The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether A-1 Security and Detective Agency’s Class B security agency license, and Mr. Rozzi’s Class MB security agency manager license should be disciplined because of the matters set out in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, between May 5 and August 4, 1997, the Petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division) was the state agency responsible for the licensing of security agencies and security agency managers in Florida. Respondent, A-1 Security and Detective Agency, Incorporated (A-1) held a Class “B” security agency license number B89-0115; and Respondent, Stephen V. Rozzi, held a Class “MB” security agency manager’s license number MB89-00186. Respondent Rozzi was President and operating manager of A-1. At some point during the period in issue, Gary Q. Floyd, an investigator with the Division, received a call from the owner of another security agency who reported a potential problem. At the time, Mr. Floyd was nearby and responded immediately to the apartment complex which belonged to a client of the individual who had called in. His review of the security logs revealed abnormal entries. Returning to the Division office, Floyd checked on the license status of the guard in question who had made the questionable entries and found that this guard was not licensed. The guard, Carmen Santiago, had applied for a class “D” license as a security guard, but because of a prior disciplinary problem out-of-state, the Division had indicated its intent to deny the license. Santiago was employed by Respondent, A-1. Coincidentally, the following morning, Respondent Rozzi came to the Division office on another matter and Floyd showed him the questioned logs. Respondent agreed that the entry was unusual, but said he had terminated Santiago from employment with A-1 as a guard on July 30, 1997, before the date of the questioned entry. Floyd asked Rozzi which guard had worked on the site on Wednesday, July 30, 1997, and on Thursday, July 31, 1997, after Santiago had been terminated. Respondent indicated the replacement guard was a Mr. Michelin. The log entries in question, which got the interest of Floyd, indicated that Santiago, who was not properly licensed as a Class “D” security guard, had served as such at the Whisper Woods Apartments. By pre-hearing stipulation dated June 10, 1998, Rozzi agreed that he had employed Santiago at Whisper Woods Apartments during the period July 30 to July 31, 1997, and that Santiago did not have the proper license at the time. Rozzi indicated at hearing that he received notice from the Division to the effect that Santiago’s application for licensure as a security guard was being denied, but claims he did not receive the notice until he picked up his mail at about 9:00 p.m., on July 31, 1997. As soon as he got that word, Rozzi claims, he called Santiago at home but was unable to reach him. Nonetheless, he left word on Santiago’s answering machine for him not to report for work that evening. In his report to the Division made previously, he indicated he had fired Santiago on July 30, 1997. At hearing Rozzi claimed he back-dated the firing to the date he received the information on the denial, which would have been July 30, not July 31, 1997. However, Rozzi had already indicated he had notified Mr. Michelin, who was scheduled to work on July 30 and 31 at Fletcher Woods Apartments, to go instead to Whisper Wood Apartments to relieve Santiago. Mr. Carter, another employee, was to take Michelin’s place at Fletcher Wood Apartments. When asked to asked to explain the inconsistencies, he could not do so. Carter, when interviewed by Floyd on August 5, 1997, as a part of the investigation, stated he did not work at Fletcher Woods Apartments that night nor has he ever worked there. Carter also indicated that when he was contacted by Rozzi shortly before August 5, 1997, Rozzi told Carter, to say, if he were asked, that he had worked at Fletcher Woods on the night of July 31, 1997. When Floyd advised Rozzi of Carter’s story, Rozzi still declined to change his version. Santiago is disqualified from licensure as a security guard in Florida because of his conviction of a felony in another state. Nonetheless, he applied for a security guard license in Florida in April or May 1997. At the time he applied, he received a temporary Class “D” license which allowed him to work pending action on the permanent license application, and he started work at A-1 as a security guard at different locations wherever he was posted. From time to time, including on July 30 and 31, 1997, he worked at Whisper Woods Apartments. On July 30, 1997, Santiago went to work at 4:00 p.m., intending to stay until relieved at the end of his shift, at 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997. At the time he went to work, he did not know that his application for licensure had been denied, nor did he know of the denial when he went to work on July 31, 1997. He claims he did not go home after work on either July 31 or early on August 1, 1997. Santiago claims he first learned of the denial when he got home later in the day on Friday, August 1, 1997, to find Floyd at his door. During the conversation he had with Floyd which followed, Floyd advised him that his license had been denied. This was the first he had heard of the denial, he claims. Santiago indicates that as soon as Floyd told him that, he left Floyd in his apartment and immediately went to his mailbox where he found the denial letter from the Division. There is some evidence to indicate that Santiago told Floyd in another interview prior to the hearing, that he had received the letter informing him of the denial on either July 30 or July 31, 1997. At hearing he claims that he was referring to a letter from the Division soliciting more information. This contention is rejected, however, since it is considered unlikely the Division would seek additional information and reject the application almost concurrently with the request. After Floyd left Santiago on August 1, 1997, Santiago immediately called Rozzi to tell him he could no longer work. Santiago claims Rozzi was upset with him when he called, claiming that he, Rozzi had tried to call Santiago a few days earlier to tell him not to go to work, but Santiago had not received the message or called him back. However, Santiago was at work at Whisper Woods Apartments from 4:00 p.m., on July 30, 1997, until 1:00 a.m., on July 31, 1997, and again that evening, and no one came to the job site either evening to talk with him about his status. This was, he claims, even after he told Rozzi that he, Rozzi, was going to get a letter indicating Santiago’s license was denied. Santiago claims that at no time after that notice did Rozzi terminate him or advise him he would be terminated when the letter came in. Rozzi contended at hearing that the first time he heard anything about the problem with Santiago working was on August 1, 1997, when he was in the Division office on a probation matter. It was at that time that Floyd showed him the logs from Whisper Woods Apartments and asked him about what appeared to be differences in the handwriting on them. Floyd also asked him at that time if he knew Santiago’s license was going to be denied. Rozzi said then that he had first learned of the problem on July 31, 1997. That same day, Rozzi claims, he made arrangements for someone else to cover that post so that Santiago would not be on duty, and Rozzi insists he did not know that this had not happened until the next day. Analysis of and comparison of the varied stories told by Rozzi regarding when he found out that Santiago’s license was being denied results in the conclusion that Rozzi found out on July 30, 1997. Had he not known, he would have had no reason to contact Michelin and tell him to switch duty assignments or to call Santiago and leave the message not to go to work any more. However, Michelin did not testify at the hearing, and the evidence of what he told Floyd regarding this is hearsay evidence. Even if Rozzi received the notice on July 30, 1997, as it appears, by his own admission he did not receive it until mid- evening, at a time when Santiago would have already been at work on the 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. shift. There is no way he could have reached Santiago that evening. Knowing this, Rozzi still did not make any effort to contact Santiago by going to the work site and relieving him by taking a relief guard with him. Consequently, it is found that regardless of which day Rozzi found out about Santiago’s disqualification, he did nothing to ensure that Santiago did not serve as a security guard without a license. Merely calling Santiago and leaving a message on the answering machine is not enough. At the least, he should have gone to the site to insure Santiago was not on duty. At this initial interview, Floyd also showed Rozzi a copy of one of A-1’s invoice forms which reflected at the bottom that the firm was available to perform certain tasks which were limited to a licensed detective agency and not permitted to a security agency. Rozzi indicated that he had copied the information from an advertisement of another agency, but assured Floyd that A-1 was not doing the unauthorized work. No evidence was introduced to indicate it was, and it is so found. Rozzi agreed to remove the inappropriate language from any form or communication used by the firm immediately. He did so. On December 31, 1996, the Director of the Division of Licensing entered a Final Order in Case No. C96-00855 relating to the two Respondents herein, adopting and incorporating the terms of a Stipulation and Settlement entered into between the division and the Respondents in that case. None of the documentation submitted in connection with that case indicates what offenses were alleged to have been committed by either Respondent. The terms of the Stipulation and Settlement called for the Respondents’ licenses to be placed on probation for a period of two years, and for Respondents to pay an administrative fine of four thousand dollars.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of employing an unlicensed employee to perform services which require the possession of a license; of advertising the business of a private investigative agency without possessing the proper license; of failing to respond truthfully to questions asked by an authorized investigator during an official investigation; and of violating the terms of probation by committing violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that Respondents’ class “B” and Class “ MB” licenses as a security agency and security agency manager respectively, be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Rayford H. Taylor, Esquire Stiles, Taylor, Grace & Smith, P.A. Post office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Recommendation Based on the foregoing stipulation, it is RECOMMENDED that the stipulation of the parties be accepted. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. H. E. SMITHERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Audis Ferrell 781 West Oakland Park Blvd. Box 124 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 James Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Don Hazelton, Director Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether respondent should be disciplined for allegedly operating various security services without a license as charged in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: On April 25, 1989, petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division), received by mail from an anonymous source a copy of a business card reflecting the name of respondent, Robert D. Wingard, and another individual, and indicating that respondent provided the following services: "Executive & V. I. P. Protection, Undercover Investigation, Alarm Technology, Bonding & Courier Work." The card further represented that Wingard held "Lic. No. 34882-809099." The card listed Wingard's address as 4419 Melbourne Street, Punta Gorda, Florida. After receiving the card, a Division investigator, Daniel J. Cabrera, interviewed respondent in Punta Gorda on May 11, 1989. During the course of the interview, respondent acknowledged to Cabrera that he operated a private investigative service, performed the services of a private investigator, operated a security guard agency and performed the services of a security guard, all under the name of Security Enforcement Specialists. However, Wingard maintained he had all necessary licenses from the state. According to Charlotte County records, Wingard applied for and was issued an occupational license by that county on June 18, 1988. The administrative complaint has used that date as the date on which Wingard commenced providing the above services. An examination of Division records indicated that Wingard did not hold those licenses needed to operate the services described in finding of fact 2. Therefore, all services being provided by Wingard were performed without the proper licensure from the state.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the administrative complaint issued against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Donald R. Alexander Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Question 13 on the application for unarmed guard license requests that an applicant list any and all arrests and dispositions thereof. The Petitioner responded to this inquiry by indicating that he had been arrested once in 1972 for being drunk, and that he was released. At the hearing it was established that the Petitioner has been arrested more than 100 times on charges of drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and breaking and entering. The Petitioner is a reformed alcoholic. He has had no difficulties with the law since approximately 1972, and he has totally abstained from alcoholic beverages for more than three years. The Petitioner now works closely with a religious group, and he has been awarded custody of his children from a previous marriage. It is apparent the Petitioner has reformed himself, and he is capable of working as an unarmed guard. The Petitioner's failure to reveal the extent of his law enforcement record did not result from a desire to falsify his application, or to fraudulently obtain a license, but rather from his desire to put his past behind him. His failure to fully answer the inquiry is not totally justified, but in view of the outstanding efforts that the Petitioner has made to rehabilitate himself, and the fact that he has worked effectively as an unarmed guard under a temporary permit for some months, the failure is not of overriding importance.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents were negligent by failing to provide proper supervision and control of two security guard employees, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has held a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License No. A00-01448; a Class "B" Watchman, Guard or Patrol Agency License No. B00-01042; and a Class "DS" Guard School License No. DS89-00077. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has held a Class "C" Private Investigator License No. C87-00645, a Class "DI" Guard Instructor License No. DI89- 00275, a Class "G" Statewide Gun Permit No. G88-00869, and a Class "M" Manager License No. M90-00046. At all times material hereto, Respondent Bahram Sedaghat has been the Vice-President of Respondent U.S. Security, and Juan Cabrera and Octavio Valdez were employees of Respondent U.S. Security. At all times material hereto, Respondent U.S. Security has provided supervision of its security guards (including Cabrera and Valdez) through patrol supervisors, assistant area managers, and area managers. Pursuant to that three-tier level of supervision, every guard post was checked by a supervisor almost every night as part of Respondent U.S. Security's regular supervisory procedures. For several years, Respondent U.S. Security had in effect a contract with Flamingo Plaza, an industrial complex in Hialeah, Florida, to provide unarmed guard services to Flamingo Plaza. That contract was in effect on October 23, 1989. When Cabrera was first employed by Respondent U.S. Security, he was assigned to perform unarmed guard services at a construction site for the Carnival Cruise Lines building. On his first day at that post, construction workers noticed that he was armed. When Brian Pierce, the area manager, came to the post approximately one hour later, the construction workers advised Pierce that Cabrera was armed. Pierce immediately reprimanded Cabrera, reminding Cabrera that the post was an unarmed guard post and that Cabrera was prohibited from being armed while on duty at that post. He made Cabrera lock his gun in his car. Thereafter, no one saw Cabrera with a firearm at that unarmed post. Cabrera was subsequently reassigned to perform guard services at the unarmed guard post located at Flamingo Plaza. On his first day at that assignment, James Cee, the property manager at Flamingo Plaza, saw Cabrera with a firearm while on duty and reported that to Brian Pierce. Pierce reprimanded Cabrera in front of Cee and instructed him not to return to the post with a firearm since it was an unarmed post. Thereafter, there were no further complaints regarding Cabrera carrying a firearm while at Flamingo Plaza although Cabrera continued his assignment at Flamingo Plaza for approximately three or four more months. After Pierce reprimanded Cabrera for appearing at Flamingo Plaza on his first day with a firearm, however, on one occasion Mark McCray, the assistant area manager, saw Cabrera at Flamingo Plaza wearing a jacket while on duty. Visible below the jacket was the bottom of a holster. Cabrera was specifically ordered by McCray not to wear a holster while on duty at an unarmed post. Cabrera was not armed on that occasion. There were no other reports that Cabrera wore a holster at Flamingo Plaza on any other occasion. On October 23, 1989, a shooting incident involving Cabrera took place at the Flamingo Plaza. Upon being notified of the incident Respondent U.S. Security immediately suspended Cabrera and fired him on the following day. Criminal charges were filed against Cabrera based on that shooting incident, and those charges remained pending at the time of the final hearing in this cause. Petitioner immediately conducted an investigation of the incident and of Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of its unarmed guard employees. At the conclusion of the investigation, Petitioner determined there were no violations of the statutes regulating the security guard industry and closed its file. Thereafter, Cabrera, while the criminal charges were pending against him, appeared on television and gave statements which directly contradicted the evidence obtained by Petitioner in its investigation. As a result of those statements made by Cabrera and pressure exerted by the news media, Petitioner reopened its investigation and subsequently issued the Administrative Complaint which is involved in this proceeding. Respondents were not aware that Juan Cabrera or Octavio Valdez had firearms in their possession while on duty on October 23, 1989, when their assigned duties did not require firearms. Further, there is no reason that Respondents should have known that Cabrera or Valdez had firearms in their possession on that occasion. It is standard procedure for Respondent U.S. Security's supervisors to provide all security guards with "post orders" prior to each guard beginning a new post assignment. Among other things, this document notifies the guard as to whether the post calls for armed or unarmed personnel. Respondent U.S. Security ensures that the guard reads and understands the post orders prior to beginning his shift. On October 23, 1989, Respondent U.S. Security had procedures set up for the hiring, training, and supervision of security guards, both armed and unarmed. Respondent U.S. Security had in place procedures for taking disciplinary action against employees. Those disciplinary guidelines included the exercise of judgment by the supervisory personnel involved. If an employee did something prohibited, the employee was specifically reprimanded and instructed not to engage in that conduct again. If the employee engaged in the same conduct again, he would be fired immediately for disobeying direct orders. Respondent U.S. Security did not have a specific policy directed at a guard appearing at an unarmed post with a firearm or with only a holster because such conduct simply did not occur. Respondent U.S. Security's procedures for supervision of security guards comply with or exceed the procedures utilized in the industry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of January, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-4840 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 3-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2 and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 9 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues involved in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Florida Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Norman S. Segall, Esquire Bentata Hoet & Associates and Zamora Segall Lacasa & Schere 3191 Coral Way Third Floor, Madison Circle Miami, Florida 33145 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Homeowner’s Association of Eagle Creek, Inc., (Respondent) discriminated against Stanley Byrdsell (Petitioner) based on race or disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was a homeowner at, and resident of, a residential community identified as “Eagle Creek” in Orlando, Florida. The Petitioner is an African-American male. On occasions during his residency at Eagle Creek, the Petitioner relied on a wheelchair for mobility following surgeries related to injuries sustained in automobile accidents. The Respondent is the legal entity created, in relevant part, to manage common areas at Eagle Creek, to enforce various Eagle Creek property restrictions, and to collect assessments from Eagle Creek homeowners. The Petitioner’s complaint of discrimination by the Respondent was essentially focused on his interactions with Maria Loffredo, the Respondent’s manager during the time the Petitioner resided at Eagle Creek. Ms. Loffredo is no longer employed by the Respondent. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, discriminated against the Petitioner in any manner based on his race or disability. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, treated the Petitioner in any manner differently than any other resident of Eagle Creek. UNPAID ASSESSMENTS Collection of assessments from Eagle Creek homeowners appears to have been a substantial issue for the Respondent. At one point during the relevant period, approximately 60 percent of Eagle Creek homeowners, including the Petitioner, were delinquent in paying assessments to the Respondent. The Respondent routinely provided delinquent homeowners with an opportunity to become current on unpaid assessments by making periodic installment payments of the funds due. The periodic payment plans were documented by written agreements executed between the Respondent and the participating homeowners. The Petitioner was offered the opportunity to enter into such an installment payment plan to satisfy the unpaid assessments, but did not do so. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent’s efforts to collect the unpaid assessments from the Petitioner were in any manner different from the collection efforts routinely applied to all Eagle Creek homeowners who were in arrears on assessment payments. The Petitioner testified that he and Ms. Loffredo entered into a verbal agreement whereby he would provide web design services to the Respondent in an amount equal to his unpaid assessments. The Petitioner offered no documentation to support the assertion. Ms. Loffredo denied entering into such an agreement and testified that she had no authority to enter into a contract with the Petitioner without approval by the Respondent’s board of directors. There is no evidence that the board of directors ever considered any such agreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent. The evidence fails to establish the existence of any agreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding web design services. THE PLYWOOD RAMP As previously stated, the Petitioner occasionally relied on a wheelchair for mobility. During those times, the Petitioner placed a sheet of plywood across an entry step at the front of his house to facilitate his entry into the home. On more than one occasion, Ms. Loffredo contacted the Petitioner to inquire about his use of the plywood ramp. The Petitioner has asserted that Ms. Loffredo harassed him about the ramp, and that her inquiries were discriminatory. At the hearing, the Petitioner’s former girlfriend testified that she believed Ms. Loffredo was rude or disrespectful during the inquiries. The evidence fails to establish that Ms. Loffredo’s inquiries were discriminatory in any manner. The Respondent took no action whatsoever to prohibit or restrict the Petitioner’s use of the ramp. COMMUNITY INSPECTIONS The Petitioner has asserted that Ms. Loffredo targeted his home for various inspections in order to harass or intimidate him because of his race or disability. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner’s residence was inspected more frequently than that of other homeowners in Eagle Creek, or that the Petitioner was subjected to property restrictions different from those applied to other homeowners. RACIAL SLUR The Petitioner has asserted that, on one occasion, he observed Ms. Loffredo parked in front of his house, and alleged that when he approached her to ask about her presence, she responded by directing a racial slur towards him and then driving off. Ms. Loffredo testified that she routinely went through the Eagle Creek community to monitor homeowner compliance with property restrictions, but denied making the statement attributed to her by the Petitioner. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the alleged racial statement occurred. ENTRY GATE REMOTE CONTROLS Eagle Creek is a private community. Entry into Eagle Creek is through gated and guarded access points. Residents entering the community use coded electronic devices to open the gate. Residents, as well as non-residents, can also gain entry into the community by stopping at a guardhouse, where security personnel are present on a 24-hour basis. The Respondent’s governing documents provide that a resident’s electronic gate access can be suspended for non- payment of assessments. At some point after the Petitioner became delinquent in payment of assessments, the Respondent disabled the Petitioner’s entry codes, thereby suspending the Petitioner’s ability to enter the development through the electronic gate. The Respondent suspended electronic gate access for numerous residents who were delinquent in paying assessments. The evidence fails to establish that the suspension of the Petitioner’s electronic access codes was related to the Petitioner’s race or disability. Notwithstanding the Petitioner’s non-payment of assessments, the Petitioner’s ability to enter through the electronic gate system was restored after he provided a letter to the Respondent asserting that one of the Petitioner’s children had a medical condition. GATE INCIDENT At some point as the Petitioner drove a vehicle through an open electronic entry gate, the wooden gate came down onto the Petitioner’s vehicle before it had cleared the entry point. The gate was damaged as the Petitioner continued to drive as the gate came down. Ms. Loffredo became aware of the incident when witnesses who observed the Petitioner driving through the entry reported it to her. The gates are common property owned by the Respondent. Ms. Loffredo thereafter contacted law enforcement authorities to document the incident, and she went to the gate to observe the damaged gate. The evidence fails to explain why the gate closed while the Petitioner’s vehicle was proceeding through it. Although the Petitioner generally asserted that Ms. Loffredo committed some type of discriminatory act towards him in relation to these events, there is no evidence to support the assertion. VANDALISM On one occasion, a group of juveniles accompanied by an adult drove through a part of Eagle Creek while tossing raw eggs at presumably random houses and cars. The Petitioner’s residence and vehicle were hit and damaged by the eggs. Before the vandals managed to escape from Eagle Creek, the Petitioner and a neighbor managed to stop and detain them, and then contacted local law enforcement authorities. Ms. Loffredo became aware of the incident, and came to the scene while the law enforcement authorities were present. Ms. Loffredo determined that there was no damage to the Respondent’s property and apparently so advised the law enforcement authorities. The Petitioner has asserted that Ms. Loffredo also told law enforcement officers to refrain from prosecuting the vandals for the apparent damage to private property caused by the event, and that her actions in this regard were discriminatory towards him. There is no evidence that the Petitioner filed any complaint with local law enforcement or pursued any legal action against the vandals. Ms. Loffredo denied telling the law enforcement authorities not to prosecute the vandals for damage to private property. There is no evidence that Ms. Loffredo had any authority to prevent the prosecution of the vandals. Even presuming that Ms. Loffredo somehow had the authority to prevent prosecution of neighborhood vandals, the Petitioner’s claim that Ms. Loffredo discriminated against him based on race or disability would suggest that the vandals were prosecuted for damage to houses or vehicles owned by other residents of Eagle Creek. There was no evidence presented that the vandals were prosecuted on behalf of any Eagle Creek homeowner. The evidence fails to establish that Ms. Loffredo had any authority or took any action to prevent criminal prosecution of the vandals for damage to the Petitioner’s private property, or to that of any other Eagle Creek resident. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE ENFORCEMENT The Petitioner has asserted that the Respondent targeted his residence by frequently filing various complaints with the local housing code enforcement agency. While local housing code enforcement inspectors apparently received a number of complaints about the condition of the Petitioner’s residence, the evidence fails to establish that the Respondent was the source of the complaints. Further, there is no evidence that such complaints were related to the Petitioner’s race or disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Stanley Byrdsell. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Wonsetler, Esquire Suite 135 860 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32601 (eServed) Stanley Byrdsell Post Office Box 1645 Windermere, Florida 34786 (eServed) Cheyanne Michelle Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Sarah Elizabeth Gammon, Esquire Law Office of Karen Wonsetler, P.A. Suite 135 860 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801-1011 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Respondent entered a store, not in connection with his duties as a security guard, while openly wearing a firearm, in violation of Sections 493.315(2) and (3) and 493.319(1)(p), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent held the following licenses: Class "B" Watchman, Guard, or Patrolman Agency license number B-88-00055; Class "MB"' Watchman, Guard or Patrolman Agency Manager license number MB-88-00083; Class "D" Watchman, Guard, or Patrolman license number D-89-01736; and Class "G" Statewide Gun Permit number G-89-00216. In September, 1989, Respondent provided security services to about six of the approximately 41 merchants located at a small "L"-shaped strip mall located on Saxon Boulevard in Orange City, Florida. These services were provided pursuant to contracts between the individual merchants and Respondent. The security services supplied by Respondent required him to patrol common areas, such as sidewalks and parking areas. Entrances to all of the stores faced the unenclosed mall's parking lot. One of the merchants at the strip mall with whom Respondent had no contract was Lauri Black, who owned and operated a store known as "Florida Scene." This store, which opened for business on or shortly after September 22, 1989, is located at the end of a long line of stores and faces directly into the parking lot serving all of the stores. The closest store that Respondent protects is relatively close to Florida Scene, about five stores away. Ms. Black also operated a similar store in nearby Deland. Respondent had previously visited her to solicit security business. Based on prior conversations, Respondent reasonably believed that he might successfully obtain the business for the new store in Orange City. On Monday, September 19, 1989, at about 3:25 p.m., Respondent, who had just gone on duty, entered Ms. Black's store for the purpose of soliciting security business. At the time, he was in his normal security guard uniform and was wearing a handgun, which remained holstered at all relevant times. Ms. Black did not ask Respondent to leave or to remove his gun. In fact, she was not intimidated by the fact that he was armed. However, upon his entrance into her store, Ms. Black, without warning or prior objection, excused herself and contacted the police. At the hearing, Ms. Black testified that she had been "roped into this." "This" apparently refers to her participation that day in an ongoing dispute between Respondent, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the management and certain mall merchants that is not otherwise relevant to the present case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings: adopted. rejected as irrelevant. adopted except that Florida Scene was not open for business until after September 22, 1989. adopted in substance. adopted. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1-3. adopted. adopted in substance. adopted in substance. adopted as to Respondent being on duty. Whether he was in proper performance of his duties is rejected as conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 T. Hulen Ray, Attorney 118 WeSt. New York Ave. Deland, FL 32720
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing, licenses and regulates private investigators in Florida. The Respondent, Edward W. Salvato, is licensed in Florida as a Class C private investigator. On August 31, 1993, while working in his capacity as a private investigator, the Respondent was monitoring the movements of a subject who entered Sea World in Orlando, Florida. As he entered Sea World, the Respondent hurriedly "flashed" his Class C private investigator license credentials and told the admissions gate attendant that he was a "state investigator" who was following a subject into the park. He told the attendant that, under those circumstances, he normally does not have to purchase a ticket. The Respondent's gestures and words gave the gate attendant the impression that the Respondent was a law enforcement investigator with official status. The gate attendant was new on the job and was unsure how to handle the situation. She referred the Respondent to a supervisor. The Respondent repeated essentially the same gestures and words to the supervisor. Understanding from the Respondent's gestures and words that the Respondent was a law enforcement investigator with official status, the supervisor authorized the Respondent to enter the park without having to purchase a ticket. Before he left the park, the Respondent telephoned his employer and reported on his activities. The employer advised the Respondent that it was against the employer's policies for the Respondent to seek free admission to Sea World under the conditions described by the Respondent. The employer instructed the Respondent to purchase a ticket and get a receipt for reimbursement by the Respondent's client. Before leaving Sea World, the Respondent proceeded to the "Special Services" window to purchase a ticket and get a receipt. He also told "Special Services" that he was a "state investigator." Subsequent misunderstandings resulted in the Respondent being arrested by Sea World security guards. When a law enforcement officer responded to a call from Sea World, the Respondent also told the officer that he was a "state investigator." The officer cautioned him that his use of the term "state investigator" to describe himself could lead one to believe he was a law enforcement officer. He advised the Respondent to stop using the term to describe himself to members of the public. Evenually, the Respondent's admission to the park was paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order finding the Respondent, Edward W. Salvato, guilty of violating Section 493.6118(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (1993), and fining him $500. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward W. Salvato, pro se 1051 South Hiawassee Road, #2121 Orlando, Florida 32835 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Respondent's Class "D" Security Guard license expired on September 10, 1993. On or about October 29, 1993, Respondent was employed by Thoney Georges Investigations. During the period October 29 through November 2, 1993, Respondent performed the duties of a security officer after expiration of his Class "D" license. On November 3, 1993, Respondent renewed his Class "D" Security Guard license.
Recommendation Upon consideration of all of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and imposing the following penalty: issuance of a reprimand and imposition of an administrative fine in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00). DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of November 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Letroy Altidor 12300 N.E. 4th Avenue, #323 Miami, Florida 33161 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue At issue is whether the respondent violated section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: During the period of time specified in the Administrative Complaint, May 19, 1994, through October 10, 1994, 24-Hour Security held a Class "B" Security Agency License, number B91-00117. From May 19, 1994, through October 10, 1994, Richard R. Cullen was president of 24-Hour Security and held, among other licenses, a Class "M" Manager License, number M86-00152. 24-Hour Security, whose only office is located at 1515 South Federal Highway, Boca Raton, Florida, is in the business of providing security guards to businesses and condominiums. It employs licensed security guards and trains and supervises them to ensure that they adequately perform their duties and carry out the instructions of 24-Hour Security's clients. From May 19, 1994, through October 10, 1994, Michelle T. Reilly was employed by 24-Hour Security and worked as assistant to Mr. Cullen. She began working for 24-Hour Security in September 1992 and has always been highly regarded as an employee by Mr. Cullen. He has trained her in all aspects of the private security service business in order for her to get the experience necessary to qualify for a chapter 493 manager's license. Prior to February 16, 1995, she had never held any type of license authorized by chapter 493 of the Florida Statutes. Mr. Cullen was aware that she was not licensed. Since the agency's inception, Mr. Cullen has designated himself manager of 24-Hour Security and has considered himself ultimately responsible for the operation of the agency. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, Ms. Reilly's business cards identified her as "Branch Manager," and she was identified as such by licensed employees of 24-Hour Security. On one occasion during the Department's investigation, Ms. Reilly expressly identified herself to an investigator of the Department as manager of 24-Hour Security. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, in addition to performing secretarial and bookkeeping duties, Ms. Reilly assisted Mr. Cullen in (1) hiring and training licensed security guards; (2) preparing daily work schedules for the guards; (3) preparing post orders outlining the duties a guard is to carry out at a particular post, including the client's special instructions or requirements; (4) supervising the operation of the agency's dispatch center; (5) addressing clients' problems; (6) consulting with clients regarding proper security precautions; (7) conducting post inspections to ensure that the guards are at their posts, properly uniformed and carrying out their responsibilities; and (8) writing security proposals for clients and in developing new accounts. In assisting Mr. Cullen with these duties, Ms. Reilly at times was allowed by Mr. Cullen to direct and control the activities of licensed security officers and to operate the agency. When Mr. Cullen was advised by the Department that Ms. Reilly could not function as or be designated as "manager" of 24-Hour Security, he immediately removed her business cards from the office. Ms. Reilly applied for a Class "MB" manager's license on November 9, 1994. Her application was denied by the Department by letter dated January 17, 1995, because she had "not demonstrated the lawfully gained experience or appropriate training" required for licensure. Ms. Reilly was issued a Class "D" Security Officer license on February 16, 1995.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order finding 24-Hour Security, Incorporated, and Richard R. Cullen guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a fine of $500 for this violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April 1995. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on petitioner_s Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1 through 9: Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 8. The following are my specific rulings on respondent_s Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact numbered 2 and 5. Paragraph 2: The proposed finding of fact in the first portion of the first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact set out in the second portion of the first sentence and in the second, third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as merely summaries of testimony. The proposed finding of fact in the final sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 3: The proposed finding of fact in the first sentence was adopted in substance in Finding of Fact numbered 6. The remaining proposed findings of fact are rejected as argument. Paragraph 4: The proposed finding of fact in the first portion of the sentence is rejected as merely a summary of testimony; the proposed finding of fact in the second portion of the sentence is rejected as argument. Paragraph 5: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 6: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 7: The proposed finding of fact in the first portion of the sentence is rejected as unnecessary; the proposed finding of fact in the second portion of the sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 8: The proposed findings of fact in the first two sentences are rejected as legal argument. The proposed finding of fact in the last sentence is adopted in substance in Finding of Fact numbered 5. Paragraph 9: The proposed finding of fact in the first two sentences are rejected as unnecessary. The proposed findings of fact in the last two sentences are rejected as argument. Paragraph 10: Rejected as argument. Paragraph 11: Rejected as argument. Paragraph 12: Rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Richard R. Cullen, President 24-Hour Security, Incorporated 1515 South Federal Highway Suite 109 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32300-0250 The Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
