The Issue Whether Saxon Business Products, Inc.'s ("Saxon") response to the Department of General Services' invitation to bid for walk-up convenience copiers should be disqualified on grounds that: Saxon's omission of a supply price list was a material deviation from the bid specifications and conditions; and Saxon's walk-up convenience copier, model "Saxon 300," failed to prove two-sided copy capability.
Findings Of Fact I. Invitation to Bid On June 10, 1981, DGS issued invitation to Bid No. 544-600-38-B ("ITB") entitled, "Walk-Up Convenience Copiers; Bond Paper and Magazine Finish Bond Paper." The ITB proposes an annual contract under which state agencies and institutions can purchase copying machines. It contains general and special conditions and specifications, and warns vendors that bids that do not comply with such conditions "are subject to rejection." (Testimony of Celnik) The ITB specifications divide copiers into two groups: Group I, plain bond copiers, Group II, magazine finish copiers. The copiers are further categorized by type: Type I indicates minimum features; Type II indicates two- sided copying capability; Type III indicates one reduction capability; and Type IV indicates two or more reduction capabilities. These types are further separated into 12 classes on the basis of speed and volume (P-1.) The ITB special conditions instruct bidders to submit bid sheets 2/ breaking down all copying costs to a per-copy basis. Bids are to be evaluated and contracts awarded to bidders submitting the, lowest cost per copy in each category of copier. Cost per copy is calculated by using a specific cost formula. (P-1.) The ITB cost formula contains three components: machine cost, labor cost, and supply cost. DGS proposes to disqualify Saxon's bid in several categories of copiers for failure to supply a supply price list required by the supply cost component. This component provides, in relevant part: C) SUPPLY COST - The bidder shall compute supply costs on the Manufacturer's Brand. If there is an existing state con- tract for supplies for the manufacturer's brand equipment, the state contract price may be substituted. Supply costs will be rounded to six (6) decimal points. All other costs will also be rounded off to six (6) decimal points. The volume price used by the vendor to compute supply cost shall be based on the monthly median vol- ume of the type and class being bid. Supply cost submitted shall be firm for the contract period, except for paper, and all supply costs shall be current market price, verifiable. Vendor must submit supply price lists with his bid to substantiate that correct price vol- umes were used, unless state contract prices were used. A contract award may include supplies if deemed in the best interest of the State. By electing to substitute state contract supplies, the vendor is certifying that his equipment, using said supplies, will meet all per- formance requirements of this bid and of the equipment manufacturer. NOTE - All cost formulas will be verified by the Division of Purchasing and errors in extension will be corrected. In the event incorrect supply cost volumes are used by a bidder, the Division of Purchas- ing will adjust these costs to the median volume range. (e.s.)(P-1.) The purpose of the supply price list requirement, included in DGS's 1980 and 1981 ITB for convenience copiers, is to enable DGS to verify the supply cost figures shown on a vendor's bid sheets; in this way, DGS can insure that all vendors are using correct quantity pricing on their bid sheets. 3/ (In the past, some bidders had used lower supply prices, which were tied to high volume purchases; but those volumes frequently exceeded the state's needs and the median volumes specified by the ITB for each category of copier.) The verification procedure followed by DGS in both 1980 and 1981 involves checking the vendor's bid sheets against the prices shown on the supply price list. 4/ If DGS finds an inconsistency between the two, it "corrects" the bid sheet supply cost upward or downward to reflect the price shown on the supply price list. 5/ Such a bid sheet correction would also change the total median cost per copy, the factor used to evaluate competing bids. DGS also checks the supply list to determine whether it contains current market prices. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) If a vendor fails to submit a supply price list, DGS cannot verify that the supply prices used on the bid sheet (to compute total median cost per copy) accurately reflect the median volumes specified in the ITB. Neither can DGS determine whether the supply prices used on the bid sheet are set prices, which do not vary with volume, or volume prices, which do; the bid sheets, on their face, do not reveal which type of pricing is being used. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-1.) After sealed bids are publicly opened, DGS has an established practice of not allowing any bidder to submit additional material which could alter price or other information previously submitted on bid sheets. DGS does, however, accept late information if it can be corroborated by an independent source. For example, a bidder might -- after bid opening -- supply its corporate charter number, which can be easily verified by contacting the Department of State. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) The ITB special conditions also require DGS to test and approve copiers prior to bid opening. Copiers which are not tested and accepted by DGS are ineligible for a contract award: EQUIPMENT APPROVAL - Each item of equipment bid shall have been tested by the Division of Purchasing prior to the bid opening time and date for performance and reliability under normal working con- ditions. Any bidder whose equipment has not been tested shall provide a model of the equipment on which he intends to bid to a specified testing station, complete with all supplies, at no expense to the State. Testing will extend for a period of twenty (20) working days. In the event evaluation and acceptance of untested ma- chines has not been accomplished prior to the bid opening date and time, such machine shall not be eligible for an award. (P-1.) II. Bid Opening: Saxon's Failure to Submit Supply Price List Prior to the 1981 bid opening, Saxon failed to submit a supply price list in connection with its bid. This was apparently an oversight on its part; a year earlier, it had furnished a supply price list in response to a similar ITB for convenience copiers. Because of Saxon's omission, DGS was unable to verify the supply prices used by Saxon on its bid sheets or determine whether Saxon was utilizing set or volume prices. (Testimony of Eberhard, Celnik, Hittinger.) After bid opening, Saxon notified DGS that the supply prices shown on its bid sheets were set supply prices -- unit prices which do not vary with volume -- and confirmed that they are the supply prices which it now offers to the state. (Testimony of Celnik.) In its evaluation of the bids, DGS applied the requirement of a supply price list equally to all bidders. All bidders who omitted a supply price list were informed that they were disqualified. Saxon's bid was disqualified in five copier categories: Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II. At least 11 vendors, however, did submit supply price lists with their bid sheets; approximately one-third were set price lists, the remaining were volume price lists. (Testimony of Eberhard; P-3.) If a vendor could submit a supply price list after the bid opening, it could effectively decrease or increase its bid. (This is so because, in case of a conflict between the bid sheet supply price and the supply price list, the price list value will prevail. A change in the bid sheet supply price will change the cost per copy figure the determining factor in awarding contracts.) A vendor submitting a late supply price list would have an unfair advantage since it could change its bid after bid opening while its competitors could not. The competitive nature of the bidding process would be impaired. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) Furthermore, if late submittal of a supply price list was allowed, a bidder could disqualify itself by refusing to provide it; the bidder would then have the advantage of revisiting its bid and -- if it chose -- withdrawing it after bid opening. The opportunity to withdraw a bid -- after bid opening -- would be an advantage not enjoyed by those who timely submitted supply price lists with their bids. (Testimony of Hittinger, Eberhard.) In some copier categories, the vendors who omitted supply price lists were the low bidders. If DGS disqualifies them for their omission, it must award the contract to the next highest bidder. The difference between those low bids and the next higher bid is substantial -- in some cases exceeding 23 percent. 6/ (Testimony of Celnik, Eberhard, Nee, Reinhart.) III. Failure of "Saxon 300" to Demonstrate Two-Sided Copying Capability In accordance with the ITB, Saxon submitted its "Saxon 300" copier to DGS for evaluation and testing. Prior to bid opening, DGS conducted a 20-day test of the machine. The "Saxon 300" machine which DGS tested lacked two-sided copying capability. It could reproduce clearly on one side, but not on the other. The "Saxon 300" sales literature and instruction manual submitted with the machine did not represent that the machine had two-sided copying capability. (Testimony of Nee; 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, R-2.) The "Saxon 300" may have two-sided copying capability, but only after special modifications are made to the copier. These modifications include removal of a roller device, replacement of the heating element, and replacement of the blower system. Saxon did not indicate at the time of testing, or in its bid, that the "Saxon 300" required such modification for two-sided copying capability. Neither did it indicate what, if any, additional costs would be charged for such modifications. (Testimony of Nee, Wallace; R-3.) After DGS tested the "Saxon 300," it sent Saxon a form letter indicating that the copier met minimum operating requirements. The letter did not inform Saxon that the machine lacked two-sided copying capability because DGS did not consider the lack of such capability a major malfunction in the equipment. (Testimony of Nee.) If a machine malfunctions, DGS has -- in the past -- allowed vendors to correct the deficiency or substitute another machine. (Testimony of Nee.) The Group I, Type II, Class I category of copiers, requires two-sided copying capability. Saxon bid its "Saxon 300" as a copier which meets this requirement. (Testimony of Celnik, Nee; P-1.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Saxon's bids in Group I, Type I, Class I; Group I, Type I, Class II; Group I, Type I, Class IV; Group I, Type II, Class I; and Group I, Type II, Class II be disqualified; and That Saxon's bid in Group I, Type II, Class I be disqualified. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1982.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Did the Respondent, Alix Aldonis (Mr. Aldonis), commit fraud; misrepresentation; concealment; false promises; false pretense; dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence; or breach of trust in a business transaction by: (a) misrepresenting the sales price of real estate in a sale and purchase contract, (b) misrepresenting a commission amount in a sales and purchase contract, and (c) misrepresenting receipt by an escrow agent of a $5,000 deposit? Did Mr. Aldonis fail to obtain and retain written confirmation from the escrow agent of delivery of the Buyer's funds for purchase of the property?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the State of Florida, under the authority of section 20.165, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). At all times material to this proceeding, the Department licensed Mr. Aldonis as a State of Florida real estate sales associate. He holds License Number SL-3117116, which is in effect until March 31, 2011. At all times material to this proceeding, Total Stop, Inc., d/b/a Total Stop Real Estate (Total Stop Real Estate), contracted with Mr. Aldonis to affiliate with it as a sales associate. At all times material to this proceeding, Lawrence Ligonde, of Total Stop Real Estate, was the licensed real estate broker with whom Mr. Aldonis was affiliated. Mr. Ligonde did not employ Mr. Aldonis. Currently, Mr. Aldonis is affiliated with Tropical Springs Realty, Inc. The agreement between Mr. Aldonis and Total Stop Real Estate did not provide for Total Stop Real Estate or Mr. Ligonde's receiving a percentage commission based on the price of sales that Mr. Aldonis made. Mr. Aldonis paid a flat fee of $495 to be affiliated with Mr. Ligonde. In 2006, Joseph Phen and Cheryl Phen listed a home that they owned, located at 3500 S.W. Viceroy Street, Port St. Lucie, Florida, for sale. They listed the property for $330,000. Ms. Phen was a real estate sales broker. She was the listing agent for the property. Mr. Aldonis represented a buyer in the sale of the Viceroy Street property. The buyer, Manuela Celestin, signed a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract for the property on August 2, 2006. Mr. and Ms. Phen signed the contract on August 3, 2006. They also initialed each page. The contract set forth a purchase price of $272,000. The contract also indicated that the buyer was providing a $5,000 deposit. Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of the contract and a copy of a deposit check by facsimile transmission. The record does not reveal the sequence of contract signing, contract transmission, check transmission, the date of the check transmission, or whether the contract was transmitted more than once to Ms. Phen. Due to conversations with Ms. Augustine at Premier Choice Title & Escrow, the escrow agent identified in the contract, Ms. Phen grew concerned about whether the deposit had been placed in escrow. She spoke to Ms. Augustine about her concerns. Ms. Phen also told Mr. Aldonis she was concerned that the deposit check may not have been deposited in an escrow account. After the conversation, Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of a check payable to Total Stop Real Estate from Charassard & Associates, P.A., for $5,000. "Phen/Celestin" is written in the "Memo" section of the check. The check bears the date August 6, 2006. Persuasive evidence does not establish if this was a copy of a second check or another copy of the check Mr. Aldonis transmitted earlier. Ms. Phen requested and received a copy of the Residential Sale and Purchase contract from the title company. The first page of this copy listed the sale price as $330,000. Although Ms. Phen testified about two HUD closing statements, the Department did not offer a copy of a HUD closing statement into evidence. The sale of the property occurred. The closing sale price was $272,000. The Department entered a second copy of the contract signed by the Phens and Ms. Celestin into evidence. The first page of the second contract reflected a sales price of $330,000. The initials at the bottom of the first page are not the initials of the Phens. The rest of the contract is identical to the contract signed by the Phens on August 3, 2006. Nothing in either contract provides for a four percent commission to be paid to any person or entity. There is no persuasive evidence indicating who created the second contract or how the title company obtained it. Mr. Ligonde testified that the contract with the higher purchase price "looks like" the one Mr. Aldonis provided him. The contracts "look" the same. Only a very close examination would identify the differences in the initials on the first page. The difference in amounts is more obvious, but it still requires a reading of the contract, not just looking at it, to note the different amount. Mr. Ligonde did not testify that the second contract entered into evidence came from his files. He also did not provide any information about how files are maintained at his business or who has access to them. He did not know when the contract arrived at his office or how. In addition, Mr. Ligonde's statement that a document "looks like" one provided him by Mr. Aldonis does not equate to testimony that the document is in fact the document Mr. Aldonis provided. At some point in the transaction, the employees of Mr. Ligonde's office, the employees of a title insurance company, and the employees of a mortgage broker had possession and control of the sales contract or a copy of it. The Department did not present credible, persuasive evidence that ruled out any of those individuals having created the new page one with the $330,000 sales price.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S John D. C. Newton, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and Title 61J2, Florida Administrative Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Gerry Sullivan & Associates Realty, Inc., was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0215569 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued for that corporation was at the address of 7169 West Broward Boulevard, Plantation, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0086238 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was the qualifying broker and office manager of the corporate Respondent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Jim Sullivan and Pamela Sullivan were real estate salespersons in the State of Florida and employed by the corporate Respondent. Jim Sullivan is the son of Geraldine R. Sullivan and the husband of Pamela Sullivan. On June 16, 1997, Elaine P. Martin entered into a listing agreement with the corporate Respondent to sell her condominium for the price of $32,900. The listing agreement provided for the seller (Ms. Martin) to pay a brokerage commission of 6% that would be reduced to 5% if Jim Sullivan or Pamela Sullivan found the buyer without the involvement of another broker. The listing agreement also provided that Ms. Martin would pay a processing fee in the amount of $150.1 The listing agreement did not refer to a transaction fee.2 Ms. Martin did not agree to pay any fees other than the commission and the processing fee. In 1996, the corporate Respondent began a practice of charging sellers in certain transactions a fee, referred to as a transaction fee, that was in addition to the processing fee and the commission. The transaction fee was used by the salesperson to pay the salesperson's "facilitator," a person employed by the salesperson to run errands to facilitate the closing of the transaction. Examples of the type errands performed by the facilitator included meeting persons at the property to perform inspections and delivering documents. The practice of charging a transaction fee was not uncommon in Broward County, but it was not standard practice. Whether a particular seller would be charged a transaction fee depended, in part, on the listing salesperson. Typically, if a salesperson employed by the corporate Respondent did not us a facilitator, no transaction fee would be charged. The minutes of the Florida Real Estate Commission for July 16-17, 1996, contain the following entry: It was decided that as long as there is disclosure to all parties involved, the transaction fees indicated on closing statements is not a violation of F.S. 475. The customary practice of the corporate Respondent in June of 1997 was for its salesperson to complete a "net sheet" at the time the listing agreement is executed. The "net sheet" is a good faith estimate of the seller's expenses and reflects the estimated amount the seller will net from the transaction. The evidence established that Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, and Pamela Sullivan could not locate in the Martin file a net sheet was prepared on or about the time Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement on June 16, 1997. From that evidence, and from the testimony of Ms. Martin, it is found that Jim Sullivan did not complete a net sheet when he and Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement. The listing agreement created a principal/agent relationship between Ms. Martin, as the seller, and the corporate Respondent, as the agent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the corporate Respondent and Geraldine R. Sullivan, as the qualifying broker of the corporate Respondent, were the agents of Ms. Martin and owed her the fiduciary duties of an agent. In connection with the subject listing agreement, Ms. Martin executed an Agency Disclosure Statement which set forth the fiduciary duties owed by the agent to the principal, in pertinent part, as being the ". . . fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality, obedience, full disclosure, accounting and the duty to use skill, care and diligence." In addition, the statement set forth that the agent owed the duty of honesty and fair dealing.3 A buyer working through another real estate broker made an offer to purchase the Martin property for the sum of $30,000. The offer, dated June 22, 1997, was presented to Ms. Martin by Pamela Sullivan. Because another real estate broker was involved, the real estate commission was based on 6% of the sales price. On June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan discussed the offer with Ms. Martin by telephone and informed her, for the first time, of the transaction fee. Later that day, Pamela Sullivan and Ms. Martin met and Pamela Sullivan prepared a "net sheet" that reflected the seller's estimated closing costs. The transaction fee in the amount of $3004 was reflected on the net sheet as an expense of the seller. As of June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan knew or should have known that the file on the Martin transaction maintained by her office did not contain a net sheet that was executed at the same time the listing agreement was executed. Prior to signing the contract or the net sheet on June 22, 1997, Ms. Martin placed a question mark next to the line on which the transaction fee was disclosed. Ms. Martin questioned the charge because she did not understand what was being done to earn that fee. Ms. Martin did not accept the explanations Pamela Sullivan gave for the transaction fee. Ms. Martin thereafter had Pamela Sullivan insert the following as a special condition of the contract: The seller reserves the right to have her attorney review the contract at his earliest opportunity. After the special condition was signed, Ms. Martin signed the contract and the net sheet. The net sheet was intended to be informational. By signing the net sheet, Ms. Martin did not intend to agree to pay the $300 transaction fee. Ms. Martin did not agree in writing or verbally to pay the transaction fee. Between June 22 and June 25, 1997, Pamela Sullivan, on behalf of the corporate Respondent, reduced the amount of the claimed transaction fee from $300 to $200. Following the execution of the Sales Contract, Ms. Martin had her attorney review the contract and the net sheet. Ms. Martin informed her attorney by memo dated June 25, 1997, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . We disputed the Transaction Fee of $300.00 and Century 21 lowered it to $200. We asked Pam Sullivan for a break down (sic) on the $200.00 cost. She refused to provide any; stated it was the cost of doing business. Since the housing prices in Broward County have not increased, they charge this extra fee along with their normal commission. . . . Ms. Martin sent a copy of her memo to Pamela Sullivan. Ms. Martin's attorney accepted the sales contract without any changes and informed her that he would address the issue of the transaction fee at the time of the closing. On the day of the closing, Ms. Martin's attorney telephoned Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, to discuss the transaction fee. Geraldine R. Sullivan would not agree to waive the transaction fee after she learned that there was a signed net sheet. She did not realize that there was no net sheet prepared when the listing agreement was first executed. This was the only direct dealing Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, had with this transaction. Between June 25, 1997, the date of Ms. Martin's memo, and July 7, 1997, the date of the closing, neither Ms. Martin nor her attorney voiced additional objection to the transaction fee.5 The transaction closed on July 7, 1997. The sum of $200, representing the amount of the disputed transaction fee, was placed in escrow by the closing agent, where it remained at the time of the formal hearing. All other fees and costs were paid at closing, including a brokerage commission of $1,800 (which was split with the realtor representing the buyer) and a processing fee of $150 (which was retained by the corporate Respondent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered that finds the corporate Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and finds Geraldine R. Sullivan not guilty of that charge. It is further RECOMMENDED that the corporate Respondent be reprimanded and fined in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1998
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been employed in the securities industry since approximately 1957. He has worked for a number of broker/dealers over the years and is familiar with the procedures involved in transferring employment from one broker to another. It is the custom in the securities industry that when a securities salesperson changes employment, forms U-4 and U-5 are filed with the National Association of Securities Dealers. As registration is approved by that organization and by the various states involved, the states give that information to the National Association of Securities Dealers, which in turn gives that information to the securities firm which employs the associated person seeking registration, and that brokerage firm in turn notifies the applicant. Respondent began to work at Alison Baer Securities, Inc., in September, 1988, and remained employed there until February, 1989. When he associated himself with Alison Baer, Respondent applied for registration as an associated person with that company. As is the proper procedure, he submitted a U to the National Association of Securities Dealers. While waiting for his registration to be approved, Respondent maintained telephone and personal contact with his own clients. He did not, however, sell or offer to sell securities until after he was sure his registration was approved. Respondent's application for registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities, Inc., was approved by the National Association of Securities Dealers and was also approved by the states of New York, Texas, Georgia, Florida, and Oklahoma. In late October of 1988, Jeffrey Britz, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Alison Baer Securities, told Respondent that his registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities had been approved by the state of Florida. In fact, Respondent was not registered as an associated person by the state of Florida until December 7, 1988. Respondent did not attempt to directly confirm with the Department of Banking and Finance his registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities. Respondent has applied for registration with the Department as an associated person with Shamrock Partners, Ltd. The Department denied that application based solely on the allegations which are the subject matter of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause, and granting his application for registration with the Department as an associated person with Shamrock Partners, Ltd. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 27 has been adopted in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5, 11-14, 16-18, 23- 26, 28, 29, and 31-34 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 6-10, 15, 19, and 30 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved in this proceeding. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 20-22 have been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 211 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Richard Doggett, Esquire 808 Northeast 3rd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0521991. Respondent's last license issued was as a broker c/o Stellings Realty, Inc., 2368 Saratoga Bay Drive, West Palm Beach, Florida. Beginning on or about March 1, 1998, until August 31, 1998, Respondent had an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement (Agreement) with Judy Cominse (Seller) for real property, owned by the Seller, located at 4397-B Woodstock Drive, West Palm Beach, Florida. Respondent represented the Seller as a transaction broker and owed her certain duties pursuant thereto. A Brokerage Relationship Disclosure statement was provided to the Seller by Respondent. Another broker, Robert Berman, was the referring agent and was personally known by the Seller. Respondent was of the opinion that Berman was to receive a referral fee of 25 per cent in the event of a sale. The listing was problematic for Respondent. Respondent encountered problems due to restrictions placed on the showing of the property by the Seller and her tenants, who were the Seller's son and daughter-in-law. Respondent contemplated not continuing with the listing. He even mentioned discontinuing the listing with the Seller, but he did not discontinue it. A contract for sale of the Seller's property was entered into by the Seller and Evelyn Swinton (Buyer Swinton). Buyer Swinton signed the contract on June 1, 1998, and the Seller signed it on June 3, 1998. The contract provided, among other things, for an escrow deposit of $1,500 to be held by Sun Title, located in Lake Worth, Florida. The $1,500 was paid and held in escrow by Sun Title. The transaction for the sale of Seller's property failed to close. By a Release and Cancellation of Contract for Sale and Purchase form (Release and Cancellation) dated July 28, 1998,1 both the Seller and Buyer Swinton agreed, among other things, that the $1,500 escrow deposit would be disbursed to the Seller. On July 30, 1998, Sun Title prepared an escrow check in the amount of $1,500, made payable solely to the Seller. The check was forwarded to Respondent sometime after July 30, 1998; the evidence presented was insufficient to show when Sun Title forwarded the check to Respondent.2 On August 6, 1998, Respondent prepared an addendum (Respondent's Addendum) to the Agreement that he had with the Seller. Respondent's Addendum was dated and signed by Respondent on this same date. Respondent's Addendum provided, among other things, the following: This contract [Agreement] will be extended from August 31, 1998 until March 1, 1999; if necessary.3 * * * Stellings Realty, Inc. will receive 7% of the total purchase price. In addition 25% commission of the listing side will be given to Berman Realty as a referral fee. If the Seller should cancel this listing the cancelation fee would be $1000.00. Judy Cominse [Seller] will receive $1500.00 by mail upon acceptance. Paragraph numbered 5 of Respondent's Addendum indicates that, upon the Seller accepting Respondent's Addendum, the Seller will receive $1,500, which was the escrow deposit, by mail. The Seller did not accept Respondent's Addendum although the Seller was of the opinion that the only way for her to obtain the $1,500 was to agree to an addendum to the contract that she had with Respondent. With the assistance of her sister, who was a licensee, licensed by Petitioner,4 the Seller negotiated a change of terms to Respondent's Addendum. The seller prepared and executed an addendum (Seller's Addendum) on August 6, 1998, and forwarded it to Respondent. The Seller's Addendum provided, among other things, the following: This listing agreement [Agreement] will be extended six months (i.e., from August 31, 1998 until February 28, 1999). * * * Stellings Realty, Inc. will receive 7% of the total selling price (if sold at full listing price), otherwise negotiable; however, no lower than 6%. Additionally, $533.75 to the listing agency (Stellings Realty), which amount will not be subject to the referral fee due and payable to Robert A. Berman Real Estate, the referring broker to the listing agency. If the seller should cancel this listing, the cancellation fee would be $788.75 ($250.00 cancellation fee, plus $533.75). Judy Cominse [Seller] will receive $1,500.00 (100% of the escrow deposit relinquished by the buyer [Buyer Swinton]) by mail upon acceptance. Paragraph 5 of Seller's Addendum indicates that, upon Respondent's accepting the Seller's Addendum, the Seller will receive $1,500, which was the escrow deposit, by mail. Respondent executed the Seller's Addendum on August 11, 1998, and faxed it to her on this same date. Respondent accepted the Seller's Addendum on August 11, 1998. Prior to August 11, 1998, Berman had contacted Respondent on behalf of the Seller. Berman was requested by the Seller to make an attempt to obtain the escrow deposit of $1,500 for her. Berman contacted Respondent who indicated to Berman that, as soon as the escrow check was received, he would contact Berman. Sometime after July 30, 1998, Berman contacted Sun Title and was informed that the escrow check had been prepared and forwarded to Respondent. On or about August 11, 1998, Respondent contacted the Seller and informed her that the escrow check had been received by him. On or about August 11, 1998, Respondent also contacted Berman regarding the receipt of the escrow check. At the request of the Seller, Berman went to Respondent's office, obtained the escrow check, and forwarded it to the Seller via express delivery. Based upon the required proof, the evidence fails to demonstrate that Respondent refused to relinquish the $1,500 escrow deposit to the Seller in order to force or pressure the Seller to agree to an addendum to their Agreement. Respondent continued to represent the Seller. The Seller's property was sold on November 3, 1998. Subsequently, Respondent sued the Seller in the County Court of West Palm Beach, Florida for $533.75, based on the Seller's Addendum. The Seller had refused to pay Respondent the $533.75, pursuant to the Seller's Addendum, and Respondent sued the Seller to recoup the monies. On or about January 4, 1999, the court suit was settled. Before the end of 1998, Respondent paid Berman the referral fee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate enter a final order and therein dismiss the Administrative Complaint filed against Leon Stellings. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction contrary to Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and Whether, if the above allegations are proven, the Respondent is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest or untruthful that the money, property transactions and rights of investors or others with whom he may sustain a confidential relation may not be entrusted to him by virtue of a second violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, contrary to Section 475.42(1)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert E. McMillan, III, is and was at all times material to the administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker holding license number 0317361. The Commission is charged under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, with regulation of real estate brokers and salesmen. The Respondent was previously disciplined by the Commission by a Final Order dated September 2, 1992 in which the Commission found the Respondent guilty of violation of Sections 475.25(1)(b),(e),(k), and 475.42(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Dr. Manuel S. Couto and his wife desired to have a home built on Block 2, Lot 12 Marineland Acres, 1st Addition, Plat Book 5, page 50. They approached Respondent's business, which was a construction and real estate development concern, and spoke with Randy Joyner, a salesman employed by the Respondent and the brother of the Respondent's late wife, who had sold the Coutos the lot. The Respondent offered to build a particular house for the Coutos for $50,000. The Coutos counteroffered to purchase the house for $30,000 cash and to convey to the Respondent two lots described in the contract as: Section 29A, Block 7, Lot 4, Palm Coast, Florida, and Section 29A, Block 7, Lot 5, Palm Coast, Florida. Dr. Couto bought Lot 4 for $3,900, and Lot 5 for $4,900; however, he paid a total, including interest, of $15,264.80 for the two lots. Palm Coast is a real estate development located in the western portion of Flagler County in which the Respondent's business was located, and he was not particularly familiar with the area in which the Coutos' lots were located. The Respondent accepted the counteroffer, above, upon the recommendation of Joyner. The Respondent believed the lots in question to be valued at $10,000 each. The Coutos paid the Respondent $30,000, and the Respondent began construction. Shortly after commencement of the project, it was determined that the Respondent would have to do considerable site work in order to install a septic tank. The costs of this work, $5,400, was paid by the Respondent, and Dr. Couto wrote the Respondent an additional check in the amount of $1,900. In addition, Dr. Couto made numerous changes to the plans which raised the costs of the construction for which he was obligated to pay under the contract. Work progressed on the project until the Respondent became aware that the lots which were to be transferred were not valued at $10,000. A dispute arose between the Respondent and the Coutos regarding the Coutos paying the difference between the value of the lots and $20,000. When the dispute went unresolved, the Respondent ceased work on the project. Thereafter, the Respondent again began work on the project because of Dr. Couto constant badgering; however, the underlying disagreement about the value of the lots was unresolved. The Respondent finished the house at a cost to him of $55,004.82, and the Coutos paid him $38,425. When the second lot at Palm Coast was to be transferred, it was arranged to have the Coutos transfer the lot directly to the new purchasers, with the money, $4,690.37, due to the Respondent to be held in escrow pending payment of the subcontractors and materialmen building the Coutos' house. Dr. Couto prepared an affidavit that all the contractors had been paid for the Respondent to sign. It is this affidavit dated January 16, 1992, which purports to bear the signature of the Respondent notarized by Martha B. Bennett, Notary Public. The Respondent denies that the document bears his signature, and asserts that Dr. Couto signed the affidavit. Dr. Couto states that he saw the Respondent sign it, and the Respondent's secretary notarize it. The authenticity of this document was put in question by Respondent's answer to the administrative complaint, and the notary was not called as a witness. Dr. Couto and his attorney had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain similar affidavits from the Respondent, who had refused to sign them. At the time the affidavit was prepared, Dr. Couto was aware that materialmen had not be paid. The purported purpose of the affidavit was to release the funds retained by the title company. However, it was Dr. Couto who prepared the affidavit, and it was not presented to the title company to obtain the release of the funds. The affidavit was retained by Dr. Couto, and presented to the title company in June 1992, by Dr. Couto together with letters from Respondent stating that he was not going to pay the subcontractors. Upon the affidavit and letters, the title company paid the $4,690.37 to Dr. Couto. Given the background of the affidavit, the contradictory testimony about its execution, and the absence of additional authentication, the signature of the Respondent is not accepted as genuine. In spring 1992, various materialmen and subcontractors filed liens on the house being built for the Coutos. In order to clear the title to his home, Dr. Couto had to settle with the lienholders and pay them $14,878.18. As stated above, Dr. Couto received the proceeds from the sale of the second lot, $4,690.37. Subsequently, the matter was brought to the attention of the state's attorney. The Respondent paid the Coutos $3,000 in cash, and the state's attorney dropped the case against the Respondent after handwriting analysis was completed on the affidavit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX The Petitioner submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of the findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 5,6 Paragraph 8,9,10 Paragraph 7 Rejected as contrary to better evidence, See Paragraph 13 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire 507 East Moody Boulevard Bunnell, Florida 32110 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction by misrepresenting that money he borrowed from a one Julie Couch would be used for the purchase of a lot but, instead, he utilized the money in connection with the purchase of a house for use by his family and for payment of other vacation and travel expenses and refuses to repay the loan, in a manner violative of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.3
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is a licensed real estate salesman and holds license number 0329068. On or about July 13, 1984, Respondent solicited and obtained $3,500 cash from Julie S. Couch (Couch) for the stated purpose of assisting Respondent in purchasing a lot on behalf of Keith and Beverly Rayburn, friends of the Couches. In connection therewith, Respondent executed and delivered to Couch a mortgage note dated July 13, 1984, to secure the $3,500 loan via certain real property owned by Respondent.4 Pursuant to the terms of the note executed by Respondent and given to Mrs. Couch, Respondent was to repay Couch the principal of $3,500 plus $1,000 interest due on or before July 27, 1984. On July 30, 1984, Respondent attempted to repay part of the loan via check dated July 30, 1984 drawn in the amount of $1,000. Respondent's check was returned unpaid by the Drawers Bank with the notification "insufficient funds." (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4) Thereafter, Respondent advised Mrs. Couch that the money was used to pay for his moving, vacation and other relocation costs for his family. Keith Rayburn attempted to buy property from the Respondent which was owned by Southern Standards Corporation. At no time during the attempted purchase by Keith Rayburn did Respondent offer to loan him money to purchase a lot from Southern Standards Corporation. Respondent executed and drafted the terms of the note which was given to Julie Couch which memorialized the loan from Mrs. Couch to Respondent. In this regard, Respondent contends that Julie Couch's ex-husband suggested the terms and the rate of interest which he inserted into the note which memorialized the loan from Julie Couch. On the other hand, Julie Couch testified that it was Respondent who suggested the terms and the interest which he provided with the executed note given her. Based on all of the evidence introduced herein including the fact that Respondent misrepresented the purpose for which the money would be utilized, and his failure to call Gary Couch as a witness to substantiate his claim that it was he, Gary Couch, who suggested the terms under which the loan would be made, the testimony of Julie Couch in this regard is credited.5 Respondent has repaid approximately $1,250 of the $3,500 loan from Julie Couch. Respondent, based on advice of his counsel, refuses to repay any further amounts on this loan contending that the interest rates were usurious and, further, that the State, in the person of Petitioner, is attempting to use its "strongarm tactics" to exact money from Respondent which is a usurious transaction. Respondent also contends that because the interest rate charged by Mrs. Couch was in excess of 45 percent per annum, Mrs. Couch committed a third degree felony. As previously stated, the weight of the evidence reveals that it was Respondent who drafted the note and provided the terms for repayment. It is also clear that Respondent misrepresented to Mrs. Couch the purpose for which he would utilize the money that he borrowed from her. It is therefore concluded that by such acts Respondent engaged in acts of misrepresentation, false pretenses, trick and dishonest dealing in a business transaction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the license of Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, be suspended for a period of one (1) year and that he be fined $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida.6 JAMES E. BRADWELL , Hearing officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488- 9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction, pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes(1983).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr. was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0402257. Respondent has since been issued a license as a real estate broker, same license number. Mr. and Mrs. Walther Ellis were the owners of certain property located on Windsor Road, Bonita Springs, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis listed their property for sale with Wesley Brodersen of Gulder Real Estate, Inc. in Bonita Springs, Florida. The Respondent was employed at Gulder Real Estate, Inc. during the time that the Ellises listed said property with Gulder Real Estate, Inc. On or about May 23, 1984, the Respondent solicited and obtained a Catherine A. Griffin as a prospective purchaser of the Ellis' property. Mrs. Griffin submitted a contract for sale and purchase, witnessed by Respondent, which contract for sale and purchase the Respondent in turn submitted to the Ellises. Pursuant to the terms of the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase, Mrs. Griffin had placed down a total deposit of $5,000.00. The Ellises rejected the terms of sale (offer) as expressed in the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase. Thereafter, Mrs. Griffin, as buyer, along with her husband, Donald Griffin, who is not a buyer in the transaction but was intimately involved in the negotiations, continued to express an interest in the property and the Ellises continued to express an interest to sell the property. In July, 1984, contract negotiations were once again begun and Mr. Griffin informed the Respondent what terms would be acceptable to his wife, Catherine A. Griffin. Mr. Griffin further requested that the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Ellis be obtained first on a new contract for sale and purchase setting out the terms he had dictated to Respondent. Somewhere during this time period, Mr. Griffin directed Respondent to have completed a survey of the property at the Griffins'expense. Respondent next communicated with Mr. Ellis and a new contract for sale and purchase was prepared by the Respondent and signed by Mr. Ellis personally and signed by Mr. Ellis for Mrs. Ellis with Mrs. Ellis' express consent and permission. Subsequent thereto, the Respondent brought the new contract for sale and purchase to the Griffins. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Griffin the Respondent presented the offer. Mr. Griffin immediately signed the new contract for sale and purchase in the presence of both Respondent and Mrs. Griffin on the line indicating he was signing as a witness to the buyer's signature/execution. However, as this contract (offer) was physically handed by Mr. Griffin to his wife for formal execution, it was further reviewed by Mr. Griffin, who became aware that the terms of purchase contained in the new contract for sale and purchase were not as he had dictated them to the Respondent. Mr. Griffin advised his wife not to accept the offer, instructed her not to sign, and, in fact, the new contract for sale and purchase was not signed or accepted by Mrs. Griffin. Respondent requested that the Griffins think about the offer for a while longer and they agreed to do so over an extended vacation. While the Griffins were on vacation, the Respondent, apparently believing the offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase would eventually be accepted, notified Mr. Ellis that the offer had already been accepted. Believing that the offer had been accepted by a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Ellis requested a copy of the signed contract. Due to the fact that the Respondent did not have a contract signed by a bona fide buyer (Catherine A. Griffin) but believing that one would be obtained in the very near future because Donald Griffin had signed the second contract and because Donald Griffin had indicated that he could finance the entire operation by himself, the Respondent caused a photo copy of the signature of Catherine A. Griffin to be placed onto the second contract without the permission , consent, or knowledge of either Donald Griffin or Catherine Griffin. The altered copy of the second contract is apparently no longer in existence and did not come into evidence. The only real point of contention in the parties' respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is concerning what representation was made by Respondent to Mr. Walther Ellis concerning who had accepted the second contract. Respondent admits he represented to Mr. Ellis that Mr. Griffin, controlling the transaction for buyers, had accepted the second contract. Mr. Ellis maintained that Respondent represented to him that the second contract had been accepted on his terms but he is not clear·whether Respondent told him Mrs. Griffin accepted it or who accepted it. (Walther Ellis Deposition Page 22). Mrs. Ellis's testimony presents no independent confirmation of any of this as her information in all respects is second-hand. Mr. Brodersen's testimony is that the Respondent's representation to him was that "the Griffins" had accepted the second contract for purchase and sale and that Respondent told Mr. Ellis the same thing in Brodersen's presence and also told Brodersen that the last copy of the signed contract had been mailed to Mr. Ellis by Respondent the day previous to this three-way conversation. Mr. Brodersen thought Mr. Ellis never got the fraudulent contract but testified further that Respondent later admitted to Brodersen that he had altered this copy of the second contract so as to fraudulently reflect Mrs. Griffin's signature and further admitted to Brodersen that he, Respondent, had mailed that fraudulent copy to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Brodersen never saw the fraudulent contract. Mr. Ellis testified to receiving in the mail a copy of the second contract with a suspicious-looking set of signatures which he turned over to his attorney. The parties stipulated the attorney does not now have the contract copy. By itself, the testimony of Investigator Jacobs that Respondent by telephone admitted falsifying Mrs. Griffin's signature onto a copy of the second contract for purchase and sale and further admitted destroying one copy of the fraudulent contract would fail as not having the proper predicate for voice identification. However, in light of Mr. Ellis's and Mr. Brodersen's testimony, Mr. Jacobs' testimony on Respondent's creation of the fraudulent document is accepted as corroborative pursuant to Section 120.58 Florida Statutes. The remainder of his testimony is rejected. At no time did Catherine A. Griffin and/or Donald Griffin as her agent or on his own behalf accept the Ellis' offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase nor did Catherine A. Griffin nor Donald Griffin ever execute the second contract as a buyer. The transaction was never closed and Mrs. Griffin was returned her deposit money when she requested it in September 1984. Mr. Ellis admits having told Respondent he was not anxious for the deal to close and did not care if the deal failed to go through. Mr. Griffin spoke at length and with considerable feeling at the hearing of his desire that Respondent not receive a permanent record as a result of a single mistake committed while under stress from Respondent's father's medical condition. That Respondent was under such stress when all this occurred was confirmed by Mr. Brodersen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered whereby Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr.'s licenses as a real estate salesman and broker be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Mitchell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Steffan Jr., Pro Se 18645 Sandpiper Road Ft. Myers, Florida Harold R. Huff, Director Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did the Respondents offer to sell a business opportunity without filing a disclosure statement with the Department and without providing prospective purchasers a disclosure statement at least three working days prior to the receipt of any consideration for the signing of a business opportunity contract contrary to Section 559.80, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact On March 5, 1994, Star Vision was in attendance at a trade show in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representatives, Bob James and Bill Bassett, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity as defined by Chapter 559, Part VIII, Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Star Vision offered to sell a business opportunity representing that one could become a "licensee" upon paying $600. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5) Star Vision had not file a copy of the required disclosure statement with the Department prior to making the offering above. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) Granhan and Bray were given a letter notifying them of the filing requirements together with a business opportunity registration package. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) On March 12,1994, Star Vision attended another trade show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representative, James R. Kelly, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Star Vision represented the following while offering to sell a business opportunity: The regular price of the opportunity was $1,495 but they were running a special of $495 for anyone signing up at the show; and Purchasers would receive training tapes and other training that teaches how to market and sell the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) The Department received a consumer complaint against STAR VISION from Mr. Alan Drake. Upon purchasing a business opportunity from Star Vision, Mr. Drake was provided with audio and video tapes which instruct purchasers how to sell and market the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1) Upon selling him a business opportunity, Star Vision did not provide Mr. Drake with a disclosure statement, and has never registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ordering that: Respondents to cease and desist selling business opportunities in the State of Florida, Imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 for each violation, in accordance with Section 559.813(2), Florida Statutes, against Terry Granhan and Mike Bray d/b/a Star Vision Direct Cable in the amount of $15,000. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay S. Levenstein, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Terry Granhan and Mike Bray Star Vision Direct Cable, Inc. 9050 Highway 64, Suite 115 Memphis, TN 38002 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
