The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondents were first licensed as a family foster home in April 1994. As a result of Respondents' obtaining a foster home license, the Department put in their care: M.A1.A and M.Au.A, brother and sister; and, J.H. and L.H., brother and sister. M.Au.A was nine years old and her brother M.A1.A was eight years old. J.H. was eight years old and his sister, L.H., was five years old. J.H. and L.H. were later adopted by their foster parents, Robert and Irene Holmes. J.H. was born September 2, 1991. He was, and is, a very troubled young man. Schizophrenia runs in his biological family and his mother abused chemicals during her pregnancy. He is diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and has episodes of violence, aggression, unpredictability, poor impulse control, and agitation. He is likely to be pre-schizophrenic and, given his behavior, could develop full schizophrenia in the future. Even though only diagnosed with ADHD and in addition to stimulant medication prescribed for his ADHD, J.H. takes several psychotropic medications generally prescribed for manic and depressive behavior and other mood disorders. However, these drugs do not seem to fully control his behavior. Because of his aggression and severe behavior problems, J.H. has been involuntarily committed multiple times and has been repeatedly recommended for a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Department has not provided J.H. a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. On October 7, 1999, the Department received an allegation of abuse against Respondents. The allegation involved J.H. The allegations involved alleged favoritism of L.H. over J.H., abandoning J.H. with teachers, emotional abuse, and not wanting him in their home. The Department's investigation, on very tenuous evidence, verified abuse for neglect - abandonment; neglect - failure to protect; abuse - other mental injury; neglect - inadequate supervision; and abuse - confinement/bizarre punishment. The report further found some indication of medical neglect and other physical injury-threatened harm. Because of the abuse report, the Department took L.H. and J.H. into shelter care on October 8, 1999, and filed a dependency action regarding J.H., Case No. 99-628-CJ. Additionally, based on the verified findings of the abuse report, the Department revoked Respondents' foster home license. By Order of the Circuit Court dated July 12, 2000, the dependency action was dismissed for lack of evidence and an utter lack of co-operation by Department's personnel and witnesses during the dependency action. J.H. was returned to Respondents' home and has remained with them to date. L.H. was returned to Respondents' home sometime before her brother's dependency action was concluded. Put simply, at the hearing, none of the allegations of the abuse report or facts supporting the verified findings were supported by the evidence since only uncorroborated hearsay was introduced at the hearing. Moreover, even though the evidence was hearsay, many of the allegations appeared from all the testimony to have been taken out of context and given meanings which were not warranted when their context was known. Significantly, the Department did not call J.H. to testify about any of these allegations. To the contrary, the testimony of various witnesses indicated that Respondents did, in fact, keep a very neat, tidy, and orderly foster household and that J.H. was not abused or neglected. The evidence presented by Respondents and the testimony of their witnesses indicate that J.H. was provided a safe environment. The teachers provided temporary care during the period of time alleged to be when Respondents were neglecting J.H. by being out of town. The witnesses, including the teachers, stated that the plan was that they would care for J.H. until the return of Respondents. Furthermore, there was never any indication that the child was mistreated or neglected or left without care by Mrs. Holmes after returning from a wedding out-of-state. Finally, there was no evidence of noncompliance with any treatment plan, that the multiple involuntary commitments were in any way mentally abusive of J.H., or that the quiet times J.H. needed to calm himself were intended to be time-out punishment or were inappropriate or bizarre punishments of J.H. Because the allegations of abuse were not established, there is no basis on which to revoke Respondents' foster home license. Therefore, Respondents are entitled to their foster home license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order not revoking Robert and Irene Holmes' family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith J. Ganobsik, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Charles P. Vaughn, Esquire 120 North Seminole Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4125 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1999). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster care in the state. Petitioners were foster care parents until October 5, 2000, when Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their foster care license for medical reasons. Prior to October 5, 2000, Mrs. Williams suffered from high blood pressure and dizziness. She was physically unable to care for foster children and asked that Respondent remove all foster children from her home. Before her medical problems began, Mrs. Williams complained to Respondent that she could not provide foster care for children with behavior problems. Mrs. Williams asked Respondent to remove certain children from her home because they presented behavioral problems with which she could not cope. In March of 2001, Petitioners applied for a new license to provide foster care. Petitioners did not provide any medical evidence, during the hearing or the application process, that Mrs. Williams has recovered from her medical problems. Her medical problems have a long medical history and come and go each year. Mrs. Williams is 62 years old. On the family profile sheet filed with Respondent, Mrs. Williams lists her occupation as "disabled."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster care to dependent children. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbert and Estella Williams 412 Pine Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services, District 7 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondents should be granted a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Alfonso and Lynda Zapata, applied to be licensed as a family foster home care with the Department through the Devereux Foundation. The Devereux Foundation maintains a network of foster homes to serve parents who need to temporarily place their children in foster care (private placements) and dependent children in the custody of the Department (public placements). Previously, Petitioners had been licensed as a family foster care home with the Department through Florida Baptist Children's Home (Florida Baptist). Like the Devereux Foundation, Florida Baptist maintains a network of foster homes to serve parents who need to temporarily place their children in foster care and dependent children in the custody of the Department. Petitioners had withdrawn form the relationship with Florida Baptist after a disagreement with Florida Baptist personnel over the removal of a child from their home and reunification of that child with her mother. In 2001, about half of the children placed in Florida Baptist's homes were placed by the Department in connection with cases of child abuse, or abandonment, while the other half were private placements by families whose circumstances necessitated that their children temporarily reside elsewhere. In July 2001, Petitioners had two foster children living in their home. One of these children, T.D., also known as J., had been placed in the Petitioner's home by the Department. The other, C.R., a three-month-old boy, had been privately placed in the home by Florida Baptist at the request of the child's mother, E.R., who was single. E.R. had placed her child in Florida Baptist care because she had enlisted in the United States Army and was undergoing basic training out of state. E.R. had enlisted in order to provide her family a better life. It was initially anticipated that E.R. would be gone six months, but due to injuries sustained during basic training, she was actually gone for eight or nine months. There was no evidence of abuse, neglect or abandonment on E.R.'s part. During C.R.'s stay, Petitioners developed a negative impression of E.R. They did not think that E.R. called or wrote frequently enough. Petitioners had commented to Florida Baptist staff that E.R. was an unfit mother, that Petitioners provided C.R. with a better home than E.R. could, that E.R. did not love C.R., and that Petitioners could love C.R. more than E.R. could. Petitioners' opinion was based on their belief that no really good mother would take a job which required her to be away from her child for extended periods and a belief that C.R.'s grandmother was physically abusive towards C.R. Unfortunately, Petitioners let their beliefs about appropriate parenting interfere in their duties as foster parents to aid in reunification of a child with that child's legal parents. Florida Baptist staff also believed that Petitioners had become too attached to C.R., which caused them to attempt to undermine the Department's later attempts to reunify mother and child at the planned time E.R. would return from basic training and be able to provide a home to C.R. In late July 2001, Florida Baptist staff also became concerned about other behavior exhibited by Petitioners involving confidentiality issues and concerned that the Department had removed T.D. (aka "J.") from Petitioners' home. The behavior concerning confidentiality arose because Mrs. Zapata had discussed the fitness of E.R. to be C.R.'s custodial parent with a Department employee. C.R. was not a Department placement. However, it should be noted that the discussion was with a Department employee involved in the fostering program. Such an employee could reasonably be viewed as a person to report any suspected abuse or neglect to. In this instance, the conversation did not involve a report of abuse or neglect, but concerned Petitioners' belief that E.R. was not a good mother. On the other hand, the evidence was unclear whether the same confidentiality requirements regarding public placements by the Department appertain to private placements by the parents. The incident does cast doubt on Petitioners' awareness and desire to comply with privacy considerations should they be licensed by the Department. During the month of July 2001, T.D., also known as "J.", lived in Petitioner's home. T.D. was a little less than a year old at the time and had been placed in Petitioner's home by the Department because of ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings. On July 31 or August 1, 2001, the Department counselor, Wendy Cheney, picked T.D. up at Petitioner's home to take him to a doctor's appointment. Ms. Cheney noticed that there were crumbs and dirt in the car seat in which Petitioners had placed T.D. Ms. Cheney also noticed that T.D.'s clothes and diaper bag had a strong odor of spoiled milk. A crust also appeared on the nipple of the baby bottle and the eye medicine bottle Mrs. Zapata gave her to take with T.D. to the physician's appointment. During the preceding month, Ms. Cheney had visited Petitioners' home on at least a weekly basis to monitor T.D.'s situation. On many of these occasions, Ms. Cheney also observed that T.D.'s clothes had the same sour milk smell she experienced during the doctor's appointment. She also noticed during these visits that the nipples of T.D.'s baby bottles were not properly covered. On one occasion, Ms. Cheney saw T.D. drop his pacifier and then observed Mrs. Zapata pick it up and replace it in T.D.'s mouth without washing it off. This is of particular concern, as Petitioners had a long-haired dog whose hair was apparent on the floor of Petitioners' home. The Department removed T.D. from Petitioners' home because of these observations. Again, these observations cast serious doubt on the quality of hygienic care provided by Petitioners to foster children. There was no evidence offered to contradict the apparent lack of good hygienic care provided to T.D. However, there was also no evidence that Petitioners' care of T.D. constituted neglect or abuse of T.D., since a finding of neglect or abuse requires demonstration of harm or significantly dangerous conditions. Because of these concerns, Florida Baptist staff agreed that C.R. should be removed from Petitioners' home at least until these issues sorted themselves out. On August 1, 2001, Florida Baptist social worker Sue Kiser telephoned Mr. Zapata and scheduled an appointment for 4:30 p.m., on August 2, 2001, to discuss the reunification of C.R. with E.R. Later that day, Florida Baptist staff decided that since E.R. had recently returned from basic training, the optimum way of accomplishing reunification was to have E.R. meet Ms. Kiser and C.R. at a previously scheduled medical appointment on August 2, 2001, following which C.R. and E.R. would stay together at another foster home. Florida Baptist social worker, Jackie Barksdale, communicated this plan by telephone to Mr. Zapata on August 1, 2001. Mr. Zapata became angry and stated that he refused to allow C.R. to leave his home and go to visit with E.R. He accused Ms. Barksdale of "screwing with" C.R.'s life and committing "child abuse." He promised that "heads would roll" and disparaged E.R.'s family. Ms. Zapata then got on the telephone. She also accused Ms. Barksdale of child abuse and threatened to call the abuse hotline on Florida Baptist. Since no abuse reports were made by Petitioners, these threats were made as a bluff in an attempt to coerce Florida Baptist to leave C.R. with Petitioners. Given this conduct, the staff of Florida Baptist felt they had little choice but to remove C.R. from Petitioner's home. C.R. was removed from Petitioners' home on August 2, 2001. C.R. stayed in the other foster home without incident for about five weeks. C.R. and E.R. were then reunited, and continue to live together as a family. No reports of any problems between C.R. and E.R. have been received since that time. These facts clearly demonstrate Petitioners' unwillingness to cooperate in reunification plans for a child and mother. Petitioners permitted their low opinion regarding C.R.'s mother to interfere with their duty as foster parents. There was no evidence that Petitioners' attitude regarding the parents of foster children would not cause future interference in reunification efforts should their application for licensure be granted. An abused child, V.V., was placed in shelter care with Petitioners. V.V. had sustained a broken arm from abuse she had suffered. She stayed less than three days with Petitioners because her crying kept them up at night and interfered with Mrs. Zapata's home schooling of her biological children. Petitioners acted appropriately in requesting the removal of the child when it became apparent that the placement could not work out and does not demonstrate a lack of qualification for licensure. Finally, a pregnant teenage girl who wished to place her child with Florida Baptist wanted to see the home her child was to live in. Florida Baptist arranged for the girl to look at Petitioners' home. After the visit, Petitioners asked Florida Baptist never to ask them to submit to such an inspection, as they felt they were under some heightened level of scrutiny. Florida Baptist staff explained that parents frequently made this request, and Petitioners repeated that they did not wish to undergo it again. Petitioners request is troubling since one of the duties of the foster parent is to work with the biological parent of a foster child. Again, Petitioners' negative attitudes toward the parents of foster children demonstrate that Petitioners' application for licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying the application for a foster care license submitted by Petitioners Alfonso and Lynda Zapata. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Room 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Alfonso Zapata Lynda Zapata 1947 Treeline Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Paul F. Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioner’s foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in social work from Florida International University. Since his graduation in December 1995 he has been steadily employed in a variety of positions which involve dealing with foster children and special education students. Davis' employment included work for the Department as a foster care counselor and a protective investigator. In addition, he has a long history of involvement in his church, including teaching Sunday school and volunteer work with youth in the community. Relatives, including a mother and sister, live in the area and are supportive of his desire to continue as a foster parent. For all these reasons, the Department held high hopes for Davis as a foster parent when he sought and received a foster home license in the fall of 2001. Notwithstanding his extensive experience with exceptionally needy children Davis was required to and did attend the 30-hour training course required of all new foster parents. Davis, like all foster parents, entered into a detailed contractual agreement with DCF which sets forth the obligations of foster parents and states that non-compliance will lead to revocation of the license. The contract is lengthy, but for purposes of this case it suffices to say that it obligates foster parents to provide adequate, age-appropriate supervision at all times. In order to assist the foster parents in fulfilling this and other obligations, DCF is contractually obligated to support foster parents in a number of ways. The foster parent must be informed in as much detail as is available to DCF of a child's special needs or limitations. If the child is taking prescribed medication, DCF is obliged to provide the medication when the child is brought to the foster home, along with instructions for administering the drug. DCF is also required to exercise professional judgment when placing a child in a foster home to assure, to the extent possible, that the foster parent is capable of managing the child. Shortly after Davis was licensed, DCF assigned to him a particularly difficult child, K.N. At the time K.N. was brought to Davis on December 4, 2001, the child, a boy, was 12 years old. Davis was informed that K.N. was on medication, but DCF did not provide the medication. Davis made several efforts to secure the medication for K.N., but he was not successful. At the time K.N. was placed in Davis' home, Davis already had one foster child, D.L. Davis had previously committed to D.L. and to other neighborhood teenagers to take them in his van to the Soul Bowl high school football game in Tallahassee on December 9, 2001. The trip was uneventful until the return drive. During the trip back from Tallahassee, K.N.’s difficult behavior irritated the other children. In the ensuing horseplay, K.N. ended up with his pants down for approximately the final hour of the return trip. Details of the incident are impossible to state with certainty. The Department presented no testimony of any individual with personal knowledge of the incident. Davis and a teenage girl who was on the trip testified to their recollections. The undersigned, having carefully viewed their demeanor under oath, credits their testimony as candid; they were clear and precise with regard to elements of the day that they did recall, and honest in stating where their recollections were imprecise. The Department repeatedly asserts that K.N. was "naked" but the use of this word, as it is commonly understood, is unsupported by any competent evidence. It cannot be ascertained from the record, for example, whether K.N. was wearing underwear as well as pants, and if so, were the underwear pulled down as well? The only direct testimony regarding whether or not K.N.'s genitals were exposed to the other children was offered by Davis, who believes that K.N.'s genitals were always covered. K.N. and D.L. denied any improper touching to DCF's investigator, according to his written report. After years of driving youth from his church and community on field trips, Davis, like anyone who drives carloads of children, had learned to filter out background noise in order to focus on safe driving. Yet, like anyone responsible for a vanload of kids, he also had to remain cognizant of behaviors in the back seat(s). At some point, Davis became aware that there was an issue concerning K.N.'s pants. Davis, as well as the teenage passengers in the car, acting on Davis' instructions, made efforts to convince K.N. to get his pants back up. K.N. refused. It was raining for at least a portion of the time while Davis was attempting to deal with the situation from the driver's seat. The testimony offered by Davis on his behalf establishes that the situation among the children, particularly K.N., could have been dealt with more aggressively and with better results. The wiser course would have been for Davis to pull over, rearrange seating, verbally re-direct K.N. and the other passengers, and, as a last resort, summon the police. It is equally clear that Davis was the only adult in the car and responsible to deliver the children home safely on a rainy day. He had tuned out the back seat noises to focus on driving when it seemed reasonable to do so, and, once aware of the situation with K.N.'s pants, decided to manage it as best he could from the driver's seat and get everyone back home as quickly as possible. The situation was resolved when Davis drove his van to the north Dade home of Davis’ sister, who had a good rapport with K.N. K.N. complied promptly with her instruction that he get himself properly dressed. Soon after the trip, K.N. related a lurid and untruthful version of events to a third party. A complaint against Davis to the state's child abuse hotline resulted. Davis felt mistreated by the DCF investigator who was dispatched to look into the allegations. Davis perceived that the investigator had prejudged the complaint and deemed Davis to be guilty of participating in and/or allowing sexual abuse of K.N. Rather than complain to the supervisor of the investigator who offended him, Davis made another bad decision---he refused to honor the investigator's request that he provide the names and whereabouts of the other passengers in the van. Davis' failure to provide this information immediately was not deemed by DCF as a serious enough offense to warrant immediate removal of the foster children. Nor did it prejudice DCF in these proceedings, for Davis did provide the names to DCF well in advance of the final hearing. Davis' refusal to provide the names when first asked to do so was self-defeating in the extreme, for the passengers were in a position to corroborate what the investigator was told by both foster children: that Davis had not provoked the removal of K.N.'s pants, and had made efforts to ameliorate the situation as soon as he became aware of it, and was successful to the extent that the other children cooperated with his request to encourage K.N. to pull his pants up, which K.N. was fully capable of doing. The Department contends that "there is no amount of additional training or any other remedial action (short of license revocation) that would alleviate the Department's concern about [Davis'] ability to provide proper care and supervision to foster children." This contention is rejected for two reasons: First, although the substance of DCF's investigation was completed by December 12, K.N. remained in Davis' home until December 17, at which time Davis realized that he was not capable of handling K.N.'s behaviors and returned him to the custody of his foster care counselor. Second, Davis requested and received DCF's permission to keep his other foster child, D.L. "through the holidays." That time frame was generously interpreted by DCF staff; they did not take D.L. from Davis' care until February 8, 2001. Davis is appropriately regretful that he was not adequate to the task at hand on December 9. He also understands the inappropriateness of failing to fully cooperate with DCF's investigation in a timely fashion. Although the future is impossible to predict, it is reasonable to credit Davis' word that he has learned from these mistakes. Davis is willing to unconditionally accept additional training, supervision, and assistance from DCF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the April 1, 2002, charges against Davis. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Travis Davis 2922 Northwest 92nd Street Miami, Florida 33147 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josefina Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?
Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondent was initially licensed to operate a foster home in 1992. In April 1995, her license was renewed. As part of the licensing process, the Respondent signed documents entitled "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" and "Discipline Policy", thereby agreeing to comply with the terms of each document. Both of these documents clearly provide that corporal punishment of a foster child is prohibited. On October 30, 1995, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter of its intent to revoke her foster home license and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: This letter is to advise you that your Foster Home license is being revoked, effective November 1, 1995. This decision has been made based on our past concerns about inappropriate child-parent visits, the recent complaint about use of physical discipline, and the altercation on 09/18/95 between you and Foster Parent Veronica King. 1/ At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent provided foster care for three teenage girls under the age of 18 years. On September 29, 1995, Petitioner's abuse registry received a report that Respondent had been physically and verbally abusive to the children in her foster care. The report included allegations that Respondent had hit and knocked down one of the girls in her foster care and that she attempted to return the girl to her natural mother, who had abused her daughter in the past. In response to that report, Petitioner removed the three girls from Respondent's foster care and began an investigation of the allegations. As part of that investigation, Respondent and each of the three girls were interviewed by employees of the Petitioner with appropriate training. The three girls who had been in Respondent's foster care made statements to these employees pertaining to their treatment by Respondent. These statements are hearsay that cannot be used as the sole basis for a finding of fact in this proceeding. 2/ In her interview, Respondent denied that she physically abused her foster children, but she admitted that she intentionally pushed one of the girls to the ground. Respondent violated Petitioner's discipline policy by pushing this girl to the ground. Respondent denied that she threatened to return one of the girls to the girl's abusive mother. Instead, she testified that she arranged for this girl to visit with the abusive mother. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony. Respondent conceded that she talked firmly to the three girls, but she denied that she verbally abused them. There was no competent evidence to dispute Respondent's testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that revokes Respondent's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Cathy Taylor (Petitioner) was issued a foster care license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent). On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children (Substitute Care Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with certain conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of foster children in her care. The Substitute Care Agreement provided in pertinent part: We are fully and directly responsible to the department for the care of the child. * * * 6. We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department. * * * 9. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. * * * 11. We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department. * * * We will immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in our care to the department. * * * 19. We will abide by the department's discipline policy which we received during the MAPP training. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a certificate from Respondent for successful completion of the MAPP training. On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement). The Discipline Agreement provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S) ... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTI- GATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. * * * (6) Delegating authority for punishment to another child or person that is not the Foster Parent(s) ... NO OTHER CHILD, ADOLESCENT, OR ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of the children placed in the foster home. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department.... * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs of the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * We will provide a nurturing, supportive, family- like home environment. * * * We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. At that time, Trevor Barnes was Petitioner's fiance. They were married in January 1996 and have, therefore, been married for less than one year. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a Discipline Agreement. The pertinent language of the Discipline Agreement was no different from the one signed on October 25, 1994. In December 1994, minor foster child N.R. was placed in the care of Petitioner. In 1995, minor foster children V.M. and J.M., two sisters, were placed in the care of Petitioner. Petitioner was responsible for the supervision and care of the foster children. Petitioner allowed her sister, an adult, and her sister's son, who was not placed with her under foster care, to live in her home. At the time, her relatives had no other place to live. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that her relatives were living with her. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. At times, Petitioner left the children under the supervision and in the care of Mr. Barnes and her sister, thereby, violating the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. On November 23, 1995, Thanksgiving day, one of Respondent's representatives, who was transporting V.M. and J.M. to visit with their prospective adoptive family, became aware of marks on one of V.M.'s legs. Respondent's representative overheard V.M. tell J.M. to look at what "mommy" had done. Respondent's representative examined V.M.'s leg and discovered marks on V.M.'s leg. She questioned V.M., regarding the marks, and V.M. confirmed what Respondent's representative had overheard. Also, V.M. informed Respondent that Petitioner spanked both she and her sister, J.M. Respondent's representative determined that the marks were consistent with marks which would result from striking the child's leg with a metal hanger. However, she could not determine if the marks were fresh or recent or old scars because she was not trained to make such a determination. There was no other evidence as to any other observations made regarding the marks. Respondent's counselor, assigned to V.M. and J.M., reported the incident. An investigation was begun by Respondent for alleged abuse. Neither V.M. nor J.M. testified at the hearing. The investigator who conducted the investigation on the alleged abuse did not testify. Petitioner denies striking V.M. with a metal hanger or with any object. Moreover, she denies having ever inflicted corporal punishment on the children. Her method of punishing the children was taking away their privileges to do the things that they enjoyed. Further, Mr. Barnes questioned V.M., regarding the marks, who told Mr. Barnes that the natural mother inflicted the marks on V.M. Respondent was unable to provide evidence as to the last period of time that the children had visited with their natural parent(s). Petitioner did not report the marks on V.M.'s leg to Respondent. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement. Regarding spanking the children, prior to the discovery of the marks on V.M.'s leg, Respondent suspected that Petitioner was spanking the children. Respondent's counselor to V.M. and J.M. questioned Petitioner as to whether she was spanking the children. Petitioner denied any spanking and responded with her method of punishment as indicated above. But, also, Petitioner informed Respondent's counselor that perhaps Mr. Barnes or her sister had spanked the children. Petitioner presented no evidence that she had confronted both her sister and Mr. Barnes as to whether they were spanking the children and that she had instructed them not to do so, as such action was violative of the Discipline Agreement. Further, there is no evidence that Respondent questioned Petitioner's sister or Mr. Barnes. There is insufficient evidence to find that Petitioner used corporal punishment. However, the circumstances presented causes concern to the extent that Respondent was justified in questioning the suitability of Petitioner to be a foster care parent. At all times material hereto, Mr. Barnes did not live with Petitioner. He lived with Petitioner's grandmother. Petitioner never indicated to Respondent that Mr. Barnes either lived in the foster home or did not live in the foster home. Although he spent considerable time at Petitioner's home, the evidence is insufficient to show that he lived with her. Even if Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner, Respondent became aware of it in October 1995. Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to N.R., believed that Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner and informed him that, if he was going to live with Petitioner, she had to perform a background check on him. Respondent's counselor obtained the necessary information from Mr. Barnes to perform the background check. At that time, Respondent was aware that Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were planning to be married. Petitioner received a monthly allowance from Respondent for the care of the minor foster children. Petitioner became unemployed. Petitioner did not report her unemployment to Respondent. However, Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to V.M. and J.M., was aware of Petitioner's unemployment but assumed that Mr. Barnes was Petitioner's husband and that he was supporting the family. However, Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were not married, he was not living in Petitioner's home, and he was not supporting the family. Regardless, Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Petitioner paid too little attention to V.M. and J.M.'s hygiene and personal appearance. The hygiene was inappropriate to the point that the children's school contacted Respondent. The children frequently appeared to be unkept, and Respondent did not observe the children with any new clothes. Because of her unemployment, Petitioner had insufficient income to adequately support the minor foster children. Because of the marks on V.M.'s leg, because of V.M.'s statement to Respondent that Petitioner inflicted the injury to her leg and had spanked both she and her sister, and because Respondent had determined that Petitioner had violated its rules and regulations, Respondent removed the minor foster children from Respondent's home. Furthermore, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's foster care license. Petitioner no longer wishes to renew her license.3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her foster care license should be renewed. Department of Transportation v. J. W. C. Company, 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitatives, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Section 409.175(1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The purpose of this section is to protect the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the state who are cared for by family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies, by providing for the establishment of licensing requirements for such homes and agencies and providing procedures to determine adherence to these requirements. Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the minimum standards by which foster parents must be evaluated. Rule 10M-6.012 provides in pertitnent part: Section 409.175, F.S., mandates that the department establish minimum standards, or rules for the types of care defined in the statute. The standards, once promulgated, have the full force and effect of law. The licensing rules specify a level of care below which programs will not be able to operate. Rule 10M-6.024 provides in pertinent part: (4) Responsibilities of the Substitute Care Parents to the Department. * * * (b) The substitute care parents are required to participate with the department in relicensing studies and in ongoing monitoring of their home, and must provide sufficient information for the department to verify compliance with all rules and regulations. * * * (g) The substitute care parents must notify the department regarding changes which affect the life and circumstances of the shelter or foster family. Rule 10M-6.025 provides in pertinent part: Length of Marriage. If married, substitute care parents should have a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year prior to being licensed. Income. Substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure their stability and the security of their own family without relying on board payments. The substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care until a board payment is received. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof. Petitioner has failed to meet the minimum standards of Rule 10M-6. In addition, during the course of her licensure, Petitioner violated several provisions of the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Regardless, Petitioner has indicated that she no longer wishes to renew her foster care license.4
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the renewal of Cathy Taylor's foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November 1996.
The Issue In this case Petitioner seeks to revoke the Respondents' foster home license premised upon allegations set forth in a complaint letter dated September 27, 1991 and under authority found in Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondents hold a family foster home license issued pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. That license expires in April, 1992. (The Respondents had been initially issued a license for the period April 1990 through April 1991.) The license was issued following rigorous training provided to the wife Jean Burgett and a more abbreviated explanation of the responsibilities of foster parents that was provided to the husband, Richard Burgett. The wife is principally responsible for providing foster care under the terms of the license in that the husband's employment requires him to be away from the home frequently. It is the conduct by the wife that has subjected the license issued for the foster home at 17 Teak Course, Ocala, Florida to be placed in jeopardy premised upon allegations set forth in the complaint letter dated September 27, 1991. In the initial training received by Jean Burgett and in the renewal of the license which took place in April 1991, Jean Burgett was made aware of Petitioner's disciplinary policy concerning children placed in foster care. That policy is especially important given the nature of the children who were placed with the Burgetts. The background of those children was that of young people who were abused, neglected or dependent. The initial training which Ms. Burgett was subjected to concerning matters of discipline was a setting in which the general emphasis was that of positive reinforcement of the children in an effort to promote self esteem and eventually gain control over any aberrant behavior and this general emphasis was tied into a more discrete block of training which was a three hour presentation on disciplinary matters. In furtherance of this instruction Jean Burgett was provided the Petitioner's policy manual which spoke to matters of discipline. In addition the Burgetts were made aware of the need to ensure confidentiality concerning the background of the children who were placed with them as it pertained to protections set out in Section 415.513(2), Florida Statutes. By this agreement the Respondents promised not to willfully or knowingly make public or disclose information that was contained in the child abuse registry or records of any child abuse case and to hold that information that came to the attention and knowledge of the Burgetts as privileged and confidential and not subject to disclosure to anyone other than authorized persons. In agreeing to the terms set forth in the family foster home license Mrs. Burgett was made aware that the children in her care as a foster parent were not to be subjected to corporal punishment. Emphasis was placed on the need to promote self-esteem and the importance of this attempt because of the nature of the background of the children and the trauma that the children had been subjected to. An explanation was made to Mrs. Burgett that she was to be gentle and that she was to build up the self-esteem in the children as opposed to tearing down their self esteem. A great deal of time was spent in the training in that Mrs. Burgett had revealed that she was the subject of harsh discipline as a child and had noted her concerns about what was described as the "soft approach" to discipline contemplated by the Petitioner. Nonetheless, Mrs. Burgett agreed to undertake the methods contemplated by the Petitioner in dealing with disciplinary matters associated with foster children in her charge. The complaint letter speaks of a general lack of judgment on the part of Mrs. Burgett concerning care of the children that were placed with her under the foster care program and the fact that the Petitioner's staff had participated in discussions with Mrs. Burgett about this problem. These observations are accurate for reasons which will be described below related to particular inappropriate conduct Mrs. Burgett is held accountable for. One incident involved a four year old boy, Bucky, who had been placed with the Burgetts for foster care, in particular it was respite care from a shelter. That child had been undergoing toilet training and had been taken out of diapers and placed in what is referred to as "big boy pants" before he came to stay with Mrs. Burgett. Apparently for matters of her convenience she changed that regime and placed the child back in diapers. He resisted and went into a tantrum. Mrs. Burgett's response to that conduct was inappropriate and contrary to the training which she had received from Petitioner concerning responses to those episodes by a child. Mrs. Burgett threw the child on the bed striking his head and covered the child up with a pillow and placed herself on top of that pillow as a means of controlling the child. Mrs. Burgett was counseled by Patricia Gilman, an employee with Petitioner, concerning the inappropriate nature of this conduct. In December 1990 Tina 16, Tracy 9, Trevor 7 and an infant Jordan were in foster care with Mrs. Burgett. Mrs. Burgett and the children had been to "Toys R Us" and in the course of that trip Tracy and Trevor caused a scene in the toy store. Mrs. Burgett responded to this situation by returning the children to her vehicle and proceeding to a Burger King restaurant to get something to eat. While at the restaurant Trevor said something that made Tina angry and Tina responded by throwing a drink on Trevor. In the fracas Mrs. Burgett tried to restrain Trevor by putting a hand over his mouth and in struggling with her in an attempt to get away Trevor banged his head on the back of the booth. These circumstances caused the manager of the restaurant to come over to where Mrs. Burgett and the children were located and while the manager was there and other persons were watching Mrs. Burgett remarked to the manager, "these are foster children and they have been damaged." This was an inappropriate comment which would not further the underlying goal of promoting self-esteem in those children. In describing the incident Mary J. Rogers, an operations program administrator for Petitioner, said that no license disciplinary action was taken at that time because Mrs. Rogers regarded the children as difficult to deal with and thought that Mrs. Burgett had demonstrated a willingness to become an acceptable foster parent when interviewed about the December 1990 incident at Burger King by improving her approach with the children in her care. With the advent of other inappropriate conduct by the Petitioner that took place beyond the point in time the Burger King incident occurred, the Petitioner was confronted with conduct so serious as to call for revocation of the foster home license. Another incident about this time by Mrs. Burgett was attempting to counsel an 11 year old girl, Judy, who was in foster home placement with Mrs. Burgett. The subject of the counseling concerns sexual activity, and it included having the child draw male sex organs. Mrs. Rogers discussed this matter with Mrs. Burgett in December 1990 in the course of which conversation Mrs. Burgett said she was trying to help the child. Mrs. Burgett was advised that it was not appropriate for Mrs. Burgett to undertake counseling with the child because Mrs. Burgett was not qualified to do so. In the December 1990 conference concerning the performance of Mrs. Burgett as a foster parent, the Petitioner agreed with the Respondent that no teenage foster children would be placed in Mrs. Burgett's home because Mrs. Burgett acknowledged having difficulty dealing with those children. Nonetheless, such placement was made in September 1991 upon agreement by Mrs. Burgett to such placement. This involved one teenage child from another foster home in which three children had been placed. The eldest child was a 13 year old girl, Rhonda K. and the other two children were younger brothers to Rhonda K., whose ages were 8 and 4. At the time of the placement of the children from the other foster home Mrs. Burgett was caring for three other foster children, Jeremick 5, Amanda 3, and an infant. The arrangement for respite care did not work out, in part due to the manner in which the Mrs. Burgett responded to Rhonda. This led to a request by Rhonda to be removed from Mrs. Burgett's home sooner than anticipated. The reason for the placement of the three children from the other foster home concerned the need by that foster parent to tend to her dying father. Among the inappropriate actions by Mrs. Burgett concerning Rhonda was a remark to the effect that it was the child's fault that her "grandfather", meaning the father of the regular foster parent, was dying with cancer. As Rhonda described at the hearing, this remark by Mrs. Burgett "didn't make her feel good." While Rhonda was staying with Mrs. Burgett, Mrs. Burgett asked Rhonda to slash the tires of the neighbor's vehicle and spray paint that neighbor's house. This was a neighbor that Mrs. Burgett did not get along with. Whatever disagreement Mrs. Burgett had with the neighbor, it was inappropriate behavior to recruit Rhonda to pursue Mrs. Burgett's ideas of unacceptable relations with a neighbor. It taught Rhonda the wrong social skills and commended inappropriate behavior. In a couple of instances, Mrs. Burgett shown a flashlight into the bedroom window of the 4 year old twins of Theresa Kennedy, a neighbor of Mrs. Burgett. This was done in a harassing manner in the Spring or Summer of 1991. On another occasion in which Theresa Kennedy was at the house of Linda Smith, the neighbor whom Mrs. Burgett had advised Rhonda to slash the tires of the neighbor's vehicle, and paint the Smith house, Mrs. Burgett stood for several hours at the end of the driveway of the Smith home. This followed an argument at the Smith home between Mrs. Burgett and Mrs. Smith in the presence of the children, Jeremick and Amanda, which led to the sheriff's office being summoned by the Smiths. The children were then taken back to Mrs. Burgett's home and given that no other adult appeared to be in the home, and in particular Mr. Burgett, this meant that the children, Jeremick and Amanda and an infant, were left unattended for several hours. Mrs. Smith had observed Mrs. Burgett yelling at Jeremick on a number of occasions. At times Mrs. Burgett would tell Jeremick "You can't play with other children in the neighborhood because they are bad." Twice she saw Mrs. Burgett yank Jeremick by the arm. Although Mrs. Smith did not believe that this contact was sufficient to cause physical damage to the child, she was concerned about the manner in which it was done. Mrs. Rogers has observed a deterioration in Mrs. Burgett's attitude over time and an unwillingness to acknowledge that Mrs. Burgett has acted in an inappropriate way; an example being, that she denied the events that have been described relating to Rhonda or Mrs. Burgett's neighbors. In particular, Mrs. Burgett remarked that personnel with the Petitioner should believe Mrs. Burgett and not the children. Mrs. Burgett's attitude is one of hostility in the latter conference of September 13, 1991 between personnel of the Petitioner and Mrs. Burgett, in contrast to the interview of December 1990 in which a willingness had been expressed to work with the requirements incumbent upon Mrs. Burgett under Petitioner's policies on foster care. Mrs. Rogers expresses a reasonable belief that Mrs. Burgett might lose her temper and become physically abusive of the children in her care. Mrs. Burgett's attitude is one of deceit, and demonstrates an inclination to blame others for inappropriate conduct that is attributable to her.
Recommendation Based upon a consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which revokes the family foster home license of Respondents to operate and provide foster care at 17 Teak Course, Ocala, Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 22 day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22 day of January, 1992. APPENDIX CASE NO. 91-7202 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts by Petitioner: Paragraph 1 is addressed in the preliminary statement. Paragraphs 2-10 are subordinate to facts found except the last sentence which is rejected. Paragraph 11 is not pled in the complaint letter and is therefore irrelevant. Paragraph 13 is rejected. Paragraph 14 See discussion of Paragraph 11. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 17-28 are subordinate to facts found except in the suggestion about inappropriate household duties which is rejected and not allowing Rhonda to talk to her regular foster mother or attend school which latter facts are not in the complaint letter. Paragraph 29 is addressed in the preliminary statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire HRS-District 3 Legal Office 1000 N.E. 16th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32609 Richard and Jean Burgett 17 Teak Course Ocala, FL 32672 Sam Power, Department Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioners were licensed to operate a family foster home. Their most current license was effective through April 7, 2004. Petitioners have served as foster parents for about five years. There has been no report of child neglect or child abuse in their foster home prior to the time period relevant here. A. H. is a 10-year-old male. At all times relevant here, A. H. was in the fourth grade. Sometime prior to October 3, 2003, Respondent removed A. H. from his mother's custody and placed him in an initial foster home. A. H.'s first foster home shall be referred to hereinafter as the Gs' foster home. Thomas Munkittrick worked for Respondent as a family service counselor. A.H. was one of Mr. Munkittrick's clients. A. H. had separate visitations with his mother and father on October 6, 2003. Mr. Munkittrick supervised both visits. During a visit to the Gs' foster home on October 14, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick noticed a rash on A. H.'s stomach. The rash appeared to be a ringworm. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On or about October 15, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick spoke to Petitioners to determine whether they would accept A. H. in their home as a foster child. For reasons that are not clear, Respondent changed A. H.'s placement to Petitioners' foster home that same day. On October 16, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick took A. H. to see a medical doctor at Express Care of Belleview. Mr. Munkittrick and A. H.'s mother were present for the medical examination, during which A. H. removed his shirt. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. A. H.'s medical record dated October 16, 2003, indicates A. H. had a scratch/bruise on his nose, a ringworm on his stomach, and a rash on his wrist. According to the doctor's notes, A. H. reported that he accidentally injured his nose while playing football with Petitioners' dogs. The doctor's notes do not refer to any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On October 23, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick visited A. H. in Petitioners' home. Mr. Munkittrick saw no visible marks or bruises on A. H. Instead, Mr. Munkittrick observed what he believed was dirt on A. H.'s arms. Mr. Munkittrick also observed that A. H. was slightly flushed from playing outside with Petitioners' dogs, two large Doberman Pinchers. During a visit to Petitioners' home on October 30, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick observed multiple bruises on both of A. H.'s wrists and arms. The bruises were round and as large as quarters. There were no scratch or bite marks on A. H.'s arms. Prior to October 30, 2003, Petitioners had not advised Respondent about the bruises on A. H.'s arms. During the October 30, 2003, home visit, Petitioner R. B., the foster mother, indicated that she had never seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms before Mr. Munkittrick pointed them out. She relied on A. H. to explain how he was injured. During the hearing, Petitioner R. B. admitted that she saw blue/purple bruises on A. H.'s arms for the first time two or three days after his medical examination on October 16, 2003. Despite the inconsistency of Petitioner R. B.'s statements, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner R. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. Her testimony that she did not cause the bruises on A. H.'s arms is credible. On October 31, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick went to A. H.'s school to photograph the bruises on his arms. He then took A. H. for an examination by Respondent's child protection team. The examination included an evaluation of the bruises by an advanced registered nurse practitioner. The nurse was qualified by training and experience to assess pediatric injuries resulting from physical and sexual child abuse. The nurse was unable to reach a conclusion as to the exact source of the bruises. She could not rule out that they were self-inflicted. However, the nurse's testimony provides competent evidence that the bruises on A. H.'s arms were consistent with being grabbed by another person and that they were inconsistent with injuries resulting from roughhousing with dogs. Bruises heal in stages identified by colors beginning with red and ending with brown before they disappear. The colors of bruises in order of healing are red, blue, purple, green, yellow, and brown. In general, a bruise is: (a) red within one to two days of infliction; (b) blue within one to four days of infliction; and (c) yellow/green from the fifth or sixth day up to the tenth day after infliction. A. H.'s bruises ranged in color from red to yellow/green to yellow. The yellow and yellow/green bruises were located on both of A. H.'s upper extremities. He had two forearm bruises with a red component. It is highly unlikely that A. H. received the bruises prior to October 6, 2003. It is more likely that the injuries causing the bruises were inflicted approximately one to two weeks prior to October 31, 2003, i.e., between October 18, 2003, and October 31, 2003. A. H. was living in Petitioners' home and attending public school during this period. On the evening of October 31, 2003, Respondent's staff decided to move A. H. to a third foster home. Respondent's child protective investigator took A. H. back to Petitioners' home to pick up his clothes and belongings. Petitioner R. B. became excited and increasingly emotional when she learned that Respondent was changing A. H.'s placement to another foster home. Petitioner R. B. began yelling, in A. H.'s presence, that he was a liar and a "schizo" just like his "schizophrenic mother." The child protective investigator had to ask A. H. to leave the room when Petitioner R. B. began calling him and his mother names. Petitioner R. B.'s behavior on the evening of October 31, 2003, was inappropriate. However, the deputy sheriff, who was assisting with the change in placement, did not make any arrests. On the evening of October 31, 2003, and during the hearing, Petitioner J. B., the foster father, admitted that he had seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms sometime during the week before October 31, 2003. On both occasions, Petitioner J. B. stated that A. H. was crazy. Petitioner J. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. During the hearing, Petitioner J. B. provided credible testimony that neither he nor his dogs caused the injuries. In order to operate a foster home, foster parents must undergo training on an annual basis. The training includes knowing when to advise Respondent about injuries to their foster children. The requirement to report injuries is a part of the annual service agreement signed by Respondent's staff and foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioners' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: J. B. (Address of Record) R. B. (Address of record) Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether HRS should grant the Petitioner's application a license to operate a foster care home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Christopher Murphy, is a single male, born July 27, 1966. He wants to be a foster care parent for up to two teenagers, same sex, including those with a history of having been abused. In approximately September, 1994, the Petitioner approached the Children's Home Society (CHS), located in Orlando, Florida, to inquire about applying for licensure to operate a foster care home for dependent children. CHS is and was under contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to screen prospective licensees. The screening process included, among other things: interviews with the Petitioner; a home study; review of written personal references on behalf of the Petitioner; evaluation of the Petitioner's participation in the HRS-approved Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting (MAPP) program. After conducting its training and screening of the Petitioner, CHS recommended the Petitioner for licensure "for two children, same gender, ages 12 to 18 years," and the Petitioner filed his application for licensure on or about May 3, 1995. The Petitioner and the "relief persons" he designated in his application underwent background screening, and no disqualifying information was found. However, by letter dated July 11, 1995, HRS gave notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application for the following reasons: According to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 10M-6, it is the opinion of the Department that based on your own experience with depression, your single lifestyle and your sexual orientation that your desire to be a foster parent is not in the best inte- rest of the children in the custody of Health and Rehabilitative Services. You have indicated that you have doubts about your ability to work with HRS in seeking rehabilitation of the families with children in foster care, that you have limited patience with bureaucracy, and that you would not like to see the foster children in your care return to their parents. Professional counseling to relieve distress over your sexual orientation did not resolve that issue. These consider- ations lead HRS to believe that it would not be in the best interest of children in state custody to be placed with you in foster care. The Petitioner's Mental and Emotional Status The evidence is that the Petitioner experienced some difficulties growing up as one of ten siblings. His mother was very religious but, at the same time, appears to have been a strict disciplinarian and, at times, almost "cruel" to the children. In addition, the Petitioner tended to be a loner during his early years. He was physically weak and was susceptible to being bullied by other children. In addition, he played differently from other boys his age, preferring to spend his time reading Jane Austen and the Bronte sisters rather than playing with friends. As the Petitioner grew older, he increasingly recognized signs that he was homosexually oriented. These signs disturbed him because a homosexual orientation was contrary to his desires and to what he understood to be the morals of his family and religion. When the Petitioner went to college in the mid-1980's, he still would have been considered a "social isolate," and the combination of stresses from leaving home, living on his own at college and dealing with his sexual orientation resulted in depression requiring individual psychotherapy and medication (at first Impramine and later, in 1992, Prozac). Dealing with his mother's death in 1988 caused the depression to recur, but the Petitioner was able to recover with the help of the psychotherapy and medication. Since 1988, the Petitioner has suffered periodic bouts of mild depression. (Medication he takes for rapid heartbeat tends to cause some depression as a side effect.) However, the Petitioner's major depression is in remission, and he has been able to control the mild depression by the appropriate use of medication. The Petitioner's physicians advise him to continue on medication and seek therapy as necessary. In recent years, the Petitioner has resolved his conflicted feelings about his mother, as well as many of the conflicts he had with members of his family. The Petitioner also has made great strides to resolve his conflicted feelings about his sexual orientation. At the same time, he still rejects the values and lifestyle of the gay world and continues to accept most of the basic tenets of traditional values and lifestyle. As a result, there is no indication that the Petitioner is trying to use the foster parent program in order to make a political statement about gay rights. However, the difficulty the Petitioner will continue to face is that traditional society does not necessarily always accept him. This probably will make being a foster parent more difficult for the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has made considerable progress making and maintaining viable personal relationships. He has been able to work responsibly and well in the positions he has held with Universal Studios in Orlando and has made and maintained several positive and valuable friendships through work and elsewhere. In the words of a licensed psychologist who evaluated him in August- September, 1995, the Petitioner is "on the mend" in this regard; by this he meant that the Petitioner is making good progress in the right direction. If major depression were to recur, the Petitioner obviously would have difficulty persevering, and probably would be unable to persevere, in seeing a foster child through to the end of his or her temporary placement. But in recent years the Petitioner has been able to control depression by appropriately using his antidepressant medication, monitoring himself for symptoms of depression, and seeking appropriate therapy as needed. As long as he continues to do so, it is not anticipated that major depression will recur. HRS has licensed others with mental and emotional status similar to the Petitioner to be foster parents. It is true that there is a possibility that the stress of being a foster parent could cause the Petitioner's depression to recur. In many ways, teenage is the most difficult age bracket for foster care, and abused teenagers can present even greater difficulties. But HRS maintains control over the children to be placed with the Petitioner, and an effort could be made not to place the most difficult foster care challenges with the Petitioner, at least initially. In addition, HRS and the Petitioner could cooperate in monitoring the effects that the stress of being a foster parent have on the Petitioner. There is a good chance that the Petitioner's depression will not recur as a result of being a foster parent. The Petitioner's Parenting Experience The Petitioner has no children of his own and has no parenting experience. He grew up in a family of ten children but tended to spend much of his time apart from them. The Petitioner did some baby-sitting during his teens. But otherwise, through his college years, the Petitioner did not exhibit much inclination or desire to be around or work with children. The Petitioner changed as he reached adulthood. He now has a very strong desire to help teenage children by acting as their foster parent. In recent years, he has had the opportunity to work with families having their pictures made at the Universal Studios park in Orlando and has found that he had success interacting with the young members of those families. While he has not had much experience taking care of teenagers, he also has enjoyed spending considerable time in recent years interacting with the young children of friends and other family members. (Living in the a vacation center, many siblings and other members of his family have taken advantage of the opportunity to visit him since he moved to Orlando.) The Petitioner seems to interact well with the children in several arenas--facilitating play, sharing snacks and meals, helping with homework, going on picnics and other outings, suggesting and participating in other positive family activities. His friends' children like him, and his friends trust him with tending to their children. On the other hand, the Petitioner's experience taking care of children is limited. The Petitioner's experience as the sole caretaker responsible for children is relatively sparse and of relatively short duration. While the Petitioner has done some baby-sitting for family and friends, most of the time he has spent with children has been while their parents were around. The Petitioner has not had occasion to be responsible for children overnight or for extended periods of time (certainly not for 24 or more hours). He also has not had much other experience working with children in other settings. He has not, e.g., worked or volunteered as a counselor for church or civic youth groups or camps. Due to the nature of the Petitioner's experience with children, and his lack of experience with teenagers, it is not certain that the Petitioner will succeed as a foster parent of teenagers, or children of any age. It also is not certain that the Petitioner himself will thrive as and enjoy being a 24- hour a day foster parent. It would be desirable both for the Petitioner and for the children to be placed with him for the Petitioner to get more experience before beginning to act as a foster parent. But, on the other hand, the same probably could be said for most first-time parents. It is hard to truly know what it is like to be a parent until you become one. HRS has no non-rule policy establishing clear minimum experience standards for licensure as a foster parent. HRS has licensed others to be foster parents with as little or less parenting experience compared to the Petitioner. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS stated that HRS never has issued a provisional license to a first-time applicant and that HRS would not issue one for the purpose of evaluating the provisional licensee while the licensee gains additional parenting experience. The Petitioner's Ability to Be a "Team Player" On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am intolerant of those who hurt children and may have a difficult time holding back and/or editing my language in their company (during visits). I have limited patience with bureaucracy. If something is not getting done, I will do it myself regardless of who gets offended. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) I probably will assume I am a better parent than the child's birth parents, and I don't think I'll want the child to return to his biological family. As CHS conducts MAPP training, prospective foster parents are encouraged to use the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" to honestly express their deepest concerns about their ability to succeed as foster parents. Then, the trainers help the trainees deal with those concerns. CHS' MAPP trainers believed that, during the course of the training sessions, the Petitioner was able to work through his concerns and grow through the training process. He was open to the trainers' ideas and actively participated in the sessions. In their estimation, the Petitioner's comments, even when in the fifth session, should not be taken as an indication that the Petitioner would not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS was not familiar with how CHS conducted MAPP training and was not in a position to conclude, as she did, that the Petitioner's statements on the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet," in and of themselves, show that the Petitioner will not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner has had no difficulty working within the bureaucracy at Universal Studios. He has had good relationships with his supervisors and has had no difficulty accepting their authority over him. Nothing about his employment experience would indicate that the Petitioner would have difficulty working in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner's Single Life Style On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am responsible, but do not lead a structured life. I eat when I'm hungry, sleep when I'm tired, have ice cream for breakfast . . . (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) I may not be able to go out all night and do things as spontaneously as I do. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) It's just me - one on one. If I had a spouse to back me up when making rules or administer- ing discipline, things would be easier. On the other hand, the Petitioner also counted among his strengths: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) It's just me. . . . A foster child has only one person to adjust to. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 4) I have no other people living in my home and can devote a majority of my free time to my foster child. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) As a single male with no children, I will be the only one affected. These comments indicate an awareness on the Petitioner's part that his life will change if one or two foster children are placed in his home. As he recognizes, being single will make it more difficult in some ways, but somewhat easier in other ways. What can make being a single foster parent most difficult is not having the emotional and intellectual support and help of another adult in the home. A single foster parent must attempt to compensate by having adult family and friends who are willing and able to serve some of those needs. Several of the Petitioner's friends are willing and able to serve in this role for the Petitioner. All have met HRS's screening requirements. One thing a single foster parent cannot replace is the inability to demonstrate (and teach through) a successful marriage. But this inability clearly is not disqualifying. The Petitioner's Sexual Orientation HRS's notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application mentioned the Petitioner's sexual orientation. But at final hearing HRS took the position that sexual orientation itself was not a ground for denial of the Petitioner's application. While not disqualifying in itself, being a homosexual foster parent undeniably will present special problems. First, it already has been mentioned that it can be a challenge for a homosexual to function in traditional society, and trying to function as a foster parent in traditional society surely will present its own special challenges. Along those lines, it is foreseeable, e.g., that a foster parent's homosexuality could be unacceptable to the birth family. In addition, since unmarried cohabitation by two or more adults is disqualifying, the Petitioner would be restricted to living alone. Lastly, many foster parents later adopt children placed with them, but the Petitioner will not be able to because homosexuality is disqualifying for purposes of adoption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order issuing the Petitioner a license to operate a foster home for up to two children, same sex, ages 12 to 18 years of age. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 27th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Rejected that he applied for a license then; he initiated the screening process and preservice training at that time. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 2.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5.-8. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9. The characterization "extensive" is rejected as not proven; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 10.-12. Accepted and incorporated. 13. The date "July 11, 1996" is rejected as contrary to the evidence. (It was 1995.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 18.-22. Conclusions of law. Accepted and incorporated. Conclusion of law. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4.-6. Conclusions of law. 7.-9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The first testimony referred to Noll's knowledge of whether the Petitioner was on medication at the time of the hearing. Noll was not "pressed" for the additional testimony; he was just asked a different question.) Rejected as contrary to the evidence that Noll "failed to follow through." Also, subordinate and unnecessary, as the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that he did not present any experience in his application; he presented more at final hearing after being informed that HRS included experience in the "single lifestyle" ground for the July 11, 1995, notice of intent to deny. Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; he presented more at final hearing. See 13., above. 15.-16. Generally, accepted. The Petitioner's exact statements are incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Petitioner's purpose was to "avoid working with birth families." (The gist of Noll's discussion with the Petitioner appears to have been that foster parenting older children generally makes reunification less of a concern; either reunification would not be a viable option or, if considered, the older child would have more say in the matter. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but, as previously ruled, subordinate to the ultimate issue for determination, and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann E. Colby, Esquire 305 Elkhorn Court Winter Park, Florida 32792 Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
