Findings Of Fact John L. Durden, Petitioner, was initially employed by the State Road Department (SRD), the predecessor agency to Respondent, on September 29, 1952. He left the SRD on June 30, 1955, and was employed by the Florida Turnpike Authority (FTA) on July 1, 1955. Petitioner was employed by the FTA until October 9, 1958, and was reinstated at the SRD on October 10, 1958, and has been continually employed by this agency and Respondent. At the time Petitioner terminated his employment with the SRD, the Merit System in Florida had not commenced although the law became effective on June 20, 1955, when signed by the Governor. The Merit System became applicable to a state agency when that agency was so designated by the Governor. During the period Durden was employed by the FTA that agency was not placed under the Florida Merit System, but the SRD was placed under the Merit System. Accordingly, when Durden returned to the SRD in 1958, he became covered under the Florida Merit System. Leave policies in effect during the period between 1952 and 1958 provided that an employee earned annual leave at the rate of one working day per month during the first ten years of creditable service and one and one-quarter working days per month from the commencement of the eleventh year of creditable service. After state agencies came under the Merit System, State Personnel Rules promulgated thereafter were applicable only to agencies under the Merit System. When Petitioner returned to the SRD in 1958, there was no provision in the statutes or rules whereby Petitioner could use his prior service with the SRD or his service with the FTA to accrue ten years' creditable service for the purpose of computing earned leave. Accordingly, the entry on his personnel records that he would complete ten years' creditable service in 1968 was correct. In 1968 the personnel rules were changed to allow an employee, working for an agency under the Merit System, to earn ten hours of annual leave per month after five years of continuous and creditable service and twelve hours of annual leave after ten years of continuous and creditable service. These rules specifically provided they would have no retroactive application (Exhibit 11). In 1968 Petitioner completed ten years of continuous and creditable service with the SRD and earned leave in accordance with these rules. At the time Petitioner tendered his resignation to the SRD to accept employment with the FTA sick leave could not be transferred to a different agency. When Petitioner left FTA to return to SRD, any sick leave Petitioner had accrued at the FTA could not be transferred to the SRD because the FTA was not under the Merit System. The FTA was made a state agency by the Legislature when the FTA was created in 1953 Section 340.05, Florida Statutes (1955), but, as noted above, its employees were never covered by the Merit System. The pay records maintained by the Comptroller show that Petitioner was paid by state warrant issued from the Comptroller's office from 1952 until 1955 and from 1958 to the present. This indicates that FTA employees were not paid from appropriated funds but from revenues (or bonds) from the Turnpike.
The Issue Did the absenteeism of Respondent, Hector Marrero, amount to just cause to terminate his employment as a teacher with Petitioner, Polk County School Board (Board), under Article 4.4 of the County's Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreement (Agreement)?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Marrero worked 20 some years in Polk County schools as an art teacher. Most recently, he taught art to the students of Palmetto Elementary School for eight years. The Board employed him pursuant to a professional services contract. Mr. Marrero's home life was difficult for him and his children. This was due to his wife's substance abuse, her domestic violence toward Mr. Marrero, and her mistreatment of their children. In 2016, these problems reached a crescendo. Authorities filed criminal child abuse and domestic violence charges against Mr. Marrero's wife. In October 2016, the criminal charges were resolved by judgment that included a prohibition against the wife possessing weapons, a prohibition against the wife contacting Mr. Marrero, 12 months' probation, and random drug tests of the wife. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) intervened to help protect Mr. Marrero's minor children. This resulted in requirements for counseling, which Mr. Marrero fulfilled. In August 2016, Mr. Marrero began a dissolution of marriage proceeding. It was contentious and abusive with numerous issues related to the problems identified above. The issues included critical child custody disputes. The disputes were resolved with Mr. Marrero being given full-time custody with the children and their mother permitted only supervised visits. Throughout this period, courts issued several restraining orders against the mother. Mr. Marrero, as the sole responsible parent, cared for his daughters, ensuring their continued participation in events at their separate schools. These demands and disruptions caused the absences resulting in his proposed termination. The absences described below were to attend various court hearings, attend litigation related conferences, attend required counseling sessions, transport his daughters to events, attend their events, and other obligations arising from the legal and DCF issues created by the behavior of Mr. Marrero's wife. The Polk County school system suffers from a significant absenteeism problem. The Board employs over 13,000 people. Approximately 9,000 of them are teachers or other instructional staff. During the 2018-2019 school year, the system imposed attendance related discipline 302 times. The Polk County school system has taken several actions to improve attendance. The actions include providing training and guidance to school principals and other administrative employees to help them assist employees to manage available leave time. The actions also include promulgating guidelines for principals and supervisory personnel to address absenteeism as a disciplinary issue. A teacher's presence in the classroom is a critical part of the job. The interruption of continuity of instruction that excessive absenteeism causes compromises student learning. It also injures co-workers asked to cover the absent teacher's duties. The entire school suffers as a result. The Agreement governs the availability of paid leave for Polk County teachers. Section 20.1 of the Agreement grants four days of sick leave as of a teacher's first day of employment. After the first day, teachers earn one additional day of sick leave for each month of employment. The system credits the day to the employee at the end of each month. The maximum number of sick leave days an employee may earn during any given school year is twelve. Unused sick leave accrues from year-to-year. The Agreement does not limit the number of days that teachers may accrue. Section 20.2 of the Agreement grants teachers six personal leave days during the school year. They are drawn from the pool of total available sick days. The distinction between personal days and sick leave days is that sick leave is intended to be taken because of an employee's or employee's family's illness or other health problem. Personal days may be taken for any reason. Personal leave days are a subset of sick leave days. A teacher may take personal leave days only if sick leave days are available to the employee. If an employee is absent and has no available sick leave time, then the employee is absent without authorization. Article XXI of the Agreement governs unpaid leave. It includes a variety of categories including medical leave, educational leave, and parental leave. There is no indication that Mr. Marrero inquired about unpaid leave or that the school administration suggested that he consider it. Mr. Marrero's struggles with attendance reach back to 2016. By letter dated February 12, 2016, his Principal, Edgar Santiago, documented a verbal warning for excessive absenteeism. The Principal noted that he held a conference with Mr. Marrero on the 12th and had discussed the fact that attendance records showed Mr. Marrero had missed 18 days of work during the school year. Eight days were unpaid because he had exhausted his available leave time. The letter cautioned that it was the first step of the Progressive Discipline process set forth in Section 4.4-1 of the Agreement. The letter concluded, "It is important to note that further disciplinary action, up to and including termination, will follow if unacceptable behaviors continue." On March 15, 2016, Principal Santiago delivered another letter to Mr. Marrero. The letter was a written reprimand under Step 2 of the Progressive Discipline process. The letter noted that by then Mr. Marrero had missed 23 days of work that school year, 13 of which exceeded his available leave time. The letter referenced the Agreement's Progressive Discipline section and noted that further disciplinary action could result in termination of Mr. Marrero's employment. On March 29, 2017, Principal Santiago wrote the Superintendent of the Polk County schools and advised her that Mr. Marrero continued to miss work after depleting his available sick and personal leave days. Principal Santiago noted that Mr. Marrero knowingly missed work without available sick or personal leave. His letter stated, "I am of the opinion that Mr. Marrero's recent absences without pay is [sic] a continuing trend and just cause for further disciplinary action." Principal Santiago recommended imposition of Step 3 of the progressive discipline process, suspension for up to five days without pay. He provided Mr. Marrero a copy of the letter. On April 19, 2017, the school administration provided Mr. Marrero a letter from Associate Superintendent Teddra Porteous notifying him that he was suspended without pay for three days for his absenteeism. The letter stated specifically that the suspension constituted Step 3 of progressive discipline under the Agreement. The letter also stated that further disciplinary action could result in termination. Because of Mr. Marrero's absenteeism, Principal Santiago placed him on a Professional Development Plan, which included goals and strategies for improving his attendance. After the suspension and imposition of the Professional Development Plan, Mr. Marrero completed the 2017-2018 school year without absences exceeding his accrued leave time.1/ Mr. Marrero's attendance problems returned in the 2018- 2019 school year. Beginning in August of 2018, Mr. Marrero missed work for one-half or more days on 23 different dates. These dates do not include his absences on May 30 and 31, 2019, which were the result of his suspension after the Superintendent recommended termination of his employment. As of January 24, 2019, Mr. Marrero had exhausted his available sick leave and personal time for one-half day or more on ten different workdays. Yet he was absent five days in April. Principal Santiago wrote the Superintendent on April 30, 2019, recommending termination of Mr. Marrero. This was Step 4 of the progressive discipline process. The Superintendent accepted the recommendation. On May 29, 2019, Principal Santiago delivered a May 23, 2019, letter from Associate Superintendent Porteous to Mr. Marrero. The letter stated, "Based on these facts [absences history], and in accordance with Step IV of Progressive Discipline in Article 4.4-1-Progressive Discipline of the Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Superintendent has determined that 'just cause' exists to recommend termination of your employment to the School Board of Polk County." The letter advised Mr. Marrero of his right to request a hearing. He exercised that right. During the 2016-2018 period, Mr. Marrero had advised Principal Santiago of the serious personal problems causing his repeated absences. Principal Santiago authorized Mr. Marrero to occasionally arrive late for work or leave early. He did not authorize Mr. Marrero to take full days or half-days off without charging them to available leave. Nor did Principal Santiago have authority to do that.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Polk County School Board, enter a final order finding just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent, Hector Marrero, and dismissing him from his position with the Polk County School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2020.
The Issue Whether the Department of Juvenile Justice overpaid Christopher Stokes for pay periods ending May 25, 2000, for 34.5 hours amounting to $274.91; June 8, 2000, for 9.25 hours amounting to $73.81; and June 30, 2000, for 8.0 hours amounting to $63.71.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Christopher Stokes, was employed by the Department of Juvenile Justice (Respondent) as a painter at the Dozier School for Boys in Marianna during the period at issue, May 12, 2000, through June 30, 2000. Petitioner continues to be employed by Respondent in the same capacity. Respondent's Policy and Procedure 3.26 (FDJJ 3.26), which is available in hard copy at the workplace and via the internet, delineates the agency's Sick Leave Transfer Policy.1 FDJJ 3.26 is based upon the requirements and provisions of Rule 60L-5.030(3), Florida Administrative Code. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure A provides that in order to donate sick leave, the donor must complete the Interagency Sick Leave Transfer (Request to Donate) form and submit it to the Bureau of Personnel. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure B provides that in order to receive donated sick leave, the employee must complete the Interagency Sick Leave Transfer (Request to Use) form and submit it to the Bureau of Personnel.2 The Department of Juvenile Justice is a centralized agency and the Bureau of Personnel is located in Tallahassee. A request to donate or to use donated sick leave may be made directly to the Bureau of Personnel via U.S. Mail, courier, or fax. FDJJ 3.26, Procedure C provides that sick leave credits donated to the receiving employee shall be credited on the last day of the pay period. Transferred leave must be processed by the last day of the pay period in order to be credited to the employee. This includes checking to see if the donor has leave to transfer and is permitted to transfer it by the donor's employer. The Department of Juvenile Justice has 26 pay periods per year. Requests to donate leave to use donated sick leave that are timely submitted to the Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Personnel, located in Tallahassee, will be accepted by the Department of Juvenile Justice even when the request may be incomplete or incorrectly submitted. Requests to donate leave or to use donated sick leave will be processed by the Department when the error or delay is attributable to the Bureau of Personnel. During the pay period ending May 25, 2000, Petitioner had a medical emergency requiring him to miss several days of work during that period and those that followed. Lynn R. Price, a Department of Children and Families employee, completed a request to donate 25.5 hours of sick leave to Christopher Stokes on May 24, 2000. Christopher Stokes submitted the Lynn Price Request to Donate Sick Leave Hours to the personnel office at Dozier School on May 25, 2000, the last day of the pay period. The Department of Children and Family Services, donator's agency, approved the donation of the leave on June 29, 2000, seven days after the last day of the three pay periods in question. The leave donated by Lynn Price was "not approved per criteria" by the Department of Juvenile Justice on September 12, 2000. This leave could not be credited to the employee's leave account for the next pay period. Earma J. Hendrix, Department of Children and Family Services employee, completed a request to donate 8 hours of sick leave to Christopher Stokes on June 8, 2000, the last day of the period. The Department of Children and Family Services, Donator's Agency, approved the donation of the leave on June 9, 2000, the day after the last of the second pay period at issue. The leave donated by Earma Hendrix was "not approved per criteria" by the Department of Juvenile Justice on September 11, 2000. This leave could not be credited to the employee's leave account for the next pay period. The Department of Juvenile Justice paid Christopher Stokes for 34.5 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of May 12 through May 24, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix during that pay period was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 34.5 hours of donated sick leave, totaling $274.91, on the June 2, 2000, warrant. The Department of Juvenile Justice paid Christopher Stokes for 9.25 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of May 26 through June 8, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix and Lynn Price was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 9.25 hours donated sick leave hours of donated sick leave, totaling $73.81, on the June 16, 2000, warrant. DJJ paid Christopher Stokes for 8 hours of donated sick leave during the pay period of June 9 through June 22, 2000. Because the attempt to donate sick leave by Earma Hendrix and Lynn Price was not approved as untimely submitted, Mr. Stokes should not have been paid for the 8 hours of donated sick leave, totaling $63.71, on the June 30, 2000, warrant.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order upholding the Agency's determination of a salary overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter hereof and the parties hereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent has been employed as a permanent full-time employee since March 7, 1980 with Petitioner's facility, Landmark Learning Center (hereafter, "Landmark") located in Opa-locka, Florida and is subject to the Career Service rules of Chapter 22A, Florida Administrative Code. The purpose of Landmark is to train, program, and modify the behavior of retarded clients so that they may realize their fullest potential for self care and independence. Ulysses Davis is the Superintendent of Landmark. Immediately below him in the chain of command is Deborah Wicks Kahn, Residential Services Director. Hers is a supervisory administrative position also over the entire facility. Within Respondent's unit, which is one of several units within Landmark, there are other supervisors between Respondent and Deborah Kahn. Approximately 1980, Respondent was convicted in federal criminal court of bank fraud but remained at liberty pending resolution of an appeal and various post-conviction relief procedures for reduction of a three-year sentence. Respondent has had a history of leaves of absence during his employment with Landmark. The longest hospitalization established by his medical records was from January 30, 1983 to May 6, 1983 at North Miami Hospital for approximately 96 days or three months; from September 18, 1983 to September 25, 1983 (approximately six days) he was again hospitalized at North Miami Hospital. At that time, ulcer disease was ruled out by Dr. Bertram P. Shapiro (Bell Composite Exhibit 7). These hospitalizations were known to Respondent's supervisors and co-workers and occurred during periods when leave had been authorized, although the nature of the type of leave (i.e., sick leave, annual leave, disability leave, leave without pay) was not established. Everyone at Landmark seems to have known that thereafter Respondent was on medication for his stomach and assumed or had been told by the Respondent that his problem was associated with bleeding ulcers. The usual procedure followed at Landmark requires that any leave of absence of one to two days may be approved by a lower level supervisor on an employee's bi-weekly time sheet. Leaves of absence in excess of one-two days require approval of at least Director Kahn. If the leave requested will be completed within the current two-week pay period, the bi-weekly time sheet may be used by the employee to make his leave request and approval is indicated on the time sheet itself. A time sheet is signed by Director Kahn or a lower level supervisor if the shorter leave is approved, and if it is disapproved, the word "disapproved" and the supervisor's or Director's signature is signed at the bottom. So that multiple time sheets will not be tied up by extended leave requests, a separate written request is required from the employee and a separate outside proof of need therefor must be attached to the employee's written request for all leave requests in excess of a two-week period. For instance, if the request is for extended educational leave, the employee's request must be made in writing with an attached verification of the program from the educational institution. If the request is for extended medical leave, the employee's request must be made in writing with an attached doctor's statement verifying the employee's need therefor. Superintendent Davis requires that his subordinate supervisors get his approval before they grant any extended leave request. In extended leave cases, a separate approval letter is typed, signed by Superintendent Davis and sent certified mail, return receipt requested, to the employee whose leave has been approved. Director Kahn testified she habitually would approve leave requests in increments of one, two and three months after getting guidance from Superintendent Davis or the personnel office. Shortly prior to October 17, 1983, Respondent requested a leave of absence for two months which Director Kahn denied due to an agency-wide survey (inspection). She wrote on the bottom of this request that Respondent would also need to get a supportive medical statement. When the survey concluded, Respondent approached Director Kahn about a leave of absence which she said she would approve if the Respondent provided a supporting medical statement. Director Kahn understood this to be a renewal of Respondent's request for either two or three months of medical or personal leave. Respondent states he understood this to be a request for one year of medical leave, specifically October 17, 1983 through October 17, 1984. Director Kahn again asked for a supporting medical statement. Director. Kahn left on vacation for three weeks immediately following this conversation. Respondent, in response to telephoned information from his lawyer, reported to Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and on October 17 and 13, 1983 was processed in accord with federal prison procedures to begin serving his criminal sentence. Part of this process is a thorough medical examination (Bell Exhibit 6) and he thereafter received extensive treatment for his medical problems, including ulcers. After Director Kahn returned from three weeks' vacation, the person she left in charge in her office presented her with a medical statement on Dr. Bertram Shapiro's stationery, dated October 17, 1983, urging that Respondent be granted a one-year medical leave of absence (Bell Exhibit 3). The date this item was stamped into the Landmark personnel office is November 10, 1983. No formal written request of Respondent for one year's medical leave was received by Director Kahn, Superintendent Davis, or the Personnel Office. Despite the absence of a formal written request from Respondent for one year to correspond with Dr. Shapiro's statement dated October 17, 1983, a letter authorizing two months' leave of absence from October 19 through December 19, 1983 was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at 2146 N.W. 61st Street, Miami, Florida 33142 (HRS Exhibit 1). This letter was signed by Ulysses Davis, Superintendent, and Deborah Wicks Kahn, Residential Services Director, Facility II. It states that Respondent's failure to report for duty December 20, 1983 would constitute unauthorized leave and three consecutive days of unauthorized leave would result in Respondent being deemed to have abandoned his position and to have resigned his position in accord with Section 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's November 17, 1993 letter was delivered November 25, 1983 to 2146 N.W. 61st Street, Miami, Florida 33142 and was signed for by Respondent's sister-in-law, Vesturee Brownlee (HRS Exhibit 2). This address continued to be the legal address of Respondent from October 17, 1983 at least through the date of the hearing. Respondent admitted intentionally not notifying Petitioner of any other address where he right be reached until mid-May 1984. Indeed, Respondent and his girlfriend, Ann White, a co-employee, worked diligently until mid-May 1984 to camouflage his criminal incarceration and exact location from everyone at Landmark. Further, this address appears as his legal address on all of his federal prison incarceration documents (Bell Exhibit 6). At hearing, Respondent denied that he received the November 17, 1983 letter but it is clear that he knew its contents because approximately December 19, 1983 Respondent telephoned Director Kahn at her home and requested an extension to a full year's leave dating from the doctor's statement dated October 17, 1984. Director Kahn said three months' leave might be authorized. Despite discussing his ulcer problems, no mention of jail or his actual whereabouts was made by Respondent. Although a written request and new doctor's statement was not submitted by Respondent, his oral telephone request to Director Kahn was acted upon. On January 20, 1984, a letter (HRS Exhibit 3) was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at his last known address. This letter, signed by Ulysses Davis, Superintendent, and Deborah Wicks Kahn, Director, authorized leave from December 17, 1983 to Friday, April 27, 1984. Instructions were given that if Respondent could not report on Monday, April 30, 1984 at 8:00 a.m., he must, prior to that date, complete a blank leave request showing his anticipated date of return and submit it to "me". Since the letter was signed by two supervisors, I interpret its intent to be that the Respondent could have submitted his completed leave request to either Superintendent Davis or Director Kahn. Again, Respondent was instructed that failure to either report for work timely on April 30 or to submit a written request for extension would result in a determination of abandonment of his position pursuant to Section 22A- 7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's January 30, 1984 letter was delivered on February 8, 1984 to Respondent's last known address and was signed for by Rosa L. Bell, Respondent's mother (HRS Exhibit 4). Although at hearing Respondent denied that he received Petitioner's January 30, 1984 letter, it is clear that he knew the contents thereof because in at least four telephone conversations with Landmark employees, Ann White and Leah Black, Respondent discussed the concern over his medical condition and absence from the job which had been expressed to Ms. White and Ms. Black by Director Kahn and other Landmark employees. On April 30, 1984, Respondent again did not report to work nor did he complete and submit to anyone at Landmark a written leave request form. In excess of three consecutive days Passed without Petitioner receiving any communication from Respondent. Petitioner did not report to work at any time during this period because he was still involuntarily incarcerated in Lexington, Kentucky. On May 8, 1984, a letter (Bell Exhibit 1) was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent at his Miami address. This letter was signed by Superintendent Davis and by Leah F. Black FOR Director Kahn in Ms. Kahn's absence. This letter, designated a "warning of abandonment letter," states that Respondent's failure to report for work or otherwise make contact after April 27, 1984 had resulted in Respondent being placed on an unauthorized leave of absence and that unless Respondent contacted the signatories with a "reasonable and acceptable" excuse for the unauthorized absence since April 27, 1984 and/or reported for work by close of business on May 17, 1984, a determination of abandonment pursuant to Section 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, must be made. Respondent was specifically cautioned that a "response is vital to your continued employment." The letter provided Respondent the option of resigning if he sent a letter of resignation by May 17, 1984. This letter was delivered on May 11, 1984, to Respondent's Miami address. It was signed for by Rosa L. Bell, Respondent's mother (Bell Exhibit 1). At hearing Respondent denied that he received Petitioner's May 8, 1984 letter but it is clear that he knew its contents and import because he admittedly signed and sent a two page typed letter dated May 16, 1984 to Superintendent Davis. (Tr. 151) This letter was received in the Superintendent's office on May 21, 1984. (Bell Exhibit 2) This was four days after the requested due date of May 17, 1984 for any excuse. Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter informed his supervisor for the first time that Respondent was serving a federal sentence for bank fraud, that he was scheduled to be released June 30, 1984; that he felt he was not guilty of crime, that he was unaware of Director Kahn having her vacation during the time when Respondent requested his leave, that he did not confide his jail problem to Director Kahn because he did not trust her, that in December Director Kahn told him she did not receive the Respondent's one year leave request letter from Donna Bailey, that Respondent had been in touch with Ms. Leah Black since 1983 and recently hand informed Ms. Black of his present location due to rumors, that before leaving Landmark, Respondent requested a leave of absence of one year, that at that time Respondent had accumulated four months of accrued leave and requested four months leave with pay and the remainder as leave without pay, that Director Kahn told him she could not approve his leave request without a physician's statement and he had attached such a statement to his letter request before he left Landmark and gave it to Donna Bailey. Superintendent Davis and Director Kahn believed Respondent to be sick until receipt of his letter dated May 16, 1984. That date is the first date either had actual knowledge of his physicial location and that he was in jail. In Respondent's absence, his supervisors were required to hire temporary employees to fill his position as Behavior Program Specialist. Sometimes they were not able to hire any temporary fill-in personnel and this created additional work for other full-time employees in covering Respondent's caseload. Sometimes the temporary help they were able to hire were not of a comparable skill level with Respondent or someone who might have taken the job full-time. As long as Respondent was on a leave of absence they were unable to advertise for a skilled full-time replacement. This had a detrimental effect on Landmark's in-depth applied behavior modification program. Superintendent Davis determined that Respondent's admission of involuntary incarceration, even if coupled with institutional medical care, did not constitute a reasonable and acceptable excuse as requested in Petitioner's May 8, 1984 letter. This determination is consistent with Landmark's internal policy. Superintendent Davis has previously refused all employees' requests for extended leave for the purpose of serving involuntary jail time. He testified that he would not have granted any of Respondent's previous leave time nor any extensions thereof if the jail sentence had been known to him. His basis for this policy is that criminal sentences are detrimental to employees' functions as role models. He applied this policy to Respondent because Respondent's position as a Behavior Program Specialist requires intensive leadership and role modeling/programming of retarded clients. Superintendent Davis also considered the Respondent's failure to disclose his incarceration to be dishonest dealing with the agency. Superintendent Davis further determined that the date of his receipt of Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter was beyond the allotted time for such excuse. Respondent maintained that he was diagnosed early on the morning of October 17, 1983 by Dr. Shapiro as needing a year's ulcer treatment, applied for and got the leave of absence from Director Kahn some time between Noon and 2:00 P.M. that same day, and thereafter, between 4:30 - 5:00 P.M., he was telephoned by his lawyer to report that very day to federal prison in Eglin, Florida. Respondent says that he had a normal appointment with Dr. Shapiro at 10:45 A.M., October 17, 1983, and at that time received the statement indicating need for a year's leave of absence (Bell Exhibit 3), returned to Landmark, wrote out on a legal pad what was apparently an explanation to Director Kahn that he wanted to use 4 months of accumulated leave with pay (annual and sick leave combined) and to receive 6 months leave without pay to cover October 17, 1983 through October 17, 1984; that he then gave this to Donna Bailey to type, that Director Kahn signed her approval on the typed letter and he returned his letter and medical letter to Donna Bailey. Stephanie Green states that she was with Respondent at the doctor's office on October 17, 1983, and saw him give his typed letter request, the medical letter, and his timesheets to Donna Bailey. Ms. Green does not recall any approval at the bottom of Respondent's letter. Ann White, Respondent's girlfriend, supports some of this information but contradicts much by saying she saw Respondent's letter request at her home on a separate occasion and saw the doctor's letter before that date when hue showed it to her at Landmark. She then says that at the end of October 1983, she examined Respondent's personnel file and saw the Respondent's typed letter request with Director Kahn's approval written at the bottom with the medical letter. These witnesses may have seen another earlier leave request, but timesheets and approval on the bottom of an employee's request would be inappropriate for extended leave request and approval. Director Kahn absolutely denies giving a year's approval in writing at any time and denies ever receiving a typed letter request for one year signed by Respondent. Her secretary was not Donna Bailey but was Sandra Williams. Based upon observation of the candor and demeanor of the witnesses testifying and their credibility or lack thereof, I choose to believe Director Kahn. Independent of the credibility of the live testimony, I also find supportive of Ms. Kahn's testimony the Respondent's admission that he gave his documents, if they were given, to someone not her secretary. Respondent further stated that at that time before his lawyer's call he intended a vacation to get away from it all instead of immediate medical care. Also clearly supportive of Ms. Kahn's testimony is Bell's Exhibit 2 wherein Respondent admits Director Kahn told him in their December phone conversation that she did not receive his letter request for a year's leave and that he was not approved for a year but might be approved for an additional three months after the original December 19, 1953 date. On June 6, 1984, Superintendent Davis sent a letter, (HRS Exhibit 5), certified mail, return receipt requested, to Respondent Bell at Antaeus Unit, Post Office Box 2000, Lexington, Kentucky, 40511. This was the return address on the envelope of Respondent's May 16, 1984 letter. At hearing, Respondent denied receipt of this letter but was admittedly incarcerated by the federal government at that location at that time and did not return to Miami until June 17, 1984. Petitioner's June 6, 1984 letter was received at that address on June 11, 1984, and was signed for by "D.D. St (illegible)" (HRS Exhibit 5). The undersigned finds that Respondent did receive on that date Petitioner's June 6, 1984 letter which stated that Respondent's failure to report on April 30, 1984, and thereafter was now considered abandonment of his position under Section 22A- 7.10 (2)(a) and that he was deemed to have resigned as of the date the letter was received or date it was returned to Petitioner if that occurred. The undersigned is not impressed by Respondent's analysis of Bell Exhibit 5. This item was found among Petitioner's business records, in Respondent's Personnel file. It is a handwritten, undated memorandum which reads in one handwriting "N. Bell went out on med. leave but last med slip is 10/83. Needs one every 30 days even the leave is for year-they keep jumping back and forth on AL to SL, etc." To which, another's hand has replied, "notified Bill Miller 2/13/84 will send in." At best, its message is ambiguous and one obvious interpretation is that monthly doctor's statements would be required by Petitioner from Respondent although the payroll employees already had the medical statement dated October 17, 1983 specifying one year, and that some confusion existed as to how to debit the Respondent's four months accumulated annual and sick leave during his absence. Under the foregoing findings of fact, Respondent abandoned his position upon his unexcused absence for three consecutive days after April 30, 1984.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that, Respondent having been absent without approval for 3 consecutive workdays he be deemed to have abandoned the position of Behavior Program Specialist and to have resigned from the Career Service effective Jun 6, 1984. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Langer, Esquire 255 Alhambra Circle Suite 312 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 John Abramson, Esquire 799 Brickell Avenue Suite 800 Brickell Center Miami, Florida 33131 Gilda Lambert Secretary, Dept. of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree Secretary, Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has just cause to terminate the employment of the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the School Board of Lake County, Florida (Board)(Petitioner). It is charged with operating and managing the public school system in Lake County, Florida, otherwise known as the Lake County School District. The Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, was employed by the Board as a school guidance counselor at Sawgrass Elementary School. Her principal was Rhonda Hunt. During the 2005-2006 school year, the Respondent missed 71 days from her job. In the 2006-2007 year, she missed 97 days. In the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent missed 87 days from work. The contract for a guidance counselor requires that they work for 221 days per school year. During these times, especially in the 2007-2008 school year, the Respondent had been making repeated requests for leave. Ms. Hunt, her principal, became concerned and in May of 2008 reported the situation about extensive absences, and leave requests, to Ms. Rebecca Nelsen, the Board's Supervisor of Compensation, Benefits and Employee Relations. In the 2007-2008 school year, when Ms. Hunt brought the issue to Ms. Nelsen's attention, the Respondent had missed work the number of days found above, which represented all the days in the school year from February 13th through the end of the school year. In the previous year, she had missed work from the middle of January through the end of the school year. Ms. Nelsen prepared a memo to Deke DeLoach, the Board's Chief of Human Resources, apprising him of the situation regarding the Respondent's absences. She explained to him the situation involving the excessive absences over a 5-year period. She explained to Mr. DeLoach that when an employee has been on extended unpaid leave that, according to Board policy 6.50, her return to employment is dependant upon a position being available. Therefore, while an individual is on extended leave, which is approved, their position becomes available to be filled at the decision of an individual school administrator. Moreover, unpaid leave, the status applicable to the Respondent's situation, must be approved in advance. An employee may not go off-duty on unpaid leave and then get approval for it at a later time. Approval must be requested in advance. A formal request must be made to the Superintendent, for the Superintendent's recommendation to the Board. Extended Illness Leave is a leave category that is required to be approved by the Board as well. Ms. Nelsen therefore explained to Mr. DeLoach that the Respondent had been on extended unpaid leave and, according to the above-referenced Board policy, her return to employment was dependent upon a position being available. Employees are required to have approval for some form of leave before they take leave or miss time from work. If an employee does not have approval for some form of leave and does not come to work, then under Board policy they are deemed to be absent without leave. If that is the situation, the employee can be terminated under Board policy. The School Board must have a recommendation from the Superintendent in order to be able to act on any sort of leave request. Under Board policies, an Extended Illness Leave is required to be approved by the Board. The school fiscal year ends June 30th. July 1, 2008, therefore, was the beginning of the new fiscal year for the 2008-2009 school year. The regular school session then began near the end of August 2008. Ms. Nelsen wrote to Ms. Chavous on August 19, 2008, explaining to her that she had been on unpaid sick leave numerous days, and giving her options to consider. Ms. Nelsen informed her that she must report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, that she could explain to her supervisor any accommodations that she may need, or that she could request Extended Illness Leave. That communication, from Ms. Nelsen to Ms. Chavous, references a July 29, 2008, request for sick leave. Ms. Chavous completed the July 29, 2008, request for sick leave on a Request for Leave of Absence form, which is the form required to be completed by employees who are requesting any kind of leave from the School Board. The July 29, 2008, leave form depicted a request for leave from August 4, 2008, through August 19, 2008. The reason for the leave requested was indicated as "Illness of self.” The Respondent did not have any sick leave available to her at that time. In the 2008-2009, school year, the Respondent was not eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. This was because she had not worked enough days in order to trigger eligibility under that law. This leave request was denied because the Respondent was on unpaid sick leave the prior year, had missed 87 days, and had never offered an explanation for her need to use sick leave. Therefore, the Board had no basis on which to approve the additional leave request and the Respondent's approved leave ended June 30, 2008. Any leave that the Respondent would have received for any extended illness would have been for the previous school year which was over at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 2008. Ms. Nelsen gave the Respondent two options in her August 19, 2008, letter: To report to work or be considered absent without approved leave, or To submit a leave request form asking for extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. On August 28, 2008, a request was faxed from the Respondent seeking extended illness leave. The attached doctor's note did not explain the nature of the medical situation or condition, in terms of providing justification for the leave requested. The Respondent submitted a leave request form with that August 28, 2008, request. It did not confirm that she was asking for extended illness leave for the school year. Instead she requested leave from August 4, 2008, until October 30, 2008. Since School Board policy required the Respondent, in this situation, to request leave for the remainder of the school year, Ms. Nelsen sent an e-mail to the Respondent telling her that she had no available sick leave to use and again telling her that she had the option to either report to work or to request an extended illness leave for the remainder of the year. That communication was sent on August 29, 2008, the day after the Respondent faxed the form requesting leave through October. The Respondent then sent Ms. Nelsen another leave request form in response to the August 29, 2008, e-mail. It again requested leave from August 4, 2008, through October 30, 2008. On September 9, 2008, a letter was sent from the Superintendent to the Respondent, explaining that the Respondent had not reported to work and that she had not requested extended illness leave. Consequently she was informed that she was now considered “absent without approved leave” and would be recommended to the School Board for termination of employment. When the Superintendent sent the letter to the Respondent, on September 9, 2008, the Respondent was not on approved leave. She was absent without leave under the terms of the School Board policy. Pursuant to that policy she was therefore subject to being terminated. Ms. Nelsen received three leave request forms from the Respondent, none of which requested leave for the remainder of the school year, and none of which gave an explanation for the basis of the medical condition. The Respondent's response to these facts was her statement to the effect that "[I]t was just always told to me that you can't request for more leave than what your doctor has put on the form. So, therefore, that's why I put the dates there." She also acknowledged that sometimes she does not remember some things or doesn't respond as fast as she should. Therefore she simply stated that she believed, in effect, that she had submitted everything that she could and had explained her situation to the best of her ability at the time. The collective bargaining agreement between the Lake County School District and the Lake County Education Association includes the position of guidance counselor. That contract references the Board policy which makes it a terminable offense to be absent without leave. The recommendation to the Board, prior to the Respondent making a Request for Hearing, was that she be terminated for being absent without leave. The Respondent's prior leave had expired at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. When the first day of school started in the current school year of 2008-2009, the Respondent did not report to work. The Respondent probably would have been unable to work because of her illness before January 2009. She would therefore have missed all of August, September, October, November, and December.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Lake County School Board finding that the employment of the Respondent, Latonya Chavous, be terminated for just cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Latonya Chavous 136 Desiree Aurora Street Winter Garden, Florida 34787 Dr. Susan Moxley, Superintendent Lake County Schools 201 West Burleigh Boulevard Tavares, Florida 32778-2496 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) when she submitted the DROP paperwork to her employer, but that paperwork was not submitted to Respondent within the timeframe set forth by statute or administrative rule. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 10, 2021, Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (the Division), issued a letter to Petitioner, Celeste Lyons (Ms. Lyons or Petitioner), denying her application to participate in DROP because the Division did not receive her application to participate within the required time, pursuant to section 121.091(13)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2020), and no provision in Florida law would allow the Division to approve her for participation in DROP after the eligibility period.1 On April 7, 2021, Ms. Lyons filed an Amended Request for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Division. The Division transferred the matter to DOAH, where it was assigned and set for hearing. On June 28, 2021, Petitioner moved to amend her Request after discovering the Division was also relying on Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-11.002(2) and (3)(a) to deny her participation in DROP. Petitioner was granted leave to amend her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, and this matter proceeded on the Second Amended Request for Formal Hearing submitted July 13, 2021 (Second Am. Req.). After three continuances, the final hearing was held on September 16, 2021. Petitioner presented her own testimony and the testimony of Kathy Gould, Bureau Chief of Retirement Calculations for the Division. Petitioner's Exhibits P1 through P34 and P36 were admitted into evidence. 1 All references to the Florida Administrative Code Rules and Florida Statutes are to the 2020 codifications. The Division presented the testimony of Garry Green, Policy Administrator for the Division. Respondent's Exhibits R2 through R5, R6-1, R6-2, R7, R10 through R13, R15, and R16 were admitted into evidence. At the outset of the hearing, the parties agreed to submit a joint stipulation of facts regarding the timeline of events. The Stipulation of Facts was filed on October 4, 2021, and is incorporated into this Recommended Order when appropriate. The Transcript of the hearing was filed on October 4, 2021. Both parties timely filed proposed recommended orders, which have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ms. Lyons, is a Fiscal Administrator for the Office of the State Attorney, Twentieth Judicial Circuit (SAO-20). Respondent, the Division, is a part of the Department of Management Services (Department). The Division is responsible for administering the retirement plans and programs under the Florida Retirement System (FRS). DROP is a retirement benefits program that entitles an eligible member of FRS to defer receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with the employer. § 121.091(13), Fla. Stat. The deferred benefits accrue with FRS on behalf of the member, with interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of DROP participation. Id. After the member terminates employment with the employer, the member receives the total DROP benefits and begins to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Id. SAO-20 has been Ms. Lyons' employer for more than thirty years. Employees of SAO-20 participate in FRS and, if eligible, can choose to participate in DROP. SAO-20 obtained administrative services through the Justice Administrative Commission (JAC). JAC is a statutorily created "central state office" that provides "administrative services and assistance when possible to and on behalf of the state attorneys and public defenders of Florida, the capital collateral regional counsel of Florida, the criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, and the Guardian Ad Litem Program." § 43.16(5), Fla. Stat. These services include accounting, payroll, benefits, and retirement assistance to the above cited entities that participate in FRS. Although JAC was not Ms. Lyons' employer, it did have access to employees' personnel files. Moreover, the Division had trained JAC personnel on FRS and DROP, and the Division authorized JAC to accept DROP paperwork from various employers and submit it to the Division. JAC, however, was not part of the Department or the Division. Rather, JAC served as a conduit between SAO-20's human resources office and the Division for the processing of all the retirement benefit paperwork. MS. LYONS' DROP ELIGIBILITY AND PAPERWORK Ms. Lyons' normal retirement date was January 1, 2020. Ms. Lyons' 12-month eligibility window to elect to participate in DROP was between January 1 and December 31, 2020. § 121.091(13)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Before this date, in February and August 2019, Ms. Lyons requested estimates of her retirement benefits from the Division. These estimates were generated by the Division and sent directly to Ms. Lyons' home address. In the "Comments" section of the estimates created by the Division, it explicitly states, "If the DP-ELE is not received in our office by 12/31/2020, your eligibility to participate in DROP is forfeited." The August 2019 estimate projected that after 60 months, Ms. Lyons would have received $113,826.03 if she entered (or began participation in) DROP during her first month of eligibility, January 2020. In January 2020, Ms. Lyons continued to work for SAO-20 but filled out the Division's paperwork for participating in DROP with the help of Rosemarie Mitchell, Director of Human Resources for SAO-20. These forms included the following: Notice of Election to Participate in [DROP] and Resignation of Employment (DP-ELE); Application for Service Retirement and [DROP] (DP-11); Option Selection for FRS Member (FRS-11o); [FRS] Pension Plan Spousal Acknowledgment Form (SA-1); and [FRS] Pension Plan Retired Member and DROP Participant Beneficiary Designation Form. (FST-12). On these forms, Ms. Lyons certified she elected to participate in DROP and would resign her employment on the date she terminated from DROP. Ms. Lyons listed "January 1, 2020," as her DROP start date and "December 31, 2024," as her DROP termination resignation date. Petitioner's employer, SAO-20, also certified that Ms. Lyons would "be enrolled as a DROP Participant" on January 1, 2020, and that Ms. Lyons would "terminate ... her employment" on December 31, 2024. All of the above forms were filled out, signed by Ms. Lyons, and notarized on January 9, 2020. On January 9, 2020, Ms. Lyons submitted the above forms to Ms. Mitchell. On that same day, Ms. Mitchell emailed Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the JAC Retirement Coordinator. Jessica Estes (formerly known as Jessica Liang), a Senior Human Resources Coordinator for JAC, acknowledged JAC's receipt of Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork and requested two new FST-12 forms and more documentation verifying Ms. Lyons' date of birth. The requested information was not required to be eligible or participate in DROP. Ms. Estes' normal procedure was to forward DROP paperwork to the Division before the end of the month in which it was received. If she had followed this practice, she should have sent in Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the Division on or before January 31, 2020. She did not. In fact, no one in SAO-20 or JAC forwarded Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the Division before December 31, 2020. This mistake was not discovered until more than a year later. On February 25, 2021, JAC discovered it had failed to submit the DROP paperwork for Ms. Lyons to the Division. On February 26, 2021, after JAC contacted the Division, Ms. Estes emailed Petitioner's DROP paperwork, including Forms DP-ELE and DP-11, to Kathy Gould, Chief of the Bureau of Retirement Calculations at the Division. Again, there is no dispute this was outside of Ms. Lyons' 12-month eligibility window. On March 5, 2021, SAO-20 notified Ms. Lyons of JAC's failure to submit her DROP paperwork to the Division within the eligibility period. On March 10, 2021, the Division issued an Administrative Notice to Ms. Lyons denying her participation in DROP and informing her that she was not eligible to participate in DROP because the application and election were received outside her 12-month eligibility window (and past the December 31, 2020, deadline). Relying on sections 121.091(13)(a)2. and 121.021(29)(a), the Division informed Ms. Lyons that a member must "submit a form DP-ELE ... to the Division ... within twelve months of the date you first bec[o]me eligible to participate," and because the Division "received [Ms. Lyons'] DP-ELE after the end of [her] eligibility period, [she was] not eligible to participate in DROP." The denial letter did not reference any administrative rule. The testimony established that the Division has accepted DROP paperwork after the eligibility period when there is a dispute about whether the paperwork has been received by the Division within the 12-month eligibility window. In these cases, the Division has, after an investigation, discovered that there was a technical mistake on the Division's end that prevented submission of the DROP paperwork within the statutory deadline. For example, in the past, the Division has accepted DROP paperwork as timely received when an FRS member submits DROP paperwork via facsimile, but it does not print out on the Division's end because of a technical issue; or where an email with DROP paperwork attached was sent by the member to the Division within the eligibility period, but did not upload or arrive in the Division's inbox until after the end of that period. That is not the case for Ms. Lyons. Her documentation was not sent to the Division within the statutory timeframe, and there was no technical (or human) error on the Division's end of the communication. Any error was on the part of JAC or SAO-20.
Conclusions For Petitioner: George T. Levesque, Esquire James Timothy Moore, Esquire Patrick Hagen, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Respondent: Gayla Grant, Esquire Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Whitney Rebecca Hays, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Celeste Lyons from participation in DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: George T. Levesque, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Patrick Hagen, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 James Timothy Moore, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Whitney Rebecca Hays, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kristen Larson, Interim General Counsel Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Marshall T. Hazlewood, was an employee of respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), from April 12, 1972 until July 14, 1983 at the Pinetta Toll Plaza in Satellite Beach, Florida. He served in the positions of toll collector, shift supervisor and manager I at that facility. In April, 1983 Hazlewood advised his supervisor that he would retire in July, 1983. By this time, Hazlewood had accumulated annual leave in excess of 240 hours, as well as an undisclosed amount of compensatory time and sick leave. His supervisor asked him not to use his annual leave in excess of 240 hours until July, or just prior to his retirement, because of a shortage of other personnel services (OPS) money for that fiscal year. In other words, if Hazlewood used his leave in April, May or June, the supervisor would necessarily have to use current fiscal year OPS funds to hire a temporary replacement. Hazlewood acquiesced and continued to work until June without taking annual leave. On June 16, 1983 Hazlewood put in an annual leave slip requesting annual leave (except for July 4, a holiday, and his personal holiday) from June 27 through July 14, 1983, his retirement date. This brought his total annual leave down to 238.50 hours as of the close of July 14, his date of retirement. The leave slip was approved by his supervisor and forwarded to the bureau chief in Tallahassee. He also spoke by telephone with the coordinator for the Tampa section and the assistant bureau chief in Tallahassee concerning his retirement. Whether he told them of his plans to use annual leave the last few weeks of employment was not disclosed. In any event, no one questioned his leave slip. When he retired on July 14, 1983 Hazlewood received his normal pay plus compensation for unused sick leave. He also received a warrant in the amount of $1,005.68 which represented compensation for 238.50 hours of unused annual leave. Because the pay system at DOT is computerized, and not manually checked until several weeks later, Hazlewood received his final pay without a hitch. Later on, after a manual review of his file was made, it was learned that Hazlewood's final pay had been improperly computed. DOT requested a return of the warrant, and apparently reissued a second warrant which was $324 less than the first. That prompted the instant proceeding. According to Rule 22A-8.10(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, promulgated by the Department of Administration (DOA), and which must be adhered to by DOT, an employee cannot be paid for leave after his "last official day of employment." An employee's last official day of employment is interpreted to mean when he is physically present on the job. The parties have stipulated that Hazlewood's last official day of employment was June 26, 1983, when he actually reported to work. The DOA also interprets the rule to prohibit the taking of annual leave in conjunction with an employee's separation from service. This includes the taking of such leave merely to use up sick leave or to bring one's total annual leave down to the maximum reimbursable amount of 240 hours. These interpretations were disseminated by DOT to all of its field offices, including the chief of toll facilities, as early as October, 1981, and are generally described on page 21 of the DOT Employee Handbook which Hazlewood had. They are also expressed in "Interpretation of Attendance and Leave Rules" issued by the DOA. After determining Hazlewood's last date of employment to be June 26, his balance of annual leave was properly reduced to 176 hours rather than 238.50 hours. This balance was arrived at by deducting those hours of leave improperly used during the pay period ending July 14, 1983, and for which he had already been paid, from the 240 maximum hours one can accumulate at date of retirement. The DOT accordingly reissued Hazlewood a check for 176 hours of unused leave, which was $324 less than the amount previously given to him. This was actually less than the amount DOT should have deducted, for it did not seek to recover excess payments during the two-week pay period ending June 30, 1983. Petitioner contends that because no one advised him that taking leave in the manner he did was improper, it is unfair to now penalize him for doing so. He also points out that his supervisor approved the leave slip and was the one who suggested he delay taking leave until July because of budgetary problems. He considers it morally wrong for DOT to treat him in the manner that it has. The DOT acknowledged that the leave slip was approved, but stated the supervisor was apparently unaware of existing Department policy. It contends that all non Tallahassee offices are periodically advised of personnel rules, and that the Hazlewood case was one of a few that sometimes occurs. After the Hazlewood error came to light, DOT issued another memorandum on September 1, 1983 to all personnel explaining the policy for leave time upon separation from service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Marshall T. Hazlewood to have reinstated $324 in payments for unused annual leave be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Marshall T. Hazlewood 333 McLeod Drive Cocoa, Florida 32922 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began working at Apalachee Correctional Institute (ACI) in 1993. ACI had about 1,600 to 1,800 inmates during times pertinent to this case. The inmates assigned to ACI are those found to be mentally disturbed. ACI is divided into the East Unit and the West Unit. Petitioner was hired as a Clerk Typist Specialist. She worked in the health services area performing typing and filing in the East Unit. In time Petitioner developed carpal tunnel syndrome. She had three surgeries, two of which involved her wrists. These medical problems prevented her from working a normal schedule and she had to expend her leave in order to cover her absences. Because of the problems with her wrists, she had, from time to time, difficulty typing without experiencing pain. Ann Lashley was employed in the West Unit. In 1995, she had a disagreement with her co-workers and, as a result, she was transferred to the East Unit. Subsequently, Petitioner was moved to the West Unit. Much of the work accomplished by the clerk-typists was related to transcribing psychiatrists' notes. The psychiatrists in the East Unit often typed their own notes. The psychiatrists in the West Unit did not. Therefore, there was more typing for the clerk-typists in the West Unit. Petitioner had difficulty keeping up with this additional typing. John Frank Williams was the overall supervisor of the East and West Units. He does not know, or in any event does not recall, why Petitioner was transferred. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim based on a date of accident of August 1, 1993. Petitioner's medical situation was coordinated with the Florida Division of Risk Management. A contract service, Compensation Rehabilitation Associates, was employed to audit Petitioner's work station and to determine what, if any, special equipment might assist Petitioner in accomplishing her employment duties without pain. A representative of Compensation Rehabilitation Associates opined that Petitioner required an ergonomically designed chair. Mr. Williams ordered one for her and Petitioner used it. Mr. Williams had work which had to be addressed. Nevertheless, he was aware of Petitioner's limitations and need to visit doctors and made diligent efforts to resolve the situation, including scheduling her work hours in a manner which would permit her to seek medical care. Petitioner related the following events which she contended constituted harassment: In 1994, when she first had problems with one of her wrists, she was told by Kenneth Swann to type with one hand. She was also told, at some time, by Dr. Cherry to type with one hand. She attended a meeting where Mr. Williams said, apparently in response to her continuing medical difficulties, that no one would want her. Joseph Thompson, at some point, told her she was not a team player. Dr. Loeb placed Petitioner at maximum medical improvement (MMI) on June 6, 1995 with no impairment or restrictions. Dr. Vogter placed the Petitioner at MMI on June 25, 1995, with an impairment rating of 17 percent, with restrictions of light duty and no continuous transcription work. Dr. Chason placed the Petitioner at MMI on April 7, 1998, with regard to psychological care, with a zero impairment rating. In a letter from Margaret Forehand dated August 12, 1996, a Personnel Technician II of ACI, Petitioner was informed that she was being placed on alternate duty. This letter outlined Petitioner's proposed work hours and took into consideration her need for reduced hours of typing and her need to visit her doctors. Petitioner, in response to this letter, declined to return to work. She had failed to report for work on August 15, 1996, and has been continuously absent since that date. Her sick leave was exhausted on October 4, 1996. Her Family Medical Leave Act benefits terminated on November 17, 1996. In a letter dated November 25, 1996, C. W. Sprouse, Superintendent of ACI, informed Petitioner that another position had been found for her and invited her to contact Ms. DeDe McMillian so that she could begin working. On or about December 10, 1996, Petitioner called Ms. McMillian and declined the offer. In a letter dated December 17, 1996, C.W. Sprouse informed Petitioner that a personnel action was being taken which could result in her dismissal. She was further informed that she was entitled to a predetermination conference. Petitioner did not request a predetermination conference and on January 3, 1997, her employment with ACI was terminated by Superintendent Sprouse. On May 26, 1998, a Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order adopting a stipulation between Petitioner, ACI, and the Florida Division of Risk Management whereby Petitioner received a lump sum of $50,000. The stipulation further recited that the stipulation resolved any and all issues regarding any aspect of the Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Bullard, Qualified Representative 805 Shelby Avenue Alford, Florida 32420 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, a former employee of the Respondent, was overpaid in the amount of $1,165.76, and should be required to repay that amount to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a career service employee of the Respondent and was initially employed on November 17, 1997. The Petitioner’s employment with the Respondent was terminated on June 30, 2003, due to layoffs created by the outsourcing of the Family Services Unit of the Respondent. The Petitioner’s annual rate of pay at the time of her termination was $19,797.44, paid bi-weekly. By letters dated August 26, 2003, October 14, 2003, and February 16, 2004, the Petitioner was informed that six separate salary overpayments had occurred. The Petitioner actually worked 56 hours during the pay period of June 20, 2003 through July 3, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The Petitioner was inadvertently paid for working the days of July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, although her employment had been terminated effective June 30, 2003. The overpayment was for 24 hours, amounting to $183.79, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. The Petitioner was no longer employed by the Respondent during the pay period of July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The overpayment amounted to $601.70, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. Following termination of employment, the Respondent’s Human Resources Department conducted an audit of the terminated employee’s leave. An audit was performed by the Respondent concerning the Petitioner’s leave. In the course and scope of the Respondent performing the audit of the Petitioner’s leave, the Respondent discovered that the Petitioner had been overpaid for four pay periods in 2003. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages in sick leave. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has either sick leave or annual leave remaining, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time becomes “leave without pay.” The Petitioner was overpaid in four separate pay periods when she had insufficient sick or annual leave as follows: 1/31/03-2/13/03: 16.50 hours 4/11/03-4/24/03: 22.75 hours 4/25/03-5/08/03: 4.25 hours 5/23/03-6/05/03: 4.75 hours The sum of the hours of overpayment is 48.25, which translates to the amount of $380.27 in overpayment to the Petitioner for the referenced pay periods. The total amount of the Respondent’s overpayment to the Petitioner, based upon the salary payments for July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, July 4 through 17, 2003, and the four pay periods in which the Petitioner was overpaid when her sick and annual leave had run out is $183.79 plus $601.70 plus $380.27, which totals $1,165.76. The Petitioner was not at fault for the overpayment. She did not falsify her leave reports or timesheets, nor was she accused by the Respondent of having done so. The Petitioner believed that the pay she received for July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, was severance pay since she had been terminated when her position had been eliminated. The Respondent does not issue severance pay to terminated employees. The Petitioner believes that some of the leave she had taken during the four pay periods when her sick and annual leave had run out should have been considered administrative leave which, according to the Respondent, was offered to employees in the Family Services Unit who were facing termination as an aid to finding new jobs. Administrative leave was available to employees whose positions were being eliminated to allow them to use the Internet while at the office to search for jobs, and to leave the office for interviews or any testing required for re- employment. The Petitioner failed to document leave time, if any, during the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, that she took for purposes of job testing or interviews. The Petitioner failed to properly designate administrative leave on the automated leave system, Time Direct, for the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, even though, as a secretary specialist for the Respondent for seven years, her duties included keeping track of leave for the people in her work unit. The Respondent offered several of the Petitioner’s timesheets that reflect the Petitioner’s having taken administrative leave on more than 30 occasions from October 2002 through May 2003. These time entries for administrative leave include time during each of the four pay periods at issue in this proceeding, January 31, 2003 through February 13, 2003, April 11, 2003 through April 24, 2003, April 25, 2003 through May 8, 2003, and May 23, 2003 through June 5, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order requiring the Petitioner to repay the Respondent $1,165.76. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosanna Boyd Apartment 162 3400 Townsend Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32277 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700