The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent corruptly used his official positions to sexually harass female subordinates in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and, two, whether Respondent solicited or accepted sexual favors from female subordinates based upon any understanding that his vote, official action, or judgment would be influenced thereby, in violation of Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rudy Maloy (“Maloy”) worked at the Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from 1980 until October 21, 2001. The last seven years of his career in state government were spent in DOT’s Turnpike District Planning Office, where Maloy served as the “Public Involvement Manager.” In that capacity, Maloy conducted workshops and public hearings around the state concerning Turnpike projects. In 1992, Maloy was elected to the Leon County Commission as a Commissioner-at-Large. He was reelected twice, in 1996 and 2000. At the time of the final hearing, Maloy was a sitting Commissioner. Laurie Bradley When Maloy began working in the Turnpike District Planning Office on October 7, 1994, Laurie Bradley (“Bradley”) was already employed there in a career service position, namely, administrative assistant to the director of planning. Though she reported to the director, who was her immediate supervisor, Bradley performed secretarial functions for others in the office, including Maloy after his arrival. Maloy did not have the authority to promote Bradley, increase her salary, or let her go, but he was one of Bradley’s “bosses” in the sense that he could assign her tasks. Maloy and Bradley enjoyed a cordial relationship at work, at least by outward appearances. For example, Maloy frequently gave Bradley (and other co-workers) the complimentary tickets to events such as hockey games and concerts that he, as a County Commissioner, routinely received but could not always use himself. Bradley genuinely appreciated this token of Maloy’s generosity. She thought Maloy was a very friendly person, and she was friendly toward him. The two, in Bradley’s words, “got along fine.” At the final hearing, however, Bradley testified about other acts and practices of Maloy’s that she considered decidedly unfriendly. According to Bradley, Maloy touched her inappropriately on a number of occasions, as follows: Hugs. Bradley alleged that Maloy hugged her——from the side, around the waist——many times, and that after awhile this began to bother her. Shoulder rubs. Bradley alleged that “fairly often” Maloy stood behind her and rubbed her shoulders without ever being invited or encouraged to do so. Kisses. Bradley alleged that in or around February 1996, Maloy kissed her on the cheek. Bradley also claimed that a few weeks later, Maloy kissed her on the mouth, while the two were alone together in an elevator going down at the end of a workday. Caresses. Bradley asserted that on one occasion in May 1996, within hours, ironically, after they had received sexual harassment training, Maloy taunted her by stroking her arm and asking if such behavior constituted sexual harassment. Bradley further averred that Maloy expressed his opinion that if one person is bothered by another’s conduct in the workplace, then the two should resolve the problem privately, rather than reporting it to management. Finally, Bradley alleged that, as part of this episode of teasing, as she perceived it, Maloy stated that he might be able to get her a job with the county having a higher salary than her present position.1 Maloy testified that he never touched Bradley inappropriately, and he specifically denied her allegations to the contrary. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Maloy sexually harassed Bradley. It is significant, therefore, that not a single witness who testified at the final hearing had actually seen Maloy touch Bradley improperly or in an unwelcome manner. In contrast, one disinterested witness testified credibly that she observed Bradley hug Maloy once or twice as a friendly gesture of thanks for receiving tickets to a hockey game; this testimony is accepted as true. Several witnesses who lacked personal knowledge of any misconduct on Maloy’s part were called to establish that Bradley told others in confidence——at or near the time of the events in question——that Maloy was allegedly harassing her. There is no doubt that Bradley did share such information with others. In fact, her contemporaneous accusations were soon reported to persons in DOT’s management, who understandably insisted that an investigation be conducted. Consequently, Bradley submitted a formal written complaint about Maloy to her employer, and DOT investigated the matter.2 That Bradley complained to others about Maloy in 1996 is circumstantial evidence from which one might infer that the alleged sexual harassment occurred.3 It is relatively weak circumstantial evidence, however, because it ultimately rests largely, if not entirely, on the credibility of the very same person——Bradley——whose testimony it was offered to corroborate. Indeed, drawing the inference largely would beg the question of Bradley’s veracity, for doing so would require that her veracity (which Maloy disputes) be assumed.4 Having carefully weighed and evaluated all of the relevant, persuasive evidence, the undersigned is unable to find, without hesitancy, that Maloy engaged in the conduct of which Bradley has accused him. This determination, it should be stressed, reflects the fact-finder’s judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is purposefully not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur between Bradley and Maloy.5 The undersigned affirmatively finds that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Bradley.6 Likewise, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Bradley that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Bradley——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ophelia Morris In December 1996, Ophelia Morris (“Morris”) replaced Bradley as the director’s administrative assistant in the Turnpike District Planning Office. As had Bradley, Morris served as a secretary to a number of managerial employees, including Maloy. She was a career service employee. Maloy could assign work to Morris, but he lacked the power to promote or fire her. Maloy and Morris became friends, and their friendship deepened over time. By 1999, the two were sufficiently close that Morris routinely confided in Maloy, sharing private information with him concerning the personal problems she was having with her then-fiancé, whom she planned to (and did) marry in May of that year. In June 1999, soon after Morris got married, Morris and Maloy began a mutually consensual sexual affair. While there are some conflicts in the evidence regarding certain immaterial details of their relationship,7 the fact-finder is convinced that neither party entered into this adulterous affair as the result of coercion, bribery, intimidation, harassment, or any type of untoward pressure, either express or implied; rather, each wanted to have an extramarital sexual relationship with the other. Some time in the autumn of 1999, Maloy offered Morris a job as his aide at the County Commission.8 The undersigned is not convinced that Morris had attempted, in any serious way, to break away from the ongoing affair with Maloy before he made this offer of employment. To the contrary, it is found that, more likely than not, Morris remained satisfied with——and had no present intention to end——the affair at the time Maloy proposed to hire her as his aide.9 Morris testified that, after initially demurring, she finally agreed to accept the at-will position as Maloy’s aide, wherein she would serve at his pleasure, but only on the condition that she and Maloy must cease having sex once she was on the county’s payroll. Morris claimed that Maloy reluctantly assented to this condition. Morris started working for Leon County as Maloy’s aide on Monday, December 20, 1999. At a Christmas luncheon that week, Morris met Denise Williams, a one-time aide to County Commissioner Cliff Thaell who was then employed in the county’s Public Works office. The two women quickly became friends and—— within a matter of days——lovers, commencing their own affair shortly after the start of the new year. In January 2000, some secrets were revealed. Denise Williams divulged to Morris that she, Denise, had slept with Maloy and asked whether Morris had done the same. Morris lied to Denise Williams and denied that she had slept with Maloy. Shortly thereafter Morris confronted Maloy with Denise Williams’s disclosure, and he admitted that the two had indeed had sex with one another. That same month, Denise Williams separately told Maloy about the affair she and Morris were having. Maloy was upset, angry, and hurt that Morris had been seeing Denise Williams. He urged her to end the affair with Denise Williams, but Morris did not immediately follow Maloy’s counsel. By February 2000, Maloy’s ongoing interest in Morris’s sexual relationship with Denise Williams was starting to cause Morris to become concerned that she would be fired because of that affair. Consequently, Morris stopped talking to Denise Williams, effectively suspending their relationship, and informed Maloy about the apparent breakup. In the meantime, Morris and Maloy continued their liaison, contrary to the supposed understanding that the sex would stop. At hearing, Morris claimed that she continued to participate in the affair with Maloy only because she feared he would fire her if she refused. However, while Maloy clearly had the power summarily to dismiss Morris, there is no convincing evidence that he ever expressly or impliedly threatened——or even intended——to take such action if she declined to have sex with him. In June 2000, unbeknownst to Maloy, Morris resumed her relationship with Denise Williams. Then, in July or August 2000, Denise Williams left a sexually explicit message for Morris on the county’s voice mail system, in a voice mailbox that Maloy checked on a routine basis. Maloy happened to hear this message before Morris did, and he was not pleased. The voice message incident was the beginning of the end of Morris’s employment as Maloy’s aide. Before long——and for a variety of reasons that are not relevant to this case—— Morris resigned, effective September 8, 2000. Two findings about Morris’s separation are made based on a preponderance of the evidence. First, Maloy did not fire Morris or force her to resign. Second, Morris did not leave because of her sexual relationship with Maloy.10 The purported understanding, mentioned above, that the affair between Maloy and Morris would terminate upon Morris’s becoming Maloy’s aide is the factual linchpin of the Commission’s case as it relates to Morris. The reason for this is that Morris clearly and candidly testified (and the undersigned has found) that her relationship with Maloy was mutually consensual and not the product of sexual harassment during the entire period she was employed with DOT. Thus, to establish that Maloy either intentionally misused his public positions to sexually harass Morris or, by sleeping with her, improperly accepted sexual favors as consideration for some official action, the Commission needed convincingly to distinguish and separate the mutually consensual “DOT phase” of the affair (which did not violate the ethics laws11) from the allegedly coercive “County Commission phase.” The undersigned is not convinced, however, that the subject affair comprised two such distinct phases. The evidence is too much in conflict regarding whether Maloy and Morris had an understanding about——or even discussed——ending their affair effective the date Morris started working as Maloy’s aide for the undersigned to find without hesitancy that such occurred.12 As a result, and in any event, it is not clear to the undersigned fact-finder that the affair between Maloy and Morris was coercive during the time she worked as his aide. The evidence in this regard, as the undersigned has evaluated and weighed it, is much too ambiguous to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that, beginning in January 2000, Maloy was explicitly or implicitly forcing Morris to have sex with him——especially given the undisputed fact that Morris freely and voluntarily had been sleeping with Maloy for the previous six months because she wanted to.13 Additionally, the undersigned affirmatively finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Morris. Finally, it is found, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Morris that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Morris. Denise Williams Denise Williams, introduced above, was an aide to Commissioner Thaell from October 1997 through November 1999. At hearing, Denise Williams testified that, in June 1998, Maloy——whom she had known since the mid-1980’s——began to “prey” on her after learning that she was separated from her husband. She alleged that Maloy frequently came into her office, uninvited, to look at her legs, rub her shoulders, or give her a hug. She asserted that this attention was unwanted but admitted that she never told Maloy to stop. To discourage Maloy, she claimed, she tried to dress in a less feminine way. At the same time, she acknowledged, she sometimes hugged Maloy back.14 The picture of Maloy that Denise Williams’s testimony ultimately paints——for which, it must be said, there is no independent, eyewitness corroboration——is that of a man pursuing her with dogged persistence, ignoring her constant attempts to turn him off.15 Maloy, in contrast, suggested that Denise Williams had taken the initiative, signaling her availability by often making mildly suggestive comments to him such as, “You could have been my husband.” It is not surprising, then, that while there is no dispute that the two had casual sex at Denise Williams’s apartment in February 1999, the evidence regarding how this came about is very much in conflict. Denise Williams testified that, despite having no desire whatsoever for Maloy, she finally gave in to his repeated requests for sex in order to “let him satisfy his curiosity” in the hope that he then would quit “bugging” her.16 For his part, Maloy depicted Denise Williams as the initiator who, one Tuesday or Wednesday, unexpectedly told him that her kids would be gone the next weekend and asked him to come over for a “visit” on Saturday, which invitation he accepted. It is undisputed that Maloy and Denise Williams had casual sex a second time, in July 1999, again at her place.17 Given the conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence, the fact-finder is not convinced, without hesitancy, that the events unfolded precisely as Denise Williams has described them. Yet, he is not able to find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Maloy’s testimony is entirely accurate, either. Thus, there can be no affirmative findings, one way or the other, on the broad question whether Maloy sexually harassed Denise Williams. Concerning the particular charges, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment or “pursuit” of Denise Williams. Nor is he convinced that there was an understanding between Maloy and Denise Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her. These determinations, it should be clear, reflect the fact-finder’s assessment of the quality and weight of the evidence; although properly made by the undersigned in his role as the trier of fact, they are not affirmative findings concerning what occurred or did not occur during the relevant timeframe.18 Tina Williams Tina Williams (no relation to Denise) was Maloy’s aide at the County Commission for about six months, from July 15, 1999, through the end of that year. Before coming to work for Maloy, she had worked as an accountant at the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), the state agency where persons who believe they have been discriminated against can file charges as a first step towards redress. Tina Williams had been introduced to Maloy in late 1998 by a mutual acquaintance, Edward Dixon, who at the time was not only a Gadsden County Commissioner but also was associated with the FCHR in some way. A few months later, Tina Williams had bumped into Maloy again at a local function, and he had asked her to apply for the position as his aide, which she later did. After having received favorable recommendations from Commissioner Dixon and from Ron McElrath, a fraternity brother of Maloy’s who was then the Executive Director of the FCHR, Maloy had hired Tina Williams. Tina Williams claims that Maloy sexually harassed her on numerous occasions, in various ways, starting before she was hired and continuing into September 1999. She testified, for example, that he frequently put his hand on her lap or attempted to do so, hugged and attempted to kiss her, talked dirty on the telephone, and made suggestive comments, including, once when they were on an out-of-town business trip together, “this is so soft” in reference to the bed in her hotel room. Tina Williams testified that the harassment stopped in September 1999, at which point, she asserted, Maloy became increasingly critical of her work and avoided her. Their relationship, she testified, seemed to improve in November 1999, but then in December Maloy asked for her resignation, which she tendered.19 Maloy testified that he hired Tina Williams to be his aide with high expectations concerning her abilities but soon became disappointed in her failure, as he saw it, to measure up. At hearing, Maloy asserted that Tina Williams had simply not worked out in the position for a number of reasons that need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that Maloy testified he asked Tina Williams to leave in December 1999 because he was generally dissatisfied with her performance on the job. Maloy flatly denies that he ever said or did anything to Tina Williams that could be considered improper or untoward, including touching, kissing, hugging, shoulder-rubbing, suggestive comments, or like conduct. The conflicts in the evidence concerning Tina Williams’s allegations of harassment clearly cannot be attributed to individuals’ unique perspectives or differences of opinion. This is not a situation where two people have described the same historical event in different but reconcilable terms; instead, the testimony has produced two mutually exclusive versions of history. Determining which of the protagonists is telling the purest truth is a difficult task made tougher by several factors. First, there is no independent corroboration of either his testimony or her testimony by a witness having personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts. This is a greater problem for the Commission, of course, because Maloy did not have the burden to prove his innocence. Absent independent corroboration, the conflicting testimony presents a classic “he said-she said” dilemma whose resolution, if one must choose between the competing narratives,20 depends on whether “he” or “she” is deemed to be the more credible witness. In this particular case, because the Commission bears the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence, Tina Williams must be judged not just credible, but considerably more credible than Maloy to sustain a finding of guilt.21 Herein, then, lies the second factor (or interrelated pair of factors) that complicates the fact-finding function: Neither participant’s testimony is inherently incredible;22 and conversely, neither one’s testimony is inherently more credible than the other’s. Tina Williams’s saga of sexual harassment cannot be rejected out of hand as a fabrication; it is obviously not fantastic. Upon hearing her story, one does not think, “That could not possibly have happened.” To the contrary, Tina Williams’s testimony is very believable. And yet, Maloy’s testimony, too, is eminently believable. He has not presented some half-baked alibi that tests credulity but rather has said exactly what one would expect an innocent man, falsely accused of sexual harassment, to say: “I did not do it.” What more, indeed, could he say, if in fact he were innocent? There was, really, no way for Maloy affirmatively to disprove the particular allegations that Tina Williams made. Third, having closely observed both Tina Williams and Maloy on the witness stand, the undersigned is unable to state with assurance, based on their respective demeanors, which of the two was probably telling the truth——or who was not. Both appeared to be sincere in recounting what had happened (or not happened) as they recalled the events in question. Neither appeared to the fact-finder to be lying. After carefully weighing all of the evidence with the foregoing factors in mind, the undersigned is not so convinced by either side’s proof as to conclude with confidence that any particular version of history advanced at hearing is highly verisimilar relative to the competing alternative. To the point, the evidence at bottom does not produce in the mind of this fact-finder a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of Tina Williams’s allegations.23 Thus, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Tina Williams. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, however, the undersigned finds that there was no understanding between Maloy and Tina Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ultimate Factual Determinations24 The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that the Commission has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Maloy violated either Section 112.313(2) or Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as charged, in relation to his respective associations with Laurie Bradley, Ophelia Morris, Denise Williams, and Tina Williams. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Maloy is not guilty of the ethics violations with which he has been charged.
Recommendation The fact-finder having determined that the evidence fails clearly and convincingly to establish a factual basis for culpability on any ground charged, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order declaring Maloy not guilty of violating Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 491.009(2)(k), and 491.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent held a license as a Mental Health Counselor in the State of Florida. Petitioner, through the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling, is the state agency that licenses and has regulatory jurisdiction of Clinical Social Workers. Respondent was employed as a counselor by the ACT Corporation (ACT) at the time of the incident that is the basis for this case. ACT operates a residential psychiatric treatment facility at which Respondent was employed. T.J. was a patient in the ACT facility from December 26, 1996 until mid-February, 1997. While at ACT, T.J. was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. T.J. had both group sessions and private sessions with Respondent while she was an in-patient at ACT. The private sessions took place in Respondent's office. Respondent and T.J. talked on the telephone, and he brought her small items, like lip-gloss and gum, that she was not allowed to have. T.J. alleges that the sessions became sexual on or about the second private therapy session. She alleges sexual contact during the in-patient sessions involved kissing and touching, that was consensual. T.J. states that she trusted Respondent and was in love with him. T.J. alleges this sexual relationship with Respondent continued after T.J. left ACT in February. There was never a therapeutic relationship between Respondent and T.J. after T.J. left the hospital. There was never any discussion of a fee arrangement, and no fees were ever paid for counseling sessions. Two days after T.J. left ACT, Respondent picked her up from her home and took her to Sapporo's for dinner and drinks. Following dinner, they went to a bar called the Barracks. T.J. alleges that when Respondent brought T.J. home that night they engaged in oral sex and intercourse. A few days later, T.J. and Respondent met for dinner at the Olive Garden. At the Olive Garden they had dinner and drinks. T.J. alleges that following dinner, Respondent walked T.J. to the van she was driving, they kissed and then had sexual intercourse in the van. On Valentine's Day Respondent came to T.J.'s house for dinner. T.J. lived with her parents. He brought her flowers and a bottle of wine for her parents. A card accompanied the flowers that said: "Sorry! No candy. Hope this will do instead." The envelope said "Traci." Following dinner, they went out to the Flagler Tavern. T.J. alleges that when they returned to T.J.'s house Respondent stayed until early morning and they had oral sex and intercourse. Respondent denies any sexual intimacy with T.J., and asserts that their relationship was one of patient-therapist even after she left ACT. T.J.’s testimony was presented by deposition. There was no opportunity to observe her. She was diagnosed contemporaneously with the events to which she testified with a condition that makes her credibility difficult to assess. Respondent testified at hearing denying the sexual relationship with T.J. I do not find the deposition testimony of T.J. credible regarding the allegations of sexual relations with Respondent. I find that there was a relationship between Respondent and T.J. because Respondent verifies the social contacts T.J. reported. Respondent did not perform any counseling with T.J. on the various occasions when they went to the bars and restaurants. This relationship was inconsistent with existing standards of professional conduct, as testified to by experts at hearing and exemplified in the code of ethics which ACT had. T.J. continued therapy as an outpatient with another ACT therapist for a short time after she was released from the hospital. During one of these sessions, T.J. told the outpatient therapist about her social/personal relationship with Respondent. Shortly thereafter, ACT fired Respondent for violation of ACT's code of ethics. This code prohibited personal relationships between patients and employees of the facility. Respondent had his Florida Teaching Certificate permanently revoked when he worked as a counselor at Deland Senior High School. He was charged with sexual misconduct with a student, and did not contest the charges formally. Psychotherapy is dependent upon a personal relationship between the patient and the therapist. Patients often develop emotional relationships or attachments to counselors or therapists because of the creation of an environment of trust. It is important that therapist recognize that this relationship is an outgrowth of treatment, and not to take advantage of the patient. Respondent had a relationship with T.J. that is contrary to the professional standards of practice, notwithstanding the allegations of sexual misconduct. His professional relationship should have been confined to the clinical setting, and the social activities in which he engaged with T.J. were inappropriate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling, enter a final order adopting this order and revoking Respondent’s license and assessing a fine of $1,000 against him pursuant to Rule 64B4- 10.002 formerly 59P-5.001, Florida Administrative Code, the Board's penalty guidelines. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ismael Lopez 13691 Gavina Avenue, No. 447 Sylmar, California 91342 Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Health 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex and by retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2008). As a Florida non-profit corporation, all of Respondent's activities are governed by its bylaws. Petitioner, a white female, has worked for Respondent off and on during the last five years. Most recently, Petitioner began working for Respondent on January 18, 2008, as a part-time food preparation (prep) worker and a part-time waitress in Respondent's restaurant. Petitioner accepted the job because she had recently left a full-time position with another employer due to the distance of that job from her house. As a prep worker, Petitioner earned a set hourly wage. Petitioner's responsibilities included assisting the chef in preparing meals and cleaning up the kitchen. The chef, Tony Mongone, directed Petitioner's kitchen work but he was not her supervisor. As a waitress, Petitioner earned $3.35 per hour plus tips. On Tuesdays and Fridays, Petitioner earned an average of $100 in tips per shift. Petitioner worked between five and six hours on Tuesday evenings and between five and eight hours on Friday evenings when Respondent served sit-down dinners to its members. On these occasions, Respondent's kitchen served an average of 200 dinners in a two-hour period of time. Petitioner also worked when Respondent catered for banquets and other special occasions. Petitioner worked a total of 41.66 hours in January 2008; 81.5 hours in February 2008; 45.13 hours in March 2008; and 71.17 hours in April 2008. She worked 10.32 hours for the first week in May 2008. Over the course of her 15.4 week term of employment, Petitioner averaged 16.23 hours per week. Although it varied according to the event, there were five to eight other servers or waitresses (all females) working along with Petitioner on any given night. There always were eight-to-10 workers in and around the kitchen, including the servers, the chef, one pizza maker, and the kitchen prep person. At all times relevant here, Linda Ferguson was the club manager and Petitioner's direct supervisor. Ms. Ferguson was responsible for day-to-day management of all club activities with the authority to enforce all club policies. Ms. Ferguson also was in charge of all aspects of hiring and terminating employees and managing volunteer personnel. Ms. Ferguson was in the restaurant on most Friday evenings. When Ms. Ferguson was not scheduled to work, the assistant manager, Carolyn Weeks, was on duty. On Petitioner’s first night as the kitchen prep worker, Chef Mongone was drinking from a pitcher of beer. Early in the evening, Chef Mongone made comments about her breasts, telling her they were nice and asking whether they were real. Later that evening, when the staff was cleaning the kitchen, Chef Mongone walked up behind Petitioner and touched her backside. Petitioner immediately turned on Chef Mongone, telling him assertively, "Don't ever do that again! How would you like it if someone did that to your wife?" Chef Mongone just stood there as Petitioner turned and walked away. Petitioner immediately informed Ms. Ferguson about the incident. Ms. Ferguson inquired whether Petitioner wanted her "to take care of it." Petitioner responded that she felt she "had already done so." Ms. Ferguson spoke to Chef Mongone about his drinking on the job and his inappropriate conduct. Chef Mongone responded in an insubordinate way, denying all allegations of improper conduct. Ms. Ferguson also spoke to Mike Mercante, Respondent's President at that time. Ms. Ferguson complained to Mr. Mercante about Chef Mongone's drinking and offensive conduct. In the following weeks, Chef Mongone sometimes raised his voice at Petitioner and she back at him. On days that Petitioner worked as a waitress, Chef Mongone held up Petitioner's food orders, causing delays in service that resulted in reduced tips for Petitioner. The delays in releasing Petitioner's food orders usually occurred after Petitioner and Chef Mongone exchanged angry words. On or about February 11, 2008, Petitioner was working as a waitress. When she placed her first food order, Chef Mongone began yelling at her for not putting her name and table number on the ticket. When Petitioner reached to retrieve the ticket, Chef Mongone told her not to touch it. At that point, Petitioner started yelling at Chef Mongone. Petitioner admits her response was not nice and describes herself as having "lost it." When Petitioner returned to the kitchen to get her next order, she overheard Chef Mongone telling the kitchen staff that she was stupid because she could not remember to put her name on a ticket. Once again Petitioner's temper got the best of her. Petitioner called Chef Mongone a drunk, triggering another argument with Chef Mongone. Despite the hard feelings between Chef Mongone and Petitioner, Chef Mongone made additional inappropriate remarks to Petitioner. On one occasion, Chef Mongone observed Petitioner wiping her hand on the seat of her pants. Chef Mongone then stated that he "would like to do that, too." On or about February 15, 2008, Petitioner was scheduled to work first as a prep worker and later as a waitress. While she was in the kitchen, she shared a bag of Valentine candy with the staff. When only one piece of candy was left, Petitioner asked Chef Mongone if he wanted it. Chef Mongone replied that he did not want the candy. However, when Petitioner put the candy in her mouth, Chef Mongone made some comment about the way Petitioner sucked the candy. Chef Mongone immediately stated that he did not mean for his comment to come out like it did. Nevertheless, Petitioner was offended and responded in a negative way. Sometime after February 15, 2008, Petitioner wrote a letter to the members of Respondent's Executive Board. The letter details Petitioner conflict with Chef Mongone. Petitioner gave the letter to Ms. Ferguson, who gave it to Mr. Mercante. February 15, 2008, was Petitioner's last day as a kitchen prep worker. From that time forward, Ms. Ferguson scheduled Petitioner to work only as a waitress in order to reduce the time Petitioner would have to spend in the kitchen. On February 20, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board had a meeting. At the meeting, the board members discussed Petitioner's letter. Chef Mongone attended the meeting and denied all allegations. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Executive Board directed one of its members to draft a letter of reprimand for Chef Mongone. In an internal memorandum dated February 22, 2008, Respondent's Executive Board advised Chef Mongone that he had been warned about his rule infractions and general behavior for the past recent months. According to the memorandum, Chef Mongone would receive no further warnings and any future infractions of club rules or Florida law would result in disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination of employment. Respondent does not have a written policy prohibiting sexual harassment. It does have a rule against drinking on duty. On or about May 6, 2008, Petitioner once again became upset at work because the kitchen was crowded and Chef Mongone yelled at her. Petitioner called her husband to complain that Chef Mongone had cursed at her, saying, "Bitch, get the f--- out of the kitchen.” Petitioner also alleged that Chef Mongone was holding up her food orders. When Petitioner's husband arrived at the restaurant, he met Petitioner, Chef Mongone, Ms. Weeks (Assistant Manager), and Lou Barletta (Respondent's Vice President) in the restaurant's parking lot. Petitioner's husband told Chef Mongone that Petitioner would show him respect if Chef Mongone demonstrated respect for Petitioner. The discussion in the parking lot was civil and ended with Chef Mongone and Petitioner's husband shaking hands. After the meeting, Chef Mongone made it clear that he could no longer work with Petitioner and that one of them had to go. Petitioner did not want to go back into the kitchen after the meeting. Ms. Weeks suggested that Petitioner go home until everything cooled down. Petitioner agreed and left the premises. Petitioner was scheduled to work the following Saturday. Before Petitioner reported to work, Ms. Ferguson talked to Mr. Mercante. After that conversation, Ms. Ferguson told Petitioner that she should not come back to work until Ms. Ferguson could replace Chef Mongone. Ms. Ferguson was actively looking for a new chef. After locating a replacement for Chef Mongone, Mr. Mercante would not approve the termination of Chef Mongone's employment. At the end of June 2008, Respondent did not renew Ms. Ferguson's contract. Ms. Weeks replaced Ms. Ferguson as Respondent's General Manager. Due to financial difficulties, Respondent did not hire an assistant manager when Ms. Weeks became the General Manager. Respondent also eliminated all table-busing positions, using volunteers to clear the tables. Respondent has not called anyone back to work after laying them off. Like Ms. Ferguson, Ms. Weeks had problems with Chef Mongone. She eventually hired a new chef and fired Chef Mongone due to his alcohol consumption at work. Petitioner initially drew unemployment compensation from Respondent's place of business. Except for a couple of days of work, Petitioner has been unemployed since May 6, 2008. She is still drawing unemployment compensation from her most recent employer. Petitioner acknowledges that the economy is the reason she has been unable to obtain a job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Mary Nelson Morgan, Esquire Cole, Stone, Stoudemire, and Morgan P.A. 201 North Hogan Street Suite 200 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white female. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at Respondent’s Melbourne store from April 2006 to September 2006. Petitioner’s primary job duty was selling appliances to retail customers. She also performed ancillary duties, such as tagging merchandise, cleaning and organizing the showroom floor, scheduling deliveries, and making follow-up calls to customers. Petitioner was not paid a salary. Her income was solely commission-based. She earned a total of $11,826.14 while working for Respondent, which equates to an average weekly gross pay of $537.55. Petitioner had several managers during the term of her employment. She did not have a problem with any of her managers, except for Jeffrey Rock. Mr. Rock is a black male, and by all accounts, he was a difficult manager to work for. He was “strict”; he often yelled at the salespersons to “get in the box”2 and “answer the phones”; and, unlike several of the prior managers at the Melbourne store, Mr. Rock held the salespersons accountable for doing their job. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rock "constantly" made sexual comments in the store, including comments about the size of his penis and his sexual prowess; comments about sex acts that he wanted to perform on a female employee in Respondent’s accounting office, Ms. Miho; “stallion” noises directed at Ms. Miho; and a question to Petitioner about the type of underwear that she was wearing. Petitioner’s testimony regarding the sexual comments and noises made by Mr. Rock was corroborated by Neina Blizzard, who worked with Petitioner as a salesperson for Respondent and who has also filed a sexual harassment claim against Respondent. Mr. Rock denied making any sexually inappropriate comments or noises in the store. His testimony was corroborated by Guy Ruscillo and Carissa Howard, who worked as salespersons with Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard and who are still employed by Respondent. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock gave favorable treatment to Ms. Howard and two other female salespersons with whom he had sexual relationships and/or who found his sexual comments funny. Mr. Rock denied giving favorable treatment to any salesperson, except for one time when he gave a “house ticket”3 to Ms. Howard because she took herself off the sales floor for six hours one day to help him get organized during his first week as manager at the Melbourne store. Ms. Howard is white. The record does not reflect the race of the other two female salespersons -- Rebecca and Shanna -- who Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified received favorable treatment by Mr. Rock, and the anecdotal evidence of the favorable treatment that they allegedly received was not persuasive. Petitioner did not have any complaints regarding her schedule. Indeed, she testified that Mr. Rock changed her schedule at one point during her employment to give her more favorable hours. Petitioner’s testimony about other salespersons having sexual relationships with Mr. Rock and/or receiving favorable treatment from Mr. Rock was based solely upon speculation and rumor. Indeed, Rebecca, one of the salespersons with whom Mr. Rock allegedly had a sexual relationship, was “let go” by Mr. Rock because of the problems with her job performance observed by Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard. Petitioner’s last day of work was Saturday, September 30, 2006. On that day, Petitioner came into the store with Ms. Blizzard at approximately 8:00 a.m. because, according to Petitioner, another manager had changed her schedule for that day from the closing shift to the opening shift. Mr. Rock confronted Petitioner when she arrived, asking her why she came in at 8:00 a.m. since he had put her on the schedule for the closing shift. An argument ensued and Petitioner went into the warehouse in the back of the store to compose herself. When Petitioner returned to the showroom several minutes later, Mr. Rock was engaged in an argument with Ms. Blizzard. During the argument, Ms. Blizzard demanded a transfer to another store, which Mr. Rock agreed to give her. Then, as a “parting shot,” Ms. Blizzard told Mr. Rock that he was a “racist” who was “prejudiced against white women.” Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock told her that she was fired immediately after she called him a racist. Petitioner testified that after Mr. Rock fired Ms. Blizzard, he asked her whether she wanted to be fired too. Petitioner testified that even though she did not respond, Mr. Rock told her that “you are fired too.” Then, according to Ms. Blizzard and Petitioner, Mr. Rock escorted them both out of the store. Mr. Rock denies telling Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner that they were fired. He testified that they both walked out of the store on their own accord after the argument. Mr. Rock’s version of the events was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo, who witnessed the argument. Mr. Ruscillo testified that he heard a lot of yelling, but that he did not hear Mr. Rock tell Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner at any point that they were fired. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard met with an attorney the Monday after the incident. The following day, Petitioner gave Ms. Blizzard a letter to deliver on her behalf to Respondent’s human resources (HR) Department. The letter, which Petitioner testified that she wrote on the day that she was fired by Mr. Rock, stated that Petitioner “was sexually harassed and discriminated against based on being a white female by my manager, Jeff Rock”; that Petitioner “previously reported numerous incidents of this discrimination and sexual harassment to upper management”; and that she was fired “as a result of this discrimination and the refusal to put up with Mr. Rock’s sexual advancement.” This letter was the first notice that Respondent had of Petitioner’s claims of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Rock. Petitioner considers herself to be a very good salesperson, but Mr. Rock described her as an “average” salesperson. Mr. Rock’s characterization of Petitioner’s job performance is corroborated by Petitioner’s acknowledgement that her sales figures were lower than those of at least Mr. Ruscillo, Ms. Blizzard, and Ms. Howard. Petitioner complained to another manager, Al Sierra, about Mr. Rock’s management style at some point in mid-September 2006. She did not complain to Mr. Sierra or anyone else in Respondent’s upper management about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock. Indeed, as noted above, the first time that Petitioner complained about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock was in a letter that she provided to Respondent’s HR Department several days after she was fired and after she met with a lawyer. Petitioner testified that she did not complain about the sexual harassment by Mr. Rock because he threatened to fire any salesperson who complained to upper management about the way that he ran the store and because she did not know who to complain to because she never received an employee handbook. There is no evidence that Mr. Rock fired any salesperson for complaining about how he ran the store, and he denied making any such threats. He did, however, acknowledge that he told the salespersons that they were all replaceable. Mr. Rock’s testimony was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo and Ms. Howard, who were at the sales meetings where Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard claim that the threats were made. The training that Petitioner received when she started with Respondent was supposed to include a discussion of Respondent’s policies and procedures, including its policy against sexual harassment. The trainer, Kit Royal, testified that he remembered Petitioner attending the week-long training program and that the program did include a discussion of the sexual harassment policy and other policies and procedures. Petitioner, however, testified that no policies and procedures were discussed during the training program. Petitioner was supposed to have received and signed for an employee handbook during the training program. No signed acknowledgement form could be located for Petitioner, which is consistent with her testimony that she never received the handbook. The fact that Petitioner did not receive the employee handbook does not mean that the training program did not include discussion of Respondent’s sexual harassment policies. Indeed, Petitioner’s testimony that the training program did not include any discussion regarding salary and benefit policies (as Mr. Royal testified that it did) and that she was never told what she would be paid by Respondent despite having given up another job to take the job with Respondent calls into question her testimony that the sexual harassment policy was not discussed at the training program. Petitioner was aware that Respondent had an HR Department because she met with a woman in the HR Department named Helen on several occasions regarding an issue that she had with her health insurance. She did not complain to Helen about the alleged sexual harassment by Mr. Rock, but she did tell Helen at some point that Mr. Rock “was being an ass” and “riding her,” which she testified were references to Mr. Rock’s management style not the alleged sexual harassment. Petitioner collected employment compensation of $272 per week after she left employment with Respondent. Petitioner testified that she looked for jobs in furniture sales and car sales while she was collecting unemployment, but that she was unable to find another job for approximately three months because of the slow economy at the time. She provided no documentation of those job-search efforts at the final hearing. Petitioner is currently employed by Art’s Shuttle. She has held that job for approximately nine months. Petitioner drives a van that takes cruise ship passengers to and from the airport. The record does not reflect how many hours per week Petitioner works at Art’s Shuttle, but she testified that she works seven days a week and earns approximately $500 per week. No written documentation of Petitioner’s current income was provided at the final hearing. Respondent has a “zero tolerance” policy against sexual harassment according to its president, Sam Pak. He credibly testified that had he been aware of the allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Rock that he would have conducted an investigation and, if warranted, done something to fix the problem. The policy, which is contained in the employee handbook, states that Respondent “will not, under any circumstances, condone or tolerate conduct that may constitute sexual harassment on the part of its management, supervisors, or non-management personnel.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include “[c]reating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment or atmosphere by . . . [v]erbal actions, including . . . using vulgar, kidding, or demeaning language . . . .” Mr. Pak agreed that the allegations against Mr. Rock, if true, would violate Respondent’s sexual harassment policy. The employee handbook includes a “grievance procedure” for reporting problems, including claims of sexual harassment. The first step is to bring the problem to the attention of the store manager, but the handbook states that the employee is “encouraged and invited to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources” if the problem involves the manager. Additionally, the handbook states in bold, underlined type that “[a]nyone who feels that he or she . . . is the victim of sexual or other harassment, must immediately report . . . . all incidents of harassment in writing to your manager or the store manager, or if either person is the subject of the complaint, to the president.” Mr. Pak had an office at the Melbourne store. He testified that he had an “open door policy” whereby employees could bring complaints directly to him. The only complaint that Mr. Pak ever received about Mr. Rock was from another salesperson, Rod Sherman, who complained that Mr. Rock was a “tough manager.” Mr. Pak did nothing in response to the complaint and simply told Mr. Sherman that different managers have different management styles.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race or gender, engaged in sexual harassment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a Caucasian female and filed a complaint of race and gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent operates retail grocery stores in several states, including Florida. The evidence, in its entirety, does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the evidence prove that Petitioner was sexually harassed. Finally, there is no evidence that Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10. Respondent first employed Petitioner sometime in July 2003 as an "at-will" employee. No written employment contract has ever existed between the parties. Respondent trained and promoted Petitioner to assistant manager of a grocery store. In April 2005, however, Mr. William Reners, Respondent's regional director of operations (RDO), offered Petitioner an opportunity to become the administrative assistant/secretary in Respondent's Regional Office without a decrease in compensation.2 Petitioner accepted the offer. Petitioner continued her employment as an administrative assistant, and she voluntary resigned on February 5, 2007. Petitioner earned positive performance evaluations and regular raises during her employment. Petitioner's claim of disparate treatment relates to Mr. Cornelius Hicks, an African-American male, who was compensated at a higher level than the compensation Petitioner received. However, Respondent employed Mr. Hicks as a store manager, and Mr. Hicks never voluntarily transferred to a position of administrative assistant. Respondent gave Mr. Hicks an extraordinary raise sometime in late 2006 or early 2007. Mr. Hicks' job performance was "tremendous." Respondent intended the raise as recognition of the duties Mr. Hicks performed as a "floater" manager. The job required Mr. Hicks to manage a number of different stores and to commute long distances, on short notice, and to perform the duties of a floater manager for extended periods. Petitioner first learned of the alleged disparate treatment when Petitioner entered Mr. Reners' office without permission while he was on vacation sometime in January 2007. Petitioner learned of the raise when she discovered relevant paperwork in Mr. Reners' office. Disparate treatment is not evidenced by Respondent's refusal to give Petitioner a merit pay increase after Petitioner earned a Master's of Business Administration (MBA) degree. Mr. David Gerdes, Respondent's vice president for Human Resources, told Petitioner at the time that Respondent did not give raises to employees when they earned college degrees that do not improve an employee's ability to do his/her job. The MBA did not improve Petitioner's ability to carry out her clerical duties as an administrative assistant. Petitioner was aware that Respondent maintains a uniform, written non-discrimination policy and a "zero tolerance" sexual harassment policy. Petitioner knew the policies were posted in all stores and included in annual training sessions. Petitioner knew the company had an "open door" policy by which employees who are not satisfied with answers to their inquiries at the local level are encouraged to contact corporate headquarters in Minnesota. Finally, Petitioner knew that Respondent promptly investigates employees' complaints of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. Mr. Reners is the individual who allegedly discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner. As the RDO, Mr. Reners is responsible for overall management and operation of the 11 grocery stores in Florida. However, Mr. Reners did not have the authority to discharge full-time employees, including Petitioner. The so-called whistle-blower evidence pertains to various memoranda about store conditions that Petitioner wrote during her employment as an administrative assistant. When Petitioner discussed the issue with Mr. Reners in September 2006, Mr. Reners invited Petitioner to send the memoranda to Mr. John Boogren, Corporate Director of Operations. Mr. Boogren is Mr. Reners' supervisor. Petitioner sent the memoranda to Mr. Boogren. The memoranda discussed what Petitioner thought were poor conditions and operating procedures in Respondent's stores. The evidence of sexual harassment involves uncorroborated allegations by Petitioner that Mr. Tom DeGovanni, a co-worker, patted Petitioner on her head and shoulders, or back, on October 6, 2006. Petitioner complained of the incident, but qualified her complaint by saying that "it was no big deal" and by saying that she did not want the company to take any action. Several days after the alleged incident, however, Petitioner delivered a memorandum to Mr. Reners complaining of the alleged conduct. Respondent investigated the claim of sexual harassment by Mr. DeGovanni in accordance with Respondent's long-standing "zero tolerance" sexual harassment policy. The investigation did not substantiate Petitioner's allegations. Mr. DeGovanni adamantly denied touching Petitioner, there were no witnesses to the alleged event, and, even though Petitioner and DeGovanni were in front of a security video camera at the time of the alleged event, the touching was not on the videotape. Respondent reminded Mr. DeGovanni of the company's policy against sexual harassment, gave Mr. DeGovanni a written warning, and transferred him to another store location so Petitioner would not have contact with him. Mr. Reners notified corporate headquarters of the complaint, the investigation results, and the corrective action. Petitioner received a satisfactory performance evaluation, a wage increase, and a bonus in December 2006, after her complaint about DeGovanni. Mr. Reners knew of and approved the evaluation, raise, and bonus and could have stopped them if he had wished to do so. Petitioner resigned her employment as Respondent's administrative assistant/secretary on two occasions prior to February 5, 2007. Although Mr. Reners could have accepted both of the prior resignations, he telephoned Petitioner and persuaded her to resume her employment without penalty. However, Mr. Reners warned Petitioner after the second resignation that, if she resigned again, he would accept the resignation. Mr. Reners was on vacation during the week of January 29, 2007. Petitioner had no communication with Mr. Reners during that week. On Saturday, February 3, 2007, Petitioner prepared a letter of resignation and resigned on February 5, 2007. The psychic that Petitioner consults had previously told Petitioner of an impending job termination. Mr. Reners returned from vacation on Monday, February 5, 2007, and commenced a meeting with two other employees to discuss renovations at Respondent's store in Labelle, Florida. Petitioner thought she should be included in the meeting and knocked on the door to the meeting room. Petitioner mistakenly thought the meeting was a staff meeting that often occurred after Mr. Reners returned from a vacation. Mr. Reners explained to Petitioner that there would be a staff meeting afterwards. Petitioner was upset at not being included in the first meeting and viewed her exclusion from the meeting as the job termination predicted by her psychic. Shortly after the first meeting ended, Petitioner walked up to Mr. Reners, handed her store keys to him, said "You win!" and left the building. Petitioner performed her job duties well. Respondent would not have discharged Petitioner on February 5, 2007. Petitioner voluntarily resigned on that day.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2008.
The Issue Whether Carl G. Bott, Jr., is guilty of immorality, misconduct in office and/or gross insubordination?
Findings Of Fact During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, Carl G. Bott, Jr., was an employee of the School Board of Putnam County under a continuing contract. Mr. Bott has been employed as a teacher for approximately ten years. Mr. Bott was a teacher and Dean in the County Alternative School Program during the 1984-1985 through 1988-1989 school years. During the 1984-1985 and the 1985-1986 school years the County Alternative School Program was located on the second floor of the Campbell Administrative Building. The County Alternative School Program was renamed the District Opportunity Center and was located on the Davis Lake Road side of the campus of E. H. Miller School during the 1986-1987, school year. Mr. Bott continued to work at the District Opportunity Center during the 1987-1988 school year and part of the 1988-1989 school year. During the 1984-1985 through 1988-1989 school years Diane Wilkinson was employed as a secretary for the County Alternative School Program and the District Opportunity Center. Mr. Bott was her immediate supervisor and prepared Ms. Wilkinson's evaluations during this period of time. During the 1984-1985 and 1985-1986 school years Mr. Bott was in charge of the County Alternative School Program. During the 1984-1985 and the 1985-1986 school years Mr. Bott made comments to Ms. Wilkinson of a sexual nature. In particular, Mr. Bott told Ms. Wilkinson that she had a nice ass, but that [her] stomach needed to be tightened up; and he also made statements in regard to women's nipples showing through their clothes, that's a real turn on to him, for women to get cold on for their nipples to show through their clothing.." Page 199, lines 113-17, Transcript of Administrative Hearing. Sometime during the 1985-1986 school year Mr. Bott intentionally placed his hand on Ms. Wilkinson's right breast without permission, warning or provocation. Mr. Bott's act was a sexual advance toward Ms. Wilkinson. This incident occurred while Mr. Bott and Ms. Wilkinson were in Ms. Wilkinson's small office discussing business. When Mr. Bott touched Ms. Wilkinson, she said nothing and looked at him with a shocked expression. When Ms. Wilkinson did not respond to his advance, Mr. Bott removed his hand and left the room. Ms. Wilkinson did not report the incident to anyone. Nor was anything said about the incident by Ms. Wilkinson or Mr. Bott. Approximately six to nine weeks before the County Alternative School Program was moved to Davis Lake Road, Mr. Bott came into Ms. Wilkinson's office where she was typing, walked up behind her and reached over her shoulders and intentionally touched her breast from behind without permission, warning or provocation. Again, Ms. Wilkinson said nothing. She looked at him with a shocked expression and Mr. Bott then removed his hand and left the room. On the same day that the second incident occurred, Ms. Wilkinson called Evie Shellenberger, the Director of Personnel for the Petitioner, and set up an appointment for the next day to report the incident. The day after the second incident, Ms. Wilkinson told Mr. Bott that I can have your teaching certificate lifted for sexual harassment if you ever touch me again . Page 205, lines 9-10, Transcript of Administrative Hearing. Mr. Bott told Ms. Wilkinson that he realized that she was correct, he apologized to her and promised it would never happen again. Ms. Wilkinson kept her appointment with Ms. Shellenberger and reported both incidents. She did not, however, file a sexual harassment charge against Mr. Bott. Ms. Wilkinson did not file charges because Mr. Bott had apologized and promised not to touch her again and she did not want to harm his family or his career. Ms. Wilkinson was concerned for Mr. Bott because he had a son who had been sick and Mrs. Bott had had cancer. After moving to Davis Lake Road, Mr. Bott continued to make inappropriate comments to Ms. Wilkinson of a sexual nature. The frequency of the statements increased, especially during the 1987-1988 school year. In particular, Mr. Bott made the following statements to Ms. Wilkinson: That he had been a virgin until he was 21 years old, and therefore "he needed to get all the sex he could possibly get to make up for lost time." That he masturbated in the shower with hand cream. That he had had a wet dream about her and he had to get up and clean himself up and clean the sheets up. That "he had had a dream about [them] being in the back seat of a car and that [they] had made love, and that he had climaxed all over the bed, and that it seemed so real to him that he could even smell [her] cologne." That he had calluses on the palms of his hands from masturbating. That "he could really satisfy me [Ms. Wilkinson] sexually without his teeth, and that he knew how -- he could gum me [Ms. Wilkinson] to death, and that he really knew how to satisfy women without his teeth in." That his wife "was so fat and so ugly that he had a hard time making love to her, and that he had to really fantasize when he was having sex with her, to pretend he was with someone else instead of her, because she had dimples in her ass and she was so fat and so overweight it was like she had two sets of breasts, one in the front and one in the back behind her armpit in regard to a fatty kind of area on her." That "I intend to have you [Ms. Wilkinson] in bed before we go our separate ways." That he had made love with a woman (not his wife) in his boat and he had been afraid that he was not going to be able to get his clothes on before the Florida Marine Patrol caught him. That he needed "a piece of ass from someone 18 to 21 years old because he didn't want to get too old to go out and enjoy it." The more explicit sexual statements Mr. Bott made to Ms. Wilkinson were not made continuously. There would be periods of time when he would not make such statements. There were, however, periods of time when the types of statements quoted above would be made and then he would be quiet again. Ms. Wilkinson did not ask Mr. Bott to stop making the statements. She also did not tell anyone about the statements Mr. Bott was making to her. In approximately March, 1988, Ms. Wilkinson did talk to Rita Moody, president of the union to which Ms. Wilkinson belonged, about changing positions and informed her of Mr. Bott's behavior. There were not any positions available, however, and Ms. Moody suggested that Ms. Wilkinson should not "open a can of worms" by reporting the incidents. Despite the incidents related above involving Mr. Bott and Ms. Wilkinson, Ms. Wilkinson and Mr. Bott were friendly to each other and discussed personal matters as well as matters related to their work. They ate lunch with each other on occasion and Mr. Bott gave Ms. Wilkinson rides to and from her home and the office on occasion. Ms. Wilkinson also actively assisted Mr. Bott in protecting the program they worked in and assisted him in remaining with the program because she considered him an asset to the program. At the beginning of the 1986-1987 school year, Jean Herring was assigned as an Assistant Principal in charge of the District Opportunity Center. Ms. Herring was Mr. Bott's immediate supervisor during the 1986-1987 school year. Because Mr. Bott had previously been in charge of the program, he had some resentment about Ms. Herring's position. During the Spring of 1988, Ms. Herring received a complaint from Dana Hales, a female student at the District Opportunity Center. Ms. Hales alleged that Mr. Bott was using inappropriate language and discussing inappropriate topics with female students. (See findings of fact 23 and 24). Ms. Hales indicated that she felt uncomfortable in one-on-one counseling sessions with Mr. Bott. Based upon this complaint, Ms. Herring directed Mr. Bott not to conduct any one-on-one counseling sessions with female students without including Ms. Herring in the session. The next morning, Ms. Herring discovered Mr. Bott conducting a one-on-one counseling session with a female student in violation of her directive to him. Ms. Herring did not see Mr. Bott violate the directive again. Dana Hales complained to Ms. Herring because of statements Mr. Bott made to her of a sexual nature. Those statements included a statement "that he had an affair with a young girl from where he came from before and that he wished he could find a young girl here that he could trust that ... would not tell anyone." Page 142, lines 5-8, Transcript of Administrative Hearing. Mr. Bott also made comments to Ms. Hales concerning his wife. Mr. Bott told Ms. Hales that his wife "was ugly and that she was fat, and in the morning like in the daylight that she was very ugly and unattractive." Page 142, lines 15-17, Transcript of Administrative Hearing. Tonnette Sanders moved to Putnam County after the 1987-1988 school year had begun. Therefore, she was placed in the District Opportunity Center. She was not placed there for disciplinary reasons. Ms. Sanders was approximately 17 or 18 years of age. Mr. Bott was not one of Ms. Sanders' teachers. Mr. Bott and Ms. Sanders did become friends, however, and Mr. Bott provided counseling to Ms. Sanders. While walking into an office together, Mr. Bott patted Ms. Sanders on her buttocks. Ms. Sanders believed that the touching was a sexual advance and it made her feel uncomfortable. Ms. Sanders did not return to school for several days after the incident because she was upset. When she did return, Mr. Bott apologized to her for his action. Mr. Bott also told Ms. Sanders that she was the nicest looking black girl he had had ever seen." Cynthia Bartrum Schmurmand attended the District Opportunity Center during the 1986-1987 school year. Ms. Schmurmand was 14 or 15 year of age at the time. Mr. Bott provided GED preparation training approximately 45 minutes a day to Ms. Schmurmand and other female students. Initially there were four or five students who attended the sessions. Eventually, however, only Ms. Schmurmand and another student, Wendy Parker, attended the sessions. Mr. Bott did not always provide instruction to Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker. Instead, Mr. Bott, Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker would just talk. During these conversations, Mr. Bott told Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker that he had been out with girls their age. He also told Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker that they could get older and more mature men. Mr. Bott offered to take Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker out on his fishing boat with the permission of their parents. Mr. Bott told them that "they would get some beer" even though Mr. Bott knew that they were not of legal drinking age. Mr. Bott allowed Ms. Schmurmand and Ms. Parker to smoke cigarettes in his office during at least one of the sessions. Mr. Bott provided the cigarettes. The use or possession of tobacco or tobacco products on school grounds was prohibited. Mr. Bott warned the students that if they ever let anyone know that they had been allowed to smoke, he would get into trouble and so would they. In addition to Mr. Bott's duties at the District Opportunity Center, he also taught health classes until December 1988 and for approximately three years preceding the 1988-1989 school year at the St. Johns River Community College. The courses taught by Mr. Bott were extra-credit classes taken by senior high students who needed additional credits to graduate from high school. During the Fall of 1988, Mr. Bott's health class was first aid. The class met from 3:30 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Monday and Wednesday. The students who attended the class were from Palatka High School and were 17 years of age or older. During the Fall of 1988, Mr. Bott made inappropriate statements to, or engaged in inappropriate conduct in front of, students in his first aid class as follows: Mr. Bott told students that his wife used to have a "nice ass" and "boobs" or "big melons", and now she is "fat and ugly." Mr. Bott wore a pin during class on his shirt which had the following words printed on it: "Sex Cures Headaches." Mr. Bott wore the pin for approximately thirty minutes. When a student asked about the pin, Mr. Bott took it off and indicated that he had forgotten he had it on. While discussing body lice, Mr. Bott told the class that he had once had "crabs." He indicated that he did not know how he had gotten them, implying that he had been involved with several different women. Mr. Bott cussed in front of the students. He used the words "dam", "ass", "bitch", "God damn" and "fuck." On one occasion Mr. Bott, while waking a student up, told the class that males have sexual fantasies every eleven minutes. Mr. Bott, while discussing the subject of drugs, told the class that marijuana makes women want to have sex or that smoking marijuana makes sex better. Mr. Bott told the students a story about a boy and girl who were riding in an automobile with the gear shift located on the floor of the automobile between the two front seats. Mr. Bott indicated that the boy was driving and the girl was sitting on a pillow between the two front seats. Mr. Bott told the class that the automobile was involved in a wreck or stopped suddenly for some other reason and that the gearshift "went up the girl" or that the "gearshift jammed up in her" and that "she took it whole." Mr. Bott also told the students a story about two couples who were riding in an automobile. Mr. Bott indicated that one couple was in the back seat of the car and they were "making out." Mr. Bott then told the class that the automobile was involved in a wreck and the boy "bit the girl's nipple off." He also said that the boy "swallowed it" and that the nipple was "a beautiful one." Mr. Bott also told this story during the 1987-1988 school year. Mr. Bott, while discussing genital injuries, told the class that he knew of a man who had sustained a genital injury. Mr. Bott stated that "his balls swelled up" and that they "were the size of baseballs." Mr. Bott told the class that "oysters put lead in the pencil." During the 1987-1988 school year, Dana Hales attended Mr. Bott's health class. Ms. Hales was walking to her automobile after one class when Mr. Bott told her that she "had the [tits or breasts] of a 25 year old." Mr. Bott also told Ms. Hales during the 1987-1988 school year that she would "stand out more" if she lost some weight. Mr. Bott was referring to Ms. Hales' chest when he made this statement. Vanessa Armster was an eighteen-year-old student at Palatka High School during the Fall of 1988. Ms. Armster attended Mr. Bott's health class during the Fall of 1988. In November, 1988, Ms. Armster missed four classes, in violation of Mr. Bott's policy that students could only miss three or less classes in order to pass the class. Mr. Bott, in deviation from his policy concerning absences, told Ms. Armster that she could make up her fourth absence by coming to his classroom at the District Opportunity Center after school the day after her fourth absence. Ms. Armster had a friend take her to the District Opportunity Center at 3:00 p.m. Mr. Bott gave her work to perform. Most of the time that Ms. Armster was at the District Opportunity Center no one was present in the room with her except Mr. Bott. While Ms. Armster was performing the work given to her by Mr. Bott, Mr. Bott made the following comments to her: Mr. Bott told Ms. Armster that he was scared for her to come to the District Opportunity Center because "he didn't know how he was going to react." Mr. Bott asked Ms. Armster "are those for real?" Mr. Bott was referring to Ms. Armster's breasts. Ms. Armster took these comments to be sexual in nature. Ms. Armster, as a result of Mr. Bott's comments, felt uncomfortable and scared in a one-on-one situation with Mr. Bott. The person who was suppose to give Ms. Armster a ride home did not arrive when she was ready to leave. Mr. Bott offered to give her a ride and Ms. Armster accepted. As Mr. Bott and Ms. Armster left the building, Mr. Bott noticed a football team practicing nearby and said that "someone might think something." Mr. Bott and Ms. Armster got into his pick-up truck. While in the truck Mr. Bott was telling Ms. Armster something about a heart attack and was referring to an area of his chest or side. While trying to indicate a location on his body, Mr. Bott moved his hand toward Ms. Armster. Ms. Armster jumped back when Mr. Bott moved his hand toward her. When Ms. Armster jumped, Mr. Bott said "oh, you just thought I was going to touch there" and intentionally put his hand on Ms. Armster's right breast. When Mr. Bott touched Ms. Armster she jumped back and he laughed. Following this incident, Mr. Bott dropped Ms. Armster off. Mr. Bott's actions have affected the way in which students view him as a teacher. In addition to the effects of Mr. Bott's actions already noted, Mr. Bott's actions had the following effects: At least two students perceived that Mr. Bott looked at Ms. Armster differently than he looked at other students; and Various students in Mr. Bott's health class found many of the sexual statements and incidents to be inappropriate and, in some cases, offensive and embarrassing. Mr. Bott's preoccupation with sexual matters was further evidenced by the following incidents which occurred during the period of time at issue in this proceeding: Mr. Bott told Beverly Emmons, a secretary at E. H. Miller School, that he like the blouses that Debbie Thomas, a teacher's aide, wore because her nipples stuck out. Mr. Bott made a comment about Debbie Thomas nipples being hard while she was lifting weights. This comment was made in front of Ms. Thomas and Diane Alred, an adaptive physical education teacher. Mr. Bott also patted Ms. Thomas on the buttocks. Mr. Bott was suspended with pay by the Superintendent of the Petitioner on December 2, 1988. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Petitioner on December 5, 1988, Mr. Bott was charged with immorality, misconduct in office and gross insubordination and was suspended without pay. By letter dated December 5, 1988, Mr. Bott requested a formal administrative hearing.
Conclusions The District School Board of Putnam County hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Conclusions of Law set forth in the Recommended Order. Based on the foregoing, and the recommendation made by the Hearing Officer in the above styled case, it is ADJUDGED that Carl G. Bott, Jr., is guilty of immorality and misconduct in office in violation of Florida Statutes Section 231.36(4)(c) and, accordingly, his suspension without pay from December 5, 1988 through January 5, 1990 is affirmed; it is further ADJUDGED that Carl G. Bott, Jr. is dismissed from his employment with the District School Board of Putnam County effective the date of this Order. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of January, 1990, in Palatka, Florida. District School Board of Putnam County Elaine Murray, Chairman
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case finding that Carl G. Bott, Jr., is guilty of immorality and misconduct in office in violation of Section 231.36(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and dismissing him from his employment with the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-0572 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-4, 34. 2 39. 3 40. 4 41. 5 42. The last two sentences are cumulative and unnecessary. 6 See 42-44. 7 Hereby accepted. 8 44. Not relevant to this proceeding. See 50. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 45. 12 46. 13 47. 14 49. 15-27 These proposed findings of fact are generally true. They are cumulative, however, and not necessary. To the extent that these proposed findings of fact are true, they have been taken into account in the weight that was given to the testimony which formed the basis for findings of fact concerning this incident included in the Recommended Order. 28 Hereby accepted. 29a 36b. 29b 36f. 29c 36j. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 29d 36i. 29e 36a. 29f 36c. 29j 36g and h. 29h 36e. 29i Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 29j 36d. 30 50. 31-33 See 50. These proposed findings of fact are generally true. They are cumulative, however, and not necessary. To the extent that these proposed findings of fact are true, they have been taken into account in the weight that was given to the testimony which formed the basis for findings of fact concerning this incident included in the Recommended Order. 36h, 37-38. The statements were made, however, in 1987 and not in 1988. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. 37 2 and 22. 38 22. 39 23. 40 22. Hereby accepted. 22 and hereby accepted. 43 21-22. 44 22. 45 Hereby accepted. 46-49 Not relevant to this proceeding. 50 Hereby accepted. 51-54 Not relevant to this proceeding. 55-56 25. 57 26. 58-59 27-28. 60 29. 61 30. 62 29-30. 63 See 31. 64 32. 65-66 33. 67 Not relevant to this proceeding. 68 31. 69 50. 70 3-5. 71 2 and 5. 72 5. 73 7. 74 Hereby accepted. 75-77 8. Ms. Wilkinson did engage in personal and sexual conversations with Mr. Bott. 78 8-9. 79 10. 80 11. 81 11-12. 82 Hereby accepted. 83 13. 84 14. 85 15. 86 16. 87 16-17. 88 18. 89 19 and hereby accepted. 90-91 Hereby accepted. 92 51. The last two sentences of 92b are rejected as hearsay. 93-101 These proposed findings of fact are generally true. They are cumulative, however, and not necessary. To the extent that these proposed findings of fact are true, they have been taken into account in the weight that was given to the testimony which formed the basis for findings of fact concerning this incident included in the Recommended Order. 102-104 Hereby accepted. Mr. Bott's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection See 50. Not relevant to this proceeding. 34 and 36 c and f. 35 and hereby accepted. See 36a. Taken into account in the weight that was given to the testimony concerning the incidents they testified about. 7-9 See 50. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 7 and all of proposed findings of fact 8 and 9 constitutes a summary of testimony. This testimony was considered in making relevant findings of fact. 10-11 Not relevant to this proceeding. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Taken into account in the weight that was given to the testimony concerning this incident. 15-17 See 50. 18 Hereby accepted. 19-20 See 50. Although it is true that Ms. Walker testified in this manner, the testimony was rejected. Not relevant to this proceeding. See 50. 24 2. 25 See 25-28 and 50. 26 Not supported by the weight of the testimony. 27-28 See 33. 29 37. 30 37-38. 31 Not relevant to this proceeding. 32-33 This testimony was rejected. 34-35 Hereby accepted. 36 22. 37-38 Hereby accepted. Not relevant to this proceeding. 20. The last sentence is not relevant to this proceeding. Not relevant to this proceeding. 42 5. 43-44 See 17-19. Ms. Wilkinson's testimony about not discussing personal matters with Mr. Bott was based upon her definition of "personal matters." 45 Not relevant to this proceeding. 46 19. 47-48 Not relevant to this proceeding. Hereby accepted. Not relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe H. Pickens, Esquire Post Office Box 2128 Palatka, Florida 32078-2128 Lorene C. Powell, Esquire FEA/United 208 W. Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Mr. C. L. Overturf Superintendent Putnam County School Board 200 South Seventh Street Palatka, Florida 32177 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's teaching certificate should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Jonathan W. Whyte, held teaching certificate number 517135 issued by the Department of Education. The certificate covers the area of physical education and is valid through June 30, 1996. When the relevant events herein occurred, respondent was certified as a teacher and was employed in various positions (both instructional and non- instructional) at Terry Parker High School (TPHS) in Jacksonville, Florida. The school is a part of the Duval County School District (District). Respondent was married to and lived with Cathy Whyte until they separated in November 1989. They had two children, S. W., born on November 22, 1985, who is the alleged victim in this case, and C. W., an older brother whose age is unknown. In addition, Cathy had two older boys from a prior marriage. The six lived together in Jacksonville, Florida, where respondent was employed as a teacher and coach at TPHS. Shortly after the separation, or in March 1990, dissolution proceedings were initiated by the wife, and a somewhat acrimonious and lengthy custody battle for the two biological children ensued. A dissolution of the marriage was eventually granted, and Cathy was given primary custody of the two children while respondent received visitation rights during parts of the summer and Christmas holidays. In 1990, or after the two were separated but before the marriage was dissolved, Cathy relocated to Connecticut with her boyfriend and another male friend taking all four children with her. In December 1990, charges that respondent may have sexually abused S. W. were allegedly made by the daughter to the mother who reported these allegations to Connecticut authorities. The charges were subsequently reported to Florida authorities, and after learning of them, the District temporarily removed respondent from the classroom in 1991 and reassigned him with pay to the media center for the remainder of the school year. Because the charges still remained unresolved at the beginning of school year 1992-93, respondent was temporarily reassigned with pay to the transportation center for that school year. By the summer of 1993, respondent had not taught in a classroom for two consecutive years, and this constituted a ground for the District to refuse to renew respondent's annual contract for school year 1993-94. Consequently, he was forced to seek employment in an unrelated field pending the outcome of this complaint. In September 1992, petitioner, Betty Castor, as Commissioner of Education, issued an administrative complaint against respondent charging him with sexually abusing his daughter in July 1990. The complaint was later amended to add the charge that he also sexually abused his daughter during Christmas holidays of 1992. The filing of the complaint prompted respondent to request a hearing. The Allegations The origin of the charges The administrative complaint, as amended, alleges that from July 15, 1990, to July 31, 1990, the Respondent committed sexual acts upon his five year old daughter. Such acts included but were not limited to kissing with an open mouth, engaging in oral sex, fondling of genitals, and penile penetration of the vagina. The complaint goes on to allege that on or about December of 1992, when the Respondent's daughter was visiting him for Christmas vacation in Florida, while the Respondent's daughter was at her Grandparent's home, the Respondent again committed sexual acts upon his daughter. Such acts included but were not limited to fondling of genitals, penile penetration of the vagina, and other inappropriate touching. The Respondent thereupon told his daughter, "Don't tell anyone I did this." The veracity of these allegations, which respondent strongly denies, is discussed in greater detail below. In December 1990, or after Cathy had moved to Connecticut and while she and respondent were in the midst of a custody battle, charges that respondent had sexually abused his daughter first arose. These charges were lodged by his estranged wife after she allegedly heard these complaints from her then five year old daughter. The matter was referred to the state police, and the daughter was interviewed on videotape by a female state trooper. This videotape was later furnished to the Florida circuit court having jurisdiction over the dissolution and custody matters. In March 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) also received the same report that respondent had abused his daughter in July 1990. After an investigation was conducted, the report was classified by HRS as unfounded. In late 1992 or early 1993, the mother again reported to Connecticut authorities that respondent sexually abused his daughter while she visited him during Christmas holidays of 1992. The charges were referred to the Jacksonville sheriff's office in January 1993 and were later incorporated by petitioner into an amended complaint. The validity of the charges In support of the complaint, petitioner has relied upon the testimony of the alleged victim, two psychologists, an HRS investigator, and a sheriff's detective. The mother did not testify. Although the alleged victim made statements concerning the allegations to each of these witnesses, petitioner has conceded that, with one exception, all of these statements are hearsay and can be used only for the purpose of supplementing and explaining other competent evidence, if any. As to the one claimed exception, which involves the statements made by the child during an interview with Dr. D'Amato, a psychologist, the circumstances surrounding the making of the child's statements indicate a lack of reliability, and they are accordingly deemed to be hearsay. The specific reasons relied upon by the undersigned in making this finding are cited below. The validity of the charges turns in large measure on the veracity of the alleged victim's testimony. Bearing on this issue are several considerations. First, the allegations in the amended complaint arose during the course of a protracted child custody battle. Where there is marital conflict, divorce or custody proceedings, false sexual abuse allegations are not uncommon. Indeed, according to the accepted testimony of one expert, Dr. Krop, a higher percentage of false sexual allegations are made by a parent in this type of case. At the same time, there was evidence here of the presence of the parental alienation syndrome. In other words, one parent (the mother) was attempting through negative statements to alienate the children, including S. W., towards respondent, the estranged parent. When such alienation occurs, it tends to cast doubt on the credibility of the complaints of the alleged victim. Further, the evidence showed that during the child's first interview concerning the alleged abuse in late 1990 or early 1991 with a Connecticut state trooper, she was "contaminated" by inappropriate questioning and improper interview techniques. For example, during that interview, the trooper improperly interrogated, rather than questioned, the child. In addition, and contrary to accepted practice, the mother was allowed to remain in the room during the interview and was asked to verify some of the child's responses. Also, the interrogator repeatedly used leading questions and prompted the child with the desired responses. When contamination such as this occurs, any further allegations of abuse must be viewed "suspiciously" and are placed in doubt since the child is vulnerable to figures of authority and may give an answer, whether truthful or not, simply because she believes that the answer given is expected by the interrogator. Moreover, by being "interviewed" in this manner, the child was "conditioned" to give the same responses in subsequent interviews to authority figures. It is also noted that during the child's videotaped deposition in May 1993, which has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 2, her answers lacked sponteneity, and she was repeatedly led by counsel and answered many questions only after being given the suggested answer. At that time, she acknowledged that "someone" had told her that by confirming that abuse had occurred, it would "help" her father. It is noteworthy that during the deposition, while claiming that some abuse occurred, the alleged victim specifically denied the allegations of oral sex, penile penetration and kissing with an open mouth, all being charges in the amended complaint. She also changed her testimony as to the number of times she was abused, and she used and understood the meaning of the words "vagina" and "penis" because of knowledge imparted to her by her mother. It is extremely unusual for a child of that age to use and understand those anatomical words. Collectively, these considerations cast considerable doubt on the credibility of the alleged victim's testimony and lead the undersigned to find that it should not be accepted. Given this finding, the hearsay testimony (consisting of statements made by the child during various interviews) offered by the HRS investigator, sheriff's detective and two psychologists does not supplement or explain any competent evidence of record and has been disregarded. Finally, the undersigned has also considered other pertinent testimony that supports the above findings, and that accepted testimony has been set forth below. The charge that respondent sexually abused his daughter during Christmas holidays of 1992 does not comport with other competent evidence. Due to the earlier allegations of abuse (that allegedly occurred in July 1990) being leveled against respondent, he agreed to certain restrictions during his visitation periods with the children. Under the terms of that agreement, when the two children visited him in Florida, they were to stay at his parents' home in Neptune Beach, and S. W. was to sleep in her grandparents' bedroom. Also, respondent agreed to never be alone with the children and to have one or both of the grandparents with them at all times. During her visit at Christmas 1992, S. W. was never alone with her father or out of sight of one of the grandparents except on one occasion when the girl accompanied her father out of the home during the day with another adult but not the grandparents. This was confirmed by uncontroverted testimony. During that same period of time, respondent slept on a couch at his parents' home, and his two children shared a bedroom directly across from his parents' bedroom. As to the alleged abuse in July 1990, the only time that the child was in Jacksonville without her brothers or mother being present was for one three day period, a Saturday afternoon to the following Tuesday. During that time, S. W. stayed at her grandparents' home while respondent spent the nights at his apartment. Respondent was working from five until midnight at a second job on Monday through Saturdays, by which time S. W. had already gone to bed, and he was attending classes at the University of Florida each work day until mid-afternoon when he returned to Jacksonville to go to work at his second job. On the only days he saw his daughter, a Saturday afternoon and all day Sunday, his parents were constantly present. Three psychologists testified in this cause. The first, Dr. Krop, a witness for respondent, became involved with evaluating respondent's family in October 1990 after being appointed by a circuit judge to evaluate the family and make a recommendation for the childrens' primary residence and visitation arrangements. The second, Dr. Kaplan, was appointed by the same circuit judge in July 1992 to offer his recommendation as to visitation arrangements for S. W. Both psychologists interviewed the alleged victim and her family, including respondent, and became aware of the sexual abuse allegations during the course of their interviews. Doctor Kaplan, who testified on behalf of petitioner, had extremely limited experience in the area of child sexual abuse, and before this case, had never been proffered as an expert in that area. Although he was accepted as an expert in psychology, he was not accepted as an expert in child sexual abuse, and very little weight, if any, has been accorded his opinions on this subject. The third psychologist, Dr. D'Amato, a Jacksonville psychologist, and also a witness for petitioner, first interviewed the child in April 1991 after the case was referred to him by the Jacksonville state attorney, presumably in response to the allegations referred to that office by Connecticut authorities. At the request of the mother's divorce attorney, and for the purpose of "monitoring" the child on the mother's behalf, Dr. D'Amato continued to see the child on four occasions in July and August 1992 for either fifteen or thirty minute sessions when she was visiting Florida. During those sessions, the psychologist found the child to be free of anxiety, comfortable with her father, and "enjoying herself." The testimony of Dr. Harry Krop, an expert in the field of child sexual abuse and who testified on behalf of respondent, has been accepted as being the most credible and persuasive of the three psychologists who testified. Based on his interviews with the child and family, and review of videotapes, depositions and other pertinent medical records, Dr. Krop concluded that the alleged sexual abuse of S. W. cannot be validated. The undersigned concurs with this finding. In summary, for the reasons cited above, it is found that respondent did not sexually abuse his daughter as alleged in the amended complaint. Therefore, the charges must fail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative complaint with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6173 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-9. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence or hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 12. The remainder has been rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 11-13. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 16-20. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 22-24. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 25-26. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 27-30. Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 31. Rejected as being unnecessary. 32-33. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. 34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 35-37. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as being hearsay which does not supplement or explain other competent, accepted evidence. Rejected as being unnecessary or contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence. 40-41. Rejected as being irrelevant. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, cumulative, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Wm. Bruce Muench, Esquire 438 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Karen Barr Wilde, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry L. Moore, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Paul Rancourt (Mr. Rancourt), established through clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Before discussing the findings from the administrative hearing, it is appropriate to set out the procedural history of the criminal proceedings. On December 18, 1996, the State charged Mr. Rancourt and Daniel McLean (Mr. McLean) with the kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery of A.S., which occurred on October 31, 1996. On July 27 through July 30, 1998, the State tried Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean together. The jury convicted both men, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On April 5, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion overturning Mr. McLean's conviction based on trial errors. McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The appellate court reversed Mr. McLean's conviction for kidnapping because it found that the State "failed to prove [McLean] intended the kidnapping to occur, or that he performed any action that assisted in the kidnapping." Id. at 180. Further, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in two key evidentiary rulings. First, the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from the medical provider who examined A.S. following the assault. The disputed question was: "[d]id she act in any way inconsistent with the way a rape victim would act?" Id. at 181. The appellate court found that the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony under the Rape Shield Statute.3/ Id. Specifically, the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. McLean's attorney to cross-examine the medical provider about whether or not the A.S.'s soreness in her vulva area was due to the fact that she had not had sexual intercourse in the past year, as opposed to a sexual battery. Id. The appellate court found that this question went to a key issue of whether the sexual contact was consensual. The appellate court found the exclusion of this testimony was not harmless error; and thus, reversed Mr. McLean's convictions and sentences, and ordered a retrial. On January 5, 2001, Mr. McLean, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1996). Based on the plea agreement, Mr. McLean was sentenced to 64 and one-half months’ incarceration, which reflected his time served, and two years’ probation. On June 14, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Rancourt's convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, and his life sentences. Rancourt v. State, 766 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In affirming Mr. Rancourt's conviction, the appellate court found that trial counsel had failed to preserve the issues concerning the medical expert's opinion vouching for the victim's credibility and the exclusion of the medical testimony under the Rape Shield Statute. On September 13, 2000, the appellate court issued its mandate. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Rancourt filed a post- conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction motion alleged, in part, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the evidentiary issues that had formed the basis of Mr. McLean's reversal. On November 3, 2003, the circuit court entered an order vacating Mr. Rancourt's convictions and sentences "after considering the Motion and applicable law, and upon agreement of both parties[.]" The order directed that a new trial be held. On September 27, 2005, the State re-tried Mr. Rancourt for sexual battery and kidnapping. The jury convicted Mr. Rancourt of the lesser-included offense of battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1996), a first-degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt to one year in the Polk County jail with credit for time served. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Rancourt filed the Amended Petition for Determination of Wrongfully Incarcerated Person, which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Rancourt has not been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. At the time of these events, Mr. Rancourt was a 32-year- old man, and A.S. was a 19-year-old freshman at Florida Southern College. Mr. Rancourt, in offering proof of actual innocence, testified on his own behalf that the sexual encounter that occurred between him and A.S. was consensual. Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, was consistent with the testimony that he had provided in his two criminal trials. Transcripts of Mr. Rancourt's prior testimony at the criminal proceedings were admitted into evidence. Mr. Rancourt's testimony at the hearing concerning his meeting A.S. and the subsequent sexual encounter was not believable. Specifically, the undersigned did not find Mr. Rancourt's description of how a young woman, whom he had never spoken too, would at the closing of the bar grab him at the door as patrons attempted to leave the bar, and give him a "deep french kiss." Further, it was incredulous that after asking him for a ride back to her dorm room that A.S., while in the back seat of the car, would engage in a series of intimate gestures towards himself and his best friend, Mr. McLean. Finally, it was not credible that A.S. and Mr. Rancourt engaged in a consensual sexual encounter as described by Mr. Rancourt on the lawn of a home off a dark street. The conclusion that Mr. Rancourt's description of the events is not credible is further bolstered by the testimony showing A.S.'s actions immediately after the sexual encounter, and Mr. Rancourt's untruthful responses to the police investigation following the events. Mr. Rancourt also offered Mr. McLean, who testified that he witnessed A.S. acting as a "willing participant" in the sexual encounter with Mr. Rancourt. Further, Mr. McLean offered testimony that he did not engage in any sexual relations with A.S., and that he only pled to the sexual battery charge in order to avoid the risk of receiving another lengthy sentence. Next, Mr. Rancourt brought forward the testimony of Brandon Perron (Mr. Perron), a private investigator, and introduced into evidence copies of Mr. Perron's investigative reports. The record shows that Mr. Perron prepared these reports as part of Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction efforts. The reports and Mr. Perron's testimony show that he identified many factual issues regarding Mr. Rancourt's convictions. Specifically, Mr. Perron raised issues concerning discrepancies in A.S.'s statements, testimony, and her motivations to lie concerning the events of October 31, 1996; discrepancies in witnesses' statements to the police investigator and testimony; poor and prejudicial police investigative techniques that overlooked potentially exonerating evidence showing that the sexual encounter was consensual; and defense counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential witnesses. Although Mr. Perron was a persuasive witness for showing potential problems with the State's criminal case against Mr. Rancourt, Mr. Perron's testimony did not establish Mr. Rancourt's actual innocence. Mr. Rancourt's final witness was his aunt, Barbara Hoffman (Ms. Hoffman). In October 1996, Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean were living with Ms. Hoffman while they sought employment. Ms. Hoffman's testimony concerned Mr. Rancourt's character and her opinion that he was not capable of committing a crime. Further, she testified about the day that law enforcement officers went to her home to ask Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to come in for questioning. She testified that the detective investigating the events had prejudged Mr. Rancourt to be guilty of rape. The purpose of this testimony appeared to show that statements given by Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to the police may not have been voluntary. It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Rancourt nor Mr. McLean was arrested; thus, the questioning was non-custodial. Moreover, Ms. Hoffman's testimony was marginally relevant in that it did not bring forward any fact showing that Mr. Rancourt was actually innocent of the sexual battery and kidnapping charges. The State introduced evidence showing that the sexual encounter was not consensual. A.S.'s trial testimony shows that she consistently testified that the sexual encounter was not consensual. In addition to A.S.'s trial testimony, the State introduced trial testimony of Angie Wren (Ms. Wren) and Issac McKeithan (Mr. McKeithan). The criminal trial transcript shows that Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove upon A.S. shortly after the event and saw a car quickly drive away from the area where A.S. was standing. Ms. Wren testified that A.S. was hysterical and crying, and "she just didn't look like she had been through anything good, that's for sure." A.S. reported to Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan that she had been raped. Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove A.S. to the Lakeland Police Department immediately, and the attack was reported. This testimony shows that A.S. contended that she had been raped moments after the sexual encounter. Further, a review of the criminal proceedings shows that the State brought forward medical testimony showing bruises on A.S.'s arms. A.S. had testified that, before the attack, she did not have the bruises. Finally, the criminal trial transcripts and testimony given at the December 8 through 9, 2011, hearing showed that Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean had provided false statements, and changed the story given to the officer conducting the investigation. Specifically, the trial transcripts, and Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, showed that he told the investigator at first that he did not engage in sexual relations with A.S., then changed his story to claim that he and A.S. had sex in the vehicle, and then changed his story, yet again, to state that he and A.S. had consensual sex on the front yard of a home off a dark street. During his testimony on December 8, 2011, Mr. Rancourt acknowledged that the statements he gave about not having sex with A.S. and then having sex in the vehicle were false. Similarly, Mr. McLean, when asked if he and Mr. Rancourt had sex, informed the officer "no." Mr. McLean testified that he answered that way because he contended that he had not had sex with A.S. This parsing of words was not credible. The undersigned found these acknowledged false statements, made at the time of the investigation, persuasive evidence that Mr. Rancourt's explanation of the night was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Mr. Rancourt has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Mr. Rancourt's claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2012.
