The Issue The issue is whether the claim of employment discrimination contained in the Petition for Relief must be dismissed due to Petitioner's execution of a release of all claims.
Findings Of Fact On June 29, 2012, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated. On July 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that he was subjected to discrimination. On August 18, 2012, Petitioner signed an agreement. Under the agreement, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $5,000.00, net several items, provided Petitioner did not exercise his right to revoke the agreement within the seven days following execution, as provided in the agreement. Petitioner did not revoke the agreement, and Respondent discharged all obligations under the agreement. In exchange, Petitioner agreed to release Respondent from all claims, damages, suits, complaints, damages, losses and expenses, of every nature, legal or equitable, whether known or unknown, which Olascoaga ever had, now has, or may claim to have, upon or by reason of the occurrence of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever . . . . This release specifically includes, but is not limited to, a release of any and all claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act . . . . There is no contention that Petitioner was not acting knowingly or voluntarily when he executed a release of claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Carlos Olascoaga's Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 2014.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
Findings Of Fact Robert Owens was employed by UPARC from December, 1979, until his release on 13 December 1981. He was placed on leave with pay and was terminated 22 January 1982. Roberta Egan commenced working at UPARC in October, 1980. Both Owens and Egan worked as Horticulture Instructors. In November, 1981, the Horticulture Department at UPARC consisted of one Landscape Supervisor, one Retail Sales Supervisor, one Assistant Salesperson, and two Horticulture Instructors. Owens and Egan began dating around April, 1981, and on or about 16 November 1981, Owens posted a notice on the bulletin board at UPARC inviting UPARC employees to his wedding on November 20, 1981, to Roberta Egan. William Dean, supervisor of both Owens and Egan, heard about the notice, verified its existence, and, on 17 November 1981, talked to Owens about his pending marriage and the nepotism rule at UPARC. Owens admitted that Dean told him the nepotism rule might apply to him if he married someone also working at UPARC; however, Owens testified that Dean indicated he was unaware of the application of the nepotism rule and the final decision would be made by the Executive Director, James Leach. Following his discussion with Owens, Dean went to the Personnel Director to apprise him of the situation. The Personnel Director, Michael Thompson, discussed the nepotism rule with Owens on Thursday before he was married on Friday, November 20, 1981. Owens testified he recalled the discussion with Thompson occurred after the wedding, but he does not remember the date. In response to Owens' query that was it true he might lose his job if married to a fellow employee, Thompson told him that was his understanding of the nepotism rule and, in his opinion, one of them (Owens or Egan) would have to leave if they were married. During the week beginning November 16, 1981, James Leach, the Executive Director at UPARC, was out of town on business. When he returned on Monday, November 23, 1981, following the Friday wedding of Owens and Egan, he learned of the marriage almost as soon as he arrived in his office, and further learned that Owens did not believe the nepotism rule applied to him. Leach sent for the newly married couple and explained to them the rule, the reasons therefor, and told them that one of them would have to resign. Owens was quite incensed with the determination that one of them would have to resign, and Leach agreed to extend their employment for sixty days to allow them more time to decide which would leave and find a new job. In letter to the Owenses dated November 23, 1981 (Exhibit 11), Leach confirmed the directions given at the meeting and advised that one of them must be gone by January 22, 1982. After a week or two passed with no indication either of the Owenses would resign, Leach, on 11 December 1981, held a meeting with the Owenses to inquire if they had made a decision regarding who would resign and learned that neither would submit a resignation. He then placed Petitioner on administrative leave until January 22, 1982, at which time Owens was terminated. Leach offered to help Owens find other work and, in fact, lined up a job as a Horticulture Instructor for Petitioner with Pinellas Association for Retarded Children (PARC). PARC is a nonprofit charitable organization similar to Respondent. Petitioner did not go to PARC to inquire about the job Leach had told him was available, ostensibly because it was located on the other side of town from where Respondent lived, and he would have a longer commute to and from that job than from UPARC. UPARC is a community-based, nonprofit organization set up to train mentally retarded children and adults. UPARC employs approximately 85 people and serves some 220 clients daily. About 60 percent of its funds are derived from government sources and the remainder from fund-raising activities. Its public image and the trust engendered thereby is vital to its success. As Horticulture Instructors, the Owenses worked with the same clients and often assisted each other in preparing evaluations. Robert Owens delivered products outside UPARC two days per week, during which time his wife had charge of his clients. Although Owens testified that there were other qualified Horticulture Instructors in the department, the Owenses were the only ones so designated. One policy at UPARC is that two people from the same department cannot take leave at the same time. Furthermore, as the only two Horticulture Instructors in the five- or seven-man department (Owen testified there were seven in that department), the absence of both at the same time would deprive the facility of the ability to provide training for some 22 clients. The nepotism rule at UPARC prior to October, 1979, forbade related persons to work at UPARC. During the period October, 1979, to July, 1981, this policy was modified to permit the employment of relatives if approved by the Executive Director. During this period, on two occasions, a man and a woman employed at UPARC married each other and were allowed to remain at UPARC. Both of these couples presented difficulties. In one case disciplinary action taken against the wife led to a degradation of the husband's performance and both subsequently left UPARC. In the other case the wife's disagreements with her supervisor led to her resignation and to the husband orally tendering his resignation when his wife's demands were not met. After this wife resigned the husband withdrew his resignation and is still working at UPARC. Leach described the work at UPARC, dealing with mentally retarded clients, to be very stressful. If both husband and wife suffer these stresses at work, there is less likelihood of relief at home from these stresses than there would be if the stressed partner comes home to a partner who is not subject to similar stresses. He attributes some of the problems encountered by the two married couples working at UPARC in early 1980 to these stresses. Leach became Executive Director while the modified nepotism rule was in effect. After his experience with the two couples noted in paragraph 9 above, he concluded there should be no exception to the rule against married couples working at UPARC and instituted the move to change the nepotism rule back to what it was before October, 1979. This change became effective in July, 1981, and the rule in effect when Owens and Egan married states: "Immediate relatives of UPARC employees will not be eligible for employment." On 17 July 1981 before the UPARC Employee Handbook containing changes from the previous Handbook was printed, all employees were called together in order to explain the changes in the new Employee Handbook, which included the change to the nepotism rule. Exhibit 8 contains the minutes of the staff meeting at which these changes were explained to all employees. Exhibit 9 contains the signatures of Bobbie Egan and Robert Owens indicating they were present at the July 17, 1981, staff meeting. When the Employee Handbook was printed, copies were given to all employees. Petitioner never contended to be unaware of the nepotism policy. He did not think it applied to one already working at UPARC who married a fellow employee. Both Robert Owens and Roberta Egan Owens acknowledged that they were aware of the nepotism rule before they got married, knew the rule placed one of their jobs at UPARC in jeopardy, but concluded the rule did not explicitly cover them. Most of the employees at UPARC are married, as is the person who replaced Petitioner when he was fired.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against due to her age, with regard to her termination from employment on June 19, 1996, and, collaterally, whether her claim is barred by the doctrine collateral estoppel because of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by a hearing officer in an unemployment compensation appeals proceeding also related to her termination from employment.
Findings Of Fact Roberta McCabe, the Petitioner, was employed by the Respondent, Woodland Towers, Inc., as a dining room manager from October 22, 1991, through June 19, 1996. During her employment with Woodland Towers that entity employed more than fifteen employees. Ms. McCabe's initial date of employment was August 19, 1991, but she began her capacity as dining room manager on October 22, 1991. She served in that capacity until her termination date of June 19, 1996. She was terminated on that date against her will. Ms. McCabe was born on June 3, 1935, and at the time of her termination she was sixty-one years of age. After her termination, on June 21, 1996, the Petitioner filed a claim against Woodland Towers with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation. In that claim she first raised the issue that she had been discharged due to her age. That claim was filed, of course, before a different state agency, with a different jurisdiction, although the parties were the same. The legal issues were not established to be the same, however, with the exception that in that case, as in this one, the Petitioner raised the question of discharge due to age discrimination. The statutory standards for liability for unemployment compensation, however, were not shown to be co-extensive and identical to those statutory standards and statutory-based legal issues which prevail in the instant case before a different state agency. While the issue of age discrimination may have been the reason offered by the Petitioner in the employment compensation case for her separation from employment, as opposed to what was ultimately found (discharge for misconduct) that legal concept was not shown to have the same definition under the Unemployment Compensation statutes involved in that proceeding, nor was it shown that those statutes support the same or similar actions and remedies as does Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, under which the instant proceeding arises. Therefore it cannot be determined that the legal issues or, for that matter the factual issues in the instant proceeding, are substantially identical to those extant in the unemployment compensation proceeding. In any event, Ms. McCabe timely filed a charge involving age discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, on or about August 26, 1996. The matter ultimately came on for hearing before the undersigned judge. Ms. McCabe testified at hearing that the only act of discrimination she contends occurred with regard to her termination from employment, on June 19, 1996, occurred on that date and involved discrimination on account of her age. She did not, however, establish that anyone at Woodland Towers ever actually made any discriminatory comments or remarks regarding her age. Ms. McCabe essentially inferred from her status as an older employee, and the fact that she was terminated, the conclusion that Woodland Towers had terminated her on account of her age. She offered no testimony other than her own to support her claim of age discrimination. Conversely, Eleanor Gustavsson and Sidney Roberts both testified that age had nothing to do with their decision to terminate her. Their testimony was unrebutted by the Petitioner. The testimony supporting Petitioner's position that age discrimination or animus resulted in her termination is based solely on the Petitioner's own testimony, chiefly involving her conjectural position, without corroborating evidence, that Woodland Towers intended to terminate her because of her years of seniority which resulted in higher pay and benefits and that therefore, resultingly, her age, with attendant higher pay and benefits, in her position, caused her to be terminated in a discriminatory way, predicated upon her age. Moreover, the Petitioner failed to describe any other co-employee who committed a similar infraction but who was treated more favorably than the Petitioner and did not show that there was any other employee of a younger age who was treated more favorably after committing a similar infraction. The Petitioner did produce the testimony of two fellow employees and offered to produce others to testify that another employee was rude and hostile to the Petitioner. This is insufficient, however, to establish that she was discriminated against because of her age. It was not shown that that employee was in a supervisory position over the Petitioner and merely being rude and hostile to a fellow employee does not rise to the level of Ms. McCabe's infraction. It is therefore unpersuasive to show that Ms. McCabe was the subject of disparate treatment because of her age. Uncontradicted evidence was presented at hearing which establishes that the Petitioner was allowing employees under her supervision, in her capacity as dining room manager, to report for duty before normal working hours and begin work without compensation for the extra time. It was established that she was aware of and indeed responsible for these employees "working off the clock" or before "punching-in." The evidence establishes that she was aware that this was contrary to federal law and Woodland Towers' policy. She was also aware that she was responsible for supervising those offending employees and enforcing the law and policy concerning hours of employment. The Petitioner took full responsibility for the law and employment policy violation in this regard and admitted during the hearing that her actions violated Woodland Towers' employment hours policy. Additionally, Woodland Towers presented credible evidence that Ms. McCabe was terminated solely for reasons of violation of that federal law and policy concerning hours of employment. Woodland Towers' evidence establishes that her age was not the reason for her termination, but rather that her violation of federal law and employment policy concerning the working hours of her employees was that reason. That showing was not rebutted.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lloyd, Esquire Cobb, Cole and Bell Post Office Box 2491 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Roberta McCabe 701 North Ocean Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age for the reasons stated in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was born in 1953. At the time of the events which form the basis for his claim, he was more than forty years old. The Petitioner was born in Cuba and spent most of his life in Cuba. The Petitioner came to the United States of America approximately two years before the events which form the basis for his claim. The Petitioner speaks fluent Spanish, but does not speak English. In October of 1999, the Petitioner was hired by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner is still employed by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner's pay rate has never been changed during his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens. During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never held either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never been demoted from either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor of the City of Hialeah Gardens has the sole authority and responsibility to make employment decisions. The Mayor appointed Nivaldo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to the position of Assistant Parks Director. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was in his late twenties. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez spoke fluent English and Spanish. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was a friend of the Mayor and the Mayor was aware of his qualifications for the position. The Mayor appointed Rodriguez to the position of "Assistant Parks Director" because he thought he was qualified for the position. The Mayor also thought that the Petitioner was not qualified for the position because, among other things, the Petitioner did not speak English. It is necessary to be able to speak English in order to fulfill all of the duties of the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor had credible non-discriminatory reasons to appoint Rodriguez as "Assistant Park Director," and not to appoint the Petitioner to that position. There is no credible evidence that the Mayor's reasons for appointing Rodriguez were pretextual. Age was not a factor in the decision to appoint Rodriguez rather than the Petitioner. The evidence regarding the Respondent's hiring and termination practices does not establish any pattern of age based discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the petition in this case and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
The Issue Is Respondent employer guilty of an unlawful employment practice, pursuant to Section 760.10, F.S., for discrimination on the basis of handicap, to wit: diabetes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed part-time at Respondent Jackson County Hospital as an x-ray aide. In this position, he transported patients to and from the x-ray department. Petitioner had diabetes when he was hired by Respondent. He disclosed his diabetes on his initial health information sheet. The employer was aware of Petitioner's diabetes when he was hired. However, on his initial health information sheet Petitioner also represented his health status as "excellent" and denied having any physical condition which impaired his body as a whole. He further represented that he had no defect "which may prevent your performance in the job. . . ". Accordingly, the employer did not know that he had a handicap, if any, when it hired Petitioner. While he was employed as an x-ray aide, Petitioner had two "reactions" on the job due to his diabetes, and he was laid off immediately prior to having a third "reaction." Petitioner did not describe the nature of his diabetic "reactions", and no other record evidence revealed their symptomatology. Nonetheless, Petitioner felt that he did his job well and got along well with everyone. This testimony was unrefuted. Indeed, both of Respondent's witnesses acknowledged that Petitioner performed his job duties acceptably. Petitioner went to Respondent hospital's emergency room as soon as he had these reactions. He assumed that some of the x-ray technicians whom he worked with in the hospital x-ray department talked to Wayne Austin, the head of the x-ray department, about his situation. No other witnesses supported his assumption. No forms reporting either of Petitioner's "reactions" were received by Jim L. Treglon, Respondent hospital's assistant administrator. Wayne Austin knew of Petitioner's diabetes but had no knowledge of either of Petitioner's "reactions" prior to laying him off. When Mr. Austin laid Petitioner off on August 15, 1994, he told Petitioner that it was due to the hospital's economic restructuring. Petitioner believed, upon the basis of conversations with other employees who were not called to testify, that he was laid off due to his diabetes. According to Mr. Treglon and Mr. Austin, the employing hospital underwent a personnel restructuring process by reduction of work force for financial reasons, and Petitioner was laid off as part of the larger financial conservation scheme. Petitioner had the least seniority and was a part-time employee, so his position was eliminated. There is no evidence that Petitioner's position was ever recreated or refilled. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, another x-ray aide with more seniority was allowed to work weekends only, thereby reducing the hours for which that aide was paid. It is possible, but not proven, that this other aide's hours were eventually increased or restored when the hospital's economic situation improved. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, the x- ray department's clerk-secretary was allowed to resign, and that position was not filled. As part of the employer's restructuring process, a total of 17 employees were eliminated from the employer's total work force based only upon seniority at approximately the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated. Mr. Treglon testified that as of the date of formal hearing, the employer employed at least 40 people who have disclosed disabilities. The definition of "disability", as used in his testimony, was not given.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief herein and determining that Petitioner recover nothing thereby. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner was discriminatorily dismissed from her employment by the Respondent on the basis of race and whether she was retaliated against by the Respondent for filing a complaint of discrimination with the City of Jacksonville.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the University of Florida, is a state university located in Gainesville, Florida. The Respondent, through its Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, operates a Cooperative Extension Service, which maintains a county extension office in each of the 67 counties in the State of Florida. Each of these offices is headed by a county extension director. On September 13, 1991, the Petitioner, Pamela R. Dallis, was hired by the University of Florida as a part-time secretary for the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) in the Duval County Extension Office located in Jacksonville, Florida, which is headed by Mr. Thomas Braddock. The Petitioner was hired in a temporary position known as Other Personal Services (OPS). The Petitioner was initially interviewed for a permanent position, but she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position because she did not achieve the required score (35 c.w.p.m.) on the typing test. The Respondent changed the classification of the position from permanent to temporary in order to be able to hire the Petitioner despite her typing deficiency. As an OPS employee, she did not have permanent status in the position and was not subject to a probationary period or to periodic written evaluations concerning her performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. Deborah Patterson, provided the Petitioner training as to the policies and procedures applicable to her position. Specifically, the Petitioner received training concerning data entry, reimbursement of expenses incurred for EFNEP and travel reimbursement vouchers. The Petitioner was also provided assistance concerning computer data entry from another employee in EFNEP. The Petitioner was provided oral counseling concerning deficiencies in her performance on several occasions beginning on January 7, 1992. By June 22, 1992, Respondent considered dismissing the Petitioner from her employment because of her performance deficiencies. Due to budgetary constraints, the decision was made to work more closely with the Petitioner because if she were dismissed, there was no assurance that her position could be filled by another individual. On July 6, 1992, in order to provide closer supervision to the Petitioner, the Respondent moved the Petitioner's work station to a location close to her supervisor's office. Prior to this time, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor had requested to Mr. Braddock that this move be made. Mr. Braddock did not approve the request and recommended that the Petitioner be counseled concerning her work performance. In July, 1992, Mr. Braddock agreed to the move because the Petitioner's performance had not improved despite the performance counseling provided. On July 24, 1993, a few weeks after the Petitioner's work station was moved, she reported to Mr. Braddock an incident that had occurred with a white co-worker, Rachel Fleming. Mr. Braddock spoke separately with each employee and asked for their written description of the incident. There were no other witnesses to the incident. Mr. Braddock received conflicting reports from the Petitioner and Ms. Fleming. The Petitioner stated that on July 24, 1992, after informing Ms. Fleming of her dislike for "chain letters" while talking in the printing room, Ms. Fleming placed a chain letter on the Petitioner's desk with her name on it. The Petitioner scratched her name, placed Ms. Fleming's name on the letter and taped it on Ms. Fleming's desk drawer. The Petitioner stated that she later went to the restroom, and as she was exiting, Ms. Fleming came in, blocked her exit, pushed and grabbed her, and said, "I don't like you no more than you like me, bitch!" Ms. Fleming then allowed her to exit. Ms. Fleming acknowledged in her statement that she had an exchange of words with the Petitioner concerning a chain letter that she had given the Petitioner. Ms. Fleming stated that the Petitioner told her, "This is stupid and so are you." Ms. Fleming also stated that about 15 minutes later, she saw the Petitioner as she was leaving the restroom, asked to speak with her, but the Petitioner "brushed past her" saying nothing. Ms. Fleming grabbed the Petitioner, turned to face her and told her that they did not like each other and to "leave me the hell alone". Ms. Fleming denied pushing the Petitioner or calling her a "bitch". She said she called the Petitioner "a biddy". Based upon the unsubstantiated conflicting reports given by each employee, Mr. Braddock determined that no disciplinary action was warranted and counseled each employee. A few weeks after the incident with Ms. Fleming, the Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the City of Jacksonville on the basis that Ms. Fleming had not been disciplined. After having learned of the complaint, the Petitioner's second level supervisor, Ms. Halusky, advised the Petitioner that the proper avenue for her to file a complaint was through the University's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, not the City of Jacksonville. The City of Jacksonville did not proceed with the Petitioner's complaint because she was not an employee of the City of Jacksonville. The Petitioner never filed a complaint with the University of Florida. Despite the performance counseling and assistance provided to the Petitioner, her performance did not improve. The deficiencies concerning the Petitioner's data entry skills continued. Two reports that were due in September, 1992 at the main EFNEP office in Gainesville were late because the work done by the Petitioner had to be redone. The Petitioner's supervisor decided that the Petitioner's continuing performance deficiencies were causing additional work for the EFNEP staff and, even without the assurance of a replacement, it was better to have the position vacant rather than having to redo the Petitioner's work to correct the mistakes. By letter dated September 10, 1992, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor advised her of her termination effective at the close of business that day. The reason given for her dismissal was that she had not developed in her job as expected and because of performance deficiencies. Sixty-six percent of the employees in EFNEP in the Duval County Office are African American. They serve a clientele that is 75 percent African American. Thus, EFNEP is interested in hiring and retaining African American employees for the program. Three of the individuals who testified at the Petitioner's request are African Americans who work at the Duval County Extension Office. They testified that they had not experienced discrimination in their employment at the Duval County Extension Office. Two of those three employees are in EFNEP. One has been an employee in the office for 23 years, and the other has been an employee for 14 years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are all accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Pamela R. Dallis 8050 Arlington Expressway #C-401 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Isis Carbajal de Garcia, Esq. Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, FL 32611
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on national origin and disability.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Llevado was born in the Philippines and is a naturalized citizen of the United States. In 1995, Mr. Llevado began working for Sandestin Resort as an equipment operator at the Burnt Pine Golf Course. Mr. Llevado’s duties included mowing greens, raking bunkers, and other tasks related to the maintenance of a golf course. Mr. Llevado was part of a golf maintenance team. The members of the team are cross-trained so that they are able to do all the tasks necessary to maintain the golf course. None of the team members receive extra compensation for doing a particular task. The assignment for each team member is posted at the beginning of the work day, which is 6:00 a.m., on a chalkboard in the break room. The assignment of the tasks is based on the tasks that are needed to be completed and the personnel working each day. Mr. Llevado’s supervisors were Barry Sayers, who was the assistant superintendent of golf maintenance at the Burnt Pine Golf Course, and Jake Leham, who was the director of golf maintenance. Both Mr. Sayers and Mr. Leham considered Mr. Llevado to be a good employee, who could perform all the necessary tasks of an equipment operator. During his employment with Sandestin Resort, Mr. Llevado kept a diary. He noted in his diary that, in April 2001, Mr. Sayers said bad words to him. Mr. Llevado did not specify what the bad words were, but the interpreter at the final hearing interpreted it to mean the words were probably curse words. Mr. Sayers did not recall the incident. No evidence was presented that Mr. Llevado was the only employee to whom Mr. Sayers may have said bad words. On August 22, 2002, Mr. Llevado received an Employment Communication Notice, suspending him for one day without pay. The offense was failing to complete his work as instructed and leaving grass clippings in a bunker. Two times during his employment with Sandestin Resort, Mr. Llevado received an Employment Communication Notice concerning his failure to abide by the company’s policy for requesting leave time. The first occurrence was on September 26, 2003, and the second occurrence was on January 8, 2006. He was suspended two days for the first occurrence, and no disciplinary action was taken for the second occurrence. On October 25, 2006, Mr. Llevado received his annual performance evaluation. He met or exceeded expectations in all categories except following instructions, where it was noted he needed to improve. As a result of his evaluation, Mr. Llevado was given a raise. On October 26, 2006, Mr. Llevado reported to work and found that he was assigned to mow the greens. Two employees failed to come to work, and it was necessary to assign Mr. Llevado the task of mowing greens. Mr. Llevado did not like to mow greens and preferred to rake the bunkers. He requested Mr. Sayers to allow him to rake the bunkers instead of mowing the greens. Mr. Sayers refused and explained the reason why Mr. Llevado was assigned to mow the greens. Mr. Llevado refused to mow the greens. It was 7:00 a.m., and Mr. Sayers had to leave the maintenance building to begin the work of the day. He left Mr. Lehman to deal with Mr. Llevado. Mr. Lehman discussed the mowing of the greens with Mr. Llevado, who requested to be paid more than his hourly wages if he had to mow the greens. Mr. Lehman refused to pay him additional money, and Mr. Llevado accused Mr. Lehman of discriminating against him. When Mr. Llevado accused Mr. Lehman of discriminating against him, Mr. Lehman told Mr. Llevado that he would need to speak to personnel in the human resources department. The human resources department did not begin work until 8:30 a.m. Mr. Lehman indicated that he would arrange a meeting with Sylvia Hanks, the director of human resources. Mr. Lehman told Mr. Llevado to clock out and go home until the meeting could be arranged. Mr. Lehman told Mr. Llevado that he would be compensated for the lost time, if Mr. Lehman erroneously told Mr. Llevado to go home. Mr. Llevado called his sister to come and get him. Mr. Lehman instructed Mr. Llevado to wait in the break room for his ride home from work. Mr. Llevado returned to the break room to wait. While Mr. Llevado was in the break room, he was struck on his head. Terry Clemons, who is the administrative assistant to Mr. Lehman, got to work around 7:00 a.m. on October 26, 2006. When she came in the building, she saw Mr. Llevado sitting in the break room. Approximately 15 minutes later, Mr. Llevado came to her with a bleeding head and said that he had been hit and someone was behind the door. Mr. Llevado had called Sandestin Resort’s security office and reported the incident. Mr. Llevado claims that he saw three men in uniforms running away from the building after he had been hit. Personnel from security were unable to locate anyone described by Mr. Llevado as running from the building. The door to the break room was a swinging door, and it is possible that Mr. Llevado pushed the door, hitting someone behind the door, and causing the door to swing back and hit him in the head. The incident was reported to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Llevado told the investigating officer that he was attempting to exit the building through the swinging door, and someone was on the other side of the door, and he was hit in the head. Mr. Llevado claimed that he passed out as soon as he was hit. If Mr. Llevado passed out as soon as he was hit, it is difficult to reconcile his claim that he saw three uniformed men running away from the building. The greater weight of the evidence does not establish that Mr. Llevado was attacked by employees of Sandestin Resort. It is undisputed that Mr. Llevado did sustain an injury in the break room of the Sandestin Resort on October 26, 2006. Mr. Llevado was treated at the emergency room for his injuries. Mr. Llevado came back to work the day after his injury but left by midday, complaining that his head hurt. Within a day or two of the incident, Mr. Llevado, his sister, Mr. Lehman, and Mr. Sayers met with Ms. Hanks to discuss the situation. At the meeting, Mr. Llevado indicated that he thought that Mr. Lehman had fired him on October 26, 2006. Mr. Llevado was assured that Mr. Lehman had no authority to fire him and that he was not fired. Mr. Llevado did not return to work after October 27, 2006. He requested and received workers’ compensation benefits related to his injury. By letter dated March 22, 2007, the human resources office for Sandestin Resort advised Mr. Llevado that Mr. Llevado’s physician had released Mr. Llevado to return to work and that Sandestin Resort had a job available for him. Mr. Llevado was told to report to work on March 28, 2007. By letter dated March 26, 2007, Mr. Llevado advised Sandestin Resort that he was aware that his physician had released him to return to work, but that he was still experiencing headaches and dizziness. Mr. Llevado also advised that he was seeking further medical treatment. By June 12, 2007, Mr. Llevado had not returned to work at Sandestin Resort. By letter dated June 12, 2007, Sandestin Resort advised Mr. Llevado that he had been on leave of absence since November 28, 2006, and that he had exceeded Sandestin Resort’s leave policy. Mr. Llevado was advised that if he was able to return to work that he would need to submit a full release from his medical provider. Mr. Llevado was also advised that if he did not return to work by June 18, 2007, that his employment would be terminated. Mr. Llevado never submitted a medical release and never returned to work. Sandestin Resort’s Employee Handbook provides that an eligible employee may take up 12 weeks of unpaid medical leave during any “rolling” 12-month period. The handbook further provides that an employee who exceeds the 12-week medical leave may be subject to termination of employment. Mr. Llevado claims that on December 19, 2005, Mr. Sayers told him that he was an illegal alien and that he should go back to the Philippines. Mr. Sayers denied ever telling Mr. Llevado that he should go back to the Philippines. The greater weight of the evidence does not establish that Mr. Lehman made the statement. Both Mr. Sayers and Mr. Lehman have participated in discrimination prevention training. Sandestin Resort employs many persons who have foreign nationalities. Mr. Sayers has personally worked with many people with varying nationalities. Sandestin Resort gives each of its employees an Employee Handbook, which describes the procedure an employee can follow to report a claim of discrimination. If an employee feels that he or she has been discriminated against, the employee is to bring it to the attention of the employee’s supervisor. If the supervisor is the subject of the claim of discrimination, the employee may contact either the manager of the human resources department or the vice president for human resources. Mr. Llevado received the handbook. His personnel file does not indicate that he made any claim of discrimination to his supervisor or the human resources officer prior to October 26, 2006. Part of Mr. Llevado’s claim of discrimination is based on an alleged disability. However, Mr. Llevado failed to establish that he had a disability or that Sandestin Resort perceived him to have a disability. Prior to his injury on October 26, 2006, Mr. Llevado performed his work in a satisfactory manner. He never asked Sandestin Resort for any type of accommodation for his alleged disability. Mr. Llevado contends that he is unable to work because of the injury he sustained on October 26, 2006, and that he has not sought work since the incident. However, Mr. Llevado did not present any medical evidence to establish that he is disabled.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Sandestin Golf and Beach Resort did not discriminate against Mr. Felixberto A. Llevado based on national origin or disability and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2009.
