The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and Title 61J2, Florida Administrative Code. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Gerry Sullivan & Associates Realty, Inc., was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0215569 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued for that corporation was at the address of 7169 West Broward Boulevard, Plantation, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0086238 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, was the qualifying broker and office manager of the corporate Respondent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Jim Sullivan and Pamela Sullivan were real estate salespersons in the State of Florida and employed by the corporate Respondent. Jim Sullivan is the son of Geraldine R. Sullivan and the husband of Pamela Sullivan. On June 16, 1997, Elaine P. Martin entered into a listing agreement with the corporate Respondent to sell her condominium for the price of $32,900. The listing agreement provided for the seller (Ms. Martin) to pay a brokerage commission of 6% that would be reduced to 5% if Jim Sullivan or Pamela Sullivan found the buyer without the involvement of another broker. The listing agreement also provided that Ms. Martin would pay a processing fee in the amount of $150.1 The listing agreement did not refer to a transaction fee.2 Ms. Martin did not agree to pay any fees other than the commission and the processing fee. In 1996, the corporate Respondent began a practice of charging sellers in certain transactions a fee, referred to as a transaction fee, that was in addition to the processing fee and the commission. The transaction fee was used by the salesperson to pay the salesperson's "facilitator," a person employed by the salesperson to run errands to facilitate the closing of the transaction. Examples of the type errands performed by the facilitator included meeting persons at the property to perform inspections and delivering documents. The practice of charging a transaction fee was not uncommon in Broward County, but it was not standard practice. Whether a particular seller would be charged a transaction fee depended, in part, on the listing salesperson. Typically, if a salesperson employed by the corporate Respondent did not us a facilitator, no transaction fee would be charged. The minutes of the Florida Real Estate Commission for July 16-17, 1996, contain the following entry: It was decided that as long as there is disclosure to all parties involved, the transaction fees indicated on closing statements is not a violation of F.S. 475. The customary practice of the corporate Respondent in June of 1997 was for its salesperson to complete a "net sheet" at the time the listing agreement is executed. The "net sheet" is a good faith estimate of the seller's expenses and reflects the estimated amount the seller will net from the transaction. The evidence established that Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, and Pamela Sullivan could not locate in the Martin file a net sheet was prepared on or about the time Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement on June 16, 1997. From that evidence, and from the testimony of Ms. Martin, it is found that Jim Sullivan did not complete a net sheet when he and Ms. Martin executed the listing agreement. The listing agreement created a principal/agent relationship between Ms. Martin, as the seller, and the corporate Respondent, as the agent. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the corporate Respondent and Geraldine R. Sullivan, as the qualifying broker of the corporate Respondent, were the agents of Ms. Martin and owed her the fiduciary duties of an agent. In connection with the subject listing agreement, Ms. Martin executed an Agency Disclosure Statement which set forth the fiduciary duties owed by the agent to the principal, in pertinent part, as being the ". . . fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality, obedience, full disclosure, accounting and the duty to use skill, care and diligence." In addition, the statement set forth that the agent owed the duty of honesty and fair dealing.3 A buyer working through another real estate broker made an offer to purchase the Martin property for the sum of $30,000. The offer, dated June 22, 1997, was presented to Ms. Martin by Pamela Sullivan. Because another real estate broker was involved, the real estate commission was based on 6% of the sales price. On June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan discussed the offer with Ms. Martin by telephone and informed her, for the first time, of the transaction fee. Later that day, Pamela Sullivan and Ms. Martin met and Pamela Sullivan prepared a "net sheet" that reflected the seller's estimated closing costs. The transaction fee in the amount of $3004 was reflected on the net sheet as an expense of the seller. As of June 22, 1997, Pamela Sullivan knew or should have known that the file on the Martin transaction maintained by her office did not contain a net sheet that was executed at the same time the listing agreement was executed. Prior to signing the contract or the net sheet on June 22, 1997, Ms. Martin placed a question mark next to the line on which the transaction fee was disclosed. Ms. Martin questioned the charge because she did not understand what was being done to earn that fee. Ms. Martin did not accept the explanations Pamela Sullivan gave for the transaction fee. Ms. Martin thereafter had Pamela Sullivan insert the following as a special condition of the contract: The seller reserves the right to have her attorney review the contract at his earliest opportunity. After the special condition was signed, Ms. Martin signed the contract and the net sheet. The net sheet was intended to be informational. By signing the net sheet, Ms. Martin did not intend to agree to pay the $300 transaction fee. Ms. Martin did not agree in writing or verbally to pay the transaction fee. Between June 22 and June 25, 1997, Pamela Sullivan, on behalf of the corporate Respondent, reduced the amount of the claimed transaction fee from $300 to $200. Following the execution of the Sales Contract, Ms. Martin had her attorney review the contract and the net sheet. Ms. Martin informed her attorney by memo dated June 25, 1997, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . We disputed the Transaction Fee of $300.00 and Century 21 lowered it to $200. We asked Pam Sullivan for a break down (sic) on the $200.00 cost. She refused to provide any; stated it was the cost of doing business. Since the housing prices in Broward County have not increased, they charge this extra fee along with their normal commission. . . . Ms. Martin sent a copy of her memo to Pamela Sullivan. Ms. Martin's attorney accepted the sales contract without any changes and informed her that he would address the issue of the transaction fee at the time of the closing. On the day of the closing, Ms. Martin's attorney telephoned Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, to discuss the transaction fee. Geraldine R. Sullivan would not agree to waive the transaction fee after she learned that there was a signed net sheet. She did not realize that there was no net sheet prepared when the listing agreement was first executed. This was the only direct dealing Respondent, Geraldine R. Sullivan, had with this transaction. Between June 25, 1997, the date of Ms. Martin's memo, and July 7, 1997, the date of the closing, neither Ms. Martin nor her attorney voiced additional objection to the transaction fee.5 The transaction closed on July 7, 1997. The sum of $200, representing the amount of the disputed transaction fee, was placed in escrow by the closing agent, where it remained at the time of the formal hearing. All other fees and costs were paid at closing, including a brokerage commission of $1,800 (which was split with the realtor representing the buyer) and a processing fee of $150 (which was retained by the corporate Respondent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered that finds the corporate Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and finds Geraldine R. Sullivan not guilty of that charge. It is further RECOMMENDED that the corporate Respondent be reprimanded and fined in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1998
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been employed in the securities industry since approximately 1957. He has worked for a number of broker/dealers over the years and is familiar with the procedures involved in transferring employment from one broker to another. It is the custom in the securities industry that when a securities salesperson changes employment, forms U-4 and U-5 are filed with the National Association of Securities Dealers. As registration is approved by that organization and by the various states involved, the states give that information to the National Association of Securities Dealers, which in turn gives that information to the securities firm which employs the associated person seeking registration, and that brokerage firm in turn notifies the applicant. Respondent began to work at Alison Baer Securities, Inc., in September, 1988, and remained employed there until February, 1989. When he associated himself with Alison Baer, Respondent applied for registration as an associated person with that company. As is the proper procedure, he submitted a U to the National Association of Securities Dealers. While waiting for his registration to be approved, Respondent maintained telephone and personal contact with his own clients. He did not, however, sell or offer to sell securities until after he was sure his registration was approved. Respondent's application for registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities, Inc., was approved by the National Association of Securities Dealers and was also approved by the states of New York, Texas, Georgia, Florida, and Oklahoma. In late October of 1988, Jeffrey Britz, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Alison Baer Securities, told Respondent that his registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities had been approved by the state of Florida. In fact, Respondent was not registered as an associated person by the state of Florida until December 7, 1988. Respondent did not attempt to directly confirm with the Department of Banking and Finance his registration as an associated person with Alison Baer Securities. Respondent has applied for registration with the Department as an associated person with Shamrock Partners, Ltd. The Department denied that application based solely on the allegations which are the subject matter of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause, and granting his application for registration with the Department as an associated person with Shamrock Partners, Ltd. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 27 has been adopted in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5, 11-14, 16-18, 23- 26, 28, 29, and 31-34 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 6-10, 15, 19, and 30 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved in this proceeding. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 20-22 have been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 211 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Richard Doggett, Esquire 808 Northeast 3rd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Respondent Santaniello holds real estate broker license number 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. Santaniello is the active broker for Respondent, Sunair Realty Corporation, which holds license number 0213030. Mr. Don M. and Mrs. Agnes C. Long own two lots in Port Charlotte which they purchased as investments. By letter dated June 8, 1981, Respondents forwarded a "Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase" on each of these lots to the Longs. The documents established that Anni Czapliski was the buyer at a purchase price of $1200 per lot. Respondent Sunair Realty Corporation was to receive the greater of $120 or ten percent of the felling price for "professional services." The letter and documents were signed by Respondent Santaniello. Anni Czapliski was Bernard Santaniello's mother-in-law at the time of the proposed sale. This relationship was not disclosed by Respondents and was not known to the Longs at the time they were invited to contract with Respondents for sale of the lots. The Longs rejected the proposed arrangement for reasons not-relevant here.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining each $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert J. Norton, Esquire Suite 408 First National Bank Building Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mr. C.B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R.T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing real estate sales associate licenses and monitoring compliance with all statutes, rules, and regulations governing such licenses. Respondent was at all times relevant to this proceeding a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida and held License No. 3115665. In March 2006, Respondent was introduced to Willie Belle Lewis (Lewis) by a mutual acquaintance. Lewis was interested in selling her house, and Respondent agreed to work for Lewis in that regard. On March 13, 2006, Lewis and Respondent entered into an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement (the "Agreement"). Under the Agreement, Respondent was to act as Lewis' sales agent for sale of the house. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Agreement, Respondent was to receive a commission of six percent of the purchase price. Respondent initially requested a seven percent commission which was the ordinary and customary amount at that time, but agreed to six percent in deference to Lewis' request (and due to the fact that Lewis had recently lost her grandmother and Respondent empathized with her, having just lost her mother). In one version of the Agreement admitted into evidence, there is a notation that any cooperating real estate agent (presumably a buyer's agent) would receive a commission equal to three percent of the purchase price, i.e., one-half of Respondent's six percent commission. Another version of the Agreement admitted into evidence did not address sharing the commission with a cooperating agent. At some point in time (which was not clearly defined during testimony at final hearing) Lewis and Respondent re-negotiated the amount of Respondent's commission.2 Lewis maintains that the re-negotiated commission was three percent; Respondent says the re-negotiated commission was four percent. Respondent's testimony was more credible on this point. The amount of the new commission was not reduced to writing or indicated on either version of the Agreement. There is no indication, for example, what Respondent's commission would have been if a cooperating agent had been involved. It is highly unlikely that Respondent or any other agent would agree to a two percent commission, i.e., one-half of four percent (or 1.5 percent, one-half of three percent). Once the Agreement was signed, Respondent immediately began efforts to sell the Lewis house. Respondent invited Lewis to her (Respondent's) house and offered Lewis plants and flowers from Respondent's yard. Respondent and Lewis dug up various plants and transferred them to Lewis' yard to generate some "curb appeal," i.e., to dress it up for potential buyers. Within days, a potential buyer was found. A Contract for Sale and Purchase (the "Contract") was entered into between Lewis and Mrs. Bibi Khan. Respondent was listed as the seller's agent; no agent was indicated for the buyer. In fact, Respondent agreed to act as buyer's agent as well, performing services as both an agent and a broker. Again, there were two versions of the sales Contract admitted into evidence. On one version, Respondent's signature included only her first name; on the other it included her first and last name. On one version of the Contract, there appears to be "white-out" on Respondent's signature line. Contained and legible under the whited-out portion of the signature is the phrase "3%." Respondent admits she whited out the three percent figure, but that it was done after the closing occurred. The three percent figure appearing at that place in the Contract is confusing. It only makes sense if that was meant to represent Respondent's portion of a six percent commission split between a buyer's agent and a seller's agent. Respondent explained that she whited out the figure because it was not written in both places it was supposed to be. Rather than going through the process of re-doing the entire Contract and re-distributing it to all pertinent parties, she whited it out in one place. The explanation is plausible. However, it seems an unnecessary action inasmuch as the closing had already occurred. When the parties arrived at closing on April 17, 2006, the closing documents--including the HUD Settlement Statement-- indicated a six percent commission for Respondent (as originally stated on the Agreement). Lewis vehemently objected to the commission, saying that it should be three percent as verbally agreed to by her and Respondent.3 Respondent acquiesced at closing and, in front of witnesses, said the commission should be three percent. She asked that a letter be drafted by the closing agent reflecting a three percent commission. In effect, Respondent re-negotiated her commission at that time. She rues having done so and says she was confused, but she did so nonetheless. The closing was only the third closing Respondent had taken part in since becoming licensed. She was not very experienced with the process and seemed to be thinking she was getting a four percent commission, even when three percent was being discussed.4 It is clear, however, that Respondent did verbally agree to a three percent commission during the closing. The closing agent told Lewis to return on Monday and she would re-calculate the commission and provide Lewis with a final check in the appropriate amount. Meanwhile, Respondent attempted to contact Lewis over the weekend to discuss the discrepancy. Respondent wanted to remind Lewis they had agreed on four percent despite what she said at the closing. All attempts at communication with Lewis over the weekend were futile. When Lewis returned to the closing office on the following Monday, she found the check to still be in error as it reflected a four percent commission instead of a three percent commission. Apparently when Respondent advised the closing agent about her mistake regarding the amount of the commission, Respondent still maintained that the verbal agreement was for four percent. This was contrary to her statements during the closing and is not substantiated by any written documentation. Respondent directed the closing agent to issue a check reflecting a four percent commission, instead of the six percent commission reflected on the Agreement. Lewis ultimately, under protest, accepted her $74,264.92 check reflecting a four percent commission to Respondent. The check contained a shortage of $1,600, if a three percent commission had been applied. Lewis continued to seek repayment of the $1,600 she believed she was entitled to receive. Subsequently, Respondent discussed the entire dispute with her sales team and decided that the disputed amount ($1,600) was not worth fighting about. A check was then sent to Lewis in that amount.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, imposing a fine of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) against Respondent, Marian Lemon Coaxum. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent operated as a real estate broker or sales associate without a license, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has not been licensed as a real estate broker, broker sales-associate, or sales person in the state of Florida. Respondent entered into an arrangement with Tina Mathews, who holds a valid broker or sales person's license, to find buyers in return for which she would split the commission with him. Although Respondent never showed the properties to prospective buyers, after finding them, he performed other, unspecified tasks to ensure that the deals closed and he would be paid. Respondent's defense is that he did not know that what he was doing was illegal. In fact, this case arose by a complaint filed by Respondent against Ms. Mathews, who had paid him several times in the past for similar work in connection with other transactions. When Ms. Mathews declined to pay Respondent in connection with three other transactions described in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent contacted Petitioner, which, after an investigation, brought these charges against Respondent for two transactions, as identified in the Administrative Complaint, for which Ms. Mathews paid him. In one letter (received June 12, 2007) from Mr. Haque to Petitioner, he acknowledges that he has "done 10 more deals with [Ms. Mathews] in the past for which she compensated me 1/3 of her commission. Enclosed are the HUDS for Ronald Nicolas and Beryl George . . .." These are the two transactions that are the subject of the Administrative Complaint, so there is no doubt that Respondent received compensation for his work on these two transactions. It is difficult to determine exactly what Respondent did to "earn" his share of the commission, although clearly he found the buyers. Although Respondent claims to have substantial work on each of these transactions, he is vague about what he did, and the weight to be accorded this admission is limited due to Respondent's persistent misunderstanding of this case as some sort of vehicle by which he can obtain payment for his share of the commission for the three subsequent transactions about which he filed a complaint against Ms. Mathews. The only remaining element of Petitioner's case against Respondent involves any ownership interest that Respondent may have had in the two properties identified in the Administrative Complaint. A summary of the investigator's interview with Ms. Mathews, who did not testify, states that she told the investigator that the deals that she did with Respondent were with properties that he owned. However, Respondent supplies the needed evidence as to this critical point when, in his post- hearing statement, he refers to this statement from the investigator and disputes it by stating: "The fact is, this is the only property in my complain [sic] I own with Ms. Mathews as agent of record." It is impossible to determine whether this admission applies to one of the two transactions that are the subject of the Administrative Complaint or one of the transactions for which he is, even now, seeking payment. At minimum, though, even if the statement applies to one of the two subject transactions, it applies to only one of them, and, by negative implication, Respondent concedes that he was not an owner of the other property. On the basis of this record, Petitioner has proved all of the above-cited allegations of the Administrative Complaint in connection with both transactions that underlie Count I.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of operating as a broker or sales person without a license and imposing an administrative fine against him of $5000. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802 North Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Syed Haque 10100 Country Brook Road Boca Raton, Florida 33428
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's registration as a real estate salesperson, without prejudice to the filing of a proper application. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 s. Grace Fararo Mazon Rt. 1, Box 40 R-5 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Ms. Grace F. Mazon c/o Marguerite L. Rhea 816 North West 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601
The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction, pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes(1983).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr. was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0402257. Respondent has since been issued a license as a real estate broker, same license number. Mr. and Mrs. Walther Ellis were the owners of certain property located on Windsor Road, Bonita Springs, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis listed their property for sale with Wesley Brodersen of Gulder Real Estate, Inc. in Bonita Springs, Florida. The Respondent was employed at Gulder Real Estate, Inc. during the time that the Ellises listed said property with Gulder Real Estate, Inc. On or about May 23, 1984, the Respondent solicited and obtained a Catherine A. Griffin as a prospective purchaser of the Ellis' property. Mrs. Griffin submitted a contract for sale and purchase, witnessed by Respondent, which contract for sale and purchase the Respondent in turn submitted to the Ellises. Pursuant to the terms of the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase, Mrs. Griffin had placed down a total deposit of $5,000.00. The Ellises rejected the terms of sale (offer) as expressed in the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase. Thereafter, Mrs. Griffin, as buyer, along with her husband, Donald Griffin, who is not a buyer in the transaction but was intimately involved in the negotiations, continued to express an interest in the property and the Ellises continued to express an interest to sell the property. In July, 1984, contract negotiations were once again begun and Mr. Griffin informed the Respondent what terms would be acceptable to his wife, Catherine A. Griffin. Mr. Griffin further requested that the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Ellis be obtained first on a new contract for sale and purchase setting out the terms he had dictated to Respondent. Somewhere during this time period, Mr. Griffin directed Respondent to have completed a survey of the property at the Griffins'expense. Respondent next communicated with Mr. Ellis and a new contract for sale and purchase was prepared by the Respondent and signed by Mr. Ellis personally and signed by Mr. Ellis for Mrs. Ellis with Mrs. Ellis' express consent and permission. Subsequent thereto, the Respondent brought the new contract for sale and purchase to the Griffins. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Griffin the Respondent presented the offer. Mr. Griffin immediately signed the new contract for sale and purchase in the presence of both Respondent and Mrs. Griffin on the line indicating he was signing as a witness to the buyer's signature/execution. However, as this contract (offer) was physically handed by Mr. Griffin to his wife for formal execution, it was further reviewed by Mr. Griffin, who became aware that the terms of purchase contained in the new contract for sale and purchase were not as he had dictated them to the Respondent. Mr. Griffin advised his wife not to accept the offer, instructed her not to sign, and, in fact, the new contract for sale and purchase was not signed or accepted by Mrs. Griffin. Respondent requested that the Griffins think about the offer for a while longer and they agreed to do so over an extended vacation. While the Griffins were on vacation, the Respondent, apparently believing the offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase would eventually be accepted, notified Mr. Ellis that the offer had already been accepted. Believing that the offer had been accepted by a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Ellis requested a copy of the signed contract. Due to the fact that the Respondent did not have a contract signed by a bona fide buyer (Catherine A. Griffin) but believing that one would be obtained in the very near future because Donald Griffin had signed the second contract and because Donald Griffin had indicated that he could finance the entire operation by himself, the Respondent caused a photo copy of the signature of Catherine A. Griffin to be placed onto the second contract without the permission , consent, or knowledge of either Donald Griffin or Catherine Griffin. The altered copy of the second contract is apparently no longer in existence and did not come into evidence. The only real point of contention in the parties' respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is concerning what representation was made by Respondent to Mr. Walther Ellis concerning who had accepted the second contract. Respondent admits he represented to Mr. Ellis that Mr. Griffin, controlling the transaction for buyers, had accepted the second contract. Mr. Ellis maintained that Respondent represented to him that the second contract had been accepted on his terms but he is not clear·whether Respondent told him Mrs. Griffin accepted it or who accepted it. (Walther Ellis Deposition Page 22). Mrs. Ellis's testimony presents no independent confirmation of any of this as her information in all respects is second-hand. Mr. Brodersen's testimony is that the Respondent's representation to him was that "the Griffins" had accepted the second contract for purchase and sale and that Respondent told Mr. Ellis the same thing in Brodersen's presence and also told Brodersen that the last copy of the signed contract had been mailed to Mr. Ellis by Respondent the day previous to this three-way conversation. Mr. Brodersen thought Mr. Ellis never got the fraudulent contract but testified further that Respondent later admitted to Brodersen that he had altered this copy of the second contract so as to fraudulently reflect Mrs. Griffin's signature and further admitted to Brodersen that he, Respondent, had mailed that fraudulent copy to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Brodersen never saw the fraudulent contract. Mr. Ellis testified to receiving in the mail a copy of the second contract with a suspicious-looking set of signatures which he turned over to his attorney. The parties stipulated the attorney does not now have the contract copy. By itself, the testimony of Investigator Jacobs that Respondent by telephone admitted falsifying Mrs. Griffin's signature onto a copy of the second contract for purchase and sale and further admitted destroying one copy of the fraudulent contract would fail as not having the proper predicate for voice identification. However, in light of Mr. Ellis's and Mr. Brodersen's testimony, Mr. Jacobs' testimony on Respondent's creation of the fraudulent document is accepted as corroborative pursuant to Section 120.58 Florida Statutes. The remainder of his testimony is rejected. At no time did Catherine A. Griffin and/or Donald Griffin as her agent or on his own behalf accept the Ellis' offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase nor did Catherine A. Griffin nor Donald Griffin ever execute the second contract as a buyer. The transaction was never closed and Mrs. Griffin was returned her deposit money when she requested it in September 1984. Mr. Ellis admits having told Respondent he was not anxious for the deal to close and did not care if the deal failed to go through. Mr. Griffin spoke at length and with considerable feeling at the hearing of his desire that Respondent not receive a permanent record as a result of a single mistake committed while under stress from Respondent's father's medical condition. That Respondent was under such stress when all this occurred was confirmed by Mr. Brodersen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered whereby Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr.'s licenses as a real estate salesman and broker be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Mitchell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Steffan Jr., Pro Se 18645 Sandpiper Road Ft. Myers, Florida Harold R. Huff, Director Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did the Respondents offer to sell a business opportunity without filing a disclosure statement with the Department and without providing prospective purchasers a disclosure statement at least three working days prior to the receipt of any consideration for the signing of a business opportunity contract contrary to Section 559.80, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact On March 5, 1994, Star Vision was in attendance at a trade show in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representatives, Bob James and Bill Bassett, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity as defined by Chapter 559, Part VIII, Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Star Vision offered to sell a business opportunity representing that one could become a "licensee" upon paying $600. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5) Star Vision had not file a copy of the required disclosure statement with the Department prior to making the offering above. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) Granhan and Bray were given a letter notifying them of the filing requirements together with a business opportunity registration package. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) On March 12,1994, Star Vision attended another trade show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representative, James R. Kelly, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Star Vision represented the following while offering to sell a business opportunity: The regular price of the opportunity was $1,495 but they were running a special of $495 for anyone signing up at the show; and Purchasers would receive training tapes and other training that teaches how to market and sell the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) The Department received a consumer complaint against STAR VISION from Mr. Alan Drake. Upon purchasing a business opportunity from Star Vision, Mr. Drake was provided with audio and video tapes which instruct purchasers how to sell and market the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1) Upon selling him a business opportunity, Star Vision did not provide Mr. Drake with a disclosure statement, and has never registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ordering that: Respondents to cease and desist selling business opportunities in the State of Florida, Imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 for each violation, in accordance with Section 559.813(2), Florida Statutes, against Terry Granhan and Mike Bray d/b/a Star Vision Direct Cable in the amount of $15,000. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay S. Levenstein, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Terry Granhan and Mike Bray Star Vision Direct Cable, Inc. 9050 Highway 64, Suite 115 Memphis, TN 38002 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate, in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(e) and 475.25(1)(e); committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) (two counts); failing to account for or deliver funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1; failing to maintain trust funds in a real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement is authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k); failing to provide a written agency disclosure, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(q); being found guilty for a second time of any misconduct that warrants suspension or of a course of conduct or practices that show such incompetence, negligence, dishonesty, or untruthfulness as to indicate that Respondent may not be entrusted with the property, money, transactions, and rights of investors or others with whom Respondent may maintain a confidential relation, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o); and failing to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failing to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions together with such additional data as good accounting practice requires, in violation of Rule 61J-14.012(4) and Section 475.25(1)(e).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license numbers 0489551 and 3000384. Respondent is the qualifying broker for Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc., of which Respondent was a principal. Respondent has been disciplined once previously. On December 8, 1994, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered a final order, pursuant to a stipulation, ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $500 and complete 30 hours of professional education. In late 1993, Respondent, Armand Houle, and Svein Dynge formed DSA Development, Inc. (DSA). Respondent, Houle, and Dynge were directors of the corporation. On December 1, 1993, Respondent, Houle, and Dynge formed Gulf Southwest Developers, Ltd. (GSD). DSA served as the sole general partner of GSD, whose original limited partners included Houle and several foreign investors represented by Dynge, but not Respondent or Houle. The investors formed GSD to assemble a vast tract of land in Collier County, through numerous purchases, for purposes of mining, development, and speculation. The initial investors contributed or agreed to contribute over $4 million to GSD. Respondent's role was to find suitable parcels of land and negotiate their purchase by GSD or its agent. GSD agreed to pay Respondent $1000 weekly for these services. GSD also authorized Respondent to take a broker's commission of 10 percent of the sales price for each fully executed contract presented to the closing agent. This is the customary broker's commission in the area for transactions of this type. Respondent's claim that he was entitled to a commission of 20 percent is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. There is some dispute as to whether the seller or the buyer was to pay the commission. The contracts provide that the commission was to be deducted from the seller's proceeds. However, regardless of the source of the commission, Respondent was entitled only to 10 percent, not 20 percent. Respondent knew that he was not entitled to 20 percent when he took the additional sum from GSD funds. Thus, the act of taking the funds constituted no less than concealment (due to his failure to disclose his withdrawals), dishonest dealing, culpable negligence and breach of trust, if not actual fraud. There is some evidence that Respondent took substantial sums from GSD without authorization. Without doubt, part of these sums represented the additional ten percent commission described in the preceding paragraph. Petitioner has attempted to prove that Respondent took sums in excess of the extra ten percent commission without authorization. However, as to such sums in excess of the additional ten percent commission, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either that Respondent took such additional sums or, if he did so, that these withdrawals were not authorized or at least ratified. As agent for GSD, Houle entered into numerous contracts in the second half of 1994 and first half of 1995. In each of these contracts, Respondent signed the contract below printed language stating that he, as broker, and Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. had received the initial escrow deposit under the conditions set forth in the contract. At no time did Respondent or Buyers Realty of Naples, Inc. hold the escrowed funds in an escrow account under the name of Respondent or Buyers Realty. Respondent maintains that he transferred the funds to the title company to hold in escrow. The record does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not do so, although there is some evidence indicating that the title company did not hold such funds. However, it is sufficient that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that neither Respondent nor Buyers Realty held these escrow funds, despite clear misrepresentations by Respondent in each contract that he or his company held these escrowed funds. Respondent's misrepresentations constitute fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, and breach of trust. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not make the required agency disclosures in a timely fashion or that Respondent did not make available to Petitioner's investigator the books and records that he is required to maintain. Likewise, Petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to complete the education required by the prior final order or participated in the fraudulent endorsement of Houle's signature on checks by a secretary, who later obtained Houle's consent to the act.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 James H. Gillis James H. Gillis & Associates, P.A. Law Offices of Gillis & Wilsen 1415 East Robinson Street, Suite B Orlando, Florida 32801-2169 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
