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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROY AHRINGER, 85-000118 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000118 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1985

Findings Of Fact Roy Ahringer, hereinafter referred to as "Respondent" has held real estate broker-salesman license number 0158288 at all times material hereto. From approximately August 15, 1983 to November 20, 1983, and from approximately March 1, 1984 to April 30, 1984, Respondent was licensed and operated as a real estate salesman in the employ of Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., a licensed brokerage Corporation. On or about August 11, 1983, Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., obtained from Mildred M. Haydon, as owner, a six month listing to sell certain property designated as Lot 9, Block 353, Section 26 Lake Placid, at a price of "any reasonable cash offer". By the terms of this listing agreement, the listing would continue beyond the six month period "until this agreement is revoked by a ten day's written notice" delivered by the owner to Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc. There is no evidence that this listing agreement was ever revoked and it remained in effect during the time Respondent was employed at Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc. Respondent was therefore an agent for Mildred M. Haydon. While this listing agreement was in effect, Respondent obtained a sales contract on March 29, 1984, executed by Robert J. and Marjorie P. Mitchell, as purchasers, for the purchase of Mildred M. Haydon's Lot 9 at a total purchase price of $5000. On April 30, 1984, the Mitchells executed two checks totaling $5000 to Highlands Holiday Realty which were to be placed in a trust account for this transaction. The contract was initially prepared omitting the name and address of the seller but was later completed by Respondent by having a secretary at Highlands Holiday Realty Inc. type in the names of Roy Ahringer and May Ahringer as sellers. On March 31, 1984 Respondent and his wife, May Ahringer, executed a contract for sale and purchase of Mildred M. Haydon's Lot 9 for the purchase price of $2220. Mildred M. Haydon executed this contract for sale and purchase on April 4, 1984. Subsequently this transaction closed and Respondent, with his wife, purchased the subject property for $2220 on or about May 23 or 24, 1984. The evidence presented establishes that Respondent did not explain to the Mitchells or to Mildred M. Haydon that he would be purchasing the property for $2220 from Mildred M. Haydon and then reselling the property to the Mitchells for $5000. Mildred M. Hayden was not informed of the Mitchell's offer of $5000 for her lot prior to her sale of the lot to Respondent. It is Respondent's contention that he told the Mitchells he was having a problem with the lot owner and that he might have to buy it from her in order to be able to resell it to the Mitchells. However, no evidence supporting this assertion was presented by Respondent, and in any event there is no evidence that the Mitchells or Mildred M. Haydon knew about the difference in the purchase and resale prices which would have resulted from this transaction. When the circumstances surrounding this transaction became apparent to Ronald N. Weisser, broker and owner of Highlands Holiday Realty, Inc., he stopped the Ahringer-Mitchell transaction, and the $5000 paid by the Mitchells for this lot has been returned to them. Respondent still owns the subject property. Mildred M. Hayden was damaged in an amount of approximately $2780 due to Respondent's failure to present the Mitchells' offer to her. The Mitchells were damaged in an amount equal to the interest they were required to pay on money borrowed for the purchase price during the period when the funds were retained in a non-interest bearing escrow account. The parties were allowed to submit post-hearing proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, F.S. A ruling on each proposed finding has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order except where such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative immaterial or unnecessary.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a period of two (2) years and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1000). DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1985 at Tallahassee Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 10th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roy Ahringer 232 Harmony Avenue Lake Placid Florida 33852 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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SUNRISE OPPORTUNITIES, INC.; SUNRISE COMMUNITIES, INC.; AND THE HAVEN CENTER, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 02-000085 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 09, 2002 Number: 02-000085 Latest Update: Oct. 22, 2002

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Department of Children and Families (DCF), may impose a moratorium for new residents at The Haven Center, Inc., for those who are enrolled in the Developmental Services Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Program (DS Waiver).

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating residential facilities that provide DS waiver services. Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., Sunrise Communities, Inc., and The Haven Center, Inc., are members of the Sunrise group of providers that serve individuals with developmental disabilities. Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., is a charitable, tax-exempt entity that provides residential and day treatment services to individuals under the DS Waiver program. The Haven Center, Inc., owns seven homes located on 23+/- acres in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The homes located at The Haven Center, Inc., are operated by Sunrise Opportunities, Inc. Such homes have been monitored and reviewed by the DCF on numerous occasions. The reviews or inspections have never revealed a significant deficiency. Moreover, historically the DCF has determined that residents at The Haven Center, Inc., have received a high quality of care. For some unknown time the parties were aware of a need to move individuals residing at The Haven Center into community homes in the greater South Miami-Dade County area. Concurrently, it was planned that individuals in substandard housing would then be moved into The Haven Center. This "transition plan" as it is called in the record would be accomplished as improvements were completed to the Sunrise properties. That the parties anticipated the transition plan would be implemented as stated is undisputed. Because it believed the transition plan had been agreed upon and would be followed, Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., incurred a considerable debt and expended significant expenses to purchase and improve homes in the South Miami-Dade County area. Additionally, DS Waiver participants were moved from The Haven Center to the six-person homes in South Miami-Dade County. In fact, over fifty percent of The Haven Center residents have made the move. In contrast with the transition plan, only 12 individuals were allowed to move into The Haven Center. Instead, DCF notified the Petitioners of a moratorium prohibiting the placement of DS Waiver residents into The Haven Center. This moratorium, represented to be "temporary," is on-going and was unabated through the time of hearing. The moratorium prompted the instant administrative action. Upon notice of DCF's intention to impose a moratorium on The Haven Center, the Petitioners timely challenged such agency action. DCF based the moratorium upon an Order Approving Settlement Agreement entered in the case of Prado-Steiman v. Bush, Case No. 98-6496-CIV-FERGUSON, by United States District Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. on August 8, 2001. The Petitioners had objected to the approval of the Settlement Agreement in Prado-Steiman but the court overruled the objectors finding they, as providers of services to the DS Waiver residents, did not have standing in the litigation. The Prado-Steiman case was initiated by a group of disabled individuals on behalf of the class of similarly situated persons who claimed the State of Florida had failed to meet its responsibility to such individuals under Federal law. Without detailing the case in its totality, it is sufficient for purposes of this case to find that the Prado-Steiman Settlement Agreement imposed specific criteria on the State of Florida which were to be met according to the prospective plan approved and adopted by the court. At the time the Prado-Steiman case was filed, The Haven Center was licensed as a residential habilitation center. After the Settlement Agreement was executed by the parties in Prado-Steiman, but before the court entered its Order Approving Settlement Agreement, the licensure status of The Haven Center changed. Effective June 1, 2001, The Haven Center became licensed as seven group homes together with a habilitation center. Pertinent to this case are specific provisions of the Prado-Steiman Settlement Agreement (Agreement). These provisions are set forth below. First, regarding group home placements, the Agreement provides that: The parties agree that they prefer that individuals who are enrolled in the Waiver [DS Waiver] live and receive services in smaller facilities. Consistent with this preference, the parties agree to the following: The Department [DCF] will target choice counseling to those individuals, [sic] enrolled on the Waiver who presently reside in residential habilitation centers (where more than 15 persons reside and receive services). The focus of this choice counseling will be to provide information about alternative residential placement options. The Department will begin this targeted choice counseling by December 1, 2000, and will substantially complete the choice counseling by December 1, 2001. * * * 4. The Department and the Agency [Agency for Health Care Administration] agree that, in the residential habilitation centers, if a vacancy occurs on or after the date this agreement is approved by the Court, the Department will not fill that vacancy with an individual enrolled on the Waiver. (Emphasis added) None of the individually licensed group homes at The Haven Center is authorized to house more than 15 persons. All of the group home licenses at The Haven Center were approved before the Prado-Steiman Court approved the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that the parties: . . . have agreed that the Court may retain jurisdiction of this litigation until December 31, 2001, at which time this case will be dismissed with prejudice. The Plaintiffs may seek to continue the jurisdiction of the Court and to pursue any of the relief requested in this lawsuit only if they can show material breach as evidenced by systemic deficiencies in the Defendants' implementation of the Plan of Compliance. In any motion to continue the jurisdiction of the Court, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that alleged breaches and any proposed cure were fully disclosed to the state defendants consistent with the "Notice and Cure" provisions set forth below in paragraphs 7-10 below, that the action requested by the plaintiffs is required by existing law, and the State Defendants have refused to take action required by law. Such relief may not be sought after the scheduled dismissal of the litigation. Absent the allegation of material breach in a pending motion, the Court will dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice on December 31, 2001. (Emphasis added) Also pertinent to this case, the Agreement provides: 19. The parties' breach, or alleged breach, of this Agreement (or of the terms contained herein) will not be used by any party as a basis for any further litigation. "Systemic problems or deficiencies" is defined by the Agreement to mean: problems or deficiencies which are common in the administration of the Waiver, inconsistent with the terms of this Stipulated Agreement, and in violation of federal law. Isolated instances of deficiencies or violations of federal law, without evidence of more pervasive conduct, are not "systemic" in nature. State otherwise, a problem or deficiency is systemic if it requires restructuring of the Florida Developmental Services Home and Community-Based Services Waiver program itself in order to comply with the provisions of federal law regarding the Waiver; but that it is not "systemic" if it only involves a substantive claim having to do with limited components of the program, and if the administrative process is capable of correcting the problem. After the Agreement was adopted the Respondent advised Petitioners to continue with the transition plan. On or about September 1, 2001, the Petitioners and the Respondent entered into contracts for the group homes operated at The Haven Center. Each home is properly licensed, has honored its contracts to provide services to disabled individuals, and has complied with state licensure laws. A licensed Residential Habilitation Center may not have a licensed capacity of less than nine. Advocacy issued a letter dated March 8, 2002, that alleged systemic problems constituting material breaches of the Agreement. Among the cited alleged deficiencies is the failure of the state to ensure . . . that locally-licensed providers receiving waiver funds for providing group- home services in fact are providing services in that setting rather than in institutional settings. Examples include: a) A former residential habilitation center known as Haven is now licensed as a group home in District 11 (Miami/Dade) and receives HCBS waiver funds. There is no evidence that The Haven Center is providing services in any setting other than as licensed by the Respondent. That is, there is no evidence it is not operating as individually licensed group homes. Further, Advocacy had actual knowledge of the instant administrative action. In short, it did not attempt to participate in the Petitioners' challenge to the moratorium. DCF has imposed a moratorium on no other licensed group home in the State of Florida. The group homes at The Haven Center are the sole targets for this administrative decision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a Final Order lifting the moratorium on placements of DS Waiver participants at The Haven Center's group homes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Sevices 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Veronica E. Donnelly, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger & Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue, Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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K. B., J. B., M. B., T. B., AND S. B. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 95-004672F (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Sep. 22, 1995 Number: 95-004672F Latest Update: Feb. 28, 1996

Findings Of Fact For the purposes of the motion, the parties stipulated to the following facts: The Department's action giving rise to Petitioners' petition for attorney's fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, was to propose confirm a report of abuse/neglect against each of the five Petitioners in their individual capacity. Each Petitioner requested a formal hearing under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, which resulted in five separate cases, none of which named Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. as a party. The five cases were consolidated but were subsequently dismissed as a result of the Department downgrading each case to "closed without classification". All five of the Petitioners worked at the Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. and are related to each other. The Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., is a Florida corporation in good standing and registered with the State of Florida as an adult congregate living facility. James E. Biggins is the president and a director of Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., and is the corporation's sole shareholder. Palmetto Guest Home, Inc., was not named as a party in the underlying administrative action and is not one of the Petitioners in this case. James E. Biggins was not named as an alleged perpetrator in the underlying administrative action and is not one of the Petitioners in this case. James E. Biggins is the father of Petitioners, K.B., J.J.B. and M.B., who are vice presidents of the corporation. James E. Biggins is the husband of Petitioner S.B., who is a director and the secretary/treasurer of the corporation. James E. Biggins is the father-in-law of Petitioner T.B., who is the administrator of Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. Palmetto Guest Home, Inc. has net a worth of less than two million dollars.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. O. B. LINKOUS AND O. B. LINKOUS REALTY, INC., 80-002235 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-002235 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1982

Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Delmar D. Carter purchased the Buccaneer Motel and Woodside Apartments [the motel] from C.E.K., Inc., whom respondents represented in the sale. Respondents agreed to accept less from C.E.K., Inc., as their commission on the sale, that they might have otherwise, because the Carters agreed to give respondents the exclusive right to resell the motel for a period of five years. Two years after they purchased the motel, the Carters asked O.B. Linkous to try to sell the motel, but the Carters sell held the motel when the resale agreement expired in late 1978. One of the obligations assumed by the Carters in exchange for the motel was secured by a mortgage that C.E.K., Inc., had executed in favor of O.B. Linkous Realty, Inc., on December 14, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This assumed obligation required the Carters to make certain monthly payments to the corporate respondent including a payment of $862.19 on January 1, 1979. Under the mortgage agreement, the entire principal (originally $88,247.93) would become due if a "default continue for a space of 30 days." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On January 25, 1979, Mr. Carter delivered to Mr. Linkous a check in the amount of $862.19, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, as payment of the amount due on January 1, 1979. When he handed the check to respondent Linkous, Mr. Carter told him that the funds in the account on which the check was drawn were insufficient for the drawee to pay the check, but that he would deposit sufficient funds on the following day. Respondent Linkous answered that he saw no problem since he intended to deposit the check in his own account in another bank and assumed it would be at least a day before the check was presented to the drawee. On the following day, Mr. Carter deposited $865.96 in the account on which the check was drawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On January 31, 1979, the balance in the account was $1,000.32. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Instead of depositing the check, respondent Linkous took the check, on the same day he received it, to the Flagship First National Bank of Ormond Beach, on which it was drawn, and persuaded a teller there to stamp it so as to indicate that it had been dishonored because sufficient funds were not on deposit. On February 7, 1979, a mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed against the Carters and C.E.K., Inc., (as holder of a junior mortgage), in which respondents' attorney alleged that the Carters had "defaulted under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the payment due January 1, 1979, and all subsequent payments." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Carters retained counsel who filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was alleged, inter alia, that Linkous "deliberately with premeditated design, deceived and tricked [the Carters]." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After these pleadings had been filed, the Carters agreed to respondents' counsel's suggestion that they grant the corporate respondent the exclusive right to sell the motel for another five-year period in exchange for an end to the litigation, and executed an agreement to that effect. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The parties stipulated that both respondents hold real estate licenses issued by petitioner.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondents' licenses for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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KRISTIN M. YANICK vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 87-003020 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003020 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for licensure by examination as a real estate salesman sometime prior to July 14, 1987 but her application was denied because she had been convicted of the possession of cocaine. On July 15, 1986, the Petitioner, Kristin M. Yanick, was arrested in Martin County, Florida, and charged with possession of cocaine, resisting an officer without violence, and possession of narcotics equipment. Thereafter, the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the possession of cocaine charge and dismissed the others, and, in November, 1986, placed her on probation for five years, assigning her to Mr. Martin T. Zientz, a Probation Officer. Petitioner successfully carried out the terms of her probation until sometime in May, 1987 when one of her periodic drug analysis reports requested by the Probation Officer came back positive for cocaine. Petitioner immediately and voluntarily entered a detoxification unit and Mr. Ziantz considers this an isolated incident. Since her release from the detoxification unit he considers her conduct to have been exemplary. Petitioner has taken a job and, according to interviews conducted with her supervisors is doing well. Mr. Zientz is convinced that Petitioner will stay clean of drugs because of her strong goal of getting a real estate license. He is willing to work with the Real Estate Commission to ensure she remains free of drugs if such could be made a condition imposed by the Commission. Mr. Zientz does not feel Petitioner is manipulating the system. She works closely with him and he would consider her to be in the top 15 percent of his probationers. She will be eligible for termination of probation when she has completed one-half her sentence. He considers her to be a responsible individual and he believes she could serve effectively as a real estate salesman. These sentiments are shared by Deputy Johnson who has known Petitioner for about two years including the period of her difficulty with drugs. Subsequent to her treatment, he has seen a considerable difference in her attitude and outlook. She is working and has taken over the care of her own children who previously were with her parents and she appears to have improved physically. Johnson, too, feels that she is not a manipulative person and is sincere in her efforts to be a responsible individual. Petitioner is quite active in her church and its Sunday School. According to Jacqueline Esker, Petitioner has filled in as a substitute Sunday School teacher and Mrs. Esker feels that Petitioner is making a sincere effort to get on with her life and her children. She is active in other church activities as well. Mrs. Esker is aware of Petitioner's problems with drugs and would nonetheless, have no hesitancy in allowing Petitioner to teach her children in Sunday School. She feels safe with her children in Petitioner's care. Petitioner worked for Mr. Edward Bessemer several years ago. He is aware of her drug problem and can see a night and day difference in her since her rehabilitation. While she was working for him, she had the keys to his office and his home and had access to petty cash. Even when she was involved with drugs, she never violated his trust and he would trust her with his life. He considers her to be responsible, conscientious, and an honest person. If it were possible for him to do so, he would hire her on a full time basis. Sherry Ketchum, a former member of the Ethics and Standards Committee of the Martin County Board of Realtors, worked with Petitioner in the same real estate office during the period Petitioner was having trouble with drugs. Since her rehabilitation , Petitioner has become a conscientious employee with a good attitude. She is punctual and responsible and Ms. Ketchum has no reservations about Petitioner sitting for the real estate examination. When they were working together for a developer, Petitioner showed homes for Ms. Ketchum and had access to private property. There was never any indication of Petitioner's dishonesty and were she able to do so, Ms. Ketchum would hire Petitioner. Frances J. Yanick, mother of Petitioner's estranged husband, has known her for approximately 5 to 6 years and is aware of Petitioner's drug problem. Mrs. Yanick has seen a tremendous change in Petitioner's behavior. She has taken hold of her life and is going to work every day; her children are well taken care of; she is active in the church; and has made a responsible effort to manage her time and set a goal for herself. Mrs. Yanick, does not feel that Petitioner is manipulating the system. She believes that Petitioner should be allowed to sit for the examination since she has proven she is capable, honest, and trustworthy and would be no threat to the public. If Petitioner is allowed to earn her license, Mrs. Yanick intends to hire her. Petitioner admits she is guilty of possessing cocaine. However, she contends, prior to her arrest, she enrolled in the Palm Beach Institute, a drug rehabilitation facility, on her own because she knew she needed help. She has learned a lot about her addiction. Petitioner has wanted to be a real estate agent even prior to her arrest but at that time, did nothing about it. After her arrest, she decided she had to do something positive or she would never get her life in shape. She stopped using drugs, voluntarily entered a drug rehabilitation program, and enrolled in real estate school. Petitioner admits that in April, 1987, she again used cocaine. For the most part, however, she has continued with mental health counseling , has entered Alcoholics Anonymous , and has enlisted the support of her pastor and her mother-in-law. She believes this is a very strong support system and will be instrumental in keeping her drug-free. She now has hope instead of despair and courage instead of depression. She got rid of all her old friends and has new ones; she has developed a routine to live by; and, most important, she has grown up. She has self-discipline and has opened a new relationship with her children , and , hopefully, with her husband. Understanding the legitimate concern of the Real Estate Commission and recognizing that licensing is a privilege with responsibilities attendant thereto and not a right, she feels confident she can handle these responsibilities. She believes her dependency is sufficiently under control that she can handle the responsibilities that would go with licensing as a real estate salesman . Her support system is sufficient to bolster her when things do not go as she would hope. She is willing to work under any conditions imposed by the Commission. Petitioner submitted a package of letters from numerous individuals testifying to her rehabilitation and recovery. These include her addiction counselor at the Indian River Mental Health Center; her sister; her pastor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Lucien Roy, a former employer in the investment business; her mother-in-law; her husband; the church secretary; neighbors; other real estate professionals; co-workers; and acquaintances; all of whom support her in her effort toward licensure. In their opinion, she is honest, sincere, dependable, enthusiastic, and conscientious and should not be continually penalized because of her one mistake with drugs. Petitioner's sister, Ms. Silva, who was herself an addict, is now a rehabilitation professional in Palm Beach County. She concludes that Petitioner has all the right things going for her. The biggest thing in Petitioner's favor at the moment is her participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. She believes that Petitioner, honestly recognizing that she has and will continue to have a drug addiction, can nonetheless manage it with continuing success.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Kristin Yanick be permitted to sit for the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman in Florida. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3020 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Fact 1. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Fact 2. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 1 and 2. 4 and 5. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 1 and 2. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 3-5. For the Respondent 1 and 2. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 1 and 2. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Facts 3 and 15. Rejected as a restatement of the evidence and cumulative. Rejected as a restatement of the evidence or comment thereon. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce M. Wilkinson, Esquire 55 East Osceola Street Suite 100 Stuart, Florida 34994 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Acting Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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MARION COUNTY HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-001126 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001126 Latest Update: May 10, 1989

Findings Of Fact On December 22, 1988 Petitioner made application with the Respondent for a permit to erect a banner across State Road 40 in the 900 block, East Silver Springs Boulevard in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. The copy to be placed on that banner would say "18th Annual Marion County Home Builders Assn. Parade of Homes May 13 thru May 21." After considering this permit application, Peter W. Wright, the Respondent's administrator for outdoor advertising in his part of the State, determined to deny the permit. That decision was reached based upon the interpretation by Mr. Wright that under the terms of Rule 14-43.001(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code, the permit could not be granted in that the banner was one of a commercial nature. This decision was reached on November 11, 1988. A further attempt to explain the reason why the Petitioner felt that it was entitled to this permit was made in the person of its executive officer, J. W. Shoemaker, by correspondence of January 23, 1989. Mr. Wright, having examined that correspondence wrote to the Petitioner's executive officer and advised him that the request was being denied because the banner was deemed to be commercial in nature. This decision was reached on February 8, 1989 and it explains the right of the Petitioner to a formal hearing to dispute that choice of denial. On February 20, 1989, the Respondent received a request for formal hearing under the terms of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The case was then forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the final hearing held on the date identified in this Recommended Order. Marion County Home Builders Association, Inc., Petitioner, is a not- for-profit corporation incorporated under the Laws of Florida, specifically at Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. The corporation is for the benefit of home builders and related industries within its jurisdiction, having in mind mutual advantage and cooperation and collaboration with all fields related to the residential building industry within that jurisdiction, for the construction industry as a whole and to assist the accomplishment of the mutual objectives of the National Association of Home Builders of the United States and Florida Home Builders Association. The executive officer for the Petitioner stated further that the Petitioner had an interest in assisting its members with legislation in Ocala and Marion County, Florida reference the businesses of its members. Further, it has as its purpose to advertise to the public the skills and wares of the members of the association, in particular through the Parade of Homes for which the banner permit is sought. In that Parade of Homes the association hopes to show the public what the members of the association are involved with as business, and to show the homes themselves. The builders of those homes are at the Parade of Homes show and the public is invited to tour the homes. Not only are the members of the public touring the homes, but also looking at home products being shown by members of the association. The public is charged a nominal fee of $1 to view the homes and in the past, that money has been contributed to the United Way. On one occasion $1400 was given to the United Way. It is expected that the $1 fee collected would be given to the United Way in the 1989 Parade of Homes Show. While persons are looking at the homes in the parade, they may ask the builders who constructed those homes, questions about the homes and if it is the desire of the consumer public and the builder to make arrangements for a home purchase, then that is an acceptable arrangement from the point of view of the association. Nonetheless, the specific idea which the association has in mind is to advertise the display of homes and home products. Other activities concerning the sale of houses or home products is left to the individual members of the association who have homes and home products in the show. The home builders who are in the association pay dues and constitute one-third of the membership. Other dues-paying members are suppliers within the industry and they constitute approximately two-thirds of the membership. Petitioner's Exhibit number 2 is a photograph which shows indicating the appearance of the banner in question. In 1985, Petitioner had been allowed to place a banner in Ocala at a time when Mr. Wright was not in the position of granting permission for banner displays. Within the last year the Respondent has granted permits to such diverse organizations as the Ocala Civic Theater, the Ocala Shrine Rodeo, the Florida Blueberry Festival/Ocala Blueberry Festival and the Rotary Club of Ocala-Silver Springs Charity Barbeque. Copies of these permits may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 5-8, admitted into evidence. Mr. Wright made the decision to grant those permits. Related to the Ocala Civic Theater, Wright spoke to someone within that organization and was impressed with the fact that it was, in his mind, for a public purpose. Related to the Ocala Shrine Rodeo, Mr. Wright felt that the Shrine is a charitable organization and aids burn victims. As to the Florida Blueberry Festival/Ocala Blueberry Festival, Mr. Wright felt that the majority of the funds that were collected in this endeavor went to the Chamber of Commerce to assist in civic and charitable events. In the main, he identified that his process of assessment was one of asking whether the function to be advertised by the banner was one in which the primary interest was for charity as opposed to profiting individuals or companies. Examples of permit requests that he has turned down as not being acceptable in that they were commercial in nature would be rock and gem shows, art festivals, sales of equipment for homes and other types of businesses. He has no recollection of ever having to decide the question of whether a Parade of Homes banner was an acceptable purpose to allow the display of a banner across a public roadway, other than the case at issue. In making decisions about the grant of the permit in the region in question, Mr. Wright does not require the submission of a corporate charter to ascertain whether an organization is a for-profit or not-for-profit corporation.

Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies the banner permit application. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: J. R. Shoemaker, Executive Officer Marion County Home Builders Association 409 Northeast 36th Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (2) 120.57337.407 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-43.001
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JOHN E. PHILLIPS, JR. vs OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF SECURITIES AND INVESTOR PROTECTION, 94-006481F (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Nov. 18, 1994 Number: 94-006481F Latest Update: Mar. 16, 1995

The Issue The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This case involves a claim by petitioner, John E. Phillips, Jr., that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because of an administrative action improvidently brought against him by respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). When the complaint was filed, Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc. DBF contends the claim is without merit because Phillips is not a small business party within the meaning of the law, there is substantial justification to support the agency's decision to file a complaint, and special circumstances are present which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. The action which underlies this claim involved an administrative complaint filed against Phillips on February 4, 1994, charging him with violating various provisions within Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. That complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1266. The complaint also denied an application by Phillips to register as an associated person with a new firm. In addition, the complaint named Bruce M. Walker as a co-respondent, and as to that registrant, the complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1358. Both cases were consolidated for hearing and, after an evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 27, 1994, a Recommended Order was issued on September 13, 1994, recommending that all charges against Phillips be dismissed and that his application for registration be approved. The Recommended Order was adopted by DBF without change, and Phillips is accordingly deemed to be a prevailing party in that action. Phillips has requested fees and costs in the amount of $15,000.00, the maximum allowed by law. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of that amount. Prima Facie Requirements for an Award of Fees and Costs In order to show entitlement to an award of fees and costs, petitioner must demonstrate that he is a "prevailing small business party" within the meaning of the law. Since he has filed the petition on his own behalf, he must show he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time the action is initiated by the state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, Phillips was domiciled in Pensacola, Florida, and had a net worth of less than $2 million. According to an uncontroverted allegation in his petition, Phillips had no "employees relating to business that formed the basis for the Agency's charges." Petitioner was also a 50 percent shareholder in a subchapter S corporation known as Phillips, Walker & Associates, Inc. (PWA), a Pensacola firm engaged in the sale of insurance products. Although Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc., that firm was not the subject of the complaint nor is it otherwise relevant to this dispute. Petitioner's principal source of income was through the sale of insurance products sold through PWA although he occasionally sold a few securities during that same period of time. The administrative complaint was not filed against PWA, which held no licenses from the state, but rather was filed against the registration of Phillips as an individual. Although he was an officer, employee and shareholder of PWA, Phillips was not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice. Therefore, he does not qualify as a small business party. Was There Substantial Justification? The consumer complaint which eventually led to the filing of the charges in Case No. 94-1266 was made by Jane Hubbard, a Gulf Breeze realtor who had loaned a substantial amount of money ($50,000.00) to PWA in May 1988 and was never repaid. The loan was secured by a promissory note personally signed by Phillips and Walker, as the owners of the corporation. After PWA ceased doing business in May 1990, and both Phillips and Walker had filed for bankruptcy, Hubbard, or her attorney, contacted DBF in an effort to seek DBF's aid in collecting her money from Phillips and Walker. Since petitioner was registered with DBF as an associated person, and thus was subject to DBF's regulatory jurisdiction, Hubbard apparently assumed that Phillips may have violated the law in some respect, and the agency might be able to assist her in recovering all or a part of her money. A similar complaint filed with the Department of Insurance was not pursued by that agency. Hubbard's complaint was eventually referred to a DBF financial examiner, Robert R. Kynoch, who, among other things, interviewed Phillips, Walker, Hubbard, and three other persons who had made loans to Walker (but not Phillips). Although Kynoch did not place the persons interviewed under oath during the investigative stage, there was no requirement that he do so. Based on a representation by Hubbard that Phillips and Walker had failed to disclose to her all relevant information regarding PWA's financial status at the time the loan was made, Kynoch concluded that a reasonable basis existed to bring charges against the two if the loan was actually an investment, and thus subject to DBF's jurisdiction under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Kynoch prepared a written investigative report, received in evidence as respondent's exhibit 3, which recommended that the report "be further reviewed for appropriate disposition." The report was first reviewed by Michael D. Blaker, a DBF area financial manager, who approved the recommendation and forwarded it to his supervisor, Richard White. It was then reviewed and approved by a bureau chief, William Reilly, and finally by the division director, Don Saxon. After Saxon signed off on the report, it was sent to the general counsel's office for a legal determination as to whether the loan was an investment. Margaret S. Karniewicz, an assistant general counsel, concluded that it was, and recommended the issuance of an administrative complaint. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted, a determination was made that the loan constituted an investment. This determination in the Recommended and Final Orders was not contested by any party, including Phillips. There was, however, insufficient evidence to establish that misrepresentations were made by Phillips during the sale of the investment. For this reason, the charges against Phillips were dismissed and his application for registration with a new firm was approved. Because DBF had statements, which it assessed to be credible, from a complaining witness (Hubbard) that misrepresentations or material omissions were made by Phillips and Walker during the transaction, and DBF properly construed the transaction as an investment, it had a reasonable basis in fact and law to file the complaint. Since there was no showing that the agency's credibility assessment was unreasonable, DBF was substantially justified in bringing the charges in Case No. 94-1266. Special Circumstances There was no evidence presented by respondent to show that special circumstances exist that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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