can be sustained over time. The economic impact statement (EIS) was prepared by an economist, using data from a variety of sources. The statement itself is 16 pages long, it contains three pages of references, five figures to illustrate points, and six pages of tables of data to support its conclusions. Much of the important information was derived from a 1989 study published by the Institute of Food and Agriculture Science at the University of Florida by Robert Degner and others entitled "An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Changes on the Economic Structure of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico Finfish Industry Centered in Florida" (Reference 11). Section 3 of the EIS estimates the economic benefits and costs to persons directly affected by the proposed amendments. It analyzes who are the persons directly affected (Section 3.20); the costs and benefits of having no regulation, of maintaining current regulations, or of imposing the new regulations published in the August 28, 1992 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly (Section 3.30); the result of changes in net lengths (Section 3.40); the result of the seasonal closures (Section 3.50), and of trip limits (Section 3.60). It contains as well an analysis of the impact of the proposed rules on competition in the open market for employment in Section 4.00, a small business impact statement in Section 5.00, and an analysis of alternatives in Section 6.00. Section 7.00 evaluates costs to the agency and to local governments. Section 8.00 describes the data and methods used by the Commission in making its estimates. The Petitioners presented testimony at final hearing of an economist that many of the views expressed in the economic impact statement are misinterpretations of economic data or are in error. It is essential to remember that the purpose of rulemaking is not to produce assessments of potential economic impact which can withstand the intense scrutiny of a Ph.D. dissertation. Rather, the EIS is required to insure that the agency considers each of the topics required in the statutory economic impact analysis before settling on a policy which will be embodied in its rule, and to give affected persons the opportunity to bring to the attention of the Commission information which could lead to other regulatory choices, if the Commission is persuaded by that economic evidence or argument. Basically, Mr. Murray's testimony at final hearing argued that the Commission's economic impact analysis focused on macro-economic results of the proposed regulations, but not enough on micro-economic results, that is, impacts on individual households and business (Tr. 458). The EIS concentrated on such things as estimates of total dollar losses caused by the regulation proposed. In Section 3.20 the EIS defines the persons directly affected by the rules as "those engaged in the directed harvest of mullet for commercial purposes;" and commercial harvesters (fishermen) were estimated to be between 455 and 3,150 persons, based on estimates in two sources (EIS at 5). The fishermen generally work alone, as two-man crews, and in a few instances in six to eight fishermen groups. These estimates of those directly affected appear to have an adequate basis. While a broader number of people will feel the pinch of the rule (for instance consumers wishing to buy fresh mullet at retail) they are indirectly rather than directly affected, since there is no prohibition against possession of mullet purchased at retail for home consumption during closure periods. The statute requires the analysis of the effect on those persons who will be prevented from harvesting mullet during closure periods and the EIS is not deficient for limiting its analysis to those whose actions would be directly regulated by the Commission. The section of the EIS dealing with the impact on competition and the open market for employment acknowledged that the rule would have seasonal affects on employment and the incomes of persons in roe mullet fishing and processing businesses (EIS Section 4.00 at 9). Most all of the fishermen are small businesses, so there is no effective way to tier the rules to impose lesser restrictions on small businessmen and ultimately achieve the impact the Commission intends to achieve. If small businesses were exempted, no regulation could be effective. EIS has an analysis of the effect on the standing stock of fish and the dollar value of that stock under four scenarios, (1) under equilibrium conditions with no regulation, (2) the then current weekend closure and net size regulations, (3) under the proposed rule as published and (4) under the assumption that the rule would result in an increased recruitment to the fishing stock of an additional 10 percent. The dollar value for the fish used in the these evaluations is probably inappropriate (the value is $6.70 for each fish, which is the ecological value the Department of Environmental Regulation was considering establishing for fish killed through violations of ecologic regulations). What is significant is the comparison of the increase in standing stock in each scenario, as well as the dollar value ascribed to that stock. Commissioners, legislators, or anyone else could interpret the dollar value by making different dollar assumptions for the stocks levels projected. Mr. Murray's written comments pointed out to the Commission that a better value might be 60 per pound. The EIS does provide a means of comparing the benefits of not adopting the rule to the benefits of adopting the rule, at least as far as an increase in the size of the fish stock is concerned. Proper notice of the proposed rule was sent to the Director of Economic Development, the Bureau Chief of Minority Business, and the Small and Minority Business Advocate, as well as to the Joint Administrative Procedure Committee. The Marine Fisheries Commission received neither a response nor an objection from any of these agencies. The Commission amended the proposed rules in significant ways in an attempt to relieve the burdens which the fishermen argued they would suffer if the rules were adopted with no changes. The one week on/one week off closure periods were substituted for the two week closure periods originally proposed, and the trip limit was amended to permit two licensed fishermen to fish in a single boat and bring in 1,000 pounds of fish during the roe season. The agency thus seriously considered alternatives to achieve their management goals while ameliorating the economic impact on those regulated. This shows that the economic information contained in the economic impact statement was seriously considered by the Commissioners. The only economic objection actually voiced to the Commission on September 25, 1992, during public testimony by Mr. Murray was that the EIS did not ascribe sufficient value to mullet flesh taken during roe season, but concentrated on the value of the roe. He informed the Commission that for some sellers, fresh mullet flesh was 80 percent of their sales, and that two week closures could put them out of business. (Ex. 12, at 57-58). This error in the EIS was remedied by Mr. Murray's testimony.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation for fishing nets that he sold to the State of Florida under the Net Buy-Back Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a commercial fishers who is an affected person under the Florida Net Ban, which is set forth in the Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 16. Section 370.0805(5), Florida Statutes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, establishes the Net Buy-Back Program. The program enables eligible persons previously engaged in the commercial fishing industry to sell fishing nets to the State of Florida. The Legislature appropriated $20 million to the Seafood Workers Economic Assistance Account (the Account) to fund the payments authorized in Section 370.0805, as well as agency expenses in administering the program. Section 370.0805(3)(b) directs Respondent to purchase nets "according to the availability of funds on a first-come, first-served basis determined by the date of receipt of each completed application." By Net Buy-Back Application signed on July 5, 1995, and filed with Respondent on the same day, Petitioner applied to sell nets to the State of Florida. His application form is completely filled out and shows two saltwater-product license numbers, one for an individual and one for a vessel. The application form calls for the applicant to list the "TOTAL NUMBER OF YARDS OF EACH NET TYPE THAT YOU INTEND TO SELL." The form lists five categories of nets: gill (49 meshes or less); gill (50 meshes or more); beach, purse, seine; trawl; and trammel. The former gill net is a shallow-water gill net. The latter gill net is a deepwater gill net. Petitioner listed on his application 800 yards of shallow-water gill nets, 4600 yards of deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and 600 yards of trammel nets. After checking a data base maintained by the Department of Environmental Protection, Respondent found only one of Petitioner's two listed saltwater-product licenses. Respondent thus processed Petitioner's application as though he had only one license. By letter dated August 8, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was eligible "to receive compensation for 8 nets" and set an appointment for him to turn in the nets on September 6, 1995. On September 6, 1995, Petitioner appeared at the appointed site with nets to sell to the State of Florida. He delivered 4800 yards of seine nets, for which he received a voucher for $27,998.40. Prior to paying the voucher, Respondent discovered that the Account might be exhausted before Respondent had paid for all of the nets that fishers might lawfully seek to sell to the State. Respondent thus dishonored Petitioner's voucher, as well as the vouchers held by numerous other fishers, while Respondent considered changes in its administration of the program. The purpose of the Net Buy-Back Program, as provided by Section 370.0805(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was to allow, "[a]ll commercial saltwater products licensees and persons holding a resident commercial fishing license" to apply to Respondent "to receive economic assistance to compensate them for nets rendered illegal or useless by the constitutional limitation on marine net fishing." The emphasis was on economic assistance. Section 370.0805(5)(a) authorizes Respondent to make payments only "in nonnegotiable amounts not intended to reflect the actual value of the nets." Section 370.0805(5)(a) assigns payment amounts of $3500 for beach, purse, or seine nets of at least 600 yards in length; $500 for trawls and shallow-water gill nets of at least 600 yards in length; and $1000 for trammel nets of at least 600 yards in length and deepwater gill nets of at least 600 yards in length. Section 370.0805(5)(a) states that, except for trawls, nets of less than 600 yards in length shall be "valued proportionately." Section 370.0805(5)(c) limits the number of nets that a commercial fishers could sell, based on his annual earnings from the sale of eligible saltwater products. The limits range from four nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average from $2500 to $4999 in earnings, to ten nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average more than $30,000. Respondent relied on another data base from the Department of Environmental Protection to determine the average yearly earnings of applicants. The Department of Environmental Protection maintains records of each licensee's trip tickets, which disclose earnings. The only other limit in the statute as to the type and number of nets to be purchased is that, under Section 370.0805(5)(d), "[n]o licensee may be paid for more than two. . . trawls." Respondent reviewed the applications that it received from the initial 951 fishers who filed applications. This was a large majority of the 1104 fishers who would eventually sell their nets to the State under the Net Buy-Back Program. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the funds in the Account would be sufficient to cover the nets that the State was to be purchasing. Respondent found from the applications that seine nets represented only about five percent of the nets that fishers intended to sell to the State. Relying on this information, Respondent calculated the potential encumbrance of $6.5 million on the Account, based on an average payment of $1000 per net. Applications contained few seine nets because commercial fishers initially resisted selling their best nets to the State of Florida. The Net Buy-Back Program provided for payment of only $3500 per seine net, even though many seine nets were worth $10,000. And commercial fishers were optimistic at first that their legal challenges to the constitutional amendment would succeed. Applying liberal eligibility criteria, such as calculating the number of nets that each applicant could sell based on the number of licenses that he held, Respondent raised its estimate of the potential encumbrance to $8.775 million. But in recalculating the potential encumbrance on the Account, Respondent still assumed that the average payment per net would be $1000. Respondent began receiving nets on August 3, 1995. Through the first three weeks of August, Respondent purchased seine nets in roughly the same five-percent mix that it had used in calculating the potential encumbrances on the Account. After this point, however, fishers started turning in much larger numbers of seine nets than they had listed in their applications. During this first phase of the program, Respondent paid fishers for whatever types of nets they presented at their net buy-back appointment. Respondent would pay a fishers entitled to sell eight nets for seine nets if he turned in seine nets, even though he had listed only gill nets on his application. This policy jeopardized the solvency of the Account because the payments to fishers turning in all seine nets were 3.5 times greater than the figures that Respondent had used in calculating the potential encumbrance on the Account. From the fishers's perspective, the program acquired an element of chance, as applicants with earlier appointment times-which did not necessarily correspond with earlier-filed applications-netted fine catches of economic assistance at the expense of their counterparts, upon whom destiny had bestowed later appointment times. By late August, the applicants, less sanguine about their litigation prospects (as the fishers suggest) and more inventive in recasting old gill nets as seine nets (as Respondent suggests), began turning in seine nets in large numbers, so that Respondent was purchasing nearly all seine nets. Eventually, the cumulative effect of this trend raised the total mix of seines purchased from five percent, during the first three weeks, to sixty percent. After a brief period of trying to stay the course, Respondent decided on September 6, 1995, that it had to take action or else the Account would be exhausted before the State had purchased all of the nets listed on the applications. Respondent immediately suspended further payments on issued vouchers and applied new criteria to persons holding unpaid vouchers, as well as to applicants who had not yet received vouchers. This action stopped payment on all vouchers issued from around August 28 through September 6. At the time that it stopped payment on outstanding vouchers, Respondent had approved the purchase of nets from about 750 fishers. About 450 of these applicants received their money prior to the suspension of payments, leaving about 300 applicants, including Petitioner, holding worthless vouchers. However, a large number of the 450 applicants who were actually paid for their nets prior to September 6 sold a relatively large percentage of gill nets rather than seine nets. As of September 6 (retroactive to August 28), Respondent began the second phase of the Net Buy-Back Program. In this phase, Respondent paid for seine nets, but only up to the greater of the number of seines shown on the application or the number of seines based on past use of seines. Respondent determined the latter figure from the trip tickets, which also contained information as to types of catch, from which Respondent could infer the type of net used. As in the first phase, Respondent continued to insist the fishers turn in seines if they were being paid for seines. The 300 fishers holding dishonored vouchers filed a class action suit. Petitioner's voucher for his first eight nets was covered in this legal action and is not the subject of this case. Petitioner received slightly more than $10,000 on his claim for about $28,000. In the meantime, Respondent discovered that Petitioner in fact held two licenses, as he had represented on his application. By letter dated October 5, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had reconsidered his application and determined that he had the right to sell 16 nets, not eight nets, but none could be a seine net. Respondent issued Petitioner a new voucher for these additional eight nets. This voucher is in the amount of $7996.80 for 4800 yards of deepwater gill net. On October 13, 1995, Petitioner turned in eight nets and received his money. Petitioner's application lists no seine nets. His application, as noted above, lists one and one-third shallow- water gill nets (i.e., 800 yards), eight deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and one trammel net. Petitioner claimed that he turned in seine nets. If turned in during the first or second phase of the program, Respondent would have treated these nets as seine nets. But it is Petitioner's unique fortune to have been intimately involved with all three phases of the Net Buy-Back Program. Evidently dissatisfied with the effects of the restrictions introduced by the second phase of the program, Respondent added a third phase by promulgating an emergency rule defining "seine nets," effective October 2, 1995. This third phase, which did not change Respondent's policy of paying for the greater number of seines as shown on the application or the trip tickets, restricted the kinds of nets that fishers could turn in as seine nets. Rule 38BER95-1 provides that, for the purpose of "the implementation of the Net Buy-Back Program" described in Section 370.0805(5): "Gill net" means a wall of netting suspended vertically in the water, with floats across the upper margin and weights along the bottom margin which captures fish by entangling them in the meshes, usually by the gills. Any net offered for the net buy- back program that consists of at least fifty- one percent (51 percent) gill net, shall be considered a gill net. "Seine" means a small-meshed net suspended vertically in the water, with floats along the top margin and weights along the bottom margin, which encloses and concentrates fish, and does not entangle them in the meshes. No net offered for the net buy-back program shall be considered a seine if the wings are composed of entangling mesh. * * * THIS RULE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Effective Date: October 2, 1995 Under the emergency rule, Respondent's nets were not seines, but were gill nets because they were at least 51 percent, by area, gill net. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent estimates that the Account balance is about $300,000 with about 160 contested claims remaining to be resolved.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order dismissing the petition for additional payment from the Account. ENTERED on October 3rd, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this October 3rd, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Secretary Douglas L. Jamerson Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 John Wayde Campbell 1103 67th Street Northwest Bradenton, Florida 34209 Louise T. Sadler Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Whether Respondent, The MG Herring Group, Inc. (MG Herring), was an employer of Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Xencom provides general maintenance, landscaping, housekeeping, and office cleaning services to retail facilities. In September of 2015, Xencom entered three contracts for services with CREFII Market Street Holdings, LLC (CREFII). The contracts were to provide maintenance, landscaping, and office cleaning services for a mall known as Market Street @ Heathbrook (Market Street) in Ocala, Florida. Michael Ponds, Xencom’s president, executed the contracts on behalf of Xencom. Two individuals executed the contracts on behalf of CREFII. One was Gar Herring, identified as Manager for Herring Ocala, LLC. The other was Bernard E. McAuley, identified as Manager of Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC. MG Herring was not a party or signatory to the contracts. MG Herring does not own or operate Market Street. A separate entity, The MG Herring Property Group, LLC (Property Group) operated Market Street. The contracts, in terms stated in an exhibit to them, established a fixed price for the year’s work, stated the scope of services, and detailed payment terms. They also identified labor and labor-related costs in detail that included identifying the Xencom employees involved, their compensation, and their weekly number of hours. The contract exhibits also identified operating costs, including equipment amortization, equipment repairs, fuel expenses, vacation costs, health insurance, and storage costs. The contracts ended December 31, 2016. The contracts specify that Xencom is an independent contractor. Each states: “Contractor is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent of the owner. Accordingly, neither Contractor nor any of Contractor’s Representatives shall hold themselves out as, or claim to be acting in the capacity of, an agent or employee of Owner.” The contracts also specify that the property manager may terminate the contract at any time without reason for its convenience. The contracts permit Xencom to engage subcontractors with advance approval of the property manager. They broadly describe the services that Xencom is to provide. Xencom has over 80 such contracts with different facilities. As the contracts contemplate, only Xencom exerted direct control of the Petitioners working at Market Street. Property Group could identify tasks and repairs to be done. Xencom decided who would do them and how. In 2013, Xencom hired Michael Harrison to work as its Operations Manager at Market Street. He was charged with providing services for which Property Group contracted. His immediate supervisor was Xencom’s Regional Manager. In 2016, that was David Snell. Mr. Snell was not located at Market Street. Property Group also did not have a representative on site. Before Xencom hired him, Mr. Harrison worked at Market Street for Property Group. Xencom hired the remaining Petitioners to work at Market Street under Mr. Harrison’s supervision. Each of the Petitioners completed an Application for Employment with Xencom. The application included a statement, initialed by each Petitioner, stating, “Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and I may be terminated at any time without previous notice.” All of the Petitioners also received Xencom’s employee handbook. As Xencom’s Operations Manager and supervisor of the other Petitioners, Mr. Harrison was responsible for day-to-day management of Petitioners. He scheduled their work tasks, controlled shifts, established work hours, and assigned tasks. Mr. Harrison also decided when Petitioners took vacations and time off. His supervisor expected him to consult with Property Group to ensure it knew what support would be available and that he knew of any upcoming events or other considerations that should be taken into account in his decisions. As Operations Manager, Mr. Harrison was also responsible for facilitating payroll, procuring supplies, and managing Xencom’s equipment at the site. Xencom provided Petitioners work uniforms that bore Xencom’s name. Xencom required Petitioners to wear the uniforms at work. Xencom provided the supplies and equipment that Petitioners used at work. Only Xencom had authority to hire or fire the employees providing services to fulfill its contracts with the property manager. Only Xencom had authority to modify Petitioners’ conditions of employment. Neither MG Herring, Property Group, nor Xencom held out Petitioners as employees of MG Herring or Property Group. There is no evidence that MG Herring or Property Group employed 15 or more people. Property Group hired Tina Wilson as Market Street’s on- site General Manager on February 1, 2016. Until then there was no Property Group representative at the site. The absence of a Property Group representative on-site left Mr. Harrison with little oversight or accountability under the Xencom contracts for Market Street. His primary Property Group contact was General Manager Norine Bowen, who was not located at the property. Ms. Wilson’s duties included community relations, public relations, marketing, leasing, litigation, tenant coordination, lease management, construction management, and contract management. She managed approximately 40 contracts at Market Street, including Xencom’s three service agreements. Ms. Wilson was responsible for making sure the contracts were properly executed. Managing the Xencom contracts consumed less than 50 percent of Ms. Wilson’s time. During the last weeks of 2016, Mr. Harrison intended to reduce the hours of Kylie Smithers. Ms. Wilson requested that, since Ms. Smithers was to be paid under the contract for full- time work, Ms. Smithers assist her with office work such as filing and making calls. Mr. Harrison agreed and scheduled Ms. Smithers to do the work. This arrangement was limited and temporary. It does not indicate Property Group control over Xencom employees. Ms. Wilson was Xencom’s point of contact with Property Group. She and Mr. Harrison had to interact frequently. Ms. Wilson had limited contact with the other Xencom employees at Market Street. Friction and disagreements arose quickly between Mr. Harrison and Ms. Wilson. They may have been caused by having a property manager representative on-site after Mr. Harrison’s years as either the manager representative himself or as Xencom supervisor without a property manager on-site. They may have been caused by personality differences between the two. They may have been caused by the alleged sexual and crude comments that underlie the claims of discrimination in employment. They may have been caused by a combination of the three factors. On November 21, 2016, Norine Bowen received an email from the address xencomempoyees@gmail.com with the subject of “Open your eyes about Market Street.” It advised that some employees worked at night for an event. It said that Ms. Wilson gave the Xencom employees alcohol to drink while they were still on the clock. The email said that there was a fight among Xencom employees. The email also said that at another event at a restaurant where Xencom employees were drinking, Ms. Wilson gave Ms. Smithers margaritas to drink and that Ms. Smithers was underage. The email claimed that during a tree-lighting event Ms. Wilson started drinking around 3:30 p.m. It also stated that Ms. Wilson offered a Xencom employee a drink. The email went on to say that children from an elementary school and their parents were present and that Ms. Wilson was “three sheets to the wind.” The email concludes stating that Ms. Wilson had been the subject of three employee lawsuits. On December 14, 2016, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Bowen, and Mr. Snell met at Property Group’s office in Market Street for their regular monthly meeting to discuss operations at Market Street. Their discussion covered a number of management issues including a Xencom employee’s failure to show up before 8:00 to clean as arranged, security cameras, tenants who had not paid rent, lease questions, HVAC questions, and rats on the roof. They also discussed the email’s allegations. The participants also discussed a number of dissatisfactions with Mr. Harrison’s performance. Near the end of a discussion about the anonymous email, this exchange occurred:2/ Bowen: Okay, so I know that David [Snell], I think his next step is to conduct his own investigation with his [Xencom] people, and HR is still following up with John Garrett, and you’re meeting with Danny [intended new Xencom manager for Market Street] tonight? David Snell: Yes. Bowen: To finish up paperwork, and, based on his investigation, it will be up to Xencom to figure out what to do with people that are drinking on property, off the clock or on the clock, you know, whatever, what their policy is. * * * Bowen: So, I don’t know what to make of it. I’m just here to do an investigation like I’m supposed to do and David is here to pick up the pieces and meet with his folks one-on- one, and we’ll see where this takes us. This exchange and the remainder of the recording do not support a finding that Property Group controlled Xencom’s actions or attempted to control them. The participants were responsibly discussing a serious complaint they had received, their plan to investigate it, and pre-existing issues with Mr. Harrison. The exchange also makes clear that all agreed the issues involving Xencom employees were for Xencom to address, and the issues involving Property Group employees were for Property Group to address. At the time of the December 14, 2016, meeting, the participants were not aware of any complaints from Mr. Harrison or Mr. Smithers of sexual harassment or discrimination by Ms. Wilson. On December 15, 2016, Gar Herring and Norine Bowen received an email from Mr. Harrison with an attached letter to Xencom’s Human Resources Manager, and others. Affidavits from Petitioners asserting various statements and questions by Ms. Wilson about Mr. Harrison’s and Mr. Smithers’ sex life and men’s genitalia and statements about her sex life and the genitalia of men involved were attached. Xencom President Michael Ponds received a similar email with attachments on the same day. On December 21, 2016, Mr. Ponds received a letter from Herring Ocala, LLC, and Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC, terminating the service agreements. Their agreements with Xencom were going to expire December 31, 2016. They had been negotiating successor agreements. However, they had not executed any. Xencom terminated Petitioners’ employment on December 21, 2016. Xencom no longer needed Petitioners’ services once MG Herring terminated the contract with Xencom. This was the sole reason it terminated Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitions of all Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2018.
The Issue Whether proposed rules promulgated by the Florida Marine Fisheries Commission are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission (MFC) has proposed rules requiring use of bycatch reduction devices (BRD.) The proposed rules are applicable where trawling for shrimp is permitted in specified Florida waters within the Gulf of Mexico. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published in Volume 23, Number 30, Florida Administrative Weekly, July 25, 1997. The Petitioners have challenged the proposed rules, specifically the provisions prohibiting possession of an otter trawl (a type of trawling net) that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel without having a required BRD installed. All parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. The federal government requires BRDs in the Florida waters not impacted by the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. The federal rules are intended to protect red snapper in the Gulf and weakfish and Spanish mackerel in the Atlantic Ocean. The MFC rules are intended to offer broader protection than federal rules, and are intended to protect the Gulf ecosystem rather than specific species of organisms. Shrimp trawls operating in the Gulf of Mexico harvest approximately 2.4 pounds of non-shrimp species for every pound of shrimp harvested. The MFC goal is to reduce the level of bycatch harvested by 50 percent. The proposed rules do not cover the “Big Bend grass beds” where trawling for shrimp is already prohibited. The proposed rules do not cover Florida’s northeast coast where other BRD rules are in effect. The Petitioners challenge the same provision in three separate rules. Proposed Rule 46-31.010(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Northwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.012(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In the Southwest Region, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) Proposed Rule 46-31.013(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: In all waters of the Southeast Region outside nearshore and inshore Florida waters, no person harvesting shrimp as a food shrimp producer shall operate or fish any otter trawl, or possess any otter trawl that is rigged for fishing aboard any vessel, which otter trawl does not have a bycatch reduction device (BRD) installed therein meeting the requirements of Rule 46-31.045. (emphasis supplied) On a shrimping boat, “otter trawl” nets are suspended from the ends of “outriggers” attached to the sides of the boat. When in use, the nets are dropped from the outriggers into the water. Once in the water, the nets are dragged along behind the boat, collecting shrimp and other marine species. The non-shrimp marine species collected are referred to as the “bycatch.” The phrase “rigged for fishing” means that the nets are shackled to the outriggers and are in a condition ready to fish, but are not yet in the water or being dragged along the bottom of the water. Nets attached to the outriggers of a shrimping boat and ready to be dropped into the water are rigged for fishing. Nets lying on the deck of the boat which are not attached to the outriggers are not rigged for fishing. It takes no more than a few minutes to attach the nets to the outriggers. The phrase being challenged in the proposed rules essentially prohibits a shrimp boat operator from suspending the nets above the water prior to dropping the nets into the water without having the BRD installed in the nets. Although there is no credible evidence indicating the reason shrimp boats leave the docks with nets in a position rigged for fishing, many apparently do so. There is no credible evidence suggesting any reason nets would be suspended from the outriggers other than in anticipation of initiation of shrimp harvest activity. There is no credible evidence that any impact would result from requiring that non-BRD equipped nets remain unrigged for fishing until outside of waters affected by the proposed rule. Use of the BRDs results in a substantial reduction of bycatch. There is no evidence that use of the BRDs results in any reduction in shrimp harvest. The evidence establishes that the reduction in bycatch will contribute towards the preservation of renewable marine fishery resources and will benefit the continuing health of the resources. There is no evidence that the proposed rules are unfair or inequitable to any persons including shrimp boat operators. The Petitioners assert that because the penalty for violations of the rules may eventually result in incarceration, the cited phrase creates a criminal presumption that a shrimp boat operator with non-BRD equipped nets is presumed to be fishing without a BRD. The evidence fails to support the assertion. There is no presumption being created by the proposed rule. The challenged rules are gear specifications for shrimp trawls, and are clearly within the realm of the MFC's rulemaking authority. The cited phrase does not prohibit the mere possession of a net without a BRD installed. The cited phrase prohibits suspension of a net from an outrigger without having a BRD installed in the net. There is no reason, other than in anticipation of immediately dropping the net into the water, that a trawl net must be suspended from an outrigger. The Petitioners assert that the rule would impact shrimp boat operators who are passing through Florida waters traveling to waters outside the areas impacted by the proposed rules. There is no evidence that the proposed rules would interfere with fishing operations. In the example of boat operators fishing outside Florida waters and using non-BRD equipped nets, compliance with the rule requires only that the nets remain unrigged for fishing while passing through Florida waters. The Petitioners assert that there are instances due to emergency, weather or otherwise, that may result in a shrimp boat operator working waters outside those covered by the proposed rules, raising non-BRD equipped nets and moving through into Florida jurisdictional waters. In such an event, the Petitioners assert that an operator could be subject to application of the rule even though the non-BRD equipped nets, still rigged for fishing, were not used in Florida waters. The Florida Marine Patrol will be responsible for enforcement of the proposed rules. Obviously, a Marine Patrol officer’s judgment will be required to determine the existence of an emergency and whether any official action is appropriate. A shrimp boat officer cited for violation of the proposed rules is entitled to challenge the application of the rule.
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Kelly Boat Service, Inc.'s and Cape Kennedy Charter Boats, et al's activities fall within the admissions tax liability imposed by Section 212.04, F.S. (1973). Based upon the pleadings filed herein, the documentary evidence introduced during the course of the hearing, the other evidence of record including the arguments of counsel, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact In the instant matter, the Department of Revenue issued two sales tax assessments. The first such assessment is against Cape Kennedy Charter Boats and covers the audit period of March 1, 1973, through February 29, 1976. The Department also assessed Kelly Boat Service, Inc., in a series of three separate assessments covering the audit periods August 1, 1970, through January 31, 1976. Based on such assessments, a tax liability resulted in the amount of $25,072.37. Of this amount, $10,000 was paid by the tax payer on July 21, 1976 (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The remaining tax liability plus interest which has accrued from July 21, 1976, is outstanding and continues to accrue. During the course of the hearing, the parties agreed that the specific liabilities as set forth in the assessment were not at issue. Rather, Petitioner solely challenged the legal authority of the Department of Revenue to impose the assessments in question. The Petitioners are owners and operators of a fleet of deep sea fishing boats in and around Destin, Florida, which, for a fee, carry individual fishermen to certain fishing banks which lie beyond the three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico. While there, the Petitioners sell food and drinks to the fishermen and rent them fishing equipment. The fishing is done at the snapper banks in the Gulf of Mexico or in the vicinity of those banks. The fishing equipment and tackle used on these trips are mainly used beyond the three-league limit in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and most, if not all, of the food and drinks sold at the galley of the refreshment stand on the boat was outside the three-league limit of the State of Florida. In an earlier summary final judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeal declared, as authorized by Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, 1973, the liability of Kelly Boat Services, Inc., for payment of the admissions tax by Section 212.04, F.S., 1973, from which the Department of Revenue filed an appeal. In that decision, the Court held that Kelly, whose boats take on passengers at Destin for fishing in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial limits of Florida, is taxable at the statutory rate on the admission fare charged at the dock, but that the State is foreclosed from assessing Kelly for taxes that should have been paid between August, 1970, and the first day of August, 1973, the period in which the Department demanded the production of Kelly's records for audit. Section 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. Kelly cross-appealed and urged that its activities were not subject to the tax, citing Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla.App. 1st 1968). In its decision, the First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly B Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1976), indicated that the trial court was correct in its reading of its decision in Dept. of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla.App 1st 1972), Cert. Denied, 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), Cert. Dismissed, 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974), and in hold that Kelly's commercial activities, as evidenced by the record, render it liable to assessment for the admissions tax. The Court noted that the trial court was incorrect, however, in foreclosing the Department of Revenue from making the assessment for the full three-year period authorized by Subsection 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. The decision goes on to read that the State is not foreclosed by reason of the Court's 1968 decision in Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., or otherwise to assert that on the facts evidenced by record, Kelly should satisfy its full tax liability incurred three years prior to August 1, 1973. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1960); Jackson Grain Company v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 So. 464 (1939). Based on the above decision of the First District Court of Appeal, the Department's assessment, which the parties admit is factually correct, is valid both as to the August 1, 1970, through July 31, 1973, and the August 1, 1973, through January 31, 1976, audit periods. Since this matter has previously been adjudicated, the same is res judicata as to the legal validity of the Department's assessment. Further, since the assessment relative to Cape Kennedy Charter Boats is based upon the same factual circumstances and legal authority as the one against Kelly Boat Service, Inc., which was upheld as aforementioned in the case of the Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, there is no factual challenge to the validity of the Department's assessment and there being no assertion by the Petitioner that any rules of law other than those enunciated by the District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, are applicable, such assessment must likewise be upheld. I shall so recommend. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue's assessment in the instant matter against the Petitioners be UPHELD. Additionally, in view of the Petitioners' letter of April 11, 1979, Petitioners' motion to treat this matter as a class action is hereby DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue As provided in the notice of hearing, the issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether agency statements within a memorandum and notice of Final Executive Order issued by the Department of Environmental Protection on July 5, 1996 are rules subject to sections 120.535 and 120.54, Florida Statutes, and if so whether the statements violate those sections. 1/ Petitioners pled only a violation of section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and contend that the remedy they seek, a determination of the invalidity of the agency statements, is available without recourse to section 120.535, Florida Statutes. At hearing, the parties, including Petitioners, availed themselves of the opportunity to elicit evidence related to section 120.535, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are shellfishers who harvest and relay in the affected areas in Brevard County, Florida. Intervenor is a resident of Indian River County who utilizes the areas affected by the Department of Environmental Protection (agency, or DEP) statements at issue in this proceeding. The standing of these parties is uncontroverted. Respondent, DEP, is the state agency charged with the administration, supervision, development and conservation of the natural resources of the state, as provided in section 370.013, Florida Statutes. "Saltwater fish" includes shellfish, among others. Section 370.01(2), Florida Statutes. DEP is given the authority in section 370.021, Florida Statutes, to make, adopt, promulgate, amend and repeal all [rules and regulations] necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the duties, obligations, powers, and responsi- bilities conferred on the department or any of its divisions. [Emphasis added] Persons violating any of the rules and regulations adopted under the agency's authority are guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 370.021(2), Florida Statutes, describes penalties for various violations of Chapter 370 or the rules of the agency or any rule of the Marine Fisheries Commission. Section 370.021(3), Florida Statutes, provides that [[r] ules and regulations] shall be admitted as evidence in the courts of the state when accompanied by an affidavit from the secretary of the department certifying that the [rule or regulation has been law- fully adopted, promulgated, and published]; and such affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of proper adoption, promulgation and publication of the rule or regulation. [Emphasis added] Section 370.071(l), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that DEP ... is authorized to adopt by rule regulations, specifications, and codes relating to sanitary practices for catching, handling, processing, packaging, preserving, canning, smoking, and storing of oysters, clams, mussels, and crabs. Consistent with its specific authority in sections 370.021 and 370.071, DEP has adopted Chapter 62R-7, Florida Administrative Code, "The Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code." Included in the comprehensive code is rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines various classifications of harvesting areas, adopts by reference Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas maps, and describes circumstances for opening or temporarily closing harvesting areas in the event of red tide outbreak or other emergencies or when other criteria are met. Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, also adopts by reference specific maps of growing areas and harvesting areas in the Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas published by the agency. Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, describes boundaries of classified areas throughout Florida, county by county, and establishes operating procedures. Rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code, establishes conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas of Body D waters in Brevard County, Florida. The boundaries of each are described in explicit detail; further, temporary closing to shellfishing is provided for when ... five day cumulative rainfall as measured in the immediate vicinity meets or exceeds 2.68 inches. The area will be reopened when bacteriological levels meet standards as described in Rule 62R-7.004 and fecal coliform levels in shellfish return to normal background levels so that consumption of shellfish will not be a hazard to the public health. The history note to Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, reflects that the rule was new on January 4, 1987 and was amended May 21, 1987, August 26, 1987, August 10, 1988, August 31, 1988, October 27, 1977, July 18, 1989, August 30, 1989, November 11, 1990, January 9, 1991, November 5, 1992, May 6, 1993, May 31, 1994 and May l, 1995. Body D is a shellfish harvesting area located in the Indian River, south of the State Road 528 bridge and north of the State Road 518 bridge, in Brevard County. DEP conducted a sanitary survey of Body D pursuant to the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual and released its findings in a document dated June 13, 1996. The first sentence of the document, in a narrative introducing the detailed survey procedures and results, states: Reclassification of the Body D Shellfish Harvesting Area in Brevard County is proposed for the harvest of oysters, clams and mussels [through amendment to 62R-7.005 (29)], the Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code. [Respondent's exhibit no. 5, emphasis added] The narrative summarizes the proposed classification changes, by total acreage, and projects an adverse economic impact due to increased closures. The narrative further states that the current classification of Body D is based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 1988. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program, of which Florida is a voluntary member, requires that a complete survey be conducted at least every twelve years, with updates annually and triennially (every three years). On July 5, 1996, DEP issued a Notice of Final Executive Order with an attached detailed description of the boundaries of conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas within Body D, "Effective August l, 1996." The attachment to the notice describes the management procedures governing temporary closings. Also attached to the notice was a map of the new classifications boundaries. The notice states that "[t]he order will remain in effect until administrative procedures are completed to amend rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code." DEP also issued on July 5, 1996 a memorandum to "Interested Parties," describing the reclassification of Body D for harvest of shellfish as follows: Effective August l, 1996, the Department of Environmental Protection reclassified Body D for the harvest of oysters, clams, and mussels. Body D is located in the Indian River, south of State Road 528 Bridge and north of the State Road 518 Bridge. A public workshop was conducted March 22, 1996 in Melbourne to get input on the proposed reclassification. The reclassification will increase the Conditionally Approved area by 404 acres, increase the Conditionally Restricted area by 6,075 acres, and increase the Prohibited area by 1,979 acres. Also, 9,116 acres were classified that were Unclassified; portions of this area were used for relay activities. Currently, the Conditionally Approved and Conditionally Restricted areas close when five-day cumulative rainfall measured at the DEP Rockledge Gauge exceeds 2.68 inches. Beginning August 1, 1996, the Conditionally Approved management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rockledge Waste Water Treat- ment Plant exceeds 0.44 inches, and the Conditionally Restricted management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rock- ledge Waste Water Treatment Plant exceeds 1.29 inches. The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally Approved area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of 0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 21 days and an average 8.2 days per month. The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally Restricted area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of 0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 15 days and an average 2.9 days per month. Maps are available that illustrate the shellfish harvesting area classifications at the DEP shellfish office in Palm Bay. The mailing address of this office is 250 Grassland Road, SE, Room 149, Palm Bay, Florida 32909. You may call your local DEP Marine Patrol Office or the DEP Shellfish Office at 407/984-4890 to the open/closed status of the area for shellfishing. (Petitioners' exhibit no. 2) As described in the Notice of Final Executive Order and the memorandum, the reclassification substantially altered the classification descriptions and the management practices found in rule 62R-7.005(29), Florida Administrative Code. The reclassifications were not adopted as a rule amendment pursuant to section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Instead, on September 20, 1996 DEP published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 22, number 38, page 5397, that it proposed repealing rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, in its entirety, and amending rules 62R-7.001 and 62-7.004, Florida Administrative Code: * * * PURPOSE, EFFECT AND SUMMARY: This amendment proposes to repeal a rule containing references to shellfish harvesting area maps, the detailed verbal descriptions of shellfish harvesting areas classification boundaries, and criteria for temporary closure, reopening, and monitoring of shellfish harvesting areas. The rule proposed for repeal is 62R-7.005 because it was identified as procedural. An address and telephone number were provided in 62R-7.004 where the information currently contained in 62R-7.005 will continue to be made available to the public. This approach provides for reclassifications through the Governor's delegation of authority to the Division of Marine Resources. Repeal of the rule is in accor- dance with Governor Chiles' rule reduction initiative. The Department will continue to conduct public workshops and hearings and incorporate pubic input that is consistent with maximizing the harvest of shellfish and protection of public health. Additionally, this amendment proposes to update a 1993 version with a 1995 version of the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, Part I and Part II, that is incorporated by reference. SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: 370.021(l), 370.071(l) FS. LAW IMPLEMENTED: 370.071 FS. DEP has closed harvesting areas in the past without following the section 120.54, Florida Statutes, amendment procedures. The record in this proceeding does not reflect whether those changes or closures were on a temporary or emergency basis as provided within rules 62R-7.004 and 7.005, Florida Administrative Code. DEP has never opened up new, previously unclassified, areas for harvesting without a formal rule amendment and has not been challenged in the past. DEP concedes that the regulatory content of the Final Executive Order supersedes rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code: Q. I want to clarify one aspect of your testimony, Mr. Heil, because I think you suggested that if a hypothetical individual were to go into Body D today and to harvest shellfish pursuant to a classification contained in Rule 67R-7.005, that is to say his conduct would have been lawful under the standard contained in that administrative rule, but his conduct is in discord or isn't in compliance with the standard for Body Water D contained in the final executive order which is the subject of this dispute today. Am I correct that it was your view that that person would be subject to present criminal prosecution for that act? A. If the area in question from harvest was previously allowed in the classification effective August 1st by the July 5th memorandum was not now allowed for harvest, then that person would be subject to arrest by the Florida Marine Patrol. Q. And prosecution and conviction? A. Correct. (Transcript, pp. 131-2) The National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP), of which Florida is a voluntary member, is a consortium of federal officials (including the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency and National Marine Fisheries), state officials from state shellfish control agencies, and members of the shellfish industry. DEP contends that its participation in the NSSP and obligation to comply with the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations (the manual) precludes compliance with section 120.54, Florida Statutes, rulemaking requirements. Florida has been criticized for moving too slowly in reclassifying areas, but the record in this proceeding does not establish that delay is because of rulemaking requirements. The manual is adopted as a rule by reference in rule 62R-7.001(5), Florida Administrative Code. The manual provides, in pertinent part: (Both the 1993 version currently adopted and the 1995 version proposed for adoption are precisely the same in this regard.) Public Health Explanation The NSSP gone [sic] beyond the original objective set forth in the 1925 Conference of insuring that shellfish shipped interstate would not be the cause of communicable disease. In the 1940's paralytic shellfish poison became a matter of public health concern and steps were taken to protect the public against this hazard. In 1957 it was recognized that shell- fish might concentrate certain radionuclides and that a radiation surveillance activity might become a necessary addition to the established procedures. In the 1960's and 1970's it became apparent that shellfish have the ability to concentrate poisons and deleterious substances such as metals, pesticides, hydrocarbons, etc. to potentially unsafe levels. To ensure the safety of shellfish, the State must supervise the growing, harvesting, relaying and transportation of shellfish. It is also important that shellfish be protected against contamination. [If State supervision is to be effective, the activity must be supported by legal authority. This authority may be either a specific law or a regulation]. The success with which the State is able to regulate the several components of the shellfish industry provides a measure of the adequacy of the statutory authority. [The unique nature of shellfish as a food also makes it necessary for the State shell- fish control agency to have authority to take immediate emergency action without recourse to lengthy administrative procedures, to halt harvesting and processing of shell- fish]. This authority should include placing restrictions on harvesting on the basis of a potential as well as an actual public health hazard. As examples, a State may find it necessary to close a shellfish growing area following a breakdown of a wastewater treat- ment plant or the unexpected finding of marine toxin(s), or when a growing area is implicated in confirmed illness. [Periodic revisions of State shellfish laws or regulations may be necessary to cope with new public health hazards and to reflect new knowledge]. Examples of changes or develop- ments which have called for revision of State laws include: (1) the increased used of pleasure boats with the resulting probability of contamination of shellfish growing areas with fresh untreated fecal material, (2) the conditionally approved area concept resulting from the construction of wastewater treatment facilities, (3) the effect of non-point source pollution, and (4) the ability of shellfish to concentrate certain radionuclides and hazardous chemicals. Experience has demonstrated that all actual and potential shellfish growing waters of the State must be classified by their sanitary suitability for shellfish harvesting. Harvesting should be permitted only from those areas which have been found by sanitary survey to meet the criteria of this Manual. Harvesting should accordingly be specifically prohibited from areas which do not meet the criteria, or which have not been surveyed, or which have outdated survey information. [Respondent's exhibit no. 4, pp. A2 and A3, emphasis added] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to section 120.535, Florida Statutes. Standing of all parties has been established by stipulation. Petitioners allege that the Final Executive Order issued by the agency on July 5, 1996 is a rule that has not been promulgated by the procedures in section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and is therefore invalid. At the time that the Petitioners filed their challenge, the agency action was proposed to take effect on August 1st; thus, Petitioners invoked section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, which provides: Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Pursuant to section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, a proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority when the agency has materially failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The agency readily admits that it has not promulgated the material styled Final Executive Order as a rule. Nor has it commenced rulemaking proceedings to adopt the material. On the contrary, it has commenced proceedings to repeal all of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including the portion which conflicts with the Final Executive Order. The agency claims foremost that the material in the Final Executive Order is not a rule; but that if it is a rule, the agency is entitled to the section 120.535, Florida Statutes, defense that rulemaking is simply not practicable. This latter argument is based, at least partially, on the insistence by federal members of the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference that the agency improve its procedures. It is appropriate to consider this case under section 120.535, Florida Statutes. In Christo v. State Department of Banking and Finance, 649 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the court determined that section 120.535, Florida Statutes, was the exclusive mechanism for challenging an agency's failure to promulgate rules. The case cited by Petitioners, Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1994) Rev. denied (654 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1995), arose under substantially different procedural circumstances (an appeal from a circuit court decision in an injunctive proceeding) and does not establish authority for section 120.54 or 120.56 challenges to agency statements based on their non- promulgation as rules. Without citing section 120.535, Florida Statutes, Petitioners' petition still included the three allegations required by subsection 120.535(2)(a), Florida Statutes: that Petitioners are substantially affected by the statement; that the statement constitutes a rule under section 120.52(16); and that the agency has not adopted the statement by the rulemaking procedure provided in section 120.54. The parties had ample notice that the hearing was to be conducted pursuant to section 120.535, and testimony and evidence was presented with regard to the defenses available to an agency. Because section 120.535, Florida Statutes, in general, and more specifically in this proceeding, permits the consideration of factual matters presented by the agency, Petitioners' motion for summary final order is DENIED. Petitioners, however, still prevail in their challenge to the Final Executive Order. Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, provides: 120.535 Rulemaking required.- Rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible and practicable to the extent provided by this subsection unless one of the factors provided by this subsection is applicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible unless the agency proves that: The agency has not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by rulemaking; or Related matters are not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement by rulemaking; or The agency is currently using the rule- making procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the statement. Rulemaking shall be presumed practi- cable to the extent necessary to provide fair notice to affected persons of relevant agency procedures and applicable principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions unless the agency proves that: Detail or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions is not reasonable under the circumstances; or The particular questions addressed are of such a narrow scope that more specific resolution of the matter is impractical out- side of an adjudication to determine the substantial interests of a party based on individual circumstances. The material contained in the Final Executive Order is a rule, defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, as follows: (16) "Rule" means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any require- ment or solicits any information not specifi- cally required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule. It does not matter how the agency seeks to characterize its statement. Amos v. Department of HRS, 444 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Proper characterization of a statement depends on the effect of the statement, not on the agency's appellation. Thus, the fact that DEP adopted similar statements as rules, then disavowed the necessity for such procedural refinements is immaterial. In twenty-plus years of experience under the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the distinction between rule and order has been immutable. An agency statement is a rule if it purports in and of itself to create certain rights and adversely affect others, or serves by its own effect to create rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of law. Balsam v. Dept. of HRS, 452 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) The agency statement contained in the Final Executive Order is generally applicable. Anyone intending to harvest shellfish within the many thousands of acres of water described in Body D is subject to the classifications. Anyone failing to comply is subject to criminal prosecution. The statement implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy: it establishes where, and under what conditions, shellfish may be taken; it establishes rainfall standards which affect temporary closings; it plainly, as stated in its counterpart rule 62R-7.005, implements section 370.071, Florida Statutes; it also implements rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, and the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, which is, itself, a rule. Significantly, the statement does not fall within one of the exceptions described in section 120.52(16)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes. It most closely resembles the specific exception provided in section 120.52(16)(d), Florida Statutes, for agency action which alters established annual harvest limits for saltwater fishing. This latter statutory exception underscores the notion that the legislature intended to otherwise include such statements within the definition of a rule. Since the statement at issue is found to be a rule, the agency is entitled to prove that rulemaking was not feasible and practicable. The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Final Executive Order and the testimony of the agency's witness establish that rulemaking is both feasible and practicable. As provided in the document describing the comprehensive survey of Body D, Brevard County, Florida, the survey was conducted over many months and culminated in the survey report and in the reclassifications and changes in procedure described in the Final Executive Order. Prior to issuance of the Final Executive Order, the agency conducted a workshop. The agency had ample time to acquire knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address its statement by rulemaking. The specificity of the text reflects that related matters have been sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address the statement by rulemaking. Indeed, the agency has, in the past, addressed such statements by rulemaking and, for the present, still has such rules in effect. At the time of hearing, the agency had not proceeded with rulemaking procedures addressing the statement, although the text of the Final Executive Order disclosed an intention to so proceed. In the material filed post-hearing and officially recognized upon the request of the Intervenor and agency, the agency "addressed the statement" by announcing its intent to repeal the whole of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including, of course, the subsection which is substantially amended in the Final Executive Order. The principles, criteria or standards for agency decision based on the Final Executive Order are detailed and precise and are established by agency fiat, rather than through an adjudicative process in which the substantial interests of a party are determined based on individual circumstances. Evidence in this proceeding establishes that the agency plainly intends to rely on the Final Executive Order as its basis for enforcement and prosecution and does not intend to develop on a case by case basis the standards it has already created. Nothing in the record of this proceeding supports the argument by the agency that its Final Executive Order is legally compelled by a higher federal authority or that the shellfish industry in Florida is jeopardized by rulemaking requirements. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations supports, rather than discourages, the adoption of regulations. (See paragraph 17, above). Throughout Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, are references to regulations. (See, paragraphs 3 and 4, above.) Section 370.103, Florida Statutes, authorizes the agency to enter into cooperative agreements with the Federal Government, but also includes this manifest intent: When differences between state and federal laws occur, state laws shall take precedence. None contests the need for the agency to act promptly under certain circumstances to meet the exigencies of a reasonable enforcement program. According to the record in this proceeding, the Final Executive Order was not developed under such compulsion. Existing rules, the manual and even the Administrative Procedures Act provide for emergency responses to threats to public health, safety and welfare. Those are the procedures which the agency must employ. The "impressive arsenal" of remedies in the Administrative Procedures Act, acknowledged in State, ex rel. Department of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) exists for the benefit of agencies as well as citizens at large.
Findings Of Fact Grace L. Waldron owns the property in Osceola County where the proposed project is located. Carl Wagner leases a portion of the property and operates a fish camp/bait and tackle shop on the property. On August 22, 1986, the Petitioners submitted an application, designated DER File No. 49-124177-4, to dredge an access canal which would connect an existing elongated borrow pit with Lake Cypress, and to construct two commercial piers, 300 feet long by 4 feet wide, with sixty finger piers, 12 feet long by 2 feet wide. The borrow pit, also called the "existing canal" is approximately 50 feet wide by 800 feet long. The dredging would create a dead end finger canal approximately 1160 feet in length. Approximately 5,800 cubic yards of muck, hard pan and clay would be dredged to create the canal and channel into the waters of the lake.. Lake Cypress is located in the Kissimmee "chain of lakes" a series of lakes connected by man-made canals or by the Kissimmee River. The system is a popular fishing and recreational area. It also has been adversely affected by intense development and volumes of effluent flowing into the lakes. Cypress Lake has very poor water quality. Chlorophyll a consistently runs around 90-160 milligrams per liter (mg/1). DER has a policy of allowing no wasteload allocation if chlorophyll a is greater than 60 mg/1. Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) is also extremely high. A BOD level of 2-3 mg/1 is deemed acceptable. Samples taken by Petitioner's consultants in December 1986, reflected a BOD level of 9.8 mg/l in the lake and 27 mg/1 in the borrow pit. Some violations, though not as serious, were found in the Dissolved Oxygen (DO) standard of 5 mg/1. The creation of a finger canal will create a more serious water quality problem than currently exists. This is evidenced by experiences with such canals throughout the state. Dead-end canals prohibit effective exchange of water and after a period of build-up within the basin, a winter storm event or unusually heavy summer thunder-shower will create a sloshing effect, the toxic plug will be released and the polluted water will flush into the lake, creating a potential fish kill. After a period of buildup, boaters are reluctant to use dead-end finger canals as it is impossible to keep the boats clean. The proposed channel dredging would eliminate approximately 0.25 acres of densely vegetated littoral zone habitat. Such zones provide spawning, nursery and feeding habitat for a wide variety of fish species. Lesser concerns, but nonetheless negative impacts from the project, are a short term increase in turbidity from the dredging of the channel, and the effect on endangered or threatened species of birds found on or near the site. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have commented negatively on the proposed project. These agencies have cited the same concerns with water quality, effect on the littoral zone and effect on wildlife described above, and explained in depth in the testimony of DER's expert witnesses. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, also commenting on the project, has a policy of encouraging development and use of public access facilities and discouraging all private channel construction. On Lake Cypress there exists a public boat ramp and launching facility approximately 300 feet to the north of the proposed project. Other access to the lake is provided through facilities on other lakes in the chain, although these facilities are a considerable driving distance from the proposed site. The public boat ramp on Lake Cypress does not have lights nor restrooms. Parking is limited and Waldron provides parking for boaters at his commercial establishment for $7.00 a year. Carl Wagner presented six pages of signatures obtained from his posting a "Petition" in support of the project at his bait and tackle shop. The Petition cites deficiencies in the existing public facility. Carl Wagner has lived and worked on the Kissimmee chain of lakes for 37 years. He worked for the South Central Florida Flood Control District maintaining pumps and locks for eleven years, and has fished and served as a fishing guide for the remainder. He has an intimate familiarity with the wildlife, fish species, drift and flow of the lakes and weather patterns in the area. His knowledge is valid, though not so technical as that of the various agency experts. His position is that he is just trying to make a living, that if the public ramp and facilities were adequate, he could make a living with a tackle shop, but the public access is not adequate. He concedes that the water quality is bad, but argues that the impact of his project would be so minimal as to be a mere "drop in the bucket". While the applicant has not suggested alternatives, the Department has suggested that a boardwalk could be constructed with a dock extending into the lake, with finger piers. This would avoid the need to dredge a canal and channel, but the environmental impact of the pilings and any navigational hazards have not been fully studied. The applicant has not Suggested mitigation measures to improve water quality, nor is it likely that such measures would be effective.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying permit application number 49-1241774. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of August, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Grace L. Waldron Post Office Box 1341 St. Cloud, Florida 32769 Carl W. Wagner Post Office Box 975 KenanSville, Florida 32739 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner and developer of real property in Brevard County, Florida. Petitioner applied to DER for a development permit to construct three wooden docks and retain an existing wooden dock on its property. The docks were designed to provide a total of 58 mooring slips. On March 13, 1983, the Department issued an Intent to Deny the requested permit, On March 10, 1983, Petitioner filed a petition for a formal 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing on DER's intent to deny the permit application. DER's Intent to Deny asserted DER jurisdiction under Chapters 403 and 253, Florida Statutes and Rule 17-4.28 and 17- 4.29, Florida Administrative Code. DER contends that the construction of the proposed docks was to be conducted in areas within DER jurisdiction under Rules 17-4.28(2) and 17- 4.29(1). Additionally, DER asserted that the proposed project was located in Class II waters approved for shellfish harvesting, and that dredging in those areas was prohibited by Rule 17-4.28(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department recognizes the special value and importance of Class II waters to Florida's economy as existing or potential sites of commercial and recreational shellfish harvesting and as a nursery area for fish and shellfish. Therefore, it shall be the department's policy to deny applications for permits for certifications for dredging or filling activities in Class II waters, except where the applicant has submitted a plan of procedure which will adequately protect the project area and areas in the vicinity of the project from significant damage. The department shall not issue a permit for dredging or filling directly in areas approved for shellfish harvesting by the Department of Natural Resources. . . . The parties have stipulated, and the record otherwise established, that Petitioner is substantially affected by Rule 17-4.28(8)(a), which is challenged in this proceeding, by virtue of the fact that DER asserts that rule as a grounds for denying the requested permit. Both Petitioner and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact concerning whether the driving of pilings for the construction of the dock constitutes "dredging", so as to invoke the prohibition against such activities contained in Rule 17-4.28(8)(a). It is specifically determined that these facts are irrelevant to the issue to be determined in this cause, as will more fully hereinafter appear.
