The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing licenses to operate foster homes for dependent children. Petitioner also prosecutes license discipline proceedings. Respondent is the maternal aunt of three female children, Deanna, Angelique, and Antoinette. Respondent is a retired teacher. She worked for the state of New York before she moved to Florida. She also receives Social Security payments. Prior to 1990, Respondent's three nieces lived with their biological parents in the state of New York. New York adjudicated the children dependent and assigned the children to the foster care of Respondent. The three nieces were approximately 5, 7, an 8 years old. New York paid Respondent $2,100 a month to provide foster care for the three children. New York pays a monthly board rate of $700 per child. Petitioner agreed to supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. On March 12, 1992, Petitioner and Respondent entered into an Agreement To Provide Foster Care For Dependent Children ("Foster Care Agreement"). Each Foster Care Agreement provided, in relevant part: We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s) . . . without the consent of a representative of the Department. * * * We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, . . . living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster care home as prescribed by the Department. * * * This child is placed in our home on a temporary basis and is at all times under the supervision and control of the Department. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. We will take no action to acquire legal custody or guardianship of the child. * * * The Department may remove the child from our home at any time but will, whenever possible, give us at least two weeks notice. Until May 2, 1995, Respondent provided foster care for her three nieces without incident. Respondent was a loving and caring foster parent while the children were young. The children regarded Respondent as their mother. On April 25, 1995, Petitioner increased Respondent's licensed capacity for the period May 2, 1995, through May 1, 1996, to five children. Petitioner assigned two Florida foster children to Respondent. Petitioner paid Respondent $592 a month to provide foster care for the two Florida children. Florida pays a monthly board rate of $296 for each child. Problems developed in the foster home due to overcrowding. Tiffany, one of the two Florida foster children, had an infant child. Tiffany did not maintain good hygiene for herself or her child. Tiffany neglected her child. The additional parenting responsibilities fell on Respondent. Petitioner reduced the overcrowding by removing the two Florida foster children. Petitioner removed Tiffany and her child on December 8, 1995, and removed the second foster care child as soon as the school year ended. Other problems persisted in the foster home separate and apart from the problem of overcrowding. The three nieces were growing up and were beginning to manifest problems from unresolved childhood issues. Each niece had unresolved issues that presented very difficult parenting problems. As the nieces grew older, Respondent did not have the parenting skills necessary to parent her three nieces. Deanna's unresolved issues are illustrative. Deanna weighed under four pounds at birth. The mother was a cocaine addict throughout the gestational period. There was some fetal distress related to withdrawal. Deanna was always irritable. She had a very low frustration tolerance. She had frequent tantrums in which she would throw, spit, and hit her siblings and Respondent. Deanna had been treated with various medications. They included Ritalin, Depakote, Dexedrine, and Clonidine. The other two nieces presented Respondent with similar parenting problems. They hit Respondent when they did not get their way, frequently lied, and stole items from home and school. The problems presented by the three nieces would have been difficult enough to deal with for the best of parents. However, Respondent practiced inappropriate parenting techniques. Respondent used excessive corporal punishment to discipline all of her foster children. She practiced humiliation tactics on her oldest niece. Respondent gave preferential treatment to the youngest niece. Respondent arbitrarily allowed the youngest niece to have privileges denied to the other nieces. Respondent routinely gave the youngest niece excessive amounts of money for nominal tasks. For example, Respondent paid the youngest niece $100 for two hours work around the house. Respondent manages her own money poorly. Her income is insufficient to cover her expenditures. She is evasive and vague about her finances. Respondent became depressed and withdrawn. She remained non-verbal with lengthy periods of silence. She stared at the wall. When counselors and case workers confronted Respondent regarding her depression, she became very angry and agitated. She retreated into denial and relied on adolescent responses to distance herself from those trying to help her and her nieces. Petitioner conducted a critical case review on June 28, 1996. Petitioner provided numerous intervention services for Respondent and her nieces from July through November, 1996. Petitioner provided counseling through The Harbor Mental Health Services ("Harbor"). Respondent and her three nieces attended group therapy at Harbor. In addition, each niece participated in individual counseling at Harbor. Petitioner provided an Intensive Crisis Counseling Program ("ICCP") for Respondent. ICCP is an intense in-home counseling program over six weeks. It is designed to prevent removal of foster children from the home. Petitioner extended the ICCP in Respondent's home for an additional six weeks. Petitioner provided psychological evaluations to determine if Respondent was suicidal or suffered from alcoholism. The evaluations found no evidence of either problem. Therapists attempted to assist the individual family members toward effective communication, establishing boundaries, reasonable consequences, and consistent discipline. The intervention services provided by Petitioner were unsuccessful. Respondent and her nieces persisted in their inappropriate behavior. Petitioner issued a provisional license to Respondent for the period August 2, 1996, through November 2, 1996. The license required weekly visits by a foster care counselor. Petitioner conducted a routine home visit on September 26, 1996. The situation had not improved. On October 4, 1996, Petitioner conducted another critical case review. At the critical case review, the foster care counselor learned from members of the ICCP team that Respondent planned to leave Florida to visit New York. On October 10, 1996, the foster care counselor telephoned Respondent. Respondent confirmed that she was leaving for New York on October 11, 1996. When the foster care counselor asked Respondent to provide the location of her three nieces and the identity of the respite caregiver during Respondent's absence, Respondent stated only that she was leaving the nieces with her mother. Respondent told the foster care counselor that if Petitioner wanted to see her nieces while Respondent was in New York, the foster care counselor should telephone Respondent's home and leave a message on Respondent's voice mail. Respondent's mother would check the messages each day and return the case worker's telephone call. Respondent's manner and tone were abrupt, cryptic, abrasive, and angry. The foster care counselor was unable to obtain any further information. Respondent terminated the telephone call. Respondent violated several requirements of each Foster Care Agreement. Respondent allowed the removal of each niece from her home by someone other than Petitioner's representatives. Respondent gave each foster child into the care or physical custody of another without the consent of Petitioner. Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with adequate notice of any change in the living arrangements or family composition of the foster children. Respondent's mother was not, and never has been, an authorized foster care parent or respite caregiver. Respondent did not consent to Respondent giving her nieces to the physical care and custody of Respondent's mother. Respondent did not give Petitioner the information needed for Petitioner to adequately supervise the foster children during Respondent's absence. Petitioner determined that it could no longer supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. Petitioner ascertained the location of the foster children. On October 17, 1996, Petitioner removed the nieces from the home of Respondent's mother. Petitioner returned the nieces to the appropriate authorities in New York. By letter dated, October 17, 1996, Petitioner notified Respondent of the action taken. The letter also notified Respondent that the foster care home was closed and that Respondent's license was being revoked.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating material provisions of the Foster Care Agreement for each of her three nieces, failing to effectively supervise and safeguard her foster home, and revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster care home for dependent children. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire District 13 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Patricia Genovese Qualified Representative 13140 Jessica Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Yvonne B. Butler, Esquire 6341 Gainsboro Avenue Spring Hill, Florida 34609
Findings Of Fact Respondent was initially licensed to operate a foster home in 1992. In April 1995, her license was renewed. As part of the licensing process, the Respondent signed documents entitled "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" and "Discipline Policy", thereby agreeing to comply with the terms of each document. Both of these documents clearly provide that corporal punishment of a foster child is prohibited. On October 30, 1995, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter of its intent to revoke her foster home license and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: This letter is to advise you that your Foster Home license is being revoked, effective November 1, 1995. This decision has been made based on our past concerns about inappropriate child-parent visits, the recent complaint about use of physical discipline, and the altercation on 09/18/95 between you and Foster Parent Veronica King. 1/ At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent provided foster care for three teenage girls under the age of 18 years. On September 29, 1995, Petitioner's abuse registry received a report that Respondent had been physically and verbally abusive to the children in her foster care. The report included allegations that Respondent had hit and knocked down one of the girls in her foster care and that she attempted to return the girl to her natural mother, who had abused her daughter in the past. In response to that report, Petitioner removed the three girls from Respondent's foster care and began an investigation of the allegations. As part of that investigation, Respondent and each of the three girls were interviewed by employees of the Petitioner with appropriate training. The three girls who had been in Respondent's foster care made statements to these employees pertaining to their treatment by Respondent. These statements are hearsay that cannot be used as the sole basis for a finding of fact in this proceeding. 2/ In her interview, Respondent denied that she physically abused her foster children, but she admitted that she intentionally pushed one of the girls to the ground. Respondent violated Petitioner's discipline policy by pushing this girl to the ground. Respondent denied that she threatened to return one of the girls to the girl's abusive mother. Instead, she testified that she arranged for this girl to visit with the abusive mother. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony. Respondent conceded that she talked firmly to the three girls, but she denied that she verbally abused them. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that revokes Respondent's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether HRS should select the Petitioners as the adoptive parents of M. C.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Rosa and Edwin Wise, live in Bradenton, Florida. They have been married since 1986. They have a strong and sharing marriage relationship; each considers the other not only spouse but best friend. They have been HRS-licensed foster parents since approximately 1992. Both are in good health. The Wises have experience foster-parenting children with "special needs." For approximately 18 months to two years, they were the foster parents of two African-American siblings. The older boy was nine months old when the Wises became his foster parents; the younger girl was just three months old when the Wises became her foster parents. The girl was cocaine-dependent at birth and had developmental delays as a result. Happily, not only were the Wises very successful foster parents for the children but the family was able to be reunified successfully. Today, some two years after reunification, the Wises continue to have a wonderful relationship with the children and their mother, and children's mother continues to be grateful to the Wises for what they have done and continue to do for her and her children. Since the Wises had notified HRS that they would be happy to foster parent one or two "special needs" children again, HRS contacted them in early July, 1995, to ask if they would be foster parents for a high risk, cocaine-dependent African- American newborn girl, M. C. The Wises readily agreed. Rosa went to see the infant in the hospital the next day, and they continued to visit daily during the infant's week-long hospital stay. They began acting as the child's foster parents as soon as the baby was discharged from the hospital. A warm and loving relationship quickly blossomed between the Wises and the infant, and the Wises soon expressed a desire to adopt the child if parental rights were terminated-- unfortunately, a probable outcome in this case. (The infant's mother was addicted to cocaine, had abandoned the child at the hospital after birth, and gave no indication of having any desire or ability to mother the child.) M. C. had older siblings, but all but one of them were in the full-time care and custody of family members who were unable to care for any more full-time. One brother was in the care and custody of another foster parent, who had expressed a desire to adopt him. It was agreed between HRS and the two sets of foster parents that it was not especially desirable for the infant and her brother to be adopted as a sibling group. Due to alleged "confidential information pertaining to another child," HRS refused to disclose to the Petitioners the entire contents of the Referral for Permanency Staffing form signed by the Wises on August 9, 1995, and the Petitioners did not further pursue disclosure of the information. But the evidence is clear that the Wises consistently expressed to HRS their desire to adopt M. C. (and, if necessary, her brother) if parental rights were terminated. HRS staff urged them to be patient in awaiting termination of parental rights, a prerequisite to initiation of the adoption process. A staffing conference was held on August 8, 1995, in the matter of the children. Participating were the Wises, their foster care counselor, the adoption counselor, the adoption counselor's acting supervisor, the program specialist, and others. The evidence was that, as a result of the staffing conference, the staffing committee approved a plan to expedite termination of parental rights. The committee specified the need for a "complete developmental evaluation" by August 25, 1995. The evidence was not clear what a "complete developmental evaluation" entails, or whether one was completed. No HRS employee who would have knowledge of exactly how HRS initially went about exploring the suitability of the Wises to adopt M. C. was available to testify at final hearing, and the Petitioners were not able to prove those details. However, the evidence was clear that, by approximately September 9, 1995, the program specialist involved in the matter expressed to the Wises his "concerns" about the Wises. When they asked him what the concerns were, he answered vaguely that they were "cultural." When pressed, he declined to be more specific but instead referred the Wises to the adoption counselor. The Wises suspected that the "concern" was that the Wises are Americans of European ancestry. HRS did have available at final hearing its "One Church One Child Coordinator," 1/ who testified that in approximately late September or early October, 1995 (she also could not specify when, and the Petitioners could not prove exactly when), she received a telephone contact from within HRS asking her for the names and home studies of qualified African-American prospective adoptive parents who might be interested in adopting M. C. The HRS One Church One Child Coordinator reviewed the information available to her and provided several names and home studies to the adoption counselor working on the M. C. adoption and the adoption counselor's acting supervisor. From the names and home studies, the three HRS workers chose three prospective adoptive parents for consideration along with the Wises. On or about October 11, 1995, HRS's adoption and related services (ARS) Children and Family (C&F) senior counselor and supervisor wrote the program specialist an Inter-Office Memorandum recommending that the Petitioners "be approved for adoption for one or two children" and noting that they "indicated, they would like to have a sibling group of two of any race." 2/ In addition, by this time bonds had formed between M. C. and the Wises that were as strong as any a three to four month old could have. Despite the October 11, 1995, memo, an HRS meeting was held some time before the end of October, 1995 (the HRS witness again could not specify the date), among the One Church One Child Coordinator, the adoption counselor, the adoption counselor's acting supervisor, an operation program administrator, a district program manager, an HRS attorney and perhaps others for the purpose of selecting adoptive parents for M. C. from among four sets of prospective adoptive parents--the Wises and the three chosen from among the One Church One Child names and home studies. On or about October 31, 1995, Rosa Wise was notified by telephone that HRS had chosen one of the others, a single African-American female, to adopt M. C. The Wises were required to allow the person chosen to have overnight visitation with the child. There is no evidence as to whether the HRS staff decision was reviewed by the HRS district administrator,3 but HRS staff notified the Wises on November 15, 1995, that HRS had chosen one of the others to adopt M. C. Staff also notified the Wises that the adoptive parent selected by HRS staff was supposed to have overnight visitation from November 17-20 and again from November 22-27, 1995, with placement to be made the next day. By letter from HRS's attorney dated November 17, 1995, the Wises and their attorney were given notice "of HRS' intention to exercise final adoptive placement in favor of another family." The child was not returned to the Wises on November 21, 1995, as planned.4 Then, instead of having the child returned to the Wises on November 28, 1995, the parties went before the circuit judge in the dependency case involving M. C., and the judge entered an order authorizing the child to remain in the care and custody of the prospective adoptive parent chosen by HRS pending the resolution of Section 120.57 administrative proceedings. The Wises did not believe that HRS would allow them visitation or other contact with M. C. during the pendency of these proceedings, and they did not pursue it. They have not seen the child since approximately November 16, 1995. The evidence indicated that, by the time of the final hearing, M. C. had grown at least as attached to her new foster mother as she was to the Wises. Based on the evidence, there is no reason not to believe that the Wises would have been, and still would be, warm and loving parents who would provide M. C. with a home in which the child would thrive. They clearly were "suitable" adoptive parents. HRS did not allow the adoption to proceed only because of "cultural concerns"--i.e., the Wises were not African- American. It was felt by HRS staff--in particular, the program specialist--that these "cultural concerns" could override any foster parent preference in favor of the Wises and that inquiry should be made as to whether there were African-American prospective adoptive parents who could adopt M. C. After the African-American prospective adoptive parents entered the picture, HRS staff decided what it considered to be the best interest of the child, taking into account the "cultural" considerations. Essentially, as between the Wises and the person ultimately chosen to be the adoptive parent, HRS staff decided that the latter would be better able to "maintain the child's culture and give the child emotional support," although the Wises clearly were committed to value, respect, appreciate, and educate the child regarding her racial and ethnic background and to permit the child the opportunity to know and appreciate her ethnic and racial heritage. On balance, the other factors cited by HRS actually were neutral at best; some seemed bogus.5 On the evidence presented at final hearing, it is difficult to say whether HRS's choice against the Wises was, on balance, against the best interest of the child. There were factors in favor of both the Wises and in favor of the person chosen by HRS. Perhaps, given HRS's rules, the choice HRS made at that time was wrong. However, the Wises clearly were unable to prove that, at this time, it is in the best interest of the child to require her to be adopted by the Wises instead of the foster mother she has had for the past seven to eight months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioners' request to be selected as the adoptive parents of M. C. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 1996.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioners, Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, for a family foster home license. 1/
Findings Of Fact Through series of circumstances, the Petitioners in this case--Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, husband and wife--came to know the children of a woman named N. M. 4/ Their priest told them about Nancy and her predicament. A serious drug and alcohol addict, and already the single mother of two boys (J. D., born December 30, 1977, and B. F., born January 7, 1983), each of whom had a different biological father, she was about to have another child by yet another man. The Petitioners were asked to help the family, and they agreed. Shortly after the third child--a girl, N. F., born November 4, 1988-- was released from the hospital, the mother asked the Petitioners to let the family live with them temporarily. Not long afterward, the mother slipped back to her way of abusing drugs and alcohol and left, leaving the children with the Petitioners. For some time, the Petitioners cared for the children without being licensed as a family foster home and without any financial assistance from HRS. Later, in approximately March, 1991, they became licensed as a family foster home for the specific and limited purpose of caring for the children of M. 5/ When it came to the children in their care, the Petitioners generally were very attentive to their needs for food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and they provided very well for the children, following up on all doctor appointments and the like. They were very conscientious in this regard. Generally, they got along well with the children, and the children tended to view them as if they were their real parents. As a result of their involvement with the family, the Petitioners came to know the children's maternal grandparents. While initially the Petitioners got along fairly well with the maternal grandparents, they had the opportunity to form opinions of them based on personal experience and stories related by the children and, later, by the fathers of the two boys. Essentially, the Petitioners thought the maternal grandparents were good grandparents, and they encouraged and cooperated in the maintenance of a relationship between the children and the maternal grandparents. At the same time, they did not perceive the maternal grandparents as a good option for permanent placement of the children. Besides the maternal grandparents' age and limited physical and emotional capabilities, and their lack of interest in being permanently responsible for the children on a full-time basis, the Petitioners also had a concern about what they understood to be the maternal grandfather's drinking habits. Instead, since reunification with the mother did not seem feasible to either the Petitioners or to HRS, the Petitioners felt the best option, at least for the boys, would be to investigate their reunification with their fathers. Along with HRS, the Petitioners were instrumental in locating the fathers of the boys and reestablishing contacts between them and their sons. Along with HRS, they actively encouraged and fostered the strengthening of the relationship between the boys and their fathers and worked with HRS to bring the men into a position to begin to care for their sons permanently on a full-time basis. When the Petitioners became licensed as a child-specific family foster home in approximately March, 1991, they agreed to work within the policies and procedures established by the Department and to accept supervision by a foster care counselor. There was no evidence that they were not supportive of the efforts outlined in the foster care agreement or plan. 6/ But problems between the Petitioners and the maternal grandparents developed between the time of the Petitioners' licensure and September, 1991. The problems got so bad that the HRS counselor assigned to the case had to conduct visitation in his office to ascertain who was causing the problems and how to best resolve them. The problems culminated in the maternal grandparents' ultimatum that they no longer could work with the Petitioners as foster parents and that they wanted the children placed with them, the grandparents. The problems worsened as HRS began to investigate the possibility of placing the children with the grandparents. 7/ The Petitioners were against this and attempted to use their positions as foster parents to thwart HRS efforts in that direction. A senior HRS counselor replaced the initial counselor in an effort to shepherd the grandparent placement, with its attendant visitations. But, although regular visitations by the grandparents was prearranged during the fall of 1991, 8/ the Petitioners consistently raised various obstacles to the grandparent visitations, requiring multiple interventions by the HRS senior counselor and others at HRS. Three times, despite HRS interventions, visitation had to be cancelled. The Petitioners' case was taking such an inordinate amount of time that the HRS senior counselor went to his supervisor for relief. The grandparents felt the need to go to court to have the court establish visitation over the Christmas holidays. A hearing had to be held on or about December 10, 1991, and the court granted the grandparents overnight visitation from December 25 through 30, 1991. On inquiring of the children on their return, the Petitioners believed the grandparents did not properly administer prescribed medications for two of the children and accused the grandparents of child abuse. HRS investigated and found that the grandparents had been in direct telephone communication with two of the children's doctors to resolve a discrepancy between two of their medication prescriptions and had followed the telephone instructions of the doctor in charge of the prescription. In connection with the problems with the grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a clear tendency to try to manipulate the foster care system to their advantage, even unintentionally to the detriment of the interests of the children, and sometimes, out of overzealousness, through use of untruths and half truths. On one occasion, in an attempt to persuade the first HRS counselor not to pursue placement of the children with the grandparents, they told the counselor that an HRS protective services worker had told them that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. In fact, it was the Petitioners who had alleged to the protective services worker that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. On another occasion, to avoid allowing the grandparents to pick up the children for visitation, the Petitioners cited a supposed statute or rule making it illegal for the grandparents to provide transportation for the children. 9/ Once the boy, B. F., lost a hospital pass for use to visit his grandparents because of problems raised by the Petitioners concerning the legality of the grandparents providing transportation for him. In addition to the problems with the maternal grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a certain tendency to take things into their own hands when closer contact and consultation with HRS would have been advisable. Once they made arrangements for one of the boys to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital without consulting with HRS and did not advise the counselor until shortly before admission. To attempt to justify their actions to the HRS counselor, the Petitioner told the counselor that the boy's family therapist strongly favored hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. In fact, the counselor later found that the family therapist only had said that it might become necessary at some point to hospitalize the boy. Once the Petitioner, Charles Wenz, used corporal punishment on one of the boys although he knew it was against HRS policy for operators of a family foster home to use corporal punishment. He explained that, due to the history of the Petitioners' relationship with these children, the Petitioners felt more like parents than foster parents and that he did not think it was appropriate in their case for the usual prohibition against corporal punishment to apply to them. Later, Mr. Wenz had another occasion to use a form of corporal punishment on the other boy. 10/ In January, 1992, the Petitioners applied to renew their "child- specific" license as a family foster home. On or about February 1, 1992, the court placed the children with the maternal grandparents, and the Petitioners converted their application to one for general licensure as a family foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), enter a final order granting the application of Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher for general licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1992.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's license to operate a foster care home.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Respondent issued this license to Petitioner through the Devereux Foundation, which operates and maintains a network of foster homes to serve dependent children in Respondent's custody. Respondent places children in therapeutic foster when they have been exposed to a severe degree of physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse, as well as extreme neglect and/or abandonment. Such children require special care and cannot be disciplined like children in a stable nuclear family. Therapeutic foster parents should never spank or use other physical methods of punishment or behavior management on these children. Many therapeutic foster children have acute and unresolved issues with control and authority. In such cases, attempts by authority figures to assert rigid control over the children will likely provoke emotionally charged oppositional reactions by the children. This is especially true when the children have not developed a relationship with the authority figures. The likelihood that such oppositional reactions will occur is much greater when authority figures attempt to impose their will on the children with the use of physical force. Children in foster care experience great difficulty in learning to trust others. The inability to trust others is reinforced when a near-stranger makes demands on therapeutic foster children, then uses physical force to compel submission. Children from dysfunctional families often experience violence in the homes of their natural parents. The children learn at an early age to respond with violence to stressful situations. The use of physical force on foster children thus generates a real and severe risk of physical injury to the foster children, the foster parents, and innocent bystanders. One purpose of therapeutic foster care is to help children learn that violent behavior is not acceptable. When foster parents use physical force to compel obedience, they reinforce the lessons learned in the homes of their natural parents at the expense of the lessons the foster care program attempts to teach. Therapeutic foster parents undergo special training before they become licensed. The Model Approach to Parenting and Partnership (MAPP) training that all foster parents receive places special emphasis on the emotional fragility of children in foster care and the consequent need to avoid confrontation with foster children. In other words, MAPP training teaches foster parents not to engage in power struggles with their charges. MAPP training emphasizes the use of positive discipline for the inevitable situations in which foster children test the boundaries set by the foster parents. These methods include reinforcing acceptable behavior, verbal disapproval, loss of privileges, and redirection. Any form of verbal abuse or physical force is strictly prohibited. Petitioner received all of the training described above. In March 2001, a sibling group of two sisters (S.M.1 and S.M.2) and a brother (D.M.) were living in a therapeutic foster home operated by Brad and Sharon Carraway through the Devereux Foundation. Mr. and Mrs. Carraway were licensed therapeutic foster parents. Respondent and the Devereux Foundation have a policy that allows for substitute foster care when therapeutic foster parents need some time away from their foster children. In that case, Devereux arranges for another licensed therapeutic foster home in its network to care for the foster children for a period of time, usually a weekend. This arrangement is known as respite foster care. During March 2001, the Carraways needed a weekend away from their foster children to take care of some family business. At that time, Loretta Kelly was the foster care program manager for Devereux in the North Florida area. Ms. Kelly made arrangements for Petitioner and his wife to take the children during the weekend of March 23-25, 2001. The children arrived in Petitioner's home late in the afternoon of Friday, March 23, 2001. As S.M.1 and S.M.2 settled into their room, Petitioner advised them that supper would be served in five minutes. S.M.1 then announced that she was not hungry and would not be going to supper. Petitioner replied that S.M.1 could either go to the table for supper or he would be back in five minutes and make her go to the table. Five minutes later, Petitioner returned to the bedroom. He told S.M.1, who was sitting on the bed, to come in to supper. When S.M.1 refused again, Petitioner grabbed S.M.1 by the wrists and tried to drag her into the dining room. A struggle ensued with S.M.1 yelling for Petitioner to let go. During the struggle, S.M.1's wrist watch broke, leaving scratches on her arm. S.M.2 was in the hall. Hearing her sister call for help, S.M.2 ran in to help S.M.1. S.M.2 pushed Petitioner away from her sister. Petitioner then grabbed S.M.2 by the wrists and struggled with her for over a minute. During the struggle, S.M.2 slid down to a sitting position with her back against the wall. S.M.2 then used her feet in an attempt to break free from Petitioner. The struggle left S.M.2 with a scar from a scratch she received on her arm. Petitioner finally gave up and called the girls' therapist, Lori Farkas, to complain about the situation. S.M.2 heard Petitioner state that he wanted the girls out of his home. The incident was reported to Respondent. Subsequently, Respondent commenced a child protective investigation into the allegations; the investigation was still open on April 20, 2001. Petitioner became angry when he learned what the children told Respondent's investigators. He telephoned Ms. Kelly on the afternoon of April 20, 2001. He accused the children of lying and asserted that they should be punished. He threatened to file battery charges against the children and have them arrested if they did not change their story and "tell the truth." Next, Petitioner telephoned Ms. Carraway. He told Ms. Carraway that she ought to be teaching the girls morals and honesty. He accused the girls of lying. Petitioner informed Ms. Carraway that he was going to consult an attorney and have the girls arrested at school for assault and battery. Petitioner told Ms. Carraway that he would be more believable in light of the children's background. S.M.1 was with Ms. Carraway during Petitioner's telephone call. Ms. Carraway and S.M.1 wrote notes to each other regarding Petitioner's comments during the telephone call. Both girls were apprehensive for some time after this telephone call about the possibility of being arrested. Ms. Carraway called Ms. Kelly immediately after talking to Petitioner. Ms. Kelly then called Petitioner to instruct him not to make any further calls to the Carraway home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioner's therapeutic foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Motes 2023 Duneagle Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32311 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether HRS should grant the Petitioner's application a license to operate a foster care home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Christopher Murphy, is a single male, born July 27, 1966. He wants to be a foster care parent for up to two teenagers, same sex, including those with a history of having been abused. In approximately September, 1994, the Petitioner approached the Children's Home Society (CHS), located in Orlando, Florida, to inquire about applying for licensure to operate a foster care home for dependent children. CHS is and was under contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to screen prospective licensees. The screening process included, among other things: interviews with the Petitioner; a home study; review of written personal references on behalf of the Petitioner; evaluation of the Petitioner's participation in the HRS-approved Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting (MAPP) program. After conducting its training and screening of the Petitioner, CHS recommended the Petitioner for licensure "for two children, same gender, ages 12 to 18 years," and the Petitioner filed his application for licensure on or about May 3, 1995. The Petitioner and the "relief persons" he designated in his application underwent background screening, and no disqualifying information was found. However, by letter dated July 11, 1995, HRS gave notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application for the following reasons: According to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 10M-6, it is the opinion of the Department that based on your own experience with depression, your single lifestyle and your sexual orientation that your desire to be a foster parent is not in the best inte- rest of the children in the custody of Health and Rehabilitative Services. You have indicated that you have doubts about your ability to work with HRS in seeking rehabilitation of the families with children in foster care, that you have limited patience with bureaucracy, and that you would not like to see the foster children in your care return to their parents. Professional counseling to relieve distress over your sexual orientation did not resolve that issue. These consider- ations lead HRS to believe that it would not be in the best interest of children in state custody to be placed with you in foster care. The Petitioner's Mental and Emotional Status The evidence is that the Petitioner experienced some difficulties growing up as one of ten siblings. His mother was very religious but, at the same time, appears to have been a strict disciplinarian and, at times, almost "cruel" to the children. In addition, the Petitioner tended to be a loner during his early years. He was physically weak and was susceptible to being bullied by other children. In addition, he played differently from other boys his age, preferring to spend his time reading Jane Austen and the Bronte sisters rather than playing with friends. As the Petitioner grew older, he increasingly recognized signs that he was homosexually oriented. These signs disturbed him because a homosexual orientation was contrary to his desires and to what he understood to be the morals of his family and religion. When the Petitioner went to college in the mid-1980's, he still would have been considered a "social isolate," and the combination of stresses from leaving home, living on his own at college and dealing with his sexual orientation resulted in depression requiring individual psychotherapy and medication (at first Impramine and later, in 1992, Prozac). Dealing with his mother's death in 1988 caused the depression to recur, but the Petitioner was able to recover with the help of the psychotherapy and medication. Since 1988, the Petitioner has suffered periodic bouts of mild depression. (Medication he takes for rapid heartbeat tends to cause some depression as a side effect.) However, the Petitioner's major depression is in remission, and he has been able to control the mild depression by the appropriate use of medication. The Petitioner's physicians advise him to continue on medication and seek therapy as necessary. In recent years, the Petitioner has resolved his conflicted feelings about his mother, as well as many of the conflicts he had with members of his family. The Petitioner also has made great strides to resolve his conflicted feelings about his sexual orientation. At the same time, he still rejects the values and lifestyle of the gay world and continues to accept most of the basic tenets of traditional values and lifestyle. As a result, there is no indication that the Petitioner is trying to use the foster parent program in order to make a political statement about gay rights. However, the difficulty the Petitioner will continue to face is that traditional society does not necessarily always accept him. This probably will make being a foster parent more difficult for the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has made considerable progress making and maintaining viable personal relationships. He has been able to work responsibly and well in the positions he has held with Universal Studios in Orlando and has made and maintained several positive and valuable friendships through work and elsewhere. In the words of a licensed psychologist who evaluated him in August- September, 1995, the Petitioner is "on the mend" in this regard; by this he meant that the Petitioner is making good progress in the right direction. If major depression were to recur, the Petitioner obviously would have difficulty persevering, and probably would be unable to persevere, in seeing a foster child through to the end of his or her temporary placement. But in recent years the Petitioner has been able to control depression by appropriately using his antidepressant medication, monitoring himself for symptoms of depression, and seeking appropriate therapy as needed. As long as he continues to do so, it is not anticipated that major depression will recur. HRS has licensed others with mental and emotional status similar to the Petitioner to be foster parents. It is true that there is a possibility that the stress of being a foster parent could cause the Petitioner's depression to recur. In many ways, teenage is the most difficult age bracket for foster care, and abused teenagers can present even greater difficulties. But HRS maintains control over the children to be placed with the Petitioner, and an effort could be made not to place the most difficult foster care challenges with the Petitioner, at least initially. In addition, HRS and the Petitioner could cooperate in monitoring the effects that the stress of being a foster parent have on the Petitioner. There is a good chance that the Petitioner's depression will not recur as a result of being a foster parent. The Petitioner's Parenting Experience The Petitioner has no children of his own and has no parenting experience. He grew up in a family of ten children but tended to spend much of his time apart from them. The Petitioner did some baby-sitting during his teens. But otherwise, through his college years, the Petitioner did not exhibit much inclination or desire to be around or work with children. The Petitioner changed as he reached adulthood. He now has a very strong desire to help teenage children by acting as their foster parent. In recent years, he has had the opportunity to work with families having their pictures made at the Universal Studios park in Orlando and has found that he had success interacting with the young members of those families. While he has not had much experience taking care of teenagers, he also has enjoyed spending considerable time in recent years interacting with the young children of friends and other family members. (Living in the a vacation center, many siblings and other members of his family have taken advantage of the opportunity to visit him since he moved to Orlando.) The Petitioner seems to interact well with the children in several arenas--facilitating play, sharing snacks and meals, helping with homework, going on picnics and other outings, suggesting and participating in other positive family activities. His friends' children like him, and his friends trust him with tending to their children. On the other hand, the Petitioner's experience taking care of children is limited. The Petitioner's experience as the sole caretaker responsible for children is relatively sparse and of relatively short duration. While the Petitioner has done some baby-sitting for family and friends, most of the time he has spent with children has been while their parents were around. The Petitioner has not had occasion to be responsible for children overnight or for extended periods of time (certainly not for 24 or more hours). He also has not had much other experience working with children in other settings. He has not, e.g., worked or volunteered as a counselor for church or civic youth groups or camps. Due to the nature of the Petitioner's experience with children, and his lack of experience with teenagers, it is not certain that the Petitioner will succeed as a foster parent of teenagers, or children of any age. It also is not certain that the Petitioner himself will thrive as and enjoy being a 24- hour a day foster parent. It would be desirable both for the Petitioner and for the children to be placed with him for the Petitioner to get more experience before beginning to act as a foster parent. But, on the other hand, the same probably could be said for most first-time parents. It is hard to truly know what it is like to be a parent until you become one. HRS has no non-rule policy establishing clear minimum experience standards for licensure as a foster parent. HRS has licensed others to be foster parents with as little or less parenting experience compared to the Petitioner. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS stated that HRS never has issued a provisional license to a first-time applicant and that HRS would not issue one for the purpose of evaluating the provisional licensee while the licensee gains additional parenting experience. The Petitioner's Ability to Be a "Team Player" On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am intolerant of those who hurt children and may have a difficult time holding back and/or editing my language in their company (during visits). I have limited patience with bureaucracy. If something is not getting done, I will do it myself regardless of who gets offended. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) I probably will assume I am a better parent than the child's birth parents, and I don't think I'll want the child to return to his biological family. As CHS conducts MAPP training, prospective foster parents are encouraged to use the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" to honestly express their deepest concerns about their ability to succeed as foster parents. Then, the trainers help the trainees deal with those concerns. CHS' MAPP trainers believed that, during the course of the training sessions, the Petitioner was able to work through his concerns and grow through the training process. He was open to the trainers' ideas and actively participated in the sessions. In their estimation, the Petitioner's comments, even when in the fifth session, should not be taken as an indication that the Petitioner would not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS was not familiar with how CHS conducted MAPP training and was not in a position to conclude, as she did, that the Petitioner's statements on the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet," in and of themselves, show that the Petitioner will not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner has had no difficulty working within the bureaucracy at Universal Studios. He has had good relationships with his supervisors and has had no difficulty accepting their authority over him. Nothing about his employment experience would indicate that the Petitioner would have difficulty working in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner's Single Life Style On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am responsible, but do not lead a structured life. I eat when I'm hungry, sleep when I'm tired, have ice cream for breakfast . . . (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) I may not be able to go out all night and do things as spontaneously as I do. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) It's just me - one on one. If I had a spouse to back me up when making rules or administer- ing discipline, things would be easier. On the other hand, the Petitioner also counted among his strengths: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) It's just me. . . . A foster child has only one person to adjust to. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 4) I have no other people living in my home and can devote a majority of my free time to my foster child. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) As a single male with no children, I will be the only one affected. These comments indicate an awareness on the Petitioner's part that his life will change if one or two foster children are placed in his home. As he recognizes, being single will make it more difficult in some ways, but somewhat easier in other ways. What can make being a single foster parent most difficult is not having the emotional and intellectual support and help of another adult in the home. A single foster parent must attempt to compensate by having adult family and friends who are willing and able to serve some of those needs. Several of the Petitioner's friends are willing and able to serve in this role for the Petitioner. All have met HRS's screening requirements. One thing a single foster parent cannot replace is the inability to demonstrate (and teach through) a successful marriage. But this inability clearly is not disqualifying. The Petitioner's Sexual Orientation HRS's notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application mentioned the Petitioner's sexual orientation. But at final hearing HRS took the position that sexual orientation itself was not a ground for denial of the Petitioner's application. While not disqualifying in itself, being a homosexual foster parent undeniably will present special problems. First, it already has been mentioned that it can be a challenge for a homosexual to function in traditional society, and trying to function as a foster parent in traditional society surely will present its own special challenges. Along those lines, it is foreseeable, e.g., that a foster parent's homosexuality could be unacceptable to the birth family. In addition, since unmarried cohabitation by two or more adults is disqualifying, the Petitioner would be restricted to living alone. Lastly, many foster parents later adopt children placed with them, but the Petitioner will not be able to because homosexuality is disqualifying for purposes of adoption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order issuing the Petitioner a license to operate a foster home for up to two children, same sex, ages 12 to 18 years of age. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 27th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Rejected that he applied for a license then; he initiated the screening process and preservice training at that time. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 2.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5.-8. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9. The characterization "extensive" is rejected as not proven; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 10.-12. Accepted and incorporated. 13. The date "July 11, 1996" is rejected as contrary to the evidence. (It was 1995.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 18.-22. Conclusions of law. Accepted and incorporated. Conclusion of law. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4.-6. Conclusions of law. 7.-9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The first testimony referred to Noll's knowledge of whether the Petitioner was on medication at the time of the hearing. Noll was not "pressed" for the additional testimony; he was just asked a different question.) Rejected as contrary to the evidence that Noll "failed to follow through." Also, subordinate and unnecessary, as the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that he did not present any experience in his application; he presented more at final hearing after being informed that HRS included experience in the "single lifestyle" ground for the July 11, 1995, notice of intent to deny. Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; he presented more at final hearing. See 13., above. 15.-16. Generally, accepted. The Petitioner's exact statements are incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Petitioner's purpose was to "avoid working with birth families." (The gist of Noll's discussion with the Petitioner appears to have been that foster parenting older children generally makes reunification less of a concern; either reunification would not be a viable option or, if considered, the older child would have more say in the matter. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but, as previously ruled, subordinate to the ultimate issue for determination, and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann E. Colby, Esquire 305 Elkhorn Court Winter Park, Florida 32792 Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
The Issue Whether the Respondents are entitled to renewal of their foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the re-licensing at issue in this proceeding, the Respondents were licensed foster care parents with whom the Department placed minor children for care. When their license came up for renewal in December 1998, the Department informed the Respondents that their license would not be renewed as they had not met the minimum standard for foster parenting. The Respondents have a history of minor incidents which, taken as a whole, have suggested to the Department that they are not able to provide the quality of care to foster children as contemplated by the statute and rules governing foster care providers. More specifically, the Respondents have left minor children ages four and nine in the care of developmentally delayed adolescents. Respondents were not authorized to leave the children with the adolescents nor did they provide meaningful supervision for the young minors. The incident resulted in a call to police who were summoned when the children called their mother. Respondent, Estoria Walker, has also used disparaging comments to and in front of a minor child who was placed in her care. In this instance, in front of the child's case worker, Respondent complained to the child of the volume of food consumed by the child. She sought additional funds to feed the child as she felt the child's board rate was inadequate to cover the costs of feeding her. Also, the Respondent complained about how the child kept herself. These disparaging remarks to and in front of the child did not contribute to a nurturing environment for the child. The child was ultimately moved from Respondents' home as she was miserable there, and the Respondents did not want her to remain. On another occasion the Respondents were caring for a teenager who became pregnant. Respondents delegated the task of informing the Department of the pregnancy to the teen. As foster parents they assumed no responsibility for notifying the caseworker of the situation. As a result, the caseworker for the teen was not promptly advised of the pregnancy. Respondents gave an adolescent in their care permission to leave their home for an extended visit to the child's relative. They did so without the caseworker's approval or knowledge of the visit. They did so without following Department guidelines for extended visits outside of the foster home. Most of the complaints to the Department resulted from the Respondents' failure to provide a loving, nurturing environment for the foster children placed in their home. Nevertheless, other incidents resulted from a claim of improper discipline, including spanking. As to all of these complaints the Department sought to work with the Respondents, to counsel them for performance improvement, and to allow them to retain children in their home despite serious reservations. From as early as 1995, the Department received complaints from the foster children in the Respondents' home that they had been inappropriately disciplined with spanking. As a result, Mrs. Walker was required to review and execute the disciplinary policy to assure the Department that the Respondents would not use physical discipline with the children. Despite this reminder, additional complaints of physical discipline were made against the Respondents. When the time came for the Department's committee to consider the renewal of Respondents' license, the entire licensing file documenting all of the above-identified issues was considered. Thereafter, the Department determined it would not renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Respondents' request for license renewal as foster care parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Albert and Estoria Walker 5311 Southwest 25th Street Hollywood, Florida 33023 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The determinative issue in this cause is whether Petitioners "abused" and "neglected" foster children in their care, as those terms are defined in Sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2000). As a result of the alleged abusive neglect, two subsequent issues are raised: (1) whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked for the reasons as stated in the Administrative Complaint dated July 20, 2001; and (2) whether Respondent's denial of Petitioners' requests to adopt the "M" sibling and to adopt the "T/S" sibling foster children, based primarily upon the allegations in the Administrative Compliant dated July 20, 2001, as explained in a denial letter dated January 18, 2002, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and by taped interviews, the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings during the final hearing, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving applications for foster care licenses and for monitoring, regulating, and if necessary, suspending or revoking foster parent licenses pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving, evaluating, approving or denying applications for adoption of foster children pursuant to Section 63.062, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 65C-16, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners' Foster Care Licensure History Petitioners are married and are the parents of two biological children. Mrs. Sawyer was reared with foster children and has always desired to become a foster parent. Petitioners were initially licensed by the Agency as foster parents in October of 1986, and six months later on April 20, 1987, Petitioners voluntarily closed their foster home due to Mrs. Sawyer's complications with the pregnancy of their second child. During the above six-month licensed period, Petitioners successfully fostered ten children, the last child was removed by the Agency from the foster home in March 1987. In December 1986, two months after initial licensing, Petitioners were the subject of an abuse report alleging spanking a child. The Agency's investigation concluded that the abuse report was "unfounded,"4 and closure was recommended by the Agency's investigator. On September 7, 1987, the Agency again licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Eight months thereafter, on May 23, 1988, the Agency again closed Petitioners' foster home. On August 10, 1988, three months later, the Agency, for the third time, licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Mrs. Sawyer acknowledged using corporal discipline on a foster child during the 1988 licensure period. As a result of the corporal punishment incident in 1988, the Agency required Petitioners to attended its Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes, which Petitioners attended and completed. The 1988 licensure of Petitioners as foster parents was specifically granted for the "T/S" sibling group who, with voluntary permission of their biological parents, had been living with Petitioners for approximately two months before their official placement with Petitioners by the Agency. Since 1988, the Agency has annually renewed Petitioners' foster care license.5 Responding to the requests of the Agency, Petitioners on occasions fostered as many as 16 to 20 foster children. Petitioners' foster home was frequently used by the Agency for unannounced "overnight" foster care, many of which extended into protracted foster care periods. During periods when the Agency's need for foster home beds was pressing, the Agency's rule-of-five was waived by the Agency's District Administrator so that Petitioners could and did house more children.6 The record reflects no evidence of complaints of abuse or any other complaints during the periods the Agency needed and made use of Petitioners' home to foster children. The evidence of record, viewed chronologically, reflects a protracted period of intense investigation of allegations which, if true, were apparently ongoing over a period of months prior to the filing of Abuse Report 2000-198255, the basis of the Agency's intended revocation of Petitioners' foster care license. Petitioners' latest license was issued on August 24, 2000, and was effective until August 24, 2001. This August 24, 2000, foster home license is the subject of the Agency's revocation notice, which states: The revocation is based on the following reasons: Between December 21, 2000 and March 1, 2001, the Department of Children and Families investigated eleven reports of abuse and neglect involving your home. In Florida Abuse Hotline Report 2000-198255[7] it was concluded that there were verified findings of excessive corporal punishment and confinement, bizarre punishment and excessive restraint committed by Cynthia Sawyer towards several foster children in her care. The report also noted several instances of inappropriate physical punishment, which is a violation of the foster parent disciplinary policy. These incidents are considered "an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health and safety of children in the home or agency" and a violation of the licensing rules promulgated pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. Section 409.175(8)(b) 1 and 2 Florida Statutes; 65C- 13.010(1)(b)5 Florida Administrative Code. (emphasis added) The Agency's allegations of neglect and abuse revolved around four specific types of disciplinary activities that are alleged to have occurred on or after August 24, 2000, the date the current foster care license was issued, and to have terminated on or before March 1, 2001, the date the Agency removed children from Petitioners' home. The four specific types of disciplinary activities are: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) excessive restraints.8 In support of those allegations, the Agency presented the testimonies of several foster children, video- taped interviews of three foster children made in March 2001, approximately one month after removal from Petitioners' home; the testimony of another foster care parent; the testimony of a Guardian Ad Litem; and the testimonies of several of the Agency's employees. Mike Katz, agency employee, prepared the Administrative Complaint but had no personal knowledge of the abuse allegations contained in Abuse Report 2000-198255, which formed the basis for the Administrative Complaint he prepared. Mr. Katz acknowledged that his understanding of the Agency's practice and policy was that "one incident of corporal punishment" did not equate to foster care license revocation. According to Mr. Katz, evaluating corporal punishment allegations requires all factors be taken into consideration and the totality of circumstances be reviewed; the intended result is a fact specific determination for each case of alleged corporal punishment. Kate Kimball's, the Sawyers' family service counselor, testimony was primarily concerned with agency reports dating from December 3, 1996, through the year 2000. Her testimony regarding and relating to matters that occurred prior to December 21, 2000, are not relevant nor material to issues of foster home license denial as stated in the Administrative Complaint that is challenged by Petitioners. However, Ms. Kimball's testimony regarding the Sawyers' life-style during the period she was their case worker is relevant and material to the issue of denial of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" children. The record reflects that in 1999, while fostering the "T/S" and the "M" siblings under the Agency's District Administrator's waiver of the rule-of-five policy, Petitioners were given an "Above Satisfactory" evaluation by the assigned foster care case worker, Kim Bryant. Ms. Bryant reported that the Sawyers are "very involved, supportative of the children's extra curricular activities and educational needs; show children much needed attention and affection; children and foster parents seem very fond of each other and there is much improvement with the children educationally and emotionally and they appear to have adjusted well in the home." Ms. Bryant's report is undisputed and credible. One year later, Hotline Report 2000-078274 was filed containing an allegation of medical negligence against Mrs. Sawyer as a result of her attempt to refill a prescribed medication for a foster child in her care after the child had taken all the medication. In this particular instance, the Agency had failed to provided Mrs. Sawyer with the child's medical record when the child was placed in her foster home. This medical negligence allegation was resolved when the case worker assigned to the Sawyers secured from the child's file the physician's prescription refill order. The Hotline Report was closed by the Agency with "No indicators of alleged maltreatment-or abuse/neglect." On June 26, 2000, and after the Sawyers added separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the girls and separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the boys to their home to accommodate 16 children, their case worker, Ms. Kimball, wrote, "It appeared that the Department has continued to utilize their home, as we have had no alternatives." The home study case worker's comments are revealing and reliable. It is reasonable to infer that the Agency was satisfied with the Sawyers' methods of disciplining foster children in their home, when they met the Agency's need for foster beds. However, when the Agency's need for foster beds were apparently met by other resources their prior position of satisfaction with the Sawyers, for reasons not entirely clear from the record, took a sudden 180-degree turn-about from satisfaction to dissatisfaction, within a six-month time period from June 26, 2000, to December 21, 2000. The case worker assigned to the "M" children, Anjanet Stilwell, reported that the Sawyers' foster home was "a wonderful foster home--they were very cooperative and caring." Case worker, Karen Braden, who was in the home twice weekly regarding kids assigned to her, wrote, "Cindy is great! I have no concerns regarding placement of my kids. I truly don't know how she does it!" I find Ms. Stilwell's and Ms. Braden's opinions acceptable and reflective of the Agency's approved satisfactory view of the Sawyers as foster parents for many children who were housed solely by the Agency's waiver of its rule-of-five policy and for its benefit. One foster care referral report regarding the "T/S" children written by case worker Heather Blair was considered at the Adoption Applicant Review Committee (AARC) staffing. In her report, Ms. Blair summarized Psychologist Lisa Gaise's conclusions that: "3 T/S children reported being paddle [sic] and 'the context in which these clear disclosures were made was so natural as to dispel any questions of the veracity of their statements.'" Apparently the AARC staffing considered Ms. Gaise's comments credible in their decision to deny the adoption application. The fact of the matter is that Ms. Blair's statement regarding the "truth" and acceptance of Lisa Gaise's opinion that the child's statement were true, is not accepted for the truth asserted and, therefore, is not credible.9 Bobby Cooper, another agency witness, commenced his investigation of Abuse Report 2000-198255, on December 21, 2000, at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Cooper's investigation consisted entirely of reviewing reports of other agency investigators. Mr. Cooper had no personal knowledge nor had he personally sought independent collaboration of statements contained in the reports he reviewed. His testimony is not credible. Kate Kimball, the case worker assigned to Petitioners' foster home, often made announced and unannounced visits to Petitioners' foster home, as required by Agency policy. Ms. Kimball was in close and constant contact with the foster children and the foster parents during her visits to the home. Ms. Kimball was required to (1) observe the foster children, speak in confidence with each child individually, immediately report any "signs" of abuse or "suspected abuse," and to (4) cause "removal" of a child or children from abusive foster home situations. Ms. Kimball never requested nor caused removal of a child from Petitioners' foster home during the period of December 21, 2000, through March 2001, the period the abuse reports were allegedly "verified." Detective Christi Esquinaldo was assigned to investigate this case by Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department. Her investigation consisted of interviewing foster child L.S., reviewing the abuse reports, and creating a matrix from those reports. The matrix consisted of Detective Esquinaldo's listing the names of children who were alleged to have been subjected to a specific abusive discipline crossed referenced by the names of the children who made the allegations. According to Detective Esquinaldo, L.S. told her that the Sawyers "made children stand in a corner for three to four hours" as punishment, and Lil David was restrained to a chair for "three to four hours." However, during her testimony at the hearing, L.S. denied having made those statements to Detective Esquinaldo. L.S.'s testimony at the final hearing is credible. In closing her investigation, Detective Esquinaldo recommended to the State Attorney's Office the direct filing of a felony charge of Aggravated Child Abuse against the Sawyers. The Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office, citing "numerous inconsistencies in the statements of the children," declined to file any charges against the Sawyers and closed their files on the matter. After reviewing the children's testimonies of record, I am compelled to agree with the Hillsborough County State Attorney Office that the "inconsistencies of the statements of the children" render their collective testimonies unreliable and insufficient to provide a preponderance of evidence necessary to establish a fact. None of the adult witnesses, presented by the Agency, possessed knowledge acquired through collaboration of the children's stories from independent sources and/or their investigations regarding the abuse allegations alleged in the Complaint. The Agency's employees' initial and total acceptance of the children's recollection of time, i.e. as "all day" and "all night," should have, but did not raise reasonable concern regarding each child's ability to differentiate between fantasy and reality and the child's accuracy of recall as well. The children's story-line, that Petitioners forced each of them to walk, to stand in time-outs, to dig holes, to sleep in their beds or do any other activities "all day" or "all night," was testified to as a form of punishment and not discipline for acting up. Accepting as true, accurate, and realistic, their identical versions of four specific experiences from the several children without more does not equate to credible nor collaborative evidence. The testimonies presented by several foster children at this hearing were, at best, confusing, conflicting and contradictory. When asked specific questions about the several forms and methods of discipline, the unanimity of their responses were: stand in the corner "all night," dig holes "all day," walk in circles "all day," and sleep in the bed "all day." The fact that the children's testimonies clustered in a certain position (sibling groups wanting to stay together as a group and those sibling groups wanting to be moved to another foster home as a group gave almost identical answers to questions relating to specific disciplines) does not mean nor imply that their testimonies were necessarily accurate, realistic, or true. In fact, the record reflects that several of the testimonies initially given by the children to the Agency were in conflict with their testimonies subsequently given to the Agency representatives and testimony given at the final hearing. Considering the children's testimonies in the context of the children's ages; the children's physical sizes; the physical improbability of a small child actually squatting, with knees bent, against a wall with both arms held out in front of the body or held out to the sides of their bodies all day; and their description of time as "all day" and "all-night," rendered their collective testimonies unrealistic, unreliable and, therefore, not credible. Steve Barber, Petitioners' pastor and the one who has interfaced with the foster children, based upon his experience as a former high school football coach, gave undisputed testimony that the physical size and stature of the young children made it physically impossible for any of them to "stand, squat, dig or walk in circles, all day." Based upon the testimony of Mr. Barber and the unrealistic testimonies of the several children, Respondent has failed to prove that Petitioners committed "excesses" in administering policy discipline, by imposing time-outs, separation from other children, grounding, loss of privileges, and by assigning other chores. I find that the cumulative testimonies of the foster children found in the Agency reports in evidence and of those children who testified at the final hearing unreliable, inconsistent, devoid of details, physically impossible in most instances and, therefore, insufficient to establish by a preponderance that the Sawyers subjected them to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints as punishment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause. Of the three video-taped interviews reviewed by the undersigned, the interview of D.I. revealed a reliable and detailed account of the daily life and activities of the foster children in the Sawyers' home from an articulate child with personal knowledge and accurate recall of events. First, D.I. was in the Sawyers' foster care for a period of seven months. Second, D.I. appeared to be bright, intelligent, articulate, straight-forward, and he was definite and clear in his responses to questions asked by the Agency's spokesperson. Third, D.I.'s memory of details was complete, uncompromising, realistic, and reasonable. Fourth, D.I. acknowledged that his possibility of being reunited with his biological mother was nonexistent, and he would probably be in foster care until his majority, if not adopted, preferably by the Sawyers. Fifth, he is familiar with and aware of foster children, individually and as sibling groups "working the foster care system for their desired ends by telling stories." During his seven months' stay in foster care with the Sawyers, D.I. testified that he never saw nor was he made aware by other children of any child punished by the Sawyers in the form of being forced to stand in time-out "all day," forced to dig holes "all night," or forced to walk in circles "all day." D.I. knew that Lil L.S. pooped in her pants and smeared the poop over the walls of the foster care residence. He knows this because he was one of the older children who volunteered to clean the poop off the walls; he remembers these incidents because the walls had "white spots" where the cleaning solutions were used. He also remembered because Mrs. Sawyer would put white powder on the bedroom floor leading from Lil L.S.'s room to other parts of the house. In the morning when Lil L.S. was awaken and asked about poop on the walls, she would blame other children, but her foot prints would prove contradiction of the story of not having gotten out of bed during the night. According to D.I., Lil L.S. was never "hosed down outside" the house after pooping on herself. Each time Lil L.S. pooped on herself, Mrs. Cindy would require her to go into her bathroom10 and bathe herself. When asked about household chores and work around the house as a form of punishment, D.I. answered that older children would be offered the opportunity to "work outside" with Mr. Sawyer on "things around the house," only if that child wanted to work outside. If not, the child was given the option to stay outside and play or to go inside and watch T.V., play games, or do other things. D.I. was emphatic that the opportunity to do other things was made available to each child only after that child completed his or her homework. Homework was always first, and some children got in trouble because of not doing or completing their homework. According to D.I., the younger children who played outside would customarily play in the round-about driveway, the yard, and on the Jungle Jim play set. The older children would customarily do other things. D.I.'s examples of "doing things around the house" were: helping Mr. Sawyer work on his truck; putting together and/or repairing the Jungle Jim swing-slide play set; helping to dig a trench line to lay pipe for the new water heater connection; tending to and caring for the animals; planting trees and stuff; and painting and building additional bathrooms and bedrooms onto the house. According to D.I., all outside activities were made available to any children who wished to participate in them instead of playing among themselves. When asked, D.I. was empathic in his answer that no child, "as a form of punishment," was forced to assist Mr. Sawyer in "doing things around the house," if they wanted to help they could, if not, then other activities were available and that no child was handcuffed nor had he seen any (metal) handcuffs at the Sawyers' house, save his pair of red plastic toy handcuffs that came with a toy set the Sawyers gave him. D.I., from observation, knew Lil David to be self-mutilating.11 D.I. recalls that "Lil David would sometimes just pick himself to make himself bleed." During his seven-month stay and on more than one occasion, in passing, D.I. would see Lil David in bed at night with velcro restraints on his wrists and the bed to stop him from picking himself and making himself bleed. "Mrs. Cindy did this to keep Lil David from picking himself when he was asleep."12 Regarding meal times and meals at Mrs. Cindy's, D.I. stated that all the children ate the same meal at the same time "cause there was so many of us and Mrs. Cindy had no time for separate meals and we [older children] helped to feed the young children, we did help." When asked about peanut butter sandwiches as a form of punishment, D.I. responded, "Those children who had been bad or were in time-out at mealtime were separated from the other children and given peanut butter sandwiches to eat while in their time-outs. But Mrs. Cindy would say to them 'say you are sorry and you can join us.'" He never saw nor knew of a child in time-out (against the wall) for "hours." The longest time-out he could recall was about "20 minutes," and that was because the child was "acting up" in the time-out and had additional time added to the time-out. D.I. was familiar with the "T/S" and (other) siblings. He knew from personal experience in foster care that older siblings would instruct their younger siblings on all matters: what to say, when to say it, how to act, and how to act up. D.I. was personally familiar with "foster homes" and the means and methods of "getting out of one" and "staying together" as a sibling group and getting into another as a group. When asked about "corporal punishment" i.e. spanking with a wooden paddle and/or slapping with hands, D.I. testified that during his seven-month stay, he knew of no child to have gotten spanked with a wood paddle. "I never saw a wood paddle." Regarding "getting slapped by Mrs. Cindy" as punishment, D.I. answered that Ms. Cindy would "tap" you on the back of the head, butt, or shoulder "to get your attention, like if she was talking to you and you were watching T.V. and not answering her but she never slapped any of us for punishment." This method of getting one child's attention by touching is reasonable when considered in the context of the Agency's waiver of its rule-of- five policy so as to place as many as 16 to 20 children in the Sawyers' foster care home. 13 The video testimony of D.I. is accurate, detailed, reasonable, realistic, based upon his personal knowledge, undisputed and, therefore, credible. Based in part upon the video testimony of D.I., Respondent has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the Sawyers subjected a foster child in their care to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints for the time period alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints on Lil David was neither excessive, punitive nor disciplinary, but rather was for Lil David's protection from harming himself. The Sawyers' used velcro restraints on Lil David during the day only when he was in time-out and sitting in a small rocking chair and during the night when he was put to bed. The evidence of record by testimonies of virtually every witnesses who knew Lil David knew him to be a self-mutilator. The use of restraints is an acceptable, preventative method for protection in this situation. The record contains no evidence that the Agency provided the Sawyers with an evaluation report of Lil David upon his placement nor during his stay within their foster home. Lil David's medical report would have advised the Sawyers of Lil David's self-mutilation problem. It is a reasonable assumption that had the Agency provided Lil David's medical records, the Sawyers would have been alerted to Lil David's self-mutilation problem and would have had the benefit of the Agency's instructions regarding care and protection for Lil David's problem of self-mutilation. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints reflects a caring and sincere effort of the foster parents to protect the child from hurting himself. In the absence of information from the Agency regarding Lil David's condition, the Sawyers' use of an acceptable, safe and preventative method of care for this particular problem reflects their efforts to comply with the "spirit" of the rules regarding foster parent responsibilities. The record contains no evidence that the Sawyers' use of velcro restraints to prevent Lil David's self- mutilation was "willfully harmful" or "neglect" or an "abusive" act of intentional punishment. Bobby Cooper's, child protection investigator, reported findings and conclusions were based entirely upon statements provided by individuals he interviewed. The record contains no evidence of collaboration to substantiate testimonies of the children. Therefore, Mr. Cooper's testimony is hearsay without support and therefore, not credible. Finally, consideration is given to what is not in evidence. First, the record in this case contains no evidence of a child alleged to have suffered ongoing neglect and abuse in the form of excessive, bizarre,14 and inappropriate punishment, or to have borne body marks or bruises resulting from the alleged treatment by the Sawyers. Second, the record in this case contains no evidence of a Sawyer-housed foster child to have suffered "physical, mental or emotional injury" as the result of the alleged negligent and abusive treatment. Third, the record contains no evidence from which it could be inferred that a foster child removed from Petitioners' home suffered a "discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior" as a direct result of the alleged abusive discipline.15 The evidence of record supports a reasonable conclusion that Mrs. Sawyer was proactive in seeking the assistance of local politicians and state officials to accomplish her apparent goal of responsive and exceptional services from the Department for her foster children. It is undisputed that the Sawyers, with the advice and consent of the Department, had more foster children than was reasonable to expect only two adults to provide a minimal of custodial care. Permitting the Sawyers to house as many as 16 to 20 foster children, plus their two biological children, at any point in time, was permissive and self serving by the Department and was overreaching acceptance by the Sawyers. It is a reasonable inference that in this case both the Department and the Sawyers engaged in a mutual course of conduct to satisfy their respective needs and desires. When the mutually beneficial relationship came to a close, a reversal of opinions and recommendations from the Department regarding the Sawyers occurred. The Sawyers, who had been described by the Department as "unbelievable foster parents," became merely unbelievable when confronted with and evaluated by conflicting stories of 14 foster children removed from their home. Denial of Adoption Application for the M sibling group Turning to evidence in the record regarding the denial of Petitioners' application to adopt the four "M" siblings, the fact that some animosity existed between Ms. Gains16 and Mrs. Sawyer, became readily apparent during Ms. Gains' testimony. The existence of animosity was further confirmed by Ms. Gains' detailed chronology of alleged abusive acts and omissions by Mrs. Sawyer over a period in excess of one year. When answering questions asked by the Agency's representative regarding Ms. Gains' statements and opinion of Mrs. Sawyer, D.I. answered: "She [sic] said handcuffs and other things about Mrs. Cindy so as to get kids moved out of Mrs. Cindy's house to her house." Based upon D.I. testimony above, Ms. Gains' testimony given at the hearing and her written report in evidence is biased and unreliable. In the evaluation and review of Petitioners' adoption request, Respondent appropriately engaged in a holistic evaluation of all abuse reports filed, investigative reports, personal opinions, and comments from Department employees, community members and other foster parents, dating from as early as 1986 to the date of the adoption denial. Respondent, in reevaluation of Petitioners' adoption request for the "M" children, should hereinafter be guided by the Findings of Fact herein that allegations of excessive discipline as contained in the Administrative Compliant herein were not proven by the testimonies of the Agency's witnesses and documentary evidence. Therefore, allegations found in Abuse Report 2000-198255 reported or alleged to have occurred within the time period of December 21, 2000, through March 1, 2001, shall not be considered by the Agency in its reevaluation of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" siblings; being mindful that the "M" siblings' desire to be adopted by the Sawyers is in the "M" child(ren)'s best interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting renewal of Petitioners' Foster Care License. It is further RECOMMENDED, that in accord with the expressed desires of the "M" siblings to be adopted by Petitioners, that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioners' application to adopt the "M" siblings. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2002.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Children and Family Services should revoke the foster care license of Joey and Donna Tolbert.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the home of Joey and Donna Tolbert was licensed by the Department as a foster home. They were initially licensed provisionally in December of 1998 for one year. They received a regular license in 1999 and retained a regular license until December 1, 2000, when they were issued license number 1200-008-2, a child specific license with a capacity of two children. The Relicensure Process Prior to issuing the child specific license, two Department employees of the Department, Mary Martin, a relicensing counselor for foster homes, and Ann Brock, a family services counselor, conducted a relicensing visit to the Tolbert's home on October 12, 2000. Donna Tolbert was present but Joey Tolbert was out of town. During the home visit, a Bilateral Service Agreement (Agreement) was signed by Mrs. Tolbert and Ms. Martin. The Agreement was signed and dated by Mr. Tolbert and again by Ms. Martin on October 17, 2000. The relicensing visit resulted in a Foster Home Relicensing Summary written by Mary Martin. The Summary recommended that the Tolberts be issued a regular license effective December 1, 2000 through December 1, 2001, for the capacity of two children. The Summary was signed by Mary Martin on October 26, 2000, and read in pertinent part as follows: The Tolbert family is an invaluable asset to this Department. They have made themselves available on a regular basis for the placement of children when needed. Both Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are experienced in childcare and they have three (3) children with special needs whom they adopted prior. They should not be asked to take numerous children with severe behavioral problems or teenagers. It appears Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert have satisfied the Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 65C-15, requirements. It is respectfully recommended that the Tolbert family be issued a REGULAR license, effective December 1, 2000, through December 1, 2001, for the a capacity of two (2) children, ages birth (0) through twelve (12) years of either gender. Children with severe behavioral problems and teenagers are not to be placed in the Tolbert home. However, Ms. Martin later wrote an addendum to the licensing summary. According to Ms. Martin, she was asked by her supervisor, Jill Green, to write the addendum. The addendum is undated but references the October 12, 2000, home relicensing visit that resulted in her original recommendation. There is also an entry dated October 16, 2000, which is a date prior in time to her signature to the original relicensure summary, and an entry dated November 17, 2000. The addendum relates to matters concerning the Tolberts and their adopted son, Mi.1/ Richard Messerly has worked for the Department for approximately 22 years and works in protective investigations in Pensacola. From June 1999 through September 2001, he was the program operations administrator for the central licensing unit of the Department. In that position, he had authority over foster care licensure. He supervised Mary Martin and her supervisor, Jill Green. Mr. Messerly signed Ms. Martin's relicensure summary on December 4, 2000, and initialed both pages of her addendum. He also created a written history of the Tolbert foster home which concluded with a recommendation that the Tolberts' foster home license be revoked: SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS The Tolbert family has a positive licensing history of capably caring for many of our foster children. However, a serious change has occurred in the family's willingness to work with our staff, including rebuffing our attempts to offer them assistance with the disruption of an adoptive placement. The Tolberts have attempted to convince others that they had been requesting assistance for M for a very long period of time and that this is flatly not borne out in licensing records. The matter was never brought to our attention until the visit in October 2000, at which time the matter was promptly referred to the adoptions unit, who responded promptly. Since that time the family has not cooperated with any attempts to assist them in that matter, and they seem to be insensitive to M's plight, and are completely focused on regaining their prior licensed status, as if nothing had happened. Contacts with Pat Franklin, Kathi Guy, Sally Townsend and others reflect the absence of any prompt attempts to get help dealing with M's behaviors, yet many requests were made regarding foster children in their care with similar problems during the same time frame. It appears the family was more focused on attending the needs of foster children to the exclusion of sensitivity to their own (adopted) child's cries for help. Even when the needs were identified, the family was unwilling to become involved in attempts to remedy the problems and appeared to have given up on the child. I am very uncomfortable with the inappropriate position this family has taken in regard to our family safety staff, as well as licensing staff, and do not see how we can hope to interact positively with them given their recent radical behaviors and threats. I feel that they have violated the Bilateral Service Agreement and have failed to "Treat all members of the foster care team with respect and courtesy." I recommend that we revoke the license using the violation of the agreement in conjunction with their other oppositional behaviors, omissions, and misrepresentations reflected in family safety foster care and adoptions records. On December 1, 2000, Mr. Messerly signed a letter on behalf of Charles Bates addressed to the Tolberts which read: Dear Mr. And Mrs. Tolbert: Your home has been relicensed for the continuance placement of D and M.R. only. No other placements or overcapacity requests will be authorized at this time. A regular license is issued for twelve months pending the outcome of matters presently before the Circuit Court. If you have questions or wish to discuss this further, please contact Jill Greene, Foster Care Licensing Supervisor at (850)- 595-8451. On June 4, 2001, Mrs. Tolbert met with Charles Bates, District Administrator for District 1 of the Department. This meeting was at Mrs. Tolbert's request regarding her foster care licensure status. During that meeting, Mrs. Tolbert complained to Mr. Bates about certain adoption case workers. On August 24, 2001, Charles Bates sent a letter to the Tolberts notifying them of the revocation of their license. The letter reads in pertinent part as follows: RE: Revocation of Foster Home License. Dear Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Children and Families has made a decision to revoke your foster home license. The basis for this decision is your failure to comply with Florida Administrative Code 65C-13 and the Bilateral Service Agreement (form CF-FSP 5226) which you executed. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.009(1)(e)5. states: Work in a partnership. Develop partnerships with children and youth, birth families, the department, and the community to develop and carry out plans for permanency. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(1)(c)1. states: Substitute care parents are expected to work cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(4)(i) states: The substitute care parents must be able to accept supervision by department staff and participate in and support case plans for children in their homes. Specifically, substitute care parents must be included in the development of performance agreements or permanent placement plans, and in the carrying out of these plans. As part of your foster care licensing, you executed a bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement that you signed enumerated the Administrative Code responsibilities and detailed responsibilities of foster parents. The paragraphs violated are listed below in pertinent part: h. To notify the department immediately of a potential change in a family composition, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well- being. Obtain authorization from the department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. To accept the direction and supervision given by department to assist in caring for the foster child. To work cooperatively with the department to attend scheduled meetings to discuss the child and his family and to meet the needs of the child. To treat all members of the foster care team (i.e., the department, child's family, and GALS) with respect and courtesy. As stated in the service agreement, non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of the service agreement and may also result in the department revoking the home's license. You have failed to comply with the above code citations and service agreement provisions in that you have accused departmental staff of failing to disclose complete information to you and of misrepresenting statements that you have made. You have not worked cooperatively with the department employees who offered to assist you and your child; and have not worked in partnership with the department. Specifically, you have previously stated you were obtaining therapy for a child, didn't agree with the therapist's recommendation, and were obtaining a psychiatric evaluation and assessment for the child, when in fact you did not do any of those things. A review of the department records reflected concerns you mentioned to the department in October 2000, regarding your child's disruptive behavior. However you would accept no assistance even though the department offered extensive assistance. You surrendered your adopted child later that same month. Further, you have stated to a department employee that Ms. Peggy Custred and Ms. Sally Townsend should not work for the department, have accused them of wrongdoing, and have stated that you "will have their jobs." You have failed to treat members of the department with respect and courtesy. Given the above problems, I find that it would not be in the children's best interests to continue licensing your foster home and am permanently revoking your license. The Tolberts as foster parents The overwhelming evidence shows that the Tolberts were excellent foster parents. Jane Crittenden, licensing supervisor for the Department, who was a foster care supervisor at the times material to this proceeding, acknowledged that the Tolberts received the award of Foster Parents of the Year in May of 2000 for the year 1999. She also acknowledged that as far as she knew, the Tolberts excelled as far as their work as foster parents; the foster children in their care did quite well; the Tolberts always seemed to provide a loving, nurturing home to foster children placed there; the Tolberts were called on by the Department to take extra children beyond their cap, which they agreed to do; and the Tolberts cooperated with her and her case workers during the period of time she worked with them. Arlene Johnson, a former guardian ad litem for a foster child in the Tolberts' home from December 1998 until July 1999, visited the Tolbert home about twice a week during that time. She has been in a lot of foster homes and described the Tolberts' home as "the best one I've been in." Gerald Reese, a family service counselor for the Department, worked with the Tolberts over a period of 6 to 7 months in 1999 and 2000 while he was a case worker. During that time, Mr. Reese did not have problems dealing with the Tolberts, did not observe any instance in which the children were not adequately provided for, and observed that the foster children in the Tolberts' home were happy. Richard Messerly acknowledged that the Tolberts were exemplary foster parents as far as the care they provided to the foster children in their care. Mr. Messerly also acknowledged that the only staff the Tolberts had problems with were particular members of the adoption staff, not the Department's foster care staff. The wallpaper expense Carlita Bennett was employed by the Department from 1986 until March of 2002. When she was working for the Department in the capacity of a foster parent recruiter in May of 2001, she sent an e-mail message to Mary Martin regarding the Tolberts which contained the following: 11/04/99 A restitution claim form was submitted by Mrs. T for damage to wallpaper caused by 2 yr. Old. The bill total was $1,151.04 to replace wallpaper in living room, dining room, kitchen and hall. PS Counselors were not made aware of the damage until repairs were made. According to Ms. Bennett, it is regular procedure for someone from the department to go out to a foster home and look at damage before repairs are made. The Bilateral Services Agreement requires the foster parents to obtain authorization from the Department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. According to Ms. Bennett, this policy was not followed in this instance. Ms. Bennett did not explain why she sent the e-mail message on May 30, 2001, to Mary Martin referencing an incident that took place two and one-half years earlier. According to Mrs. Tolbert, a former two-year-old foster child in her care ripped the wallpaper in the dining room and the living room. Her dining room, kitchen, and hallway are all one color. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she gave an estimate of the repair work to Shiela Campbell, an employee of the Department. Richard Messerly acknowledged that this matter of the expense for wallpaper would not in and of itself have resulted in the Department revoking the Tolberts' foster care license. At most, the Department would have only talked to the Tolberts had there not been other issues about which the Department was concerned. Notification to Department of change of condition The August 24, 2001, revocation letter from Mr. Bates alleged that the Tolberts failed to notify the Department of a potential change in conditions in the home that might affect the well-being of foster care children in the home. This allegation relates to behavior problems of the Tolberts' adopted son, Mi. The Tolberts adopted Mi. in September of 1998. They signed surrenders of Mi. in November of 2000. The Tolberts' surrender of Mi. was central to the Department's decision to revoke the Tolbert's foster care license.2/ Mi. began having serious behavior problems in 1999. Mrs. Tolbert recalls telling Gerald Reese, the foster care worker assigned to the Tolberts at that time, about problems with Mi. Mr. Reese acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert mentioned to him problems she was having with Mi. to which he responded that she should bring it to the attention of the adoption case worker. The Tolberts' adoption case worker was Sally Townsend. Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert stopped by her office three times when Mrs. Tolbert was in the Ft. Walton Beach Service Center to see other department employees. Mrs. Townsend acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert told her of behavior problems with Mi. the first time she stopped by Mrs. Townsend's office. The second time Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert told her Mi.'s behavior problems were better. The third time, however, Mrs. Tolbert informed Mrs. Townsend that Mi.'s behavior was much worse. Mrs. Tolbert remembers these encounters with Mrs. Townsend differently. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she met with Mrs. Townsend approximately 10 times during which she spoke to her about Mi.'s behavior problems. According to Mrs. Townsend's case notes, Mrs. Tolbert told her on October 24, 2000, that Mi. was urinating all over the house, had gotten a butcher knife out of a drawer in the kitchen, and shoved a puppy's head under a piece of furniture. Evidence was presented at hearing regarding whether or when the Tolberts received notice that Mi. had significant problems before he was adopted by the Tolberts. However, what is important for purposes of this proceeding is when was the Department notified of Mi.'s problems. The Department knew of Mi.'s previous problems prior in time to the Tolberts adopting Mi. and were told as early as 1999 that the Tolberts were experiencing behavior problems with Mi. Kathi Guy is an adoption program specialist for the department. She met with the Tolberts immediately after Mrs. Tolbert met with Mr. Bates on June 4, 2001. On June 21, 2001, she wrote a memorandum to Charles Bates concerning the issues relating to the Tolberts. Regarding the issue of the Tolberts' responsibility of notifying the Department of Mi.'s behavior in relation to the foster children in the home, Ms. Guy wrote, "It is unclear what responsibility the Tolberts had to inform Central Licensing of M's behaviors that may have had injurious effects on foster children in their care." Working in partnership The June 24, 2001, revocation letter alleges that the Tolberts failed to work in partnership with the Department and did not obtain certain services for Mi. although they were offered. It is important to remember that the provisions to which Mr. Bates' revocation letter references are part of the Bilateral Services Agreement that pertained to the Tolberts' role as foster parents. However, Mi. was their adopted son, he was not a foster child at that time. Further, there is ample evidence in the record that the Tolberts sought and received services for Mi. over time, although they were in disagreement with the Department regarding certain services during the time immediately preceding the surrender of Mi. Marianne Vance is a first grade teacher. Mi. was in her class for two years. According to Ms. Vance, Mi. received testing in school for learning disabilities and for "everything possible." When Mi.'s behavior problems became worse during his second year in Ms. Vance's class, Mrs. Tolbert sought assistance from the school. The school counselor worked with Mi. and Mrs. Tolbert. According to Ms. Vance, the Tolberts did everything possible in seeking help or assistance.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order rescinding its revocation of the Tolberts' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2002.
