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BERNARD M. TULLY, M.D. vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE, 87-002265F (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002265F Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1987

Findings Of Fact Bernard M. Tully, M.D. served by mail his Motion to Tax Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Chapter 57, Florida Statutes, on May 19, 1987; same was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 21, 1987 and was assigned DOAH Case No. 87-2265F. This instant cause is a fee and costs case pursuant to Chapter 57, Florida Statutes, arising out of Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Bernard M. Tully, M.D.; DOAH Case No. 85-3175. The Department of Professional Regulation has moved to dismiss Tully's Motion to Tax Attorney's and Costs, (hereafter, "Fees and Costs Petition") upon allegations that the claim was not filed in a timely manner pursuant to Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, and upon allegations that the Fees and Costs Petition did not comply with the requirements of Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, in that the claimant had not submitted an itemized affidavit of the nature and extent of the services rendered as well as the costs incurred. A Voluntary Dismissal was served by mail by Petitioner Department of Professional Regulation in DOAH Case No. 85-3175 on March 6, 1987, and filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 10, 1987. The Order closing the Division file in that case was entered March 18, 1987, but is largely superfluous since a Voluntary Dismissal by the party bearing the burden of proof dismisses a cause by operation of law as of the date of filing of the Voluntary Dismissal. Tully's Fees and Costs Petition was served (May 19, 1987) and filed (May 21, 1987) well beyond the 60 day timeframe (May 11, 1987) provided in Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, for the filing of such claims. Tully's Fees and Costs Petition attached schedules itemizing costs incurred and pleadings filed in DOAH Case No. 85-3175. The Petition was not verified and no affidavits are attached. In these respects, the Fees and Costs Petition failed to comply with Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.35, Florida Administrative Code. Neither does the Fees and Costs Petition or any accompanying affidavit allege whether or not Tully requests an evidentiary hearing; that he is a small business party; where his domicile and principal office are located; how many employees he has; whether or not he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, and, if so, whether or not his net worth exceeds $2,000,000; whether or not he operates as a partnership or corporation i.e. professional practice, and, if so, whether or not the net worth exceeds $2,000,000; whether the agency's actions were substantially unjustified; and whether or not circumstances exist that would make the award unjust; or whether or not the agency was a nominal party only. There were also no documents upon which the claim was predicated attached to the Fees and Costs Petition. in these respects, the Petition failed to comply with virtually all of Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035(1)(2), and (3), Florida Administrative Code. Tully timely filed a Response to Order to Show Cause wherein he acknowledged as true and accurate the dates as found in Finding of Fact 4, supra. Moreover, his Response concedes that pursuant to Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, the application for an award of attorney's fees must be made within 60 days after the date that a small business party becomes a prevailing small business party, but his Response asserts that nothing in the applicable statute provides that an application for costs must be made within 60 days, and therefore at least his application for costs must be deemed timely. The Response further sets out an itemization of costs incurred and is sworn to by Tully's attorney of record. No leave to amend the Petition was granted by the Order to Show Cause.

Florida Laws (2) 120.6857.111
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GOLDEN YEARS RETIREMENT HOME vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 80-000666 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000666 Latest Update: Mar. 19, 1981

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are all corporations which own and operate adult congregate living facilities in Broward County, Florida. Each of the Petitioners had previously been licensed by the Respondent under Chapter 400 and timely applied for renewal of licensure on various dates. Golden Years Retirement Home, Lincoln Manor Retirement Home, and Southside Retirement Club, Inc. applied in November 1979, and Camelot Retirement Home applied in May 1980. (Stipulation, Exhibits 6-8) Golden Years, Lincoln Manor, and Southside Manor were advised by letters from Respondent in February and March, 1980, that their applications would not be processed because the current statement of assets and liabilities prepared by an independent bookkeeper or accountant in accordance with Rule 10A- 5.04(2)(e) F.A.C., had not been submitted. They were also informed in the letter of the availability of procedures under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. They thereafter requested an administrative hearing. (Stipulation, Exhibits 6- 8) Camelot Retirement Home, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who is the Petitioner in DOAH Case 80-1218, submitted its application for relicensure in May 1980, and enclosed a financial statement executed by the administrator of the facility. By letter, dated June 4, 1980, Respondent advised the home that, although Chapter 10A-5 formerly required an applicant to submit the required financial statement prepared by an independent bookkeeper or accountant, an emergency amendment to Rule 10A-5.04(2)(e) then permitted an applicant to prepare its own statement. It further noted that because Camelot Retirement Home is a corporation, the personal statement of the administrator was not acceptable because Rule 10A-5.01(4) defines "applicant" to be the owner of the facility. (Stipulation, Exhibit 9) Respondent's District Program Specialist who reviews license applications for adult congregate living facilities, determines the financial solvency of an applicant based on the statement of assets and liabilities submitted with an application to determine if the facility would "go bankrupt in providing care to the residents." She makes this determination by observing whether the facility has excessive debt which would render it unable to provide proper care to the residents and continue operation. In doubtful cases, she would have the district fiscal staff, including accountants, review financial statements, but, to date, has had no reason to do so. Since February, 1980, the district office has had sample financial forms available for applicants upon request. Respondent has promulgated no rules nor does it have any written policies setting forth criteria as to the financial requirements for licensure. None of the petitioners in these proceedings except Camelot Retirement Home submitted financial statements with their applications for license renewal. No application has been denied for an insufficient financial condition since the promulgation of Rule 10A-5.04(2)(e), F.A.C., on October 3, 1979. License application files, including financial statements of applicants, are available in Respondent's offices for inspection by the general public. (Testimony of Kroeger, Exhibits 1-2)

Recommendation That the applications of Petitioners for renewal of licensure as adult congregate living facilities under Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Toothaker, Esquire 222 SE 10th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Harold S. Braynon, Esquire Donna Stinson, Esquire Department of HRS General Counsel District X Legal Counsel Department of HRS 201 West Broward Boulevard 1323 Winewood Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.56120.57
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MARINATOWN REALTY, INC., 81-002097 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002097 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Respondent Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, holding license number 0208680 and located at 3440 Marinatown Lane, Northwest, North Fort Myers, Florida. Marinatown Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation whose president is Thomas P. Hoolihan. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December, 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1 1/2 percent commission on all sales. When the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December, 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commissions on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1 1/2 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January, 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May, 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented moneys previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchinson decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent 30 percent respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified on the bottom of the contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. When received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April, 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected. In early May, 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January, 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. Although he held multiple licenses, Hutchinson denied that a conflict ever existed between his duties to Marinatown Realty, Inc., and his own company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. When questioned during the final hearing regarding how he decided where to list properties while he was the broker for both companies, the following exchange occurred between Hutchinson and counsel for Marinatown Realty, Inc.: Q Let me ask you, Mr. Hutchinson, how would it be decided when you were to go out and list property as to whether or not that property would be listed under Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc.? Who would make that determination? A I would. Q Solely on your own? A I had no contract with anyone. I had nothing in writing to direct me where to place any business. Q So this would be solely your decision as to how you would list the property? Either Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty? A If I secured the listing it was my dis- cretion as to where I listed the real estate. I had the choice of one of two companies. * * * Q If you were to list property in my hypo- thetical with Marinatown Realty, is it not a fact that they would receive, and being Marinatown Realty, would receive one half of the commission and you, as the broker, would receive the other half? A That was what I did. Q So it would certainly be beneficial to Seago to have you list as much property as you could with Marinatown Realty because they, in fact, owned the stock with Marinatown Realty, is that not true? A Yes, sir. Q When you would list property with L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., would you do this with the full knowledge, consent and permission of Marinatown Realty, Inc.? A Yes, sir. Q How would you say that you gave full consent when you just testified that it was solely up to you as to how you would list property? A If I solely decided, I give my consent. I don't have anybody else to answer to. (T. pp. 108-110) During the period that Hutchinson was a broker for Marinatown Realty and L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Hutchinson believed his primary duty was toward his own company as illustrated by the following exchange between counsel for Respondent and the complainant: Q It's a fair statement to say that you, as a broker for Marinatown Realty, Inc. didn't make a whole lot of money for Marinatown Realty, did you? A I didn't run the P & L statement. Q I'm asking you as being the broker. You didn't make a lot of money for Marinatown Realty, Inc., did you? A I made as much money for them as I did for the responsibility. Q Well, did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during that period of time? MR. FERNANDEZ: Objection as to relevancy, this whole line of questioning. MR. NEEL: Your Honor, it isn't. It's germaine. HEARING OFFICER: Objection overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, the question? Q Did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during this period of time? A That's relative. Q In comparison to what money Marinatown Realty made? A Yes, sir, because L. E. Hutchinson Realty had a thirty thousand retainer that was coming in up until April 30th. Q From Seago? A Certainly. Q So L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. made a lot more money than Marinatown Realty, Inc., didn't they? A That's the way its supposed to work. Q And, again, it was at your sole dis- cretion as to how you would list the properties; under which principal. A Yes, but I asked for a specific con- tract and never got it. (T. pp. 124-125) The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR re- commended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investigation was undertaken, an Administrative Com- plaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC. was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUBJECT has acquired his BROKER'S license #020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present em- ployees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances a recommendation that no action be taken against the Respondent was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Hutchinson is entitled to compensation for services rendered on the following sales contracts: Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to Michael T. and Judith Marchiando as buyers, Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to John E. and Charlotte A. Ferguson as buyers, and Seago Group, Inc. as sellers, to Kenneth J. Dawson as buyer. In regard to the first transaction, the Marchiandos were personal friends of the son-in-law of Seago's major shareholder, Mr. R. Berti. Hutchinson's role in this transaction was limited to preparing the contract and mailing it to the Marchiandos for signature. Hutchinson had no part in selling this property and never met the Marchiandos. The sale of the Ferguson's arose in a manner similar to the Marchiandos. Mr. Ferguson is the manager of a Detroit company owned by Mr. Berti. Similarly, Mr. Dawson works for Mr. Berti in Detroit as an accountant. These sales were made by Mr. Berti and Hutchinson furnished administrative assistance by completing the contracts and sending them to these individuals for signature. Under the terms of the agreement between Hoolihan and Hutchinson, a commission was not due on these properties to Hutchinson since these were not outside listings and his agreement with Hoolihan did not contemplate that commissions be paid in such situations.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Marinatown Realty, Inc. be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 3440 Marinatown Lane, N.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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MICHAEL A. CRANE, D/B/A ACCENT BUILDERS OF FLORIDA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 05-003802F (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Smyrna Beach, Florida Oct. 14, 2005 Number: 05-003802F Latest Update: Feb. 13, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner Michael A. Crane, d/b/a Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On October 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reimbursement of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Petitioner seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is the prevailing party in the underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 04-4040PL. On September 23, 2005, the Construction Industry Licensing Board entered its Final Order in the underlying case, in which it adopted the Recommended Order entered in the DOAH proceeding, thereby dismissing the charges that Petitioner had violated certain provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. In the underlying proceeding, Respondent charged Michael A. Crane with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, in his capacity as a certified general contractor holding Florida license No. CGC8644. Petitioner had entered into the contract which gave rise to the underlying proceeding as Accent Builders of Florida, Inc. (Accent). Respondent's disciplinary action was not directed at Accent Builders of Florida, Inc., but at Petitioner as the qualifying agent for the company. Petitioner is not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. Petitioner is neither a partnership nor a corporation. Petitioner does business in Florida as Accent, but at the time the underlying proceeding was initiated, Petitioner had not applied for and been granted a certificate of authority for Accent through himself as the qualifying agent. In September 2004, while the underlying proceeding was pending, Petitioner applied for and was granted a certificate of authority for Accent with Michael A. Crane as the qualifying agent. Despite the fact that Petitioner was granted a certificate of authority for Accent, the underlying proceeding was brought against the certified general contractor, Michael A. Crane, not against Accent as a corporate entity. In order to determine whether the underlying action brought by Respondent against Petitioner was substantially justified at the time it was initiated by the Agency, the information that was before the probable cause panel that directed the filing of the Administrative Complaint must be examined. In the underlying matter giving rise to Petitioner's request for attorney's fees, the Probable Cause Panel had before it a 188-page Investigative Report, as well as three supplemental Investigative Reports related to the alleged defects in the construction performed by Petitioner. The Probable Cause Panel convened on April 27, 2004, at which time it made a finding of probable cause that Petitioner had violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., (i), (k), and (m), Florida Statutes. The panel members reported that they had reviewed the investigative reports and draft complaints, and were advised by a member of the Attorney General's staff regarding their responsibilities in determining whether probable cause existed to file an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner. The consumer complaint accompanying the Investigative Report alleged that the contractor did not properly supervise the project; that the construction has resulted in numerous leaks; that the steam shower was not installed as required by the manufacturer; that the decking was not installed according to the manufacturer's instructions; and that most of the punch list items had been left unaddressed. The Investigative Report also contained Petitioner's response, which stated that Petitioner was precluded from correcting the deficiencies by the consumer, and that, although responsive to the consumer regarding the leaks, Petitioner saw no damage as a result of the leaks. The Investigative Report contained numerous documents describing the efforts of contractors hired by the consumer to remedy the leaks and alleged defects in construction. The report also included documentation of payments made by the consumer to the various contractors called in to eliminate the problems the consumer was experiencing. The Probable Cause Panel's review of the materials before it resulted in a determination that a reasonable investigation had been conducted, and that a reasonable person could conclude that sufficient evidence existed to charge Petitioner with violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. At the time the Probable Cause Panel reviewed the Investigative Report, it appeared that Petitioner's work had resulted in water damage, and that a valid subcontractor's lien had been placed against the consumer's property resulting in financial harm. The Probable Cause Panel's determination to direct Respondent to file an Administrative Complaint had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was made. Respondent was not a "nominal party" to the underlying proceeding according to the meaning of that term in Subsection 57.111(4)(d)1., Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.6857.10557.111
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. EDWARD P. FULTZ, 85-000343 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000343 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a practical nurse in Florida with license number 28131-1. Respondent's license was previously suspended for a two year period from 1975 to 1977 but has been active since that time. On or about February 7, 1975, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to a charge of grand larceny in Case No. 74-3162, Circuit Court, Pinellas County. Adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence were withheld, but the Court ordered Respondent to be placed on probation for five years. On or about March 24, 1977, Respondent was arrested and charged with grand larceny, to which she plead nolo contendere in Case No. 77-1689, Circuit Court, Pinellas County. On April 15, 1977, Respondent's probation officer executed an affidavit of probation violation as a result of the March 24, 1977 grand larceny charge, and Respondent subsequently entered a plea of guilty to the charge of violation of probation. Respondent was adjudicated guilty of the crime of grand larceny and also violation of probation on September 21, 1977, and was sentenced to one year in jail, with all but sixty days suspended and with credit for six days already spent in jail. Respondent was also placed on probation for three years. On August 16, 1978, Respondent completed an employment application for a nursing position at Beverly Manor Convalescent Center. In response to a question on the application, "Have you been convicted of a crime in the past ten (10) years?", Respondent checked the box for "No". Respondent was employed at Beverly Manor from the Fall, 1978, until May 15, 1984, when she was terminated for her failure to reveal her prior conviction of a crime on her employment application. Respondent's performance evaluations while at Beverly Manor were generally "satisfactory" to "very good", although she did receive four written warnings and a three day suspension during 1983 and 1984. On her employment application, Respondent also falsely indicated she was employed at Sunshine Nursing Home in 1975 and 1976 during a time when her license was suspended. The only evidence presented concerning the charge that Respondent diverted Tylenol #2 and Tylenol #3 for her own use from 1982 to May, 1984 was the "post test statement" contained in the polygraph examination report, Exhibit P-7. Respondent denies making the statement contained therein. She testified that at the end of the examination she answered what she understood to be a hypothetical question from the examiner about whether it was possible for a nurse to divert controlled substances. Her response was that it was possible, hypothetically, for nurses to do this, but she denies ever having actually taken these controlled substances for her own personal use. However, she did admit to taking Tylenol #2 and Tylenol #3 for other employees of Beverly Manor and giving it to them when they were not feeling well on particular days at work. Respondent's testimony on this point was very credible and convincing, and having weighed the evidence, it is the finding of the undersigned Hearing Officer that Respondent did not take controlled substances for her own personal use, but she did divert Tylenol #2 and #3 for other employees.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a period of three years. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 480-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Judie Ritter, Executive Director Board of Nursing Room 504 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Darryl Ervin Rouson, Esquire 556 1st Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street_ Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57464.018
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING, BUREAU OF COMPLIANCE vs. HEARTLAND PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCIL, INC., 88-006061 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006061 Latest Update: Mar. 16, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Heartland Private Industry Council (Council), is a thirty- four member council established under an interlocal agreement by five area counties in Central Florida. The counties are Polk, DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands and Okeechobee. The Council's office is located at 300 Parkview Place, Lakeland, Florida. The Council has entered into a contract with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (Division), under which it receives federal grant monies provided by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). As is pertinent here, the Council used the funds to provide summer job training for disadvantaged youths. The Division is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all grant moneys are properly expended. Under federal regulations, the Council was required to engage the services of an independent public accounting firm to perform a financial and compliance audit on its contract expenditures made during the fiscal period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. During the period in question, the Council had total expenditures of approximately $7.9 million. Under the audit program developed by the accounting firm, the firm sampled and reviewed at random various expenditures. Among those reviewed were two checks dated August 23 and October 10, 1985 in the amount of $239 each payable to one Joyce Barber, a JTPA participant from the City of Auburndale. The expenditure was questioned, but not disallowed, on the ground the first check written to Joyce Barber had apparently been stolen and cashed by another person. A second check in the same amount was then issued to Barber. The auditors questioned whether, under these circumstances, the first expenditure was appropriate. In addition, the auditors noted a $13 mathematical error and recommended that amount be disallowed. Other than these two items, which totaled $252, there were no other proposed adjustments in the audit report. The audit report was forwarded by the Council to the Division on or about June 29, 1987. The report itself is not in evidence. The Division then reviewed the audit report and preliminarily concluded that both expenditures ($239 and $13) should be disallowed. After the matter could not be resolved informally, the Division issued proposed agency action in the form of a "Final Determination" on January 4, 1988. That prompted the Council to request a hearing to contest the action. Barber was one of approximately fourteen hundred youth participants during the summer of 1985 who received job training sponsored by the Council. In addition to their training, these youths were compensated by the Council for their services. There were several hundred employers in the five county area who were involved in the project. Because of the sheer number of participants and employers, the Council mailed its checks directly to the participants, including Barber. According to the Council's in-house certified public accountant (CPA), this was a reasonable manner of disbursing the payroll. The CPA also concluded that the Council's internal controls were adequate. After the checks had been mailed, the Council received a complaint that Barber did not receive her $239 check. It then requested that the Sheriff's office investigate the matter. Based upon that investigation, the Council concluded that the check had been stolen and cashed by another person, and it sent a second check to Barber. From this factual setting, it can be reasonably inferred that the money was either stolen or was not received by Barber. The Council could have obtained insurance to cover this type of loss. However, it would not be economically prudent to do so when comparing the money lost to the cost of a policy. The Council did not deny that a $13 mathematical error was made on one expenditure. Therefore, it is found that such an error occurred, and an adjustment in favor of the Division is appropriate. There are no Division or federal regulations governing the loss of grant monies under the circumstances that occurred here. However, the Division bases its disallowance on the theory that the contractor (Council) received no benefit from the first $239 check sent to Barber. The specific regulation which supports this theory was not cited or offered in evidence. Even so, the Council did not show what benefits, if any, it received from the lost moneys.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring respondent to repay $252 in JTPA funds to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOUDREAU`S CONCRETE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 06-004891 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 04, 2006 Number: 06-004891 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 2007

The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to secure worker’s compensation coverage for seven employees who worked from February 28, 2006, to March 3, 2006, in violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and whether, as a result, Petitioner should be assessed a penalty in the amount of $1,115.52.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation ("the Division"), is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers provide workers' compensation coverage for their employees. Subsection 440.107, Florida Statutes (2006). Petitioner, Boudreau Concrete, Inc. (BCI), was, at all relevant times, an employer and engaged in concrete construction work in Florida. John Cipyak is a vice president with Builders Plus, a Boynton Beach Company hired to work on a Westview Office Building Site, in Port St. Lucie, Florida. Builders Plus subcontracted with BCI to perform pre-concrete form carpentry work at the site, including construction of the foundation and panels into which the concrete slab would be poured. Near the end of February 2006, Mr. Cipyak told Mr. Boudreau that the Westview project was falling behind schedule and that BCI needed more laborers on the job. Mr. Cipyak testified that Mr. Boudreau specifically agreed that his company, BCI, would hire sufficient additional manpower and would not use subcontractors. That agreement was not reduced to writing. In response to the need for additional laborers, the Division claims that BCI violated the applicable statutes and the insurance code by hiring seven carpenters, who worked at the Westview site from February 27, 2006, through March 3, 2006, as employees of BCI without providing workers' compensation insurance coverage for them. The seven carpenters are Dimas Zelaya, Francisco Figueroa, Gerardo Nava, Hector Sevilla, Jeremias Martinez, Carlos Quevedo and Jesse Hernandez. BCI claims that the seven carpenters were employees of a subcontractor, J. A. J. Construction Company, owned by Jose Alfredo Jiminez, and that Mr. Jiminez, BCI believed, carried the required workers' compensation insurance. The arrangements to have the additional workers on the project were made during a telephone call between Mr. Boudreau, Mr. Jiminez and Mr. Zelaya, who got the other six men to come with him and once they reported to the job, served as a translator for them. On March 2, 2006, Lynn Cornelius, a manager with Woodland Construction Company, Inc. (“Woodland”), sent an e-mail to Thomas Puglis, of the Division, listing the names of seven former employees of Woodland who had left Woodland’s employment, on February 24, 2006, to work for a subcontractor on another project. He named the same seven people who started work on the Westview site on the following Monday, February 27, 2006. On March 3, 2006, Mr. Puglis and Lieutenant Vance Akins, both investigators for the Division, visited the construction site where the seven former Woodland employees were working. With the assistance of an interpreter over the telephone, because no Spanish speaker was available for the site visit, the investigators instructed the seven workers to fill out Spanish language questionnaires for public works contractor licensing, provided by St. Lucie County. The investigators also tape recorded a statement from the only one of the seven men who spoke some English, Dimas Zelaya, during which, at best, he could be understood to have recognized and identified a picture of Mr. Boudreau. Lieutenant Akins telephoned another Division investigator Robert Barnes from the work site. Mr. Barnes testified that he telephoned someone who identified himself as Todd Freeman, a BCI employee, from whom he got the name of William Yocum of First Financial Employee Leasing, Inc., as the leasing company that provided workers' compensation coverage for BCI. Although he had no personal knowledge about where the seven carpenters were working from February 27 through March 3, 2006, Mr. Yocum noted that they were not covered on the policy for BCI and that the failure of BCI to report the names of all of its employees to the leasing company would violate the agreement between those two companies. Mr. Boudreau, on behalf of BCI, wrote a check dated March 10, 2006, to J. A. J. Construction Services, Inc., for $3860.00, with the notation "7 men - 2/27-3/3." BCI had no evidence of a written agreement with J. A. J. and the compensation to J. A. J. was solely for the wages earned by the carpenters. The Division's case is essentially based on the inference, without corroborating evidence, that Mr. Boudreau fabricated the subcontractor relationship and furthered that deception by writing the check after he knew BCI was being investigated for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance. The Division based its assertion on the fact that Mr. Boudreau could not name the subcontractor during his first interviews by Mr. Barnes, saying that he was dealing with the subcontractor through Mr. Zelaya. The Division also presented evidence to demonstrate that the nature of the working relationship between BCI and the seven men was that of employer and employee, not independent contractors. That evidence was inconclusive. Although Mr. Boudreau kept their time sheets and personally supervised the work at the job site everyday from Monday through Thursday, with the assistance of Mr. Zelaya, as a translator, the carpenters brought their own tools and used materials and supplies provided by Builders Plus. The argument that J. A. J.'s role was administrative in nature is not convincing, since the same can be said of the leasing company, with which the Division asserted BCI should have obtained coverage. Mr. Barnes testified that he reviewed records of J. A. J., that someone from his office questioned Mr. Jiminez, and that they determined that the seven carpenters were not covered by J. A. J.'s workers' compensation policy during the time that they were working for Mr. Boudreau, based on some sworn statement made by Mr. Jiminez to the investigators. Mr. Jiminez did not appear as a witness in this case. The Division's investigator conceded that the Division did not determine whether or not the seven workers should have been on the J. A. J. policy. Mr. Zelaya testified that he spoke to Mr. Jiminez about getting more pay and understood that he would ". . . work with the license and insurance of Jose Jiminez. Mr. Boudreau was going to pay Jose and Jose was to pay me." Further, he stated that "Jose gets the workers, Jose makes a dollar off of the pay that we make. Mr. Boudreau was to give Jose a check, and Jose was to pay us, but Jose never paid us." Before he paid Mr. Jiminez, Mr. Boudreau requested and received from J. A. J. a workers' compensation policy, but that certificate of insurance was dated March 6, 2006, and did not appear to cover BCI for the prior week. At the same time, Mr. Boudreau added some of the workers to his own lease company policy, in an apparent attempt to continue the job, but was unable to do so after the stop work order was issued.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order rescinding the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Iriye, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Mary Morris, Esquire Morris & Morris, P.A. 224 Datura Street, Suite 300 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57440.107
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